tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN February 17, 2016 11:31am-1:32pm EST
and what do we need to know? >> brazil has taken this very seriously. they consider it i think absolute top national priority. and as the chairman mentioned, the other chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, they have deployed hundreds of thousands of people in the response. they're working to reduce mosquito populations. they're trying new forms of mosquito control. they point out that the season of the olympics is a cooler season. so generally has less mosquito activities, though not none. but i think from our standpoint, at cdc, our role is to give travel advice to people. regardless of why they're traveling. so whether it's someone is traveling for the olympics or any other reason, our advice would essentially be the same. and from the very first days when we had strong evidence suggesting a link between the presence of zika virus and microcephaly, we've advised that pregnant women strongly consider
not going to a place that has zika spreading. so that is our advice from cdc. and that for women who live in such areas or people who go there, to take really good steps to prevent mosquito bites, and there are things can you do, applyi applying deet. wearing long-sleeved shirts ardo and long pants. wearing clothing that has deet treatment and staying indoors within air conditioning or at least screened enclosed spaces. i think as we learn more in the coming weeks and months, more will be understood about what can be done to keep any risk that might be there to the absolute minimum. >> i think it will definitely smell like deet down there. sure enough. i was in peru, there's a mosquito and dengue research project going on.
and tracking individuals that, that may have been contracted and where they have traxed to and who else may have been exposed or mosquitos in that area. a lot of folks in my district are concerned about children coming north from latin america, it's been an issue. now it's been exacerbated with zika. do we need to know anything? how prevalent is, for a child, a minor, to carry a disease? i know you said it's got a very short period where its symptoms are prevalent. are we researching how long an adolescent would carry the disease and whether you know say they come north of the border. and are bitten. you see where i'm going with that? what do we need to know about that? >> we've studied this in a variety of prior outbreaks, as have others. the virus stays in the blood for about a week.
after people begin to get sick. we don't see long-term persistence, so unlike for example hiv or hepatitis, which can stay in your blood really for life, this is a short-lived, a virus that doesn't persist in the blood. beyond a week. and if you think about the numbers, they're really quite striking. there's a lot of travel from americans going to central and south america and the caribbean, in the on the order of 40 million visits per year. so lots of travel. and if you think about the different types of travel. that's a very large number compared to a different types of risk. the one area i would, just do give full information what we don't yet know is how long the virus can persist in semen. and we're doing studies on that. but that's the one area where we might see the potential for transmission through sexual contact. for more than a week. and we won't know until we do
the studies. that's why we've recommended that for men who have sexual contact with women, who are pregnant, to avoid the transmission of zika. >> you had mentioned that earlier. i get that. so when ebola outbreak was happening, we were doing airport screening of folks that had traveled to the african continent. especially those three main countries. latin america travel is much broader than that. is there any proposal. any talk about doing airport screening for potential symptoms that you know of? >> as you point out, the situation is very different. we have roughly 20,000 visitors versus 40 million. we have a disease which is spread from person to person in the case of ebola. whereas it's not with other than the rare sexual -- >> sexual activity. right. >> so i think the situation is really very different in terms of zika and our goal really is
to protect pregnant women. that's the key priority now. >> so we have an el nino going on. that's very wet across the south. the amount of water i've seen in arkansas and louisiana and texas and south carolina and alabama, mississippi, north carolina, means that there's going to be a lot of standing water in the south this year. that means mosquitos are going to be very, very prevalent. whether they're the no-see-um variety or the tiger variety you mentioned earlier. what are you proposing to help the states address maybe a mosquito outbreak? >> this is exactly what is one of the core components of the emergency supplemental request. we would be issuing grants to states at risk and southern states, as well as u.s. territories, to better control mosquito populations. >> historically that's been a
winning strategy against mosquito-borne viruses and others. as someone who chairs the western hemisphere subcommittee. who is going to be continually focused on this, who may seek congressional travel in that area, individual congressmen are going to be concerned that you know, they're wanting to know what level of information we have. and how can we waylay their fears. and the general public so this has been very helpful, mr. chairman and with that i'll yield back. >> thank you very much for your questions and this collaboration of the two subcommittees. i would like to yield to pl dmr donovan, the chairman from staten island. >> thank you for sharing your expertise with us. welcome my friend tom frieden. it's been a long time, i look forward to visiting you in atlanta. thank you for all the work you did for the people of new york city when you were the health commissioner there. we were fighting west nile, it was in its infancy stage in new
york when you were the health commissioner. i know that you need more resources. until we figure that out, is there an ability for you to redirect some resources that you have to address this? >> we'll do everything within our power to address the zika challenge. but the supplemental calls for $828 million for cdc and three broad areas, emergency response in puerto rico. which has a significant risk of seeing widespread transmission of zika. support for the continental u.s., for states at risk, including mosquito control, diagnose sticks and a series of other measures, and then international support. and while we can get started with that, we can't do it at scale. to the level that we would need. and we've already had to curtail some other activities. such as our activities that deal with lyme disease. >> i ask that because one of the proudest moments i've had in the short nine months that i've been here is when we passed the 21st
century cure act to fund cdc and nih, to come up with remedies and vaccines for some of the diseases that are known in the world. is there any mechanism in place, tom that we could help you speed that up? through legislation or something of that nature? >> we've been working very closely with the fda and in both ebola and zika, they've been able to rapidly allow us to use effective test technologies within a day or two. of our asking. so that's worked well. dr. fauci can comment further. >> we really want to tip our hat to the fda and what they've helped us with. with ebola. when we really needed to get the vaccine trial out quickly and go from a preclinical to a phase 1, without cutting corners of safety or anything, they greatly expedited to us to get the phase
>>. it's a promising technology. the biggest challenge is scalability. multinational companies work all over the world in that acceptance factor might be different as we get closer to the equator. you would agree with that, too, right? >> you've got a bigger outbreak. you've got a bigger problem. we have vaccination for dengue in brazil. they were working on one in southeast asia for a long time. i don't remember where it got. did they go quicker on this sort of thing to get vaccines in brazil? i mean would you -- would americans that are worried about dengue fever, should they go to brazil for vaccination? or are you all hesitant about you know, the safety of this? it seems like the obvious question. >> no, actually it's a good
question. the, there's a, approved vaccine by mexico and brazil. for a dengue vaccine that's about 60-plus percent effective. >> there's four different types of dengue to my -- >> you're correct. >> if you get a vaccine for dengue fever in mexico, is, would it be, would it work in india? >> that's a different strain and sometimes a different mosquito -- >> it's the relative proportion of the serotype that's dominant in a particular area. the one that didn't quite get off the ground in asia didn't have a good protection against evenly all four serotypes, the one that's in brazil now. and i'm saying that -- >> so it works better with whatever the mosquito here? and maybe the one adjacent? >> right. >> that's closer in the serum as you say? >> right. and we actually have a phase 3 trial that's ongoing that started just about four weeks ago in brazil.
in collaboration with the institute of butantan, that the nih is running the trial with them. >> is anybody working in asia now, so that if somebody gets off a plane during the monsoon in india. they don't bring a different strain to mexico or brazil? >> well i don't think it's a question of a different strain. because you have four serotypes that are essentially universally seen all over. so even in india there will be all four. rather that one strain or the other, it's the one that's dominant. like serotype ii is one of the most problematic ones. >> got it. for me that's a big deal. i'm had breakbone fever and i don't want number two and have a hemorrhagic complication here, guys. >> you got it. >> so as i think through from my own experience, i would say okay, in a world of international travel, second time is going to be worse. i'm in the 50 and older crowd, right? which makes me even, my liver even more susceptible to
swelling. so we also have to think about the global nature of that. am i right? >> you are correct. >> do you, you know my idea, our idea legislatively, was we could always get use government money here. it seems to me that as long as mr. donovan's point, as long as drug companies see a profit motive. i'm always worried about that in zika. i've got one of the few districts that might actually be impacted here. it's not going to get impacted in new hampshire, right? but it could be impacted if my district, naples. nonetheless, i mean if we gave somebody tax credits for their r&d, in order to expedite research into you know, battling this virus, or coming with vaccine, you see any downside on that? trying to accelerate the private
sector to jump in the game here? because it feels to me like they set out dengue fever it feels like they're sitting out chikungunya. and we don't want them to sit out zika. am i right about all of that? >> incentives to pharmaceutical companies are often helpful in getting them engaged. we have another way to incentivize them, which is what we do at nih. we do derisking. we do a the lost work that they would otherwise pay for themselves. so that their investment risk is less. some companies take the vaccine from the concept to the product, they don't need anybody. they don't need the nih, they don't need anybody. but when something is a public health inpair tiff. they're much more enthusiastic about getting involved. in addition to what you said, which i agree with, that's a good way to incentivize them.
>> we always think about these diseases as if they were malaria. which means outdoor, nighttime, you know, these are indoor daytime mosquitos. and so spraying, whenever i see the spray trucks i say, that's a wasted bullet. on the other hand, in our country and in my district, we don't have as much water sitting around fresh water sitting around like you would find in the caribbean or in brazil. if we do a good job on making sure we don't have a lot of pooling water around, are we going to be, is that enough? are we going to be okay until there's a vaccination? >> it's going to depend on the local environment so how -- >> how about southwest florida? >> well this is one of the reasons we need a supplemental to give resources so we can look at mosquito populations, trap them, analyze them and then
sometimes larvaeciding them conversation a very significant impact on reducing mosquito populations. your point is quite correct that the outdoor spraying may have limited impact, if any, on this mosquito population. but we're looking at different ways of doing mosquito control. and in some circumstances, what they've done in australia for example, is use targeted indoor residual spraying for this particular mosquito. with as far as we've seen, some pretty effective results. but all of that is quite complex to do. >> and let me see, taking off on that point so that i understand it correctly. because again we want to get in the game here legislatively. i'm not just asking to take your time here. like a lot of things, it always impacts the poor. and people that you know, life's never fair. and so you know, in my house, i have air conditioning. if i see a mosquito inside i say to myself, it's not chikungunya, it's not zika, so if i get bit,
i don't have to worry about it. but someone else who may not be able to afford that is more at risk. am i right about that? do i understand that >> you are exactly right. if i -- >> but that should drive some of our policy here as well. i mean, pooling water at my house is not as much of a problem as it will be at someone less fortunate. am i right about that? economically speaking. >> if we look at a study done by cdc doctors, scientists of a dengue outbreak in brownsville, matamoros in south texas a few years back, the rate of infection was eight times higher than it was in brownsville and the two driving factors for that were air-conditioning -- >> really. >> -- reduced people's risk 15-fold and smaller house plots which increased crowding and increased risk seven-fold. >> right. and then even if they have ac,
they often don't have it in the bathroom where the water is or in the kitchen where the water is. am i right about that, too? so, it complicates it. dr. mendez, you have -- is there anything on my line of questioning that you've heard me say or -- [ speaking spanish ] >> we discussed this last time we were talking about dengue. you were almost prescient that clearly the scenario, the sanitation. i just want to report that under the malaria initiative we work with the gates foundation and many other partners on an the vector control program. we are looking at new insecticide and tools. that capability can be deployed to address this need in the region. >> can i interrupt -- you're making a great point. i got bit at 9:00 in the morning at an auto parts plant that you are never going to
air-conditioning. the work environment is an area that we got to keep in mind. i think that's a great point. >> you are correct also that is usually the poor. it's a section of brazil, a poorer area, more tropical area, so, yes, there are local conditions that make it more likely that you will get the disease. the other point i would like to just mention is, of course, we do have for a while now the orphan drug act that provides some incentives for industry to develop vaccines where otherwise market failure would prevent them. we have some tools and we have different things as dr. fauci has alluded, we are looking to how we're going to work so that industry is engaged to finally developing these products so they can reach the poor in particular. >> you all keep talking. you all are great. and, you know, we need to spend some money on this. real life impact on a lot of people. so, thanks for what you're doing. and thanks for being so patient
with me here asking all these questions. >> thank you very much, mr. clawson. two final quick questions. first i remember my first trip to el salvador in the early '80s being struck by how many people -- i remember being in the ambassador's home, the president duarte and there wasn't a screen in the place amd for many trips in central and south america people do not have screens and even the foreign service officers obviously in their homes, they are at risk it would seem to me if there's no screens. is that something being looked at to promote screening as one of the best practices? secondly, there are press reports that some ngos are planning to exploit child disability and the potential link of microcephaly with zika to promote abortion. and i'm wondering and i'm hoping and maybe you can verify that none of the $1.8 billion and the president's strategy does not
have that agenda. >> thank you very much. yes, we do believe screens may play a role. there are also treated screens that may be even more effective and this is something we're very actively looking at now. i can assure you that the emergency supplemental request does not contain any proposal to change in any way current policy regarding abortion. >> yes, doctor. >> a thank you very much. indeed usaid fully advised by the u.s. law which includes the helms amendment that precludes us from using any foreign assistance resources to pay for the perform anticipates of abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate, of course, any person to practice abortions. we don't do abortions. >> the amendment makes clear that even the promotion is not -- >> correct. even the promotion. the only thing i would say we are so careful with this, we monitor this very carefully everywhere we do work, so one thing we will need to do is --
part of the request includes some requests because we'll need to have staff deployed to ensure, to ensure, that our partners and the work that gets deployed does not go into areas of the laws that are not allowed. >> appreciate that. you've been tremendous in providing information to both the subcommittees, insights, and i thank you for your service, which is extraordinary, and for allowing us to benefit from that expertise and that knowledge. the hearing's adjourned. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you.
rubio holds a campaign town hall. we'll take viewer phone calls after that event and talk to the attendees. south carolina holds it presidential primary this coming saturday. tonight on american history tv oral histories and explorations of black leadership. starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern, phyllis left her talks to us. 8:15, armstrong williams is featured. and just by 10:00 p.m., former national education association president mary few trel. all of this on american history tv on c-span3. american history tv on c-span3 features programs that tell the american story. this weekend we continue our special series on the 1966 vietnam has hearings 50 years later. we'll hear general max well's
opening statement followed by questions. >> our purpose is equally clear and easily define. baltimore's speech 1965, president johnson did so in the following term. our objective is the independence of south vietnam and its freedom from attack. we want nothing for ourselves, only that the people of south vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. this has been our basic objective since 1954. it has been pursued by three successive administrations' and remains our objective today. >> next saturday, deen rusk gist his testimony defending the policies. for the weekend schedule, go to c-span.or c-span.org. now a hearing on the iran nuclear agreement. steve mall said that iran has
complied with everything outlined in the joint comprehensive plan of action. he also testified that there has not been an increase in terror related funding from iran since nuclear related sanctions have been lifted. he appeared last week before the house foreign affairs committee. this hearing will come to order. this morning the committee continues our extensive oversight of the obama administration's nuclear agreement with iran and its consequences for the national security of the united states. the consequences also for our allies. as many know here, i feel those consequences are quite dire. january 16th was implementation day. and that marked an historic turning point in the middle east, because in a snap iran's record was cleared, its pariah
status was dropped, and this reconnected iran to the international trade and financial system. now with access to $100 billion in unfrozen assets, and sanctions wiped away. iran has instantly become the dominant country in the region. the regime has achieved this all without having to end its aggression against its neighbors. it still calls for the overthrow of the governments in bahrain and saudi arabia and other regional states. it's done it without swearing off its support for terrorism. and the iranian economy was, frankly, prior to this hemorrhaging. hemorrhaging because the sanctions which we had pushed had worked. the sanctions we pushed in 2010
and 2012 had led, by 2013, to the implosion of the economy there. now iran's leaders are predicting swift growth. and they're probably right. because we see these european countries, that have observed that the sanctions dam is broken and they are sprinting into the iranian market to cut billions in deals and to invest there. and they're making a mockery of the administration's claim that sanctions could snap back if iran cheats. you tell me if these companies are going to turn back when iran stiffs international inspectors. the revolutionary guards, already iran's most powerful economic actor. now those are the words of our treasury department. the most powerful economic
actor. why would that be the iranian guards? because they're the ones that nationalized the construction firms and the companies. so they're only going to grow more powerful with this additional international investment. just hours after the agreements implementation, the regime disqualified 2,967 of roughly 3,000 moderate candidates, from running in the parliamentary elections later this month. and after the administration finally responded to iran's missile tests, with very minor sanctions, verydy -- very diminimus sanctions, iran's president ordered the military to accelerate its
intercontinental ballistic missile program. that's aimed here at the united states. and it's designed to carry a nuclear payload, that icbm program that they're running where the ayatollah said it's every military man's mission to help mass-produce and duty to help mass-produce icbms. now worse, the administration continues to go out of its way to appease the iranian regime. and even thanked iran after it recently seized ten u.s. sailors in a highly provocative act, if you ask me. i mean when was the last time we've seen u.s. sailors taken off their ships with their hands behind their heads, guns trained on them, their ships stripped, photographs for propaganda purposes taken, photographs of one of these sailors crying, appearing in the iranian press, and then medals, medals given to those iranian agents who took them into custody. it appears the administration is determined to protect this deal
at all costs. and just look at how the obama administration backed away from a new bipartisan u.s. law ending visa waiver travel for those who have traveled to iran, iraq, syria. after an outcry, after an outcry from the iranian regime. and the administration has now decided to basically ignore the law, and iran's ongoing sponsorship of terrorism. by stretching a narrow national security waiver far beyond reason. president obama signed this bill into law, but has essentially allowed iran's supreme leader to veto it. and in an unusual move, the state department settled a decades-old financial settlement the day after implementation day. sending the iranian regime a
check for $1.7 billion. as you know, mr. ambassador, the committee eagerly awaits answers from the state department. to the many questions surrounding that surprise payment. the administration had countless opportunities to seek committee input to this matter in advance. but purposefully did not do so. that's the conclusion i have to reach. iran has never complied with any, any of its past nuclear-related agreements. we're watching this to see if this time it will be different. but even if iran meets all the administration's expectations, in a few short years the accord will leave it the dominant power in the middle east and only steps away from the capability to produce nuclear weapons on an industrial scale. all the while, and this is the
most vexing part to me. all the while iran's leaders continue on friday to chant "death to america." and many of us are struggling to see how this tilt toward iran makes us safer. i now recognize the ranking member for any opening comments he may have. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you again for calling this hearing. ambassador mull, welcome to the foreign affairs committee. mr. smith. i know ambassador, your current role is the latest stop on a distinguished career as an american diplomat. no matter whether we supported the iran deal or opposed it, we're fortunate to have you as our point person on implementation and we're grateful for your service. mr. smith welcome to you, thank you for your service. your office has led the way in cracking down on some of iran's worst offenses. in my view treasury could be doing even more if we had it undersecretary for terrorism and
financial intelligence. but the nomination of adam zuben is bogged down in the senate banking committee, despite the urgent need to cut off iran, isis, north korea and other from their resources, the senate should confirm mr. zubin immediately. this is far from the first time the foreign affairs committee has held a hearing on iran. we've held many hearings. we understand exactly what the deal was and is. but today's hearing is distinctly different from any we've had before because the iran deal has been implemented. nuclear-related sanctions have been lifted. and iran no longer has enough fuel to make a nuclear weapon. again, no matter what anyone's position was on the iran deal -- and i strongly opposed the iran deal -- this ship has left port and now we need to decide which course to chart. one option would be to continue bringing up legislation designed to undermine the deal. the house has passed two bills
like this already. largely along party lines. these are symbolic votes, they'll never become law in my view they're not a valuable use of this committee or congress's time. so i don't think we should treat the iran deal the way we've dealt with the affordable care act, voting again and again to repeal it, even though it's a settled issue. i didn't like it, i voted against it, but it passed, so there's another option. and the other option, the one i support is to work in a bipartisan manner to hold iran's feet to the fire and insure there are serious consequences for its nefarious behavior. there's a lot we can and shu be doing and i'm confident we can work across the aisle to find common ground we can build on. iran remains the world's most active state sponsor of terror and a chronic human rights abuser. iran continues to break
international law with impunity. we don't trust iran and our policies must reflect that. >> that's why i'm glad we slapped new sanctions on iran for testing two medium-range ballistic risles late last year. tests that were a blatant violation of the u.n. security council resolution governing the nuclear deal. and there are other problems we need to address. an iran free from most sanctions can spread more resources to bad actors throughout the region. strengthening the murderous what sad regime. boosting the houthis in yemen and supporting the militias in iraq. as the chairman pointed out, it's galling that after we sign an agreement with iran they continue their, their leaders continue to yell "death to america." it really is galling. but we need to work together on new legislation that will crack down on this other dangerous behavior of iran and shore up our allies and partners in the region. so ambassador mull and mr. smith, i look forward to hearing from you about the
implementation of a jcpoa, the monitoring and verification that iran is living up to its commitments and what else we can be doing with respect to iran outside of the scope of a nuclear deal to help make our country safer and enhance stability in the region. iran had sanctions lifted. because of the nuclear agreement. but there are a lot of things that iran has not yet done. and a lot of bad things that iran is doing that i think will warrant additional sanctions. for instance, iran's continued support for terrorism. it's not something we can turn a blind eye to and we shouldn't. so we need to figure out the way we can be most effective. what we can do with respect to iran. again, outside the scope of the nuclear deal. during the nuclear deal we were told well we can't really talk about anything else. we can only talk about the nuclear deal. so again, it is galling when we
look at iran. it is -- i think the frustration thaw heard from the chairman, is frankly the frustration that all of us have with the iranians and with their bad behavior and with their not changing at all after they sign an agreement showing no good faith whatsoever. poking us in the eye. continuing to walk and malign and walk over the wrong way. we must hold their feet to the fire. so i look forward to your testimony, gentlemen, thank you, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. engel. this morning, we are joined by a very distinguished panel. we have ambassador mull, he serves as the lead coordinator for iran nuclear implementation at the department of state. prior to this appointment, ambassador mull served as the ambassador to poland. and as executive secretary of the state department. mr. smith is the acting director of the office of foreign assets
control. at the treasury department. prior to joining ofac. mr. smith served as an expert at mr. smith served as an expert at the united nations al qaeda and taliban and sanctions committee and as a trial attorney at the u.s. department of justice. without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements have been made part of the record and members here have five calendar days to submit any statements or questions or extraneous materials for the word. so if you would, mr. ambassador, please summarize your remarks. we'll go to you first. >> with pleasure, chairman royce, ranking member engel and all the distinguished members of this panel. i appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. to testify on the progress we've had on implementing the joint comprehensive plan of action. or the jcpoa. this is a really important deal for america's security. and that of our friends and allies around the world. and i welcome congress's oversight and partnership in
making sure we get this exactly right. on january 16th, the international atomic energy agency issued a report verifying that iran had completed its key nuclear steps under the jcpoa. thus reaching implementation day. those commitments signified that iran had dismantled two-thirds of its installed centrifuge capacity. including all of its most advanced machines and drastically rolled back its enrichment program. which had been growing over the past decade. it shipped out almost all, about 25,000 pounds worth of its enriched uranium material. going forward, iran can possess no more than 300 kilograms of up to 3.67% enriched uranium for the next 15 years. further, iran removed the core of its iraq reactor and rendered it inoperable by filling it with concrete, cutting off the path
by which iran could have produced significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium. iran placed its nuclear program under an unprecedented and continuous iaea verification and monitoring regime. using monitoring technologies like electronic seals and online enrichment monitors that can detect and report cheating. the iaea also has oversight of iran's entire nuclear fuel cycle from uranium mills to enrichment facilities and centrifuge production plants. insuring that iran cannot divert nuclear materials to a potential covert program without detection. furthermore, any goods and technology usable for nuclear purposes must now go through a procurement channel administered by the united nations security council creating yet another layer of transparency, oversight and monitoring into iran's nuclear program. iran is now also provisionally applying, as a result of this agreement, the additional
protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the iaea. this along with the jcpoa special provisions to address disputes regarding iaea access to an undeclared location within a short period of time insures that the iaea will have all the access it needs to ongoing -- in an ongoing way verify iran's commitments. as a result of these actions, in keeping with the deal, on january 16th, the united states, the european union, and the united nations security council lifted nuclear-related sanctions against iran allowing the resumption of some international commercial and investment activity with iran. in keeping with our commitments, we will not try to block commercial activity that the jcpao admits. however, we will be monitoring it with being ready to act with
authority if though activity supports goals that are hostile to our interests in the realms of terrorism or in iran's ballistic missile program. all u.s. sanctions on iran that are not nuclear-related remain in effect. as evidenced a few weeks ago when we designated for sanctions, a number of individuals and entities for supporting iran's ballistic missile program, the jcpoa in no way limits our ability or will, to use these tools to respond to iran's other destabilizing activities. that's precisely why our allies and nations around the world support this deal. it eliminates the threat of a nuclear-armed iran it gives the international community unprecedented tools to insure iran's nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful going forward and it does not limit our ability to respond to iran's destabilizing policies and actions. in short it makes the world safer for all of us. just a few weeks ago israeli defense force chief of staff lieutenant general gahdi isenkot acknowledged that the jcpoa
reduces the immediate threat to israel because it, quote, rolls back iran's nuclear capability and deepens the monitoring capabilities of the international community into tehran's activities. in the same remarks, he also said that he believes that iran will make great efforts to fulfill their side of the bargain. the jcpoa was not built on a prediction of what the future will bring. it's built on a solid verification regime. and my team and i will continue working every day to confirm that iran is living up to its jcpoa commitments or face the consequences. the administration looks forward to continuing to engage with this committee and with the congress in general on this important topic. i look forward to answering your questions today. thank you. >> thank you, ambassador. mr. smith?
>> good morning, ranking member royce and engel and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the invitation to appear before you to discuss our actions on implementation day on the joint comprehensive plan of action or the jcpoa and our efforts to enhance and enforce our iran-related sanctions going forward. i'll be addressing the key steps that my office, the treasury department's foreign office of control, or ofac, took to fulfill the u.s. government's sanction-related commitments on implementation day and i'll address the sanctions authorities that remain in place and how we approach our responsibilities to enforce those authorities. the jcpoa is a strong deal that protects the national security of the united states and our partners and allies overseas. and implementation day was a significant milestone of the jcpoa. in exchange for iran verifiably completing its key nuclear-related commitments under the jcpoa, we lifted nuclear-related sanctions on iran.
we took our steps on implementation day only after the international atomic energy agency verified that iran had completed its key nuclear commitments under the jcpoa. the deal gives us the necessary flexibility to respond to iran if it fails to comply with its jcpoa commitments. including the ability to fully snap back international and domestic sanctions. as an agency tasked with implementing and enforcing u.s. economic sanctions, we're clear-eyed about the fact that iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism. and continues to engage in other destabilizing activities. we believe it is crucial to continue to implement and enforce the sanctions that remain in place. on implementation day, the united states took action with respect to sanctions in two key areas. the first and most significant was to effectuate the lifting of
nuclear-related secondary sanctions which are sanctions that are directed toward nonu.s. persons for activity outside of u.s. jurisdiction. the second area concerns three relatively narrow exceptions to our primary embargo on iran. which remains in place. on implementation day, ofac issued a statement of licensing policy, establishing a favorable licensing policy with respect to exports or re-exports to iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services. to be used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation. we issued a general license authorizing the importation of iranian carpets and food stuffs and issued a license authorizing u.s. controlled or foreign entities to engage in activities in iran that are consistent with the jcpoa and applicable u.s. laws and regulations.
to assist the public in understanding all the sanctions modifications effective on implementation day, ofac also published on our website a summary of the actions we took, as well as hyperlinks to documents that explain in detail the contours of the sanctions lifting, including a guidance document that describes in detail the lifting of the nuclear-related sanctions and the sanctions that remain. a set of more than 85 frequently asked questions. and information on the changes we made to the various sanctions list. while we have fulfilled our implementation day commitments to lift the sanctions specified in the jcpoa, ofac continues to administer a robust sanctions regime targeting iran outside of the nuclear arena, and the range of iran's troubling activities. broadly, the u.s. primary embargo on eye ran remains in place this means that u.s. persons generally remain prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings with iran or iranian entities, unless the transactions are exempt from regulations or authorized by ofac.
in addition, secondary sanctions continue to attach to the 200 iran-related individuals and entities on ofac's especially designated nationals and blocked persons list. what we call our sdn list, as well as any such persons we add to the sdn list in the future and treasury remains fully committed to using our existing sanctions authorities to target iran's support for terrorism, its human rights abuses, its ballistic missile program, and its destabilizing activities in the region. thank you and i welcome your questions. >> thank you, mr. smith. let me start, mr. smith, with the fact that you note in your testimony that there's still hefty secondary sanctions available. for anyone who is connected to the irgc or iran's support for terrorism. why then haven't we been able to
do more on mahan air, which is the iranian passenger airline that also happens to be the favorite with the country's islamic revolutionary guard corps. the irgc uses this particular company to ferry its weapons and its personnel into syria. to aid the syrian regime. and after kut's force commander salami flew to moscow to enlist russian support for a counteroffensive to salvage the syrian regime, these flights to syria actually increased and so last year your colleague at treasury testified that regardless of the deal, a foreign bank that conducts or facilitate as significant financial transaction with
iran's mahan air will risk losing its access to u.s. financial systems. so instead of more action to ground these planes, as part of the prisoner deal, the white house agreed to lift an interpol red notice against mahan's chief executive and its senior manager whom the u.s. treasury said was responsible for the airline sanctions evasions operations. so if we're serious, we could take immediate action against those financial institutions that transact on this iranian airline's behalf in asia and europe and the gulf. we should slap heavy fines on european and asian ground service companies working with the airlines. are we going to do that? >> sir we've been very engaged around the world on the question of mahan air. we've reminded our allies, partners and other third
countries of the secondary sanctions that remain with respect to mahan air. we've continued to designate those entities that try to support mahan air around the world. we did some designations several months ago. we continue to look at those targets. and we continue to engage with governments around the world on the need to stop working with mahan air. and we're going after the finances where we can. >> yeah, but i've just got to point out. so unless those heavy fines, i mean it's one thing to jaw bone and to say this. but in the meantime, they are expanding their operations. and in the meantime, they are flying into syria on a regular
basis. and you see what's happening in aleppo. in terms of the encirclement of aleppo. as that support comes in, it has varied our consequence -- very dire consequences in syria. and what i don't see is the pushback. let me give you another example. so what is the specific national security interest that justifies this claimed waiver? we know what happened. we passed legislation here that said you don't get an automatic visa waiver. you've got to go through the regular process so we can check if you go to syria, or you go to iran or you go to sudan. because those are state sponsors of terrorism. by what logic does the administration then do a carve-out? what is this national security interest that justifies this waiver? does the u.s. have a national security interest in supporting so-called legitimate business in iran? this is the argument the administration makes. legitimate business in iran, the reality is, as your treasury department says, the revolutionary guard corps is the most powerful economic actor. how does this justify going around the law that the president signed, simply because
the iranians protested this? >> sir i can say that with respect to the iranian revolutionary guard corps secondary sanctions continue to attach. we continue to enforce those. with respect to the visa waiver program, i'd have to defer to my colleagues at the state department. >> well, let me explain, ambassador and mr. smith. what the administration should have told iran is stop supporting terrorism. and this won't be a problem. because the way we wrote it, it is state sponsors of terrorism. but the problem we are having is that iran has not changed its course. iran is still supporting hezbollah to the hilt. still saying they're going to transfer 100,000, 100,000 gps guidance systems to help missiles and rockets held by hezbollah, provided by iran by the way, to better target cities in inside israel.
but instead of doing that, instead of taking that stance, you created an exception. the administration created an exception. and again the president signed the law. it sounds harsh. but it sure looks as if the supreme leader effectively vetoed the bill. that had been passed and signed. >> mr. chairman, the administration supported the law that the legislation as it came through the congress to amend requirements for the visa waiver program as a means of tightening the security of our borders. which is something very important to the administration. that law, the congress included in that law, a waiver provision to allow waivers for those cases that affected the national security of the united states. as a government in implementing that law, we have to develop
what the criteria are for exercising what those waivers will be. and i can tell you that none of the criteria that we considered was how to promote greater business engagement with iran. it was really aimed at making sure that those people who carry out important missions to our national security in iran, whether it's the iaea inspectors, who need to get into iran to verify that iran is keeping its commitments to allow journalists to go in and -- >> that was not our objection. our objection is that the administration turned the concept of a case-by-case waiver on its head. under the law the proper question is, why is it in the national security interests of the united states that this particular person be allowed to enter the united states without a visa?
but you've boiled that down to, is this person involved in so-called legitimate business in iran. at a time when the irgc controls all the major businesses in iran. a broad category that was expressly discussed and then rejected during the legislative process. we had this debate. we had this debate with the administration. we reached our consensus. this bill was signed into law. and then the iranians objected. they objected because they wanted more business with the irgc and with these other entities controlled by the mullahs and controlled by the iranian revolutionary guard corps. i should go to mr. engel, my time is expired. but thank you very much ambassador and mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think what you're hearing is the frustration that while we
seem to be, in many instances, talking tough about iran, in reality we are, our actions are far away from our rhetoric. and that's a worrisome thing. we want to make sure that iran's feet are held to the fire. and we don't want loopholes to allow iran to wiggle out of the thing. wiggle out of their obligations. let me ask -- ambassador mull, the administration said that on implementation day iran would receive around $50 billion. and a government spokesman in iran claims $100 billion was released. do we know how much was released? and where the money is going?
>> our estimate throughout this process has been that iran had slightly upwards of $100 billion in frozen assets and international financial institutions around the world. of that amount, a significant portion of it, our understanding is more than $50 billion is already tied up and committed to other debts, to trade deals that had stalled. because of those frozen assets. and that in fact those assets freely available of that slightly upwards of $100 billion. about $50 billion would be available. that has remained our assessment throughout. >> i thank you. mr. smith, president rouhani recently toured europe and in doing so he is seeking to deepen economic ties, particularly it seems to me between iran and
italy and iran and france. he announced tens of billions of dollars in new economic ventures. are we expecting that europe will hold a hard line on the deal should iran cheat or i should say, when iran cheats? do we expect europe to enforce snapback sanctions if iran cheats he when now it's becoming economically beneficial to have some of the european countries having these deals with iran. how much can we count on them if and when iran cheats. and i suspect that they will that europe will forgo some of its ventures and slap economic sanctions on iran? >> i fully expect that europe is going to continue to remain a committed partner with us and our sanctions programs. we have to remember that europe had many of these trade deals before 2010. before 2012 and yet, europe has gone along with us. they've sacrificed many of those
deals the first time around, and cut those deals off. in compliance with the coordination that we've done and the secondary sanctions we've implemented in cooperation with this congress. so i fully expect that europe will continue to comply with the deal that we've struck. >> the lifting of the arms embargo and the lifting of sanctions against iran's ballistic missile program, obviously could further destabilize the region. when the arms embargo empires. iran will legally be able to ship weapons to assad, to hamas. to hezbollah. international interdiction efforts will suffer greatly and after eight years countries will be able to sell iran components for its ballistic missile program. it's galling because during the entire negotiations we were told that the only thing that was
being negotiated was the -- was not ballistic missile programs. but just the nuclear question. and then suddenly we find this, this clause stuck in, which allows -- frees iran from being banned to purchasing ballistic missiles in eight years and others in five years. how will u.s. sanctions work to address this issue after five years and after eight years? >> i think part of the reason that you saw the difference in what the u.n. would allow after eight years was the way that we had all conceived of our sanctions. i think the u.n. had looked at those sanctions and those sanctions were imposed at the u.n. and we got the u.n. consensus because those were viewed as nuclear-related sanctions. so they were viewed at the u.n. level as part of the nuclear-related file. but i will tell you that the u.s. sanctions are secondary sanctions, continue with respect to the ballistic missile program. we've got all of the major iranian components related to
the ballistic missile program. on our sdn list, secondary sanctions remain on those individuals and entity which is means that any european or third country or other actor that deals with iran and deals with those entities, with respect to the ballistic missile program, even after eight years will still have to contend with our secondary sanctions. >> let me ask you my final question. what has the response been, from our allies in the middle east since implementation day. that includes israel and the sunni-arab countries. what's the administration doing to reach out to israel and our gulf allies, those who were obviously more closely affected by the iran deal to raise their comfort level. >> thank you ranking member engel. in my current capacity since taking on this responsibility in september i have met several times with senior israeli
officials to hear their concerns. secretary kerry also maintain as regular dialogue not only with the israeli leadership, but also with our gulf allies on a regular basis to address their concerns. it's no secret that israel was opposed to this deal. my impression since the deal came into force, is that they want to work with us to make sure that it is implemented fully. that's a partnership and a relationship that i welcome. i intend to go to israel in the next few weeks to continue that dialogue. secretary kerry was most recently in riyadh to meet with his counterparts from the gcc states to hear their concerns. they've been supportive of the deal as well, but they also want us to remain focused on iran's destabilizing activity in the region. and of course, we will be. >> thank you, gentlemen. >> thank you, ranking member engel. in the 1990s, previous c.i.a. directors confirmed in congressional testimony that
north korea was selling missiles and technology to iran. and 2013, former state department official david asher testified before our committee that a cooperation agreement signed in 2002, between north korea and iran was the keystone, his phrase, for the north korea-designated nuclear reactor built by iran proxy, syria, which was destroyed in 2007. and throughout the years, there have been a litany of reports confirming iran/north korea collaboration on nuclear and ballistic missile technology. as well as the presence of iranian and north korean scientists and technicians. at the test of these weapons in their respective countries. the united states has repeatedly sanctioned north korean and iranian entities for their collaboration on these issues.
reports now indicate that iranian scientists were again present for north korea's nuclear test in january. so i have several questions relating to that. ambassador mull, what u.s. entities are tasked with monitoring iranian and north korean collaboration on nuclear and ballistic missile issues. and if iran acquires nuclear technical knowledge from north korea and just the expertise, the know-how, the results from nuclear tests, not actual nuclear-related materials, would iran be in violation of the jcpoa or any other sanctions against itself or north korea? and also, can you confirm if iranian officials, scientists or technicians were present in north korea for its latest nuclear detonation on january 6th. and moving to another topic
under the jcpoa's annex 3, the civil nuclear cooperation, the u.s. and other p5+1 members are helping iran develop its civil nuclear program. has the u.s. or any other p5+1 country begun any transfers to iran as part of this annex? and what has been transferred, how do we reconcile some of these transfers with prohibitions under existing u.s. law? and lastly, the u.s. no longer seems to care as much about iran's human rights atrocities and its support for terrorism worldwide because the administration seems solely fixed on giving iran a good report card on complying with the nuclear deal. if you could comment on that as well. thank you, gentlemen. >> congresswoman, thank you very
much for those very topical questions, which i'll be happy to address. you are right that through the years there have been connections with iran with many other partieparties, north kore others as well in developing the nuclear program that we have found to be such a grave threat to our interests, our friends such as israel and other friends in the region. so that's the reason that we took on this deal to limit the capacity for that program to pose a threat. >> but which are the entities that are tasked with monitoring this? >> i can assure you there are few issues that get as much attention from the u.s. intelligence community, our diplomatic attention, our military attention than the nuclear threats from iran, north korea and elsewhere. we will remain very much engaged, in fact i would say more engaged now that we have
very specific criteria by which to judge iran -- >> can you confirm whether iranian officials were present in north korea? >> i cannot. >> and if they acquire -- if iran gets from north korea not the actual materials but a lot of the expertise, would that be a violation under the jcpoa? >> the jcpoa spells out very specific measurable commitments that iran must meet. the number of centrifuges, the number of -- the amount of enriched material that it has -- >> but if iran gets know-how, advice, et cetera, results from tests but not material itself is that a violation? >> north korea is not specifically mentioned in the agreement, however, in the agreement iran committed to refrain from all research aimed at developing a nuclear weapon. if we had reason to believe they were not complying with that, we have all the full range --
>> and then just quickly, have we begun any transfers to iran on this the third annex, the civil nuclear cooperation? >> that annex does not require civil cooperation -- civil nuclear cooperation. it allows as appropriate the united states has not provided any material, however we will be co-chairing a working group of the p5+1 that will review iran's development of a new iraq reactor to make sure that it does not -- >> thank you. and mr. smith, just one note, you are no -- not overlooking the human rights record, you're not overlooking their support for terrorism throughout the region, throughout the world? >> no, ma'am, we continue to be very engaged in iran's human rights abuses and its support for terrorism. we've already designated many of the principle actors in iran, many of the principle entities it engaged in human rights abuses and we continue to follow the evidence.
>> thank you, sir. mr. deutsche of florida. >> thank you very much, madame chairman. i want to touch on three different things. thanks for being here. i want to talk about the $100 billion in frozen assets that are now available to iran. i want to talk about the secondary sanction -- the u.s. secondary sanction on ballistic missiles and sanctions under the deal. and third, i want to talk about non-nuclear sanctions in the 300 individuals and entities that were de-listed on implementation day. first, on the issue of the funds, ambassador mull, you explained that it's $100 billion but $50 billion is tied up elsewhere, meaning $50 billion is available. whatever the ultimate numbers are, what are we doing to actually track that money as it is released since any of that money that flows into the hands of those who are supporting terrorists would then trigger terrorist sanctions or human
rights sanctions. >> in this setting i can tell you that we monitor very closely without going into too many details where those assets go as they are released. as general clapper testified earlier a few days ago, so far it seems that most of those funds are going into infrastructure, domestic infrastructure projects to the extent that they're able to monitor that. we have not seen a substantial change in levels of support for terrorist activity. however, we remain very closely focused on that. and through the sanctions that we have remaining very strong tool kit of sanctions we remain ready to take exact appropriate penalties when required. >> i appreciate that response. and i hope that we have an opportunity to continue to engage in this discussion in this setting and in a classified setting. secondly, on the issue of ballistic missiles, mr. smith,
you talked about u.s. secondary sanctions applying even after eight years. i'm less concerned now about what happens after eight years rather than what's happened right now. right now iran has violated the u.n. security council resolution by testing those ballistic missiles. we post sanctions and i commend the administration for doing so, but the jcpoa, the international component of the jcpoa is founded upon a security council resolution. what, if anything, can we expect the security council to do in response to the clear violations of existing security council resolutions and the jcpoa that iran has engaged in by testing these missiles? >> so what i can tell you is we still have most of the major economic actors in iran that have engaged in ballistic missile testing. and any of the work on that we still have them on our secondary sanction list -- >> no, i understand. security council. >> in terms of the security
council activity i'd probably defer more to my state colleague. >> that is will the security council remain focused on -- >> we took these tests to the security council, as i understand it. the security council looked at it then it goes to the sanctions committee. where does the stand now? how likely is it that we're actually going to see sanctions on what is a clear violation of the u.n. security council resolution? and if they don't sanction when there's a clear violation, what confidence can we have in their ability to carry out the terms of the jcpoa? >> well, the security council of course has a feature that was written into the founding treaty of the security council where a permanent members of the security council have a veto. so if any -- we have raised in the days after this test our strong belief ambassador power condemned this launch as a violation of u.n. security council 1929. which we believe. the sanctions committee agreed with that assessment. the security council has not yet won the full agreement of all five permanent members to take appropriate actions. but i'll tell you, congressman, we don't counter the iranian
missile program just by relying on the security council. we have a broad range of tools -- >> ambassador, i understand that and i appreciate that. but it gets back to my main point here which is under the terms of the jcpoa there is -- we wrapped all these security council resolutions into a new security council resolution that specifically includes the ballistic missile section which has now been violated. and ultimately we've been told throughout including this morning that our allies remain committed, which i guess the question is that simply our closest allies is it no longer the p5+1? that's a concern. but i only have a little time left and i'd like to turn to my last issue which is the company that the 300 individuals and entities that were delisted on implementation day, we have been told repeatedly that that list is being scrubbed and that if any one of those individuals or entities should be sanctioned for violating either terrorism either because they support
terrorism or because they violate human rights that they would be sanctioned. where are we on the review? have you identified any that should be? >> congressman, before we reached implementation day we had over 400 entities because they're being put there for nuclear reasons on implementation day while removing them for the nuclear reasons we added 200 of those back onto our sdn list because of terrorism and other concerns. i can ask mr. smith to get into the details. >> so what i can say is when we took the 400 off before we did that we did the comprehensive review of all of them to make sure that we were comfortable with removing them, that we didn't see any support for terrorism, human rights abuses, ballistic missiles, we kept those entities on. since that time we've continued to follow the evidence. if there's evidence of any kind
of activity that would violate our sanctions that fall within the sanctions that remain, we will act against those. >> i just want to clarify. so are you -- i didn't know this. you're saying that of the 400 individuals and entities who were listed in the agreement, 200 of them are still being sanctioned for terrorism and human rights violations? >> no, i should clarify this. as we remove 400 from the list because they were not related to terrorism, human rights abuses, ballistic missiles or others, 200 of those were marked by the treasury department before as government of iran or iranian financial institution. we still in the united states our u.s. persons are still obligated to block and do no transactions with anyone that is identified as the government of iran or iranian financial institution. so those 200 that we put on a separate list, just a list for u.s. persons to say these are government of iran and iranian financial institutions, no terrorism, no human rights
abuse -- >> which i understand. i just want to know, have you -- where are you in scrubbing the list of other names? and when will you make a determination whether any of those other individuals or entities should be subject to sanctions for terrorism or human rights violations? >> so the plan that we continue to have is we review all of the intel and all of the evidence that comes in. we don't look at every name that's on our -- we have 5,000 names on our sdn list. we don't look at every name. we look at all of the intel that comes in. and does that affect any name on our sdn list, should we add a name to our sdn list? so we work with our partners and the rest of the u.s. government to make sure we collect all the information. and if it's sanctionable conduct, whether or not you were removed from our list or you were never on our list, that's when we take action. >> has any action been taken? >> we have taken action. we took action the day after implementation day against a number of ballistic missile supporters. we continue to work -- we designated an al qaeda related yesterday. we are continuing to work across the range of our sanctions
programs. >> time of the gentleman has expired. chair recognizes himself. my understanding is on the ballistic missile deal they're relatively low level people. in regards to -- and simple yes or no would be helpful. the iran sanctions act expires december 31st of this year, will the administration support legislation simply extending the iran sanctions act so that nuclear related sanctions it provides can be snapped back if iran cheats? i know there's been some talk already. the talk of that is premature. i absolutely disagree. we need to set this just a straight reauthorization. secondly, in terms of enriched uranium, exactly what can 5,000 -- ambassador mull, this would be to you. what exactly can 5,000 centrifuge machines produce as it constitutes any threat whatsoever and if they build more machines how can we be sure that has or has not happened?
you've testified that iran shipped almost all of its estimated iranian stockpile out of the country leaving behind no more than 300 kilograms over 15 years in iran. could you tell us exactly where has iran enriched uranium been shipped? who watches it? who guards it? and is there any potential or any concern that it could be clandestinely returned to iran? and of course i've raised this with secretary kerry in the past, are there concerns that north korea could be providing such material to iran in a clandestine way. and finally on the human rights issue and i'll be chairing another subcommittee another hearing on human rights issues in iran. they are despicable. one of the worst violators of human rights in the world. the use of torture, the use of executions. there are very few parallels. north korea comes to mind and a few other countries.
how many individuals have been designated, has the top justice in iran been designated? i yield for your answers. >> i'll start with the last question on human rights abuses. we've continued to designate under human rights authority, but we designated all of the top actors in iran almost from the beginning. and so if you go down the list on human rights we've got the irgc, the iranian ministry of intelligence and security, we've got all of the major -- the law enforcement forces, the iranian cyber police, the center to investigate organized crime. all of the major actors in iran that would have any touch on the human rights abuses we've designated. the numbers are about 37 individuals and entities designated because we went after all of the big, big actors. >> how many in the past year? >> none in the past year because we had already done -- >> and designation in real term?
>> the assets are frozen in the united states. u.s. persons are prevented from dealing with them but also carries secondary sanctions so we can tell third country entities, you deal with these individuals or entities -- >> and response of those third entities? >> if europe tries to deal with any of those that are designated for human rights abuses, i would say that europe has many of those actors still remaining on its sanctions list, so we haven't seen that conduct, but we would go to anyone and say you will be cut off from the united states if you continue to deal with those actors. >> and you're ready to do that? have you done that yet? >> we haven't seen that activity from those organizations and individuals are not the ones that anyone is trying to deal with at this time. >> okay. ambassador mull. >> sir, on your nuclear related questions, the 5,060 centrifuges permitted to operate -- the operational part isn't on what they produce. it's that iran may not have more than 300 kilograms at any time
in the next 15 years of no more than 3.67 relatively low enriched uranium. if iran exceeds that amount, it will face a response from the joint commission, which could feature being declared in violation of the agreement and then appropriate snapback sanctions that could take -- that would be one of the consequences. secondly, if iran builds or employs more than 5,060, they will also be subject to being declared in violation of the agreement. these enrichment facilities are under 24/7 monitoring by the iaea with cameras and regular visits. we have a good handle on whether or not they will be keepingcomm. in terms of other covert support because there is full-time iaea monitoring of the entire fuel cycle within iran, it is impossible to introduce elements into that system without being
detected by the system by the iaea. that applies to whether north korea supplies material or anyone. the material that iran shipped out, the 25,000 pounds of nuclear enriched nuclear material, russia took that under its control. we obviously have many differences over many years with russia, but one of the features of our relationship is pretty close cooperation on protection of nuclear material. we do not have concerns that that material -- >> do we have any on site accountability? can we go and verify ourselves? >> we cannot. >> we cannot. >> who does? >> well, i mean, russia has tons of nuclear material, has for many years. russia is responsible for maintaining access -- >> what town is it actually being -- where is the repository for it? >> i'm sorry? >> where has it been put? >> it's not been fully according to our information it has not
yet been decided where exactly -- >> so it's shipped out but it's going somewhere. >> it's still in the process of being delivered in its entirety. >> so it's not all shipped out yet? >> it's all shipped out. it all left iran on a ship. >> where does it go? it's got to be somewhere? >> it's on a russian ship in russian custody. >> it's actually on a ship right now? >> i believe if it has not arrived yet, it will very soon. and it will be kept within controlled russian facilities. >> but again, we're then trusting the russians to say that they have it under their purview, they're watching it? i mean, they're so close to iran, they have double dealed us and especially in the middle east, the syrians. i don't know why we would trust them. could you tell us where it's going? i mean, that's important. >> that's a russian government responsibility to decide where it goes. we do not have concerns about russian custody of this material. what's important in this deal is will it go back to iran, and i
can guarantee there are sufficient controls in place that if one piece of dust of that material goes back into iran -- >> again, can i aea go to that ship and follow it to its final resting place? >> i think iaea has different monitoring relationships with each country in the world. >> i would not have confidence that -- i mean, it's not even in a city then, you're saying. it's not even -- it's not somewhere in russia that we can say there it is. we don't even know where it is. >> the iaea verified the loading of all of this material. >> loading. but where does it end up is very important. >> again, that is the russian government's responsibility to decide where it goes. >> that is a flaw in my opinion. and the yes or no on the iran sanctions act? >> on the iran sanctions act we remain ready to work with the committee to decide on its proper when and if it should be properly reauthorized.
>> our opinion would be many of us, not everyone, is if you want snapback sanctions and you want to continue the accountability regimen, you got to have the iran sanctions act. otherwise it's not a simple yes because we're talking about straight reauthorization. brad sherman. >> the entire country's been captivated by isis, the beheadings on youtube revolt us all, but the shiite extremist alliance based in tehran is more dangerous and more evil. they have killed far more americans, hundreds in the 1980s in lebanon, hundreds in iraq and hundreds in afghanistan from iranian-provided ieds. this alliance of iran, assad, hezbollah and the houthi is wrapping up in the middle east
now. they're responsible for the deaths of 200,000 syrian civilians. the difference here is that assad supported by iran, and by the money that iran now has available. when isis kills 50 people, they put it on youtube. when assad kills 100,000 -- kills thousands, he has the good taste to deny it. now, the nuclear deal was not supposed to be a get out of jail free card for everything that iran does. we have sections 301 and sections 302 of the iran threat reduction act i worked with, our former and present chairman on. you've only designated 70 entities under 301, but just as important under 302 you have not
sanctioned a single business that i can identify for doing business with the iran revolutionary guard corps, an entity that puts new blood on its hands every day in syria. mr. smith, what's the most prominent or well-known company that has been sanctioned for doing business under section 302, for doing business with the iran revolutionary guard corps? >> sir, i'm sorry, i'd have to get that information -- >> i've got the information. 0.0. >> we've done a significant amount of irgc designations. >> designations are nice, what about sanctions? >> designations are sanctions, sir. designations under this authority -- >> i'm talking about secondary sanctions. >> so when we designate irgc -- >> okay, look, the irgc isn't trying to do business in the united states. the irgc is getting its supplies from companies in europe.
which european companies have you sanctioned for doing business with the iran revolutionary guard corps? >> when we designate an irgc and we put an irgc tag, that carries secondary sanctions. >> have you imposed a secondary sanction, mr. smith? the filibustering supposed to go over on the senate side. >> the answer is if they carry second -- >> if -- have you been posed a secondary sanction on any business in europe? >> we have not had to because the european actors moved away from that business. >> and none of them are doing business with the irgc? >> i have not seen evidence of european actors continuing to deal with the irgc. >> okay. what about south asian and east asian actors? >> i haven't seen -- >> okay. because the treasury department announced the irgc is this huge economic monolith. you've only designated 70. there are a lot more fronts for you to designate. but you say it's this huge economic and yet you can't find a single east asian, south asian or european company doing business with them.
let me move onto another designated sbi, the airline of choice for the iran revolutionary guard corps and for thugs going to syria to kill people. they're flying airbus aircraft into friendly countries in the middle east and europe. those airbus aircraft have u.s. technology on it. what have we done to prevent those aircraft from being received in those friendly cities? >> a number of agencies of the u.s. government including treasury, commerce, state and others have been actively engaged to try to prevent them from being able to fly. >> have we stopped anything or just sending letters? >> we have stopped -- >> where have we stopped? >> i don't think i can say in this setting. >> can you get that to me confidentially? let's break this. they're flying into an awful lot of european and asian and middle east friendly cities. why haven't we nailed a single
bank for doing business with mohan? >> we continue to try. we continue to do what we can -- >> we can't find a single bank doing business with mohan? >> when we find the evidence -- >> okay. but you have found zero evidence -- i mean, we're relying on the executive branch to enforce this deal because you're able to monitor what iran does. and here's an example where you've got a major airline doing business in dozens of cities and you conditioned find them doing business with a single bank. >> thank you, mr. sherman. thank you. >> thank you very much. first of all, i would like to associate myself with the con servants about human rights that congressman smith outlined. and i would like to say that
there are ways of approaching a human rights issue that will have an impact for today. there are other ways of approaching it that will have a major impact for the future as well. let me just say we have with us today folks in their yellow jackets who remind us they're here as testimony to the fact that we have a brutal human rights abusing regime in tehran. they're here to remind us that they have families. and there are still people whether it's in camp liberty or whether it's in iran itself who are being held and being tortured and being repressed by this government that has -- they think they have the destiny of
how do you say, the blessings of god for the horrible crimes they're committing against their own people and have been doing so for decades now. if we are to have a nuclear-free iran, and what we're trying to do is stop this, we recognize now the shiite sunnis split and the last thing we want to see is a nuclear exchange between sunni muslims and shiite muslims. this is really almost -- it's not just for our own national security, it's almost a humanitarian effort on our part to try to prevent that weapons system to become part of that historic fight between these two factions of islam. but let me just note that just the sanctions for human rights abuses is not enough. and i don't believe we're doing it with the gusto or with the
determination that we need to. although you know more about that than i do of what the potential use of this is. but that's one part of the human rights approach. the other approach is that we need to be supporting those people -- not just punishing those people who are oppressing the population, but supporting those people in the population who want to bring about a more democratic iran and want to basically sever the iron grip they have on iranian society. have we done anything based on the fact that now we've had this reproachment on the nuclear issue with the iranian regime. have we in any way stepped up support, direct support for any group within iran that is trying to make a more democratic
country? >> congressman, thanks for the question. i'm afraid i'll have to take that back for you. in my responsibilities day-to-day my job is focused exclusively on making sure iran meets all of its commitments, that it doesn't get to have a nuclear weapons capability. we remain gravely concerned about the human rights situation in iran. i think there's probably not another country in the world who speaks up more often about our concern and takes action through the international community, through international organizations as well as through our own laws. >> i understand that you folks wouldn't understand -- wouldn't know if we had operations going on this part of the human rights issue. i mean, challenging those people who are violating human rights and versus helping those people like the mek and others who are trying to overthrow this dictatorship and would create a better situation for achieving all of our goals if we had a
more democratic government there. let me just say that that is -- if we do not do that, if we do not help those people who are struggling to build a more democratic iran, we're just postponing the time when iran and the mullahs will have a nuclear weapon. because our treaty that we're talking about how many years is it before it no longer applies? is it a 15-year thing? so instead of postponing, we don't need to postpone that time. we've already postponed it long enough. we need to eliminate that eventuality by making sure we're supporting the democratic elements like the mek and others and the azaris and others, the kurds in iran who want to live a more free society. so thank you very much. >> thank you very much. mr. conley of virginia.
>> thank you very much. it's fascinating here supposed to be on the implementation of the iran nuclear deal, and some of the most strident and loud critics of entering into that deal at all are now focused on airlines and revolutionary guard business activities and sanctions and closing down banks rather than the actual elements of the nuclear agreement which they were the first to say would never work. they would cheat, the metrics weren't good enough, this was enabling nuclear development by iran. so, ambassador mull, i'm going to ask some questions about the nuclear agreement and its compliance. so any evidence of iran cheating so far? >> so far no. i can tell you, congressman, that in the six months or so i've been working on this in the run-up to implementation day, whenever we've detected that there might be a potential for moving away from the commitments, we've engaged with
our iranian counterparts and they've addressed those concerns every single time. >> every single time. okay. we're going to have to run through this real quickly because i want to try to understand. let me see. one of the requirements the agreement was to modify the iraq heavy water research reactor so it could no longer produce weapons grade plutonium, is that correct? >> yes, that's correct. >> and did they do that? >> yes. >> what did they do to that? >> they removed the core of the reactor and filled with concrete. >> is that reversible? >> not very easily, no. >> is it observable? >> yes, it was observed. >> so they complied? >> yes. >> pretty big deal? >> yes. >> all right. they had 19,000 estimated sen y centrifuges and they were required under the agreement to get down to 6104, is that correct? >> that's correct, sir. >> did they do that? >> yes, sir, they did. >> they did? >> yes. >> and was that observable? >> it was. it was verified by the iaea. >> my lord. all right. they had full enrichment at
fordow and natons. >> all enrichment at fordow have been observably ceased. >> what was the enrichment level before the agreement? >> the highest amount that they enriched to was 19.75%. >> and is that weapons grade? >> no. >> but they're required to go down to 3.67%, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> so from 19 to less than 4. >> yes. >> did they do that? >> yes, sir. >> was that soerobservablobserv? >> yes, it was. >> can they quickly go back to 19 or 20? >> only by breaking elements of the agreement and they would have to do so at places under full-time observation under the iaea. >> did i understand you to say there's a stockpile of enriched uranium was in excess of 25,000 kilograms? >> 25,000 pounds. >> 25,000 pounds. and the agreement says they can have no more than 300 kilograms, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> from 25,000 pounds to 300
kilograms. did they do that? >> yes, sir. >> you're kidding? >> no. >> they complied again? >> yes. >> and was that observable? >> it was observed and documented by the iaea. >> now. they also had to agree that sentcentrifuge production in th iranian mines and mills would be subject to iaea international inspection at any time, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> have they complied with that? >> yes, sir. >> huh. so all those predictions of the end of the world, armageddon, the fact is we're just enabling a nuclear development, it sounds to me, ambassador mull, that at least so far we're not dealing with a perfect state, we're not dealing with perfect behavior, there are lots of other things we object to vehemently, but with respect to this agreement so far they have in fact not
cheated that we know of. we've got a pretty vigorous inspection regime. we have metrics that met. and it sounds to me like despite predictions to the contrary notwithstanding they're further away from a nuclear weapon today than they were before the agreement, is that correct? would that be a fair assessment from your point of view? >> that is undeniably true. >> well, my lord. so we can, you know, we can decide we want to pillery the administration in one of the most nuclear agreements in my opinion in our lifetime. i happen to draw the opposite conclusion of the prime minister of israel. the existential threat to israel would have been denying this agreeme agreement. it's hard work to make an agreement. it's hard work to make it implemented.
it's hard work to validate it. it's hard work to stick with it and oversee it. but so far it's working. and thank god it is. >> and it's hard work to say that's enough. mr. connolly. and now we turn to mr. wilson. >> thank you, madame chair. i appreciate the extraordinary efforts of chairman ed royce. his leadership to expose the threat to american families. i am grateful this is a bipartisan concern. we've heard it from ranking member engel, mr. deutsche, congressman sherman. ambassador smith -- mull and mr. smith, i believe your testimony today confirms american families are at greater risk than ever that the terrorists are better financed than ever to achieve their goal of death to america and death to israel. and in fact, mr. smith, you admitted that iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. how could you not recognize that
by releasing $100 billion to a state sponsor of terrorism that a significant amount of that money would be used to kill american families? >> sir, i think we thought that a state sponsor of terrorism with a nuclear weapon was a far dangerous threat to the international community, its neighbors and to the united states. what i can say is that we put through the efforts of our sanctions iran is in half a trillion dollar hole. and what we've released allows iran to have about $50 billion, much of which it needs to stabilize its currency and to have any foreign trade whatsoever. >> but american families are at risk. in fact, last month in baghdad it was iranian-backed terrorist that kidnapped four americans. and so they're not stopping. and that may be kidnapping today, i have still not forgeten 283 u.s. marines killed in
beirut by the iranian regime. we should not forget that. i had two sons serve in iraq. every day they were at risk of ieds provided by iran. dismissing this is incredible. and putting the american people at risk. and, ambassador mull, you indicate that israel now supports the agreement. this is in direct contradiction to every bit of information we've received from the israelis themselves. so yes or no does israel support this or not? >> congressman, as i said in my testimony, the chief of staff of the israeli armed forces say that -- has publicly said that the threat to israel of a nuclear iran has declined as a result of this agreement. does that mean that the entire israeli government is happy with it? no. obviously they've had serious concerns about it. but at the same time -- >> yes or no but, hey, in a democracy you'll have -- thank god israel is a democracy. you'll have good people agree
and disagree. and back again to the development of the intercontinental ballistic missiles, ambassador, there was virtually no response as iran continues to do that there's only one purpose for the icbms as indicated by congressman engel, congressman deutsche. and that is to develop a capability of nuclear weapons to strike america. is there any other reason for icbms? >> well, that's one of the reasons that we undertook to rid iran of the ability to attach nuclear payloads to those missiles. missiles -- icbm missiles can be used without nuclear payloads. that's why they're still a threat to us and our allies and why we're working hard against them. >> but the real use of an icbm is to use with a nuclear capability, not to make some type of conventional attack. the american people are actually at risk. and for this to simultaneously occur is extraordinary to me.
and there not be repercussions and so over and over again we see the american people at risk. and then when you identify the iaea inspections, is it not true there's not an american on the inspection team? >> there are a number of americans who work in the iaea -- >> but not on this team. >> americans do not travel to iran. >> no. what you've really described and the american people need to know this, no americans, no canadians, what you're really describing is self-verification by the iranians of their own existence. and so i really am saddened by what i hear today. and to me it just confirms what lieutenant general michael flynn, the former director of the defense intelligence agency said, quote, the middle east policy is one of willful ignorance. and it's willful ignorance i think putting the american families at risk and i hope you'll change course. there's been overand over again
requests for what's been done to enforce sanctions or to reinstate sanctions. i'm really grateful to be working on legislation with congressman joe kennedy as bipartisan about zero tolerance for violations. i yield back my time. >> thank you, mr. wilson. mr. cicilline. >> now this agreement has been approved and we have the responsibility to be certain it's being implemented properly and we prevent iran from becoming a nuclear power. i think when you think about as you said, ambassador mull, in our efforts to push back on iran in a number of ways in the region because of their aggression and ongoing activity, it would be a very different scenario if we were required to push back on iran with nuclear capability. and make, i think, a difficult situation even more dangerous. so i have three very specific questions. when the united states began negotiating with iran, the breakout time was a few weeks to a few months, according to most