tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN October 12, 2015 5:00pm-5:59pm EDT
fundamentally and technological transformation. but the technology has gotten better at a furious pace. the aggregate national level, the improvement in the efficacy in shale rigs over the last five years has been 500%. that is the amount of energy produced per dollar of capital spent on a rig has improved 500%. that one fact alone, just that single fact tells you why there's been a shale revolution. over the same time period, measured the same way, alternatives have gotten better too, wind, farms have gotten better, solar rays have gotten better. over the same time frame measured the same way, they've improfds at a rate one quarter to one-half as fast as shale technologies. that's the gap that's hard to close when one is getting better at double or triple the rate. so the consequence of this kind of a technology revolution that
was unexpected by most people -- i know i hear that nobody expected it. i do want to take some credit for expecting it with my if colleague who is a fellow fellow in our book, we explain what our view was, we published some time ago, we anticipated this. we were voices in the wilderness during the heyday of peek oil. technology improved and it improves fastest in area of inhere inherent advantage. last year was the fastest single increase since the dawn of the oil age a century ago. total oil production in america went up 4 billion barrels a day in the last seven years. that comprised more than three-quarters of the total world's increase of total oil
supply. if the shale fields were a country, they would be a fifth largest hydrocarbon producing country on the planet. this did not come about because somebody discover new oil. these shale fields were mapped out a century ago. we've known they've been there for a wheel. we know it contains ill and gas. gio physicists have been aware of this for a long time. what didn't exist was the technology to extract it in an affordable way until really the last decade. the consequence has been the biggest single disruption in energy markets in the united states and in the world in 30 years. so that brings me to shale 2.0. the united states has spent over the last ten years in private money about $600 billion in bailing out shale
infrastructure. and we've drilled about 2 billion horizontal wealthy in hundreds of thousands of shale wells. two billion horizontal feet is a distance, if you're not doing the matt real quick, that goes around the earth 200 times. it's a lot of wealthy. but all of these activity, the money and capital, all of the drilling, the sensor information and processing has generated something more than just more oil and gas an jobs and revenue to the government. it's generated a tsunami of data. the tsunami of data comes at a time in history which is unique. we're now on the verge of profound changes in our ability to operate complex systems because of big data analytics. this wasn't the case ten years ago. in the 20th century this data
set has profound interest. it's unmind. give you a sense of how big a number that is if you're prefixed challenged the global data set for health care industry is in the same range of hundreds of pet da diets. it's true agriculture, and in the shale industry. particularly strew in the shale industry because it's a young industry, a new industry. it's been driven by the same entrepreneurial drive that created the ail age in the first place. it makes it accept nl because it's fundamentally a technology invi tif driven business. this is fascinating. unwittingly when the silicon valley investors started pouring billions of dollars into finding alternatives to hydrocarbon, the
people who changed the game are the people who changed the infrastructure for the big data analytics. so shale 2.0, here's what's going to happen. three complimentary things take place over the next decade. first we'll get underlying improvements in the existing technologies at least equal to that that's already occurred. the drilling, the operational capabilities for muches, seismic mapping. that will happen again. it's not open. secondly what will happen is we'll layer in new stuff, advanced automation. only 10 prs of the shale rigs are fully automated and the automated ones are far for efficient. we're going to add robotics and drones. and the third thing is all of this will be optimized with analytics. wh we'll do is uberize the
entire shale industry. this is a kind of the uber of everything is a new troupe but it's captured something that's new. if you think about what this means as a bottom line, there's no reason to believe -- there's every reason to believe that the adoption of these new technologies come faster now not slow ner the environment. you don't try the new things when mardi gras is going on. you can make money by doing what's called factory drilling, the same thing over and never again. you stop doing that when margins are squeezed, you chase technology again. people have forgotten the shale fields began when price was below $40 a barrel, took off over $50, and now we're told because it drops to $50 to $60
it's over and the technology has gotten 4000% to 500% better but yet it's over when prices are are at the same price they were with the old technology? the good operator today make the sam nar again at $55 or $60 a barrel as they did five or six years ago at $95 a barrel. it may be for the players that are fully operated and overlenched but not for the core business. the bottom line which i put on my report is if you think about what it means to double or triple the efficacy of the shale rigs with new technology, lt's translate that into dollars. we know that the average cost ranges from $10 to $12 a barrel to $55 a barrel depending on where you are. that's the range. if you double the efficacy without changing your capital expenditure, your get your average cost to $5 to $20 a
barrel. that means that the united states shale fields, as oren pointed out in his introduction are on track to having the same inherent cost metrics and the same scale of physical resource as the super low cast saudi oil fields. and i think the saudis know this and fully understand it and i think it's profoundly transformation transformational. it's also socially transformational. the united states has the capability to double its production. we added 4 million barrels a day in the last ten years, we could easily do that again. we could double that. double down. the impact will be profound on prices, be profound on the saudis and the russians and be a very good thing for the world. the world is going to grow. there's going to be an increase in aggregate energy consumption in the world equal to at least
the united states worth of consumption. there are going to be thousands of billions more air miles flown, thousands of billions of more road miles driven 20 years from now. that's a lot of pounds of fuel that need to be produced and it will all be odom nately in the 80% to 90% range hydrocarbons. this is bullish for the world. i think it's bullish for the economic growth and not just wealth creation but well-being. but nonetheless, we've spent -- we will continue to spend. we've spent, the world, hundreds of billions of dollars, north of a trillion dollars in the last 15 years devoted to the idea of disrupting oil markets. but hydrocarbons still comprise 85% of the world ears energy supply despite this aspirational
assumption. we'll spend more than that. some politicians want to make the hydrocarbons more expensive. but making them more expensive does not make the alternatives cheaper are. it punishes everybody in the world, especially the poor. so the pope often does something in his insick will call that i agree with. i agree with the moral teachings by the way. it's worth reading what he's written in this about our responsibility to the poor in the world. it's about poverty, about obligations of the wealth to the poor. and then he gets off on a side tangent on climate change an fossil fuels. but it's predominantly about our moral obligation to the world. but the pope says two things which are important. he calls for a debate and a dialogue on the science. does not call for silencing the
scientists. he also calls for more basic research, which is what the google scientists did. it's what i did in my previous manhattan paper which you may not have read but i'd like to put a pitch in for because i feel passionate about funding basic science. we need more basic science. fortunately though, here's why i'm fundamentally an optimist. tomorrow's hydrocarbon technologies can fuel the world and do it affordably. and tomorrow's scientists i'm quite confident, they'll pursue new science and they will eventually find the kind of magic that everybody hopes that will ultimately displace and compete affordably with hydrocarbons and do it in a way that the world can compete financially. we have both thing going on in the world. and in fact i'd have to say from a moral perspective we have the obligation to do both. thank you. [ applause ]
>> thank you, mark. i thought that was fantastic. we're going the take questions now. i'll use my prerogative to ask the first question because i have the microphone. and i guess one thing i'm struck by, mark, is as you were describing what's coming next, you talk about what this is going to mean for oil prices. what is step four? what does this mean for the market? is this a case where you see the current pause essentially being a deep breath before prices go further down and production goes further up? do you see other high cost producers getting pushed out and replaced by the u.s.? somewhere do we go from here? >> if i got oil prices prieth in timing i would be a commodities
trader and a major donor to the manhattan institute as opposed to a senior fellow at the manhattan institute guessing about prices. [ inaudible ] >> i'll give you my card. we'll see what we can do. i'm bullish on production and bearish on price as a consequence. there's events that we know, major wars or disasters can take a supply out. but technology fundamentally put the world into a for the next 20 years. we can supply the world's demands with the resources that exist and the technologies that exist. how low they go depend on the same inverse. there's exxon jous events that end up pushing the prices down. if the world's economy is slow a little bit and production is not slowing, can could see the
prices tip back down again. it would not be shocking for the prices to drop to the 30s. because the last time we had this much oversupply in '86 we had oil at $21 a barrel. the production is not the issue. it's the marginal, the oversupply. we have a 4 million barrel oversupply today. you could say, why isn't it $20 or $25? i think that's pause because the inherent demand poll is bigger than it was. it's 30 barrels a day more consumed now than '86. if you did the relevant difference, you would have to be a oversupply of 8 billion. my arithmetic says we're at the four were give or take. i don't think it goes north in the 70s. maybe 80. the world doesn't like hundred
dollar oil. markets don't like oil at those prices and i think the saudis know that. >> if you could say your name and affiliation and then your question. >> gene epstein economics editor at barons. thanks for your exciting talk and inspiring words. two questions. well, three questions, i guess. first of all, you would agree, however, that in the short run the frackers are a little bit in disarray? second, for the long term, you focus mainly on the u.s. potential for shale and isn't there enormous potential for shale production abroad? and third, are you interested at all in what i gather is happening within hydrocarbons with fracking the driving the natural gas prices so much lower in relation to oil and there
could be greater use of natural gas rather than oil which is also bearish. could you give me the short run view of -- aren't the frackers a little -- second what about oil abroad and what about natural gas. >> some frackers are in disarray. most of them are not. they're deeply familiar to the oil industry. i think that's the troep that's put out there. ons i don't see it. they're disciplined, they understand what's happened and they can swing back and do increased production rapidly. some are announcing a return to new drilling plans. second issue of global resources, the quantity of oil and gas is astronomical literally. the issue has never been whether there's a lot of other oil, deeper water are or other shale. it's who will permit it to happen. so our oun country could do what nationally what new york did and france did, we could ban it. governments can be stupid and
prevent resource production. there's a deep track record for these things. setting that aside, the united states has an inherent advantage. the $600 billion of infrastructure on top of already the world's largest hydrocarbon downstream infrastructure on the planet. we have tens of trillions of dollars in infrastructure and the knowledge base equivalent of being an amazon, if you like. if you're in that business and you this resource base and market base, why would you go anywhere else? and the talent is here, the capabilities are here, the resources are here, so it's bullish for the shale markets of the united states and bearish frankly elsewhere because there's little incentive for the talent to go there. they'll have to do what we did, understand how the shale works and build the infrastructure. china will do that, in my view.
i think it will take china, if i'm guessing, 15 to 20 years to catch up. [ inaudible ] >> the biggest wild card in natural gas is if some brilliant check mist invents a catalyst to make you liquify the gas. it would be the biggest tsunami to hit the world economically in the last century. >> hi, miles weigel. you mentioned -- i support all of the concepts of what you presented in your paper. i guess the question becomes the investment capital decision. you think right now the way that pretty much the servicing sector for the shale markets has just run out of capital, black rock is not going to say sure, i'll fund an investment in this. so a lot of it is being
concentrated in the big mayo ares with to be exxonmobils, the sails, how is that next influx of private capital going to come to fuel shale 2.0. how does it get kick started when it's in the hands of the big guys? >> i'm not sure it's true that it's all in the hands of the big players. we're seeing significant support from kpeens much smaller than black rock. but the trigger is not complicated. as the prices rebound slightly, which is normal as there's a slowdown in the production growth, it's easy to turn the frack fields back on. n they have a much higher velocity. when the gas prices collapse below the operating and production costs, everybody pulled back. as soon as the prices recover modestly, people rush in because they can make the money.
the oil fields now and shale have that characteristic. it's a profoundly different characteristic than what people have been accustomed to for the last 30 or 40 years where the velocity is so low because you to build bigger projects. very long cycle, so it's very predictable. now what you have is sort of like a fast throttle. prices go up a little bit. if i can make my money in six months of production, which you can easily do, you really don't care if prices collapse a year out, you can go back in, spend a few million dollars, make three times that money, prices collapse, go out, book, i'm back in. it means that we have actually markets functioning in oil and gas for the first time in 100 years. this is a big deal. and this wasn't driven by somebody saying we should have markets. it was driven by technology and
entrepreneurs creating a market. it's fascinating. >> hey, mark. congrats on a fine paper that's having a profound impact on the way that people think about energy. it was scintillating reading. my question is this. kind of following on what gene said, we know there are a lot of shale reserves around the world and those shale reserves haven't been exploited because the land is government land. where do you see potentially there being the most exploitation of shale reserves outside the u.s., say, over the next 10 to 20 years given those limitations? >> so i should return the compliment for those of you who don't read his scintillating reading as well. i think england is most likely to light the fuse before anybody else in europe.
and i've seen evidence of that happening. and as i say, i think china. i'm not sure about the rest of europe. i think they seem happy to be dependent on russia or us. so we'll have a bipolar world again, a lot like a cold war wu be this time we'll be warring over gasoline exports to continental europe. i don't see it happening in australia. the australian shals are difficult shals they're deep and physically hot. but they're very rich. that's challenging technology and electronics. but that's conquerable. once it's done, i think australia is a major player. once you add australia, the united states and china coming on later -- i keep writing in my forbes column, oil part one, oil part two, oil part three just to drive home the fact that we here
in a secularly driven world. this is exciting. i think it's hard to invest in this world. it's going to require some clever work for investors to understand where they can make money. but for consumers and for the poor, this is great. [ inaudible ] >> sorry. can you wait and ask your question with the microphone? >> hi, how will the new technology affect the cost of production? >> it reduces the cost of production by roughly the amount it improves the efficacy, 2 x. i think it can do better than that. but looking at the figures, it's going to be an average of 2 x. we already know that several disclosures on early projects with analytics have seen 30% to 50% increases of efficacy in
existing shale wells, which is why you're seeing so little pullbacks. production of the wells already in play, it's already cost production without the new hardware. and the new hardware follows and that drives 30% and new analytics, drive it down another 30%. very big infrastructure for cost production. >> i am an attorney in new york. my question is, could you please comment on the great alternative to fossil fuels, which is nuclear energy. can it be utilized and may it possibly be utilized and how effective it can be? >> well, it's certainly the only form of energy that has an
underloiing formology superior to hydrocarbons, nuclear energy. that's not knew. but we have built a combination of psychological impediments to that broadly. that means if i were guessing today when the united states would have a significant return to building nuclear plants, i'd say we're enough in the future to be irrelevant. decades. the biggest builders of nuclear power plants in the world now are china. as the rest of the world starts to mods dern niez, first they'll burn more coal and then they'll buy chinese nukes, instead of american nukes, which is a tragedy since we pioneered the industry. we could break the cycle but it's going to take a lot of courage. >> one of the biggest consumers
of power in the country is the manufacturing sectors were 12% of the economy. used to be larger. would you care to speculate what typical manufacturing cost of power would be say three to five years and can one infer from that that it may actually boost that sector because power is cheaper, there's more opportunities to expand production? >> short answer is yes. i mean it will boost it. it's already boosting it. the first order affecting manufacturing is we have a resush jens in the energy intensive manufacturing of check calls and associated check call products and plastics because natural gas is so cheap and in oversupply in america. companies have pointed out if they're german operations were in the united states that it would save them something on the order of $500 million a year. very big numbers.
it's just profits flowing to the bottom line. that's attracting -- i think the last number i read was $380 billion in foreign investment in manufacturing related plants. there's 100 chemical plants near completion in the next couple of years. when that come online that will cause a job resurgence. whoever is the next president will see a job bump that has nothing to do with the next president. but the new plants will come on line 18 months from now. it will create more demand for the associated manufacturing that supports those businesses, the ecosystem will expand and that will be driven more by the inherent advantages of the raw fuel cost to make chemical related products. the electric said is that regulators get the lay out taxes and social programs in the electricity. whether the electric bills will go down or not is speculative. so far they've been going up for the first time in 50 years.
the united states reversed a 50-year trend of declining electric rates over the last decade and managed to reverse a trend that the rest of the world has tried to follow, except germany and england. it may be moot given the incredible tailwind to push this increase in chemical and plastic related manufacturing. >> and actually if i could jump in with a follow-up there. the policy question is an interesting one. obviously you alluded to things like banning fracking that would hurt. what do you see as the key policy debates that are important today and coming into the next election that are going to determine the trajectory? >> the key policy debates are easy to articulate. one is to stop slow reverse federal reflex to further regulate the oil and gas, particularly the sail industry,
because you can make it more expensive and you can drive things out of business with owners regulations. that's -- as you well know, there's a lot of movement on the environmentists part. second the stimulate the shale industry without giving them a subsidy. the biggeancient ban or prohibi or inhibition of american producers of an american product, oil and natural gas, from selling it to any willing buyer in the world. the ban on exports of petroleum are nuts. i understand the political imped pmt but that ban wu put in place when it was limited and a quote strategic resource. we got lots of it and we should sell it to the world. that would be the biggest stimulus when you know that you open up world markets to every
american fracker. >> mark, first, an excellent paper. what does this mean if this increased use of hydrocarbon is going to come about for people who are concerned about additional carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. >> it means there will be more carbon dioxide in the air. >> many let me clarify that, in terms of people thinking we need to limit it or stop the usage of it. >> what i mean by that facetious response, is that we should reduce the consumption of hydrocarbons. the physics are overwhelming. they simply won't and be be resisted at the macro economic level. the world will want to fly more,
drive more, produce more, have more lighting. the world is poor energy. that is at least a billion people in the world who are so far below what we consider the level is criminal. and the only way they mo up is to consume more energy. it's locked into the physics of energy. i don't think there's any policy that can be passed that will stop that. what can be done is to make it more expensive for those people and make it more expensive for us, not for them, which you could argue is morally fine except it won't change the underlying effect that the road miles and air miles will go up and that will be with oil, 90% of it. carbon dioxide emissions will increase. it's locked into the underlying demographics of the world and the physics of what people can actually do. the aspirational idea that the battery will replace it or biofuels is silly. the united states gets 4% of all
of its transportation energy now from biofuels. by using 40% of our corn acreage. the last time we used 40% of our harvestable corn for transportation was in the age of the horse and buggy and we managed to get off of that. you can do the math there. if we took all of our corn and made it into transportation fuel, the biggest, second biggest consumer of transportation fuels in the world, us, would get a whole 8% of our transportation coming from biofuels. it's arit mat cli silly to think that would happen. it's economically damaging and silly. i think it's morally wrong and i don't think it will happen. but i do believe we'll spend a lot of money trying to make something else happen through regulations and tax. >> let me understand, are you saying that you see it as no choice but to use increased hydrocarbons. do we have a problem with doing that as we get later in the
century and have to deal with asid fie occasion of the ocean and or climate change? >> without digressing into a debate about climate change to the extent of this science is accurate or not ache rate. you may guess by me articulating that way, i'm not a particular believe in the apocalypse. we will burn more hydrocarbons. we don't have a choice. we will use more. it's locked into human need for transportation and lighting. we will use more. if there are negative consequences to that -- and there can be some, obviously. negative attributes to production of materials and use of energy. we, in my view, will mitigate those through technology and spending money. and that will be cheaper and morally superior to not having the growth. it's not a choice we're making. it's like saying what happens if the sunrises. it's going to rise.
we're dealing with, in my opinion, economic and physics trends that are foundational. doesn't mean you shouldn't ask it. when the sunrises, things happen. co2 emissions go up. some thing might happen. but if they're going to happen, they're going to happen any way. it's not going to stop. >> i want to ask you a question more about the funding of this effective improvement as you mentioned, the $600 billion has been spent in the last ten years. and how much do you think is of additional incremental capital would need to be deployed to achieve the 2.5 times efficiency improvement? and with that, isn't there a risk also in terms of, you know, we've been operating in the environment where there is low interest rates, assets in investments in these shale companies has been attractive. when the public markets are not
available for the funding, who will step in to make your vision, as you describe, a reality? >> i think this will have to be the last question. get in all of the transgeneral shall points you want to get in. >> so a lot of private money, not public money is in the shale fields. so the idea that it's public money is actually not correct. i think there's plenty of money to go in at lower rates of return but the rates of return will rise when you have higher efficacie efficacies. the capital required to get the feshcys is not the $600 billion. the money came because the efficiencies went up. you have to build the infrastructure to take advantage of that. so these investments are in pipes, trucks, you know, upgrades of refineries, seismic
imaging and so forth. the interesting thing going forward is that the capital required to get the efficiencies is declining because it's essentially technology driven. you're not an new cycle. we can get more efficiencies with less capital because we're in an i.t. sen trick do main which means the capital now is not the constraint. obviously interest rates matter. so you mere in a usual dance of what's my rate of return if my interest rate goes up, i'm waiting for the technology to get better. my point is if the interest rates go up a couple of points, i guess a 20% or 30% drive down continually in the cost of production, there's not going to be any shortage of capital. the other dirty little secret here is that we have seen this giant influx of foreign capital
investing in u.s. shale field it's a good place to make money and a lot safer place. it's not exactly a pretty picture of what's happened in terms of the corruption. that investment compared to investing in american shale fields, i think we'll have no shortage of capital flooding into the u.s. markets. incidentally, i know that the saudis know what i've told you is true and what i wrote in my report and i know that russians know what i said in my report is true. and think know much more than i know about this. and i think they worry about it. but i think they're fundamentally worried. they also know what i know. is the world's demand for oil will go up. it's not a question of should it. it's not a vision. it is a consequence of what the happening in humanity. there are a lot of people in the world that don't have a car. it doesn't matter if they buy a prius or a car twice as good as
a prius. it sort of flips that the pendency argument to a player argument. that's the part that hasn't been fully absorbed in the politics or the geopolitics. u.s. is gone from dependent prior plair to lshd an influence player. if we do it again and upping the production, we become the world's dominant influencer in oil markets and boy does that change the geopolitics. in my view, fundamentally good for america. >> all right. thank you, mark. that was great. [ applause ] >> thank you very much. coming up this afternoon ap
6:00 eastern, cia director john brennan will join james clapper and current and former cia officials as they discuss the history of the daily briefing. this is part of a symposium cohosted by the lyndon b. johnson presidential library and the university of texas austin. we'll show that discussion tonight at 10:30 eastern here on c-span3. c-span has your coverage of the road to the white house 2016 where you'll find the candidates, the speeches, the debates and most importantly your questions. this year we're taking your road to the white house coverage into classrooms across the country with our student cam contest giving students the opportunity to discuss what important issues they want to hear the most from the candidates. follow c-span's student cam contest and road to the white house coverage 2016 on tv, on the radio and online at
c-span.or c-span.org. next a conversation with former secretary of state madeleine albright. she discusses several foreign policy issues including the syrian civil war and u.s. engagement around the world. that was part of the washington ideas forum. ♪ >> thanks very much. it's an honor to be here with former secretary of state madeleine all brooith. a lot of the policy discussion we've heard in the last day and a half has been a dark tone. the world is going to hell. the u.s. is retreating. things are blowing up. the russians are gaining ground. we don't know how to deal with the crisis. what's your overview? are things as bad as the tone -- that dripgs went largely along party lines. but there is a tone that things
are bad for the united states in the world. what's your overview comment? >> well the world is a mess. that's a diplomatic term of art. but i am not feeling dark about it. i do think that there are a whole host of issues that were not there before, some due to gobleization, some due to the rising of technology, questions of identity and what the role of the united states is. and i do think that we -- president clinton said it first but i said it so often that i got identified with the word indeni indispensable. there is nothing in the definition that says alone. i think what we're seeing is how the united states operates with partner to deal with some of the more complicated issues that we've seen. >> one of the most acute issues is of course the refugee crisis. you originally came to the united states with your family as a girl, as a refugee.
you've written about america's obligation to do more for the refugees from syria and elsewhere. tell us what you think we should do and whether that is conceivable at this kind of political moment in the united states where the tone is so anti-immigrant or foreigner at all. >> i do think we need to do more. i think the united states is, as the pope reminded us, a country of immigrants where i think people are very grateful to come here. i know i am and will always be. i always described myself as a grateful american. i do think that what has to happen is to figure out if we want others to do what they're supposed to do, which is bring the refugees in, then we have to take the lead on it. and i think that we do have an obligation to explain why this is important. but ultimately -- and i'm so thrilled to be an american, most people want to live in the country where they are born.
which means we have to work to resolve the issues that makes people pick up and leave and walk for miles and be afraid of drowning and then being treated like animals when they get wherever they are. i think that we do have an obligation to do more. >> and you have a background in practical politics before you became a diplomat. how can you imagine the democrat party makes the case for opening the border to more refugees during this upcoming election year? >> i do think that one of the issues that is always out there is how domestic and foreign policy goes together. there's no question that there is a sense in america, we're tired from two wars and kind of a sense of why aren't people more gave dwratful to us for everything we've done. i think it has to be argued as a way -- what is interesting, no matter what, people are proud of our values. and so i do think not everybody would be on top of each other --
and let me just say this. i just was up in new york at the clinton global initiative and we were having a session with the king of jordan and we were talking about what the neighboring countries have to deal with on the syria issue. so jordan has refugees not only from syria but also iraq and the palestinians. and i said something like, well it's as though in terms of ratios, it's as though the united states had 40 million refugees and somebody corrected me and said no, 60 million. just visualize this country that is a frontline state, a small country that is in a very difficult position and they have so many refugee camps. we're a very big country. i fly over the fairly regularly and there's a lot of space. >> and talking about refugees, we're talking about accommodating the results of all of this turmoil in the middle east. is there anything the united states could or should be doing differently right now about the
underlying cause in syria in particular? >> i do think so. i think we should have done something earlier. i think that -- what is really hard is that foreign policy doesn't come in four-year segments. and we're dealing with a lot of the results of what happened in the war in iraq. we can talk more about that. but that is really what has happened. and i think the following things, if i might, i do teach and i say every country makes foreign policy based on five factors. the first factor is objective, which are, you know, what's the location geographical, what is the resource base. interestingly enough that doesn't change very often. it has now with the oil issue. the second is subjective. which is how does a country feel about itself. and i do think people feel, as i said, are tired from things before. the third is how the government is organized and the executive legislative relss in our case plays a huge role.
fourth are the bureaucratic politics reflected in what the budget looks like. and the fifth, the role of individuals. we should, i think, despite the tiredness and some of the budget issues, begin to deal -- go back and look at what we could be doing in syria in terms of establishing safe havens and working in some way to get a transition. and if in fact the issue is about elections, if there are elections there, they have to be monitored internationally and be free and fair and have a lot of people there opening what's going on. >> a lot of your writing and work in your post-secretarial life has concerned issues of governance, global glochbs and as you're just saying we ways the united states can think of governs its foreign policy more effecti effectively. tell us what you think are practical steps, practical ambitions on the global governance front. we'll get to domestic in a
moment. but what in a time of chaos, what are reasonable ambitions for the united states to hope for and lean towards. >> i do believe in our value system and i actually believe that people want to make decisions about their own lives. i know there are a lot of people that say x people are not ready for democracy. i think we're all the same and everybody wants to be able to -- you begin by thinking about where your kids go to school or language or et cetera and then it goes up the chain in terms of trying to make decisions. then i am chairman of the board of the national democratic institute and people think of it always as elections. now elections are necessary but not sufficient. so what has to happen ask to develop some institutional structures for governance, rule of law, the capability of having the right of assembly, commercial codes, any number of things. they take a while. and we are -- americans are the most generous people in the world with the shortest
attention span. and so what we have to do is figure that it takes a while and that there -- you can't impose democracy. that's an oxymoron. but you can provide the nuts and bolts and talk about the relationships of the election to governance. and i have said all along, democracy has to deliver. people want to vote and eat. so there has to be an economic component in terms of what the deliverables are on this. but i do think it's the right thing. and democracy, there's not just american democracy, there are other aspects of it. but i think we've been indi indianized in a number of countries. so what's the main aspect of democracy. and i say compromise. and say they yeah, like you guys? so at the moment we are not the best examples. >> that's the next thing i wanted to ask you. i've lived outside the united states for a long time.
when i come back i'm impressed that the u.s. is robust in so many ways except national level governance right now. you were talking about your days at secretary of state where jeffrey helms has an affable relationship with you. can you zroib that and how you think we can recapture the golden age of yesry helms? >> people will not believe this. if i might tell you, what happened, i was ambassador at the u.n. and i get a phone call from him saying i had been invited to saint mary's college of raleigh that was celebrating. i thought it would get out of it by saying yes, i'd be happy to do it if you would come with me. he calls me back saying i've rearranged my schedule, i'm coming. if they're supposed to introduce you, they're not going to saw you're a complete jerk. then he invited me to come to
his alma mater. i was asked questions about the quite nationed and various issues. what happened is we had been driving around north carolina looking for barbecue bionic wit artificial hips. and we're getting out of the car, and i'm hanging on to him. and all of the sudden there is a picture about the odd couple. but we disagreed on many, many things. but he said to me when i was named as secretary of state, ms. madeline, we will make history together. he is very instrumental in terms of nato expansion, in number of aspects. we did disagree on things. but i think we saw what it was like to represent america in some way either in congress as chairman. he was chairman by then, and as secretary. and we found things to agree on. and i think it is -- go back to my five factors. i think we have to get some bipartisan support for foreign policy. >> you have standing to speak on
this the rest of us don't have of what it is like to actually conduct diplomacy when the sort of surface level tension in washington, d.c. is so great. has it made an actual difference in how the obama administration has been able to carry out the foreign policy, that domestic policy ticks are so divided now? >> let me say i have always been a believer in the interaction of domestic and foreign policy. i have been an adviser to many presidential candidates, and often foreign policy isn't important. i used to do this to say domestic and foreign policy go together. but they really do. and i think it's important for us to recognize that. i have just been in new york. and i met with a foreign leader. and this foreign leader actually said we don't understand when we see you as more monolithic in the views. and when some member of congress says something totally outrageous, i think you had one of them here, that basically, they don't understand.
they think that somehow it's all connected. the other part is that i do think as a democracy, we do have to explain our foreign policy to the american people. you can't have a foreign policy without domestic support. and i happen to believe that americans are better off when the united states is involved, is respected, and understands that we are the indispensable nation. [ applause ] >> in our final couple of minutes, i'd like to talk about politics which has been a theme of a lot of the discussions here. if you were assessing the likely foreign policy of a republican administration, donald trump's or otherwise, how different do you think it could be from the last eight years, eight years before that? >> given what i've heard, bad. and very different. and i think there is a real difference if i might say so america is essential in foreign
policy, but it doesn't mean dictating to everybody. and there has to -- what is the real aspect of diplomacy is being able to put yourself into the other person's shoes, and understanding that every agreement cannot be a zero sum gain. well need to respect the countries that we deal with. we can't insult everybody. and i think that it is very important -- i think it would be very different. and i happen to think that what president obama is doing is understanding the partnership aspect of the indispensable. americans don't like the word multilateralism. it has too many syllables and ends in an ism. it basically is a partnership and understanding what the world is like that you need to have partners. and if you look at issues like climate change or nuclear proliferation or the spread of disease, no matter how powerful the united states is, we cannot do it alone just by virtue of what the subjects are. >> and finally, on your friend,
your successor as secretary of state, candidate for president hillary clinton. if she became president, how would her foreign policy likely differ from the past eight years? also, how shall we think about the e-mail situation? >> well, i think that i know her very well and admire her. and i think that she would be the best prepared person to be president of anybody that we've had in a very, very long time. i think she is able to link that domestic and foreign policy given her own experiences, and one of the major things she did as secretary of state was to restore america's reputation. you can't militarize democracy, and you can't invade countries for no reason. and so i think that she really would be amazing. i think that she has said that she made a mistake on the e-mails. she has apologized for it. and i think that i am very lucky because i went to college some time between the invention of the ipad and the discovery of fire. and i didn't use e-mail.
>> thank you. we have only a few seconds. what is the thing you feel most optimistic about in the foreign policy of the united states now? >> that we will have a president clinton. no, what i really do feel very optimistic about is that we have the capability of really making decisions, of trying to sort out what is not just best for us, but for the rest of the world. now i'm often asked if i'm an optimistic or a pessimist. i am an optimist who worries a lot. this doesn't happen automatically. we're going to have to work at it. and we are going to have to help, have the help of the media. i have to say that, where these issues are complicated and they require those of us that care and you do to be able to explain what is going on. it is really hard. >> that's a whole other conversation. and for now please join me in thanking secretary madeleine
albright. [ applause ] tonight on c-span's new series "landmark cases," in 1830, dred scott was enslaved to army surgeon dr. john emerson. during his enlistment in the army he was assigned to duties in several free states during which dred scott married harriot robinson. when the doctor died, he tried to buy his family's freedom from the widow emerson and he sued. follow the case of scott versus sanford in "landmark cases" with special guest christopher bracy and martha jones, legal research and history professor at the university of michigan law school. we'll explore this historic supreme court ruling by revealing the life and times by the people who were the plaintiff, lawyers and justices in these cases. landmark case, live tonight at 9:00 eastern. and be sure to join the conversation as we'll be taking your calls, e-mails, tweets, and
facebook comments during the program using the #landmarkcases on c-span, y span 3 and c-span radio. and for background while you watch, order your cases of landmark cases companion book. available at c-span.org/landmarkcases. washington journal will be live tomorrow from the montgomery county correctional facility for a look at the corrections system and efforts to prepare inmates for their release. our guests include robert greene who heads the montgomery county department of correction and rehabilitation. he'll give us an overview of the facility and discuss what is and isn't working in today's corrections system. also, kendra yoakum talks about her work as reentry services manager. and with the department of health, she'll talk about mental health among inmates and treatment for substance abuse. we'll also get your thoughts by phone, facebook, and twitter.
washington journal, live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. each and every day, intelligence agencies brief the president about what is going on around the world. the lbj presidential library and the university of texas, together with the cia recently hosted a symposium about the history of the president's daily briefing. as part of this program, 2500 previously classified briefs from the kennedy and johnson administrations were made open to the public. this is about two hours. >> good afternoon. the director of the lbj presidential library. and behalf of the central intelligence agency, the national archives and records administration and the university of texas is my great privilege to welcome you to