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tv   California Governor Jerry Brown State of the State Address  CSPAN  January 29, 2016 4:53am-5:13am EST

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capital region. we live under that umbrella right here, and we're thankful for that. but it leaves insufficient capacity for short-range air defense, for other army forces in other contingencies. >> if i could just add, the one thing i'd just add is yes, of course the russian threat is critical but we were extremely mindful as we -- and hopefully you'll see in the chapter we have on the future challenges that those kinds of weapons, and this is true well beyond short-range artillery issues, are exponentially dissipating across the globe. so the russian and chinese arms market is quite extensive. we acknowledge the fact that technology is defusing much more rapidly than probably was anticipated. and that's one of those threat areas that whether or not there is a specific russian challenge today we should be anticipating that capability will spread
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across the globe. >> look at the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems. i can go to best buy right now and buy me a uav. i'd go in just about any place and buy a uav and i could probably arm that thing. that is a threat to ground forces. where before we used to say we can mitigate that risk because we believe we've got the best air force in the world and we haven't had a bomb dropped on us. that may not be true in the future. when you look at this with the proliferation of these technologies. >> scott mosione, federal news radio. >> good afternoon. you talk a lot about retention and recruitment in a lot of your chapters, and i don't really see -- i see a lot of things about deployment but not necessarily about benefits or trying to kind of change the way that the soldier can kind of
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live life outside of the army per se. is that because you have faith in the reforms of the future and the reforms that secretary carter is having, or do you feel that the army's already pretty steady in what they're doing now, or do they need changes and you just didn't get a chance to get around to it? >> i think it's perhaps a bit simpler than that. it was not in our mandate, in the law to look at those particular items. nor did we have the time, energy, or expertise to replicate the work done by the compensation commission and others. >> i'd concur with that. did a little footwork on that also. >> yeah, i think what we talked about before. one of the key things that the integrated personnel system, because i think what you're getting to and what we'd all like to see is a continuum of service, where someone joins the army, they don't join a component. and the recruiter says right now
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you're best suited to go into the national guard because you already have a job and you like where you live whereas you don't have a job and you need a job and you need to go in the active component. but over your career you may choose to go back and forth or the army may choose to move you back and forth because your situation, your desires in a change. and you may say over here i've had enough of the active side, i'd like to move over here to the guard or reserve and likewise this guy wants to become active. the pay and personnel systems right now make that very, very difficult. and that's what we're saying, is we need to be able to simplify that so the individual and the army can manage their personnel across all three components as one army. and then tie in with the employment base out there to have that happening. so to me a great example, cyber. if we had a continuum of service and we had an agreement with companies like mcafee,
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microsoft, symantec and others that says we're going to constantly float people back and forth. and so you're spending three years over here on the active side and now you're going to go for the microsoft for several years and while you're at microsoft this guy's coming back over here, to maintain cutting ej technology and knowledge and everything, that's what the army of the future needs to look like. >> we know some people need to do that. one of our visits was at fort lewis joint base, lewis mcchord in washington. we talked to a reserve unit. and we said, well, are you able to take advantage of some of the cyber companies, the microsoft in washington? and they said, sir, yes. we have people who really want to serve. now, they'd love to come in and out. but they're in -- they serve in the reserve. you should see our parking lot. the number. you'd be surprised the kind of cars we have in our parking lot. >> the one thing i'd add is that
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from a soldier perspective, you know, the army's got a lot of different initiatives going on in how to better recruit and retain individuals. i'll submit to you i don't think that was really part of our charter. i think what our charter was how do we look at the total force policy and make recommendations to ensure that we do things more effectively and efficiently at the army national guard and army reserve levels. so we work together as one team. focused together on one thing, to recruit an individual, to be part of the total force. >> christina wong, the hill. >> thank you. christina wong with "the hill." just two questions. one simple. does every recommendation that costs more money, does that come with any kind of offset or a recommendation? secondly i wanted to know how far out in the future you looked and dr. hicks, you swore you addressed part of this.
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the recommendation for a total force of 980 now,0 0980,000, is the foreseeable future and are the requirements expected to continue at least throughout sequestration? i just want to look at the horizon the commission was looking at. >> with regard to the cost average, secretary hale mentioned we paid particular attention to the aviation requirements, and there are offset figures associated with those. the other recommendations are mostly not costed. for example, we identify a shortfall in short-range air defense capabilities as general thurman has mentioned and dr. hicks has mentioned but we did not make a specific recommendation to how many units that would lead to some cost estimate. but rather that's for the army to make that determination.
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>> no, i think that -- just to finish that piece. then i'll go to the overall time frame. the recommendations that relate to those capabilities -- many of those capability areas, in many cases we recommend the army study them or that congress tasks studying for them. because we felt that as much analysis as we did we know there's a wealth more that can be done. and we felt it needed to be done in order to make those kinds of tradeoffs. we do put forward among the various things we talked about here, secretary hale mentioned of course efficiencies, things like back. compensation commissions. we go back through those items. and we did put on the table this notion of the two ibcts up to the two ibcts as potential trade space. but as secretary hale said, we recognize that even, you know, in the reality of what you're likely to get there's probably more money because a lot of those things are politically
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extremely difficult to do. on the time frame we looked out ten years, ten-plus years, but i think ten is safe. you know, i would say strategists never believe that strategy is set. you always are looking and refining. so for the 980-plus ready plus modernized, that's where we felt we are today and can comfortably say that for the next two years. as you look ahead through the next cycle, budget cycle. but that could change based on the environment. but our assessment on the 980, et cetera, was looking at the world we see ten years out, assuming all that stays relatively static that's the size of source that if modernized appropriately and ready would be appropriate for that future. >> dan parsons, defense daily.
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>> you mentioned that the report as a whole recommends -- the recommendations would involve a net cost above what's available now. but given that it might be ambitious to achieve all of it, do you have a priority of recommendations that you would like to see accomplished such that you would feel that the commission's work was not done in vain? >> well, in general, i think no matter what happens i don't believe the commission's work is done in vain. it is our hope we inform the discussion and the debate. none of us at this table are decision makers. that rests with the senior leadership in the department of defense, department of the army, the commander in chief in the administration and with the members of congress and the governors. so we hope our report will offer them some food for thought, if you will, and some considerations as they anticipate their future
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requirements and face the very, very difficult decisions that they will have to make. we did not choose to prioritize. we think recommendation a, b, c, or d is the most important. it won't surprise you, we think all 63 recommendations are important. but they are offered in the spirit to help those who must make those decisions consider those facts. >> roxanna tyrone, bloomberg news. >> i did not have a question. thank you. >> that's great. does any other member of the press have any more questions for follow-up? go ahead. >> i'd ask one follow-up. the report is critical of the army's aviation restructuring
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plan, saying it looks strategic depth and it violates the total force policy. the fact that the army looked at this and came up with a plan that would take all of the guard's apache helicopters away, does that to you signal a breakdown in the budget process and that it favors -- the way the process works favors too heavily the interests of the active service versus the reserve components? >> i'll try first and then defer to the expert. i don't agree with that premise. i think as we state in the report we believe the army's restructuring initiative was well crafted, well designed. it does in fact cut costs. and that's what it was intended to do, given the budgetary environment that the army faced. it does in fact in our assessment lead to obviously an absence of that capability in the army national guard. we think that's counter to the idea of one army.
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and in the modeling that we did it did in fact lead to a shortfall in capacity longer term in the case of an operational deployment. you still had the 24, or 20 battalions in the regular army that could meet immediate needs, but then you had nothing behind that. and that's one of the reasons as secretary hale mentioned that we offered the alternative that we did. >> so the army, like all the services, faced some very difficult budget times. i was there with them and know the kinds of pressures that were put on them. i think they and the other services responded in good faith trying to find ways to meet those budget limits. the air force, for example, trade to retire all the a-10s. that hadn't worked out. we'll have to see what happens with a.r.i. but no, i don't think it's a breakdown, but i think when you step back and take a broader look at the a.r.i. and the decisions on the apaches that at least this commission feels that
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it would be better to modify -- we'd keep most of it but to modify it to keep a modest number of apaches in the guard for the one army and the other reasons i've mentioned. >> those of you who attended the first couple meetings are open meetings where we had testimony from the army budgetary and aviation leaders. the question was asked too them repeatedly, were it not for budgetary constraints, would you have crafted a.r.i. the way you did? and the answer is universally no. it was driven by budget. this isn't ideal. they understand that. they did the best they could do under the circumstances and the facts that were given them. and what they were told to do. but it is not ideal. and we realize that it was a budget result frankly. >> all right. again, if i call on you, could you say your full name and your outlet?
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go ahead. >> roxanna -- i do have a question. you did brief obviously the stakeholders. i don't know if you can be open about this. but how was the report received initially? particularly obviously in the active duty army and on the hill. what's your sense of how the combinations were received? are you getting a sense it's going to be another long fight on the hill between the stakeholders or did you strike a fine balance? >> i think it's too soon to tell. i will tell you that each of the groups we briefed, the briefing was received politely and respectfully. but in fairness to those we briefed we had not yet had an opportunity to delve into the report and understand its -- the comprehensiveness and in some cases the complexity of the
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recommendatio recommendations. so we stand ready to continue the dialogue with those parties but i think it's too soon to tell. >> nor was it our province to make everyone satisfied or happy in this. we couldn't look at it that way. >> remember the motto we're not happy till you're not happy. we kind of followed some of that. >> jen? >> hi. jen johnson with defense news. now, looking at the apache -- potential apache buy for the guard, i'm curious if you dove deeply into how and when those potential apaches could be fielded. i understand they probably have to be new build aircraft and boeing would have to sort of ramp up a production line. they have a remanufacturing line but they don't have one for new builds that's as quick. from my understanding. so it seems like that would be a very future down the road type buy than in the next couple of years.
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did you look at when you might be able to get guard apaches? >> again, i'll begin by turning to the two experts. it is important to recognize that the recommendations are distinct. the base recommendation that establishes our recommendation would establish 20 -- battalions of 24 aircraft in the regular army. four battalions of 18 aircraft in the army national guard can be paid for in the offsets secretary hale mentioned that requires no new air frames. it does require as you mentioned the one-time cost to modernize the fleet that would move from apache d models to e models. but that capability exists today. shifting to the larger issue of an 11th combat to retain an 11th combat aviation brigade in the army national guard -- or in the regular army. that would indeed require a new
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buy of apaches. we did not delve into the specifics of that, particularly the timeline, when might it take a manufacturer to restart that line, retool and be ready to produce. we did have a rough cost estimate as general thur sxhan secretary hale mentioned, somewhere in the 1.9 to 2 billion range. >> so on the first one, and general hammond has it exactly right. the d to e modernization, 24. unless there's changes made in corpus christi to speed up the production spit's probably sevel years perhaps outside the fidp before they get -- that doesn't mean the guard wouldn't keep the battalions for four years. they would have d models in some of those. the new buy as general hamm said, we did not delve into the details but it would be several years off before that could be accomplished.
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>> yes, dan. >> dan parsons. regarding the brigade in europe general hodges has said over and over again he's had to do with 30,000 troops what his predecessors had 300,000 troops to do. is it the commission's finding that the efforts to increase lethality, the european capability sets, the things that are being done now to build partnership capacity are not adequate to perform the deterrence mission there? >> for the record i'm one of his predecessors. i don't recall 300,000. but i think -- yeah. but i take the point. i think the main point, and i'll turn to dr. hicks, but the main point i think from the commission's standpoint is the security environment today and into the future is different than what we anticipated.
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when the decisions were made to reposition forces from europe to include the removal and redeployment of the two armored brigade combat teams that were there, those were perhaps logical decisions at the time, but the security environment is different now and it's our best assessment that one of the ways to cope with that changed security environment from both deterrence and assurance as general thurman mentioned is forward stationing an armored brigade combat team in europe. >> let me add that while we were undertaking our work over the last year the department is running hard on its own work with regard to approaches i guess i would say for deterrence and assurance, deterring russia and assuring in europe. so we were -- in doing our work we were -- we had to get in front of the department is the only way i can put it. ei


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