tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN April 1, 2016 1:00pm-3:01pm EDT
overlap between entities that maybe you would think of look closer to being on one side of the line than the other. but the line is a valid line. and it's a valid line largely for the reasons justice kennedy identified earlier. because in that category of religious nonprofits maybe some entities like identified appear very close to entities that have an exemption. there are also going to be lots of oh entities whose connection to that core mission is much more -- >> you have to draw the line. could you apply the same requirements you apply to the little sisters, the church entity itself? >> so i think we could, your honor, yes. i think it would be an appropriate accommodation. and i think if we had the same compelling interests and we make the same means argument, but we've constrained ourselves. we've tried to be especially careful with houses of worship. and that's a normal thing governments do with respect to houses of worship. >> but you understand the argument. and we've said this in cases that if you have a lot of exemptions, it undermines your
argument that this is such a compelling interest. >> right. but let me try to walk through this carefully, because i do think it's important. they've identified three. first is grandfathered plans. we've had a lengthy discussion about that. i don't think you can argue that that exemption undermines the government's compelling interests. they claim that there's an exemption for employers who have fewer than 50 employees, but that's just wrong. in fact, there's no reason to think that virtually anybody in that category of employees of those small employers isn't getting contraceptive coverage as part of their regular health care from regular doctors. let me explain why that is. there is no exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement for that group. proof of it is that several petitioners are in that group of fewer than 50 employees. and they're asking for the -- and they're asking for -- and they've raised the rfra claim
here, they have to meet the contraceptive coverage so the employees get the coverage from their regular doctors as part of their regular health plan. then, also, if your employer is not providing you coverage in that group, then you go on an exchange. and you purchase a policy on the exchange. and that policy provides you with contraceptive coverage as part of your regular health plan from your regular doctor. or if you are eligible you apply for medicaid and medicaid gives you contraceptive coverage as part of your regular health plan for your regular doctor. >> for the briefs who have to buy plans because they work for a small employer and the employer doesn't offer health insurance, does that arrangement frustrate the government's compelling interest? >> no, because in that circumstance, your honor, the only option that that employee has is to buy individual policy on the exchange. and that individual policy will contain the contraceptive coverage from your regular
doctor as part of your regular health care. the difference is when somebody works for a grandfathered plan, for example, that category, or for a church, those people are already getting insurance. and so for them it is an obstacle because you're forcing them to purchase a second insurance policy. and that really becomes a financial penalty for them because part of their compensation is of course the health insurance they're getting from their regular providers. >> that underscores that the church plans here, religious organization plans here are in effect subsidizing the conduct that they deem immoral. >> so, your honor, i think the answer to that is that they're not subsidizing it because the way in which this plan is structured, meaning which the accommodation is structured, is that they are not -- the employers are not to bear any financial burden for the contraceptive coverage that has to be provided without charging
the employer and funds have to be segregated and all activity has to be segregated. it's quite carefully designed to avoid the difference of any subsidy with respect to that -- >> i mean, if it's so easy to provide. if it's so free, why can't they just get it through another plan? >> because then they've got to sign up for a second plan and pay for a second plan, your honor. and that's precisely the kind of obstacle that congress is trying to ensure did not exist when it asked preventive service of this statute. the whole idea here is to ensure that the employees get the health care, get this care when their regular doctor is part of their regular health care without these added obstacles and the need to go out and sign up for another plan and find the doctors who will provide coverage on that plan, all of those are precisely the kinds of obstacles that congress is trying to eliminate. >> so it comes down to a question of who has to do the paperwork? if it's the employee that has to do it that's no good. if it's the religious
organization that has to do it, that's okay. >> i think it's a lot more than that, your honor. you've got to go out and find the separate -- >> they're on the exchanges, right? >> but put yourself in the position -- >> they're not on the exchanges. it's a falsehood. the exchanges require full service health insurance policies with minimum coverages that are set forth that are very comprehensive -- >> is that true with respect to every policy sold on the exchanges? >> yes. every policy sold -- >> pediatric dentist -- >> except for that one. >> except for pediatric dentist. so you could have separate health coverage products sold on the exchanges. you in fact do it already. >>ou cldt do it under current law, your honor. >> well, the way constitutional objections work is you might have to change current law. >> but in this circumstance, i think, you don't need to get to that question of whether there is an obligation to change current law because even if you did have a second contraceptive
only policy available on an exchange, that would be precisely the kind of barrier that congress is trying to eliminate. you have two policies instead of one policy, that creates the disincentives. allow the women employees on certain will reach the conclusion i've got this coverage over here -- >> no, i guess that substantiates the point i was trying to make. that it's a question of who does the paperwork. you said, yes, it is a hassle to go to the exchange although we've heard about how easy it is. or you allow your infrastructure as petitioners have said to be used as the vehicle for providing that. i'm not saying it comes out one way or another from your perspective. i'm just trying to focus on exactly what is at issue. >> right. >> it's a question whether you want the employee to sign a paper or you want the little sisters to sign a paper. in the one case it's an administrative burden, as you've said. in the other case it's a violation of a basic principle
of faith. >> no, i think the point, your honor, is that congress and the institute of medicine -- congress made a judgment here that this does impose a very significant obstacle. that these kinds of requirements result in significantly less use of medically necessary services. and it doesn't just come down to this -- >> that's why it's necessary to hijack the plans. >> your honor, it is why the -- it is why the government's interest is advanced in the least restrictive manner, in the most effective manner. >> is this right? the reason i get that you don't want to have the women to have to ask for the coverage is because vast numbers of women will. quite a few who have religious objections won't. and then there will be that
middle set of people who are i enertia bound. we can't say because if they get contraceptives that lowers the coverage of health care later on. so the government has an interest in that. and therefore there is an interest of some kind in not allowing a system and not having a system where the in-- bound which is not hijacking because there is a federal regulation that says the infrastructure of the insurer's contraceptive related plan belongs to the insurer, not to the person who buys the insurance, am i correct? >> that's all correct, your honor. and that's why when i say when i
make an arrangement with blue cross or etna we're not making agreement with any petitioners or the petitioners own. >> executives deal with the problem with what's available on the exchanges at the present time in this way. could executives say as a matter of our enforcement discretion we are not going to take any action against insurers who offer contraceptive only policies, and in fact, we are going to subsidize those insurers at 115% just as we do in the situation of the self-insured plans. >> no, i don't believe -- >> why would that not be a valid exercise of your enforcement discretion? >> i don't think it would be, but even if it were it creates the same problem of creating the
obstacle which creates the enertia problem, which is not just a compelling interest of the institute of medicine and hhs, but if congress itself gets the whole point of the -- >> why would it be not something that you could do in accordance with your understanding of executive power. >> well, i don't think that it would address the problem, justice alito -- >> general, will explain the difference between the employer identifying an insurer, say etna or blue cross, that coverage contraceptive for many other people that it insures the difference between that notice and the woman who now doesn't have this coverage has to go out affirmatively and get it from some place else. is it just a matter of filing the form for her? or is there a real difference between an employer saying we're not going to cover
contraceptives? just our insured. andhe woman who suddenly doesn't have it as part of her package and has to go out -- >> i think that's exactly the point here, is that the woman employee -- and i do -- >> i'm sorry, you were asked what the difference is. >> the difference is it's not just about filling out paperwork. if you're the woman employee, you go to your regular doctor, you say you have a medical condition that puts me at risk of being pregnant or i just want contraceptive coverage or i need contraception coverage, but the risk here is the doctor say i can't help you. >> that's one interest on one side of the equation. what's the other? >> understand avoid complicity.
>> in which way does rfra cut in analyzing that balance? >> i think rfra cuts in this decision quite decisively in favor of the government here because the interests are compelling. and the -- and as we've tried to explain none of the alternatives that the petitioners have proposed have come anywhere close to being equally effective at insuring that women get this coverage. and the obstacles they -- you get told by your regular doctor i can't help you, i can't even council you about this. numerous petitioners have filed declarations saying that our insurance will not cover even any counselling about contraception. so you've got to go out and find another doctor. and then you have to find a way to pay for the doctor and then find a way to pay for the contraceptive coverage. it's a whole series of obstacles. it's not just about signing a form. that gets to the whole problem -- >> why do you assume the doctor
whom the woman would go under the services in the plan be unwilling to provide those services -- under a separate plan that covers contraception? >> that will be a happenstance. somebody's got to offer that separate plan and that separate plan has got to -- and then the doctor that she goes to as a regular doctor has to be the same -- has to be under the same plan. there's no reason to think -- >> general, the reviews the hijack analogy has been mentioned. can you explain why you don't see this as a hijacking? >> right. i think what we've tried -- the way i've tried to explain that, your honor, is that we have tried. and i think the court recognized this in hobby lobby that the goal of this is to exempt the employer from providing the contraceptive coverage. to exempt them and provide it in a separate means through separate funds without their involvement. and therefore it's not hijacking. what i'd like to do if i could, i want to make one point about -- >> follow-up on your answer before you do.
the contraceptive services would be provided pursuant to what plan? hired by one of the religious organizations, you get a brochure or package with all your insurance coverage and everything it is. and where would the contraceptive services be listed? >> it won't be in that brochure. it can't be in that brochure. there's got to be a separate communication from the insurance company to the employee telling the employee you're getting this separately from us. that's how it works. >> mr. francisco, i think, earlier said, if etna offers a separate policy giving insurance that he thought would be inadequate accommodation. >> and so i think that that raises all the problems identified -- >> no, i meant he says generally if aetna under some other policy offers it on the exchange to women who might want to go on the exchange skb buy that policy, that's okay.
if that's what they do. what's different from that than what happens here? >> two policies instead of one. >> well, it is two policies instead of one because the contraceptives are being provided by government regulation. the only seamlessness is that the woman doesn't have to apply and pay separately. >> i think if it's a separate policy are going to have to apply and pay separately. it's a whole separate regime. i want to make one point about the notice because i know my friend on the other side raised the idea of notice that it's not just about us using the plan but the notice they provide. that notice argument i think can't constitute a substantial burden because it's entirely derivative of the objection to us setting up this third party arrangement. and i think mr. clement told you that this morning because he said if government didn't take this step of providing the coverage, we would be happy to
provide any information they want on a form. and so i think that tells you that the objection here is the arrangement to provide coverage -- >> before you sit down, general verrilli, i want to ask you about this particular situation of the little sisters. their regular third party administrator has also said it would not provide the coverage even if they were to comply with the form or the notice requirement. and therefore you say they probably cannot be -- there's probably no way under erisa to obtain contraceptive coverage for their employees unless you can find another third party administrator that you could deal with there. in that situation with the little sisters still be subject to fines for failing to comply? >> no, we don't think so.
if i could just in closing, what i ask this court to do is to weigh the alternatives that have been put before you here in this case. on the one side you've got a serious thoughtful effort to respect petitioners' religious beliefs by creating a system that allows them to exempt themselves from the requirement in a straightforward manner and that protects the fundamental rights and liberties and dignity of their employees, many of whom may not share their religious beliefs about contraception. on the other side of the scale, what you've got is a demand that those rights those employees who may not share petitioner's beliefs may be extinguished until such time as congress creates and enacts a different program that will require a
separate one-off jerry rigged channel for them to provide obtained contraceptive coverage that will impose precisely the burdens that congress said in a relevant statutory provision unacceptable for all preventive services. >> that's one way of characterizing what's involved here, but it can also be said that, and it is true, that this is a case in which a great array of religious groups, it's not just catholics and baptists, evangelicals, but orthodox, jews, muslim groups, the church of jesus christ of the latter day saints, indian tribe, said this presents an unprecedented threat to religious liberty in this country. what would you say to that? >> what i would say to that, your honor, is that i think essentially what eight courts of appeals have said is that rfra
requires a sensible balance. and a sensible balance is essential in a pluralistic society like ours in which people of every faith on earth live and work side by side. and the government has got to administer rules that are fair to everyone. the accommodation achieves that balance. petitioner's position is very, very far from that balance, and therefore the courts of appeals should be affirmed. >> thank you, counsel. mr. clement, four minutes. >> thank you. i would like to start with the universities, justice kennedy. because i don't think it's the case that just because congress exempts churches that it has to exempt the universities. what it needs though is a rationale for drawing the line. now, my friend on the other side says the line doesn't have to be perfect. well, under compelling interests and least restrictive alternatives it at least has to be pretty good. and the line that they've drawn here is absurd.
and i would urge you to look at the amicus filed by the former head of the tax division, because it explains the line they've picked using 6033 of the tax code makes no sense. that's an informative filing requirement. but there's no substantive difference. if my clients file the form, they get the same tax exempt status as the churches. the only difference in that provision is whether you filed the form. the substantive treatment is exactly the same. to use that line to draw a distinction between churches and universities or the little sisters of the poor is a terrible line to draw. and if you go back -- >> that is a brief that's been mentioned several times, the baptist joint committee leading proponent of rfra discusses this li line. do you say that's wrong? >> no, i would say that gets me
back to the point, finish this point for a second. hire co-religionist and less likely to have employees who would use the products. my clients equally enjoy the title 7 exemption which gives them the right to hire so their original rationale applies equally to my clients. you have to draw a sensible line. now, as to the exemptions, i mean, i will respectfully disagree with professor -- >> -- tell us churches you're not going to claim exemption, not every church that's religious have the same religious tenants. is that what you would prefer? is that the sort of incentive you want to put out there? is that the message you're giving, which is there's lots of rules that apply differently to churches because we recognize they're special. >> let me try and answer -- >> others may be special like
them, but it's clear to tell what a church is. >> let me answer both questions together. first of all, the exemption is not just limited to churches. it applies to religious orders. if my clients stuck to knitting and not help the elderly poor, they wouldn't -- professor is a great scholar but even he admitted he didn't understand the details of this particular plan. he didn't get into that. he left it at the parties. and i think he subsequently said that if there really was a requirement for these entities to contract, and there is, then even he would recognize there's a substantial burden. but the important point is not all exemptions are created equal. if you create an exemption for small employers, that's a rational exercise of enforcement discretion. if you create an exemption for take the ocentero case. if the exemption for peyote has been for a scheduled five substance less dangerous, maybe the government would have won. their problem there was that the government had already exempted
the sacramental use of peyote, so of course they had a hard time providing why scheduled one substance. all of these have to be treated the same. justice breyer, there's no excuse and no other way than to do the hard work of looking at the exemptions and seeing whether they make sense. one of the cases that congress clearly wanted to embrace in rfra was yoder. a relatively hard case because there basically were no exemptions. if the state of wisconsin had already provided an exemption for the menonites, would have been an easy case. it's not that this is a sunset provision. if you look at joint appendix 956, they link the grandfather provision to the idea that if you like your idea you can keep it. that's not going away. just in closing, my clients would love to be a ckensous --
>> thank you, council. case is submitted. >> later today on c-span, the semi-annual monk debate from toronto with a look at the global refugee crisis and how developed nations should deal with it. we'll hear from a former u.n. high commissioner for human rights. and the leader of the uk independence party. you can watch that debate tonight on our companion network c-span at 7:00 p.m. eastern. tonight here on c-span 3, american history tv. it's road to the white house rewind with presidential debates from the 1960s and 1980s. we start at 8:00 p.m. eastern with the 1960 west virginia democratic primary debate between then-senators john f. kennedy and hubert humphrey. then a 1980 debate between ronald reagan and george h.w. bush. and also a 1984 democratic presidential primary debate.
tonight, on c-span, the supreme court cases that shaped our history come to life with the c-span series "landmark cases: historic supreme court decisions." our 12-part series explores real life stories and constitutional dramas behind some of the most significant decisions in american history. >> john marshall in marbury versus madison said this is different. the constitution is a political document. it sets up the political structures. but it's also a law. and if it's a law, we have the courts to tell what it means. and that's finding on the other branches. >> what sets dred scott apart is the fact it's the ultimate antiprecedent case. it's exactly what you don't want to do. >> who should make the decisions about those debates, and lochner versus new york the supreme court said it should make the decisions about those debates. >> and tonight we'll look at the case that helped define the limits of the first amendment right to free speech particularly during wartime creating the clear and present danger standard, schenck v.
united states tonight on c-span and c-span.org. up next on c-span 3, a discussion on combatting terrorism with diplomats from egypt, libya and tunisia. and we'll hear a keynote address from the army general who formerly headed the u.s.-africa command from the potomac institute. this is two hours. ladies and gentlemen, i'm the ceo of the potomac institute for policy studies. and it's my honor and privilege to welcome you today to a seminar on terrorism in the middle east and africa. i'm sure many of you or most of you are aware of the international center for terrorism studies headed by professor yonah alexander for many decades has been looking into all aspects of terrorism,
its cause and how we can deal with it. for the last almost 20 years the center has been at the potomac institute. and it's been our great privilege to host these seminars and yonah's work, the international center has produced at least one academic volume if not three or four per year. several reports every year. we have many examples including this one today which has just been released. yesterday i believe on russia and asia for a couple decades to look at how terrorism has been used as a tool to disrupt governments and society all around the world. to look at how different governments, different cultures have dealt with it, look at what's worked and what has not work
work worked document that in academic setting to lessons learned to dealing with terrorism around the world can be studied, looked at and hopefully will improve our ways and capability for dealing with it. in keeping in that tradition and trend as i said for a couple decades professor yonah alexander has brought to us today once again and always an experienced and distinguished panel of individuals who have dealt with terrorism in its various forms across the middle east, africa into in fact europe. i think you'll agree with me we have an opportunity today to hear some of the best lessons learned, interact with those who have dealt with it on the ground and strategically at governments and in communities. and hopefully increase our knowledge and our ability to deal with terrorism. i'd like to personally thank professor alexander for the two decades that he's allowed me to work with him on these types of
issues. he is probably in my mind one of the greatest academics in the world. and we're very, very, very privileged to have him not just with us here today but with us in the world for as long as he'll stay with us. so with that let me introduce the person who needs no introduction to this crowd, professor yonah alexander. [ applause ] >> thank you, mike. your generous introduction. the main point is we cannot deal with the challenges without international cooperations. so i would like to also welcomed diplomats from dozens of countries, the media, of course academics and so on.
let me first introduce the panel briefly. and then i would like to make a few footnotes and move onto our discussion. next up to mike is general gray, the 29th commandant of the marine corps. and he will also introduce keynote speaker general william ward sitting next to him. then we are going to have a presentation from wafa bugaighis from the embassy of libya. next is the deputy chief of mission of the embassy of tunisia moez mahmoudi.
and finally, we have also another distinguished diplomat dr. alaa abdalaziz, political counselor for the egyptian embassy. obviously we cannot conduct any discussion without academics. so we are delighted to have today professor mohammed benhammou who is the president of moroccan center for strategic studies. and general gray, as always, will have the last word. now, just a couple of footnotes in terms of our academic work that mike mentioned. this year we alone at
discussions right here at the national press club on international cooperation combatting terrorism. and we also dealt with sunni/shia divide, and dealing with the russian challenge in the middle east and beyond and dealing with nato and so forth. now, just we have to remind ourselves that terrorism is only one out of many challenges that we have to consider in talking about security challenges. and clearly natural disasters, epidemics is also, i think, of grave concern.
as we have seen with the ebola crisis in africa and beyond. but obviously we're going to focus on manmade disasters that we see daily. and i think we have to keep in mind that no community and no country and no region is affected by terrorism. yesterday we had the plane hijacking in egypt, although it's not a terrorist incident as we know, but the moe ddus opore the challenges we're facing. sunday we saw with grave concern
what happened in pakistan, or with really exposed again and again the ugly face of terror. in other words, there is no end to the evil intentions. and there is no end to the imagination of the terrorists. and the list goes on and on all the way from paris to brussels to california and elsewhere. so i think we have to keep this in mind. and we have to keep in mind the trends that we see particularly in regard to the expansion of the islamic state. according to the record that we could really follow from the united nations and from the
intelligence community that close to 40,000 volunteers and fighters throughout the world would join the so-called islamic state or daesh. this is actually much larger, seven times larger those volunteers of fighters joined the mujadine in afghanistan to fight the soviet union. what is of grave concern that we don't always realize is the threat in the north african region and as well as throughout africa, in fact out of the 40 identified groups around the world that they are partners,
quote/unquote, in other words in terms of declaring religions, in terms of providing support to the daesh, we find that about 20 of them are locate d in africa. in this connection i would like to mention, again, our publication that mike already referred to that is being released today, it deals with the threat throughout the region. i'm not going to go into details because we do have fortunately with us a general ward who is going to deal with some of these issues, except this map. this map tells everything in terms of the analyses of the nature and the impact of the fact.
in other words, for many years we're very concerned about al qaeda, especially after 9/11 when an increasing number of terrorist attacks took place in north africa. and somehow the world was silent and did not recognize at the time. in fact, algeria was the first country that was victimized in the 1990s after the mujahideens came back from afghanistan to algeria. the point i'm making is today basically every country in the continent all the way from the atlantic to the red sea in some form of link or sympathizers of the daesh. so in other words we're talking about the so-called caliphate without borders and throughout africa if you have the
opportunity try to read that report. and general ward, i think, will go into some details. so, again, the threat is growing by day. okay. and this week as you well know right here in washington there is a summit on nuclear security. and there are representatives from all over the world, from africa, europe, asia and so on, to deal also with the issue of the nuclear terrorism. so it's only a matter of time. it's not if but when and where that we will -- also in nuclear terrorist incident and catastrophe.
and we have to be concerned even according to the reports about europe we know that the daesh and some intentions to target the nuclear facilities and so on and maybe explode a dirty bomb. so with this grim introduction, i would like to introduce great american general gray. [ applause ] >> well, good morning. it's my distinct privilege to have an opportunity to on behalf of the potomac institute to introduce a great warrior, a great american, and someone i i just know that you're going to really be delighted to listen to. and no matter how smart you are, i predict you're going to learn
something. general ward has been a distinguished army officer for over 40 years. most importantly, and i encourage you to read his bio because you need to read that and understand how he developed and where his ideas came from and the like and how he applied them. he started out as a platoon commander. that's where you really learn about people. and you find out real quick that everything you get done as a young lieutenant you get done through people. and so it just makes common sense, if you will, to take care of them. the very best way you know how. and to try to bring them home alive if conflict is there. he went up to really distinguished army career and the like, he's been to all the schools, he's held all the command billets from lieutenant all the way up to division commander and like. and later of course he was the first commander of the africa
command, which he will talk to us about today. now he's the president and the c.o.o. of a very interesting company in the corporate world. and we were chatting a little bit earlier before this thing started. and i said, you know, some of the leadership things that you picked up in the military are apropos in the commercial world as well because still it's all done by people. we need to learn to take care of them. and he agreed to that. we were also chatting, before he was born i graduated from high school in 1945 at 17. and i played football and the like. and my best friend was from briel, high school across the river. they were our traditional rivals. and he and i had grown up known each other for a long time. and later he went to the same
school morgan state, only it was -- he was a freshman there in 1946. and that's back when you had good athletes at morgan state. later when you got there it kind of dwindled off. at any rate, so we had a chat about that. so with no further adieu here, i'm proud to introduce general kip ward. [ applause ] >> let me start off by saying good morning. and extending a huge gratitude of thanks to professor alexander, michael swetnam for extending the invitation for me to be here this morning to address this group. and always that general there needs absolutely zero introduction, no endorsement by kip ward because general al gray is clearly one of our nation's iconic heroes. general, sir, let me thank you for your service over the years
that you continue to do and all that you've done, not just for the marines but all of us who've worn the cloth of our nation. thanks very much. [ applause ] when professor alexander contacted me about coming here this morning, i said, professor, i'm not active commission. i've not published great volumes for those to read. in fact, knowing what you do, why would i contribute to this austere occasion and offer something to this group? he said, general, that's exactly why we want you there. general gray talked about my career, and i'll briefly highlight a couple of things that might be instructive as i go through the remainder of my comments. over 40 years as an infantryman, my first 20 years as a soldier i spent ensuring our nation that should the great nemesis of the
cold war impact our national security, we were going to defeat it. i did that, assigned to units in europe, in korea, mechanized units, armored units, i did that assigned to continuously force units, 82nd airborne division here in the united states. the last 20 years presented a different paradigm. and i'll talk about that. you know, since 9/11 the security challenges that we face have grave global implications. and they've emerged globally. middle east, africa, europe, asia, all regions, terrorist networks, particularly al qaeda and daesh, but including boko
haram, the most treacherous of these organizations, killing hundreds of people a week. that goes unreported. al shabaab, they're expanding daily operations across this arc of instability that exists without borders. topic for the day, combatting terrorism, lessons learned. lessons learned. middle east, north africa and the sahel and beyond. this enemy that possesses state-like features, not a state, exspouses to be one, you have a great presentation by a youngster. i call him a youngster. general, you call me a youngster, i call ben stewart a youngster, current director and
he presented an extremely accurate from my perspective laydown of what this enemy is. so i won't dare to expand upon what he said about daesh and this force. but that is an enemy that is permeated our global commons. we indeed live in a complex security environment. we knew our enemy when i was a lieutenant. we knew who it was. we knew where it was. we knew its intent. we knew how it operated. we could devise a plan to defeat it should it dare challenge us. in 1992, i was a brigade commander, tenth mountain division. i went to somalia to help guarantee humanitarian relief in
an impoverished and devastated land. and in 1992 i discovered what i trained to do for 20 years as an infantryman just wasn't working quite well in this environment. my young sergeants, who were out doing what they did in villages and hamlets, working with tribal elders and leaders, would come back to me and say, hey, colonel, this not about fire maneuver here. this is about other things to help guarantee stability. and we talked about that. and we got through that a bit. but we knew then that the enemy presented a different face, operated with different tactics, gave its authority through different means, mostly intimidation and terror.
lesson learned. did we pay attention to it? maybe, maybe not. did you know some years later i was fortunate enough to be asked to go to egypt to be the u.s. security coordinator with the egyptian armed forces. an assignment that i absolutely treasured then and still think it was one of the best assignments that i ever held because it exposed me to understanding the importance of understanding those with whom you work that may not be just like you. important tour, and tour as the general indicated, helped create this mosaic that conformed things that i later came to believe in as i moved along. had the great opportunity to
command the 25th infantry division, a part of the u.s. pacific command area of responsibility. traveling all over the south -- south asia region, again, being exposed to folks who were not like me. not like my soldiers. but learning. lessons learned. lessons learned. i told the general he probably gave my talk and his summation because it is so true, it's about how you understand people, and how you build relationships. that theme will come forth again as i talk here. that asimilymmetrical threat we faced in 1992, kind of -- things went on in the balkans. and on september 11th, 2001, as i sat in the pentagon as the vice director of operations on
the joint staff, that threat became real in no uncertain terms. and as i spent four days in that pentagon without leaving, doing things to help that helped dete what our response would be to that devastating attack that would change all of us. to be sure, we were in a new era. lessons learned. we all got a crash course in it that day. that enemy we trained to defeat as a military no longer existed and maintaining security and protecting our national interests needed to occur more than at the end of a rifle by delivering a main gun round out of an abrams tank, by dropping a
bomb from a b-1 or by firing a missi missile. to be sure, that needed to be there, but more was required. more is required. in the balkans as the nato commander of the stable nation force insnia hers goe vmade a strategy to put together things for a horizon of hope for people. that wasn't happening because i was a combat veteran. that was happening because i better had been paying attention to other things in that environment that would make a
difference. i went in 2005 to be the united states security coordinator to israel and the palestinian authority. these lessons continue to reinforce themselves. what is it that we are doing to help bring stability to an environment. this notion of security that i had been taught as lieutenant captain, colonel, as a young infantryman my first 20 years was exposing to me its limits with respect to the total dimension of how we approach addressing this arc of instability.
i was very fortunate to be selected to be the inaugural commander united states africa command. i had served in four of our nation's geographic commands at that point in varying assignments. so how was this one to be different if it is to address challenges we face and, to be sure, in 2006 and 2007 as we were discussing it, terrorism was well known to us all. we've talked about those incidents that had led to us having it smacked right in our fac faces. because of what that young sergeant said to me on one of my trips in somalia in early part of 1993 visiting him, i knew stability was more than just what we brought to this dynamic, what we brought was absolutely critical and essential to be
sure, but it needed more. and what was the more? what was the lesson? we talk about it today like it's been around forever. in 2007 we weren't talking about the importance of development. we weren't talking about the importance of understanding the society in which we were operating, knowing what was important to the people who lived there where they were and doing things in a sustained way to address that such that they had a stake in their own stability because they had a horizon of hope. we weren't talking about it. you say well, why are you as a soldier talking about it? i'm talking about it because when it doesn't happen, my soldiers, marines, sailors, get caught in the harm's way to help bring security and stability, and i'd much rather not do that.
to be sure, prepared to do it. that's what my nation asked me to do. that's what i took an oath to do. in my mind's eye, that ought be our last resort to achieve the stability that we all desire on these global colonies. as this condition has continued to move forward, it is even more imperative that those things that are associated with stability, defense to be sure, but as was pointed out by professor alexander, it's more than that. this economic horizon, this horizon that will create something for communities that exists in this vast area that we were talking about, even i,
weren't paying attention. but. conditions that spawned the creation of those sorts of activities still exist. so how are we to address it? what are the lessons learned? we have built great systems to deal with the security aspect. intelligence fusion centers and cells. sustained engagement. combined and joint operations to address threats. the use of our special operations forces, the use of our conventional forces. i offer that that same level of engagement is important across this arc of instability in other areas as well. what is our sustained
developmental engagement? what is our sustained diplomatic engagement? you'll hear other members on the panel talk about the role of various countries in north africa play in helping to build security. what they are doing. i offer some of it will be done by having better trained intelligence, better fused and integrated intelligence, better sharing of intelligence. some of it will come by having better trained and efficient security forces, be they national armed forces, be they police forces. much of it will come because the economic requirements, the developmental issues associated with it, the living condition of folks in an area takes a turn that will cause those who live there to see for themselves a horizon of hope where they are. where they are.
whose responsibility is that? i offer that it is our collective responsibility, just as we took collective action to address it in a military perspective, that same collective action ought to be taken to address it from a developmental perspective. in this, that third "d" we talk about today. some call it diplomacy. some call it good democracy. it is go good governance. to that end, what is our sustained level of engagement. just as we have to have sustained security engagement, we must have sustained developmental and diplomatic engagement. we must develop soote some port our national treasure to that effort. we don't bear that burden alone as the united states of america.
the global community bears it as a global community because the threat is a global threat. what have we built to address the work that's being done by shabaab, by boko haram, by daesh who has now -- with boko haram causeded that affiliation to be seen in ways never before realized. as we move forward, as we look at programs, as we look at processes, this notion of sustained engagement for me comes home in disregard. i love our men and women who wear the uniform of our nation. i am who i am and where i am because of them, and i know t t
that. they -- they -- as we are engaged globally, not just because we are side by side fighting with them, and to be sure, we are prepared to do that, but we are side by side engaging with them, causing a dynamic to occur whereby there is mutual learning going on, us understanding better, they seeing a different way and taking advantage of that to bring that stability to where they are. we can't be everywhere, but we must be somewhere. in this modern age of social media, et cetera, et cetera, this notion of virtual reality is out there and we can do things virtually. you don't build relationships virtually. you build relationship because you're there. one of the best tools that we
have at our disposal is how we build relationships with our friends to cause our common objective to be realized. as the inaugural commander of u.s. africa command, one of our main focused priorities was to cause a level of sustained security engagement with our partners and friends across north africa, the sahal and sub-saharan africa so that they know that they could depend on us to be there. i offer that is not true in europe, asia, the middle east, other places of us being a part of the dynamic to create stability across a range of activities will make a difference. doesn't take a lot. doesn't take a lot. but it takes something.
and where we dedicate resources and our greatest resource in my mind's eye are american sons and daughters who willingly. don the uniform of our nation to go forward and serve. we ought to take advantage of that. what are the lessons learned? there are many, they're varied, but they are at hand. and as we work with partners around the globe, our ability to make a difference to address the arc of instability in ways beyond force of arms ought be a priority. to never back away from that. but it ought not be our first resort of action. and as we support it in ways that will make a difference, we will be able to establish a
horizon of hope such that neighborhoods, communities, nations, regions, are doing more for themselves because of the support, the cooperation, the collaboration, that's being received by the community of nations in their environments. let me close by saying this. we must present and cause our friends and allies, and all those whose interests are threatened by terrorism, to present across the range of activities -- defense, development, diplomacy -- a scenario that causes those who are impacted in these regions to see a horizon of hope so that they take a stake and take
action to address this threat. and while that's going on, we will continue to take those off the scene who are just bad actors. but that's not all that's required. these other pieces of it are also important. and as we saw in the creation of africom, that in large measure has been adopted by other combatant and regional commands. our engagement, our relationship building, our understanding of what's important for peoples in those regions, and then addressing it, and addressing it in real ways, ways that are important for them where they are. that's going to make a difference. and i've seen that around the world. from europe to the middle east,
asia and africa. those are lessons of a soldier over a 40-year career when he didn't know a whole lot about much other than getting to know people, understanding what was important to them, addressing it in some way, however modest, so that they then took steps to help create stability in their regions, because that's in our national interest. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, general, for your very profound insight and experiences, particularly
what works, what doesn't work. we -- i'm sure we'll have many questions for you, but if we may, we would like to proceed with our colleagues to make a brief statement about their own perspectives, and then we'll have a q&a discussion. >> ladies and gentlemen, first of all, i'd like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers of this important event. and thank you for hosting me to speak of this important subject
to all of us -- the terrorism that has affected all of our lives. and combating terrorism is also a personal matter to me, as i lost members of my family and my friends who were brutally killed by terrorists in my own city of benghazi in libya. i cannot agree more with the remarks of general william. it's true that stabilizing and secure nations is the only way to have a sustainable defeat to terrorism. and i think the world has to -- the international community has to support weak nations to reach securi security, and to reach stability. and that is the only way to have a sustainable defeat to terrorism. i will start by saying also that terrorism is merely a tactic,
and targeting terrorism on its own is not effective. we can for sure say that it's a phenomena that is undermining our common humanity and is inherently global, and targeting it today is a vast and major work to do. the latest brutal terrorist attacks in belgium, lahore, and before that in tunisia, mali, paris, and here in the u.s., remind us again and again of the urgent need for more efficient, concerted international strategy to combat it. we need to broaden the way we think about this threat and take measures to prevent it from propprop
propulgating. no one is immune from terrorism. what is most alarming in. present context is the rapid expansion of violent extremism, extremist ideologies in different parts of the world, especially in the sub-saharan countries. there is no question about it, we need to cooperate on many levels to combat it, and we need to learn from our past mistakes what work and what didn't work. the measurement of counterterrorism centers around the world and the inneed for an increasing number of specialists to deal with this problem to the seriousness of this issue. and i am sure we have among us here today excellent experts on the subject such as professor alexander who devotes a lot of his time as the director of the
university center for terrorism studies to this issue and to this cause, and i thank him for the valued report that has been prepared today by their center. according to a recent u.n. report published in december 2015, violent extremists have been able to recruit over 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters, as i heard from him today and also from this report, from over 100 member states. they were to travel to syria, iraq, afghanistan, yemen, and libya. the same mentioned report suggests some counterterrorism measures that require a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only ongoing essential security-based counterterrorism, but also
systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism that have given rise to the emergence of these new groups. i agree with the conclusions of the report. it makes a lot of sense, because in my humble opinion, we need to pay enough attention to why individuals are attracted to violent extremist groups. i'm also convinced that the creation of open, inclusive and pluralist societies based on the full respect for human rights and with economic opportunities for all represent the most tangible and most meaningful alternative to violent extremism and the most promising strategy for rendering it unattractive.
we will not be successful unless we can harness the idealism, creativity and energy of young people and others who feel disenfranchised. young people in our societies in particular constitute the majority of the population of an increasing and also in an increasing number of countries in the region. and these young people must be viewed as an asset and must be empowered to make constructive contribution to the political and economic development of our societies and nations. they represent an untapped resource and we must offer them a positive vision of the future, together with a genuine chance to realize their aspirations and potential.
recent history has shown in our region, and especially in libya, that while tired security situations and conflict tend to be further exasperated by civil conflict and proxy wars that deepen the crisis and increase the suffering. it's also critical that in responding to this threat we recognize that violent extremism aims at provoking states into overreacting, and then exploit ill-conceived government action for their own propaganda ends. in the case of libya where we see political and military fragmentation, daesh, and it's called isis and isil in some other parts, and other terrorists and criminal groups came in to being and took advantage of this security
vacuum to occupy a whole strategic coastal city snd combining what's left of libya state and succeeded in recruiting a large number of foreign fighters who came in big waves across our controlled borders. we do not know the exact numbers of those fighters, but intelligent assessments state that they are between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters. but it's noticeable that the number is on the increase, especially after what isis has suffered in syria and iraq. libya, in general, and libyan society is not hospitable to daesh. libyan culture and religion despises extremism. throughout our history the libyan people are moderate in
nature, and that applies to the islamic institutions as well. however, the deteriorating economic situation in my country makes an increasing number of desperate libyan youth vulnerable to recruitment to these radical groups. the lack of socioeconomic opportunities and the marginalization in addition to the poor governance and failed state we had during the past couple of years since our revolution pose real challenge for any future good governance in libya. again, it's critical to recognize that violent extremism tends to try in an environment characterized by conflict, poor governance, democracy deficit, and corruption. and, unfortunately, we have all of these diseases in libya
today. in addition to that, the prolonged and unresolved political conflict in the country makes it difficult to counter isis and come up with an effective strategy. i must also mention that it is not only isis that we have in libya. there are other terrorist groups, and we feel that there is a competition between them, and we feel that the relationship between them varies from one part of the country to the other depending on the society. the different social structures and different parts of the country, that is. violent extremist groups in libyacynically distort and misuse religion used to divide our nation today. our culture and our people.
and undermining the very existence of the libyan nation. but i would like to mention that many much these radical elements came from outside libya itself. recent developments in different cities in libya demonstrate that these groups cannot be rooted in the country. but it's important to add that isis and other terrorist groups have different make-up in different parts of libya, as i just mentioned. in each area they take advantage of the social problems present in that area. nonetheless, we should recognize that all of them are symptoms of a disease. and this is so important to remember. a lot of people think that what's happening in libya is a result of the terrorism there, but actually, terrorism just a
symptom of the disease that's happened to libya. and it's again -- terrorism, i must mention, is merely a tactic. targeting terrorism on its own is ineffective and we need to go beyond that. there are credible reports suggesting that boko haram is connected with isis in libya as well. and the implications of this could be devastating to the whole region. but the spillover could reach also -- and has reached -- to europe and the u.s. itself. as and one distinguished american journalist suggested is, and i fully agree with him, he said, "our strategy should korea it a fire wall between the two groups to prevent the spread of this cancer in the area and beyond. the islamic state or the so-called islamic state, libya.
beyond. the islamic state or the so-called islamic state, libya. it is no longer small groups. it is an increasing entity entrenched with large spaces. in this context, i would like to emphasize that libya is a unique place geographically and strategically and should be seen in that way. if if we contain and defeat terrorism in libya, we can defeat it in north africa and the sub-saharan region, and i'm sure we will. thank you so much. >> thank you very much. next we will have the deputy chief from tunisia.
>> morning, everybody. start by thanking the professor and center for policy studies for this opportunity to talk to you about this topic which, as everybody agrees, is a global issue that is affecting whole world and every single day. unfortunately, we're having proof of that, that no country is safe from this threat. i chose not to overload this presentation which will be brief with facts and figures and stuff like that. because while all this is available to everybody on the internet and on the news and in
the media, i chose just to have an overfly of the tunisian experience in that regard and where we are coming from and where we are now and where we would like to go actual ly, alog with obviously in our context and the regional context and the global context of the world in general, along with our partners, france and alliee bls friends and allies. just a few words on the tunisian background. tunisia is a country with more than 3,000 years of histories. tunisia has been throughout centuries receptacle of different organizations brought about by different peoples, from diverse origins who have been coming actually as invaders and
occupiers, but who had ended up settling on the land. and in so doing they integrated the local population in bringing their own culture background. so i mean just to mention a few of the -- of those so-called invaders, arab, spanish, french, romans, so on, so forth, all those came to settle in tunisia. they have all left their imprint obviously. and when i spoke of receptacle of civilizations, this is what i meant. like i mean religion wise. jews, christians, and muslims have co-existed tofor centuriesn tunisia as well. side by side and culturally very close to each other to the point
that cultures make up a mixture of a new culture, a new identity. hence, the diversity, the openness, the tolerance that are part of our very heritage. it's actually now genes that this has grown. now what on earth -- one could say, what on earth could lead such a country like tunisia to be one of the leading providers of terrorists in this context? i mean we know that -- well, reports say 3,000, 4,000, 5,000, even 6,000 of the so-called jihadists are tunisians. it amounts to a very obvious concept and general just mentioned, good governance. actually, if you want to sum up the origin of all that, it's bad
governance or the lack or absence of good governance. tunisia has gone through a spell of authoritarian regime. lack of political freedoms. diverse types of liberties which were not accessible to the population. growing social divide. an uneven regional development scheme. unequal socioeconomic growth. series of governance mistakes. all these have ended up in a certain situation that led afterwards to the beginning of extremism that we will see later on. so the totalitarian rift and all the collateral damages have
inevitably led to unrest, and eventually to revolt. in a situation of despair, obviously religion offers soothing, attractive refuge, and the more desperate young -- talking especially about the young people -- these young people were the more prone to sink into extremism out of despair obviously, out of frustration because of lack of employment and socioeconomic problems in general. so hence, those movements spread in the arab world in general in more or less the same contexts in the whole region and in the mideast and north africa obviously. and turned later on into
political trends coming to represent a credible alternative to the authoritarian oppressive regimes that were in place. the vacuum created by the totalitarian regimes was naturally to be filled by religion with a tendency obviously to radicalization. and it's there that it starts -- when we start radicalizing, then the -- we get into the process of extremism and end up in terrorist activities. with the 2011 upheaval and the ousting of the regime, the tunisian people opened their way to democracy and freedoms of all sorts, at all levels. nevertheless, the state apparatus in so doing that process, the state apparatus suffered a real blow due in fact
to the mistrust, mistrust fund-filled climate left over by that regime. this mistrust generated an acute weakness of the state in front of an aggressive public opinion, of their newly acquired freedoms and liberties, and their strong belief in their ability to establish the rule of the people by the people. that was the ambition and that was the main objective. so from authoritarianism, tunisia had moved to crisis of authority. sudden profusion of political parties. hundreds of them. hundreds, not to say thousands, of ngos, media -- i mean filled
up the place all of a sudden, ere were four or five media that were active, and now all of a sudden we have tens and dozens and maybe hundreds of them active. all of them were separating against the ruler, whoever this may be actually. and this, with the background that there is a risk of a totalitarian relapse again to go back to square one. it is in these circumstances of democratic turmoil that extremist groups found their ways to penetrate not only in the tunisian territory but also to infiltrate layers of the society. all sorts of activities like arms struggling, recruiting among the still desperate youth who did not see solutions to their very problems, to their frustration, to their -- who
were not seeing all of a sudden that they were hoping that with this change of regime, that they would be offered jobs straight away and they would improve their social situation and so on. this was very slow to happen. or maybe not happening at all at some stage. and then at that stage, all sorts of activities like, as we said, arms struggling, recruiting among the youth, establishing and running training camps on tunisian territory were evolving without the state apparatus being able to prevent them because it was simply overwhelmed by so many other problems, by social unrest, by pressure from the
union, by political strife, by all sorts of issues that definitely were overwhelming and could not allow the state to be ready to face certain threats. just a reminder of the facts over the last year, 2015. four major terrorist attacks. isis claimed responsibility for three of them. an attack against the museum with 22 victims. tourist resort in -- hotel actually with 38 victims. the presidential guard bus in tunis with 12 victims. and the latest and new of its kind attack against a city in the south of tunisia, adjacent to the libyan border, in which
13 security forces were killed, and seven civilians. 49 among the terrorists were killed in the same operation. i said it is new in kind, meaning that it was the first time that in the succession of events, apart from the isolated acts or very specific or targeted terrorist attacks, this one was meant to establish a stronghold for what we call the islamic state in tunisia. so they were attacking this small city to establish themselves and to start off what they did in iraq and in syria and so on.
commenting on that, i mean when you see the overall situation, it is actually a mathematical war that we are confronted with. the security forces and army are fighting a unconventional enemy with conventional means. so this is why, also, apart from the overwhelming socioeconomic situation and problems, it is also a problem for even the security forces who are never trained to be facing such an enemy. so a new doctrine had to be instated to frame the strategy in this war against terrorism. the strategy is based actually on four pillars. that's prevention, protection, follow-up, and response.
a whole set of reforms is currently under way to optimize and implement the counterterrorism strategy with a number of challenges on the ground, like interagency coordination, which is very complicated. and the u.s. have gone through that after 9/11 with the -- i mean they had to overhaul the whole system. establishing the legal framework, which is also problematic because, in making legislation to combat terrorism, you have to take special care, lest one would compromise on liberties, which in the case of tunisia, very recently and dearly acquired. so everyone is very careful and very sensitive as far as this
sort of laws combating terror m terrorism. sometimes they would definitely overlap with other laws on freedom of opinion and so on. so the main goals in all this is to reinstate the authority of stat states, to improving security governance, establish a sound strategy involving national and international actors, and establishing and articulate socioeconomic development strategy to bridge the gaps and resto restore a healthy economy. now in sort of concluding remarks on all this general context, terrorism is definitely a global threat toward peace and security, so the fight against terrorism has to be global, has
the need for a globally well coordinated multi-dimensional strate strategy. such a strategy would never be successful if it is not based on a mutual understanding as for the needs and the specifics of each and every partner in the struggle. and if you look the a tunisia, tunisia's considered to be a big enough hope for the success of the democratization process in the region, an experience that our partners like to consider as a model, even though we do firmly believe that there is no ready-made recipes for democratization and the democracy itself is a very relative concept that to be implemented has to take into consideration particular countries' specificities, like
historical background, culture, and so on. now, this model is under serious threat, meaning tunisia in that very case. it is under serious threat and it is in the global interest that we come to terms with these threats and continue on the path to success. if proof is necessary that extremism and terrorism are alien phenomena for tunisians, the recent events which i mentioned earlier in godan, and the first of a kind defeat ever inflicted to the so-called islamic state are nothing but the -- the reaction was huge and you could see not only the
security forces but population fighting without weapons, without arms, without anything. i mean chasing those terrorists all over the place. so, to sum it all up, then failure to set up the right types of coroperation in divers fields between tunisia and international partners could lead us to waste an opportunity to promote a pluralistic, inclusive model of governance in the arab world based on social justi justice, equal economic opportunity and security. so, again, this has to do top what i stated earlier that the threat is utterly global, and so must be response. but being global, it needs to be extremely well coordinated so that it's not ready-made recipes again but it takes into consideration different aspects
and different specifics of every and each partner in this war. thank you very much. >> dr. abdul aziz from egypt. >> let me also start by thanking the potomac institute, in particularly ceo and the chairman for organizing this event. special thanks of course goes to the professor who puts a lot of effort and thinking in getting us to this poimportant issue. i think i should say also that the remarks i am going to make represents only myself and not necessarily my country. when i received the invitation for this event, i like very much the notion of lessons learned.
we, the international community, have been fighting terrorism for years and years, and it is important from time to time to have a pause and think and rethink and reconsider what went wrong, what went well, and try to draw lessons in order to do better in the future. in this spirit, i'd like to share with you seven lessons that i think we in africa and the middle east have learned during the last years of fighting terrorism. lesson number one. there is no country that can fight terrorism on its own, period. regional and international cooperation is a must. i'm very glad that general ward used the term "collective" responsibility. this is exactly the lesson we have learned in fighting
terrorism. four days ago, egypt hosted 27 defense ministers from the sub-saharan region in egypt. and the topic on the table was how to cooperate better, how to coordinate better, how to share information in order to fight terrorism and terrorist-backed countries. two days ago, saudi arabia also hosted a meeting for chiefs of staffs fro selected islamic countries in order to discuss the same issue, how to coordinate better in order to fight terrorism. but in fact, this is not a lesson learned in the middle east or in africa alone. think about what happened in brussels last week. follow this tragic event, the eu coordinator for counterterrorism said that only five countries out of the whole members of the eu are really, really sharing
information. open source information and classified information that is needed in order to fight terrorism effectively. so it's a necessity also from the eu level. think globally. why the member states of the anti-isil coalition is growing every single day, to reach 66 countries right now. it's because countries are realizing more and more that they cannot fight terrorism on their own. lesson number two -- and i think general grey may explain this better than me because i am a poor civilian -- this is -- i mean our armed forces are designed, structured and trained to fight conventional wars. now this fight against terrorism is an unconventional war. what you, the u.s., has learned
in afghanistan after 9/11 is exactly what we are trying to learn right now in our region. and here comes the lesson, that we should not start from scratch. we should not re-invent the wheel. we should start from where you have ended. and here comes the sharing experience. does it require new training methods for our armed forces? of course, yes. does it require new weaponry systems? yes, of course. new structure? new command and control? i think, yes. these are questions that needs to be posed. lesson number three has to do with planning, and this is not me speaking actually. when i discussed the matter with the military officers fighting
terrorism on daily basis, they tell me that we used to say that military planning needs a lot of experience. so it's for generals to plan, and for young officers to execute these plans. we have learned from fighting terrorism that it should be the other way around. it shouldn't be a top-down process. it should be a bottom-up process. those young officers who are fighting terrorism on a daily basis have the know-how, the experience, the terrorist's tactics on a daily basis, so they can feed the planning process very well. a lesson they have learned on the battlefield, that if we keep the planning process in the capitals, in air conditioned rooms, we will lose this fight.
lesson number four, professor alexander mentioned the number of isil fighters. 35,000 to 40,000 fighters. add like 10,000, 15,000 in boko haram. add others in taliban. you have 80,000 fighters, terrorists. the question is how these terrorist organizations were able to recruit this huge number. the answer is simple. they have used two tools. first, very attractive religious narrative. two, they reach out to young people through effective use of social media. this is the lesson. in order to fight terrorism effectively, we need to develop a counternarrative to the theory
of the taliban, al shabab and boko haram. comes also the importance of institutions in tunisia and egypt, and also the importance of reaching out to those young people. if twitter and facebook will help us reach out to them, we should use them. if local leaders can help us reach out, we should use them. if local languages will help us, we should use them. i remember a very good experience that after egypt has developed a lot of counternarrative and counterfatwas to what isil is doing and what boko haram is doing. we collected them in a book and we translated into a very local language in nigeria. and we went to the very remote villages, instilled it in schools and in mosques in order to reach out to those people and it proved to be very effective.
lesson number five. development. if we are going to have a tool in the sub-saharan countries in africa and visit the towns and villages where boek ko haram we very effective in recruiting people, those are the deprived, young people, unemployed. so it has to do with development. that is why, part and parcel of egypt's plan to combat ticerrorm is to allocate towns for creating hope. that's important. this also has to do with the good governance aspect general ward mentioned in his opening remarks. lesson number six, technology.
and this is always a forgotten dimension in our discussion. think of a country like libya. with long borders with egypt, with tunisia, with chad and other countries, how can a country like this fight the cross border terrorists? neither other countries can afford using traditional ways to secure these borders, meaning to deploy one tank every single kilometer, they cannot afford to do it. egypt cannot afford to do it, tunisia cannot afford to do it. but if we have the high-tech equipments, we with do it. and here comes the question whether the developed countries are ready to provide the underdeveloped countries with this high-tech equipment or not.
it's not only related to securing borders. it also relates to the tactics of isil. i'll tell you aer is to. the international coalition were able to liberate sinjar, ramadi, and tikrit in iraq last year only. but look what isil did before withdrawing from these three major cities? they left a lot of mines and ieds behind them in order to prohibit refugees and idbs from returning back to their homes and towns. the iraqi government is facing a lot of challenges, cleaning an clearing these minefields. they need a lot of high-tech equipment, once again. this is repeated story, not only in iraq but in syria, libya and elsewhere. so once more, it is up to developed countries to decide whether they are ready to provide these high-tech
equipments or not. lesson number seven, sectarianism. and this also mentioned by profess professor. the fact is, the sunni victims of isil is more than the shiite victims, than the christian victims, and the yazidi victims. don't ever be deceived by the narrative of sectarian rift or sectarian violence. it's political conflict at the end of the day. those people are using religion, are using sects in order to -- not using, misusing religious narrative in order to achieve political goals. it is not about religion, it's not about different sects. let me conclude by a question.
are those seven issues lessons that we, the international community, have already learned? or those are lessons that we should learn? i think we should come back to this question in the q&a. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, profess professor ward, please. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to tell you that i'm very happy to be here. thank you for giving me this opportunity. it's very difficult to be the last speaker.
and i will try to be very brief and share with you some afflictions about this topic. in my country, we have been the victim of the terrorist attack. the first one was in may in casablanca, in may 2003. since this time we learned -- we learned these lessons. and since this time, we start practically with the strategy. and the uproars today.
we can see that we have -- we are in front of some experience. we start, first of all, this strategy around three pillars. the first pillar was good governance and security of good governance. of course, we are facing a -- we have to dealing with this immigrant threat. so our security services have -- have to own what they did before as work. and the first and very important state was how we can bring all
the security services to have deep -- deep cooperation so so the first was -- cooperation between security citizens. and we had to leave to the security services more capability and more, of course, streaming and we can see that we have today very good experience and we know more about these groups, how they deal, where they can find the funding and what kind of organizations they have and we have grown inside or outside moral code.
the second pillar, manage religion spectrum. in managing religious spectrum, we have, first of all, to start to -- and open this mission to women. and i can say this experience at home and abroad in the islamic world is very important because we know all of us, the role, the important role of women in our societies. bring them to this -- to the mosques and give them training and give them opportunity to act as -- can say exactly as the man
in some case. this experience, the objective, was to bring them to play their role and the role must be fresh in prayer. it was the opportunity for us to cut role for others who use mosques as space to give violent and extremist speech and political speech, too. of course, this experience today, we share it with a lot of other countries. in africa, in europe, we start
to train some imam from france, other european countries are asking morocco to share with them this experience. with ivory coast and with new guinea and with other countries. the second -- the third pillar, and as all my friends say, we have to go to this human development and, of course, to be near of all those in the pool areas and to take care of the social and economic deficit in
some areas. for this strategy of human development, give today very important result and very good result. we can see that this strategy today gives to moral code the opportunity to face this groups. as you can open in this strategy, we have one pillar, which we can see, that we are are working on short term is government's security pillar and the two others, how we can work
on them long term. but facing terrorism in morocco is a very big challenge, but at the same time, the aim of this strategy is how we can fight terrorism and continue to build democracy. how we can fight all this extremism that in the same time how we can keep what the moroccan choice as bold for their destiny to be -- to build democracy. it gives us today a lot of elements that in this context.
we can continue, as you know, mok morocco is, i would say it, and the moroccan political system, the monarchy, is one of the -- all the monarchy in all the world. our political system is there since 788. so, when we deal with moral code, we have to keep in our mind that we -- this state have very deep and long story. because of that we have a very good, the state has very good control of the national
territory. and doctrine proximity from the citizens. in the same time, we have the chance that the king is not part of the political game, so all the moroccan have the most important confidence in the monarchy so we can have -- have the feeling that they have -- of course, ask some. the new context today is completely different in origin from the first landing in casablanca in 2003. now weav