tv U.S.- Iranian Relations in the Cold War CSPAN October 17, 2015 4:50pm-6:01pm EDT
c-span 3. alvandiroham looks at president nixon's relationship with the shaw of -- shah of iran. [applause] >> thank you for being here. thank you roham for coming for this talk. irish everyone to read this book if you want to understand the u.s. iranian relationship today. let me first ask you, what inspired you to write this? roham: first of all, can i just
say thank you to the nixon foundation for the kind invitation to come. they've taken such good care of me. i absolutely love it. i look at my office in london and it is mostly raining. to be here is a real pleasure. this book was a labor of love basically. family, im an iranian was born very shortly after the fall of the shah. hah was always discussed and debated in my family. i gravitated towards that. it became the time when many of the documents from the nixon ,dministration were available and my curiosity got the better
of me and i started to read these documents. i was surprised. came out of those and, of the next relationship between these men heard different to what i , to the orthodox view in academia, i got hooked. i spent the next 3-4 years living with these three men and studying them to understand them. >> all of our audiences and money with the background of president and an henry kissinger. the shah's background? he ascended the throne in 1941 in the midst of the second world war. prince.ot born a
his father came to power in iran in 1921. he'd been a military officer. he became the crown prince of iran after his father was in 1925. throne ind the possibly the most difficult circumstances you can imagine. his country was under occupation of the allied powers. the soviet union occupy the north of iran. so, he barely managed to ascend the throne for the monarchy was touch and go, whether it would survive. old at the 21 years time.
the first american president he met was franklin roosevelt. it is an incredible life story. he becomes a major political figure of the 20th century, somebody who play the role in world affairs throughout the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's until his death in 1981. >> victim by talking of the second world war and the don of the cold war, and how the had occupied. cato about thcan you talk aboute context of iran during that time , what was happening? roham: iran was the first battleground of the cold war. the first issue was iran. stalin had occupied the north of
iran, and despite its commitment to leave iran after the end of the war, the soviet union did withdraw. it created a cold war crisis, drawing in the night it states truman administration. this was a formative experience for the shaw, for a generation of iranians who realize that the policy of neutrality was not enough to defend iran. iran had to look to a third power to preserve its independence and sovereignty .gainst the imperial ambitions in the 1930's iran had looked to germany to play that role. a whole generation of iranian states look to the united states as a country that had no imperial ambitions, no history of colonialism in the region. they hoped an alliance with the
superpower on the other side of the world would help defend and protect them from the soviet union with whom iran shared 1500 kilometer border. >> there is a debate about this policy, balancing between powers who wanted to exploit iran's oil interests. can you touch on that end where leaders comeother into the picture? the last in iran was active. the communist party was the first political party and iran. they had a military network and was supported by the soviet union. the iraniantime, national speakers, whether they were republican or monarchist,
or liberal, or conservative, they looked to the united states as a country that would be able to support the cause of liberty in iran. there were some who thought that allying with the united states unnecessarily antagonize the soviet union. there were others who thought strategy that you mentioned, the balancing , effectively it surrendered iran sovereignty to these great powers. the substance of that policy was giving one concession to britain to balance what they gave to the russians. that famouslyas he said this is like a man who
has had one arm cut off, cutting off the are there arm to have -- cutting off the other arm to have balance. he looked to the united states and placed great faith in president truman to help iran resist british influence and british imperialism. during the oil crisis of the 1950's he hoped the united states would back iran's claims to sovereignty and control of its own oil. that worked for a while but unfortunately as iran became more and more unstable, u.s.-backed its ally. >> how does the shaw emerge in 1953 out of this crisis? roham: in 1953, a huge
crisisthere was a huge for iran. they were able to nationalize the oil industry, it finally belongs to the iranians, but it comes at a price. britain and the u.s. worked together covertly to overthrow the shah, britain because they fear the consequences of allowing and tuesday and power, but not just further interest in fearedut -- and the u.s. that it would lead to instability and takeover in iran. our -- role of outside our and the inspiration of the shah as an absolute ruler, very
much undermines the legitimacy of the monarchy in iran and undermines the well of goodwill that existed for the states iniran -- iran. it is something that the shah never manages to escape, no matter how much the relationship with the u.s. changes over the years, the popular perception of is soah as a dictator powerful, that narrative, so difficult for him to shake. so it is looked at constantly. the argument i make in the book is that it was a met -- my
th and another -- and that the relationship between the u.s. and iran involved. host: was the policy of the administration, it is interesting that you brought up that he was thought of as a wasic -- ppuuppet, i think it the shah that said he was treated as a comp -concubine, not as a wife. roham: that is right. in the early 1960's, the iran was a cold war liability, it was not a country that could contribute to american strategy. was, iran'ss -- place in the cold war was to act as a bulwark against soviet penetration into the gulf.
so american policy was to keep him in power on maintaining pro-american government there, if you read documents from the kennedy. and johnson. can the united states preserved the shah government. under eisenhower, they wanted to supply iran with arms and economic aid to maintain stability during the kennedy administration, it was pushing reform in the hope of preventing a popular revolution. shah is not an asset, he is a liability in that view. as far as his ambitions for iran are concerned, his idea for iran to be a great power, influencing
the region, that is not taken seriously by any of these administrations. consistently his argument to various presidents is, iran ,eeds more money, more arms iran faces a threat from the , and nonion and arabs response from kennedy or eisenhower or johnson, it was, you should worry less about the soviet union and worry about the internal problems in your country coming to your house in order -- country, get your house in order. the power in of the world, you will not be able to stop them. it is up to the u.s. to do that. host: how did the u.s. view saudi arabia at the time, the rival of iran at the time?
the 1960's, this is after the revolution of anorm, and image emerges -- image emerges as iran as a modern country. it was a contradiction, you cannot at the same time claim to be wearing the mantle of -- the great and also claim to be a radical reformer. these things don't sit well with each other. in any case, in the 1960's, the , especiallyceived in washington, as being on the right side. and the saudis and even during the reign of thinking, they were -- king, they were conservative,
unwilling to reform, very religious and destined for their part in history. they could not have gotten it more wrong. the house of saudis is is still reeling saudi arabia, but at the time there was a perception that shah's reforms would allow iran to weather the storm. and this made the monarchy brittle. this is a narrative that the shah reiterated to washington, to convince them to back the dominant power. host: president nexen becomes nixon becomes president in 1969, can you describe his first meeting with the shah?
months afteras 5-6 a two cou -- coup. his notesinutes, from of the meeting and the report that he gave to president eisenhower, the impression that you get of the shah's of a committed and shy character and that the real power is in the hands of the general, the prime coupter who had led the efforts. that, i dides say sense something in him, that we would hear more about this man. to get along very well, on a personal level, they
rapport.ave a good they would maintain that relationship throughout the ni0's and 1960's, even when xon was out of office. host: how did the two men change, was there a change in policy? roham: i do not think that they was muched, the shah more confident by the 1960's, he was older and more experienced. iran has developed a lot. he was much more safe on his throne. what has really changed was the cold war. there was a context in which they were meeting, the u.s. was involved in the vietnam war. frustrated and
disillusioned at the leadership of the u.s. during the cold war, he worried about the decline of american power in what it would mean for iran. he was hopeful that a man like nixon could resurrect u.s. leadership and other meeting - -their meeting was remarkable. first of all, his advisers told him not to meet with nixon because it would look like he was taking sides in american politics. what if any other candidate would win the election. but nonetheless, he insisted that he would meet nexen -- n ixon. and they had a wide-ranging discussion for two hours, discussing everything from the situation and africa, to vietnam, you can just imagine these geopolitical thinkers, very well-versed and informed,
really good on substance, discussing these issues. but there is a revealing moment nixon, ishah says to am really tired of these harvard boys telling me how to run my country. he is talking about the kennedy administration, the johnson administration, those in the white house. this must have been amusing for nixon. and he is very effusive in his praise for the shah. he makes a very problem entry speech -- complementary speech on the shah and it lays groundwork for once nixon resumes -- assumes the presidency. host: after he does become
he goes toin 1969, the -- and pronounces his foreign-policy. there are only news reporters ,here and here he articulates and again when he rally support , can wecy in vietnam queue that up? >> a leader of another country expressed this opinion to me when i was traveling in asia as a private citizen, he said, when you are trying to assist another nation to defend its freedom, u.s. policy should be to help them fight the war on but not to fight the war for them. in accordance with this wise
guam thei lay down in future for american policy toward asia. first, the u.s. will keep all commitments. we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. cases involving other types of aggression, we should offer assistance in accordance with our treaty, but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume primary responsibility of assuming manpower for the attack. after i not this policy, i found leaders of philippines, south korea, other nations which could be threatened, welcomes this new direction in american foreign-policy. the defense of freedom is everybody's business, not just
america's business, and is the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. in previous administrations, we americanized the war and be in on -- in vietnam. in this prime minister said, we -izing the search for peace. host: what does this mean broadly in war politics in that investors in -- administration? roham: i can almost hear the shah saying those words, he would tell nixon, we do not want to fight until the last american. ae doctrine was part of comprehensive strategy, it was one half of the strategy.
the goal of the administration was to redirect american resources, and attention away from what they perceived as a needless engagement, unnecessary commitments, towards the issues that mattered, by which they meant relations between great powers, china, the soviet union, the united states. how to achieve that? the u.s. would have to pick and choose where in the world it confronted soviet adversaries, rather than allowing the soviet union to determine where battles fought. far -- this is it difficult to do come in even the most obscure conflict suddenly takes on an important significance, global significance. the result -- resolved the
dilemma with the nixon doctrine, partners would be given , the supporte arms to be able to confront the soviet union and its allies in those regions, without direct military intervention from the u.s. this is exactly the role that he wanted for iran, a strong regional power with support of the united states, able to contribute to american strategies of containment, to be an asset in the cold war. from 1969-1970, the president evaluated gulf war policy and made national security decisions, in which he evaluates all the american
strategies, just a couple of points on the screen. the protector of cells, backing iran as an instrument in the gulf, dealing directly with those in the lower gulf and actively promoting security. they look at all different courses of action. corporationhe saudi is the mainstay of the corporation, but to recognize that iran is the main power in the gulf and the to do it we can with a working relationship with the new political entities in the lower gulf. has -- how did the next administration come to this conclusion? roham: it was a long process, it took at least two years. in part, it reflected the
realities, the political realities of the persian gulf. britain had withdrawn, the united states was unable to take on that role, because of the anon more -- in the anon -- vi etnam war and the only country in the area to take on those responsibility is was iran. the only other option was saudi arabia, but they did not have it military capability to play that role, nor were they willing to play that role. they did not want to be -- they did not want to open themselves from the air of -- arab nationalists as a proxy of the united states. the shah was quite happy to take that on. i would argue with you that that was not a significant --
sufficient explanation, because the johnson administration, in 1968, faced the same dilemma and came to a different conclusion, the one you just listed. they decide to continue with a balancing iran and saudi arabia, their idea was a balance was the best way to maintain stability. this was the famous twin pillars policy. the nixon administration abandoned that policy and shifted to one that gave iran the primary. the reality was, the shah assumed the mantle of this policy. it has a lot to do with the personal relationship between richard nixon and the shah, which went all the way back to
1953. there was a mutual respect, interest, i would even say in esteem -- an esteem, they gave nixon confident that he could trust the shah. host: you talk about the saudi arabians reluctance to work with the united states, there was another track in the nixon administration, how did -- iran's iranian role effect that? of nixon and minds most foreign-policy establishment at that time, this was one the air of a global cold war. that is not how the actors in the region saw it, they do not see themselves as a theater in
the global cold war, they are fighting their own battles with their own regions, sometimes very local. plan, hisgers approach to the region and his portfolio within the issue, not the much iran and the persian was ahis approach regional one. he was trying to solve a regional issue, to try to gain traction and momentum. this is not something i think was of great interest to nixon or kissinger, unless it had a consequence for the global cold war. the two, where the policy in the israeli issue was under
rogers, this regional approach, in the gulf it was the global one, the cold war approach and the shah understands this and he wants, to get what he from washington. assetsent himself as an for the u.s. in strategies of containment. succeeds andly he the writer's plan -- rogers plan fails and that shows you how much of the rogers plan had traction in washington. and that applies to today, where you stand depends on -- may 30, 1972,e on following nixon's trip to moscow, where -- became a doctor
and the united states and russia to tehran mayoes 30 and the right that -- write that the doctrine of iran's policy was not applied. russiat it have made more vulnerable? roham: there were two things he did on the way back moscow, one thing that he says to the shah is that iran should not see detente -- the united states will not sell out iran for some grand bargain. the shah has anticipated this, he had his own strategy of .ealing with the soviet union
he has already normalize relations with the soviet union, gass trading so --oil and with communist countries in eastern europe. his strategy is to deal with it by making iran indispensable to the communist bloc, by supplying them with oil. for example, one country that they had a close relationship romania.he 1970's was be --anian oil, it would it would reach the mediterranean via a pipeline that went to israel to the mediterranean coast and would be shipped to romania, where it would be refined and sold throughout the communist bloc.
this was a way for the shah to integrate into the and west -- east and west and by an insurance policy. this was also an opportunity .ran, a power like iran a relaxation of tensions i the two superpowers -- by the two superpowers, would create base for iran -- space for iran, reducing barriers. - coulduld let's - flex its muscles. for example, a conflict between iran and iraq could quickly escalate into a superpower confrontation between the u.s. and the soviet union, but when tensions are low, it allows iran
to take more risks and assert itself more strongly. so the shah did a good job of responding and taking advantage of this. host: you talk about an interesting exchange between , heidents enhanced the shah said, during the same meeting, protect me. what did he mean? andm: he looks at the shah says, protect me. this must have been the best day of the shah's life. [laughter] well, protectnt, the interest of the western world in this vital theater. help maintain stability of the golf, keep oil flowing through it, street of armand -- stra
that was not just the united states'interest, is also in iran's interest. they couldn't ship oil to global -- could ship oil to global like thatd the shah role. it has been a consistent interest in policy. time iemember the first read a document, it was extraordinary. the only record we have of those briefings is in that is because of kissinger, because only those three men knew what was said. the shah would not allow other officials to be present when they met, that was another way for him to control the flow of information. so, i guess it depends on how honest and kissinger has been in
those moments. host: we will turn to iraq, there was -- of moscow on the persian gulf and in 1937, the shah's father signed a treaty waterway, right off the persian gulf, gave iraqis complete sovereignty of it. current shah, why would why would heet -- want to get this waterway that -- back? roham: it was important because iran at that time, their largest oil refinery built by the there., was located
so, it was vital, whoever controlled that waterway controlled the lanes through which iranian oil was shipped through the gulf and into global markets. for the iraqis it was important, they have a very small coastline on the persian gulf, a very tiny opening through which it can export oil, and iran has a very long coastline. always been a sensitive and important border. waterway isaving a important, because any of you that know about waterways committee shift -- waterways, they shift and change over time.
if you remember in australia, some british sailors were arrested for wandering on the wrong side of the waterway, so it is important and the shah didn't like that iran had given this concession to the iraqis. would haveaq sovereignty over the entire waterway, but the border was on the iranian sure. -- shore. and the standard practice internationally, that was to have the border in the middle of the waterway, the deepest navigable channel. but this is something the iranian -- iraqis were not willing to concede, then there was a crisis, where this comes to a head and the shah uses
flag, find the iranian with full military escort and the iraqis do not put up resistance and that establishes de facto, iranian sovereignty on their half. this is ratified between saddam hussein and the shah. host: another sticking point was in status of the kurds, both those areas. in 1972, the shah supports the kurds in their war against the united arab front, why does he do that? roham: iranian intervention in iraq is nothing new, the ties between them are old, they go of the 15th and
16th century. in the 1970's, the shah's goal armyo paralyze the iraq he , to keep them fighting kurds in the north, rather than making inuble or iran -- for iran the south. the support for the kurds began in the 1960's in cooperation with israel. beginselligence service a covert operation to support the iraqi kurds. it is important that iran has -- there, because it was border was the only way to physically get in there. of course, for the iranians, it was sensitive, because iraq has a kurdish population and the
last eight the shah wanted was an independent critics than -- cricket and --so he played this very cynical game of supporting the kurds enough to keep them fighting against iraqi, but near enough so that they do not achieve independence. so he played this strategy throughout the 90's and and early 1920's. and 1970's. the leader of the kurds, a very heroic figure, they are not fooled, they understand what the shah is doing and they start to flirt with the idea of making peace with saddam hussein that would end the war and help them achieve objectives.
this makes the shah nervous, how can you keep this war going, how can you maintain this stalemate? he needs to provide them with a guarantee, give them an insurance policy that they will not be sold out. there is only one country that can provide that guarantee, that is the united states. so the shah asks nixon and kissinger to come into the covert war in iraq, for the cia to provide money and arms to kurds, but also to establish a contact with the iraqi kurds and express empathy for their goals. athy further goals -- symp for their goals. a differentresent
-- the last says thing americans want is to get into another conflict where most americans have not heard of this. the entire foreign-policy establishment in washington advises the white house do not resist, they know, to getting involved. but nixon and kissinger overruled on -- them into they agreed to get involved. host: is there a soviet cold war context further involvement -- for their involvement? roham: absolutely. iraqis are supported by the come tonion, so if they terms, this will represent soviet domination of iraq and
the only way to prevent this is thee united states -- if united states becomes involved. why does the president and national security advisor trust the advice of the shah over the director of the cia, the secretary of defense, why do they play so much faith in the wisdom of the shah? my argument is that has to do with that unique relationship that existed between the shah and nixon and kissinger. the united states did not have in iran policy, they had in iraq policy. -- and this policy supported the shah. that is how the process evolved.
if that relationship had not kurds wouldthen the nixoneen ignored by the administration. host: how does this war end? in 1975, thes problem is, as much as iranians want to keep this conflict time., it escalates over one reason for that, there was an increase in oil prices after the october war, this gives iran and iraq tremendous resources. and this escalates the war to the iranianat forces cross the border just as engage theurds and
iraqi forces. the shah is worried that this will lead to a full-scale war between iran and iraq at a time when american allies are weakened by watergate, but the iran willr, he thinks nfront iraq, said he has a choice. either he escalates the war make a deal -- or make a deal. so he makes a deal. he meets with saddam hussein and in whiche a communique sealdegrees -- agrees to the borders with iraq and in exchange saddam hussein makes
concessions. so the -- host: so the shah becomes more yourful as a result and write that iran wants to become a nuclear power, can you talk about their nuclear ambitions during this time? roham: the nuclear program begins under the shah. it was a modest program in the 1950's, under the eisenhower administration. they built a small research program in iran. in the 1970's, with all the oil makesflowing in, the shah a decision that they will join the nuclear club. it will be one of the few countries that can produce electricity from nuclear power,
in the 1970's, this was considered a very exclusive club of countries that could do this, only the most advanced economies have this technology. he did not want necessarily, nuclear weapons. every indication i have seen is that he thought it iran developed nuclear weapons, it would undermine their position of a leading power, because so will the iraqis and everybody else. it will eliminate their advantage of the largest country in the region with force. nonetheless, he was of the view that iran should have the base,ific eighth the -- able to develop a weapon, if
needed. if the iraqis suddenly had a bomb, then iran could respond. of course, things have changed. iran no longer has conventional superiority over neighbors, like it did back then, their military is very people -- fe eble compared to others. ambitions are similar. iran is a country with a long history, with the memory of empire, of greatness, and that is something that is central to innian views of their place the world. at the same time, the irony is, not like russia or china, they were a victim of history.
there are two sides of the coin. they are a victim of: realism, but at the same time, they have a memory of the empire in of greatness, so these two things reinforce each other. for the shah, the challenge was, ambitions bes integrated within an american order, do these things need to compete with one another? is there a way the united states can accommodate iran and is there a way that iran's ambitions can meet the u.s.'s interests. nixon and kissinger and the shah to do that. today, that is possible
, but i doal skeptical see a great deal of continuity. host: thank you very much. we have time for questions. a round of applause, first. [applause] we will take a few questions. the relationship between both men, what was it like? here: i have just been looking at the papers, the relationship did not end with the fall of the shah or wentgate, when the shah into exile in 1979, nixon worked very hard to give him save even in the u.s.
and in fact, kissinger secured a safe haven for him in mexico and the bahamas, they visited him, in mexico, president nixon euro from california --winds from california to see him. and when the shah died, one of the few heads of state to attend was nixon who made a point to be there and was highly critical of president carter when he arrived. he referred to carter's policy as a black page in american foreign-policy. my name mining this --
is lou, why is there so much hatred in this regime for israel? i heard if they had a nuclear bomb, they would destroy israel yesterday? why is that? very: i think it is a cynical instrumental policy. iran is a country in a region where it is a minority, it is a persian country surrounded by sunni arab states to have an antagonistic relationship with iran. so if you want to make a case for iranian leadership, you have support. rallying the issue of israel is one that iranians use to rally support.
that strategy has now collapsed because of the air of -- arab spring. cynical policy, because the same government that professes to hate israel was happy to do arms deals with them earlier and is quite happy to engage in a cold war with israel, as long as there are no iranians doing fighting. it is in its mental -- instrumental policy, is there anyone who really believes in it? host: next question. >> the u.s. has a long history of what administration -- one administration standing behind a foreign leader in support of u.s. policy and over time, that
leader possibly through corruption or internal certainty -- insurgency, then a future administration withdraws support replaced byp being a government that is hostile to the u.s. -- vietnam, iran, philippines, egypt, there are several. what would be your thought toward, how do we keep or stop repeating this pattern? roham: it reminds me of -- i remember when during the shah's first visit to washington, he had a number of demands come asking for this and that and issinger said, look, it easier for the imperial ruler of
iran to make policy, then for us , because the u.s. is a democracy and it is subject to all of the parts of domestic politics. it seems like there is an year.on here, every that makes it difficult to have a long-term policy that is based on national interest. there is only really one way to do that and to do everything in secret, which is what the nixon administration did, most of the biggest achievements in for .olicy was done secretly that has pitfalls, because when you -- and then you fail to build public support and it can backfire. how do you resolve that dilemma? it is difficult, the -- i think
the only way to do it is to toeal, rather than appealing people's worst instincts, is to treat people intelligently and speak with a substance. i think that that is something that has been lost in politics, it is so rare you see a leader that has enough respect for people to be able to discuss the substance of policy, rather than these aredbites or the good guys, these are the bad guys. others night at the presidential library, they had a gop debate, i am not sure if you watched, they had an opinion on what they would do with the iran deal, whether they would rip it
thoughts inave regards to that and the new resident that will come in? roham: i did watch it. [laughter] it was a mixed performance. foreign-policy is often about making the best out of a bad situation, choosing the least worst option. i think the deal with iran is our least worst option, the alternatives are somewhat worse that it is worth giving this a try, i do not think anyone can say with confidence that this will work and everything will turn out as we expect, especially with a 10-15 year horizon, it is difficult enough to predict what will happen in one year.
but, the middle east is a region that is ripe with instability, every country seems to be imploding with a civil war or conflict. iran is the one country that seems fairly stable, has a government that was elected in 2013, somewhat pragmatic, seems to want to reintegrate itself into the international system. it seems it would be fullest rip that up.rto that is not mean -- that does not mean you full yourself with the policies of iran or globally, but i think it is the option. least worst
iraqis, nowans and it seems the iranians are helping the iraqis, how did they go from such animosity to coalition between the two? roham: the animosity between them was really in animosity between two regimes, i do not think that the popular level there was animosity between iranians and iraqis. happened was in the 2013 war -- the 2003 war in iraq. shiite government came to power and many of those have long-standing relations with iran and so the relationship improved dramatically, because
of that. mixedthen, it has been a picture, some things iran has done has been very destructive. some things have been constructive at times, but that is the nature of foreign-policy. back and forth. question is whether it is realistic to imagine a world in which iran has no influence in iraq, a country which it has hundreds of years of relations, many, cultural links. actually, as far as the united states is concerned, they have many common interests in iraq, when it comes to fighting isis.
the question is whether iran will encourage a direction in iraq that is inclusive of sunnis , or whether it will be a winner takes all strategy and that remains to be seen. host: time for one more question. i want to let everybody know that roham will be available to sign copies of his book. last question. about theto ask current iran deal, but in a different way. i was 20 years old when the iranian revolution came about, before i get to that, be happy about all the rain in london, --ause here is a problem here it is a problem. since then, there has been this
underlying dread of wanting to get back and work with iran, whether it is the reagan administration, arming them, or to today's deal, what is it about us wanted to take another run at iran, making friends with them, under the fray that is going on over there, what is it about that? roham: it is a reality that they ,re an important country economically, politically, historically, culturally, this is not a country that can be ignored. and u.s. policy, since the hostage crisis, understandably, has been to contain iran, isolate iran. that strategy has consequences, it has not worked well, it creates more problems than it
solves. every administration overtime flirts with the idea, maybe we can engage with them, have a deal. close during the clinton administration, there was a real, meaningful relationship between the governments. any attempt at detente, any change in the status quo will upset a lot of vested interests, there are many other countries, other domestic players, who benefit from the status quo, who are invested in it and will fight to prevent it from happening. so, with the current engagement effort, i am quite amazed it has gone this far, that we are at
this point where the u.s. secretary of state and the foreign minister for iran regularly talk to each other and they can negotiate and come to an agreement. that is extraordinary after 30 years of not talking to each other. in the very long run, there has to be some kind of relationship between the u.s. and iran, these are two important countries who have very significant interests in a very important region. so the idea that there can never an agreement is unlikely. but when that actually happens, when conditions will be right, i do not think anyone can foretell with any confidence. host: thank you, roham. thank you. [applause] [applause] host: you can ask further
questions in the lobby. books are for sale, pick one up. [applause] [applause] ♪ >> join american history tv on latter-day --saturday for divorce -- tours and live interviews in new orleans. we will look at the simmering experience and the road to berlin. then we will take questions throughout the day. later,ar ii, 70 years live from the national world war 7.museum, saturday, november reports refer to the current refugee crisis in
the european union has the worst since the end of world war ii. next, on real america, a look ofk to 1946, with seeds destiny, depicting the situation faced by millions of orphan and homeless children. those poorly clothed children, these -- this academy award-winning don't include scenes--film, includes that may be inappropriate for young viewers. age 9,able to stand, mother tortured and father burned alive. , lost her senses when shells swept her village. mother, father, sister
and brother killed because they refused to leave the shelter of a ravine, himself wounded. page 8, she did not know her toy was a grenade. 10-14. age 3, stunted by nutritional deficiencies. ♪ [crying] unquestionably, of all the victims in the programming a whole populations, the most pitiful have been the most precious, the young. heirsfter liberation, the to the legacy of fear and hate,
nursed and aspiration, calculated to supply the new tools, the new hitler's and of and evens, bloodier tomorrow. but with the lesson of two world wars to learn form -- from, fascism -- by being four into neglecting this. for this, the legacy in action as the true cost of tomorrow begins to show itself, dissension, despair, doubt, defeatism, soil for world war iii and significant signs of this, the last battle. if we permit this to be the face of the future, then there will be only one place to rest full burden of blame, on ourselves.
♪ tooley, author mark talks about the background and goals of various peace delegates who met in washington in 1861 to try to avert the civil war after lincoln's election. this talk is about half an hour. mark: it's great to see you all. i was looking for some to introduce me but i will just announce myself. here we are. i did not intend any remarks this evening, but c-span called us yesterday so i decided that yes, i would have something to say were some kind of performance to turn out for you all and for c-span. it is great to see everybody here. i have not had tim c