tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN December 31, 2015 5:00pm-7:00pm EST
in the country with our local civil society partners, the afghan government and international donors to build momentum for governance reforms. as one of the leading countercorruption organizations operating there we were offinvi to meet with president ghani to discuss government reform. corruption remains an existential threat to the afghan state. much hope has been placed in the national unity government and there have been some early countercorruption victories. fct president ghani has set up a procurement board and personally veview reviews all contracts over $1 million. the senior government have now declared their financial assets but the view from the ground is that corruption continues to grow in response to political stagnation, rising insecurity and economic decline. while the afghan government has publicized important countercorruption initiatives there's a lack of strategy and
institutionalization of reforms. surveys show this year that over half of all afghans reported paying a bribe and 90% said that corruption is a problem in their daily lives. recent scandals have hurt the per s perception of reforms. a highly profitable public/private partnership on land which should have been already confiscated. a cynical response to all this could be that the place is just too corrupt and to give up trying. instead global witness believes that while anti-corruption efforts will take time, there are immediate measures that can have a substantial impact on corruption and help afghanistan on a more stable path. american leadership is especially needed in three broad areas. first, key aspects of countering corruption inegt afghanistan ar flagging and without efforts there will be stymied. one is the urgent need of a
permanent confirmed attorney according to afghan law who can prosecute corruption. also while the independent joint anti-crumbation monitoring and evaluation committee has had some issues. its dual key approach of having e e equal number of members is a key point. strategic thin reforms and capacity building to fight economic crime and corruption have largely stagnated. in order to bring this agenda back on track, reforms made in the wake of the kabul bank scandal and promised in the framework of 2012 should be progressively pursued. the international community largely disengaged from capacity building and overseeing a robust regulatory reform of the financial sector and the associated law enforcement after but if afghanistan is going to fight corruption and investigate
and prosecute terrorist related financing and end impunity to corrupt actors then significantly increased political engagement and the national unity government needs to take on ongoing piecemeal efforts and craft them into a strategy that links the goals of fighting corruption with the ways and means at their disposal coordinating the bodies to work as one team and fight. and finally, afghanistan needs to further build its legislative international transparency and accountability standards to create a secure environment where legitimate businesses can thrive. this includes committing and actually implementing the open contracting principles, the open extractive industries transparency initiative. it would greatly improve transparency in key sectors of the economy and better enanel oversight by civil society. it is hard for afghan or
american businesses, for instance, to risk investing capital in afghanistan not only due to insecurity but also because its continued poor regulatory environment and opaque procurement system and corruption and taxation in customs enforcement and for american businesses legitimate concerns with violating the foreign corrupt practices act. one area where reforms in u.s. engagement are especially critical is in the extractive scter where mining should be a pillar of the economy and for self-sufficiency is instead a source of corruptation and conflict that contributes almost nothing to the budget while at the same time the number two source of revenue for taliban after narcotics but the afghan government has not submitted crucial amendments to this law that could help start the process of wrestling it)ífxn aw from violent and corrupt actors. there are no quick fixes but there are many tools available to the united states in this fight. carefully placed aid conditionality along withtarget
targeted funding and visa bans and asset freezes and law enforcement investigations against the most difficult actors. but most importantly the united states needs to make corruption and establishing good governance a priority on par with securing economic development with aggressive action the battle for afghanistan is not yet lost. thank you. >> thank all three of you. we appreciate it. we are privileged to have the opportunity to have people like you before us. and, again, we thank you for your time and preparation in being here. ambassador cunningham, you worked with what i think would be i think people would say you worked with one of the most difficult people ever when you were working with president karzai. we ended up with the ghani government which i think most people believe is a pretty good outcome for afghanistan.
and i know there are numbers of things that he needs to put in place. i know he's a technocrat. probably not quite as much of a politician as karzai was. but understands things about good governance and corruption and those kinds of issues. but at the same time it's going to be very difficult for him to be successful, is it not, unless there's a secure environment there? i mean, i think at the end of the day that's the number one thing that will inhibit his ability to be successful. i'd like for you to speak to that. but also, there are additional diplomatic and/or other tools you think we as a nation at not utilizing properly? >> thank you for the question, senator. i think security really is at the base of everything that afghans want to accomplish.
and the huge amount of uncertainty over the last couple of years generated by karzai's refusal to sign the bilateral security agreement which -- which we negotiated, which i negotiated, the uncertainty around the political process, the uncertainty about what would happen with american troops and the american troop presence given the president's announced deadline of withdrawal by the end of 2016 created a massive amount of uncertainty and loss of confidence in the afghan system that they're only now beginning to recover from. and that's why i said in my statement that the president's decision to extend the troop presence through 2016 without a deadline is the first time in many years that there has been a degree of certainty that the united states will actually be present in a significant way militarily to continue to support the aftghan security
forces. that's an incredibly important signal to afghans and to the region that we need diplomatically with our partners to find a way to magnify and to leverage to effect strategic strategic calculations in the region about hedging activity and which way the future will go and to give confidence the afghans in the security forces that they can succeed and that we and our partners will be there to help them up those times when they fall short. so, i think this is now a new opportunity for all of us to move forward and to try to counteract i guess is the best word the kind of report that you and your committee members were so concerned about hearing from the intelligence community the other day. >> mr. jilali, i don't know what numbers are public and what
numbers are not public and so like senator kane, i want to be very careful, but at a minimum, a massive turnover rate in the military. i don't even want to speak to what the officials' numbers are, but they are very large at a minim minimum. i know that you have discussed the need for us to be there under this same arrangement for five years, is that correct, in your written testimony? could you talk just a little bit about the state. i think all of us have -- whenever we go to afghanistan we're taken to where the afghan military's being trained and we're seeing the maneuvers they're going through, and while we appreciate the fact that people in afghanistan are good fighters, it's hard to detect a real commitment and professionalism in that regard. i just wonder if you could speak
to the turnover rate and also the things we need to do over the next five years to ensure that ghani is able to be successful and/or his successor. >> thank you, senator, for the question. there are a number of factors that affect the situation and five years is just an approximate number. what we are talking about five years also we get a cue from what the recent nato discussions and nato meetings revealed that nato would like to continue the level of support that will keep about 12,000 troops in afghanistan for the next five years. which i think probably it will be discussed during the nato summit in warsaw in july. but what i[wb, am talking aboute
years is because i see the gaps in the capability of afghan national security forces. they fight well. but because of the lack of capabilities, they are unable to have the kind of agility that they need in order to respond to the insurgents' attacks everywhere. now, in order to cover the very difficult areas in the country, most of the after gaghan securi forces are based in fixed bases. and then the taliban have the abilitoknlt to choose the time space to concentrate against fixed targets in afghan national security forces. the low ratio of force to&:tñ s
can be, you know, compensated by technological force multipliers, that's the air force, that's the mobility, that's the firepower, and also logistics. therefore, i say it will take a long time for afghan national air force to develop and also the logistic system, the intelligence, and their special forces operation. until that happens, afghanistan will be handicapped by being a kind of mostly static force, not have the agility to respond quickly to the taliban. in kunduz and helmand, it was the air strikes by the united states air force that helped afghan government forces to deny taliban to get control of many districts or to expel taliban from the kunduz5(c÷ city. >> just -- i know my time is up
and i obviously want to be courteous to the other members. what is it, though, culturally, what's happening within the afghan military where we have such a high percentage of people that leave each year that then cause us, again, to have to keep the numbers we have in mind? we have a massive amount of training that we have each year, therefore, you lack the ground that otherwise would be the case. >> that is a problem, senator. nobody knows the actual numbers of afghan national security forces. on theq 6x)nñ paper we have 195 army and 157,000 of police. however, according to the information i have i got from afghan and also international sources in november, about 90% of the forces are not on duty --
>> 90% of the forces. >> 90% are present. between 90% and 91%. which means in november the number of national afghan army were about 75,000. so it was 25,000 listed in the authorized level. on the other hand,+r=÷ some of troops are deployed in difficult geographical areas. and they are there and they could not be moved easily. so then you have the -- many of the forces, the troops, are exhausted and they have little time to go on leave. and plus some are -- when they go on leave, their families are threatened by taliban not to go back.
so, it is -- the attrition rate is about 5,000 a month. but at the same time, the number of volunteers who come far exceeds the number of the people who leave the army. so, there is no lack of volunteers. it difficult to have the full level of the forces at the same time. >> thank you. dr. vitorri, i'm sure others will ask you questions about corruption, it's been a massive, massive issue in the country and it cannot go forward productively without dealing with that. thank you for being here. senator cardin? >> that's what i'll ask about. first of all, all three of you, thank you very much. i agree with the chairman, i found your written testimony and your presentations here to be very helpful to truly understand the challenges we have in afghanistan, so i think today's hearing has been very helpful, both panels. i want to try to drill down for
all three as to what the united states can do in its policy in order to try to advance the issues that you've raised in your individual presentations. and i tell you, i found your statement to be extremely helpful in a roadmap to what afghanistan needs to do to fight corruption. and you were pretty specific as to ways that we could advance that through the tools we have available in our tool kit. could you give me perhaps your first or second or third priorities as to where you would like to see the united states concentrate for change in afghanistan to fight corruption? >> thank you, senator, i appreciate that. as we've put it in our written testimony for global witness, our first immediate priority is that there really needs to be an attorney general appointed, a permanent attorney general. the current acting attorney general has been there for -- >> that's your top priority? >> for the extremely short term which actually present ghani i believe has promised in his --
the senior officials meeting to because we have an acting attorney general right now, who has been there since the karzai administration and the attorney general's the only government official ultimately who can prosecute corruption. we would obviously strongly urge that this be a very high quality individual with a very strong mandate to go after corruption after the difficulties of the previous administration. but overall, our -- we would say in the long term that whereas the united states seems to primarily prioritize security hoping they could catch up on governance later, what we find in everything from think tank studies to academic studies to experience on the ground is that governance and security have to be operated concurrently and have to be prioritized concurrently. and i think the questioning from the previous panel has demonstrated that. when you look at issues like kunduz with the role, for example, of arming warlords for the last decade or so there, you
have warlords who had -- who have been think tanks have noted that these warlords in particular made a lot of grievances with the population due to human rights issues and in the end frankly when you're arming warlords and other elicit actors that are not strongly in the command and control of the government they are acting out on behalf themselves. if they need to switch sides retreat or retreat or whatever because it's best for them regardless of whether it's best for the good of the nation they will do so and we saw that with two key warlords in particular according to "new york times" and other reports in kunduz itself and we've seen it in other locations. we also see it in issues with the afghan national security forces themselves and the police. if the place are highly predatory in a particular location, if their level of unofficial taxation, extortion, is higher than, for example, the taliban, there are cases where it could actually make rational sense for individuals to go to the side of the taliban and the grievances that come with that
as well can push people to the side of the taliban. take, for example, corruption in land. this is one of the major reasons that has been assessed that for local violence in areas but also when people lose their land grievance -- when there's no grieve anticipates resolution mechanisms that can be used legally, people will naturally go to the other side if that's a side that promises to help them get their land back, settle their grievances, perhaps provide a cleaner level of grievance resolution, provide a better level of judicial services. so, you cannot get ahead in the security environment if the corruption environment is undermining every set of security games you make. >> i think that's very helpful. i agree with your statement. and i think you do give us a roadmap for how we need to try to develop the u.s. role in afghanistan and fighting corruption because it's very much related to security of that country. no question. economic future of the country
and everything else. ambassador cunningham, you really i think in your statement put your finger on the principal as it relates to afghanistan. and i'm quoting from your testimony, the test will be whether pakistan takes concrete actions not only to support reconciliation but to reduce the ability of the taliban in the haqqani network to plan and launch operations from pakistan which greatly diminishes the prospects for real negotiations. to understate it we have a complicated relationship with pakistan. what can the united states do in its bilateral with pakistan to further the prospects for reconciliation and peace in afghanistan? >> well, senator, congratulations for putting your finger on exactly the most
vexing question that immediately comes to the fore when you're talking about how to bring an end to the conflict. and this is something that now that i'm out of government that i want to use my current position with the atlantic council to see if we can develop some fresh thinking about. as somebody who sat in kabul for 3 1/2 years knowing that every day that i was there somebody from pakistan was trying to kill the people that i was responsible for, i have certain strong feeling about that dynamic. i think the levers that we have tried to use, leverage and incentives that we've tried to use, have -- as ambassador olson said in his remarks, i think there has been a conceptual shift among pakistan's leaders. there's certainly been a shift in the rhetoric over the last couple years.
and as the statements made in#k islamabad at the heart of asia meeting do open up some new perspectives perhaps. the challenge is to find a way to change the strategicwp strategic calculations to get them pushed to a negotiation, at least the taliban, many people think the haqqanis are irreconcilable. but the hedging behavior on the part of pakistan. in their defense, they have suffered a lot in their own fight against terrorism. they don't have very much confidence in developments in and they, too, have long had questions about what the united states would ultimately do in afghanistan. we need to resolve those issues. in our own interests. and in our own interests in dealing with the threat of terrorism from that part of the
world and then use the clarity about our intent and purpose and that of our partners to effect calculations that up to now have not been -- hat have prevented the opening of the doors that need to open to have a real discussion about what the future of that region looks like and a future that benefits pakistan as well as afghanistan. >> well, i look forward to your% active engagement as a private citizen on this issue because we need to figure this out. )ó, some of our private discussions y the public discussions and realities, unless we have a constructive role by pakistan here it's going to be very difficult to see the reconciliation move forward so i appreciate your comments on that. mr. jilali, i also appreciate you being here. i'm just going to acknowledge
factor in improving prospects for sustained political, economic and security cooperation with the national unity government is to implement the structural electoral and functional reforms with the afghan state. i think that's absolutely essential. it deals with vittore's comments and ambassador cunningham's, it's really whether we can put a confidence in the reforms in afghanistan that can really bring in all sectors of afghanistan for security and economic prosperity, so i thank all three of you, again, for your testimony and i can assure you it's had an impact on our committee. >> thank you, mr. chair, and thank you to the witnesses. i have a lot of questions, but i'm just going to ask one that intrigues me. the administration strategy in afghanistan is the title, one key element of the administration's strategy was successful elections at the end of the karzai tenure. there were efforts to
destabilize the elections that were generally unsuccessful, so that was a positive, but then the election led to a result that was a potential disastrous stalemate. the u.s. played an important role, theba(s administration pl an important role in helping to broker the formation of the partnership between president ghani and ceo abdullah. the title chosen was a national unity government which sets a pretty high standard and it seems to me that virtually you at issues we're talking about today whether it's the security issues or whether it's anti-corruption activity or whether it's relationship vis-a-vis pakistan, all these depend is the national unity government, really a national unity government. so, i would just like each of you to offer from your own perspectives a year-plus into this how cohesive and professional is the working
relationship between ghani and abdullah and their constituents. if you want to share positives and negatives and positives or work that remains to be done, i'm really interested in that dynamic a year plus in. >> thank you, senator. this is a very important question which is being discussed i think daily in afghanistan, too. unfortunately the campaign for the presidential elections turned into kind of a campaign that was not aimed as making a difference, but it was aimed at winning the elections. this way that the two camps brought together -- >> we don't know anything about that kind of election. >> i was going to say, they
learned well. >> with different groups with different agendas, different interests, different visions. when that two camps actually finally agreed to form this national unity government, then that problem was there.y06x now the two major challenges that was faced this government from day one was how to,!] main unity, keep everybody happy, but at the same time be effective in governments. the government failed to have that balance. many members of the two leader -- i mean, supporters of the two leaders have their own interests. this affects -- this actually reflects in appointments of people who are considered the allies of different elements of
these two groups. that actually undermines the professionalism of the armed forces and also it stalls the appointment of people to key positions. i think that the previous panel it was said that the minister of petroleum and mining said they cannot fill 290 positions there. it does not mean that they are not qualified people, because the two leaders should agree, and not only the two leaders but also their allies shouldyy agre on these positions. that makes this government unfunctional in many areas. second, the government all -- when the two leaders, dr. abdullah and dr. ghani, they have good relations, but they have to listen to their other allies. they are influenced by their other allies. therefore, they share the
authority to appoint people. and this makes appointment very, very, you know, slow. on the other hand, this also brings another problem. the problíírl is instead of working through institutions, empowering institutions, individuals are becoming empowered. and that undermines the effectiveness of the government. so, therefore, i think the real solution is what is in the deal. it says at the end of the two years -- in order to legalize government. if dr. abdullah is there with the review of the constitution, it becomes the prime minister, then he will be prime minister, then he will work for the president. now president and prime minister or ceo who is appointed by a decree of the president. he has the same power, equal
power, authority. and the third while the president has the constitutionaf legitimacy, it has its power, authority from the constitution. dr. abdullah gets it from the decree of the president, however, he does not have that power in the constitution. therefore, he plays his political card. ut see in opposition within the government. >> mr. cunningham, you are such an important part of a really successful negotiation. i think it was a huge coup that your role, secretary kerry's ujuj in trying to promote the formation of the unity government to get over the electoral impasse. your sense of it a year in? i'm quite interested. and, mr. jilali, thank you for your thoughts. i really appreciate that. >> i'll have to decide in due
course whether this is something i want to be remembered for or not. let me say by way of context, first, nobody ever thought this it was very clear from the beginning this was a difficult enterprise. both dr. ghani and dr. abdullah genuinely believe that -- each of them genuinely believe that they won the election, so did their followers. and so as we were even starting to begin the discussion, there was already a huge gap, each side feeling that it had won the election, therefore, why was it being asked to enter into a discussion with the other side what the government would be like. and this was also in thea=(au of lack of clarity about what the outcome of the elections would eventually prove to be. so, it was a very fraught
political exercise, and anybody who has been involved in politics if you just put yourself in their place for one second, you realize how difficult this was. even in countries that have experience in creating coalition arrangements and governing find it difficult to come to agreement and to then implement government. there's no experience in doing this in afghanistan at all. so, it's no surprise that they're struggling. the relationship, i agree with mr. jilali, minister jilali, the relationship between the two men is pretty good. they each understand what's at stake, and to their credit they both took an inkrebly responsible and statesmanlike position to put aside what their personal preference would be and to focus on the good of the country. the problem is keeping that focus is incredibly difficult and it is much more difficult for the people around them as they go through the difficult dynamics of actually governing,
making decisions, making appointments and all the rest of it. everybody's disappointed they haven't made more progress, including both of them, i know from speaking to them. they remain committed to trying to make this work, because they believe, as i do, and as i still do, that there is no better alternative for afghanistan than making this work, even if it's painfully difficult. the alternatives to forming the national unity government or an alternative now to it in some form can never create the kind of -- even if it's only formal unity that the country requires. and indeed, our discussion about elections began more than a year before the elections actually took place, because afghanistan's political classes as i was, they were concerned about the prospect of the elections leading to a break-up
in the political fabric and eventually a break-up in the country. so, we talked -- we began a discussion long before the elections about the need not to produce an outcome that would split the north and the south and pashtuns and fjhtajiks and a and sunnis. afghanistan's existed as a country for many centuries, and afghans have seen what happens when that cultural and political consensus spins apart as it did during the civil war. and they've looked into the abyss. that's the thing that gives me optimism that this will continue to work. because the alternatives are dangerous for them and ultimately dangerous for us. >> i'm over time, but i can ask dr. vittore to address it. >> thank you, senator. as has already been mentioned, both candidates ran on a strong anti-corruption platform, so in
theory this should be a transformative government and broad based if they're both sincere about corruption they should be able to transform the government significantly. but governments are more than just two individuals and are there a number of individuals of varying quality beneath the executive office that have to be contended with and significant patronage networks that still remain within the government that has to be worked with to be frank. and so while there is no poll data or other academic data we do continue to hear concerns from the field because of the tronage networks there could be two sets of parties to pay off instead of one which would be an indicator why we see corruption has grown and not shrunk from 2014 to 2015. but it also speaks to the response of institutionalizing reforms, putting in good legislative laws and so forth.
which are necessary but not sufficient in the government. and professionalizing a civil service away from individuals and more to a professionalized civil service organization to begin the patronage networks, to pull it from the individual and towards a professionalized government that can work for the good of the country versus the good of individual strong men and other interests. thank you. >> thank you very much. you've answered it from different directions but there's some consistent themes among the three answers and i appreciate your testimony. thank you, mr. chair. >> we're about at that time, but i just want to follow-up a little bit on that. i know when we go in to a culture and we want to make things happen quickly, we obviously are dealing with a culture where they are at that moment. we hope to have things put in place over time that cause corruption and other kind of things to dissipate and go away. but when we begin we're dealing
with a culture as it is. and i'm just wondering if there's any lessons learned that you might be willing to share with us. do we when we enter a country like this on the front end sometimes send mixed signals relative to our actions trying to generate immediate outcomes and our rhetoric as to what we want to see them do over time. that's you, doctor. >> if i may wear my professor hat in this case, one of the issues we will deal with when we go into countries, we never go into a country that's in a good situation by definition. we don't go into places that are strong and stable and so forth. if we're going in with the 82nd airborne, we're going in because the situation's already a problem. and that means that unfortunately corruption statistically speaking is probably already very high. the state has been very fragile. and most likely they've been through a number of cycles of warfare in these countries.
and so unfortunately there will be cases where you essentially have to rent your friends when you first get in to get access because they're the individuals that can give your airfields and intelligence and so forth. that involves suit cases of cash. through 10 years, 15 years into a warfare where you'reüj still handing suitcases of cash to try mission success is going to be extremely difficult to get to at that point. i think the biggest lesson we're learning in all of these operations in any of the.rúñ countries that we've dealt with z>!fr looking at iraq or whether we're looking at afghanistan, when we first go into the country have been wonders what the new rules of the game are going to be. everything's up in flux. i putting in strong institutions, will there be prosecutions for previous war crimes, will there be accountability and transparency put in what can individuals get away with. and we saw that in afghanistan as well. it's one of the situations where an ounce of prevention is really worth a pound of cure.
putting in those issues early on right away establishing good governance along with security is much easier in the early stages where everybody's waiting to see what's going to happen then waiting until the entrenched interests have gotten with their money and militias and so forth and trying to weed it out later and then you have a problem where weeding out corruption is probably generational at that point when you've gotten that far. so, i would say the lessons learned to afghanistan we should see being applied to ukraine. where is the oversight and accountability? how do we deal with oil politics and pipeline politics and the resource issues that can face ukraine? how have we insulated the ministry of defense and interior there against corruption and ensuring, for example, that promotions are merit based and assuring that logistics networks are sound that the quartermaster general groups and so forth aren't diverting assets that should be going to ukrainian
troops and instead be putting it, for example, on the black market or even sold potentially to enemies. if that occurs. there's no information that i know that that occurs. when we first go in to location% whether it's diplomatically or militarily how do we start the process early on and shape the battle space if you will, set the rules of the game come out with a rule of law, governance, solid military and the democratic reforms we would like. thank you. >> you gave the answer that i thought you would give. when we go, we go into a crisis mode. we want things to happen quickly. and i think, again, we establish on the front end that we're -- i understand this may be out of necessity, but we start building on the existing culture of corruption. and especially when you're dealing with people like we've had in leadership there up until
recent times. it just perpetuates that and, you know, we've heard, you know, it's almost i guess a joke, you know, we hear the stories of our guys going in to meet with former leader there about corruption and then right behind him would be somebody coming in with suitcases as you're talking about. so, i think that's a real challenge for us. and on that note moving back to the ambassador, since you're on the private sector side now and utilizing your('
any advice to us as we look to trying to reconfigure those, if you will, if our own image? >> first of all, let me say how much i appreciate your continue interest, your personaln continued interest in this, i know you have a lot of other business pending. i think one of the lessons of afghanistan -- i wasn't directly involved in iraq, i was indirectly involved through my work with the8[j'ited nations. but i think one of the lessons in both places actually is that we tend to overestimate our reach and our capabilities. it's exceedingly difficult to refashion or repair another culture, to2 state, especially in a situation where you have imperfect knowledge of how it operates, how the culture operates. you have people cycling out
after one-year tours. it's a -- i would just say it's difficult. and when i got to afghanistan in the summer of 2011, it was the peak of the military surge, which was actually already starting to turn around. butk i was instructed to comple the civilian surge which we hadn't quite topped out at becauwe never did, because as soon as i got there we needed to reverse course just like the military. >> just to refresh our memory, the time spans, the years were? >> i got there in the summer of 2011. and when i got there, we were still trying -- we americans and our partners out of the best of motives were still trying to fix every broken window in the country. and that generated that impulse and the amount of money that was -- that was available and
which people were trying to manage and doing so in very good faith created a whole bunch of secondary and third-level effects that i don't think we effects thatell.on't think we >> damaging to their society. >> and damaging to their -- did a lot of good. >> yep. >> don't get me wrong. none of the statistics and benefits that the other panelists cited would have happened without that effort. but i guess i'd say that one lesson learned is that we need to be -- first of all, i hope we're not going to be doing that sort of thing in the future. but to the extent we are, i think we need to learnbjrñ lesa little bit about the limits of our capabilities to actually accomplish the very good things that we might want to accomplish under those kinds of circumstancesb8fsp, and we cert need to do a good job of learning what worked and what didn't work in afghanistan. >> well, listen, you all have been very, very helpful. we thank you for the service you've provided our nation and
the service you're providing now on the outside. and hopefully you'll be back up to help us again in the future. if you would, we'd like to leave the record open until the close of business monday and if questions come in, hopefully you'll answer those fairly further ado, unless you'd like to close with any kind of comments. i see no nods. the meeting is adjourned. thank you so much. c-span has your best access the house and senate will
reconvene on january 4th to mark the second session of the 114th congress. on tuesday, january 5th, the house is back for legislative work and first votes with paul ryan as speaker of the house. then on monday, january 11th, the senate returns at 2:00 p.m. eastern. be sure to follow c-span's capitol hill producer craig kaplan on twitter for daily congressional updates. c-span, live coverage of congress on tv, on the radio, tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span, congress year in review. we'll look back at the major events of 2015 in congress, debate on the iran nuclear agreement, the historic papal address to a joint meeting of congress and john boehner resigning as speaker of the house. >> it's become clear to me that this prolonged leadership
turmoil would do eharm to the institution. so ñ@n5 morning i informed my colleagues i would resign from the speakership and resign from congress at the end of october. now, as you've often heard me say, this isn't about me. it's about the people. it's about the institution. >> you can see the entire story of john boehner's resignation from congress and the other top stories from capitol hill of 2015 tonight on c-span at 8:00 p.m. eastern. tonight on american history tv on c-span3, road tod the whie house rewind with archival coverage of past presidential races. at 8:00 p.m. eastern then texas governor george bush making his first presidential campaign trip then vice president al gore also making a campaign trip to new hampshire in 1999.
after that, donald rumsfeld speaking in 1987 in new hampshire as he explored a run for president. and later, former massachusetts senator paul tsongas in april 1991 announcing his 1992 presidential campaign. this new year's weekend american history tv on c-span3 has three days of featured programming. jájjt friday afternoon at 3:10 eastern pamela smith hill editor of "pioneer girl, the annotated autobiography" discussions the life of laura ingals wilder comparing and contrasting the tv series to the real life. >> wilder chose to write about people, places and memories that were not only important to her personally but that would resonate with adult readers in the early 1930s. so, as reviewers and reporters
have pointed out "pioneer girl" indeed contains stark scenes of domestic abuse, love triangles gone awry and a man who lit himself on fire while drunk on whiskey. all of that is the there. >> then on saturday evening at 6:00 james swanson compares the assassinations of presidenfyw abraham lincoln and john f. kennedy highlighting the similarities and differences between both tragedies. and at 10:00, the 1965 nbc's "meet the press" interview with daniel p. moynihan who as assistant labor secretary authored a report on the causes of black poverty in the united states. >> i believe that -- i believe what president johnson said in his howard university speech, you cannot keep a man in chains for three centuries and then take the chains off him and say the race of life with anybody else. they have to be made -- people have to be given the opportunity to compete with effective resources, and i believe that we should make a special effort. >> and sunday night at 9 :30, a
visit to pershing park in washington, d.c., to hear about proposed designs for a new national world war i memorial. for its upcoming 100th schedule, go to c-span.org. up next on c-span, a conversation on pakistan's nuclear program. israel has never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. pakistan first tested a nuclear weapon in 1998. from the atlantic council, this is 1:20. good afternoon and welcome to the atlantic council. i'm bharath gopalaswamy, and i'm the director of the atlantic council south asia center. it's my pleasure to be here with
toby dalton, sameer lalwani and gaurav kampani at theym%t atlan council south asia center, also the professor at university of tul sarks but we wanted to claim full ownership of our fellow. as you all know, we are here today to discuss the policy options to address the potential of a grand nuclear with pakistan. earlier it was rumored the obama administration was working on a deal with pakistan. for pakistan it would be a welcome into the nuclear club in the words of a journalist. prior to visits by prime minister sharif followed by rah eel shah reef, this was the rumor floating around. around the same time, toby dalton and michael cray gone from the carnegie and stinson center published "mainstream a
normal nuclear pakistan" which i understand was met with a lot oq criticism, to put it mildly s. that correct, toby? >> since then there's an increasing pes sichl about the prospects of a deal. uáuáq committee on foreign affairs hosted a hearing on the subject. what the congressional hearing made clear was the need for intense scrutiny of a possible deal, the geopolitical landscape in which it would be implemented and the lasting effects of a normal nuclear pakistan. in the region there are various hurdles to a potential deal includingvçsls pakistan's own willingness to engage with the united states. those i believe are represented in the panel today. i hope lit make for a fascinating and enlightening conversation on this very important subject. without further ado, i'd like to provide their opinions on the issue. as i have it, toby goes first. sameer, wouldó d;u like to follw
toby? and gaurav kampani. each will have seven to ten minutes and then we'll engage in question and answer session. >> thanes, bharath, great to be back at the atlantic council. always a pleasure to share the stage with you and my colleagues he here. it feels like it's a little artificial to start this conversation from today when the starting point for my involvement in this issue is several months back and a lot has happened in the intervening period. for the sake of the discussion, i'll kind of start at the-z beginning. why should there be a consideration of a nuclear deal with pakistan? i use that term nuclear deal in very vague ways. i think we can be more specific about it as we go along. think in general there's a sense that because of the evolution of pakistan's nuclear arsenal, there's a growing sense of
danger. that's being felt here and in other capitals, growing nuclear dangers are raising the possibility of nuclear terrorism or nuclear war or what have you in the region. so despite the very good work pakistan has done on nuclear security and the like over the last several years, its image is starting to change and the perception of danger is starting to grow, and it is a threat to peace and security in the region and internationally. a lot of that derives i think from the recent announcements about having tactical nuclear weapons, testing of longer range systems, the idea of putting nuclear weapons at sea. those kind of developments i think are what is driving this narrative. so this scrutiny has led to some sense of a need to think through ñare. frankly, the options are not
particularly good. if you think about what leverage exists versus what the incentives are, i would suggest on the leverage side there's very little and our record in addressing states that already have weapons with punitive measures doesn't necessarily produce better results. in this particular instance, i'm not sure there's good leverage to be had. i think in terms of pakistan's priorities, in speaking with officials there, you get a sense that it's pretty comfortable with where it is. it doesn't like the reputational part of this, but it has a sense of security that nuclear weapons have provided and there's very to change that. but at the same time the reputational piece does come into play when it comes to joining the nuclear regime. in that sense, i think if you were to assess pakistan's priorities, the first priority is to keep india out of the
nuclear suppliers group as a member. second priority is, if india goes in, to make sure pakistan has a way in, too. that actually does create some set of incentives by way of establishing a path to join nuclear regimes. now there's a question about whether it's wise to negotiate on that basis. that's i think the reason that we're here. i'll return to that in a little bit.íse;f(my sense is that tryi negotiate these things kind of in a vacuum is not going to work. b with the need for there to be a different internal logic in pakistan in order to accommodate these kinds of changes, essentially that, as long as there is a military-driven logic for more nuclear weapons, any sorts of measures that pakistan would need to take to join this path to the nuclear regime are unlikely unless there's a change in military logic and
understanding of nuclear weapons." in thinking through this problem, we tried to have this conversation in pakistan. you want to get into the nuclear suppliers group, how are you going to do that? essentially the answer we heard was we're going to do exactly what india did which is fine, but pakistan is not india. i think there's a cognitive dissonance there that exists. we thought there's potential for pakistan to join the regime if st but what does the future look like? we postulated two futures, one a projection of the status quo in which the security competition that exists between pakistan and india continues, that the pakistan military continues to think of deterrence in largely relative terms, that is, any time there's a qualitative or
quantity taif ching in yand's nuclear arsenal, that pakistan would need to address that in some way. that leads to a growing arsenal. when we looked at the numbers purely on a material production capability, assuming no other constraints, we came up with the figure that pakistan could have something like 350 nuclear weapons.+ysañ again, that's just based on future also exists which is that recognition that nuclearv.ñ6 ws aren't going to continue to deter at 300, 400, whatever the number is, then it becomes possible to think slightly differently about the nuclear capabilities that pakistan have, and if pakistan were to decide that it's secure in its capabilities in absolute terms,
then it opens the possibility for some constraints, and these kinds of constraints aren't denuclearization, ran>in,it's thinking what is the opt nall number and force posture for pakistan to have, and what does that do in terms of the diplomacy potential for pakistan. i would suggest that these kinds of questions aren't really well debated in pakistan. what is the optimal number of weapons, the right force posture? what you tend to get is a sense that any self constraint, any constraint impose friday the outside would somehow compromise national security without really thinking what nuclear weapons do provide in terms of national security or even other ways of thinking about national security. but the strong feeling that any constraints and any demand for pakistan to compromise will somehow inhibit its national security. but for the sake of argument, if
the military were to arrivedality an understanding of nuclear weapons that is different than its current understanding, the number it has to do is efficient or some years down the road is suf fusht, that it doesn't need to add more, then diplomacy becomes an option and a nuclear deal i think becomes an option. in our report we suggested five things that pakistan could do. these were exemplars, not prescriptions or demands. we suggested the changes in its declaratory policy would be useful, that somehow formalizing its recessed nuclear posture and thinking about numerical and geographic constraints on tactical nuclear weapons would be a useful signal, that coming up with limits on fisal material production given the growth potential and its arsenal would also be useful and think about signing the ctbp before india with the understanding that if
india were to test, that pakistan would be able to exercise its supreme national interest clause and leave the treaty. is it wise to seek this path? i think that really depends on what your assessment of priorities is, whether you think terrorism is a more important priority or other priorities. it depends on your assessment of alternatives and whether we have other measures available to address this sense of concern about the direction and magnitude of pakistan's nuclear weapons program. is the status quo better or is it worse than trying to negotiate some sort of deal? what is the impact to the non-proliferation regime from trying to negotiate a deal? what would the impact be on the u.s.-india strategic relationship? i think there's a lot of important questions that are inherent in this issue that haven't really been adequately addressed and deserve further discussion. focusing just on pakistan is
also a little bit artificial. received is we didn't address the india side of this question, we didn't call it a normal nuclear india. we called it a normal nuclear pakistan. even so, i think you do have to recognize that because the pathway for pakistan also depends on some measure in india's membership in the nsg, you have to look at these things together. if there's an open door for india, but a closed door for pakistan, that essentially limits our policy options. for me there is wisdom in thinking about a bargain, both here and in south asia. so i look forward to more discussion about it. >> thank you. sameer? ÷7ñ i'll try to pick up where toebly left off. i wasn't one of the co-authorities of the report. i read it, saw some merits and saw arguments about why this would be beneficial for the united states potentially, potentially for india as well. i think the critical one in this mix is that if a nuclear deal, a
nuclear agreement where pakistan took the steps that toby an michael recommend, if that occurred, there would be a significant reduction or potential significant reduction in crisis escalation, nuclear escalation. if this involved restricting or limiting the productionh u÷ and deployment of pact stan's tactical nuclear weapons, it could reduce the gravest dangers that might stem from a cross-border attack, miss attribution of an attack or simple escalation online of control firing which happens on a routine basis between india and pakistan. it could potentially strengthen crisis stability. i think some of the greatest crisis escalation risks that we see in a future scenario between india and pakistan come in miscalculation or unauthorized launch, theft or capture of a mobile platform with a
functional nuclear weapon. those are risks exacerbated by a weapon being deployed in the field and operational. if there was a way to constrain that or offer incentives for pakistan to restrict that operationalization, there would be benefits for all parties involved, for any parties that care about nuclear escalation or concerned about it, india, united states, other observers as well in terms of the other planks of the idea, it was not quite a deal, per se, but things would signal steps towards nuclear restraint in order to to be a more normalized nuclear state. some are signing the treaty, removing objections to that, separation of military nuclear programs, these things are not necessarily harmful to a country like india. it certainly would reduce pressures on nuclear competition
which in the long run is probably good for india. ultimately their objective is to become a great power and relies on continued sustained economic growth and development. that would be benefited by not having to be engaged in a nuclear competition with pakistan. i think another sort of positive step that can come out of this, it can show a path for pakistan out of isolation or potential perceptions of isolation. i think it can empower moderates to counter narratives that exist in some parts of pakistan that they're boxed in without any potential partners. the idea of containment has been floated, containment of pakistan. it only creates incentives for pakistan to take more provocative actions.[e9 and those are counter productive for stability in the region. as toby eluded to, there's some value in proposing this idea. how much does pakistan need, what mission sets, what are the objectives and what is
sufficient for national security and the trade-offs involved in that process. if there ultimately is some calculation that nuclear weapons are a substitute for conventional forces in order to have economic benefit, and there's some in the strategic establishment of pakistan's military who argue this, then there's going to be a question of what is the sufficiency of the nuclear program pakistan has. those debates were necessary to have. i think the discussion of a nuclear deal sparked it because it allows pakistan to weigh the range of its requirements for national security. i think the iran deal that was signed this summer, there's been lot of references to it by critics of this idea who say that that's not really an appropriate model. it stopped iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. "ur
but the point was the iranian nuclear program, the reason we were willing to entertain this deal despite support for violent nonstate actors, it would -- the acquisition of the weapon was less of a concern than the impact on strategic stability in terms of its power dynamics vis-a-vis israel, and with restrictions on u.s. operational freedom. it's the strategic effects of it that were the greatest concern. there would be a similar logic that if this deal could fore stall or persuade pakistan to restrict tactical deployments or long-range capabilities, then it might be worth considering. might be worth prioritizing above other concerns. there are two concerns i think
i've heard raised against the idea of this. the first is that it rewards a quest for parity with indy, that could set back india/u.s. relations. in terms of the deal, it potentially negate any request for material parody such as signing ctbt or restraining the tactical nuclear weapons deployment. what it would do is probably trade some degree of prestige, allowing it to be part of the same nuclear club as india. of course india's not particularly happy about this. this wouldn't have any significant increase in the material balance of power in th region. there's no reason to expect that marginal increase in prestige for pakistan would have a strategic effect.
in terms of the india/u.s. relations down the road, i think the united states has proved itself deft and capable of rival states. we did this with greece and turkey in nato. we've done this with japan and south korea post world war ii. we managed to maintain military lines with japan while also increasing ties to china both economically, but also politically and having a strategic dialogue as well. relationship with one state and maintain good relations with another even if they are rivals at some level. it's worth -- it's worth considering the debate. >> okay. well, without necessarily disagreeing with the logic of íw what toby and sameer have had to
say, i'm going to take a slightly contrary position. i agree with the logic of what they're saying. but i think what a lot of observers fail to take into account is the fundamental strategy of the pakistani state. i don't think their nuclear weapons program can be addressed without addressing the question or persuading pakistan to take a step back from its grand strategy that it has followed over the last 30 years. the idea has been in the air roughly about since 2010. and at least on the u.s. side, that would entail that pakistan accept some sort of -- a positive movement on nuclear arms control treaties, the comprehensive treaty, accept certain curbs in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons program in return for a nuclear -- with the united states.
and also accommodation with thek nuclear group which left restrictions on civilian nuclear trade with pakistan. in the past year, there have been rumors that the obama administration has turned its attention towards pakistan after negotiating the nuclear deal with iran. now, pakistan wants a deal similar to the one that the u.s. struck with india in 2005 where the u.s. in essence gave india's nuclear weapons program a free pass./áç
grayest issues were the rapidly expanding size of the pakistani nuclear weapons program, the scope and ambition of the pakistani nuclear weapons program, as well as the potential danger of an implosion within pakistan, a political implosion or partial breakdown of the state in the future that could in the future create a potential terrorism -- nuclear terrorism incident. from washington's point of view, pakistan must make progress in nuclear treaties and norms. and the carnegie endowment that published a report earlier this year, i'll reiterate these points. this approach is very sensible, but it misses the fundamental point that there is an underlying linkage between pakistan's grand strategy and its nuclear trajectory. the u.s. struck a nuclear deal with india because of the size of india's market and also
because india is a potential balancer to china in the asia pacific region. what a lot of people miss is the fact that india -- that the nuclear deal was made possible because india is a status quo and a normal power. india accepts the national status quo. it chooses -- but it chooses internal and external balancing as a means to acquire great status which is considered both legitimate and acceptable in the international system.!9f by contrast, pakistan is a revisionist state. a revisionist power is a power that per sues a nonpeaceful means. and pakistan is revisionist because it seeks to overturn the status quo through the use of floor. it deploys non-state actors. so there is a linkage between its posture and threats to l;gx pakistan's internal stability. during the past 30 years, pakistan has used its arsenal to
shield itself from an asymmetric war with india. india's response to pakistan's nuclear weapons program is the threat to carry a limited conventional war into pakistan. faced with the prospect of a defeat on the conventional battle field, pakistan has adopted full spectrum deterrencñ strategy that would allow it to deal with india on every rung of the nuclear ladder. hence the idea to give up on tactical weapons or strategic deterrence absent -- my argument is that we are wasting our time asking pakistan to accept radical changes and implement
arms control treaties and norms. ue pakistan to become a normal state and give up their goal.m now, if pakistan were to return to being a status quo seeking normal state, india would have few incentives to threaten it bñ with a war. pakistan in turn would have very few uses of its tactical weapons, then create positive incentives for pakistan to switch from full spectrum deterrence to a limited strategic deterrence strategy. let us assume that we succeed in persuading pakistan to accept curbs in nuclear weapons and give up full spectrum strategy. but this happens absent any changes in pakistan's grand strategy of territorial revisionism through non-state actors. in this scenario, pakistan would
still remain vulnerable to the dangers of an internal implosion or partial state failure.vyiy'x one of the arguments, negotiating with pakistan, we should adopt the approach that the obama administration adopted towards iran. this analogy between pakistan and iran is very seductive, but flawed for two reasons. iran was ambivalent for nuclear weapons. this opened the door for "i negotiations. but there is little in pakistan's establishment on the pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons. second, in iran, there was never any cause or linkage. in pakistan's case, nuclear weapons are the keystone in its asymmetric and revisionist grand strategy. it makes sense for us to negotiate with iran in the
iranian state and its fought for terrorism abroad, i don't think the same approach is valid for pakistan. in the case of pakistan, we must take up the task of pakistani revisionism as part of any grand nuclear deal. to conclude let me take a step back and put this in perspective. the goal of american grand strategy since world war ii has been to promote democracy and discourage the growth of revisionist powers. pakistan fits this last category. any nuclear deal with pakistan independently of its revisionist grand strategy would end up treating the symptoms of the disease and not the disease itself. in india's case, we made an exception by down playing non-proliferation treaties and norms. in pakistan's case as well, we should down play the narrow technical nonproliferation agenda. normalizing the pakistani state has the best downstream chance of normalizing their nuclear trajectory.
thank you. >> thank you. i'm going to take a slightly different approach and invite questions from the audience before i jump into my own questions. >> my question is that there is a timely meeting because recently india and pakistan were at the highest level in islamabad and pakistan relations, but at the same time after few days, india was told by terrorists in pakistan that they will destroy indianv@0 so what message you think india should get, one official statement sometime including defense minister of pakistan that if needed including of course the general that they will use the nuclear weapons against in
what did the future of india and pakistan relations and also do you believe there is a nuclear race in the region? thank you. >> you want to go first?u2jt >> is the question to the ! >> he was looking at you. >> well, so let me ask you -- let me answer the second question first. i don't think there is a nuclear race in the region because india is pursuing its nuclear trajectory at its own space. pakistan has really accelerated the development of its nuclear arsenal. the indians have a series of objectives. they're looking largely at china. they think they have sufficient deterrence against pakistan. i think in pakistan there is greater paranoia vis-a-vis india and they have accelerated the program. they have by most accounts a greater number of nuclear mís,y
weapons than india, their inventory exceeds india's. in the operational aspects of the pakistani arsenal is far ahead of india's. but the race implies that there is this interactive dynamic. i don't see that happening. but beyond that, i think ahfp÷ relations are pessimistic and i do not see the prospects of -- it's like an ugly stability is actually tell us about a decade and a half ago and that will lifhñ2 persist for some time to come. >> on the arms race question, i agree with the sense that there aren't interactive effects, but there are at least in a sort of tit for tat way. i think you do see in the broader security equation, you know, pakistan reacting to
thinks that india is doing. tactical nuclear weapons are essentially a reaction to cold start. cruise missiles are something they were developing anyway, but have a logic if i beg your pardon -- india were to develop missile defense. statements, rumors, procuremente et cetera in india. in india, you don't see the same kind of drivers. they tend to be a little bit different. arms race has sort of a specific meaning and i think it's not an arms race, but there are security dynamics that do drive the competition in certain ways. >> i would agree with toby on that account.qas
bluster. and a lot of it comes from the scientific agencies that have a lot of r&d programs. in pakistan, it is often read as programs that will be operationalized and the responses -- >> this raises an interesting point. our assumptions about india and pakistan are quite different in this regard. we think, okay, that is a system that is going to be operational. there tends to be greater skepticism about the pace and development in india. we don't always take it that that's something that will happen -- >> right. the rhetoric around pakistan as the fastest growing nuclear arsenal, in some sense pakistan is a victim of its own coherence and success.i2z; >> there's a reason for that why we don't take india seriously. >> it doesn't have to be just
about missile buildups. there are ways that arms race can escalate in other types of capabilities.$q@ if we're saying that pakistan is reacting to some indian capability of rapid reaction sort of on multiple fronts. whether we want to call it cold start or something else. there's a lot of talk in india these days about improving special operations forces capabilities. if that becomes a possibility, that is able to subvert pakistan's deterrence as they see it which can lead to counter reactions. in that sense, i think there's a reactionary cycle on both sides. >> could we broaden the discussion just a little bit to talk about india/pakistan in terms of potential strategic
nuclear discussions, disarmament. i know that the answer to my question may be nothing, but mhf what do you think it would take to induce both india and pakistan to sit down and begin discussions about being sensible over the nuclear issues to put in place confidence building measures and other things that would alleviate if a new mumbai takes place, both sides are at the brink and now you have pakistan with more than a >> sure. my sense is that there are several prerequisites.
one is political leadership in both sides that has the wherewithal, the credentials, the support from the military establishment particularly in the case of pakistan to be able to have that kind of dialogue. that hasn't really existed, arguably existed in 1999, but hasn't since then. there have been a number of working level discussions over the years about confidence building measures, but mostly they've been how to implement things that were agreed in the past. there are a number of obvious things on the table that could be3l3+ ñ it's been, you know, patently obvious that adding cruise missiles to that is very good. there is an agreement to provide every year a list of nuclear facilities, an agreement not to attack those facilities. adding to that, an agreement not to use cyber means to attack those facilities would also be good. the big missing thing that would
get you from confidence building measures to some arms control, broader restraint regime is political will. and it's -- partly that's will and ability to take and accept risk. just very difficult in both systems to do that. >> you want to go? >> go ahead. >> i think looking back at the case of the u.s. and the ussr during the cold war, serious arms control really happened towards the end of the 1960s when both countries reached a certain plateau. there was a maturity in the development of the arsenal that it reached a maturation point. i would like to think in one sense that india and pakistan are still in the process of arriving there. and they have not had the kind of cuban missile crisis that has concentrated the minds of the political and military leads of the dangers of a nuclear
conflict. it's all in theory yet. that would be a catalytic condition that might concentrate the minds. there's a famous saying, nothing concentrates the mind of an individual unless the prospects of being hanged in the morning. i think -- i know it sounds rather ominous, but they haven't had that kind of a cuban missile crisis that really concentrated the minds. i don't think it's reached the ñ maturity that both sides can start talking about what sufficiency means and how they might stabilize that competition. >> do you think there is a point at which there would -- >> i hope so. you know, in the report for example, they lay down the economics of what pakistan is doing. i would hope that at some point -- i would hope that it hits home. i'm skeptical, but i still hope so.
>> i wonder if the -- just one other point. i wonder if it's actually not so much as a strategic level that there has to be some sort of breakthrough, but it's actually at the sources of instability that there needs to be some assessment that that is no longer a viable means of conflict. maybe that amounts to a change in grand strategy, i don't know. but that might create the means for different kinds of confidence building that could translate into strategic arms control. >> i'll come back to that. >> okay. >> i'll just add that i think gaurav's point is well takeng&/, particularly when you talk to indians about sort of the relative priority of threats. the focus is still on sort of --
and maybe this is sort of a signaling device, but they constantly emphasize the terrorism issue above nuclear escalation risks. vjj"á(rárá)h out of terrorism scenario that provokes some sort of crisis and mobilization towards the border is the nuclear scenario.k5&tñ they're pretty persistent about that risk. maybe it does require some sort of crisis to focus the minds on thinking crew clear signals and clear red lines.0]i >> hi, thank you. i'm with the atlantic council. i wanted to ask you -- aé >> could you speak into the mike? we can't hear you. >> can you hear me? i wanted to ask you what impact
is pakistan's nuclear relationship with china have on u.s. leverage with pakistan and do you see a role for china to change pakistan's strategy? thank you. >> i actually want to couple that question with my -- with one of my own questions. this is directly to toby and sameer, you can feel free to comment on it if you want. when i read your report, i saw you had list add whole range of challenges associated with striking a deal with pakistan. you've pointed out that pakistan's nuclear commerce is also less incentivizing. and also point out that the pakistani position has hardened since the deaths and the evidence you gathered suggest that pakistanis feel compelled to compete against india. so, and coupling the chinese, that they have a healthy cooperation with the chinese. in this context, why would you
think that pakistan would subject themselves to this sort of a deal? >> depends on what you mean by deal. >> the grand nuclear bargain. >> sure. so let me address the commercial piece first. i think it's absolu-fknháhe case that pakistan's nuclear energy requirements, as it defines them, are being met by china. largely by way of ignoring the rules in the nuclear suppliers group. and it's hard to imagine a circumstance where there was a nuclear deal that would change that in some way. so i think that set of incentives that had existed in the case of india, although i take gaurav's point that that was only part of the rationale for that deal. that doesn't exist. would have the sort of state backing and tolerance to invest in pakistan..fá nuclear reactors are expensive and pakistan is short on capital.
most wouldn't want to assume the liability of a very large infrastructure project there. the chinese seem to be able to do that. i think the net result of that is that not only because pakistan is not a good nuclear market and because china is essentially satisfying the nuclear market and would under any circumstance, there's not a lot of incentive for others to argue for a nuclear deal. but your other question about whether china might have some leverage i think is an interesting one. and you know, there's a history of chinese involvement in the pakistani nuclear weapons program. it's been written about. there are very strong beliefs in india that that cooperation continues. that the pakistani tactical nuclear weapons are essentially a product of chinese cooperation. i don't know whether that's true or not. if that were true, it would be a violation of the nonproliferation treaty.
i suspect that it's -- that if there's truth in it, it's not as expansive as the indian claims are. but it may very well be the case that china and pakistan are collaborating on missile guidance, other sorts of things. who knows. i'm sure there's evidence there. i'm just not aware of it. so that kind ÷ar would have incentive, given that it's aided pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the past, ostensibly or presumably for reasons having to do with balancing india in some way. why would it seek to restrain pakistan in some way? i think the answer there is, if it becomes apparent that what is happening in pakistan has some potential to damage chinese interest as well. whether there are economic interests in pakistan, whether it's the potential that terrorists trained in pakistan carry out some attacks in china for which there's some evidence that the chinese have pressured
the pakistani government in the past. you know, you can see a logic there where chinese perceptions of this problem might start to change. it's not clear to me that there has been afgú event yet that wod precipitate that, but you can imagine that there could be. so maybe in the future, it's possible that china might be a source of leverage, but at this point, it seems to take the opposite approach, which is to essentially ignore what is happening with the pakistani nuclear weapons program and continue to focus on large infrastructure projects like the china corridor and the like and not use that in any sort of leverage terms. similarly, if you draw a fo%ñ parallel to the china-north korea relationship, you see there a pattern of behavior that would suggest caution in thinking that china might be willing to use leverage over one of its neighbors and partners in the future. >> can i just add a little to that?
i quite agree with toby on that. >> we're supposed to be opposing, by the way. >> but everything china has done so far has contributed to the autonomy of the pakistan program. so i really don't see that happening in the immediate future, except i'm just thinking of scenarios. one scenario could be what toby pointed out that pakistan becomes extremely unstable and there's possibility of partial failure and the chinese feel concern that might have spillover effects of a nuclear incident. the other is that the indians accelerate their nuclear weapons program and china feels threatened and decides it needs to acknowledge the indian program openly and come to some sort of agreement with the indians. that might open the door for some sort of triangular stabilizing the competition between the three.myhñ >> there's also a possibility, i mean, china may have played sort
of a negative contributory role in the past and potentially in the present, but there's the potential for these things to change over time. we know that for long time, china was silent about pakistan's dalliance with violent non-state actors. they were at least one of the pressure points for the the operation which then sort of precipitated a bunch of counterterrorist operations. a lot of suggestions they may have had pressure on the pakistani government as well. it's possible they can play that leverage role that the u.s. may lack, and i would also add to that, they're investing a significant stake in the pakistani land mass with substantial number of workers that are going to be deployed into this massive set of construction projects. so they are more at risk in future escalation scenarios than they have ever been, which probably gives them a stake in ñ escalation control more so than they have ever been.
>> one other thing, which is that you know, the nuclear suppliers group operates by consensus. if india is going to join, it will have to be with chinese support. fairly quiet on this subject, at least publicly. but there was one statement from the foreign ministry, i think in the spring, that was actually about pakistani membership, not indian membership. the reply that came back was that there essentially needed to be a way to handle the question of non-npt state membership in 1 an equitable way, which suggests to me that, you know, i don't know what the extent of pakistan-chinese conversations on this issue have been, but that china will protect pakistan's interests in that regard and try to keep the door open in some way. so it's important that we think about chinese interests and what it can and can't do on this question, recognizing that our
interests, the stated u.s. interest in having india in the usg may run up against china's interests. >> so, question for the panel.oé so if the pile-up and the growth in pakistan's nuclear arsenal is driven by maybe a sense of insecurity within the establishment, what could the united states do to reduce that sense of insecurity that might lead to a change in behavior?enq >> do you want to go first? >> i mean, that's a tough one. i mean, if i were to be provocative, i would almost say that pakistan's sense of insecurity is pathological. i think it's military is operating on its own belief systems that are not shared outside. i really don't know what the united states can do. all the u.s. can do is supply, you know, high-tech conventional weapons which it tried in the past, it tried right through the
1980s. and even today, if you look, actually, there have been some very interesting -- a very interesting study that came out last year that looked at the conventional balance between india and pakistan and the gap at least in the immediate short-term has narrowed and pakistan can do a much better job defending itself against india than most people would like to imagine. if there is this paranoia and it's driven by this pathological belief of fl pakistan insecuriti don't see what the united states the united states really threw its weight behind trying to change pakistani grand strategy. unless pakistan were to give up their whole role of seeking revisionism and changing the status quo, it would not be a ú satiated power. you're provoking a crisis that feeds into your threat and it becomes an endless cycle. >> so i think a lot this depends on sort of how you categorize pakistan as a state. even within -- we use a
dichotomist term, but there's gradations in between, right? iran was a revisionist power in 1979. you can argue that they still are, but probably not the same as 1979. you can argue that they still are. so there are gradations of change and learning that states can adapt to international sort of relations, structures, stimuli.2p8m i think one, it's feasible to imagine situations where it can abate over time, but if we gbñ thought about sort of what >kpnñ pakistan identifies as their core sort of security threats, territorial dispute with india,
where there's large numbers of forces concentrated. so one of the paths out of this, it may not sort of be a right solution right now, but one of the paths out of this down the road is renewed dialogue that eventually tries to resolve some of the territorial disputes. capitol hill as members of the house foreign affairs committee are reconvening for a hearing on u.s.-pakistan relations. it's just gotten under way. >> look at india, we look at pakistan, the relationship is incredibly important. particularly as the changing mission in afghanistan is -- the role of pakistan and india in >> much is made in pakistan of the fact that there hasn't been
another major attack since mumbai, that there is some desire to assert both positive and negative control over groups that in the past have been targeting in india. i think there's some evidence that should cause us to question that assumption. i would also i guess challenge your assumption that somehow addressing pakistan's insecurity is the key to nuclear constraints. i guess what we laid out is a lot of this comes back to what you believe about nuclear weapons. if you have this absolute faith in nuclear weapons, then no amount of security is going to change that and no amount of insecurity is going to change that. but if you start to question what nuclear weapons do an don't do and what they could and could not deter and how many of them and how they're postured, then you could maybe still -- the there -- there may be a need to
address the insecurity. what we suggested in our report is the faith in pakistan, the tactical nukt lar weapons will deter conflict at a nuclear level may not be correct. that's kind of a dangerous assumption. india did not do cold start after mumbai. that may or may not have had something to do with pakistani nuclear weapons. they didn't have tactical nuclear weapons at that time. i think there's reasons to question how many nuclear weapons are sufficient and i would hope that conversation is having inside pakistan. the problem is that whereas in many states there's shared responsibility for nuclear weapons that allows for some discussion of the arsenal and force posture and readiness and these kind of things, in
pakistan, those external stimuli don't really exist. these conversations happen solely within the military. there's no real -- there's civilians involved in=kzd the national command authority. let's be realistic, most of the requirements will be set by the military, decisionis made by th military. so there's not this feedback loop that would challenge very strongly held beliefs about deterrence. but there were strongly held beliefs about militants, too. you start to see some reprioritization to focus on those threats. that suggests to me that it's possible that thinking can change as evidence challenges some of the challenges. >> can i just -- i want to address the points that sameer and toby raised. you're absolutely correct that there is variation. you not treat revisionists and status quo powers as a black and white dichotomy and there is a variation.
even revisionist states do change over a period of time and there are various grades. one of the things that the united states could do -- let us assume for a moment that weibf0 accept pakistan revisionism and pakistan had a legitimate grievance, i think where the united states could bring pressure to try to persuade pakistan, to adopt different means to o pursue that revisionism, in other words, give up these non-state actors. we haven't had another mumbai since 2008. we don't know whether that's a tactical retreat, a long-term compromise for the time being. even if pakistan would stick to revisionism and give up tactics and strategy to pursue revisionism, that might have a cooling effect on the region which would then open the door for the united states to try to
their cold start option, to threaten pakistan with anesque retreat from tactical nuclear weapons. >> dan horner from arms control today. two questions coming from points that toebly made initially, so i'll direct it to toby first. given it's not, as you describe it, an interactive arnls race, what response from indian would you expect if pakistan took the steps you recommend in your report? secondly, on the point about the nsg, you cited this interesting comment from china about the requirements, and it seems at the time of prime minister sharif's visit to the united states, that there was
consideration of an exception for india. it seemed possibly the door opened to so-called criteria-based approach. do you think that's possible, that's in the cards? what do you think about that? thanks.](4 >> the second piece is whether there's a criteria-based approach that might open up for nsg. i think that's interesting. i support the idea of criteria. i think having even criteria for india and pakistan is better. india could probably meet most agreed before pakistan could. as a matter of process, i think having criteria versus exception is better.
just as there'sy#vlç american exceptionalism, there's indian exceptionalism. the idea of criteria kind of runs up against that. that's a real challenge for the obama administration's approach so far. at this point i don't think the idea of there being an1-÷ excepn for pakistan is really what was on the table. my sense of what was on the table was, you know, support for the idea that pakistan could be on the path to joining the nsg. in order to be on the path, there needed to be steps to get to the first step essentially, so pre steps, if you will. that was my sense of what the conversation was about. at this point it doesn't seem like pre stepsxiá[#fñx are in . there's steps backwards, if
anything. dan, what was your first question again? >> [ inaudible ]. >> i would love it if the indians were to say, wow, this is fantastic, our security is much better for having done this, thank you very much. in fact, when sameer and i were in india some weeks ago, we heard a lot of complaints that we would even consider that pakistan with nuclear weapons would be legitimate and these kinds of steps in some way might actually improve india's security, and how dare we reassert some sort of equivalency between pakistan and india on these questions. which at some level isn't surprising. it also suggests for all the indian professions that status that pakistan could have a similar status suggests india is involved with status. i think the steps that we suggested, there are questions about how feasible those are,
and i think their acceptability in pakistan is pretty low which is understandable. i think in india mostly they were just missed as insufficient. that's been the walk us through your experiences in pakistan? >> sure. so in pakistan there was a lot of interest in the tighttle of report but everything after page 1 was pretty much -- we were criticized for that. it was suggested that we were system how advancing india's interest, that all of the steps that we had suggested, which compromised pakistan's national security, that our assessments of fiscal material production were off, that we were completely discounting india's nuclear program, et cetera, et cetera.
>> during the cold war there was certainly the united states but i expect in russia as well, soviet union, a fear of what the consequence of nuclear war might bring. my sense is knowing pakistan better than india, that that's lacking, that there is a -- that there is no willingness whether it's in civil defense,d7@ preparations, where we thought a lot about this. you don't see anything, not that one can build bomb shelters given the kinds of weapons, but you don't get that feeling. i wonder how much that plays into the inability of both sides to perhaps evaluate this nuclear
competition. and at the same time what is the sense in both countries, because answers may be very obvious, the feelings here about adequate second strike capability because certainly, that in madd was what the neutralizer was, it wasn't numbers but just that neither side could expect to emerge here with very much left. so if you could explore this. >> i just want to biggie back that question. cold war was mentioned. my question specifically directed to you. the united states and the former soviet union negotiated the strategic arms limitations treaty at the height of the cold war and still the ussr was a division power.
so if that worked why and what are the differences you see in applying the same logic between u.s. and pakistan? >> well, i'm going to start with his question and come to you, if that's okay. okay. that's a great question, yes. the u.s. and the ussr, there was the two super powers during the cold war but let's not forget that they collapsed and weacioi a arms race and soviet collapsed. so arms control really did not take off, you know, it took off and then it, again, hit and began tog5$ç break down until servitude in one sense and ultimately collapsed. but to get back to marvin's question, at least on the indian side there is a6 psychological
misbelief that nuclear weapons are war. more of these psychological props in one sense that enforces one's the psyche of the elite in a crises or, you know, build up or support your backbone or helps you develop a backbone to put upzhi(%q! nuclear coercion. there is this disbelief that these weapons could ever be used. which is iron call because here you are building up operation abilities on the ground but at the same time at the political level i don't think the political elite recognizes or accepts the factor has brought himself to the fact that thesed' are actually usable instruments. with that apart, i think both countries are pursuing second strike capabilities very, ve very -- on the indian side, going the other way, trying to
build up a sea-based arsenal, the golden standard, for instance. on the pakistan side, from a purery military perspective they've done a pretty good job building up of mobile ballistic missile strike force. not just thinking in terms of second strike. i would argue might be thinking in terms of third strikes, which is, you know, i think you talk about this in your report, where you have this, you know, where they've really gone big and have long range missiles that can strike any part of india and beyond. which doesn't seem -- you can only make sense of it if you have began thinking in terms of protracted nuclear exchange with a much powerful -- with a much more powerful nuke cla power, which india is not. but potentially it might be. but, yeah, they are thinking in terms of second strike capabilities. even are the indians. very much so.
>> i thought i would just pick up on a thread that, marvin, you put out there. so i think you're right. when you have civil defense preparations inherently by being procedures for like duck and cover, going in bomb shelter, something like that, you engage the public in sort of what will be the consequence of an actual nuclear exchange and it doesn't appear that there has been anything like that probably because there are much higher priorities in terms of what you do with social spending in building bomb shelters, river blindness first or something like that. polio vaccines. but i think it's an important point because oftentimes you hear a lot of strategic leads invoke the public in their discussions and say, our hands are tied because if we were willing to sort of back down from our position on ctbt or attack nuclear weapons we will be lynched. i feel like that term lynched is used liberally in south asia about sort of what the public
will and will not allow. it's not clear to me that the public has ever engaged in this debate other than very surface level. so it's possible that the public has sort of very hard line views on nuclear weapons but i think if we were sort of to push a little bit in terms of what scenarios would be involved we might see some evidence for the nuclear taboo or some evidence to be concerned about, the costs of this. that's another area maybe potential engagement, maybe sort of a civil society type engagement that's required. but it certainly is invoked and i don't see any evidence ofnécc actually happening. >> an american thinking and soech yet thinking, i don't know. but you saw arguments about, you know, fighting a nuclear war and
the kind of commitment that would be required to include civil defenses and ballistic missile defense. i think that garo was right. in india the political sentiment in nuclear weapons have not allowed for that sort of discussion. pakistan is an interesting case. on the one hand you have this faith and deterrence and faith that nuclear weapons will deter, low-level is interesting. and yet you have pretty regular political statements about the use of nuclear weapons which there's a disdense there and i don't understand it. and i think you also see -- and for me the shaheen iii is part of evidence of this over and above about call nuclear weapons thinking about using nuclear weapons and counterforce roles and this leads you down the role about thinking about nuke clr war flighting not with standing these are weapons of peace and meant to incur conflict.
i think you see strains of the military logic of nuclear weapons in pakistan that push you down this road. but you're right, there is no civil society that asks or could engage the questions about what are the consequences of fighting a nuclear war. and that is really what's lacking. . and i think there's been some suggestions i've heard that the united states or others ought to try to engage that question in some way in south asia to, you know, make clear the scare that we had in the cuban missile crisis or so forth and finding ways of using the media to do that and so forth. and it's -- i think it has to come from south asia. it can't come externally. there has to be an idea that is, you know, specific to the way nuclear weapons are understood there and the fears that people have. you know, maybe it will take, you know, a cuban missile crisis or something like that to actually spur that. you don't -- where are the