tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN December 16, 2015 10:00am-11:01am EST
this particular ideology. >> one question from the media, please. >> i'm not -- shall we? or no? yes? okay. yes. >> thank you very much. thank you very much to be here. you really sketched a beautiful picture of pakistan. i hope things get right soon. despite the successful military operations, the jihadi is producing factories still thriving in pakistan. the best example is the red mosque in the center of afghanistan, he's still calling for the imposition of islamic state. the female students taking for the chief openly, they are more than thousand of students armed in that mosque. nothing is doing there. and secondly, nothing is being
done against the band organization in pakistan. >> i -- to be very honest, i would not agree with that -- the assessment for the simple reason that why we launched the operation in the north which was a huge success, simultaneously, we also launched operations against various -- coming up live next, a hearing on u.s./pakistan relays. richard olson will testify this morning before the house foreign affairs committee. this is live coverage on cspan3. >> -- and maybe some of the other members will be able to as well. so this hearing is on the future of u.s./pakistan relations. the committee has repeatedly urged pakistan to take meaningful action against key islamist terrorist groups
operating within its territory. pakistan which is now home to the world's fastest growing nuclear weapons program has remained a fount of radical islamist thought. it was no surprise that one of the san bernardino attackers tashfeen malik studied at a pakistani school spreading a particularly fundamentalist message. after more than a decade under sanctions, pakistan was to be a key ally in combatting islamist militancy becoming a leading recipient of u.s. aid in the nearly 15 years since. while the u.s. was quick to embrace pakistan, pakistan has hardly reciprocated. pakistani governments have come and gone, but it's northwest
frontier has remained a terrorist haven which its security services protecting these groups and destabilizing afghanistan and threatening neighboring india. today, schools create an infrastructure of hate. 600 funded with gulf state money teach intolerate hate-filled rhetoric that inspires the foot soldiers of jihadist terrorism. pakistan must do the work to register schools and close those creating new generations of radicals. and those are the schools that are being funded with gulf state money. they need to be closed. meanwhile, pakistan's nuclear arsenal is on a track to be the third largest. its addition of small tactical
nuclear weapons in recent years is even more troubling. this is a country which spends a fifth of its budget on the military from long-range missiles to f-16s, but under 2.5% on education. through all of the double dealing, u.s. policy has essentially stood still. security assistance, cash in arms has continued to flow under the occasional temporary delays despite some department of defense assistance for pakistan being held because of inadequate efforts, the state department is currently seeking more arms for islamabad. pakistan itself has been devastated by terrorism with over 2,000 of its soldiers killed, thousands and thousands of its citizens killed in terrorist attacks. today, we recognize the year anniversary of a horrific attack
on a school that killed over a hundred children. we want a strong partnership with the country. but a new policy is long overdue. one option as ranking member angle and i proposed earlier this year, would be to target those officials who maintain relationships with designated terrorist groups with travel and financial sanctions. this would make it clear, the u.s. and pakistan cannot have a true strategic partnership until pakistan security services cuts ties with terrorist organizations. recently senior u.s. officials including national security advisor susan rice and deputy secretary of state tony blinken have traveled to islamabad reportedly to press on the pakistani government. we look forward to hearing from our witnesses today whether there is reason for hope or if our policy is stuck in the same
rut. i now will turn to mr. ted poe of texas and then mr. dana rohrabacher of california for their opening statements. mr. poe. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my concern specifically is with our relationship with pakistan. the united states has given pakistan $30 billion since 9/11. i think pakistan is a benedict arnold ally to the united states. even going back to may the 2nd, 2011, when there was the raid on -- in pakistan on osama bin laden, we didn't tell the pakistanis we were coming because, frankly, they would snitch us off and osama bin laden would have left. and the near confrontation that took place between the u.s. and
pakistan after the raid, pakistan scrambled two u.s. made f-16s and were headed to the area where the raid took place and a possible confrontation with two u.s. made jets against american helicopters at the raid didn't happen, but it could have happened. pilots that presumably were trained the year before in 2010 in tucson, arizona, and i think we need to be very concerned about providing armaments for pakistan who seems to play all the sides. and i'll yield back, mr. chairman. >> okay. and i now yield time to mr. dana rohrabacher of california. >> thank you very much. when i was elected 28 years ago, i think most people considered me pakistan's best friend in the
house of representatives. and let me just say that i -- over the years, i have been deeply disappointed that those people who i considered to be my friends were betraying the trust of the united states and were committing acts that were only the acts that an enemy would commit even though we continued to have a facade of friendship. we've given 30 billion, $30 billion since 9/11 to pakistan, yet we realize that since 9/11 yet we still see -- there's all -- ample evidence that pakistan is still deeply involved with various terrorist networks including supporting the taliban in afghanistan and radicals who kill americans. we've been, frankly, our relationship with pakistan has
been a disgrace. we have a government that gave safe haven to osama bin laden, the murderer of 3,000 americans, 3,000 americans slaughtered in front of us. i don't think anybody believes that the high level people of the pakistan government didn't know about that. they continue to hold a doctor just to rub it in our face that they -- the type of relationship they have with us. and to their own people, they're slaughtering people and others who are being brutal lly opress by a click in their government. the click that runs that country is treating us like suckers and they should because we are. we're acting foolish. we are very foolish giving people money who have
continually to involve themselves in activity that's harmful to the united states of america is not going to win their friendship. so mr. chairman, i hope that we face facts and if the pakistan government wants to be our friend, they can be our friend, but they have not been. and they need to change that if we are to continue to have -- on the relationship that we've had. i would like to at this point submit for the record a number of articles showing that again pakistan continues to support various terrorist operations as well as their relationship with china at the expense of their own people, and i submit that for the record at this point. >> without objection. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> we have four votes on the
floor so we will recess the hearing and return for witness testimony and questions after those four votes. we appreciate it patience of our witness and those in attendance. and for now, we stand in recess. so, as you heard this hearing on u.s./pakistan relations in a break now as committee members head over to the house for a brief series of votes. after those votes, we expect the committee to reconvene. we'll have live coverage when that happens here on cspan3. we have other live coverage coming up later today when we bring you remarks by the governor of puerto rico. they'll be talking about the steps they are taking to payoff
a $70 billion debt and revive economic growth on the island. also at 2:30, federal reserve chair janet yellen scheduled to hold a news conference to discuss monetary policy following a meeting with the fed board of governors. >> live coverage of that announcement here on cspan3 starts at 2:30 eastern. after that, we'll join the house rolls committee. that bill including a number of individual and business tax breaks. republicans and democrats will decide the rules for house floor debate which is expected tomorrow. again, we will have live coverage of this hearing on u.s./pakistan relations as it convenes in just a few moments. while we wait for that, bring you a discussion on pakistan's nuclear program. >> okay. thanks. great to be back at the atlantic
council and pleasure to share the stage with you and my colleagues here. so it's -- it feels like it's a little bit artificial to start this conversation from today when the sort of starting point for my involvement in this issue is several months back and a lot has happened in the intervening period. for the sake of the discussion, i'll kind of start at the beginning. why should there be a consideration of a nuclear deal with pakistan? i use that term "nuclear deal" in very vague ways. we can be more specific about it as we go along. i think in general there's a sense that because of the evolution of pakistan's nuclear arsenal, there's a growing sense of danger. that's being felt here and in other capitals. these growing nuclear dangers are raising the possibility of nuclear terrorism or nuclear war
or what have you in the region. so the -- despite the very good work that pakistan has done on nuclear security over the last several years, that its image is starting to change and that the perception of danger is also starting to grow. it is a threat to peace and security in the region and internationally. a lot of that derives, i think, from the recent sort of announcements about having tactical nuclear weapons, the testing of longer range system, the idea of putting nuclear weapons at sea. those kind of developments i think are what is driving this narrative. this scrutiny has led to some sense of a need to think through what the options are. and frankly the options are not particularly good. if you think about what leverage exists versus what the incentives are, i would submit on the leverage side, there's very little, and our record in addressing states that already have nuclear weapons with
punitive measures doesn't necessarily produce better results. and so in this particular instance, i'm not sure that there's good leverage to be had. in terms of pakistan's priorities, in speaking with officials there, you get a sense that it's pretty comfortable with where it is. it doesn't like the reputational part of this, but it has a sense of security that nuclear weapons have provided and that there's very little outside pressure could do to change that. but at the same time, the reputational piece does come into play when it comes to joining the nuclear regime. in that sense, if you were to assess pakistan's priorities, first priority is to keep india out of the nuclear suppliers group as a member. if india goes in, to make sure that pakistan has a way in, too. that discreet some set of incentives by a way of establishing a path to join
nuclear regimes. there's a question about whether it's wise to negotiate on that basis. that's the reason that we're here and i'll return to that in a little bit. my sense is that trying to negotiate these things kind of in a vacuum is not going to work. and in part, that has to do with the need for there to be a different internal logic in pakistan in order to accommodate these kinds of changes. essentially that as long as there is a military driven logic for more nuclear weapons, any sorts of measures that pakistan would take -- would need to take to join this path to the nuclear regime are unlikely, unless there's a change in the military logic and understanding of nuclear weapons. there's obviously institutional politics and military relations that come into play. in thinking through this problem, we tried to have this discussion in pakistan a year
ago. we asked people, okay, you want to get into the nuclear suppliers group, how are you going to do that. essentially, the answer we heard was, we're going to do exactly what india did. which is fine, but pakistan is not india. so we thought, well, there's some potential for pakistan to join the regime if it were to take certain steps. but what does the future look like. so we postulated two futures. one the status quo where it continues, that the pakistan military continues to think of deterrence in largely terms. that leads to a growing arsenal. when we looked at the numbers, purely on a fissle material
capability. that's just based on physician l material. but at some point, you have to question what additional capabilities actually do for deterrence. an alternative future also exists which is that at some point if there's a recognition that nuclear weapons aren't going to continue to deter at 300, 400 whatever the number is, then it becomes possible to think slightly differently about the nuclear capabilities that pakistan has. and that if pakistan were to decide it's secure in its capabilities, then it opens the possibility for some constraints. these kinds of constraints aren't denuclearization. it's thinking about what is the optimal number and force posture for pakistan to have and what
does that do in terms of the diplomacy potential for pakistan. well, i would suggest that these kinds of questions aren't really well debated in pakistan. what is the optimal number of weapons, what is the right force positive chur. what you tend to get is a sense that any constraint imposed from the outside would somehow compromise national security. without really thinking through what nuclear weapons do provide in terms of national security or even other ways of thinking about national security, but the strong feeling that any constraints and any demand for pakistan to compromise will somehow inhibit its national security. but for the sake of argument, if the military were to arrive at an understanding of nuclear weapons that was different from its current understanding, the number of nuclear weapons it has today are sufficient or some years down the road is sufficient, that it doesn't need
to add more, then diplomacy becomes an option and a nuclear deal i think becomes an option. in our report, we suggested five things that pakistan could do. these were exemplars, not prescriptions or demands. we suggested that changes in the declaratory policy would be useful. that somehow formalizing its recessed nuclear posture and thinking about numerical and tactical constraints would be a useful signal. that coming up with limits on fissel material production would also be useful and think about signing the ctbt before india with the understanding that if india were to test that pakistan would be able to exercise its supreme national interests cause and leave the treaty. is it wise to seek this path? i think that really depends on
what your assessment of priorities is. whether you think terrorism is a more important priority or other priorities. depends on your assessment of alternatives and whether we have other measures available to address this sense of concern about the direction and magnitude of pakistan's nuclear weapons program. is the status quo better or worse than trying to negotiate some sort of deal. what is the impact to the nonproliferation regime from trying to negotiate a deal. what would the impact be on the u.s./india strategic relationship. i think there's a lot of important questions that really haven't been adequately addressed and deserve further discussion. focusing just on pakistan is also a little bit artificial. and a lot of the criticism that we received is that we didn't address the india side of this question. we didn't call it a normal nuclear india, we called it a normal nuclear pakistan. even so, you do have to
recognize because the path way for pakistan depends on india's membership, you have to look at these things together. if there's an open door for india but a closed door for pakistan, that limits our policy options. there is wisdom in thinking about a bargain, both here and south asia. so i look forward to more discussion about it. >> thank you. >> great. i'll try to pick up where toby left off. i wasn't one of the co-authors on this report, but i read it, saw the merits in it, and some arguments why it would be beneficial for the united states, potentially for india as well. sort of the critical one in this mix is that if a nuclear deal or a nuclear agreement where pakistan sort of took the steps that toby and michael recommend, if that occurred, there would be a significant -- potential significant reduction in crisis escalation and nuclear
escalation. if this involved restricting or limiting the production and deployment of pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons, it could reduce interview the gravest dangers, or simple escalation on the line of control firing which happens on a routine basis between india and pakistan. during peacetime and potentially strengthen crisis stability. i think, you know, some of the greatest crisis escalation risks that we see in a future scenario come from compromise command and control in the fog of crisis, miss calculation or unauthorized launch. those are all exacerbated by tactical nuclear weapons being deployed in the field and being operational. if there was a way to constrain that or offer incentives for pakistan to restrict that, there
would be benefits for all parties involved, india, the united states, other observers as well. you know, in terms of the other planks of the idea of the -- so the -- it was not quite a deal per se, but things that pakistan could do that would signal steps towards nuclear restraint in order to be part of the -- become more normalized sort of nuclear state. some of the ideas of assigning the ctbt treaty, removing objections to that. all these things are not thinks that would necessarily be harmful to a country like india. it certainly would reduce pressures on nuclear competition which in the long run is probably good for india. their objective is to become a great power. and that will be benefited by not having to be engaged in a nuclear competition with
pakistan. i think another sort of positive step that can come out of this, it can show a path for pakistan out of isolation or potential perceptions of isolation. i think it can empower moderates to counter narratives that exist in some parts of pakistan that they're boxed in without any potential partners. the idea of containment has been floated, containment of pakistan. it only creates incentives for pakistan to take more provocative actions. and those are counter productive for stability in the region. as toby eluded to, there's some value in proposing this idea. how much does pakistan need, what mission sets, what are the objectives and what is sufficient for national security and the trade-offs involved in that process. if there ultimately is some calculation that nuclear weapons are a substitute for
conventional forces in order to have economic benefit, and there's some in the strategic pakistan military who argue this, then there's going to be a question of what is the sufficiency of the nuclear program pakistan has. those debates were necessary to have. i think the discussion of a nuclear deal sparked it because it allows pakistan to weigh the raping range of its requirements for national security. i think the iran deal that was signed this summer, there's been lot of references to it by critics of this idea who say that that's not really an appropriate model. it stopped iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. that can't be offered to pakistan. but the point was the iranian nuclear program, the reason we were willing to entertain this deal despite support for violent
nonstate actors, it would -- the acquisition of the weapon was less of a concern than the impact on strategic stability in terms of its power dynamics vis-a-vis israel, and with restrictions on u.s. operational freedom. it's the strategic effects of it that were the greatest concern. there would be a similar logic that if this deal could fore stall or persuade pakistan to restrict tactical deployments or long-range capabilities, then it might be worth considering. might be worth prioritizing above other concerns. there are two concerns i think i've heard raised against the idea of this. the first is that it rewards a quest for parity with indy, that
could set back india/u.s. relations. in terms of the deal, it potentially negate any request for material parody such as signing ctbt or restraining the tactical nuclear weapons deployment. what it would do is probably trade some degree of prestige, allowing it to be part of the same nuclear club as india. of course india's not particularly happy about this. this wouldn't have any significant increase in the material balance of power in the region. there's no reason to expect that marginal increase in prestige for pakistan would have a strategic effect. in terms of the india/u.s. relations down the road, i think the united states has proved itself deft and capable of managing relationships with rifle states.
we did this with greece and turkey in nato. we've done this with japan and south korea post world war ii. we managed to maintain military lines with japan while also increasing ties to china both economically, but also politically. it's plausible to advance a relationship with one state and maintain good relations with another even if they are rivals at some level. it's worth -- it's worth considering the debate. >> okay. well, without necessarily disagreeing with the logic of what toby and samir have had to say, i'm going to take a slightly contrary position. i agree with the logic what they're saying. but i think what a lot of observers fail to take into account is the fundamental strategy of the pakistani state.
i don't think their nuclear weapons program can be addressed without addressing the question or persuading pakistan to take a step back from its fwrand strategy that it has followed over the last 30 years. the idea has been in the air roughly about since 2010. and at least on the u.s. side, that would entail that pakistan accept some sort of -- a positive movement on nuclear arms control treaties, the comprehensive treaty, accept certain curbs in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons program in return for a nuclear -- with the united states. and also accommodation with the nuclear group which left restrictions on pakistan. in the past year, there have been rumors that the obama administration has turned its
attention towards pakistan after negotiating the nuclear deal with iran. now, pakistan wants a deal similar to the one that the u.s. struck with india in 2005 where the u.s. in essence gave india's nuclear weapons program a free pass. pakistan wants equivalence. it is not interested beyond point in making positive moves on the cutoff treaty and accept curbs on its nuclear weapons program arguing it should get the same terms that india did. from washington's perspective, by this i mean from within the beltway and outside the administration, the three greatest issues were the rapidly expanding size of the pakistani nuclear weapons program, the scope and ambition of the pakistani nuclear weapons program, as well as the potential danger of an implosion within pakistan, a political implosion or partial breakdown of the state in the future that
could in the future create a potential terrorism -- nuclear terrorism incident. from washington's point of view, pakistan must make progress in nuclear treaties and norms. and the carnegie endowment that published a report earlier this year, i'll reiterate these points. this approach is very sensible, but it misses the fundamental point that there is an underlying linkage between pakistan's strategy and its nuclear trajectory. the u.s. struck a nuclear deal with india because of the size of india's market and also because india is a potential to china in the asia pacific region. what a lot of people miss is the fact that india -- that the nuclear deal was made possible because india is a status quo
and a normal power. india accepts the national status quo. it chooses -- but it chooses internal and external balancing as a means to acquire great status which is considered both legitimate and acceptable in the international system. pakistan is a revisionist state. a revisionist power is a power that per sues a nonpeaceful means. and pakistan is revisionist because it seeks to overturn the status quo through the use of floor. it deploys non-state actors. so there is a linkage between its posture and threats to pakistan's internal stability. during the past 30 years, pakistan has used its arsenal to shield itself from an asymmetric
war with india. india's response to pakistan's nuclear weapons program is the threat to carry a limited conventional war into pakistan. faced with the prospect of a defeat on the conventional battle field, pakistan has adopted full spectrum deterrence strategy that would allow it to deal with india on every rung of the nuclear ladder. hence the idea to give up on tactical weapons or strategic deterrence absenabsent -- my art is that we are wasting our time asking pakistan to accept radical changes and implement arms control treaties and norms. our goal should be to pursue pack tan to be a norm state. now, if pakistan were to return to being a status quo seeking normal state, india would have
few incentives to threaten it with a war. pakistan in turn would have very few uses of its tactical weapons, then create positive incentives for pakistan to switch from full spectrum deterrence to a limited strategic deterrence strategy. let us assume that we succeed in persuading pakistan to accept curbs in nuclear weapons and give up full spectrum strategy. but this happens absent any changes in pakistan's grand strategy of territorial revisionism through non-state actors. in this scenario, pakistan would still remain vulnerable to the dangers of an internal implosion or partial state failure. one of the arguments, negotiating with pakistan, we should adopt the approach that
the obama administration adopted towards iran. this analogy between pakistan and iran is very sduktive, but i think it's flawed for two reason. this opened the door for negotiations. but there is little in pakistan's establishment on the pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons. second, in iran, there was never any cause or linkage. in pakistan's case, nuclear weapons are the keystone in its asymmetric and revisionist grand strategy. it makes sense for us to negotiate with iran in the iranian state and its fought for terrorism abroad, i don't think the same approach is valid for pakistan. in the case of pakistan, we must take up the task of pakistani
revisionism as part of any grand nuclear deal. the goal of american grand sfratgy since world war ii has been to promote democracy and discourage the growth of revisionist powers. pakistan fits this last category. any nuclear deal with pakistan independently of its revisionist grand strategy would end up treating the symptoms of the disease and not the disease itself. in india's case, we made an exception. in pakistan's case as well, we should down play the narrow technical nonproliferation agenda. normalizing the pakistani state has the best downstream chance of normalizing their nuclear trajecto trajectory. >> i'm going to take a slightly different approach and invite questions from the audience before i jump into my own
questions. >> my question is that there is a timely meeting because recently india and pakistan were at the highest level in islamabad and pakistan relations, but at the same time after few days, india was told by terrorists in pakistan that they will destroy india. so what message you think india should get, one official statement sometime including defense minister of pakistan that if needed including of course the general that they will use the nuclear weapons against india. what did the future of india and pakistan relations and also do you believe there is a nuclear race in the region? thank you. >> you want to go first? >> is the question to the
panel -- >> he was looking at you. >> well, so let me ask you -- let me answer the second question first. i don't think there is a nuclear race in the region because india is pursuing its nuclear trajectory at its own space. pakistan has really axccelerate the development of its nuclear arsenal. the indians have a series of objectives. i think in pakistan there is greater paranoia vis-a-vis india and they have accelerated the program. they have by most accounts a greater number of nuclear weapons in india, their inventory exceeds india's. in the operational aspects of the pakistani arsenal is far ahead of india's. but the race implying that there is this interactive dynamic. i don't see that happening.
but beyond that, i think relations are pessimistic and i do not see the prospects of -- it's like an ugly stability is actually tell us about a decade and a half ago and that will likely persist for some time to come. >> on the arms race question, i agree with the sense that there aren't interactive effects, but there are at least in a sort of tit for tat way. i think you do see in the broader security equation, you know, pakistan reacting to thinks that india is doing. tactical nuclear weapons are essentially a reaction to cold start. cruise missiles are something they were developing anyway, but have a logic if i beg your pardon -- india were to develop
missile defense. statements, rumors, procurements et cetera in india. in india, you don't see the same kind of drivers. they tend to be a little bit different. arms race has sort of a specific meaning and i think it's not an arms race, but there are security dynamics that do drive the competition in certain ways. >> i would agree with toby on that account. for example, i don't think that's happening. but the pakistani -- in pakistan, there is a greater sense of threat and i would call it paranoia. they are developing their arsenal at a very fast clip. in india, there is a lot of bluster. and a lot of it comes from the scientific agencies that have a lot of r&d programs. in pakistan, it is often read as
programs that will be operationalized and the response -- >> this raises an interesting point. our assumptions about india and pakistan are quite different in this regard. we think, okay, that is a system that is going to be operational. there tends to be greater skepticism about the pace and development in india. we don't always take it that that's something that will happen -- >> right. >> -- with any measure of speed. the rhetoric around pakistan as the fastest growing nuclear arsenal. pakistan is a victim of its own coherence and success. >> there's a reason for that why we don't take india seriously. >> it doesn't have to be just about missile buildups. there are ways that arms race can escalate in other types of capabilities. if we're saying that pakistan is reacting to some indian
capability of rapid reaction sort of on multiple fronts. whether we want to call it cold start or something else. there's a lot of talk in india these days about improving special operations forces capabilities. if that becomes a possibility, that is able to subvert pakistan's deterrence as they see it which can lead to counter reactions. in that sense, i think there's a reactionary cycle on both sides. >> could we broaden the discussion just a little bit to talk about india/pakistan in terms of potential strategic nuclear discussions, disa disarmament. i know that the answer to my question may be nothing, but what do you think it would take to induce both india and
pakistan to sit down and begin discussions about being sensible over the nuclear issues to put in place confidence building measures and other things that would alleviate if a new mumbai takes place, both sides are at the brink and now you have pakistan with more than a handful of nuclear weapons. >> sure. my sense is that there are several prerequisites. one is political leadership in both sides that has the wherewithal, the credentials, the support from the military establishment particularly in the case of pakistan to be able to have that kind of dialogue. that hasn't really existed, arguably existed in 1999, but hasn't since then.
there have been a number of working level discussions over the years about confidence building measures, but mostly they've been how to implement things that were agreed in the past tlchlt a past. there are a number of obvious things on the table that could be added. it's been, you know, patently obvious that adding cruise missiles to that is very good. there is an agreement to provide every year a list of nuclear facilities, an agreement not to attack those facilities. adding to that, an agreement not to use cyber means to attack those facilities would also be good. the big missing thing that would get you from confidence building measures to some arms control, broader restraint regime is political will. and it's -- partly that's will and ability to take and accept risk. just very difficult in both
systems to do that. >> you want to go? >> go ahead. >> i think looking back at the case of the u.s. and the ussr during the cold war, serious arms control really happened towards the end of the 1960s when both countries reached a certain plateau. there was a maturity in the development of the arsenal that it reached a maturation point. i would like to think in one sense that india and pakistan are still in the process of arriving there. and they have not had the kind of cuban missile crisis that has concentrated the minds of the political and military leads of the dangers of a nuclear conflict. it's all in theory yet. that would be a catalytic condition that might concentrate the minds. there's a famous saying, nothing concentrates the mind of an individual unless the prospects of being hanged in the morning.
i think -- i know it sounds rather ominous, but they haven't had that kind of a cuban missile crisis that really concentrated the minds. i don't think it's reached the maturity that both sides can start talking about what sufficiency means and how they might stabilize that competition. >> do you think there is a point at which there would -- >> i hope so. you know, in the report for example, they lay down the economics of what pakistan is doing. i would hope that at some point -- i would hope that it hits home. i'm skeptical, but i still hope so. >> i wonder if the -- just one other point. i wonder if it's actually not so much as a strategic level that there has to be some sort of breakthrough, but it's actually at the sources of instability that there needs to be some assessment that that is no longer a viable means of
conflict. maybe that amounts to a change in grand strategy, i don't know. but that might create the means for different kinds of confidence building that could translate into strategic arms control. >> i'll come back to that. >> okay. >> i'll just add that i think the point is well taken particularly when you talk to indians about sort of the relative priority of threats. the focus is still on sort of -- and maybe this is sort of a signaling device, but they constantly emphasize the terrorism issue above nuclear escalation risks. when you talk -- the big risk out of terrorism scenario that provokes some sort of crisis and mobilization towards the border is the nuclear scenario.
they're pretty persice persiste that risk. maybe it does require some sort of crisis to focus the minds on thinking crew clear signals and clear red lines. >> hi, thank you. i'm with the atlantic council. i wanted to ask you -- >> could you speak into the mic? we can't hear you. >> can you hear me? i wanted to ask you what impact is pakistan's nuclear relationship with china have on u.s. leverage with pakistan and do you see a role for china to change pakistan's strategy? thank you. >> i actually want to couple that question with my -- with one of my own questions. this is directly to toby and
samir, you can feel free to comment on it if you want. when i read your report, i saw you had list add whole range of challenges associated with striking out that pakistan's nuclear council -- and also point out that the pakistani position has hardened since the deaths and the evidence you gathered suggest that pakistanis feel compelled to compete against india. so, and coupling the chinese, that they have a healthy impression of the chinese, in this context, why would you think that pakistan would subject themselves to this sort of a deal? >> depends on what you mean by deal. >> the grand nuclear bargain. >> sure. so let me address the commercial piece first. i think it's absolutely the case that pakistan's nuclear energy
requirements, as it defines them, are being met by china. largely by way of ignoring the rules in the nuclear suppliers group. and it's hard to imagine a circumstance where there was a nuclear deal that would change that in some way. so i think that set of incentives that had existed in the case of india, although i take the point that was only part of the rationale. that doesn't exist. it's hard to imagine a vendor other than chinese vendors that would have the sort of state backing and tolerance to invest in pakistan. nuclear reactors are expensive and pakistan is short on capital. most wouldn't want to assume the liability of a very large infrastructure project there. the chinese seem to be able to do that. i think the net result of that is that not only because pakistan is not a good nuclear market and because china is
essentially satisfying the nuclear market and would under any circumstance, there's not a lot of argument for another deal because of that. your other question about whether china might have some leverage, i think is an interesting one. and you know, there's a history of chinese involvement in the pakistani nuclear weapons program. it's been written about. there are very strong beliefs in india that that cooperation continues. that the pakistani tactical nuclear weapons are essentially a product of chinese cooperation. i don't know whether that's true or not. if that were true, it would be a violation of the nonproliferation treaty. i suspect that it's -- that if there's truth in it, it's not as expansive as the indian claims are. but it may very well be the case that china and pakistan are collaborating on missile guidance, other sorts of things. who knows.
i'm sure there's evidence there. i'm just not aware of it. so that kind of raises a question about whether china would have incentive, given that it's aided pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the past, ostensibly or presumably for reasons having to do with balancing india in some way. why would it seek to restrain pakistan in some way? i think the answer there is, if it becomes apparent that what is happening in pakistan has some potential to damage chinese interest as well. whether their economic interests in pakistan, whether it's the potential that terrorists trained in pakistan carry out some attacks in china for which there's some evidence that the chinese have pressured the pakistani government in the past. you know, you can see a logic there where chinese perceptions of this problem might start to change. it's not clear to me that there has been an event yet.
there could be. so maybe in the future, it's possible that china might be a source of leverage, but at this point, it seems to take the opposite approach, which is to essentially ignore what is happening with the pakistani nuclear weapons program and continue to focus on large infrastructure project like the china corridor and the like and not use that in any sort of l leverage terms. similarly, if you draw a parallel to the china-north korea relationship, you see there a pattern of behavior that would suggest caution in thinking that china might be willing to use leverage over one of its neighbors and partners in the future. >> can i just add a little to that? i quite agree with that. >> we're supposed to be opposing, by the way. >> but everything china has done so far has contributed to the atonomy of the pakistan program. so i really don't see that happening in the immediate
future, except i'm just thinking of scenarios. one scenario could be what toby pointed out that pakistan becomes extremely unstable and there's partial failure and the chinese feel concern that might have spillover effects of a nuclear incident. the other is that the indians accelerate their nuclear weapons program and china feels threatened and decides it needs to acknowledge the indian program openly and come to some sort of agreement with the indi indians. that might open the door for some sort of triangular stabilizing the competition between the three. >> there's also a possibility, i mean, china may have played sort of a negative contributory role in the past and potentially in the present, but there's the potential for these things to change over time. we know that for long time, china was silent about pakistan's dalliance with violent non-state actors.
they were at least one of the pressure points for the the operation which then sort of precipitated a bunch of counterterrorist operations. a lot of suggestions they may have had pressure on the pakistani government as well. it's possible they can play that leverage role that the u.s. may lack, and i would also add to that, they're investing a significant stake in the pakistani land mass with substantial number of workers that are going to be deployed into this massive set of construction projects. so they are more at risk in future escalation scenarios than they have ever been, which probably gives them a stake in escalation control more so than they have ever been. >> one other thing, which is that you know, the nuclear suppliers group operates by consensus. if india is going to join, it will have to be with chinese support. and chinese government has been
fairly quiet on this subject, at least publicly. but there was one statement from the foreign ministry, i think in the spring, that was actually about pakistani membership, not indian membership. the reply that came back was that there essentially needed to be a way to handle the question of non-npt state membership in an equitable way, which suggests to me that, you know, i don't know what the extent of pakistan-chinese conversations on this issue have been, but that china will protect pakistan's interests in that regard and try to keep the door open in some way. so it's important that we think about chinese interests and what it can and can't do on this question, recognizing that our interests, the stated u.s. interest in having india in the usg may run up against china's interests. >> so, question for the panel. so if the pile-up and the growth
in pakistan's nuclear arsenal is driven by maybe a sense of insecurity within the establishment, what could the united states do to reduce that sense of insecurity that might lead to a change in behavior? >> do you want to go first? >> i mean, that's a tough one. i mean, if i were to be provocative, i would almost say that pakistan's sense of insecurity is path lodalogical. i think it's militaries operating on its own belief systems that are not shared outside. i really don't know what the united states can do. all the u.s. can do is supply, you know, high-tech conventional weapons which it tried in the past, it tried right through the 1980s. and even today, if you look, actually, there have been some very interesting -- a very interesting study that came out last year that looked at the conventional balance between india and pakistan and the gap at least in the immediate
short-term has narrowed and pakistan can do a much better job defending against india than most people would like to imagine. if there is this paranoia and it's driven by this pathological believe, i don't see what the united states could do, unless the united states really threw its weight behind trying to change pakistani grand strategy. unless pakistan were to give up their whole role of seeking revisionism and changing the status quo, it would not be a seic sateiated power. you're provoking a crisis that feeds into your threat and it becomes an endless cycle. >> so i think a lot this depends on sort of how you categorize pakistan as a state. even within -- we use a dichotomist term, but there's gradations in between, right? iran was a revisionist power in
1979. you can argue that they still are, but probably not the same as 1979. so there are gradations of change and learning that states can adapt to international sort of relations, structures, stimu stimuli. i think one, it's feeasible to imagine situations where it can abate over time, but if we thought about sort of what pakistan identifies as their core sort of security threats, it's based on sort of a territorial dispute with india, where there's large numbers of forces concentrated. so one of the paths out of this, it may not sort of be a right solution right now, but one of the paths out of this down the road is renewed dialogue that eventually tries to resolve some of the territorial disputes. >> once again, we're live on capitol hill as members of the house foreign affairs committee are reconvening for a hearing on u.s.-pakistan relation