tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN April 1, 2016 9:00am-11:01am EDT
equipment for these reactors. third phase everything is dismantled. so that was kind of the deal. the wonderfulness of the deal was, the best i could tell lost on washington. washington is not filled, at least decision makers in my field are filled with people who spend a lot of. >> i'm with nuclear energy. when i called them to tell them very excited north koreans will give up their gas graphite
reactors i got so what? well two big so whats. one big so what you can't get them to give up reprocessing if they have gas graphite reactors because processing that spent fuel is integral to that fuel cycle. you can't leave water forever. them giving it up gave us a basis for which to continue to insist that there be no reprocessing on the peninsula. so if you knew a little bit, it was a real break through and then, of course, the reactors were plutonium production reactors in ways water reactors are not. water reactors do produce plutonium and we can talk about that if you want but it's safer and more proliferation resistant. the deal with the north koreans was complicated. not as complicated as the iran's
deal. we had the north koreans doing thing we wanted them to do. compared to not doing a deal and looking at maybe 30 weapons a year production for the north koreans, compare that with no production this looked pretty good. now a couple of little asterisks here. one asterisk is right in the middle of this, i'm going to go off to the hill to explain the wonderfulness of the deal, the ic intelligence community comes out with a judgment, that hadn't gone public yet north korea more likely than not has produced one or two nuclear weapons. well since the whole deal was designed to stop producing nuclear weapons, the intelligence community announced they've already got them sort of took a little wind out of our sails so i needed to persuade the intelligence community to say something else that was true, which is they actually didn't know whether north korea had nuclear weapons or not. and if they would say that, that
was helpful. so that's what they said. in fact, at that point we didn't know which comes to a second point that i want to make. if you look up at some of the slides, you will notice there's a very painful slide, my colleague put up and it says reasons why the agreed framework failed. i don't think the agreement framework failed. i think the policy failed. the north koreans cheated on it. a fair question when did they start cheating. how did they when they did. i don't know the answer to that. i don't know for example when i was sitting opposite at those wonderful lunches and dinners in geneva whether they were cheating then. i don't. i know when we caught them which was in the late '90s but i don't know when they were doing it. then if you asked why they were doing it depending on when they
it requires that they have a relationship with us. anybody else won't do. it has to be with us. no, please, don't ask as i witnessed last week the chinese to offer security assurances to the north koreans. that's not where i think we ought to go. so, let me say one or two other things here. actually about japan, which i'm supposed to say something about. japanese -- understand this deal was a bilateral, not six parties, united states met with the north koreans afterwards. every single time we met with the north koreans in geneva,
afterwards we met with a small delegation from the republic of korea and a small delegation from japan. that were in then in residence in geneva and i did brief them what happened during the day. i would say very often those sessions were very difficult with representatives from the republic of korea. who were suspicious that we americans were selling them out. and if you remember, that was a theme for the president of south korea at the time, which made things difficult for us. the only person who really enjoyed the way the south koreans were torturing those of us who were doing negotiations, north koreans who would not hesitate to pull my string when we got into a meeting about how our allies were commenting on
all this. so i understood that . . it came when the north koreans asked for an assurance of what they were really getting out of this whole deal to give up their nuclear weapons. for reasons not their fault, those reactors were not delivered by whatever international consortium we might create. the united states of america would commit to builds those reactors. washington laughed heartily and
we went to the president yes i need that. i need the president to write something. as it turns out as you may know, the united states congress appropriates money not the president of the united states. so the president, he was advised could write something like this, but it was contingent for execution on the congress actually voting the money. still the willingness of the president to do this depended upon us having, if you will, a financial plan for how this would be paid for. and as it turned out everybody wanted to build these reactors in north korea. the russians did, the germans did, everybody. nobody wanted to pay for them. [ laughter ] so south koreans said they would -- the phrase that was used would pay for the lion's share but. . wanted help from tokyo. we said because we're really
nice people we'll pay for the heavy fuel oil which we almost couldn't do. so then i was off to tokyo to get the japanese to fill in whatever is left after the lion provides his share. and that was very, very uncomfortable. and the japanese, senior japanese diplomat who was present for that has actually said at a forum, much like this, that i was beyond rude in pressing japan to come up with this commitment. and he was absolutely right. i was panicked because if i couldn't get the japanese to pay their part i couldn't get the south koreans to pay their part and then i couldn't get the president to sign the letter which i needed to give. so eventually rudeness paid off, and i got a deal putting those things together and off we went. but that little bit of diplomacy if that's what it was stands out
as a little bit unusual. so i'm going wrap up and say that it's never the nodality for these talks has never been particularly important in my mind provide consultations are close and continuing. in other words, you know, when you have six-party talks there are 100 people in the room. not much gets done. you have it on the side. if you have bilateral talks between u.s. and north korea as long as consultations with our allies actually occur and of course, consults with china as well i think that will work. i think second, that the deals, the iran deal and the north korean deal are political deals. they got a lot of technical bells and whistles on them for sure. but they are political. and if the governments don't take proper care to mine the
politics which i don't think we did in the mid-'90s after the agreed framework was neeshd and i pr -- was neeshd and i pray there's an implementation team that stays on iran there will be trouble because always both sides expect even though there's a declaraer to position on the iran deal that they are not looking for a broader political settlement they are looking for political performance and certainly on the u.s. side we are, we need to be careful of that. thank you. >> thank you very much. i asked george if he would b willing to discuss and add his thoughts on the agreed framework. >> thanks. i think the two presentations
were very good. let me be brief and say that there is a lot of value in thinking and talking about the agreed framework in relation to the iran nuclear -- i don't think we would be having this discussion if it was just a retrospective on the agreed framework. we would be talking about the p dd prp dprk challenge. it is worthwhile because throughout the run throughout the negotiation of the iran deal and afterwards, a lot of people brought up the dprk experience and usually negatively. this will never work. you were fools. et cetera. so, i think having this discussion remains a useful
thing. i had written a paper last year that's out on the table that kind of tried to talk about similarisi similarities and differences between the agreed framework and the agreement with iran. i don't want to go through all those other than to say and you heard it in a sense -- nobumasa akiyama has a good slide -- but it also involves presentation. there are a lot of differences in the deals themselves and the text and the length and the detail and so on. there are a lot of differences between two countries, between dprk and iran and to me that's the most important thing. we can elaborate interest. their sense of identity, their sense of confidence, their sense of where they stand in their region, where they stand in the world, the nature of their policies that iran kind of people's expectations and demands really matter. iran has elections, susan
maloney is here who is an expert on these things. they have elections at different levels but the presidential elections always end in a surprise which is kind of interesting when you think about the elections that the dprk has, for example for china or russia or other places. even though iran is a terrible dictatorship in u.s. discourse, politics matter there and public opinion matters, and that had an influence on, i think, their willingness to negotiate and has an influence on how this plays through. i think the u.s. is different now than it was in 1994 but also very similar in ways that i want to elaborate on because this is a big problem. in u.s. discourse and maybe somewhat in tokyo as well, kind of focus on the bad guy, the people that had the nuclear
program that was the problem whether dprk or iran and we don't focus that much on the reliability of the u.s. as the lead negotiator. on its capacity but more importantly it's willingness over time to fulfill its obligations. and these are relatively long term commitments. anything that's a major nuclear problem will have some long term implications, you know, bob talked about the agreed framework. you know, what the north koreans had to dismand of mantle date of birth dismantled quickly. but the reactors wif part of the deal no matter what the vendor tells you, you know, it's going to probably double it. so that's inevitably a longer term process. with the iran deal it turns itself, you know, the meaty ones
go-between 10 and 15 years but verification is 20 to 25 years and some of iron's commitments are indefinite. there's parts we have to deliver that are over that long per of time. to me that's the, needs to be understood and assessed more honestly in the u.s. than we tend to do which is again the reliability of the u.s. system in delivering what is supposed to be promised. so we've already alluded to with the agreed framework, the fuel oil. what a struggle that was to get congress to appropriate funds for the fuel oil and bob used to run around and, you know, not quite frantically desperately try to do this. it was quite unbecoming at that time the world's sole super power-one had to do it this way. then there was a relatively undefined process of normalization. if that had been defined and you
started to deliver on it, the s storms in washington over what that would have entailed and meant would have been enormous. you can go on in terms of questioning whether and how long, you know, we would have implemented these terms and along the way what the other party is supposed to be interpreting about kind of whether they should keep complying or whether they should start. i think the same thing goes on in iranian minds and for very good reasons. and it has been at the forefront. will the u.s. deliver. that's one of the reasons iran insisted on getting sanctions relief upfront. they wanted to have a payoff, obviously, which they are not quite getting in the way they thought they would but they wanted to test, you know, the u.s.'s commitment and there's lots of reasons to question whether we will be able to sustain that kind of commitment
through -- i'm sure we will through the presidential campaign. whether we will after the results of the campaign, i don't know. we don't know what the new congress will look like. like i say, i hope i'll be retired, i might be dead by the time the jcpoa kind of expires or doesn't expire it comes to its culmination, but who can predict what the american body politic will be like. but there's still deliverables in there. and so if you are the counterpart, this is a big, this is a big issue and something we don't pay enough attention to. on other issues when it's cyber norms and you go to other countries and they say we would need it in a treaty pup say why? because we don't think u.s. commitments are worth anything. we watch what happens in congress. we want a treaty. i laugh why do you want it in a treaty we can tear up the treaty
too. yeah but it's harder to do with a treaty. they point you can abrogate. then you have to apologize and say there are no more treaties because nobody can get 67 votes to ratify a treaty on anything so you have to take an executive agreement. this becomes very difficult and we've seen it on climate change recently. other things. so the vignettes that bob was talking about, just a short slice in time on the dprk deal, we'll be having these stories about implementation of the iran agreement as well and then that relates to alliance relation. our allies are wondering about our consistency and wondering about iran and trying to figure out what it means for them in five years and ten years. we were talking earlier and nobumasa akiyama was talking about japanese banks because there's a problem with tern deal which is even though sanctions
are supposed to be relieved, a lot of actors, private entities and other around the world aren't seeking business in iran because they are worried about either how the think will be interpreted or new sanctions imposed by congress and no one wants to get in trouble and cost of compliance is too high. they say forget it we'll stay out of the iranian market. from iran years review it's not a violation of the agreement. it feels like a betrayal. the capacity of your banks and your other actors to make this judgment depends somewhat on the sense of constancy and reliability of the political process. but if you're advising one of those banks, go now and don't worry about the presidential election or what might happen next january, nothing will change, you can make that, but it has an effect on the
behaviors. >> thank you. i'm going to facilitate a little discussion up here and then around 3:15 p.m., open it up to public question. i want to start off with this issue of -- maybe this goes to bob a little bit. when i started researching for this event, the impression i had was that we took a tougher line, a firmer line in terms of what we were willing to allow vis-a-vis reprocessing or other kinds of newark capability with north korea than we did with iran. in the case of iran we're talking about just widening this gap or opening up a longer time horizon which which brairan cou pursue a weaponized pep.
we were complete verifiable disarmament in the context. listening to your discussion it sounds like in the beginning, at least, it wasn't necessary. north koreans were kind of willing to offer it. it was really in the context of the follow on implementation and political sides. i guess -- is that fair to say that we almost didn't have to be or you didn't have the debates about how firm or how principled the agreement had to be or there was an implement of that. >> i think it was a simpler time. [laughter] this was the first time we had actually done something like this. and i think at base then was the
key question which is at base now when people talk about north korea and we just experienced that in the other room. if i ask for a show of hands how many people think north koreans will actually under any circumstance give up their nuclear weapons in some sort of omnibus deal? how many think they would. one, two, three people. i rest my case. tap there was a lot of skepticism in the intelligence communities. the first thing the guy who headed it particularly. but i believe then that we could do a deal and there was some talk, by the way, that we could do this deal provided the deal was based on the assumption that regime would collapse before too long. and i kept saying wait a minute, we're not doing it on that
basis. i can say -- the reason i can, senator mccain, who i have great respect said i hate this deal but i can support it if you told me that that was the basis for the deal. that it was going be in place until the regime collapsed. i said that's not the basis for the deal. then he said i hate it and i won't support it. so i think we could be in the same situation now. it's just that the predictions of the demise of north korea is constant and, you know, remember the soft landing, hard landing. north koreans didn't plan on landing. they were just going to keep on flying. so i think the deal then was really based upon, for both of us, the idea that they would give up their nuclear weapons program. it is possible it wasn't for them. in other words, i confois before, i don't know when they
started their negotiations with the pakistanis, with that johnny appleseed guy, h.q.kahn. but if we knew for sure that was the only basis on which they did the deal okay they never planned to give it up. but i don't know that. so for me this is still a deal that went to fundamentally our objectives which were pretty simple and then we made them a little more complicated by insisting that there be no reprocession and we said no enrichment although you can't find the word enrichment in the agreed framework because we refer to the north/south agreement which prohibits enrichment with great malice aforethought we didn't write it into the deal because he figured that would open up another three years of discussion. >> thank you. let me direct this a little bit
to you, but anyone can comment on it. missiles, for example, we had separate negotiation with the north koreans on their missile capability or program and that was not specifically linked to the agreed framework. there are other aspects of the deal i want to ask you to think back to that time and from tokyo's perspective was tokyo looking at this kind of as, you know, unsame together, it didn't go far enough because it didn't capture all these different pieces, or was there general satisfaction with the content, the accomplishment it was just this idea afterwards the fact that japan got recruited into being part of kyoto and eventually putting forward about half a billion dollars, i think, ultimately is what they were in
for. i think the south koreans put in about a billion or so towards the program. but how do you recollect the view from tokyo at the time especially in this context of what was in and what was outside of the deal. >> i'm out of government so i did not have insider information. my observation is from the outside. tokyo's condition was to address the reduction by the framework of the deal. i think that reminds me of the prioritization within the japanese government on dealing with north korea. and so the threats, nuclear threats posed by north korea at that time was not really immine imminent. there was no proof of credible
capability of north korea and there's no sense of urgency on the side of japan. reduction issue, that was a comment by the government at that time to deal with. the way the japanese government at that time and also i would like remind that the japanese government was very fragile politically at that time. so i think we need to sort of mobilize various issues and then, of course, that issue is so much of consensus of the public. so i think -- domestic political context present japanese government from dealing with the nuclear and nonproliferation as a top priority. that's one thing. may i ask actually the question.
>> sure. >> so in your analysis what's the real key program for north korea, by not complying, not implementing the agreed framework. either failure of oil or failure of providing security guarantee. >> someone may wish to correct me, but we did not fail to deliver, but we failed to deliver it on the schedule we said we would deliver it on. we just didn't do it because as george points out i was running around with my hat in my hand trying to get money from various places and in our budget to pay for this heavy fuel oil.
hard work. so we didn't meet the schedule. i don't think the deal failed because we weren't delivering heavy oil fuel quickly enough. on the other issue about security assurances, we, if you look at the framework it says we'll offer essentially negative security assurances, and what we had in mind was something like the npt negative security assurance. maybe moderated a little bit. after all if you go back in time we had just lived with ukraine and we had, in mind something like that. but we never got there. they never said we need security assurance so i wasn't going to run up and say hey guys we still owe you a security assurance. i don't remember it as an issue. i think woe have tried to stay way from the ukraine language and stick to the npt language is
my guess. >> not that the ukraine language worked that well for the ukranian language. absent the policy is correct, but if you are drawing implications from that -- >> i've got you, but it's not us that should be whacked for the ukraine language. it's the russians. i thought you were going to say, you know, were they unhappy about delivery of the lwr because that was also going more slowly. probably true. i can't imagine that the fundamental north korean decision to, from my perspective, materially breach, materially violate the framework was because of either of those. i think it was because they never intended to give up the weapons program a, or b, because they did intend to but expected
much more politically from us that they never got. i like to believe in b, because hope springs eternal. >> if we take that to today where we are with north korea, with all the water that has floated under the bridge and skepticism that has built up, the advancement of the progr program -- if i could ask all of you to think a little bit, if we were to try to enter into a discussion with the north koreans about denuclearization or somehow alleviating the risk or threat from the program, in the iranian case arguably they had not gotten as far as north korea is now. but in the most recent iaea delaration about past activities one could argue that they were relatively forgiving or at least
did no demand detailed accounting of or one criticism i've read in the program they've not accounted for all activity up to date. they are primarily focused on looking forward on, again, as i mentioned creating this wider gap and to relief the pressure on this issue. if we took a similar approach with north korea and say you know we'll be forgiving to everything that took place to date but eliminate the program now and the means by which could it develop more nuclear weapons, et cetera, i'm not necessarily advocating that. but is there -- is there an opportunity there or are we just so far gone with the north korean program or where the regime is today that there's really no opportunity to do
that? >> my sense is part of what the agreed framework is what you have argued. between 1992 and 1994, there was this tension. so the iaea and i'm a purist for saying they've allow the inspections and do all these things to fully account for what they've done in the past and part of the spirit of the iaaf greed framework yeah being a great to get that but the vital thing first let's stop it from going forward. in a sense the logic that you were talking about already was tried with the north koreans. with iran it's a bit more complicated insofar as the fact there are those who would argue the past is the past.
but there are still over the years ahead moments where the iaea has to offer its conclusion about iran's program and whether it's entirely peaceful in order to provide some of the deliverables to iran. if iaea can't get the answer to those questions it will have a much more difficult time making its conclusions. that story hasn't been fundamental ly >> imagine this with me. the reality is as follows. north korea has 12 fabricated nuclear weapons. it has a stockpile of fissile material... -- material that is composed of 30 kilograms of plutonium and 50 kill low grams of uranium. 12, 30, 50. let's say that's reality. we don't know that, though.
the north koreans know that. could you do a deal in which the north koreans say we'll end our nuclear weapons program, there will be no reprocessing plants, no reactors unconnected to a grid. there will be no uranium enrichment facilities, none. not only not producing uranium but have no need for that right now. no enrichment facilities. they commit to no fissile material. we separate plutonium from the future. and they turn in their nuclear weapons and fissile material and give us six nuclear weapons and a bunch of plutonium but not all of that. we don't know they gave us only a portion of their stocks but we
certainly can monitor probably the program. is that a deal you would take? well sense i don't know they are lying, yeah. would i ever be able to verify down to single digit nuclear weapons hidden somewhere in newark? not a chance. what about fissile material? not a chance. so there's your deal. to me makes perfect sense. >> do you want to react to this? i have a final question for you before we open it up. >> a quick footnote. this reminds me of the thoroughness and the completeness of this. the project of verification is
impossible. so if it's impossible should we keep up the object of reduction. probably no. i think we have to come up with lack of throroughness by some sort of political measures to get the confidence. i think if we have kind of -- i'm able to buy ten years and ten years for the contest building and reduce by political means, but for that maybe we may have to make a compromise. so that be 100% straight, 100% denuclearization but some elements but still with a security assurance we have to provide. we have to get sort of a thorough acceptance of, for example the safe guards arrangement with iaea including
our arrangements with protocol and implementation. >> this is the last question i want to ask you. you talked about the context of the agreed framework of the 1990's that the perception from tokyo was that the perceived threat from north korean nuclear weapons was relatively low. at least on a scale of other issues in the two countries. that's much higher today. between the missiles and nuclear weapons is the threshold from tokyo now different than the threshold in washington? are we in a potential situation we have to be careful of in the alliance where maybe washington may become willing to accept something that would be now unacceptable from just a purely security threat perspective? >> thank you. my answer is that contrary to what i've said just a moment
ago. at this moment, the perception of the nuclear capability is much higher than in the past, and that is kind of a common perception within security community. i think the gap is perception between public. and the public perception is still dominated by the issue of reduction. so the policymakers are more willing to work on them even prove much harder line of the past. but i think the political environment may not allow to do. >> thank you. >> let me give people in the audience a chance to ask our panel some questions about north korea and north korea's relation with iran and the two countries. we'll start here with this
woman. we have a microphone that will come to you. just let us know for the sake of the video who you are, where you're from. >> stephanie cook with nuclear intelligence weekly. i had two sort of slightly separate questions or comments. it seems to me that i'm really interested with what bob said about north korea at some point sort of crossed over a line, and either it was always intending to or something happened inside the regime and it crossed over. and iran as far as we know, may have not gone that far. and if you get a deal and it works before that point occurs, i mean have you, you know, have you kept them on sort of the safe side of this equation. and if you don't, as obviously happened in the case of north
korea, has it gone too far? i mean are they now -- should they be sitting around a disarmament table than a nonproliferation -- in a nonproliferation context and negotiation? it's just -- i just wanted to ask you that because i think once a weapons program takes hold it's like a virus and the military side of the government has -- has basically won over the nuclear control. it's hard to go back from that point. the second question i wanted to ask is especially the view from japan about the statement by donald trump that he thinks we should let south korea and japan go nuclear, that we shouldn't pay for the military shield, and if there's any relationship between tt and u.s. pressure, you know, more public statements
about japan's preprocessing program. >> should we take the first one first? >> i may not be right on point, but i would say that iran had a well known nuclear program to get a triggering package to the work to develop that triggering package, to get it to dissipate delivery systems. hit a program to do all that. and to the best of our knowledge they didn't get the fissle material and may or may not have done enough of the other stuff. at one point it was concluded they had stopped doing the other
stop but i don't know if they concluded they stopped because they were done or stopping because they wanted impact or whatever. it seems now to be in cryogenic arrest for some period of time. i don't know where the iranian program s-but if it is where in public literature says it is, then we have stopped them short of. i think we had stopped the north koreans short of, because i don't think they actually had -- i think the ic was wrong by saying more likely than not they had chemical weapons. i think that was wrong in 1994. obviously, though, after we discovered that it was part of an axis of evil they went ahead
with their program and produced fissile material and nuclear weapons. so different circumstances, different timing and if we had to do a deal now, would you have to be dealing with fabricated nuclear weapons which is why i put that funny scenario on the table just to try to persuade some of you that you shouldn't walk away from this one because you can't figure out how to verify it. i mean your standards, a great line from the general when he was testifying and the marines started to accept draftees in vietnam and they said, they asked the commandant of the marine corps are you lowering your standards to accept draftees and he said the united states marine corps will never lower its standards. however we no longer meet them. [ laughter ] now i'm of the same view here. i don't want to lower our standards but i think you're just going to have to change things around a little bit and take account of reality.
>> george do you have? >> before we get to the trump question and the japan piece, i think donald trump fails to understand how much japan already contributes to the alliance over there and that it would actually cost the united states more to bring them back from japan than to leave them deployed there. not to mention the disadvantages of having nonproliferation in the region. do you want to talk about how this is -- >> can i interrupt for a second. >> first, i have to say that i would pay my own money to have you explain that to trump. [ laughter ] >> it could be a new reality. "shark tank" and now some version there of "think tank." >> thank you. i sort of expected to get this kind of question. we are very much in -- very much
embarrassed to have a possible president of the united states to encourage us to think about nuclear option. two reasons. one, the main security people understand that nuclear option is not the best option for japan to defend ourselves. secondly, the u.s. reliance is beyond japan's defense and more playing a role as goods. my gut feeling about his statement is the united states really giving up the leadership because if that really happens i think naturally that leads u.s.
losing against china, against russia and then that undermines what he tried to pursue, you know, strong united states. but then what about the implication in japan's choice of the fuel cycle? i think there's a strong connection between the two. but one thing i could say is if, you know, the history of the relationship of japan's fuel cycle program from japan's perspective the getting the freedom of policy choice from the united states, if you look at the details in the '70s and '80s, the negotiation between japan and the united states, kinds of harsh. it's not like something between allies but more about kind of -- not like north korea and united states but similar tension, think between two countries. so japan really hopes that
united states respect japan's own decision and if united states puts pressure on japan which it would make much harder for the japanese to decide, you know, on the nuclear fuel cycle. so i think this issue must be addressed in very quiet fashion. thank you. >> other questions? i will go to this gentleman, then over there. let us know who you are. >> i represent advanced hospitality. nothing to do with nuclear weapons. i am a student of history. the question is, especially, robert, who has the perspective of history, is it because of their own security reasons that they felt boxed as happened in
israel's case and iran. it happened in india a couple of years back. happened in pakistan's case. [ inaudible ] -- feel comfortable when we are -- towards -- partner and ask for -- it happened in south africa. okay. they had the program. it was in brazil many years back. a program. which were a couple of years back. isn't it because of that? and question is to robert because he has more perspective of that historical perspective of -- >> older, older. yeah, older. i heard you say let's give it to the old guy. i heard you say that. >> no, no. >> no, no. i'm sorry. it's all right. it's all right. i hear that from my kids all the
time. so, as you probably know, in academia there's a huge -- well, quite a lot of literature about why countries acquire nuclear weapons and create models and give explanations and the dominant reason is the one that you put forward these decisions are driven by a perception that security will be enhanced, the country's security will be enhanced by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. the india case, the first test in '94, very hard to make that a security argue. particularly because they didn't do anything about a test. this guy forgets more about india on a daily basis than i know about the nuclear issue. so there are other factors that go to prestige, internal issues, bureaucratic issues but i think fundamentally you are right that for most of these countries it's a security issue. not so much brazil and argentina, by the way.
i don't think. but certainly, pakistan looking at an asymmetric balance of war balance. north korea as the north koreans told us in the first week of negotiation we need the nuclear weapons because we saw what you can do in iraq, regime change. this is before iraq two. this is iraq one and they were stunned by what we had done. and certainly true for israel who's looking at soviet union at the time. but having said that, i mean, one of the things -- questions i -- popped in my mind is when you say what you said, i want to say, yeah, and what does that mean? you know? yes. most often it is security driven. but it doesn't mean there's no replacement for that. it doesn't mean that there aren't other ways of meeting a state's security needs. that's what we thought we were doing in the case of north
korea. and in other cases, it wasn't security. i would say that certainly with south korea we had an alliance and we were able to use the alliance to lead the south koreans away from a nuclear weapons program and similarly with taiwan. it was enough to persuade them they didn't went to do that. so the u.s. extended deterrent. very important to countries making a calculation about whether to get nuclear weapons or not. some cases we won't extend a deterrent. pakistan asked us explicit, we said, no. all right? so it differs from case to case. i just would discourage you from thinking once you've settled on the reason for a country's wanting to acquire nuclear weapons that then you have a ir resistible force. i don't think so. >> this is -- this is paul.
i have two question, actually. the first one is, united states and the china worked closely to get a nuclear deal with iran and on north korea issue, do you think that the two nation will work together to take more actions to pull back north korea to negotiation table, like to restart its six-party talks? and my second question is, which is sovereignty nations and non state actors, which one can cause more threat to international nuclear security? thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you. i think i'm going to respond to the first question. on the -- how the united states and china work together for bringing north korea back into
the negotiation. i think the key in my view is to what extent china is able to implement the sanctions scheme. in particular, in the past, the north korea has been relying on any -- supply -- imported items including oil from china. and i don't think it's wise to stop the supply of oil from china because it may lead into the collapse of the regime. but still, you know, some supplies from china prolong this life of the regime. so but at this -- as long as the supply continues, then they're able to manage the situation. but so i think the -- if possible at all we may want to strength a crippling sanction which was posed against the -- iran and the tightening supply
into the other party leaders and military branches of the north korea. if possible. but i think it would be probably difficult in the case of iran. but in any case, if the china is serious about bringing north korea back into the negotiation, i think the key, you know, china's a key player. >> go ahead, please. >> on the which is a greater threat, you know, nonstate actors for state actors, my answer is, state actors because the -- for a bunch of reasons, but one of them is the material that terrorists would need in order to make nuclear weapons is produced by states and in the procession of states as far as we know. in all likely that's what would be feasible only so it will be states that will either make mistakes or not have the right policies or not implement those
poll sills that would enable the terrorist to get a nuclear explosive. in the first place and then all the other things that state proliferation does, as well. >> i have a question in the back. >> hi, my name is michael. i'm a researcher. my question is about how does kim jong-un's skegs in north korea play into how they see the nuclear weapons? the claim is they to have nuclear weapons before kim jong-il died and so this is a legacy of kim jong-il and thus giving up nuclear weapons would be tantamount to reneging on his legacy. >> so when you say the succession, thinking of kim jong-un, not necessarily the next -- [ inaudible ]
>> i wish that was all we had to worry about. i mean, i understand the question i think, but i wouldn't be surprised notwithstanding the worship that exists in the dprk for the kim dynasty that if they decided it was in their interest, if the youngest now kim jong-un decided it was in his interest personally and the regime's interest it would find a way to reconcile that with the policy of his father. by the way, he was behind, we thought, every bit of the negotiations in 1994. much more so than kim jong-un. the real hand back there was kim jong-il. >> and, yeah. i would tend to agree. i mean, if you really wanted to, kim jong-un could go back and use some of his statements where he was focused on a
denuclearized north korean peninsula and there are ways to rationalize that i think if he wanted to. okay. i have time for just a couple more questions but i'll take -- [ inaudible ] we'll take a couple together. >> this is for robert gallucci. >> let us know who you are. >> samara daniels. i am very curious as to what may be one or two main reasons why you give -- given the scenario you presented and there was a deal struck with north korea. under what theory would you accept it? i mean, what is the strongest reason for accepting that? what -- what would be -- >> okay. so -- >> and then, i'm sorry. >> i'm sorry.
we'll collect the last -- >> get up there. >> and then in the back. >> peter sharp. miter corporation. primarily for bob gallucci. you're talking as if the countries concerned were unitary actors and i don't know about north korea but i know about the united states and i have my, you know, fair amount of information about iran. they're not at all unitary actors. you could describe the deal struck with iran as a deal struck between a government under siege in washington and another government under siege in teheran. in each case being beaten up by people who didn't want to see an agreement at all an in each case beaten up by people who saw the agreement as the precursor of a wider political agreement that they would detest.
and i imagine that at the time the agreed framework was negotiated there were suspicions in pyongyang that the united states didn't really mean what this was saying, that you meant what you were saying but that you didn't really have the backing of u.s. political system. so, don't we need to evaluate the possibilities of reaching agreements and a possibilities that the agreements will stick in terms of a multiplicity of actors in each of the countries sear concerned? >> university of maryland. i have a question for professor gallucci. you said earlier that north korea may have been willing to give up its nuclear programs had there been a political settlement. can you elaborate on what you
mean by that? do you mean something outside of the literal deal? thank you. >> okay? >> yep. >> okay. so i've got three questions. what was i thinking when i proposed that little scenario where they -- the north koreans held on to a few nuclear weapons and some material in a box? what i was trying to do was ask you all to think about the real world because if you make a deal with north korea and it's comprehensive, what does that -- you know, cvid, whatever, we'll get everything and they say we'll get everything. i'm being realistic. how do you know? are you really going to find out? right now, do you think they've built nuclear weapons? i do. do you think they were material they haven't put in weapons? i do. do you think if we make a deal and they commit to giving everything they'll give everything? i don't. so, you know, when i think about
that, there's good news here. good news is you can't verify to that level. so you don't say you are. they get to have this little insurance. all right? we say we've got a comprehensive deal and we do. so all i'm trying to do is take the reality of the situation and point out some of the benl fits of it. which is you can do a deal. that's all. the second question, peter's question was unitary actors. i did a piece on -- which the proposition was bureaucratic politics in the vietnam war. right? so i'm all into that? over the top in that. i think it's interesting when you -- but when you put the bureaucratic politics model on top of nuclear deals, all i can think of is our country. i mean, because i know our country much better than those countries and we can't and maybe the situation has changed but when i was last in government which was a long time ago we
couldn't have done a bureaucratic map of north korea. we would say there's military. we'd say there's some bureaucratics. there was a party. i mean, no texture. you know? it was not like talking about france or something, you know. iran, we probably got more texture but i'm not sure how good we are on iran. but with us, i'm very sympathetic to anyone negotiating with us and wondering about what the executive branch can accomplish given the nature of american politics these days. i think you've got a very good point and, you know, the person who's going to go and do the negotiation better have some talking points on that or he's going to be staring for a while. so i -- it's hard. it came up specifically in the case of -- which i talked about, in the case of the assurance that came from the president. you know, i didn't have to tell them that the president was happy to sign this because he actually couldn't deliver on it. they knew that. you know?
they knew it depended on the congress. but okay. we'll take the president's signature anyway. it's not worth nothing. thank you very much. so i think other countries that are aware and we ought to be but the only thing i would do is a safety tip to you, peter, is say, this is far more demanding on the intelligence community than what the intelligence community very often produces that kind of political texture is often not there. they might be wonderful on technical issues and not so good on political issues. and the last question was i can't read my writing. political -- what was the last question? say again. [ inaudible ] yes. okay. so i didn't mean much to -- by that, other than -- look. very soon after we did the deal in 1994 we were supposed to go and open liaison offices. we had north koreans here
looking around at property. they got lost in victoria's secret. all kinds of things happened. all right? we said that we were going to take the east german which was now just german and that made them unhappy because we wouldn't be paying a lot for that. they were less than happy about us doing this before they had the elections but that was one manifestation of a political settlement. the opening of liaison offices and we had officers to go. it never happened. that's one thing that just never happened. they thought cultural exchange was in the offing and immediately we got this proposal for this synchronized dancing group of young girls to come to the united states of america and they brought it to me because i was still doing north korea. i hadn't gone to bosnia yet. i said, are you crazy?
they'll be in the kennedy center stage. they'll all be 12 years old and move as one and ask how did that happen? you did a deal with this country that takes young girls and puts them in this straight -- i mean, all i could see was since there was no human rights component to the deal, there was nothing like that, we were in for a world of hurt here because this is not a nice country and it's not a nice regime and i worry about everything falling apart. we had no kind of political basis for engagement with them. i think that they thought that there would be a political relationship with the united states that would make it implausible for the united states to launch regime change. now there would be something like normal. they kept saying investment in north korea saying that you don't have to remove your troops. you know? troops are okay. so they had an image of a relationship with us which nobody that i could find in
washington had, as well. so i think they were grossly disappointed. it's not that we didn't -- not like a material breach. it is not like what they did. i'm not equating this but i think they expected more than they got. >> patience. yes. indeed. george, any final thoughts? again, i just wanted to ask a quick question on this issue of kind of unitary actors or the bureaucratic model. in the alliance context when japan is managing this with the united states, for example, you have the north american bureau which is working with the relationship and working with ministry of defense, et cetera. you have north korea and the abduction issue and these issues. now we have a different context vis-a-vis iran and a whole new set of bureaucratic actors. how is that kind of managed -- is there tension within the inner agency system on the japan side or not too bad?
>> like other democratic countries, japan always suffers from the kind of bureaucratic politics. for example, in the case of the dealing with iran, there is always -- there has been always at the conflict of interest between the bureaus or agencies which promote the relationship with iran in the context of energy security and context of business, and those who are trying to strengthen the alliance and then try to further tighten the pressure on iran. for example, in the case of the oil field in iran which -- with which japan held the rights for the exploration, there was a kind of a battle between united states and japan but within japanese government the meeting was trying to retain the possibility of their exploration rights in the oil field. but eventually, they had -- they
followed the decision by the foreign ministry and maybe much higher political level to respect the alliance but then now they went after the jcp was in place and then when the sanctions lifted, you know, some of the sectors rushing in to be there iran and so, you know, it's always difficult, difficulty in japanese political sort of apparatus to balance the interests of the alliance and the state's own interest in the economy. >> okay. thank you. and we're going to have an opportunity to get even more deeply involved in the iranian issue in our next session. we are going to take a break right now until 4:00. right? if i'm correct. 4:00. and but now please join me in thanki
high commissioner for human rights and the leader of the uk independence party. you can watch that debate tonight on our companion network c-span at 7:00 p.m. eastern. and tonight here on c-span3, american history tv, it's road to the white house rewind with presidential debates from the 1960s and the 1980s. we start at 8:00 p.m. eastern with the 1960 west virginia democratic primary debate between then senators john f. kennedy and hubert humphrey. then a 1980 debate between ronald reagan and george h.w. bush. and also, a 1984 democratic presidential primary debate. the media teaches us that democrats and republicans are supposed to be at odds with each other, and i think that people need to recognize that we need to be respectful towards each other and we need to understand that senators are respectful towards each other, and that
will be more conducive to getting real policy done instead of just okay acromony. >> these are real people. when we saw president obama, perhaps the thing that stood out is bags under his eyes. he was tired. he's a real person dealing with real things. and so i thought that that was perhaped most interesting. >> sunday night, top high school students from around the country attending the 54th annual u.s. senate youth program talk about the experiences in the week long program, plus the plans for the future. the students met with members of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government, plus military and media representatives. >> "the washington post" journalist mr. jonathan capehart came to talk to us and i loved the insight he gave us about being kind of an outside source, you know, reporting back to us and the electorate about what's going on in our government. >> ruth bader ginsberg was the
most inspirational person we've met this week. she's been one of my idols for a long time. i either want to be in the legal profession or possibility a senator. >> i understand the need for bipartisanship at times but i also think it's important that politicians go to washington or the state capitals with the eyes on a goal and they're determined to meet that goal instead of sacrificing it in the light of money or bipartisanship or whatever it is. >> we need to get back to a constructive discourse like the one i've had here, respecting all americans no matter what their backgrounds and to making the country a more respectful place. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern on c-span's q & a. next up, a discussion about the so-called shared economy, services such as uber, lyft and air bnb if the consumer federation of america's annual meeting held recently in the nation's capital.
>> good morning, everyone. welcome to the second day of consumer assembly. so glad you're all here. it is my honor to introduce chairman eliot kay who was sworn in as the 10th chairman of the u.s. consumer product safety commission on july 30th, 2014, to a term that expirls in october 2020. mr. kay served as cps's executive director 2013 until his confirmation as chairman. previously mr. kay served as chief of staff, chief counsel, deputy chief of staff and senior counsel to chairman inez tannenbaum 2010 to 2013. during that time among other
issues, he worked to address the chemical burn hazard t young children from the ingestion of coin cell batteries and played a key role in coalescing the leading organizations and companies in american football around a common goal of creating a culture of change to reduce the risk of brain injuries in youth football. from 2007 to 2010, he was an attorney at hogan la vels. prior to this, at cooley good win and a clerk for the honorable sterling johnson jr. of the united states district court for the eastern district of new york. mr. kay has served in numerous senior staff positions for representative john tierney, pat danner and earl hudo. as chairman of the cpsc, he has identified three major areas of focus that will advance his collaborative leadership approach. cpsc will harness the experience and expertise of agency staff and safety experts in the
private sector to achieve more safety advancements for the american public, cpsc prioritize and work to accelerate culture change of brain safety and youth sports and committed to strengthening the line of defense at u.s. ports to keep dangerous imports out of the hands of unsuspecting consumers. anyone that heard chairman kye speak at a haring or a conference leaves with two perspectives of his leadership. first, being a father to his two boys profoundly shapes the way he views his work. his compassionate and real world understanding of being a parent in our complex world influences his mission at the cpsc. second, chairman kay has a deep and impressive understanding and knowledge of the many issues before the agency. he can deftly talk about both the big picture policy issues as well as the details of a
particular product safety issue. as you are about to hear. it is my honor to introduce chairman eliot kay. [ applause ] >> good morning, everybody. i want to start, and this is by far the most important part of the speech, so you can tune out after i do the introduction. i want to acknowledge rachel winetrob. [ applause ] and to be clear, i would have done that even if she had done a very different intro for me. it says it right here in my notes. in all seriousness, and as rachel mentioned, i've been in washington a long time. i've been honored and privileged to work with many different
talented people, to see the different skill set that is are offered and i have to say that there's nobody that i have come across who better combines both talent and skill and passion and knowledge of the issues and effective advocacy than rachel weintraub. and that really matters. it matters in terms of the credibility of the entire movement. in many ways, rachel speaks for and is the face of the consumer movement in the united states, especially when it comes to our agency, the consumer product safety commission. and so, she bare that is weight and she knows that. she bares that weight when she comes to represent your causes which in many ways are our causes, too. when she comes and talks in front of our agency, when she speaks on the hill. she know that is she carries that eight and it is that much more difficult that he has to walk that fine line and cannot make mistakes and she does not make mistakes. she just doesn't.
she's always right on. she's always at the heart of the matter. and she's always the leading advocate when it comes to trying to effect change and the best example of that and i'm going to call for one more round of applause for this when i'm done for rachel, the consumer product safety act of 2008. tangible, real differences. changes, reenergizing an entire federal agency because of the work led by rachel. consumers, hundreds of millions of americans, and even consumers worldwide because this trickles outside the united states, hundreds of consumers in the united states, hundreds of millions of consumers, their lives have been tangibly improved because of the work of rachel so let's do one more round of applause, please, for rachel. and i do mean that. it is such a -- so now you can tune out. it is such an honor to be here, especially at the 50th anniversary of the cfa.
it's that much more special and so thank you for the invitation. i do want to acknowledge two of my fellow colleagues commissioners bob adler and joe abromohoff for being here. i think it shows the spirit we have collectively developed at the commission to try to engage and demonstrate a more colee jal, civil, partisan, nonpartisan depending on the issue, approach. there are a lot of pressure that is pull in the other direction and i would say every pressure pulls in the other direction. there is no internal or external force other than what they bring as individuals and what i hope to bring as an individual and our other colleagues commissioners robinson and albuquerque el bring as individuals, no other forces to try to bring people together. it is obviously as we see from the campaign season, it is in my mind -- it does not represent our. i think we can be better as a society and i think the five of
us and our staffs try to do it differently and in a way that represents the best of what you want us to be and gets down to actually having solid, nonpetty, nonpartisan, nonpersonal discussions on the merits and i think we are a better agency for that and i thank commissioner adler and commissioner mohorovo for being here. so as rachel mentioned and she is 100% spot on, my entire approach at this job is starts and runs tlou the day and ends with being a parent. i -- before i even get to work, it already begins when my now 11-year-old son and my now 6-year-old son wake us up, usually far earlier than we want to be woken up with something they believe is urgent, meaning the ipad is not getting wi-fi reception and they can't do their video time. that in their sworld a crucial moment that must be addressed by waking the parents up. and it begins our whatever multi
15, 18-hour odyssey my wife and me of parenting in the morning and they have very different styles. my 11-year-old is a regulator in training. when we're at birthday parties and he gets a gift, he will turn to me and say is this compliant with the federal toy standard? my 6-year-old is the reason child proofing was invented and he runs a forseeable misuse lab in our living room and can do things with products i didn't think anyone thought was possible but it provides an incredible spectrum as i go into work each day and a frame of reference for how i approach my day and all throughout the day talking about issues at the commission, my first reaction is, how does this help parents? what does this mean for parents? we're going to go out and say something, are we provide parents with the type of information that's actionability for them? it's one thing to say that a product is not safe but to me that's not good enough. parents want to know what is safe. what should they do?
and i think it's incumbent upon us to warn away from something and guide towards something else so that they know when they have that interaction with us they've gotten all the information they need. i'm motivated, as well, of course, and i think we all are, by the stories of other parents. whether it be children whose -- who have been hanged to death by window coverings, families wipd out by carbon monoxide poisoning in portable generators, children that died on orvs. there are consumer products, some more challenging. pools, drownings. every day i get the daily death report at the end of the day and it is the hardest part of the day to read the descriptions of the children that are killed by consumer products. and like any parent, i, of course, envision that being my children and it is very difficult to force myself and i
do force myself because i think it's important to read those reports and to understand what other families are going through. that motivates us every day. and i know it motivates you. we do not do this work alone. many of you are here because this is your life's work, too. you share that passion of trying to make a difference and making sure that consumer products are not taking the lives of children, are not leading to serious injuries, that we're not going to have long-term changes to the lives of families because of something that shouldn't happen. please help us be better at our jobs. please even more and work with rachel in particular on this even more summit comments to our proposed regulations. please provide even more data and more research when we're trying to make a change. that makes a big difference to us. participate even more in our public workshops.
we are going to be having one, for instance, on recall effectiveness. we need to hear your voice. please make sure you have a robust presence. take our safety material even more that's on our website. we have an excellent office of communications that puts out life saving material. please take that material and disseminate it. it can make a difference. we are all in this together. and we've come a long way, a long, long way since the work that rachel did in 2008 on the consumer product safety improvement act to make a difference. we are now the world leaders on crib safety and other durable infant products. we have strong, very strong third party testing, independent third party testing for children's products. and again, thanks to rachel, we now have a publicly available database where you cannot only search for reports of harm that have happened to other people, you can file our own reports of
harm. please use safer products.gov is an excellent resource and an unfortunate way we have had to work around the anti-consumer safety and anti-transparency provisions of sections 6b of the consumer safety product act. we are the only agency we know of, only health and safety agency that has the limitations on us and thankfully because of the work of rachel and others we at least have that work around. it is not good enough. i still believe that section 6b needs to be repealed. i think consumers are being harmed by its existence but we at least have the database to move us forward. so we have all this. we have a lot more. but we're not done. we have so much more to do and even though i am sleep deprived because my kids are waking me up early i do come in fired up every day to tackle more issues so i want to talk about some of the things we are working on right now. this is the year that i want to
see real progress, real progress on longstanding, persist tent hazards that continue to take lives. this is the year that i expect to see finally an effective standard for window coverings. 30 years -- [ applause ] 30 years on average of a child being hanged to death once a month. that's just too much. it's got to stop. and thanks to the retailers, walmart, ikea, target, loes and home deport, in part, we are finally seeing a change. the status quo has ended. and now this is the year to see it through. this is the year i finally expect to see an effective standard for rerhee yagsal off highway vehicles. again, enough is enough. we know that changes can be made to the vehicles. we know they can be made safer and this is the year we expect to see it. and this is a year i expect to
see a proposed mandatory standard by cpcs staff for portable generators, one of the leading killers of products under our jurisdiction. we believe very strongly that design changes can significantly reduce the exposure to carbon monoxide. there is at least one company out there from south carolina that is already showing that this is possible. we're calling on industry while we're moving through our rulemaking to go ahead and make the changes, make the life saving changes now before we have to do rule making and this is not a partisan issue. i have got the commissioners here. they both share that view, as well. the commission is behind trying to save lives with these products. let's change that. this is also the year that the agency is going to be an even greater force for consumer safety. and this is not an easy task. many of the folks out there that we regulate are law abiding and
do the right thing. but not all do. we will continue to hold accountable those companies that break the law and put consumers at risk. and one of the areas that since i've been chairman i have called upon is higher civil penalties, much, much higher civil penalties as the facts allow. priority to 2008, the highest civil penalty the agency could seek was a little bit under $2 million. congress raised that threshold up to $15 million and it gets indexed for inflation. i have said repeatedly and thanks to cpsc staff we are starting to see an increase in the civil penalties because the factors we are seeing, the conduct we are seeing in some of these cases warrant much higher penalties. and i'm really pleased to announce today for the first time that cpsc has approved a
settlement with a civil penalty of $15.45 million. [ applause ] that is the highest civil penalty the agency has ever had by almost four times. the prior amount was $4.3 million. so we are now at 15.45 million. the company is gree. they produce demidifiers. you probably recognize them more under fridge dare, ge, those types of names. it is totally unacceptable that a company would put out on the market and continue to keep on the market while delaying reporting to us and misleading us being untruthful to us about these products that provided a completely unreasonable risk to human life and to property from fire. that conduct is not going to be tolerated and if there's any confusion, if there's any
confusion about what this civil penalty means, let's be very clear about it. it is not okay anymore. you cannot write these penalties off as a cost of doing business. we're going to continue to try to dve change in the way a certain segment -- i'm talking about the bad actors. i'm not talking about the good actors. the bad actors. that should get their attention that we're serious about these civil penalties. i also want to mention nobody, just because we're talking civil penalties and not talking about this specific case, nobody should assume that criminal referrals to the department of justice are off the table. we will refer for criminal conduct investigations to the department of justice every case that we think is warranted. i'm so proud in particular and i want to mention this because it's important because there's real people behind this work on the gree settlement. the work of our office of general counsel and the cpsc
staff and in particular one of our trial attorneys, daniel vice because it's because of his work that this case was seen through the way it was. he picked up a file, it happens all the time. work changes. somebody who had been working on the file didn't have a chance to get to the bottom of it before she had to leave the agency. he picked it up, dusted it off, dug in, went through the paper work, he did the hard work and he found the nugget that is led to the trail that resulted in this civil penalty. and so, i'm really proud of the work that daniel did and the support he got in the office of the general counsel and typifies the work that goes on every day at the cpsc. the last area i want to talk about, and again it goes back to being a parent, and this is probably the biggest part of what i hope to see the agency do is play our part in helping children reach their full potential. we can't do it all but there's two areas that might seem that they're disconnected that i think actually have a nexus.
and the first one is chemical exposure to children. i took my kids to the dentist a little while ago and at the end you get those bags, of course, with the tooth paste and the toothbrush and in it there was a plastic little car and before my 6-year-old could see it i grabbed it and i put in it my pocket because i didn't have the comfort knowing what i know that i could let him play with it knowing that he was probably going to stick his hands in his mouth. it made me angry as a parent i couldn't allow him to play with this truck that i had to be concerned that he was going to ingest some type of chemical. it should not be that way. we should not have to worry about that as parents. a couch which is about as inert an object as there is in our house we should not have to be concerned that the flame retardants that are on the foam might get into the dust and children are ingesting that. that is not okay.
in my mind. i don't think that parents should have to bare the brunt of wondering whether or not their children are being poisoned by chemicals in our house. it's one thing if you're talking about a hazard like a knife which is obvious. yes, we can all appreciate that. but when it is a hidden hazard and we are talking about chronic exposure, i am not okay with that and i have spent every day that i have been at the agency trying to push us forward to being a force to getting answers to these questions and i'm not 0 pining on whether any particular chemical having any particular reaction. i don't know. i'm not a chemist. i'm not a toxologist. what i do know is these public policy questions shouldn't be left to parents to have to struggle with. they shouldn't have to look at tiny font on a product to see whether there's a chemical in there they don't know what it is is even in there and they shouldn't have to wonder if bpa is taken out, what's replacing it and is that safe?
that's not a burden parents should have to bare. that's a burden public policy makers should have to bare and we're trying to bare it but congress needs to jump in, too. thankfully on artificial turf with crumb rubber in playgrounds, another area that's a hot topic, we were able to work with epa and cdc to have a task force to look at the answers and that's a good model but that's not the way it should be. we should be coming together with congress and getting the right amount of funding, the right amount of authorities to make sure that we can really answer these questions and parents don't have to sit up at night and say is it safe for my child to play on that field or not. and similarly, it is not okay for me that parents have to wonder whether their kids are getting brain injuries playing sports. and you heard rachel talk about this as a priority of mine at the beginning. kids play sports and they should. and we put them into sports and we should. because they are supposed to come out of it on the back end
as better people. they are supposed to develop character traits. they're supposed to develop physical fitness. they are not supposed to develop degeneraltive brain conditions. there's enough science out there i'm certainly concerned and it's changed the course of the way i look at my kids playing sports as it has for parents across this country. and so, this is the year in my mind and we have been working on this, working toward this, with the five professional sports league that is have a real role to play. they change culture. they move people. and so, we have sat down with all five of the commissioners of the professional sports leagues and said to them, you have a role to play, speaking with one voice, especially at the youth level to change the way parents approach sports. we should know, we should have certainty that when our kids play sports they're going to come out of it on the back end as better people. and products are not the answer. there's no super helmet out there. there just isn't. and i have had parents come up
to me and say, hey, i just bought this $400 hockey helmet. my son's okay, isn't he? and unfortunately, i had to break bad news to them. there's probably no difference of that helmet and the $200 one or $300 one. it's all off base. products are not the answer. the answer is less trauma to the brain and changing the way the games are played. and in my mind, no game's rules and no game the way it is played is more important than the safety of our children. and if somebody thinks that it's more important to preserve the way a specific sport is played regardless of what -- how the children come out of that, then i think we need to sit down and have a conversation about our priorities. [ applause ] so there's a lot to do. there is a lot to do. and we can't do it without you.
rachel needs your help. we need your help. please, please have a voice. please follow even more closely the work that's going on at cpsc and epa and cfpb. all the of the agencies. there's great people on the inside that are trying to do what you want us to do. we ore trying to make the change that is you want us to make that we all believe in b for a better society but we need your help to do it together and i'm hopeful after this presentation, at least, you'll be inspired to go to cpsc.gof, safer products.gov and let's hear your voices even more. thank you, again. [ applause ] >> so i think we have time for one question. one. so -- >> better be a good one. >> if you're fast -- you could get to the microphone. go to the mike. and please identify yourself. >> yes. richard with the consumer
federation of california. you mentioned the flame retardant chemicals. we have fought for about ten years now with the coalition of health, labor, consumer, firefighters and others to change a very bad rule that california adopted in the '70s that has become the defacto rule so every -- every piece of furniture we're sitting on is loaded with toxic and ineffective flame retardant chemicals. we have made a lot of progress in california to allow for nontoxic and flame retardant options for upholstered furniture. is this an issue that -- i know we have tried over many years going back many, many years to get the cpsc involved in developing a standard. is anything happening? >> so i'm actually going to do something unprecedented and ask the commissioner to step up to that microphone because this is his -- he's leading on this and i don't want to steal his thunder. >> nice move, eliot.
i'm wanting to put him on the spot with that, too. a good question before the agency, it is certainly not my issue and one we're wrestling with for sometime, there's also the great concern about the chemistry and flame retar dance, personally, a national -- cut out the demand driver for many of the chemical that is are at question and i think it provides an adequate level of safety for the american consumer. there's a lot of different opinions on that. from the flame retardant community as well as the, you know, different communities very intelligent opinions. i think it is time for cpsc to adopt tb 117 as a national standard. thank you. >> as a follow-up, he's led the effort internally and through the current operating plan for the staff to look at tb 117 and report the commission as to whether exactly what you were talking about, whether it makes sense to move forward in that
direction. the comfort i have taken from it from the feedback of rachel an enothers, good news is that companies are changing and that is a positive. and after the years of it being the opposite and everybody following california and going down a certain path, it is very encouraging to know they're moving to phase out these chemicals because to me, again, it's just not -- it's not acceptable they're in there, especially if as you mentioned they don't do any good. >> please join me in thanking chairman kaye. please stay in your seats. we have a very fast transition to the next panel on the sharing economy benefits and risks to consumers.
>> good morning, and welcome to our next panel. i'm going to go ahead and let everyone settle in. good morning. welcome to the sharing economy benefits and risks to consumers. we are going to stick with that theme, changing the way the game is played. the shared economy, certainly, is doing just that. pleased to be joining with you today, i'm ramsey al win,
director of financial resill intelligence, thought leadership at aarp and thrilled to have a panel here today of experts on this cutting edge topic who will share with us what is the sharing economy, when's the scope of it? is it as big as they say? what does it mean for us as consumer advocates? what are the benefits? what are the risks? what do we need to know and what questions do we need to ask at the state, local and federal level to ensure that we don't get swept away by the tsunami the sharing economy? today we have with us, brooks rainwater, senior executive and director of the center for city solutions from the national league of cities. brooks will start us off with an overview of the shared economy. brooks is the director at the national league of cities of the city solutions and applied research center. he oversees the center's research, partnerships, community engagement efforts to strengthen the capacity of municipal leaders to create
strong, local economies, safe and vibrant neighborhoods, world class infrastructure and a sustainable environment. he's a strong advocate for successful cities and often speaks and writes on the shared economy, sustainability and livable communities. prior to joining the national league of cities, brooks was director of public policy for the american institute of architects. while at aia, he developed the local leaders research series analyzing nationwide strends and sustainability and livability. in addition, spearheaded the cities as a lab initiative focusing on the key role that cities play in creating investigators of innovative practices leading the country's economies forward. we're pleased to have brooks joining us. we'l then hear from two different perspectives on the economy starting with anderson coopman at the center at george mason university. he specializes in regulation, competition and inno vase with a
particular focus on public choice and the economics of government favoritism. the research and commentary has appeared in wall street journal, "new york times," "washington post," usa today and on and on. we'll then contrast his perspective with dean baker, co-director of the center for economic and policy research. dean founded in 1999. the areas of research incloouding housing and macroeconomics, intellectual property, social security, medicare and european markets. he's authored many books, such as getting back to full employment, a better bargain for working people, the end of loser liberali liberalism. excuse me. freudian slip. let me get that right. the end of loser liberalism. making markets progressive. he has a blog beat the press which provides commentary on economic reporting. and well-known in d.c. and beyond. we have a fantastic panel.
we 'll go ahead and open up with brooks rainwater to share with us what is the shared economy and what as advocates do we need to know about it? >> thank you, ramsey. good morning, everyone. good morning, everyone. it's greet join you here today. really have an opportunity to come here and talk to you about when's happening in the sharing economy and the work that we are doing in this space. and so i really want to start and talk about how we're really in this age of disruption and the sharing economy is both a catalyst and a broader reflection of where we are today and where we are going. and while this term disruption might be a buzz word, it perfectly encapsulates this moment in time. economics to politics -- all right. okay. and so much more irks change is happening and happening more and more rapidly soy think to start off we really need a shared definition of the sharing
economy and, you know, obviously, what i'm saying here somebody else might have a different definition of it but i would kind of say that the sharing economy is an economic model of individuals are able to borrow or rent assets owned by others, prepip tated by technology for underutilized resources and our goal at national league of cities thinking about the critical issues around the sharing economy is provide the cities with the usable resource to address issues both near and long term while simultaneously helping them anticipate the game changing trends of the decades that come. you know, we really came to this looking at the regulation side of it. that we had mayors and council members coming to us and specifically talking about uber and air bnb saying the companies coming into the cities, disrupting the existing regulations and, you know, what should we do? what are the best practices out there? so from our perspective what we wanted to do was really think about, you know, what was it that kind of created this sflmt
why are we here right now? you know, three things really jumped out at us, that's urbanization, economics and user preferences and life styles so as we're urbanizing more and more globally, you know, 70% of live in cities by 2050, this creates a dynamic where people are looking for services, for experiencings in different ways. frankly, the cost of living in major cities is high. the great recession made people have less money. because of that, people are trying to find new ways to bring an income and utilize the experiences they want. the peer-to-peer economy is one way to do this. on the user preferences and lifestyles, five years ago smartphone weren't ubiquitous and uber wasn't a verb. that creates a different dynamic. app platforms we all know now have helped make the sharing economy mainstream. we are firmly entrenched in this kind of age of the smart city, and data has become the currency of now and going forward into the future.
so it's worth kind of putting into the context that people crave more connections through both collaborative consumption and commerce at the same time expect on demand services at their beck and call. that's what's put it in the context of where the shared economy is thriving, disrupting local regulatory environments, something that was kind of close to home to us, and serving as a basis for innovation and growth at the same time. all of this is coming together in a confluence that's affecting cities in many ways. we decided we needed to create a research agenda around it. the first thing we did a little over a year ago is kind of de e delved into what was happening in the largest cities in the u.s. we looked at 30 cities, rild sharing and home sharing, and he wanted to find out if there was a positive mixed sentiment or negative sentiment to these services. by and large what we found at the time, a rapidly changing field and has shifted since then is the majority of cities had a real mixed sentiment. some saw, you know, ride sharing
and uber and lift much more positively and air bnb and those services in a more negative light, kind of reflecting on the different regulatory environments both have, the zoning situation was one we heard a lot from short-term rentals. and that kind of gave us the first understanding from the national level within the city context, and so we wanted to dig in and kind of build that research out more. so we did end up best practice kind of case study research. we looked at a dozen cities, small and large, did in-depth interviews with those city leaders, brought that together with the other research that was out at the time, and within that context we found that there were kind of five key areas that cities were looking at and really thinking about. that was innovation, equity in access, economic development, process and implementation, and safety. safety was the big issue that we heard time and time again. you know, obviously here in this context consumer safety is the
big issue. from cities it's the regulatory context, thinking about how we keep our citizens safe. so building off that research, we decided that we would do a national survey on the sharing economy, finding out from mayors and council members and cities of all sizes really what were those critical issues. once again, safety came up. you know, safety was the primary concern. 61% of cities saw public safety, lack of assurance, and general safety concerns as that concern. you know, other two kind of lagging ones were 10% saw protection of traditional service providers, industry participants as a big issue. 9% saw noncompliance with current standards. on the benefit side it was a little more dispersed. 22% saw improved services, 20% increased economic activity, and 16% on increased entrepreneurial activity. so as you can see, those benefits are, you know, more equally dispersed. we saw clearly the major concern of elected officials as it
relates to all of this is public safety. building on the research we'd already done, this kind of gave us that picture. and we also wanted to find out what kind of growth cities were seeing. a clear majority of cities saw growth happening in the sharing economy, with 19% of them seeing it as rapid growth. there was more growth happening on the ride sharing side than the home sharing side. 71% of cities were supportive of the overall sharing economy growth. but where it eats interesting is when you tease out how they see the sharing economy. from the concept, they like the overall concept, but when you look at ride sharing, much more supportive, 66%, and home sharing, 44%. as we've had follow-up interview ls it really gets to kind of zoning and neighborhood issues and then also some of the issues with kind of commercial districts and hotels kind of having conversations about this as well. and so we wanted to ask the question on regulatory approaches, you know, what were cities actually doing to regulate this, what kind of laws were they passing. we saw a clear majority had not
yet passed new laws. while they had not passed new laws, a clear majority of them saw it is important to do so. and so that's kind of led us to the current environment where we've seen laws being passed more and more and we're also seeing more and more push at the state level, which is something from our perspective we really think local control and this happening locally is a place for a lot of this to take place. so, you know, from a rnl perspective where we're building and going next is looking at some of the labor challenges that have been happening within the sharing economy. it's not sharing economy per se. the 1099 economy has been building for many years, and there's a lot of issues that come together as we think about the future of work. but this is one of those that seems to be pushing us in that direction. and we're hopeful that we can see these jobs become better jobs because at the end of the day in cities we want good jobs. and so that research will be continuing ahead this year. and, you know, as i want to close here, i just want to say that the sharing economy is a game changer for cities, for good and for bad. we see clear benefits and also
definitely clear challenges. it's always critical to remember that it is the urban environment that both creates the platform for the growth in the space and provides the on the ground innovation for new idea to germinate and flourish. i thank you. [ applause ]. >> thank you for the invitation. thank you all for listening to me talk for a few minutes and letting me be part of this panel. can you hear me better now? i want to talk about three things specifically, but i do want to mention something. the sharing economy is much broader than uber, lift, and air bnb, much broader than, that although if you only read what's in the news about the sharing economy you would think it's ride sharing and home sharing and that's it. it extend into all sorts of things. there are services that provide on-demand chef experiences. someone will come to your house and cook for you. you can go to someone's house
and eat there and they will cook for you. a thousand tools. basically any underutilized resource you can think of, the sharing economy is allowing people to put that to productive use. what does that mean both for traditional industries as well as consumers in those industries? and i want to start by noting first that competitive benefits and effects that the sharing economy has both on incumbent industries and also consumers within those industries. while many regulations and specifically i'm going to talk about ride sharing. while many taxi regulations may have served a beneficial purpose at one time and were intended to produce a beneficial outcome, it's becoming increasingly clear that theseegulations have become outmoded and that these regulations may not be achieving their intended consequences. i will give you up with example of this. how many of you have been to las vegas? quick show of hands. okay.
how many of you took a taxi from mccarron airport to the las vegas strip? how many of you know if you were long hauled? blank stares, a shrug. i think i saw a hand or two. long hauling is an inherent problem in taxis. there's an information asymmetry. the taxi driver is more familiar typically with the area he or she is driving in than the rider is. and not all drivers, but some drivers can take advantage of this and drive you longer than necessary to run up the fare. this is a problem that's been inherent in las vegas since the first taxi law was passed i believe in 1969, but other places as well. new york and chicago. isle talk about those in a minute. in particular in las vegas the nevada taxi commission has been trying to combat this issue for some 35 years, 40 years now. they've really been aggressively going after this. they've done everything from giant signs in the airport to giant signs along the road to
undercover sting operations, to all sorts of attempted solutions to overcome this problem. however, it seems intractable. enter uber and lift. now, simply weather the smartphone, the gps mapping system, and a way to monitor both you yourself as the primary principal in this instance, being able to monitor the agent that is the driver but then also the platforms themselves being able to see if you've been taken the right way or the wrong way. it's putting consumers in a position where they are empowered to know whether or not on a moment's notice if they're being taken advantage of. now, add the reputational feedback mechanism to that, the five-star rating stham allows you if something does go wrong in a ride sharing ride, be it uber, lift, or any of the other, you can note it immediately to the platform and some response can be taken, usually within
minutes or longer for the platform to resolve that issue in some way. now, compare that to some jurisdictions and their attempt to overcome issues in noncompliance. you have the dctc at one point. i think they had a backlog of 18 months to resolve issues. if you have a problem in uber, typically it's resolved in 30 minutes to an hour, sometimes a little longer, but typically about that long, compared to the traditional regulatory environment which would require you to wait year and a half to know whether or not you've been overcharged perhaps $5 or $6. it's really putting consumers in a position where they're empowered in a way they have never been before in particular in taxis. now, i mentioned chicago and new york city. there was a study recently done by scott wallace at georgetown looking at the publicly available