tv U.S.- Japan Military Strategies in the Pacific CSPAN April 2, 2016 8:30am-10:01am EDT
i am i am a history buff. i like to see how things work and how they are made it. i had no idea they did history. with american history tv, it gives you that perspective. >> i'm a c-span fan. >> up next on american history tv, the woodrow wilson center hosted a session entitled "cold war lessons from the us-japan." they discuss the japan maritime
self-defense force and the navy, and their efforts to protect japan from the efforts of the soviet union and north korea. this program is about an hour and a half. >> for those of you who have never been to the woodrow wilson center before, it was established in 1958. in commemoration of the 28th president of the united states, woodrow wilson remains to date, the only american president who has a phd. regardless of what the presidential election results may be, that still may be the case. i would like to thank, the cosponsors for this program. my colleagues from the institute, and the public policy program. also, we really do want to thank the general support of the
foundation over the years. without spf, we would not have the japan scholar program. we are now in its eighth year. and the cousin of it, we have been able to bring us some of the most brilliant japanese mind involved in foreign policy at any given time, here at the center. i am delighted to say that this year, we have been able to have a man -- a donor who has given 27 presentations, not just in washington, but throughout the united states, talking not only about north korean policy, but also japan's foreign policy today. he will be kicking off today's conversation, which will focus on the military strategy in the pacific during the cold war, and
its relevance today. and after his presentation, we will be followed by captain forrest. you have the flyers in front of you. he was the principal research scientist at the center for naval analysis. he will be followed by the director of programs at the naval historical foundation. with that, i ask you to speak about 15 minutes, and then we will have enough time for questions from the audience. >> thank you very much, everybody for coming. we will talk about the cold war in the pacific today. why do we talk about the cold war? partly because we are interested in it. i am from japan, and writing a book on the cold war. captain scholz in the pacific, and a full fledged version of the maritime strategy in the
early 1980's, has significant implications in the pacific. the doctor at the end, who also served and wrote a book on peace and confrontation between the united states and the soviet union, such as the sea of japan. we are all interested, but there is another reason why we have to talk about the cold war today. there are interesting similarities between what happened in the pacific during the cold war, and what is happening there today. during the cold war, the soviet union turned the sea of okhotsk into a sanctuary, and operated its nuclear powers and submarines, capable of attacking
the 10th continent. today, china has installed installations in an effort to control it, and is building bases in the highland islands there. the soviet union attended to keep u.s. forces that they by establishing to defense lines to control this blue wall right here. and the outer defensive line, operating to defense lines like here and here the first and the second island chain to deny u.s. access. but then, the soviet economy collapsed.
including, the u.s. and japan. today, the u.s. and japanese economy might go broke as a result of that. the soviet union was a superpower, capable of a raging a global nuclear war. it is a long way for china to become a similarly capable superpower, involving conventional and nuclear. most of all, while the united states and soviet union were in the cold war, the united states and china, are not. based on a good understanding of those of those similarities and differences, we can learn lessons from the cold war experience and find a way to
maintain peace and security in the asian pacific region today, while shaping mutually beneficial relationships among the west, japan, and china. in the following one plus hours, we will discuss the cold war in the pacific, and how to cook create peace in the region today -- co-create peace in the region today. >> thank you very much. thank you for coming today. i'm going to briefly discuss -- how are we doing on the microphone? i am going to briefly discuss the united states's maritime strategy in the 1980's, the u.s. navy relationships with the japanese maritime self-defense wars at that time, from an american point of view. full disclosure, for the laugh more than 20 years, i have been
an analyst and a scholar. before that, a u.s. navy officer, and i had a hand in some of the things that i am going to talk about. first of all, what was the maritime strategy? it has all been declassified, you can read about it in publications that out by the naval war college. it was -- there were several iterations, some classified, some not classified. for those of you are interested, you can certainly go to it on the web, or try to get a hard copy of it. mr. swartz: so the maritime strategy was the naval component, of the overall u.s. military strategy of the 1980's against the soviet union and its a against the soviet union and its allies. it was a concept developed by the u.s. navy to describe what the navy's leadership thought
was the best way by the sea to block soviet adventurism, prevent them from starting a war against the u.s. and their allies, and if the deterrence failed, the best counter to defeat the soviets. it describes recommended u.s. and allied operations during peacetime in response to crises and conventional combat, and in the event of nuclear weapons being used. in discussing combat against the soviet union, it is assumed that the soviets had been the aggressors, and removing offense of lee in some manner against the united states and its treaty allies.
to counter that soviet offensive, they wanted a global, forward offense of, joint, maritime strategy with major campaigns in and from the norwegian and bearing sees -- the baltic, turkish straits, eastern mediterranean, and northwest pacific, and across the north atlantic, and north pacific. it for thought possible campaigns as well as the caribbean, south atlantic, indian ocean, and south china seas where they maybe had a presence. it assumed the war would be global, and the baseline, assumed all allies, including japan, would be involved. they saw to create, maintain, and possibly in large the alliance to include possible china. this is the china of the 1980's we are talking about. it represents a china that was very hostile to the soviet union, but looking back, was becoming decreasingly so over the decade. it represented the navy -- this is a very important point. it was the strategic viewpoint
as professionals, but it was understood throughout the u.s. government, including the navy, that the decisions to do any of this lay with the president and the secretary of defense. not the navy. it is a question of democracy, civilian control was understood. but the navy's view, still there view today is, if the president asked you what do you recommend, what are my options? the navy should not be in a position of saying, we don't know, or we had not thought of that because we never thought you would ask. this represented the navy's advice, if you will. how did it happen, emerge? first of all, it embodied fundamental characteristics of the u.s. navy, and maybe that is a different industry from other navies. it existed, since its birth, the days of john paul jones and the american revolution. it had been codified in writings
more than a century later by many naval writers. what were these characteristics? powerful ships, powerful operations seeking to carry the fight to the enemy. global campaigns. coordination with and the other u.s. services and american allies. you have to remember, this was in the face of a massive soviet naval buildup, worships, missiles, satellites, and worldwide soviet navy deployment that took place during the 1960's, 70's, and 80's following the cuban missile crisis of 1962. it was also developed, the maritime strategy, in reaction to the american carter defense policies from 1977 through 1981, which saw the u.s. navy useful, principally, to escort envoys of supplies across the atlantic for
the u.s. army and air force in germany. they did not foresee the useful role for the navy's carrier in amphibious and submarine fleets, and subsequently reduced funding for those forces. the u.s. navy during this. -- during this period had a better idea, they had a document, a concept of corporate operations by admiral heyward, the assistant fleet commander in the late 70's, it was called c-strike, and this was in newport, rhode island. this is important. the u.s. navy also achieved in the late 1970's a much better understanding of how the soviets thought about major operations that -- at sea, i should say parenthetically, there is almost nothing written about that.
it is classified, but a book by our colleagues, called "the admirals advantage." if you're interested, that is as close as you can get to how the u.s. naval and intelligence, and what was involved in that at the time. but chief among the priorities, as we understood him, the soviets, regarding naval combat operations at sea, was a deployment and -- there submarine fleet, which were increasingly placing in their bastions in the bering sea and the sea of okhotsk. also, protect the homeland, and to support the soviet armies as they swarmed into western europe, norway, turkey, hokkaido. also, the introduction of supply ships across the atlantic and pacific area 1978, admiral had left, became the head of the u.s. navy, and came to washington and expanded the forward offense of concept he
developed in the pacific and the entire globe. these concepts involved the early forward use against the soviets of carrier battle groups, amphibious forces with marines, and other u.s. and allied naval forces. two years later, ronald reagan won the election as president of the united states, defeating president carter. reagan was a believer in the navy's concerts, and he appointed an aggressive and thoughtful republican naval strategist, dr. john f lehman junior, as a secretary of the navy. he also increased the navy's budget considerably. and then what happened? the result in 1981 in 1982, was
conceptualizing the drafting and promulgation by the navy of the maritime strategy to read it was a secret document, with an unclassified version not public it -- not publicly presented until january 1986. meanwhile, the navy moved forward to implement the strategy that it was writing, practicing it in a joint exercises off the soviet coast, developing new operational contracts, expanding its wargaming program. coordinating with other u.s. services and allied navies, including the japanese maritime self-defense force, and practicing these new tax -- tactics, like top gun and strike u. some of us delve into our naval history to see just how other navy planners had gone about their business and what they had
done. we had the extreme good fortune of the time that our collie, ed miller was writing a book, struggling to get through it, which was perfect for our purposes regarding learning how to plan and write these things. he wrote the book, "war planner." a book, which is an naval writing today, a classic. in my world, the classic. he also reached out to china, visiting chinese ports for the first time since the communist revolution there. he's sailed to china, with useful lee terry could mimic
torpedoes, helicopters, destroyer engine, still in service in the chinese navy during and they are, of course, solid american technology. the key aspect of the strategy was going after the soviet nuclear strategic reserve in the bastions. there knowing that we would do this, and probably would do that, we believed would contribute to deterring them from starting a war, just as we believed that demonstrating it early offense of posture off foci go -- hokkaido and other regions would enforce the effect of the naval forces. what role did we see japan play? first of all, they defended their own air, land, and water space, including the straits between the islands. this would obviously block the soviets from coming out. it would also suit our purposes, because the alliance was tight that way. protecting the sea lines of communication, this was a policy
change during the suzuki and other periods. the support we thought we would get for u.s. forces in japan, and we saw japan as being a country being able to develop and absorb and use effectively anti-air, and i submarine, and other were sophistication -- facilities as sophisticated as our own. these world, supplemented the roles of other u.s. allies in the pacific, in nato, and the south pacific. this is a very compelling case i just made. not everybody agrees with this. there were several criticisms aimed at the maritime strategy. i can still show you some of the scar tissue. some came from within the navy itself, and some from academics.
former carter administration officials, so-called military reformers, who were active at the time, like senator gary hart, and others. of course, there were several criticisms from the soviet. so what were these criticisms? some thought you just cannot do it. soviets were too large, you could not do what we said we were going to do with naval forces. some thought it was dangerously exploratory, while the navy believed that by making sure that the soviets knew that their strategic reserve would be in jeopardy, and therefore, enhance the deterrent, there were several academics, friends of mine, who argued that on the contrary, by doing that, you are destabilizing. this fit in with our view of the soviet line, that everything we ever did was destabilizing. there were several debates during this.
thing. some thought allies could not be dependent on, one was in japan. so there were discussions about that. some thought that the soviet priorities would not be what they said we were -- be what we said they were. cutting the sea lines of communication was crucial, we thought it was not. some thought it would not make much difference to the soviets anyway. the main event was going to be in central europe. since we were not directly involved in that, that was -- we just had the wrong navy four. he thought the concept was sound, but we were building the exact wrong things to carry it out or it the army did not like it because it took money away from the army, in their view.
some said it was simply too expensive. there was a lot of criticism, and the navy worked hard to understand these criticisms, and incorporate them into the strategies themselves, and counter if necessary. the administration remains supportive. after secretary lehman and admiral heyward had left washington, and some practical application in the 1990's. they continued their expense of building program, which was extraordinary. there were still destroyers going into the water in 1990, as poland and the czech republic in east germany -- but is something the u.s. navy had to take into account. the soviets also staged their own games and exercises, interfered with hours during
they were assisted in all of this by a few american citizens, whom they paid for information, including members of the u.s. navy itself, in jobs they gave them access to critical information, especially how vulnerable soviet submarines have become, which was a problem with -- that soviets strove to fix, with some success. soviets were also aided by a few companies, toshiba, who sold the submarine technology when they knew they should not. most importantly, the soviets unleashed a major diplomatic offensive calling for arms control agreements, which would have the actual effect of constraining only the u.s. navy, and leveraging and stability to come to the assistance of exposed allies like norway, greece, turkey, south korea, and japan, as well as potentially friendly influences like china. fortunately, in our view, none of this works.
the u.s. government hung tough against naval arms controls measures, which they clearly understood what only hamper one side. allied governments and the navy's working increasingly closely with the united states and its navy, as did the u.s. marine corps, coast guard, and air force. then what happened? you know what happened. then came the demise of the soviet union itself. after the end of their colossal naval building program and operations. the u.s. navy developed a new concept, called from the sea, for dealing with the immediate, post-cold war world. so it has evolved navy thinking. their current strategy is a thing called the cooperative the strategy of the 21st century. this is also available online, it is unclassified.
it was published a year ago this month. our alliances have endured and even expanded. a strong naval alliance of japan has continued, and is often front-page news today, as you all know. but my time is up. i look forward to your comments and questions, i give things back over to my colleague. >> i guess we have a slide. the first slide should be, there you go. i saved the best for last. hello, thanks again for coming. thank you peter, i am showing a picture of the ship from 30 years ago, i was the officer in
charge, peter was talking about the maritime strategy. 32 years ago, i was off the coast, and, siberia in -- thank you for sending me to siberia in november and december. could not have a maritime strategy in tech ed -- tahiti, could you? we had encounters with the naval vessels, and i was impressed with the civility and professionalism of our soviet counterparts. we had developed a single system with an agreement i will talk more about later. mr. winkler: i want to take a
look a little bit more macro, as far as strategies during the cold war. i want to talk about it by talking about the obvious. i was in mind that at the end of the war we had japan, and how we handle japan really set the stage for everything else that would follow. the good news, unlike germany, with the exception of it northern islands, japan's integrity remained intact. this was a military command, i was mostly civilian crew. one of the members with a navy sailor who had sailed right after world war ii. he was telling me about his experiences, and what he did, he recalled going on shore, coming upon a couple of children who were playing outside, him and
his shipmate with sale near. the mother came out of the house, she was terrified. she was under the impression that these americans were going to harm her children. instead, the sailor and the shipmate pulled out a couple of hershey bars. that's kind of symbolic on how the occupation of japan in contrast to what happened in world war one with germany. we learned some lessons. you can read william manchester's book about how we brought japan into the coalition and helped contain the soviet expansion. it's a remarkable story. it becomes apparent early on
when the mouth -- north korea advances in 1950. while they proved the is be bump, it was the counter information by macarthur, the brilliant counter stroke that stabilized the situation on the korean peninsula. is interesting that some of the lst's were manned by japanese. the korean war would go on for three years. japan location was critical in that -- for maintaining south korea the way it is as an ally today. japan is important. it allowed us to fully deploy in the region and provide
credibility for the united states. thanks to the agreement in 1972, the uss navasota was able to do minesweeping. do the math. keep one ship forward, deployed, you need to have three ships in your inventory. to accommodate the transit and maintenance cycles. currently, we have 20 ships in the home port authority in japan. two additional air carriers, eight additional amphibious mine countermeasure ships and a dozen destroyers to meet the mission. these forward deployed ships need downtime for upkeep will -- when i was in navasota, i remember the quality of the work done at the shipyard.
i recall we were talking about some radio equipment and this shipyard worker told me, i could get this done for you isn't important?ally and he said, well i have a wedding tomorrow i could put off. works i said it was really not important. -- i said it was really not that important. i was impressed by the dedication and quality of work. next slide please. should be the midway. the aircraft carrier midway, we stationed an aircraft in japan in 1974 that was 28-years-old. that carrier's sister ship, the franklin d roosevelt was taken
out of service. in the good care in hands of the japanese shipyards in tokyo, our naval shipyard there, she was maintained in pristine condition and served in the western pacific for the next two decades. a very important ship and our efforts in the gulf wars and indian ocean. a forward presence. thanks to the work that was done with her japan, she is now in san diego. almost a museum ship. a testimony to the good work the japanese performed for us. also is the importance of japan as part of our strategy in bringing the japanese. of course, the cold war is about containing the soviet union and communism. as far as containing communism and asia, take a look at the scorecard. not too good. besides the soviet union, china, north korea, vietnam, laos,
cambodia over the course of the cold war came into falling under the coming his banner. -- the communist banner. not too good. during the 1950's, communism was monolithic. we have learned subsequently that communism was not monolithic. dr. kissinger accomplished diplomacy but we failed in southeast asia in the 11-year war. in vietnam. we move to containment in the union to the manchurian border. turn the 1980's, we had pretty warm relationship and considered china as a strong ally versus the soviet union. next slide, please. as far as some of the challenges over the decades to execute the policy, for the united states to maintain a containment policy it
was no easy matter. united states is an island nation. my former boss, james holloway iii told me about a meeting with secretary of defense harry brown and the carter administration. during the air of the soviet union in the 1970's. brown argued we needed to pursue civility with the soviet union by achieving parity. to be credible -- for our allies to even know the united states needed to control the high seas, the navy, on the other hand was as sea denial force. they told him, abnormal -- and rubble, the upcoming football is tie army.y navy
in a war with the soviet union, "tie soviet navy was not an option. going back to the 1950's, the eisenhower administration implemented a new look. the air force got a budget to build a be 57 b-52 bomber. the navy wanted to play in the strategic integrated operations as detailed in fisa admiral -- vice admiral jerry miller's book. eventually, we put nuclear weapons aboard ballistic submarines. the soviet navy which operated to support the red army took on the mission of defending the motherland from the nuclear bombs.
a bluewater nuclear sub that could go after our. what was at stake, anticipated war with the soviet union could go nuclear fast. which i believe was a deterrent to war. before the navasota, i served on a ship that had the slogan [-- had a slogan "the next war is on us." when asked about nuclear weapons, a response was, i cannot confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons. one of the challenges operating with the capability of the western pacific was the sensitivity in japan.
fortunately, the "i can neither conform -- confirm nor deny was ok with the japanese. finding a general war without nuclear weapons became feasible. let's go to the . -- let's go to the next slide. regarding comparisons with the cold war today, many have noted commonalities between the former soviet union and china with respect to naval forces. both countries are continental powers and a recent tradition of coastal forces, decisions of the soviets to put naval forces to the sea in the 1960's, they had fleet up young, inexperienced officers to command. it followed the collision of a soviet destroyer with another ship in november, 1970. the ussr approached the united states with soviet safeties seem measures.fety at sea
it reduced the type of dangerous behaviors. weapons pointing's, low flight and other harassments. recognizing the emergence of the 1990's of the chinese service force, there were calls for u.s.-china ink sea. it had negative connotations because it was signed by two hostile superpowers as an effort to avoid world war iii. a major trade partner with newer social ties, indeed we had 300 thousand chinese students studying in the united states right now. you did not have that during the cold war with the soviet union. the u.s. and china signed a a military consultant of agreement was signed which facilitates the annual discussion of maritime issues. and initially lacked some of the issues.
over time, the two nations adopted a code of unintended and encounters at sea that was created by the western pacific naval symposium. an annual gathering of navies that operate in the region. a friend of mine, captain smith, shared with me an encounter he in with a chinese forget -- the eastern sea a few years ago a end discussed the professionalism of his chinese counterpart. i am confident that even with accord, there was a little bit of hanky-panky between the u.s. and the ussr as i revealed in my dissertation. a list of incidents we had post-1972 with the soviets. but the public never saw this because there was a
classification called "for u.s.-usssri's only" and we would discuss this every year either in moscow or washington. a difference of concern today is social media. ok? in the 1980's i recall an incident and the soviet destroyer pulled up alongside us and it had its forward gun out pointing at our bridge. this was clearly a violation of the incidents at sea accord. i was thinking, is today the day world war iii is going to start? is there any reason for this? i was thinking, no. this guy should be able to read there is an "e" painted on the side of our ship, so any bomb he sends it to our ship is going to take him out.
even have a with that this occurred. -- a whiff that this had occurred and it would make the evening news cycle. that is a concern today. the other differences territorial seas. i am from new jersey. i used to go down to the seaside and sit on the beach and i could look out and see russian fishing boats there, because our territorial seas at the time, the united states claimed three nautical miles. during a little bit of research, it was not until 1988 that we decided to go to 12. so, that is pretty recent history. one of the issues today, of course, with the creation of 200-mile economic exclusion zones has been determined by some nations as an exclusion zone for non-economic activities. non-identification zones in the east china sea and south china sea. between social media and different views on territorial waters, i see the potential for artificial crises that could lead to some unfortunate crazies. i will leave it there and look forward to questions. >> there are some seats here. >> thank you.
let me talk about cold war challenges. similarities and differences. between then and now. finally, japan's future defense role. cold war. successes. some observers argue that japan security free rider during the cold war. that is not true. japan was making the biggest national security commitment in the 1980's in the history to-date. it played a critical role of helping the united states execute the maritime strategy. positioned in the center of the theater of confrontation in the u.s. and the soviet union in the pacific, japan undertook to a important missions. -- two new important missions. one, locating areas.
one here, one here, and one here. two, the defense of sea lines of communication. the objective of the trade blockade was to prevent soviet naval forces from advancing into the western pacific. the maritime self-defense force dramatically improved its anti-summary and wartime capabilities. they acquired c-130 as a mine-laying platform. it introduced surface to ship missiles to attack soviet vessels sailing through the strait. the objective of the defense was to make it possible for the u.s. aircraft carrier battle groups
to sale -- sail safely to striking positions. this is the northernmost island here. the maritime self-defense force was tasked with the anti-submarine operation and with providing safe passages in the western pacific for the u.s. carrier battle groups. while taking up these new missions, the self-defense forces continue to provide protection over the united states bases in japan, such as the air force base in several areas and navy bases. under the air defense provided by the self-defense forces, the
u.s. forces could focus on offensive strike operations against the soviet far east. japan's commitment to the united states global strategy did not result from political mischief. -- initiative. it was a result of the concerted efforts made by the officials and officers of the japan defense agency, the self-defense forces, the minister for the -- the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of finance. it was only when another came into office in 1982 that the japanese prime minister consciously endorsed his country's commitment to the global security strategy. this close defense u.s. strategy produced good results.
according to a retired u.s. navy officer and japan specialist, no u.s. navy operator would doubt the importance of executing the strategy. he said it was unbelievable that we tracked every soviet submarine by the end of the cold war. former soviet leaders say one of the retired soviet officers has acknowledged the soviets took the presence of allied navies such as japanese, in exercises, very seriously. he even mentioned his respect for the japanese maritime defense force. there are successes, there are challenges. during the cold war, u.s. planners were concerned that japan might become neutralized
in case of war. the u.s. government clearly indicated this concern. soviet power, for example, the soviet military power from 1989, published by the u.s. department of state of defense, stated, the soviet merger objectives in the past included, into a quote, neutralizing japan and south korea by military or political means to prevent them from supporting the united states. several scenarios were looked into as the global war games conducted at the u.s. naval war college in the 1970's and 1980's. in the 1979 games, the social -- the soviet union offered incentives to france, israel, japan, pakistan, and algeria to remain neutral.
in the 1980 game, the soviet union detonated three nuclear weapons east of japan to intimidate the japanese government into neutrality. in the 1984 game, the soviet union perceived that it would be impossible to keep japan that neutral just by diplomatic and political pressure into a threat. so they launched a large-scale air attack on japan. the scenario in the three-year games in 1985 and 1987 was more interesting. in these games, japan went back-and-forth between the united states and soviet union. during the first week of hostilities, the united states conducted air operations in japan using u.s. and japanese bases against the soviet union. when moscow protested that this
was not in keeping with japan's professed neutrality, the japanese government condemned the united states actions and band the future use of japanese soil as a base for u.s. attacks on soviet forces. but then, japan decided to take damaged u.s. aircraft carriers on ports, not a defensive action, but it was regarded as a serious violation of neutrality and they attack japan. then the japanese government made a decision to fully take obligations and pledged to use its self-defense force to protect united states forces in japan. these are hypothetical scenarios used for wargames. nevertheless, a repeated appearance of this name clearly clearly indicated
that the united states planners took this seriously and examined how best to prevent japan from getting neutralized and, if it did, how to fight a global war without japan's participation. it is hardly surprising that the u.s. planners were concerned about the neutralization of japan. first, despite japan's acquisition of modern equipment such as f-15 fighters that and other aircraft, it was doubtful the self-defense force had the real war fighting capabilities. shortage of ammunition supplies seriously limited the execution of realistic live fire exercises. many of the japanese self-defense forces did not have aircraft shelters. there were no emergency plans defining the rights and citizens of japanese citizens and major
-- and regulated major operations conducted by the self-defense forces and wartime. in 2003 and 2004, more than 10 years after the cold war, the japanese parliament announced legislation necessary for wartime operations. similarities and differences between then and now, there is both good news and bad news when the current strategic environment in the western pacific as compared with that of the cold war era. good news, during the cold war, the islands here, offered the soviet union a natural barrier separating them from the sea. today, japan controls these
islands, the southwestern island and can use it as a natural defensive barrier. the bad news, however, the only exit the soviet fleet had for advancing to the western pacific straight, today, china has at least nine or 10 locations that could be used because it is a long island chain with a lot of gaps between them. isna's economic experience superior to the soviet union. -- same might not according to the stockholm international peace institute, expenditure grew
by a remarkable 167% in the last decade while the u.s.-japanese defense expenditure decreased by 0.4% and 3.7% respectively. finally, japan's future roles. japan's defense roles in the future conflict will look very much like the ones during the cold war. here self-defense -- the air self-defense force will focus on defense with a new emphasis on crude missiles for defense. u.s. bases in japan are becoming more vulnerable by the day with the continued korean air force buildup. planned introduction of fighters will help ease the mounting pressure. limited in number, bombers can take up strike operations against vessels. the maritime self-defense force
will continue to provide safe sea lines of communication to u.s. carrier battle groups operating in the western pacific with his anti-submarine warfare capabilities which are one of the best in the world. moreover, it will now protect u.s. carrier battle groups from not only submarines that also -- but also from anti-ship missiles that china is developing. the ballistic missile will be upgraded to more advanced systems in the years to come. the ground self-defense force will attempt to stop hostile vessels at the straight along the south western island chain. it can deploy new targets or ship missile on the island chain
like this, with a range of over 150 kilometers taking cover all over the straits in the island chain. as the self-defense force will execute similar defense missions, japan will face similar challenges. as the soviet union seeks to japan and case of conflict, north korea and china will do the same. by now, north korea has deployed more than 200 missiles capable of reaching japan. with possible miniaturized and usable nuclear devices. north korea can explode a nuclear bomb in japan's vicinity in order to do as the soviet blackmail its neutrality as the soviet union did in 1980. china may seek to neutralize
japan's population. fear of entrapment is strong in japan. according to the public opinion poll, while only 32% of the japanese responding felt the new legislation would strengthen. 64% of them answered it would make it more likely that japan might get entrapped in foreign wars. 74%rding to another poll, agreed that japan would not get drawn into wars by the united states even if the situation was -- the new legislation was enacted.
keeping the isolation of japan -- the isolationists in japan committed to security will remain a challenge. thank you very much. [applause] >> we have a full house. we are excited to have c-span with his. there is a microphone if you have questions. please raise your hand and identify yourself. in the interest of time, i would like to take two or three questions together. let's initially go with this gentleman, and then with the gentleman who is up high. >> thank you. i am henry, a researcher and retired federal government. in the last few years, we have e seen japan fortified as an
artificial island in the south china sea. many years ago, all chinese serious military strategy indicated in a war they must be clever. there is a limit to how much clever can be tolerated by the united nation's. i wonder what the strategy will be or should be. prior to world war ii, japan fortified all of these islands that were mandated by the league of nations. it was supposed to guarantee their independence at the time. but other strategies also did not work out. as such, it was a powerful regi they had but secretive no other naval ships entered the area. they did not need them present. now, we have a similar situation we will face in the south china sea. what can and should be done to develop a strategy to face this? >> hello.
steve, officer of senator dan coats. the first part of my question is, how is the situation both similar and different with the cold war with americans and japanese versus the soviets. now, the situation with china. also, today, would using terror groups defensively and forwardly deployed like what was supposed to be done in the cold war, is that still viable or might we have to move to something else or do you have any thoughts on that topic? thank you. >> i guess regarding the question of what can we do about the artificial islands that are being created in the south china sea? the one thing that the navy and government has made a commitment to his freedom of navigation operations. freedom of navigation operations is, i guess it has been argued, that it would be beneficial to
-- that we have been officially doing these since 1979 but in reality to go back to naval history, all the way back to the barbary wars against -- in tripoli, establishing our right to freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation operations, we conducted them in the -- against the, you know, soviet union. they claim some survey waters -- they claim some waters that we did not agree in. the bumping incident was the karen and yorktown being bumped -- being met by a soviet frigate in 1988 in the black sea. we were demonstrating freedom of navigation. there is a rule in international law that if the peninsula juts out, you do not have to go around 12 miles around that. you can just cut through.
we were demonstrating that international right and to the soviets disagreed. subsequently, there was a meeting at jackson hole and the soviets came in line with the correct interpretation. we were, you know, innocent passages in that case. our understanding is the united states navy and other navies of the world, will continue to transit these waters that are close to these little island outposts that the chinese are creating in the south china sea. that will continue on for, you know, the near and distant future. >> a couple points are important. first of all, in the time before world war ii, given the nature of the world situation, technology, and domestic policy, navies did not normally operate
hard by and off the coast of their designated enemies. during the time that edmund mill was writing about, the fleet practice near hawaii, near panama. it did not practice off other islands. that all changed after world war ii. not immediately after world war ii. they went back to the old way. but by 1947, 1940 8, 1940 nine, it became pretty clear that based on the expanse of world war ii, based on new technology, and based on the unfolding world situation, the thing to do with the fleet was to stick it in the face of the enemy and the time of peace to keep it from doing anything at time of war. so they set up the six fleet in the mediterranean and turned it around with the seventh fleet in the western pacific, extremely fortuitously, because the
carrier was in the pacific when north korea came south and it showed the futility of having this but it did help stop them. but ever since then, the convention has been to the u.s. navy to keep two forward battle fleets, sometimes three, pretty stretched, things dave talked about, you need a lot to be able to do this, off the coast of wherever you are operating. why is this important? because in the south china sea, we have been operating in the south china sea since world war ii. forward. always. trudging back-and-forth, and also being there. and we have a strategic ally in sea.outh china it is a direct line to another treaty ally, depending upon where you are going, japan, south korea, australia.
it is also a line of communication to emerging friends india and vietnam. so, the presence of the fleet, the seventh fleet, in the china sea, which has been continuous since 1950, is a difference in the kind of things you are talking about when japan was fortifying islands out in the pacific and no one went near them. we have made a practice is world war ii of going near those places that are of interest to us, even if they are 10,000 miles away. parenthetically that is one of the things that drives the large, robust, fully-capable ships we build because they have to be able to go out and stay out there for 6, 7, 8, nine months in the kind of weather david was talking about to do , their jobs. that is different from operations in international waters, different from the assertions of freedom of navigation in which we assert
things are international waters that the local things are not. in waters that are incontestably international, we operate. we operate forward and we have since then and that seems to do the job for presence, crises, and war fighting. the point about of having such a strategy is viable given the threats like air carriers, and article came out recently by a guy named michael hass. i think he did it in defense one. it just came out within the last week. he makes a point that carriers have always been vulnerable. they are of fighting ships. that is what they're for. when the japanese carriers met american carriers off midway, the assumption was not that the
japanese might lose a carrier, the americans might lose a carrier. we better back off. all during world war ii, carrier fought carriers and other ships in the western pacific because that is what warships are for. it is not pleasant. it is not nice to think about. but this is what fighting ships do. in the case of the soviets, the time i discussed, they had, still have, backfire bombers. having a backfire bomber overfly you carrying these humongous missiles under them really sobers you. as dave said, is world war iii going to start? look at the size of that. but we have countermeasures. we develop countermeasures for that. we develop in equipment, we develop tactics.
battle which was an amazing ballet of 14 fighters. top gun, tom cruise, all of that. and, the kinds of radar-caring planes. smaller b-twos that can see out for thousands of miles and tell where everybody is an vector in the scenes. where tankers have to be to resupply those f-14s. where the electronic warfare planes have to be in order to jam the radars. all of those were worked out during the cold war. the same with submarine tactics. the same with surface tactics. we're doing that. well, i am not doing that i have not been in the navy for 20 years. the u.s. navy is doing that today. if the battle was tomorrow, the answer is, yet. the answer for 40 years, i don't
know. between now and then, many things can happen but what the navy is -- thinks that's what you pay for. figure out ways to make sure those carriers can stay forward, the cruisers can stay forward, the submarines can stay forward to do their job. whether or not it is going to work as wonderfully as i just laid out as a maritime strategy we do not know, but the navy is certainly trying and you just saw recently, for example, secretary of defense carter mentioned off hand in a speech, a mission we had never publicly disclosed. there are other systems we have that we never publicly disclosed we are working on, just as, i am sure you must suspect, the russians and the chinese and others are also working on their own systems. the idea that somehow the carrier, well, they might hit it.
we better back off. that is not why you have a carrier. the carriers are built to stand and fight to and hopefully win if we develop the right kind of systems. >> let me take the u.s. defense question. i think the most important similarity is how we divide our roles. we continue to, the u.s. continues to, provide strike offensive capabilities where as we kind of take care of our defense. we do so partly because, i mean, that is what -- partly because of the japanese defense policy which basically is not -- we are not willing to possess offensive capabilities because it can be destabilizing. japan was an aggressor in the passive war.
at least, in the beginning just after the end of the war, it was not allowed to possess offensive capabilities and this has continued. we focus on air defense, submarine warfare, you know, in case of mine warfare, we undertake both offensive and defensive mine warfare of those things. what is new after the end of the cold war is the introduction of ballistic missile defense. but, even not, even that is we invest a lot of resources and -- in ballistic missile defense which is basically defense-oriented capabilities. and also, another reason why we focus on defense is that we are close to the source of threat. you know, we are close to the soviet union, we are close to north korea. we are close to china. we have to defend across the board before we start thinking of strike capabilities. differences, i think the two
forces, u.s. and japan, are now much more closely integrated. so that, i think, is one of the most important differences. for example, in case of ballistic missile defense, we have now installed a ground defense environment which is integrated with the u.s. and japan intervention information-sharing system acquisition. second, in terms of alliance management, the relationship has become a little bit more complicated because of the emergence of --. japan was worried about, you know, in the 1980's, getting entrapped by the wars that the
u.s. might fight with the soviet union on a global level. but we don't have to worry about abandonment because the united states needed us. but now, we certainly sometimes, when the u.s. relationship improves, we kind of start worrying about abandonment and also because the u.s. and china are not in a cold war. right? as it in the soviet case. also, the island is a small island. important for us but not really, doesn't, don't have a really critical strategic importance, so it is more like a symbolic importance that they have. now we are much more comfortable after president obama said, you know, the united states would be willing to defend as part of a treaty of litigation between the countries two years ago.
but you know, japanese planners are a little concerned about that. the u.s. does not have to worry about entrapment by japan in the war. so you know, we have both we have to worry about defending. -- about different things. and, thirdly, and maybe finally, now japan has a much stronger leadership,tical and is interested and willing to undertake in a serious manner and think about and implement policies leading this process of reforming japanese defense policy. i think this is, you know, a good thing for japan because it has accountability and democracy in my country. ms. goto: we have time for two
more quick questions if we can get the gentleman here and tom. >> [inaudible] a problem we did not see during the cold war between the united states and the soviet union. thank goodness the japanese were not provocative. i was wondering whether there were any lessons you could learn from japan so we can adjust our thinking in order to try to dissuade the detergents cycle. mr. michishita: thank you for coming. japan native.
i am a member of the reagan foundation. i have two questions. number one, regarding northern territory. if you know can you comment on , that. because i understand that japan and russia are meeting in may. that is what i heard last week. so, what is the possibility of talking about territory? number two, the marine base in okinawa, i heard they may be moving to guam. can you comment on that? what is going on? what is the progress on that one? are they going to stay? are we moving? thererstand the money is to move for relocation. thank you.
>> you know, you might think that chinese provocation in the vicinity of the island is more serious than what the soviet union was doing. i do not think so. what the soviet union was doing was much more provocative in terms of the capabilities that they had and the aggressive maneuvers they were conducting in the vicinity in the face of our self-defense force assets in the sea and in the air. it was, quite, you know, -- soviets naval vessels frequently pointed guns at us. we make a fuss now, partially because the navy suggested now , this is the information age. we get information very quickly
and easily. we did not know, at least the japanese citizen, know that the soviet destroyer was pointing this done at our vessel. we did not know. so, all of these things, difficulties and provocative action going on, we just had blind eyes. or we could. good news, bad news. we are not informed by the bad news. we kind of feel at peace, that is the good news. and, so, i am not too -- but it is certainly in a way more difficult because we have to defend the island's. because the russians occupied them. we did not have to defend them. it was easy. so, that i think is good news, that we were maintaining
administrative control. in our -- in my opinion, even sovereignty over the islands. bad news, we have to defend them. >> i would like to make a comment. i attended a conference in shanghai about five years ago on united states, japanese, chinese, trilateral maritime relations. in reality, it is not trilateral relationship it was more like two bilateral relationships. this was after the instance of the bumping into the japanese coast guard and chinese fishing vessel. so we had chinese and japanese scholars shouting their papers at each other. what we have is kind of like during world war ii, china and the united states had a very close alliance vis-a-vis japan and during the cold war, japan and the united states had a very tight relationship vis-a-vis the
soviet union and in part towards china, especially during the 1950's and 1960's and early 1970's. i do not recall any situation where china and japan were aligned against the united states. so we had this interesting dynamic. as far as addressing how we deal with china, we must continue to engage. we need to work with china as far as -- [laughter] we work with them on the anti-piracy patrols in the indian ocean off of somalia. we have been working with them on humanitarian assistance operations. they have a fabulous hospital ship. they have been a participant in annual rimpac exercises. that is one way to kind of counter these concerns that we
are trying to do another containment. to bring them into the international community as a full partner. that is something that we have to work hard. i think, in a sense, it is similar to the response about the aercap carrier -- aircraft carrier. we have had 35 years, more or less, of non-cold war and nonmajor hot wars against here -- peer competitors. we have slashed our defense structure, at least united states has, japan somewhat, the europeans in or mislead. we have got used to the fact that we can send naval forces around the world anywhere to do anything. if you decide that you want to go bomb libyans or iraqis, you just do it. you put together a coalition. it all made it look easy and we
are forgetting with the cold war was like. i want to reiterate. there were provocations every day at sea. some of them were enormously dangerous. that is one of the reasons for the sea agreement that gave so -- that dave so brilliantly chronicled and reminded us of all the time. every year the japanese navy does is specific exercise. you would expect if they are keeping the navy current that it would have an exercise. you would expect of -- if it is an ally that you would be invited to join. that happened in increasingly during the 1980's. destroyers and fishing boats that were not really fishing boats and agi's following around each ship and each unit. that was routine. that was not some exciting thing that just happened that would make the newspapers because that
is how we operated. all of the exercises were conducted under the umbrella of soviet anti-ship bombers and followed around by ships on the surface. it does not even account for what happened on ships under the surface. the famous incident off japan in which one of the soviet ships is following too close and rose up under one of the american aircraft carriers and sliced it open and the crew were all excited and they said, we are a sub-getting aircraft carrier. but that could have resulted in serious loss of life. those kinds of incidents took place, unfortunately, routinely. we got out of the habit of it, wonderfully. what is happening now is worrisome, most certainly but it does not even really compare to the things that happened every
day that caused people to sit around and hammer out the agreement that dave has discussed. i want to answer the questions about the marines. i am not an expert so i am not trying to be coy. i simply do not know but i will tell you what i do know, which is vague. there are three divisions of marines and three air wings of marines. the smallest of the three divisions and the smallest of the three air wings is located on okinawa and has been since the 1950's. it is obvious forward position in an advantageous place so the u.s. military likes it there and the marine corps likes it there, the air force likes it there. meanwhile, okinawa has changed. it is not this little island where a few people live and there are fishermen. okinawa is a big place with huge cities, and the cities have grown up around the bases. this is the same thing that has happened all over the world. this has happened on mainland japan, in the united states,
where a naval base or air force base was put out in the woods in the 1920's and now it is surrounded by a giant city. we have this at oceana in norfolk and we have this near san diego. it happened in okinawa, too. those in okinawa do not like various aspects of this. these 19-year-old's marines running around with testosterone, bumping into each other. it does not appeal to them they want the marines out. ok, so marines out. but, a wonderful place. so, a compromise got hammered out several years ago in which -- i will not be clear on this, but i think it is about half of the marines that are currently -- that were currently in okinawa at that time were going to leave and go to places like guam and rotate in and out of australia. there were a number of options explored. other marines were going to remain in okinawa and the ones that remained were going to be
some buying of land, exchanges of land, operations planned in more remote part of the island and so far. the okinawans and marines have never been happy about that. okinawa is such a great location from their standpoint. the american congress says, you are going to build facilities? i think that is great. i think if you are going to build them in the sovereign state of indiana, that would be super. but your not. [laughter] you are going to build them in darwin. we are not going to give you a dime to build them in guam. it is a complex issue and it is still in play. recently, there have been some changes. abe just made a statement which i do not want to paraphrase, because i will get it wrong, but this continues to cook. the japanese government, central
government, traditionally regards the marines in okinawa as an important part to the deterrent and an important contribution to the alliance. they get it. the okinawa people get it, to bank. they have a whole bunch of marines living in an area they would rather they did not live. this continues. this remains a discussion. nobody is shooting at each other and hopefully something will work out that will be satisfactory, at least for a few years before they have to renegotiate something else. i am not being coy, that is about all i know about it. something has recently just happened to perturb an agreement they thought they had over the last couple of years. >> the mayor is being elected. by the way, those islands are part of okinawa. you have to remember that. ms. goto: it is time for us to go our separate ways.
you may be questioning why our speakers did not question each other. there is a reason for that. they actually spent three to four hours last week in a small, windowless room hashing this out. [laughter] now they have reached a peaceful conclusion to their talks. we will be summarizing their findings from that conversation. we hope to have that available online and in print within the next few weeks. those of you who are registered for this will automatically be getting an electronic version of that. i hope you will be able to read that and continued the conversation. i want to thank our three speakers for joining us and i want to thank you all. thank you for coming. [applause]
>> you are watching american history tv. twitter for information on our schedule and to keep up with the latest history news. each week, american artifacts takes you to miss -- takes you to museums and historic places. next, we visit the alexandria apothecary museum located in virginia just outside of wishing to and d.c., which was operated by the same family for over a century. we will learn about what an apothecary does and how medicine has changed over many years. gretchen bulova: my name is gretchen bulova, and i am the director of the stabler-led beater apothecary museum in alexandria, virginia. the museum is owned and operated by the city of alexandria.