tv Discussion on Mexicos Role in U.S. Counterrorism Strategy CSPAN October 19, 2015 10:32pm-11:40pm EDT
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prepare for and counter threats of violent extremism against military personnel and facilities. this was from the association of the united states army meeting with local law officials. it's just over an hour. >> good morning, everybody. i'm don lauren. i have the pleasure of introducing the subject and moderating today's panel. i would like to thank general sullivan and my good friend guy swann, for including these homeland sessions in this year's program. defense support of civil authority and countering the violent extremist threat to the nation and dod personnel and installations are increasingly important elements of today's military environment. and it's fitting that we have a meaningful discussion on this topic. i had the honor of moderating
last year's first ever panel on homeland security issues here at ausa. and i'm pleased to see that this year ausa has expanded the discussion to several extremely relevant panels. i believe there are four panels this year. and we also had secretary johnson kick off yesterday morning. first, as the duty navy flag officer in this crowd, i want to tell you our services share many, many customs and traditions. while we in the navy do not do as good a job as pronouncing hoo-ah as you all do, those who cannot produce the unit challenge point must entertain those who can at the bar. to my good friend guy swann, dave perkins, terry wolf, my new friends jeff snow and mike smith, here is my ten-mile
finisher coin, my 15th. i invite you to produce your coin or meet me at the bar later today so we can discuss it. i remember having general sullivan visited us and engaged the military fellows in discussion. i remember his frequently used mantra, the united states army exists to fight and win the nation's wars. and while i will remain silent on the responsibilities of my own service, which by the way celebrated its 240th birthday yesterday, i will say that there is no truer statement nor one that has become more relevant than that which general sullivan professed then. fight and win the nation's wars. i've heard general sullivan say that for 20 years now. we've heard the chief of staff say that yesterday, and add to
that statement, in defense of the nation. and make no mistake about it, there's no other army, no other military, no other entity on the planet as capable and competent at doing that as our united states army. but the nature of our nation's wars has changed considerably over the 20 years that have passed since general sullivan first said that to me. it's not as simple as ten soviet divisions coming across the gap anymore. no strategy document no longer addresses how we will fight and win two major theater wars simultaneously while conducting counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, or military operations other than war elsewhere. the nature of military operations has become more encompassing. in fact the very substance of these panel discussions attempts to get our hands around what it means to defend the country.
the threats we face as a nation have become more complex. these threats can come from rogue nation states, failed states, terrorist organizations, or lone wolves. not only do we have to defend the nation and defend our interests abroad, but we now have to defend our installations and our personnel here at home. connectivity and communications make actions once only the purview of nations possible by small groups of individuals. the separation between homeland defense and homeland security has become gray and less defined. as the u.s. military organizes, trains, and equips to play a role in this environment, it must do it by the rule of law, under the jurisdiction of the department of justice, an environment that spans 50
states, the territories, the municipalities, the tribal nations that make up america. and as the chief told us yesterday, it must employ all of its components, active, guard, and reserve. it must learn to interface with 72 fusion centers. it must operate with 8,000 law enforcement agencies and nearly 18,000 first responder entities. when combatting the cbrn and wmd threat, and i personally would add cyber to this threat list, as all are weapons of mass effect, today's military must plan and train for missions that are not necessarily lesser included functions of war fighting, but are every bit as important. they must apportion scarce resources to these important missions, but cannot sacrifice the core competencies that makes us the premier fighting force in the world.
and they must not only seek a whole government approach to this task, but they must participate in a whole nation mission, as presidential decision directive 8 mandates. whole of nation, not merely joint and interservice, not merely interagency, but whole of nation. federal, state, municipal government, and private sector, and citizenry. we must defend critical infrastructure, of which 85% resides in the private sector. we must defend military personnel in shopping center recruiting stations. we must defend military installations that are integral parts of their communities. we must defend these installations against classic
kinetic attacks but against cbne and cyberintrusion and against terrorist attack. the 2015 national security strategy clearly directs the u.s. military to defend the u.s. and support civil authorities at home. the national security strategy addresses the top strategic risks to our nation which include catastrophic attack on the u.s. homeland or critical infrastructure, the threat of attacks against u.s. citizens abroad and our allies, the proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction and the effect of severe global infectious disease. the dod strategy for force protection and mission assurance tells us the criticality of ensuring that we are capable of doing these things and perform our core competencies as well. the recently released report requires an integrated approach to the tasks of providing for the military defense of the
homeland, combating terrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction and providing support to civil authorities. and my dear friend dave perkins' pamphlet, the u.s. army operating concept, "win in a complex world," the same title as this conference title, poses that the u.s. army is faced with multiple dilemmas. it is faced with multiple operations, must operate in multiple environments, and must work with multiple partners. these are our marching orders. this is the strategic guidance that defines the world we must operate in. this is the complex environment in which we must defend america and keep the homeland safe. this is the battlefield in which we must fight and win the nation's wars to defend america. as the strategic guidance directs, we must understand the
threats to the force, including those posed by home-grown violent extremists. we must understand the issues surrounding force protection in the domestic environment. and the cooperation required across agencies to better protect our standalone forces. we must undertake initiatives across state, local, municipal, and tribal domestic agencies and the army that enhance our force protection. and we must eliminate barriers that impede our abilities and take actions that increase our awareness, preparedness, and exchange of threat information in a law enforcement centric homeland environment. today's panel will continue with perry wiggins's discussion from yesterday, a discussion which included active, guard, reserve, osd, and unified commander responsibility in defending america and keeping our homeland secure. our panel today is imminently qualified to continue that discussion.
and from the multidimensional perspective suggested by such an encompassing threat, a perspective that is whole of nation, state, local, municipal, and private sector. a perspective that is predicated on relationships, on planning, on training, on exercising. a perspective that truly embodies the concept of one team, one fight. leading off the discussion, we're fortunate to have major general mike smith, the director, hqda, g-34 protection. we then have major general jeff snow, commanding general u.s. army recruiting command. we have mr. chris klein, deputy director, federal protective service, national protection and programs director at dhs. we have assistant chief lamar green, assistant chief for homeland security bureau metropolitan police department of the district of columbia.
and we have my good friend sheriff al cannon, charleston county sheriff, and mr. michael trapp from u.s. army north. we have a lot to talk about. this all centers around your questions after everybody's done making their statements. so thank you very much, and let me turn it over to mike. >> thank you very much for that introduction and those opening remarks. lieutenant general wiggins, ladies and gentlemen, i am michael smith. major general, i am currently the deputy chief of u.s. army reserve. i want to thank you for the opportunity to continue on with this important work and follow through. it's important that we have knowledgeable people here and show the importance of working across the interagency community working with local law enforcement.
the army g-34 army force protection was established in response to the investigation following the first fort hood shooting in 2009. the army decided to reduce gaps and seams across protection programs by operationalizing the family of protection programs under the auspices of the newly established g-34. the g-34 is tasked with integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing all components to ensure unity of effort among headquarters department of the army staff, army commands, and other army organizations in order to develop, prioritize resource, and inspect the full spectrum of programs. the g-34 also leads the army's efforts to coordinate with the air force, the navy, the
marines, the office of the secretary and other government agencies including the department of homeland security and the fbi. after the fort hood 2009 shooting, the army recognized that the threat from home-grown violent extremists is real, and we must take actions to protect the force. in the past few years we have hardened our installations, those being large bases with their own assigned provost marshals, that is law enforcement. and now we're placing additional emphasis on the security of our off-installation facilities. you would know them as recruiting stations, many army reserve centers, national guard armories, where they don't have dedicated assigned force protection or specifically law enforcement officials. you may remember the september 2013 washington navy yard shooting where there were mass casualties. not long after that there was a second fort hood shooting in april of 2014. while the response to that incident showed we made
significant progress and were better able to respond, it also highlighted the complexities of trying to prevent these types of incidents. in the 2014 fort hood shooting, the shooter was not motivated by radical anti-american agenda, but rather a series of problems that spiraled out of control which eventually led him to lash out at those who he perceived wronged him. most recently, the chattanooga incident showed how attacks can occur away from military installations. they can occur in communities, large and small, where members of the army reserve and national guard live and work. attacks involving military personnel and facilities are often used as propaganda. regardless of the original motivation of the shooters, our enemies will attempt to exploit the event, radical publications
will proclaim the shooters to be jihadists and martyrs, even though that was not their original intentions. through numerous outlets, our enemies encourage individuals in the united states to use their residence within the united states to enable attacks and further their radical objectives. in just the last year, hundreds of names containing personally identifiable information has been released hoping to enspire people to take action. targeting can occur in many ways, ranging from simple harassment to identifying people more specifically. we must ensure that the entire army team is aware of the threat and are properly trained to identify and report suspicious activities and respond when needed. one of the toughest challenges for the army is how do we address a threat that metastasizes in the shadows like the shooter in chattanooga and only becomes physical at the onset of violence? to be successful, we must
address this at a few levels, at the federal, state and local level we need to continue to expand our cooperation with local law enforcement partners by sharing information with agencies to our mutual benefit. we need to continue to respond in coordination with these local partners to execution of the national incident management system and ensure that our policies enhance interoperability and synchronize responses across judicial jurisdictional boundaries. within the army, we assure commanders that they have the authorities and the responsibility to respond wherever and whenever warranted. we rapidly inform uniform service members and former service members when they are identified and potentially at risk. we coordinate emergency action exercises. our personnel know how to react when presented with a dangerous situation, particularly when law enforcement arrives.
we continually assess and improve mass warning notification procedures and capabilities. at an individual level, service members and family members are trained and understand that they could be targeted just because of the affiliation with the military and department of defense. we encourage them to be aware of their digital footprint, ensuring that privacy settings are properly set for all social media accounts. with that, i look forward to your questions and hearing from the rest of the panel. >> thank you, mike. jeff? >> thanks. and first of all thanks, don, for the introduction and let me just tell general wiggins, i appreciate the opportunity to participate in the panel. obviously on a topic that the near and dear to my heart so like many here we're products of our experience. i have the good fortune of commanding u.s. army recruiting command and i assumed command in late june, 23rd, to be exact.
and i can tell you the first trip i took was down in little rock, arkansas, to actually pin a purple heart on -- to hand a purple heart to the parents of a young man who was killed in 2009 standing outside of a recruiting center. i pinned another one on another young man who had been severely wounded but recovered. then two weeks later we have chattanooga. so i share that to tell you the threat is real and i had been in command long enough to circulate amongst those recruiting centers in the army a we have more recruiting centers than all of the services all across the united states. my assessment was there were things we could do to enhance our force protection. in chattanooga, it caused us to take a step back and look at what are the things we could do
to enhance our force protection and a big part of it, as general smith just articulated is enhance those relationships. we have a good relationship but for our recruiting centers and stations we are very much relying upon those relationships to sharing of intel and information and certainly are reliant upon local law enforcements to respond when a particular threat is identified to our stations, et cetera. so there's a number of things i could share with you but i'm one that is very much interested in your questions as opposed to me telling you the number of things that we've done. i will just tell you, i'm happy to do so, there are a number of things that we can and should do to enhance the force protection of some of our soft facilities, recruiting centers being one of those and we have taken steps to do so and there's a lot more
that we plan to do to do so. but a big part of it will be to continue to enhance relationships. as was highlighted yesterday, the importance of those relationships can not be understated. it's one of the things you have to work in day in and day out. not something you do one week and three, four, five, six weeks later you reach out. these are routine. i think we do a good job of sharing information but we have to continue to do that. but you can never rest on your laurels, you have to continue to work at it. so i look forward to your questions. thank you. >> thank you. >> i had a blue jacket in the car that i was coming over with me and doris lynn said "you need to take, that everyone will be dressed up" and i said "it's a simple panel, no problem." so i'm the one without a jacket on, so the federal protective service is a small component
within the department of homeland security. our responsibility is the protection and the law enforcement of all gsa, general services administration owned and leased facilities, about 9500 across the united states. dod agencies okay spy space in 995 of those building including 46 military processing stations and 127 armed forces recruiting centers. last september as most of you are aware an online chat room associated with the foreign terrorist organization directed their followers in the united states to act on their own and target government official, military, and law enforcement so within those 9500 gsa facilities, a number of those three agencies are in there. immediately following this announcement the federal protective service enhanced the protection of our highest risk facilities by implementing 12
measures at those facilities and not long after on october 22 was an incident in ottawa, canada, at the war memorial in the parliament. so if the inspiration to attack government officials, military and law enforcement, two of the three took place in ottawa on october 22. on october 27, secretary johnson who was with you yesterday directed the federal protective service to enhance a protection of high-risk facilities in five cities. that lasted for 37 days. other incidents occurred across the world, "charlie hebdo," jordanian pilot getting burned to death in a cage, a number of incidents happen and we continued to respond to other cities. it started with 20 cities, five cities, 20 cities, 101 cities and this operation which we call blue surge continues today. we interact with d.o.d. primarily at the national jttf in mcclain where you have your support team. daily interaction with those guys on threats directed towards
recruiting stations, dod agencies housed within gsa facilities. that's where the interaction takes place and where we get information to deploy our folks to those recruiting stations in our area of responsibility. may 7 this past year d.o.d. went to force protection condition bravo. we sent our guys out to go to those facilities that house d.o.d. assets in our inventory to make sure everything was in place to ensure it was properly protected and after the incident in chattanooga we sent our folks back out to those facilities to talk to tenants to make sure they were adequately protected. i don't want to take up too much time talking about things we've done. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. lamar? >> thank you for inviting the metropolitan police department to be a part of this board. i think one of the things we continue to hear from the first panelist that spoke is partnership partnership is important in establishing
partnership after an incident is simply too late. we need to know each other, work with each other, be familiar with each other's tactics and procedures well before we have an incident. in terms of force protection, the lone wolf active shooter, the hve represents a major threat to force protection efforts in a domestic environment. there have been recent attacks throughout the country and they have been so frequent in nature that it's becoming something that's -- just seems regular throughout the united states and that's just unacceptable. recent mass shootings, to give you examples, like cupertino, california, employees killed at a rock quarry, seal beach, california, subjects attacked in a hair salon, carson city, nevada, a gunman comes in and opens fire on several national guard members who are simply just having breakfast. here in our own nation's
capital, the washington navy yard, subject enters that location and commits mass murder. there are various charges as were mentioned earlier. active shooters, lone wolves are very hard to detect, they're very hard to counter so our intelligence dissemination, our partnership has to be operating at an optimal level. active shooters usually work alone. they usually have the advantage of knowing a location, being familiar with their environment before they conduct these outrageous attacks. one of the most glaring qualities is it's usually low tech and high yield in nature. a person doesn't usually have a lot of training, there's no way to track these subjects that come in and commit these atrocities. some of the lessons learned from the navy yard and i'll touch on it really quick. communications.
one of the things we learned through our experiences at the navy yard in both incidents, we had the actual shooting that occurred in 2013 and this year we had a call that turned out to be, thank god, a false alarm but it was an excellent opportunity to see if the strategies, procedures, things we put in place actually were effective. and in many cases they were. it may be prudent for military installations, especially those located near largely populated areas to review their emergency call-taking procedures and policies and ensure their guidelines for actions and events of a large-scale incident. your emergency call takers inside of your bases should really have that partnership and communication with your city's 911 call center. one of the things we recognized during the navy yard is that
inside of the military facility existed actually like a small subdivision of washington, d.c. it was a separate city. the 911 calls and all of that intelligence that was related to those 911 calls weren't passed on to the city wide 911 call center. so that was a gap we had to expose. the first responders that were responding were not getting the information that your call takers were receiving through the base communications so that's something we worked on and i think that's something that we should take from here and if you command a base that's something you should look at in your procedures. emergency call takers should train together. your police forces on your bases should train together. we currently train with ndw, with ft. mcnair on an annual basis so that we're familiar with each other's tactics,
procedures and how we respond. additionally, when we responded to the navy yard, since that was a separate environment, the navy yard went on lockdown, that's one procedure we sat down with the base commander, sat down with joint forces and talked about whether it's prudent the go into a lockdown situation if you have an emergency on your base which in essence locks out your first responders. so procedures were put in place to mitigate that type of issue. and we're still working on that right now: again, training together is key. doing table top exercises so that you're familiar with each other before an incident occurs, doing full-scale exercises so we get to actually act out our procedures and response to a major incident. i'll touch on intelligence. here in washington, d.c. we have excellent communication with our military partners. our jttf, fbi, the fusion center plays a major role in sharing
intelligence back and forth with our military partners. i'm going to end right there and open up for questions. thank you. >> as i was reflecting back, my first assignment as a police officer, specialized assignment, was as a police community relations officer in charleston, south carolina. actually, north charleston. and it did not take me long to figure that a critical part of what i needed to do given that we had the charleston naval base and the charleston air force base was to convince everybody that the military community was a part of the community and not apart from the community: that was 40 years ago. i don't know that it is any -- has been any truer than it is today. now, we've come a long way since 9/11 in terms of sharing information and i would submit
to you that charleston for a number of reasons represents the best of that kind of communication based on the efforts that we made to stand up a port security program. but i will tell you that lamar in a sense that in that they do interact on the daily basis out of necessary here in the washington district, the fact of the matter is, the further way you get out in the hinterlands, not so much. and where that mantra part of the community and not apart from the community becomes incumbent both on the base and local law enforcement to come together in ways they've not come together before. and my air force buddy here, i don't want to -- i'll give you an example post-9/11. interoperability was a major buzz word.
much was directed towards that and amc allocated a lot of money to put -- to build that capability of interoperability in their security force vehicle. well, what that resulted in was that security forces vehicles in charleston air force base could communicate with security forces vehicle at scott air force base. now, the likelihood of those vehicles being close enough to do that is very unlikely. we've since, i'm happy to say, got the joint base to come on our local radio system and where in the past they'd had a walkie-talkie at the law enforcement desk there, we now have complete communications as circumstances dictate. and unfortunately in the past
there has been need for having that kind of communications but charleston as small as it is -- and it's a real challenge we're confronting, has elements of the navy still there, the nuclear school and consolidated brig, i'm not saying that very loud because i don't want too many people to know that. they already unfortunately know that cat is out of the bag and they've been looking at that as a possible alternative to guantanamo. consolidated brig is there. 40% of materiel shipped to the middle east left out of the port of charleston. up until dover got 17s -- c-17s out of charleston were carrying the bulk of the airlift. we have remnants of the navy nuclear school is still there, spay wars is there that put the electronic sweets in the mraps.
one of the originators of the mrap design force protection is from charleston. so we have a lot going on for a relatively small place and quite frankly because of that court initiative -- port security initiative, we built a unified command approach and today anybody that has assets that can bring to the table has a seat at the table and they participate and we have an important army folks there, the corps of engineers, we're hoping to deepen the channels and help out there. but when you look at the nature of the threat as recent as yesterday, secretary johnson talked about resurrecting the national threat assessment system with the focus being more on the domestic threats, we all see them, we share them, law enforcement is as much a target perhaps for different reasons than the military but we're
targets as well so it's incumbent on us to communicate better and to coordinate efforts when those lists are posted, by asis and debek, those personnels have off base addresses that are provided by as well and you need to be -- you don't want a situation where you go off and leave your family and then have nobody that's really focused on them in terms of law enforcement. so that's an element in and of itself that should prompt greater communication and coordination. but the most recent issue of inspire magazine, aqap, which was the theme of that issue was assassinations, had a picture of dylann roof who was the perpetrator of the shootings at the church at emanuel mother ame church in charleston.
so we've been through a number of incidents in charleston and just assume not have anymore. so to the extent we can work together as a part of the community it's very challenging to the military as they look out and try to figure out how the players are in terms of law enforcement, the jurisdiction, whether it's a concurrent jurisdiction or exclusive military reservation, those issues are, very challenging and i'll be honest with you. it's not going to be the fbi that if you're on a military reservation that you call first or who will most likely to respond first. it will be your local police officers and you need to get to know them better and coordinate and i would recommend to you that one of your biggest handicaps is the fact that you turn over periodically and one of the responsibilities particularly of your provost marshal or your law enforcement
cid is to write a collection requirement ought to be assigned to write up something about the local military -- police personalities so that the incoming commander has some insight into who does what and who's responsible for what. and i'm not sure those messages get passed on to the extent they should be. those are crucial, crucial parts of that relationship and as we found in defining port security, what we were doing was defining that port further away from the waterline. and i would submit to you that the military needs to be looking at that -- from that perspective as well. that air base that naval base is not defined by the chain link fence. you've got to have a broader perspective than that and that includes your local law enforcement. you need to know what kind of
capabilities you've got. that provost marshal cid need to be doing. who do you turn to? what swat team do you turn to? do you have that capability on base? if not you need to find who you're going to call when you have somebody that is holed up in a building or something, maybe with a domestic situation. but there are a whole host of reasons to go to the effort to, one, identify who your players are in locally law enforcement wise. identify ways of developing a memorandum of understanding or those sorts of things to clarify and clear up the jurisdictional issues. i think being an attorney i'm always mindful of having a significant role in determining
legal outcomes so if you set out to do the right thing and into in the memoranda and your lawyer is obviously going to be involve but you do it -- don't just say "can i do this?" but make sure "if i can't this way, how can i do it to accomplish 90% of what i want to accomplish?" those are probably the two most important things, learning your police people and what they're capable of, who the personalities are and then overcoming whatever shortcomings you have that relate to the jurisdictional issues. thank you. >> thank you, al. mike? >> both the joy of being the cleanup batter is to look down and realize that pretty much everything you intended to say had been covered probably by people substantially more intelligent than yourself but i want to on behalf of general wiggins, our commander, thank you for taking part in this panel and thank our panelists
for being a great variety of points of view and things we need to talk about to the table. if you've heard anything yesterday and today repeated more, i doubt it's been relationships. every panel member here has talked about relationships and the other side is not a time for relationships. we've tried in the past, we know it doesn't work. so what army north brings is that centerpiece. we are responsible for force protection and anti-terrorism for the 300,000 plus soldiers and their families and civilians that are in north america. we work closely with the united states northern command on a daily basis. we work closely with the provost marshal general's office on a daily basis and of course the g-34 protection. we are the commander with the
responsibility for force protection in north america and it's our job to make sure we're all talking to one another so every individual soldier knows what's going on. knows what the threat is, knows where their safe place to be is, knows who their law enforcement presence is and who to call and what to expect when that call is made. our responsibility is to communicate daily with the 28 acoms, asccs and drus to let them know what the threat picture is. to let them know what's going on out there. i'm very proud of our 24-hour 365 threat fusion cell. we sit right next to the army north g-2 and everyday we are talking with sheriff's offices, the department of homeland security, the department of state, the federal bureau of investigation so that we know what's going on out there. we know the threats that are developing. one of our boss's primary things is this site picture. what's going on? how can he reach out if there's
an event in north carolina? an event in california and an event in north dakota against a stand alone facility. do they have something to do with each other? is this a trend? is this something every soldier in north america needs to be made aware of? one of the greatest things that our boss is driving and that we're working very hard on is a common operating picture. we want to see what's going on out there, understand what it could mean, analyze it and very quickly get that information not only to those 20 command but to be able to reach out to every individual soldier. so we have a number of things we're working with tradeoff, with g-34 with north com to make that a reality. as you figured out, the army is a big place. the more we dig, the more we're surprised in our efforts to figure out post-chattanooga how many stand alone facilities the united states army has in north america.
we began with a rough number of 5600. at last count we're up to 8900. because besides the ones you're aware of, recruiting centers, reserve centers, national guard offices we army north have folks embedded with every fema region in the country and our friends in the federal protective service provide protection for most of them although not all of them. some of them are in store fronts. we've got to find a way not only to process and share information but to make sure every single soldier knows what actions he or she needs to take to protect themselves and their families. one of my favorite sayings of the many favorite things people say is when george washington said "when we assume the soldier, we did not set aside the citizen." our soldiers live, operate, take care of their families and commit to their communities. they need to understand where
their protection comes from. we could certainly as secretary johnson said yesterday, we can build a secure internet. we can build secure borders, we can make air travel completely safe. but that's not who we are and that's not what we do. we are not going to all run to the garrison and hide. we are part of the american community. we're a part of the fabric of this society. so what general wiggins leads us to do is remain a part of the community, be prepared to execute our mission but know how to manage risk, take care of our soldiers and their families and close with the relationships and we can only do that with relationships across the army, relationships across the services and relationships with the state, federal, tribal, county, every level of law enforcement and we have to be talking everyday. we can not learn who we need to be talking to on the wrong side
of the bay. i'll turn it back over to admiral and thank you for joining us. >> well, those are pretty broad-ranging comments on a very broad-ranging subject and i want to thank everybody for their comments. i'd like to open it up to questions and i'll take the prerogative of the chair to ask the first question which is we talk about relationships and yesterday the chief talked about readiness, and an integral part of that is planning and very importantly training and training can be at various levels as we all know and the reality is it has to go from the actual lowest tactical level all the way up to the senior level. my experiences here in washington are that unless periodically the president, the cabinet and secretaries are sitting at a table top exercise you only get 90% of the effectiveness of that training unless it goes all the way to the top. so i would ask our panelists here, what are the initiatives
that perhaps they have been involved in in their respective relationships within their communities and the broader reaching relationship with the total army that they may have pursued and are engaged in? who would like to start. >> i can begin addressing that. from a department of the army standpoint, we accomplish policy at headquarters but it's executed at the unit level. when we talk about off installation facilities such as army reserve centers and national guard armories, they reach out to their local community to conduct these exercises that you mentioned. with local law enforcement establishing relationship, many members of the army reserve and national guard are also local law enforcement members so it's a natural fit and a natural tie to bring that together so those exercises are conducted periodically and we try to combine them if there's multiple
units in a building rather than having local law enforcement reaching out three, four, five times to the same location. that's the important part of that. in addition it's continual sharing of information as was mentioned, once a year we meet the local police and two years later i roll out and somebody else comes in. it's important to have the dialogue and get to know each other, share information about what's going on in the community and that works both way, both between military members and law enforcement as well. a key point was made by al that when military were transient, we're there for a short period of time then we move on. it's important that as part of that battle handover that those relationships are handed over as well so that law enforcement knows that mike isn't there anymore, that mark is and they know how to get ahold of mark and continue that relationship
that's there. it's about teamwork and the partnership and exercising at the local level and reporting it up through higher headquarters along with ideas. how can we do things better? what resources are needed to improve the response? if it's interoperability or connectivity how can we better help from higher headquarters? >> anyone else? >> i guess in the interest of time what i'd tell you is with when you say training i can tell you for us is priority has been really rehearsing our battle drills within these recruiting centers. so what are the actions an individual takes, who do they call? but really beyond that emphasis, that which we control has been the relationship so it's interesting. i reached out to some battalion commanders in advance of the panel and said, hey, listen, i'm going they have to opportunity, just give me some feedback in terms of the things that you are doing and i got to tell you, i got eight different battalions
here and they all talked about direct relationship, local police department, sharing of information, they listed all the organizations that came up in a briefing. regular force protection interaction with the jtf directly, i got names of individuals. i mean, we've talked about the importance of this relationship and that you have to work at it. that really has been our emphasis. >> just from a local police perspective. we've done table top, full scale exercises with several military partners. the table tops were more an executive level higher management going over incident command making sure that all of our components from the military, the proper people from the military would respond to incident command. that was one of the things we realized in our navy yard interactions was that we didn't have the proper people in the initial incident command. we actually -- there was confusion as to who was in charge of the base at that time so we've had several briefings where we've sat down with their
executive level and just really gotten more of a training on who's in charge, who we need in that incident command and from their perspective who they need to send out to the incident command. we've done the tactical level training through full-scale exercises where we've done drills on the navy yard facility, we've done drills at ft. mcnair as well. that communication that learning each other's procedures and who needs to be face to face is excellent. >> thank you. >> i'll add one other thing, if i may, which is always pressing the push to test button. monthly we do an exercise where we reach out from headquarters to the 20 commands within north america and we purposely change it where the response must be by e-mail or next month it must be by telephone or next month it must be by message because it never fails that something isn't
going to work. each month we find a hole. each month someone has moved and we didn't know about it. so sheriff cannon talked about making sure the first thing you pass on is who you need to talk to, who you need to go to, who you need to have a relationship with. even if it's internal you have to press that test button on a regular basis because people change, things happen, communication systems go down. so i'll just add that. so whatever great plan you have, you really have to check to make sure it survives first contact with the enemy. >> thank you. okay, your questions, please, matt has a microphone so please speak into the microphone, identify yourself and do your best to make it a question. [ laughter ] >> patrick tucker with defense one. in 2009 after the ft. hood shootings the president established an insider threat task force, one of the mandates was an integration center for analysis of big data as applied
to insider threats. so to the question, can you speak to the nascent efforts to apply big data analytics to the job of detecting early warning signs of an attack both within the broader population and within the service population because they're very different populations and data sets. thank you. >> i'll start with the response on that. you've made a reference to the insider threat task force. the g-34 leads the army's effort as part of the national insider threat task force. that has many aspects to it, active shooters, which is what we're talking about here, is just one element of it. the larger element and where that was geared to in addition to 2009 it goes to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information which is beyond the scope of this but there is user activity monitoring to ensure things are done properly. more to your point. we're working with big data
analytics now to identify what it can provide to us to help support that. other initiatives that we have are installation access controls which will verify the identity of people coming on to our bases to determine whether they have any warrants on them, that's something you want to know before people come on to bases. and things like that. background checks, again, recurring on a periodic basis in accordance with the federal rules and regulations. does that answer your question? >> yes, can you point to any particular incident where some of these techniques were used to thwart or stop an attack before it happened? we hear about the bad news in the headlines. i think the success stories get missed. has it been effective to prevent a particular attack? >> it's always hard to prove a
negative, as you say. but the identity verification measures at the access control points on bases have identified people with active wants and warrants. i can't go into the particular numbers but it was surprising to me the number of felonies, people that have felony warrants that were apprehended at the gate. that's not to say they were on their way to conduct something but they had that in their background and as a result of that i would offer that the procedures achieved their intent to provide better security for the bases and better identity coming on the bases and as the word gets out that we are checking that, in fact, is a deterrent for people who would otherwise try to get on to a base with ill intentions. >> interesting, mike, do you have anything you want to add? >> i'll add to the success stories, because it's already in the public domain, we had significant hve threat streams prior to the anniversary of 9/11
and what they've made public, the fbi specifically rolled out 10 threat actors that expressed particular threat information against the department of defense. until the prosecution is over they release very little information so the most i can say is that we have seen active law enforcement, active data analysis, active communications across agencies that's resulted in preventing planned events. >> thank you. another question? yes, ma'am. >> good morning, my name is charlotte pete, i'm with rapiscan systems. as all of you are evaluating and looking back to the tragedy in chattanooga, tennessee, what specific mitigation strategies could have or should have been in place and are you acting on any of those now? >> interesting point. >> i'll take a stab at it.
in the wake of that incident it caused us all to reassess our force protection facility. so part of this is we reviewed our policies, our programs and procedures to address the potential of this threat. i'm in the camp of it's not a question of if this is going to happen again it's going to be a question of when. so there have been a number of things done. in part there was a department of defense task force that actually did an awful lot of work across this, across all services. within the army there are things we don't have to wait for the department of defense guidance to come out. there are things we should do to enhance force protection. one of those things that we are doing, i'll give you a specific example, is we've already ordered ballistic benches to go in our recruiting centers. to those that are uninformed, it looks like a normal bench but it can withstand a 762 round.
so that's something concrete that we have taken steps to do that i think could have mitigated, i don't know that would that it would have prevented but could have mitigated. the other thing is in our recruiting centers, in some of those you can see into the recruiting centers so we've gone out and we call them clings. but you can put something on the front of the center to so the recruiters can see out but individuals looking in cannot see in. that's yet another thing. we're also pursuing controlled access so that right now it's uneven. there are some places, some recruiting centers that have controlled access. that's been a result of crime in areas as opposed to threat but we need to move to a consistent standard. i think the department of defense would help with us that. my other comment, we won't rest
on our laurels. this is an evolving threat so as such our response needs to be an evolving response based on that threat. >> so within the federal protective service, government wide is the interagency security committee. the isc sets standards and guidelines for security at federally-owned facilities. those standards are developed by security level. so as a facility security level 5 is the pentagon. facility security level 1 is a store front, social security office on martin luther king avenue in southeast. 13 employees, not a high risk, not a high volume of work that goes on there. so those facility security levels determine minimum security standards. so it's security level 4, like the reagan building, if you've been into the reagan building as a visitor, you go through screening. you go through an x-ray machine with your packages and walk
through a metal detector as you go in and there's guards there that do the screening and if you have metal on you they'll turn you away. so it's been beneficial for us. we don't have crime in our federal facilities because we do this level of screening there but the insider threat is what's unknowable. normally employees that work in those buildings don't go through screenings because they work there. they have a compliant i.d. card, a background investigation, they're known but that doesn't mean they're not having an issue that may cause them to do harm to co-workers. so we think our security facilities are secure. based on the recruiting station, it might be a level one, there might be five recruiters there and i was a recruiter so i'm glad you're doing the work you're doing. but how do you balance that out? i know as a recruiter i wanted these guys and girls to come into the office.
come in and join the army. they're not going to want to do that if they have to go through a bunker to get into the office. i don't want to join this place. i know that's a big issue that dod is working with. this happened with gabby giffords. we met with the capitol police and we recommended, you know, it'd be nice if you can move those district offices into the gfs facilities that we protect, because anyone coming through there will be going through screening and anyone going to that auditorium for that speech does not have a weapon because they've been cleared. but the members of congress are like, i need to be with my people, see them where they are, not to have to come through this
gaunts let to see me. it's something all of us are working toward to make sure we're safe. >> from a local perspective, any types of intelligence that comes through, that dictates that there's a threat or anything directed toward a military recruiting facility or base, we would pick up either through our joint terrorism task force, or it comes through however fusion center, the rtac who monitors various different ssystems, so when suspicious acts come through, we have contingency plans. sometimes for visibility, sometimes they have to check in. it just depends on the level of the threat. so we're tied into that actively as well. >> this last question. i'd like to take this woman here who had a hand up earlier.
>> i'm kathleen kerrledge army time. i'm wondering if you feel that reservists need more training opportunities and training exercises to prepare, and if so, do you have enough resources under current budget constraint to conduct the training opportunities? >> that's a great question, and one of the challenges for this when we, when we look to arm service members in the united states, is we have to be mindful of the laws and authorities that we v the office of the provost general, general hitches, his area have putting together training programs so that they understand what the procedures are, what their authorities are
and how best to manage. we have rules on the use of force. so, from an army reserve standpoint, we have already reached out and began some of that training. we are in a position to be prepared to respond if the commander chooses to do that. you recall earlier that i mentioned that commanders have the authority to do that, and everyone has been tasked to develop a plan for their particular off-installation facility. so whether it's a small, detached community on it or a small ever unit request ten or 12 units, it's the command ever's responsibility. they look at people were the proper background checkes and so fort, defer to people with a law enforcement background. they could be military police soldiers, enlisted or officer serving in the you know et or members of local law enforcement that already have an authority to carry a weapon, and they know
what the local jurisdiction responsibilities are, the local laws. funding is tight, but security is important too. this is important for our service members, our commanders and further stresses the importance of the linkage with law enforcement. >> that's what i was going to add. that is yet another area that really dictates that you trachb with and have understandings with your local law enforcement so that the, everybody knows the roles and responsibilities when something happens. crucial. >> i'll just add with that, i mean, if you think about what we've talked about before. until this point, local law enforcement is the first responders. as we arm soldiers or prepare to, they could be coming upon a scene where there's somebody
else armed in addition to the bad guy. so we don't want our good guy soldiers that are responding to be misconstrued as adversaries by local law enforcement. that's why it's extremely important to not only have that training but to do exercises with local law enforcement so they can understand that communications are essential there. that's why our first default is always to partner with local law enforcement before we go to any decision like that. >> before we thank our panel for their participation, i want to thank you for joining us. we had a good turn out here, despite the competing presentation. and we went ten minutes over. my apologies there. i counted eight working-level one and two stars, nine if you count the three-star. the, in the audience today, so i just want to thank you for your level of interest on what is an important topic, and we look forward to continuing the conversation during the remapd