tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN April 6, 2016 7:00pm-12:01am EDT
campaign. and the democratic primary. as far as i can tell, the republicans have run an insult-oriented campaign. but make no mistake about it. they are going to do everything they can to take back the white house. and if they get the white house, plus a republican congress, we will not recognize our country. this is one of the most consequential elections. we have to build on the progress that president obama has made and we have got to go further! and, and here's one of those inconvenient facts that you might want to share with your republican friends. our economy does better when we have a democrat in the white house.
i mean, we don't have to go back to ancient history. during the 1990s, under my husband's presidency -- at the end of eight years, we had 23 million new jobs and incomes went up for everybody. not, not just people on the top. middle class families, working families, poor families. the median family income went up 17% in those 8 years. and the median african-american income went up 33% because there were so many jobs. and we ended up with a balanced budget and a surplus. pretty hard to beat that record. but, i'll tell you what. you know, the republicans, you give them credit for consistency. they're consistently wrong when it comes to the economy.
so in comes george w. bush. i was in the senate representing new york. i stood up on the senate floor. i said, they don't want to take us back before the clinton years. they want to take us back before franken roosevelt. they want to take us back before teddy roosevelt. they were slashing taxes, they were absolutely taking their eyes off of the financial markets and the mortgage markets and we know what happened. the worst financial crisis since the great depression. and i don't think president obama gets the credit he deserves for digging us out of the ditch that the republicans put us in. so, beware because they're pedaling the same economic snake oil. trickle down economics all over again.
well, we're not going to let them get away with it. because it may be uncomfortable for them. but we have history, the facts and common sense on our side. so, that's why i want us to build on the progress we've made but go further. and a key to the economy that i imagine that we can create is education. and i think we have to start with early childhood education. when i got out of law school, i went to work for the children's defense fund. and working for children and giving children a chance and evening the odds for every child is really at the core of what i believe we must do. so, for me, making sure that every kid has a chance to fulfill that potential is
critical to our economy, critical to our democracy. and that's why we need universal pre-k and why we need to help kids so that when they get to school they're prepared and ready to actually learn. and when we're looking at elementary and secondary education i want to be a good partner with our nation's public schoolteachers. i want to give them the support that they need. you know, before i came out here i had the incredible honor of meeting a family. a family of a young high school student from here in pittsburgh who went to woodland high school. her name was kali mcdowel. and i met the family because kailey had been a ardant
supporter of mine. she could would come to meet mere me here in pittsburgh, even when she was a lite girl. it was her dream to some day go into politics herself. so tragically, kailey has a disease that wasn't properly treated in the very beginning and she passed away just a few days ago. and the school actually called off -- the school district called off school because she was the kind of young woman that everybody knew and everybody liked. you know, she was popular but she also was kind to the kids who weren't. and the teachers told her parents who i met with, her grandparents, her aunts and uncle, he little brother, that they were sure that kailey would have realized her dreams and i wanted to just mention her because she won't be able to fulfill those dreams for the kind of world, the kind of country she wanted to see.
but every one of us can do our part and for those in education, it is such an important role and i want to be a good partner. and i want to give young people the chance to be able to afford to go to college without drowning in debt. every single young person -- i know we can do this. because right now it's just not fair. it's wrong. too many kids are being shut out. where they start and they can't finish. or they never graduate. not because they're not trying. not because they're not able. they can't afford it. and then if they go get out, they often end up with a huge debt. how many of you have student debt? yeah. exactly.
well, i want to -- i want you to be able to get out from under it so here's what i want to do. in addition to having debt free tuition for people going to college, if you come out with debt, i want you to be able to refinance that debt to save thousands of dollars to get it down just like the way you can refinance a mortgage or a car payment. and we're going to revamp the whole student aid industry because i want more people to have the chance i did because when i got out of law school and i went to work for the children's defense fund i made very little money but i didn't care. i wanted to do that work but i was also fortunate because i was in a plan at this time where i could pay back my debt as a percentage of my income. so even though i was making only $14,000 a year, i could actually afford to rent a place and, you know, all the other things you have to pay for.
i want you to have that chance and then i want to end your debt after a certain number of years, maybe 20 years. you're done. even if you still have unpaid debt ahead of you. and we are going to get the harassing bill collectors out of your life and we're going to end the practice of the government making money off of lending money to kids to go to school. and we are going to continue the work of the affordable care act and make sure we get the cost down and we expand the opportunities under it and take on high prescription drug costs. now, again, everything i've just said republicans don't agree with. and they also want to limit our rights. all of our rights. i want you to know where i stand.
i will defend a woman's right to make her own health care decisions. and i will defend planned parenthood against the partisan attacks that the republicans are throwing at them. and i will defend marriage equality and discrimination against the lgbt community. i will defend voting rights which are under attack by states across our union. and i will do everything i can to either reverse or pass a constitutional amendment to absolutely end citizens united and its corruption on our political system.
i do not believe we should privatize social security. we should fix the problems with the veterans administration. not privatize it. we should keep working for comprehensive immigration reform with a path to citizenship. and we should bring the country together to stand up to the gun lobby to get common sense gun safety reforms. so we have a big agenda and it's important when we imagine that future we want for you to think, okay, who can deliver? you know? there was something called brk
there was something called hillary care, right? i have been in the trenches fighting for opportunity for justice, for fairness, for equality my entire adult life. and i, i am proud to continue that fight because it's at the core of who we are as americans. so we need to stand up and make sure our voices and our votes count. and the second test is can you keep us safe? and here you have to recognize you're voting for a president and a commander in chief. national security -- national security is not an afterthought. it is a core responsibility of the presidency. and it is essential. that we do everything we can to lead the world, to bring it together, to further our interest, advance our values and keep us safe at home.
i was part of the biggest counter terrorism decision in the last decades, the decision to go after bin laden. and as a senator from new york, i wanted to bring him to justice. and so, i advised the president to go forward but the president had to make the decision. and president obama made the right decision. now, finally, the third test is can you bring us together? and, boy, do we need that right now. you know, when i listen to the rhetoric coming out of donald trump's campaign it is deeply disturbing because it is intended to set people against one another.
it is intended to incite prejudice and paranoia. it is even intended to incite violence as we have seen. it is so contrary to who we are and who we must be if we're going to own the future and i intend for our country to own the future, to make the future, to be the future. so let me tell you. i will go anywhere any time, meet with anyone to find common ground. i did it as first lady. i did it as senator. i did it as secretary of state. you know, after we weren't successful on health care reform i got back up and said, okay, what can we do? you always have to look to determine what can we do. that is the progressive tradition. so i worked with democrats and republicans and we created the children's health insurance program. and 8 million children got health care for the first time in many instances.
and when i was in the senate, i worked with i think practically every republican. i worked to find that common ground. sometimes it was only a sliver of ground. but that's our obligation when we're in public life. we don't have the luxury as some do in dictatorships or religious theocracies to say my way or the highway. that's not the way a democracy is supposed to work. so we made progress, sometimes way too slowly to satisfy me and when i was secretary of state i helped to negotiate a nuclear arms treaty with russia, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides which remains the biggest threat, the biggest immediate threat that our world faces. and we got the agreement signed. but we had to get two thirds vote in the senate.
that meant i had to get 13 republicans to vote. and so, i started working on it. i just kept working and working and working. it's kind of a dull, boring but necessary kind of work. you know, you just get up every day and you think, how can i push this forward an inch or two? maybe i can even get six or seven inches if i'm lucky. i got those votes, we got that treaty. the world is safer because we lowered the number of nuclear weapons in russia and the united states. so here is what i'm asking you. i'm asking you to imagine this future with me because i want your support, of course, in this upcoming primary on april 26 but i also will want it if i'm fortunate enough to be the nominee in november. but i'll tell you when i really want it.
i really want it when i'm sworn in as president and we all begin to work together to fix these problems, to make the future haen. so, carnegie mellon, pittsburgh, western p.a. please, come support me on april 26 and i will fight for and support you for the next four to eight years! thank you and god bless you! ♪
♪ this is everything that i have, my family. i got to see my dad die on national tv. they don't know what they took from us. people are dying. we need a president that's going to talk about it. i
believe bernie sanders is a protester. he's not scared to go up against the criminal justice system. he's not scared. that's why i'm for bernie. >> i'm bernie sanders and i approve this message. >> one of the newest messages now on the air in new york media
markets, two weeks before the primary in that state. and joining us from new york city is nick corasantiti following the story for "the new york times." thank you for being with us. >> thank you for having me. >> what's the message in this ad? >> this ad is actually one that was ran by the sanders campaign at a much longer length, a two-minute ad in south carolina with the daughter of eric garner who was the staten isld man who died in an arrest after placed in a choke hold by police officers. she talks about what it was like to watch her father die on national television and her new life as an activist, and after she says that, the ad switches to pictures of senator bernie sanders as a young man in 1963 at the chicago civil rights protests. and she says something that says, i believe senator sanders, or i believe bernie sanders is a protester. and it's trying to make him seem like it's one of us. it's a message both the clinton
campaign and sanders campaign advertising on with outreach to african-american communities. we are one of you. we are with you in this movement for the fight for equal rights for equal treatment. so the underlying message of this ad is when erica garner says i believe bernie sanders is a protester, that's her way of say i believe he's with us in this fight. >> this really sets the stage for a primary in new york that is going to be getting a lot of attention. a lot of media attention. especially in light of today's front page story in "the new york daily news" and the editorial meeting earlier with bernie sanders, guns becoming a very personal issue to new york voters. >> yeah. it will certainly be an issue that will come up in the new york primary and also interesting just to see how the candidate gos from navigating the wisconsin media market to the new york media market. you know, secretary clinton being a senator here is very familiar with new york, very familiar with both upstate and new york city. she knows how to navigate both
the tabloids, major newspapers, networks, has deep connections to upstate and senator bernie sanders while he was a resident of new york city for 18 years in brooklyn, he's not as familiar both to the voters and also with the current state of new york politics and the new york media. so i think you will see from that interview with "the daily news" and a few other ways he's been kind of reintroducing himself to new york is coming from a disadvantage that not being the former senator of new york, not being a person with the foundation office in harlem until 2011. so i think that's going to be part of the initial stages of this new york primary between the two. >> clearly, the candidates want to win but as we saw in wisconsin yesterday, even though hillary clinton lost the state, she still picked up some delegates. so for the sanders campaign, they want to win new york but is it more about the delegate math than anything else? >> well, i think certainly at this point in the race it's about the delegate math just as
much as if not more so as the momentum off a win like the sanders win in wisconsin. i think both campaigns looking at new york has a place to pick up delegates and protect the lead and also kind of keep the race where it is. now, a clinton loss in new york certainly humiliating and frustrating for the campaign, create new worry about, you know, her strength as a candidate within the democratic party. but her campaign is also kind of been saying not directly but hinting at, you know, senator sanders would need a fairly significant delegate win in new york to really start to close the gap. if it's anything like wisconsin and the math is still heavily in the clinton campaign's favor so for new york while senator sanders would love the momentum to keep going, a big part is picking up a ton of delegates and a pretty substantial victory in order to not necessarily keep going but to keep cutting into the lead in a meaningful way.
>> you have been looking at some of the latest polling in new york. what do the polls tell you and how different is it between the city and upstate? >> it is very different and you still see the home state advantage in terms of being a former senator and familiar as a resident recently. she has a lead in most of the polls and she also has a good network built within the state. you know, when she was senator, she was certainly known to new york city and kicked off the campaign with an upstate listening tour. she's made a lot of her campaign platforms off her experience as a senator so her agriculture policy, for example, comes from her experience dealing with new york state farms. she often tells the story on the campaign trail learning there was more than one cow in new york and she became very well aware of the dairy farmers in upstate new york so she has a big, strong network in new york
that goes both from new york city and upstate. now, she obviously will do well in new york city with her reputation among the african-american and of the minority communities. she'll do strong in some of the upstate cities like buffalo and rochester, as well. but because of that senator -- because of her tenure as senator she has a bretty strong base in the rural areas. not to say senator sanders doesn't have any strongholds. a city like ithaca which has a college and cornell university, he does very well in college towns. there are young people moving into new york city that could cut into her lead there. he can cut into the long established roots in new york and new york city. >> we'll look for your reporting online at nytimes.com. nick, following the story for "new york times," thank you for being with us. we appreciate it. >> thanks for having me. during campaign 2016, c-span
takes you on the road to the white house. as we follow the candidates on c-span, c-span radio and c-span.org. c-span's "washington journal" live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up thursday morning, olivia golden, executive director for the center for law and social policy talks about work mandates taking effect in over 20 states and may cause 1 million americans to lose food stamps and then patrick mclaughlin, senior research fellow on the report that ranks 50 states and the district of columbia by the effect of federal regulations on a state's economy and brian lieman, state reporter for the montgomery reporter on articles of
impeachment following reports of an inappropriate relationship with a former staffer. be sure to watch c-span's "washington journal" beginning live at 7:00 a.m. eastern thursday morning. join the discussion. next, a defense department briefing on the u.s.-led fight in iraq and syria against isis. we hear from rear admiral andrew lewis of the joint chiefs of staff who briefed reporters at the pentagon. it's 35 minutes. >> good morning, everyone. glad everyone could be here and today pleased to welcome to the podium rear admiral andy lewis, the joint staff vice director call sign woody and here to give us the counter isil campaign update. if you could, identify yourself when you ask a question and again we'll take as many questions as we can.
we'd like to keep it focused on the counter isil campaign. without further adieu, sir, the podium is all yours. thank you for being here. >> well, good morning. my name is andy lewis, and as the vice director of operators on the joint staff i play a role and am responsible for overseeing the u.s. military's daily operations around the world. this includes global fight against isil and today i'll brief you on the progress our coalition has made in the counter isil campaign, particularly in iraq and syria. as has been stated by the chairman and secretary recently, the military coalition fighting isil has momentum. broadly, the coalition has degraded isil's ability to move freely on did battlefield, has regained significant territory in both iraq and syria and has degraded isil's leadership and resources. there are more than 60 nations
partying in the coalition and more than 20 of our partners contribute combat troops and equipment. although there's certainly still a long road ahead, there's been significant progress. iraqi security forces have begun shaping and isolation operations for retaking mosul. with u.s. and coalition partners supporting them, with air power and other enabling capabilities, we have seen steady progress as the isf continues to recapture territory, to include heat and mock mor 6. these are vital nodes in isil's communication networks both in iraq and syria, and are important steppingstones in isolated mosul. the isf's capabilities continue to grow and their newly trained troops are having a positive impact. in syria, coalition partners seize sha dady and closed off nearly 6,000 square kilometers of isil held territory.
they have cut off key lines of communication between iraq and syria. additionally, we've continued to target senior isil leadership and our successes are degrading their ability to govern and control their forces and territories. coalition air power has had significant impacts on isil in iraq and sir yaen and as our intelligence continues to improve so is our ability to target isil leadership and other high priority targets. this weakens isil an makes them desperate. in fact, we assess that attacks in paris and brussels are not signs of isil strength. but rather, reflection of their distorted attempts to maintain the ability to recruit in the face of the failures on the battlefield. we do not assess that there's a direct correlation but they do demonstrate the twisted lings to which isil will go as it attempts to survive as an organization. rest assured we remain focused and postured across the globe to
degrade, defeat and deny isil safe haichs from which they can operate. there's no hole deep enough in which they can hide and time is not on their side. finally, and before i finish, i'd like to say i come to work each day honored to wear this uniform and serve the tremendous soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who serve our great country over all over the globe. the sacrifices these young americans make are significant but they willingly do so with humility and dignity. they execute the mission presigs necessary and violently when necessary. it's eye watering to be a part of it. thank you for being here today and for helping tell the story to the american public. with that said, i'll take any question you may have. yes, ma'am? >> admiral, lolita with the associated press. thank you for doing this.
one quick question on your pap and then a broader question. we have heard varying percentages over time. can you say based on this isil area of influence map, what percentage of territory has isis either lost or or gained in iraq and in syria over the past year or so? we have heard varying numbers. i'm wondering if you can maybe clear that up a little bit. my broader question is about russia's bombing and fighting activities in syria. can you give us a picture of what you're seeing from russia? we know that some fighters have left, but are there bombing activities by russia starting to make it more difficult for the u.s. to conduct any operations there? does this call for greater con flix? and what are you seeing russia do over the last couple of
weeks? >> yes, ma'am. first of all, in reregards to the percentages of territory regained by -- you know, as i mentioned at the outset, it's momentum as with the coalition. it's shifted. so, a year ago, 18 months ago, the area in which was isil controlled was much larger. i would not come to a percentage decrease but it is -- it is significant. it's a significant -- and when you're talking 6,000 square kilometers in syria alone, that's a lot of space regained by coalition forces fighting in syria and coalition forces fighting in iraq. and as the -- and iraqi forces fighting in iraq. that are retaking isil territory. it is restricted their movement. their ability to lines of communication, you know, between iraq and syria, but also, within iraq and within syria.
so they can't move freely around the battlefield. so, not really a percentage but it's significantly reduced. if you look at -- comparison side by side it's a significant, less bad colors on there. in regards to the russians, what we are seeing is they have a number of fighters, fighter aircraft and other combat capability that has gone back to russia. there is still some there and they are still operating. cease fire operations are ongoing. they're still hiccups in the cease fire that are happening from day-to-day. we are not seeing them move further east at present. and then east of palmyria. we are not seeing that as being a problem to our operations. where we're operationally, where they are fighting against isil,
where they're having an effect against isil, we're -- we like that. outside of that operationally and what their intent is, i'm not qualified to even address that. >> can i just a clarification? you said 6,000 square kilometers. is that the number of kilometers in syria that you believe isis has lost? >> that has -- that coalition forces have regained. >> regained? do you have similar number for iraq? >> i do not have that off the top of my head. yes, sir? >> well, tom bowman with npr. you talked about 20 countries providing combat troops and equipment but not one of those countries is a sunni country. two months ago, secretary carter said he was confident that the saudis and uae would provide special forces to this fight. that hasn't happened yet. also, i understand no trainers from the sunni countries are in
iraq. they're all from european countries. australia. u.s. and canada. so, i guess, are you still hopeful that these countries will send special forces? and why haven't you been able to attract any trainers from any of these sunni countries? >> the dialogue is ongoing with the -- with our leadership, the u.s. leadership and the leadership of sunni countries to try to -- to get -- to try to get participation in those forces to be trainers. to have the special forces operation or thes but at my level and what i've been involved with and what those -- that dialogue continues. but i can't speak to where it is as far as, you know, where we are as far as agreement. >> one trainer from the sunni countries. i mean, you have them from
norway, finland, australia, knew zealand. not one from an arab-speaking country? >> the -- i would -- i'll just say that my understanding and that dialogue that's ongoing with the leadership, with our leadership, i'm not privy to most of the discussions and i'll just leave it at that. >> okay. one more question. there was a strike. can you talk about that? because it's kind of rare for you guys to be bombing that far west. >> i'm not going to talk about that. at this moment. so. yes, ma'am? >> sir, jennifer griffith with fox news. general votel testified to congress that there was no operational plan to retake raqqah. is that still the case? and if so, why not? secondly, if you could talk about the sinai.
there have been some report that is there are plans underfoot to remove forces from the sinai because of concerns of isis in the area and able to protect those troops? where does that stand? are you planning to pull u.s. troops out o the sinai? >> in regards to the first question, ma'am, in raqqah, i think that -- well, first of all, the campaign, counter isil campaign, the military component of the counter isil campaign in iraq and syria, if you look as it less as a simultaneous campaign. iraqi and coalition forces on the ground, they are making the determination on what they are going to isolate and what they're going to take. in accordance with how -- the ebb and flow of activity on the ground. and what we're supporting and what we're training forces to help support and in support of their overall campaign.
objectives. to -- and it's going -- we have the flexibility and to shift focus as directed by the forces that are doing the fighting. so, so it may be that raqqah becomes a focus of effort. may be that mosul becomes a focus and that uncertainty that we have against the enemy or the coalition has against the enemy makes it a much more advantageous situation for us on the ground. >> you wear itting for the local forces on the ground to come up with a plan for raqqah? >> nothing has changed in the overall strategy and support of the coalition in the fight and we are supporting their military plan to execute. >> but isn't it a little strange that a year and a half into this conflict that there is still no plan to retake the capital of the so-called islamic state?
isn't that a little bit slow going? >> i -- i don't think -- i'm not really qualified to answer that question, frankly. in regards to the your sinai question, operationally, you know, we have people there that are committed to the mission. and we -- my focus is making sure that they have the force protection measures in place and we have increased the force protection measures in the -- in the sinai to ensure their maximum safety. >> but are there plans to pull them out? >> i -- those discussions are happening at the -- with -- not the plans of whether to pull them out or not but what that looks like within the u.s. government and within -- within governments of israel and egypt. and on those discussions happening at the very highest
levels. >> can i quickly follow-up of that? i was told that two camps are closed in the sinai. is that accurate? >> no, sir. they have not been closed. there's -- yes, sir? >> jim shutto of cnn. just on the russian presence there, you say there's still hiccups, the russians withdrawn some assets and still doing bombing runs. i wonder if you would characterize it as a significant withdrawal or a symbolic withdraw. is there any operational difference from your perspective? i have a follow. >> operationally, there is a difference because their focus of effort is very refined and but as far as their intent, russian intent overall, i'm -- you'd have to ask the president of russia that. >> if you could arrange that -- just on another topic. i know it's not in iraq or syria but it's in the news today. the south koreans saying that
north korea, it is their belief, has a deployed miniaturized nuclear weapon. the u.s. view is more nuanced on that. operationally, how does it change u.s. operations in that region in terms of protecting allies? >> with keep this -- admiral -- [ inaudible ] >> we have gone to sinai. in the news. >> happy to answer your -- to his benefit, asked him to speak on -- >> yes, ma'am? >> thank you, sir, for doing this. carla bab, voice of america. i have two quick questions. the first is on the border with turkey. what's being down by the coalition to secure the border further and to stop any islamic state gains? we have seen that they have made some gains. and then ramadi and hit. there's been a lot of touting of success with the retaking of
ramadi but i have noticed that they have -- there's also been some losses around hit and ramadi, as well. is this trading territory? are they -- or are they removing fighters from the battlefield or just pushing them outside of the major cities? >> i'll take the second question first. in the area of ramadi, it is not trading territory. it is clearing operations and securing and putting governance in place. there -- it's a dangerous situation still, certainly. but one in which they are -- the iraqi security forces and iraqi police forces are moving in and securing and moving in the right direction. in regards to the border with turkey and syria, the broader coalition, you know, it's a very complicated situation there on the ground with various coalition inputs, to include the turks and our nato ally in
turks. but the -- that situation is, you know, the big takeaway operationally is we are making the coalition is making gains in securing that border because one of the things that we are concerned about is the foreign fighter flow in to syria through that area. so which that is a lot of -- a lot of impact on it but it is -- there are gains being made. yes, ma'am? >> if i may follow up. how are there gains when islamic state is also making some gains? >> i think an aggregate, the gains by the coalition are more than what the islamic state is. yes, ma'am? yes, ma'am? >> thank you. tara cobb with stars and stripes. with fire base bell, could you describe the range of operations the marines there are involved in? are they now getting outside the
base as iraqi forces keep pushing west? and then, as a follow-up to that, could you similarly describe the range of operations against the islamic state in afghanistan beyond, including the air strikes but are there any additional roles for ground forces to fight the islamic state in afghanistan? >> first i'll take your second question first because i'm going to have a short term memory loss but the -- in afghanistan, i think just a couple of days ago afghanistan had -- the command structure within u.s. and support had some specific numbers that they came out with. and so i won't talk to those but i will say that there's been, you know -- you know, i won't name numbers there have been counter terrorism strikes in afghanistan recently. and i know that's of interest in
the public affairs organization here at the secretary of defense's office is working with the press to be as forthcoming as possible as they can with the information. obviously, what we are concerned with is putting our forces at risk and putting the mission at risk by sharing too much. in regards to fire best bell going by another name and the name is -- i can't pronounce right now so i'll just leave it there but the chairman addressed this very succinctly a week ago friday in regards to, you know, well behind the slot and they were -- their mission is to provide fires and support of iraqi forces. just like we do with airplanes. just it's surface to surface fire is vice, air to surface fires. the same concept. very accurate. very -- and we have put force
protection measures in place at fire base bell and strengthened those measures even since the attack on their several weeks ago. yes, ma'am? >> hi. courtney kubie with nbc news. can you explain more that the russian focus of effort is redefined? there were reports that the syrian regime with the russians launched a fierce assault of an area south of aleppo. so that doesn't seem like it's necessarily isis if their mission is more defined. are you seeing they're continuing the support the government's assault on civilians, on opposition forces, on whatnot? and then i have one other question on syria. >> okay. i'll answer that one before you ask the second one. you know, i'm a -- i have four kids so i've always told my kids, you know, actions speak
louder than words. for me to try to figure out or any of us try to figure out about the -- what the russians' intent and what the syrian regime intent is, i'm not -- what i'm referring to as far as their actions and where we're seeing their activity it is confined to a geographical area that is not presenting a problem with our fight. coalition's fight. against isil. if that's clear. >> are they actually striking isis? i mean, like aleppo. what is your assessment of what they were striking -- >> where they're having -- where the concentric circles -- where isil struck by the russians, we will happily accept that from happening. where it doesn't happen, it's -- it is not become a hindrance to our oerngss. that would be -- >> and then if i could just ask one more about your question or tom bowman's question about -- i
was struck by your answer to that because it came out in the cent-com daily round-up of strikes and i think it was their struck a tactical unit and i was curious why you won't -- >> no, no, not at all. it's more more comfort level of talking to the detail about it. and from a -- and just from a standpoint of committing it to memory those details. not anything other than that. that's just -- to be quite honest. that's where i'm coming from. yes, sir? >> joel talbot with -- i would like to ask you if you could provide us with a clear picture about the size of the sdf of the syrian democratic forces. could you confirm that the number runs between 30,000 to 40,000? and also, i have a follow-up on syria, too. >> i don't think that i can
provide you a clear number and i will say that -- i won't even be as will back up and say the coalition and the contributing members of the coalition, which is inclusive of several different groups, is -- i think that range of numbers is probably pretty close. but i think it would be disingenuous for me to come down on a number. >> how much do you think the arab component is among this force, the coalition force? 20%? >> sir, i would be -- i would be -- i would be making something up if i answered. i just don't know. >> okay. you mentioned the significant loss that isil has faced lately.
do you believe that the u.s. and the coalition have reached a turning point in the fight against that group? >> as i stated up front, there is momentum. and i would characterize it as significant momentum. but isil is still a dangerous enemy. and capable of irrational actions that present danger to a lot of innocent people. so have we turned the corner? i don't know if we turned the corner, per se. but i know that we are -- the trend is going in the right direction. and we are committed, the coalition is committed. to accelerating that where we can. and that discussion is happening. >> my last, sir, as you know,
assad regime is pushing isil out and the suburbs. sdf are closing -- are pushing isil from the northern -- the northeastern side of syria. do you believe as a military commander that at a certain point one day you would need to communicate with the assad regime through third channels, for example? >> outside of my aim as a military officer, outside of the operational peace, i would say that those discussions -- diplomatic discussions, political discussions are happening. you know, being played out and alternatives being addressed. but not something that i'm involved with day to day or even at all. yes, sir.
>> going back to -- thomas gibbons, "washington post." going back to strikes that were not on the release. can you speak to the u.s. drone strike that targeted five militants -- al qaeda militants last night? >> i won't speak specifically to that. i will say that the authorities to strike aq have stayed in place. and we continue to execute those strikes. >> second follow-up unrelated to the -- related to the syria train and equip, there's been reports coming out of theater of a lot more u.s. equipment flowing to syrian -- free syrian army divisions that we previously haven't worked with in the past, division 30, but now there's pickup trucks, heavy machine guns, mortars. have we changed how much we're
equipping the syrian rebels that we support? >> the easy answer to that is no. what -- how we are equipping is -- it is transactional dependent. in other words, whatever force that we are supporting with equipment, their stated objectives on the ground -- we provide those -- that equipment that they can execute that mission. then we -- you know, we evaluate it at the end of it. it's not -- it's not an unfettered support of arms and supplies. >> but are we supplying people that we haven't supplied in the past with that transactional agreement? >> no. i don't think we're supplying as a group, no. we're not doing anything -- we're not supplying people
different groups overall any differently than we were in the past. okay. yes, ma'am. >> wn't to go back to -- just for purposes of efficiency i will can a call it fire base. have there been any other bases put up since that time? should the american public expect future compounds will appear in iraq and/or syria? >> subsequent to fire base bell -- it's dependent upon what's happening on the ground and in the campaign -- the military campaign. so this is -- you know, as that -- as iraqi force -- security forces progress toward isolating mosul, there may be a
situation in which there is another base or -- that is opened or reopened from years past that would be used in the same manner as a fire support base. >> has that happened yet? >> not to my knowledge. >> then there are reports emerging that anbari was killed. does the u.s. have any idea whether he has been kill order struck? >> i can't confirm that. i can't confirm that. yes, ma'am. go ahead. >> the last thing is you talked a lot about territorial losses that isis has suffered. you also mentioned that isis routinely will strike almost immediately when it suffers such losses to signal that it has not been debilitated. i would like to know if you have a sense of how much of a backlog
or an estimation of that backlog in terms of strikes, particularly in the west, that they have sort of in stock? because i think it will help understand or address how the t territory loss might not be mitigating strikes on western targets. do you have a sense in terms of how much of a backlog they have? >> if we had -- if we had a sense of that, we would stop it. now. but we don't. i mean, there's -- there is a -- there is a -- this is not a rational actor that behaves like we would behave or like common, decent people would behave. to be able to -- to be able -- we're constantly di lly dill ll looking for these type of attacks throughout the globe. but where we have an estimate on
what's cooking right now, i don't think we do. >> could you address broadly then when isis loses territory, how much is that limiting their ability to conduct, to plot, to train and to commence strikes as long as they hold on to places like raqqah and mosul where the number of foreign fighters have come in and trained and some n so in some cases gone back to europe? >> i'm sorry. can you repeat the question? >> i'm trying to understand is when you lose places -- when isis loses places like some of the other smaller towns, as long as they hold mosul and raqqah, are they not then able to continue to pose a significant threat to the west? how much does it matter if they continue to hold places like raqqah and mosul given that that's where most of the training of foreign fighters have gone through, those two
places? >> no. it degrades it. it degrades significantly. it degrades their ability to move freely on the battlefield. we are taking away their mobility and their agility on the battlefield, the coalition is. so that -- it does degrade. does it reduce it to zero? no. but it definitely degrades it. yes, ma'am. >> if you could move back to the microphone so we make -- >> sorry. >> thank you so much. >> i had to make eye contact. >> i wanted to just go back on the issue of raqqah. i was very struck by the president yesterday saying -- quoting him, he said, we should no longer tolerate the kind of positioning that is enabled by them having headquarters in raqqah and mosul. if the sort of guidance is not to tolerate the positioning of
isis to have raqqah as its headquarters, can you go back over the pentagon's thinking, the pentagon's status of this? is there an operational plan then to get isis out of raqqah? even if you can't say what the plan is. where are you on getting them booted out of raqqah? >> what i can say is the president provided -- asked the secretary of defense and the chairman to work on accelerants in the -- to accelerate the campaign against isil. and those options of being -- are being discussed and being plan planned with the leadership and the department. and what -- those options haven't been brought -- you
know, they are being discussed also with the president. and giving him options to address that. and those specific -- obviously, those options are being addressed with our coalition partners in iraq and, of course, our partners in syria. because ultimately, our overall strategy of fighting is support to those fighting those on the ground. >> do you -- do you have an operational plan yet to get isis out of raqqah? >> i can't answer that question. i'm not qualified to answer. yes, ma'am. >> one last qualifying -- >> last question. >> do we know why the base was renamed?
>> you know, i have -- i do flow why but i can't remember why right now. i'm sorry. i will take -- okay. >> the cap level of american troops in iraq, the fml is 3870. it's come out that the numbers are higher because of tdy or other temporary assignments as you call them. can you explain what the joint staff's thinking is or what do you define as a tdy in theater and what is the actual number of american troops there in iraq right now? >> this is -- >> what kind of troops are actually being sent under this kind of assignment? >> this is a pretty easy one to answer because the chairman answered this exact question here a week and a half ago. and he answered it in that the rules that we use in the process we use is the same one we have used for 15 years now as far as
fml, boots on the ground. things like swap outs of troops, we don't double count. things like security force -- military security forces for embassy personnel, that doesn't count toward fml. and then there's periods of tdy time that in the business rules, if you like -- we know there's more than 3750 in iraq in any one time. but it's all being done in the -- along the lines of the business rules. so i think the chairman answered it better than i just did. that's essentially what he said. >> is it 1,000 more than -- >> i can't say. i don't know. to be honest with you. thanks. >> thank you.
coming up on c-span3, u.s. cyber commander admiral mike rogers testifies before the senate armed services committee. then defense secretary ashton carter talks about changes to the dod command structure. after that, supreme court oral argument in betterman versus montana regarding the right to a speedy trial. later a look at the fur of ture nasa's space exploration program. next, u.s. cyber commander admiral mike rogers dismisses the notion that america can combat isis propaganda on the internet by shutting it down. admiral rogers testified before the senate armed services committee on the nation's cyber security infrastructure. this is just over two hours.
>> good morning. the committee meets today to receive testimony from admiral mike rogers, commander of u.s. cyber command, director of the national security agency and chief of the central security service. a lot of titles, admiral. that's good. thank you for your many years of distinguished service and for appearing before this committee today. threats to our national security and cyberspace continue to grow in speed and severalty. new attacks appear in the headlines on an increasingly frequent basis as nation states, creme nal organizations and terrorists seek to leverage technology to steal, coerce and deter. when you appeared before this committee in september, admiral rogers, you noted that we, quote, have competitors in cyberspace and some of them
have, quote, hinted that they hold the power to cripple our infrastructure and set back our standard of living if they choose. since that hearing, russia has demonstrated the ability to cut power to hundreds of thousands of people in central and western ukraine. this attack, the first confirmed successful cyberattack on a large scale power grid, is terribly significant as it demonstrates the sophisticated use of cyber weapons as a destabilizing capability and an effective deterrence tool. with russia, china and other potentialed aver sayretys developing capabilities intended to deter us along with our friends and allies, we must develop not only an effective deterrence policy but also the capabilities necessary to deter any nation seeking to exploit or coerce the united states through cyberspace. after significant urging by this committee, i believe the defense department has recognized this
need and progress has been made at cyber command. there's a lot of work to do. for most part, the services appear to be on track to meet the goal for the development of a 6,200 person cyber force. but unless we see dramatic changes in future budgets, i'm concerned that these well trained forces will lack the tools required to protect, deter and respond to malicious cyber behavior. in short, unless the services begin to prioritize and deliver the cyber weapons systems necessary to fight in cyberspace, we're headed down the path to a hollow cyber force as it would be unacceptable to send a solder to battle without a rifle, it's unacceptable to deprive our cyber forces the basic tools they need to execute their missions. some service budgets omitted funding for even the most basic tools like those necessary for cyber protection teams to assess
and triage a compromised network. this is unacceptable. i look forward to hearing your assessment of the milequipping the cyber force. i look forward to hearing whether the new acquisition authorities we provided cyber command in the fiscal 2016 ndaa will help address some of the service induced shortfalls. while i'm encouraged by some of the progress, i remain concern that the cyber policy as a whole remains detached from reality. for years our enemies have been setting the norms of behavior in cyberspace while the white house sat by hoping the problem will fix itself. in december, the administration provided its response nearly a year and a half late to this committee's requirement for a cyber deterrence policy. the response reflected a troubling lack of seriousness
and focus as it simply reiterated many of the same pro noupsmentes from years past that have failed to provide any deterrent value or decrease the vulnerability of our nation in cyberspace. i applaud the recent efforts of the justice department to name and shame iran for its cyberattacks against our critical infrastructure and financial sector. but again i remain puzzled as to why it took nearly five years after iran began attacking u.s. banks for the administration to begin doing so. that kind of indecisiveness is antithetical to deterrents and our nation simply cannot afford it. let me close by thanking you admiral rogers for your leadership at cyber command. you have always been very candid and forthcoming before this committee. and we appreciate that very much. we're finally beginning to field the cyber capabilities we need as we confront the challenges
ahead, this committee remains committed to doing everything we can to provide you and the men and women you lead with the tools necessary to defend our nation in cyberspace. i look forward to your testimony. senator reed. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i too would like to welcome admiral rogers back to the committee. thank you, sir. and to express my gratitude to you but also to the men and women that you lead, military and civilians who work to secure the department of networks, support the combat and command in cyberspace and defend the nation against major seib area tacks. cyber command is at another set of crossroads. the committee received testimony last fall from multiple witnesses recommending elevation of cyber command to a full unified command. i understand that elevation has been discussed by the joint chiefs and that the secretary is considering this recommendation as part of a reform effort. i would like to hear in your testimony and your commends your views on the readiness of the command for elevation and on the
related issue of sustaining the dual arrangement under which the commander of cyber command is the director of the national security agency. six years after cyber command was established, the military services are just now presenting trained military cyber units to command. a little more than half of the planned units have reached initial operational capability. this is a major milestone. trained individuals are one part of military readiness. the other pieces are unit level training and proficiency and equipping the forces. the defense department is only at the beginning phase of building a unit level training environment. there are shortages and capability shortfalls in the tool kits available for the teams and the department has not yet developed a plan for a selected service agent to acquire situational awareness and command and control systems. i look forward to a status report from you about the pace
of progress in these areas. there are other foundational challenges. the department has deploy and is in the process of acquiring additional capable cyber security sensors at all layers of its networks from gateways to the millions of individual computer across the globe. cyber command has dozens of cyber protection teams asigned to defend key segments of our networks while the military services and the defense information system agency have their own commuter network defense organization. a major task is to integrate the sense sores and organizations under joint operational concepts to enable real time work. i will be interested in your thoughts open this very difficult igs. i am pleased that cyber command is joining the initiative to leverage the innovation of the commercial information technology industry for both cyber security and its other missions. to keep pace with a changing threat, it makes sense to parter in with an industry that innovates at the same pace.
i'm interested in hearing how you plan to working with the information technology sector in particular. finally, mr. chairman, i would note that admiral rogers in his prepared statement quoted the dre director of the national intelligent and that whether china's commitment of last september moderates its espionage remains to be seen. it is a very serious matter if china does not live up to the president's pledge to president obama. again, i would be interested in your comments, sir, on this issue. thank you for your service. i look forward to your testimony. >> admiral roger ez, welcome be a. >> thank you. members of the committee, i am pleased to appear before you to discuss the opportunities and challenges facing u.s. cyber command. i would like to thank you for convening this forum. it's an honer to represent the
individuals of this fine organization. i'm grateful and humbled by the opportunity to lead this impressive team. i'm confident you would be proud of the men and women of u.s. cyber command if you saw their commitment to mission and hard earned successes on a daily basis as i am fortunate to do. while my written statement goes into detail, i would like to highlight the challenges we face in today's environment. and some of the initiatives the command is pursuing to meet those challenges. over the last year, we have seen an increase of cyberspace operations by state and non-state actors. we have seen a wide range of malicious cyber activities aimed against government and private sector. at u.s. cyber command, we focus on actors that pose a threat to our national interest through cyberspace. nations still represent the gravest threat to security. but we continue to watch closely for signs of non-state actors making significant improvements in their cyber cape bills. malicious actors use cyberspace to steal intellectual property
and personal information and criminals use of ran so many wear to export companies is a worry sp trend. malicious actors have intruded in the networks ranging from the joint staffs unclassified networks to networks controlling inf infrastructu infrastructure. they are using cyberspace to shape potential operation ways view to limiting our options. despite this challenging environment, u.s. cyber command continues to make progress as emphasizes shifts to operationalizing the command and sustaining its capabilities. over the past year, we have continued building capability and capacity of cyber command while operating at an increased tempo. we continue to make progress in building a cyber mission force of the 133 teams that will be built and fully operational by 30 september 2018. today we have 27 teams that are operational and 6 that attained initial operational capability. it's important to note that even teams that are not fully operational are contributing to
our cyberspace efforts with nearly 100 teams conducting cyberspace operations today. for example, the command continues to support u.s. central command's efforts to degrade and defeat isil. last year, we noted we had just established the joint force headquarters dod information networks. today i can proudly report it has made great strides towards its goal of leading the day to day security and defense of the department's data and networks. also as the dod expands the joint information environment, we will have significantly more confidence in the overall security and resilient of our systems. our operations to defend d to dw networks and the nation's critical infrastructure proceed with pay host of federal industry and international partners. recognizing that d do is just one component of the nation cyber team, u.s. cyber command's annual exercises, cyber flag and guard offer unmatched realism as we train with federal, state industry and international
partners. additional, cyber mission teams are regular participants in the exercises of all the combatant commands. we need to persist in a training environment when the department is continuing to develop to gain skills and to sustain readiness across our force. i'm excited by the innovation, shift and focus on long term strategy that's emerging in the command and dod. we established a partnership program in silicon valley to link command personnel to some of the most innovative minds. a program is aligned and co-located with the department's defense innovation unit oec experimental. we are building on the synergy among all elements. last september, the department identified the need to transform dod's cyber security culture by improving individual per to form answer and acount built. the second and chairman approved the dod cyber security culture and compliance initiative to
address those concerns. cyber command was identified as the mission lead for this initiative and is working closely with the joint staff and osd to build a requisite capacity and structure. cyber command is also actively contributing to the implementation of the new d do cyber strategy. the strategy released in april of 2015 provides a detailed plan to guide the development of dod cyber forces and strength dod cyber defense and cyber det deterrence posture. the purvervasive nature of cyberspace through all is he fa sets of alive and across boundaries coupled with a growing cyber threat makes deterrence in cyberspace a challenge. but ever more important. a proactive strategy is requires that offers options to the president and secretary of defense to include integrated cyberspace operations to deterred aver varies from action and to control escalation. to help with all of this, we requested and received enhanced acquisition and manpower authority. i thank congress and the president for the awizations
granted and the physical year '16. this represents a significant augmentation of our ability to provide capabilities to our cyber mission teams as well as our ability to attract and retain a skilled cyber work force. we are currently studying how to best implement the provisions and laying the groundwork needed to put them into affect while in parallel involving a formalized singization framework. we that, thank you for convening this forum and inviting me to speak. >> thank you. general dempsey was asked about our ability to address challenges to this country. he basically -- he stated that we have significant advantages in every major challenge except one, and that was cyber. do you agree with general dempsey comment about a year ago? >> i do. the phrase i use internally with him is cyber is one area we have to acknowledge that we appear
competitors who have every bit as much capacity and capability as we do. >> that i would say to my fellow members of the committee emphasizes our need to address this issue in a comprehensive fashion. so after we finish the defense bill, i would -- i will spend a great -- this committee will spend a great deal of its time on this issue since the threat is as admiral rogers stated. you stated last year in the house hearing, there is uncertainty about how we would characterize what is offensive and what is authorized. again, that boils down ultimately to a policy decision and to date we have tended to do that on a case by case basis. in other words, do we -- if we respond, how do we respond? all of those -- it seems to me, our policy decisions have not been made. is that correct?
>> i guess, chairman, the way i would describe it is we clearly still are focused more on an event by event particular circumstance. and i think in the long run, we're clearly we all want to try to get to is something much more broadly defined and well understood. >> so that you understand, when you detect an attack or as the -- or detect a probable attack, so right now you are acting on a case by case basis? >> sure. >> does russia have the capability to inflict serious harm to our critical infrastructure? >> yes. >> does china have the same capability? >> some measure of the same capability, yes. >> how is china's behavior evolves since the opm breach? >> we continue to see them engage in activity directed against u.s. companies. the question we need to ask is, is that activity then in turn
shared with the chinese private industry? we acknowledge states engage in the use of cyber as a tool to gain access and knowledge. the question or issue we have always had with the chinese is while we understand we do that formations to generate insight, using that to generate economic advantage is not something that's acceptable to the u.s. >> do you agree that the lack of deterrence or repercussions for malicious cyber behavior emboldens those seeking to exploit the u.s. through cyber? >> yes. >> eadmiral, we are looking at consolidation of command here as far as your responsibilities are concerned. i believe that the secretary of defense will also support such a move. so i will be recommending that the committee that we include that consolidation in the defense authorization bill as we
mark up. i think my friend senator reed also agrees with that. would you agree that probably the issue of cyber warfare is the least understood by all of our leadership, including in government executive and legislative branch? >> it's certainly among the least understood. i think that's a fair -- >> is part of this problem is that this challenge is rapidly evolving? >> i think that's clearly an aspect of it. the speed and the rate of change as well as the complexity. it can be intimidating. i would be the first to acknowledge that many people find this a very intimidating mission area. >> if you had a recommendation for this committee and congress as to your significant two or three priorities, what would you recommend? >> in terms of cyber overall?
>> action that you would like to see the congress and the executive branch take. >> i think we clearly need to focus on ensuring that we have got our defensive house in order and that we're able to defend our systems as well as our networks. we need to think beyond networks into individual -- >> which means policy. please, go ahead. >> secondly, we need to continue to generate the complete spectrum of capabilities to provide options for our policy makers as well as our operational commanders. so when we have these issues, we have a series of capabilities that we can say, here is capabilities that we can choose from. and then lastly, i think we have just got to -- the other point i try to make is, we've got to figure out how to bridge across not just the dod but the entire u.s. government with the private sector about how we're going to look at this problem in an integrated national way. >> would you also agree that sequestration could threaten you with a hollow force after you
have recruited and -- some of the brightest minds in america to help you? >> very much so. i would highlight in fy-13, i can remember going -- i was in a different job at the time. but still i was doing -- leading the navy cyber effort. as much of my work force explained to me why we should stay with you if this is what we're going to have to deal with on a periodic basis, being told we're furloughed, we're not going to get paid. i can remember telling them in '13, please stay with us. i hope this is a one-time thing. >> sequestration means further hamper -- >> further because -- everything is -- our ability to meet time lines we have been given have been predicated on sustaining of this. i will not be capable of generating that capability in the timely way that right now we're on the hook to do. >> senator reed. >> thank you, mr. chairman. one of the issues that has been discussed and mentioned in my
opening statement is raising cyber command to a full unifies command. and yet i also noted and you acknowledge that only half the cyber command newly formed cyber mission is initially capable to ioc. and then some critical elements such as training environment, uniform platform doesn't exist. are you in your mind mature enough to be a full uniformed command now? >> yes. >> and what would that advantage give you? or what would that decision give you? >> whethn we think -- what tend to drive should something be elevated? across the department, we tnd to focus on the impairties of of command and unity of effort and in -- it would be fungal not geographic. in this case, does the function rise to a global level and is it of sufficient priority to merit coordination across the entire
department. the other issue i would argue is one of speed. all of those argue -- again, i just am one input. i realize this is a broader decision than just admiral rogers. there's many opinions that will be factored in. my input to the process has been a commander designation would allow us to be fast he which would generate better mission outcome. the department's processes of budget prioritization, strategy, policy are all generally structured to enable direct combatant commander into the process. that's what they are optimized for. i believe cyber needs to be a part of that direct process. >> the other aspect, obviously, is the relationship with nsa. there are several options. one is to have separate command. or one option or additional option is to at least at a future time have the option to
divide the dual hat arrangement. can you comment on that? >> so, my recommendation has been for right now you need to leave them dual hatted. part of that is the premise that we built cyber command on, we created it six years ago, where we said to ourselves, we're going to maximize the investments that the nation had made in nsa in terms of infrastructure and capability. so because of that, we didn't have a huge military construction program, for example, for cyber command and put the forces, the 6,200 in different structures. we said we were going to take nsa's existing spaces to do that. so my input has been for right now, based on the very model we created cyber command, where we really in many ways very tightly aligned these two organizations, that a the occcurrent time -- n impossible. it would be difficult or less than optimal in my opinion to try to separate them now. but what i have also argued is we need to continue to assess that decision over time.
you need to make it a conditions based assessment as to at some point in the future does it make more sense to do that. >> part of that is the fact that if you are a unified command, you will be developing alternatives to nsa capabilities. >> yes. >> exclusive to cyber command so that at some point you could have an infrastructure that looks like nsa and the synergies you are talking about now operational. >> yes, sir. >> one of the issues is that -- you depend upon the services to provide you a great deal of resources. in fact, it's really i think interesting to note that only half of these identified units are released initially capable. and that there doesn't seem to be an intense training effort that's standardize and in place right now. what can you do -- what can we do to accelerate these units in
terms of their maturity and their training environment? >> so if i could, senator, i'm going to respectfully disagree. >> that's quite all right. you have to be respectful. >> remember, we started this build process in fiscal year '13. we said we would finish it by the end of fiscal year '18. ready to fight in a high demand environment. we're pretty much on track, as i have said publically. if you look right now -- in fact in the last two months, i have managed to increase timeliness since the last assessment i did in february where i publically had said based on the data as of the first of february, i believe that we will meet ioc for 91% of the teams on time and that we will meet foc for 93% of the teams on time in the two months since then we're up -- i managed to work with the services and for ioc we're up to 95% of the
force. for foc we're at about 93% of the force. so my only point is, i'm not critical of the services in terms of their generating the force. i think they are making a very good effort and it's on track. it's not perfect but it's on track. they have also been very willing when i have said what we need do is ensure that we have one integrated joint capability how we work cyber. there has to be one structure, one training standard. every service agreed to adhere to that. in that recogard, i'm comfortab. what i think the challenge for us as i look over the next few years is we initially focus on those mission teams and the men and women and their training. what experience is teaching is not unlike other domains is -- as you both chair and ranking member said in your opening statements, that's not enough. so what finding now is it's the other things that really help enable that we have to focus more on.
>> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral rogers, in december of last year you published an article saying a challenge for the military cyber work force. and you discussed as did you in your written statement today that the importance of growing and developing and maintaining this force. when you talked about it -- i guess it was the chairman in his statement, the 123 teams, where you are right now and aiming to 133, what comprises a cyber team? >> they come in several different types. there's what we call combat and command mission teams. those are aliligned with commanders. they are designed to create offensive capability, if you will. there are cyber protection -- those are about -- that team
ccmt teams, they are about 65 individuals on a team. if you look at cyber protection teams, slightly different mission. so different structure, different focus. they are at about 39 individuals per team. each of those two teams has a small subset of 23 individuals on what we call support teams. that just gives you a sense. >> sure. when you add all that together, that's when you come up with the 6,187. >> yes, sir. >> as was brought out in the chairman's statement, you would really have to know -- first of all, you are drawing from institutions that are training these people. this is new. this is brand-new to a lot of people, including a lot of people at this table. i know that in my state of oklahoma, the university of tulsa has really made great progress -- in fact your predecessor was out there and working with them. i understand from senator
rounds, similar things happening in south dakota. you have these kids out there. they are learning this. they are choosing -- they are determining what they will do for a career. i think it's a good question whether you say -- when we ask the question, can we depend on sustaining in this environment that we're in this -- these teams, this number, this work force so that individuals out there would be aiming their talents toward helping us? because there's going to be a lot of competition for these kids. how confident are you that we're going to be able to maintain the level necessary to attract good people? >> so experience to date says we're doing a good job in that regard. both of our ability to recruit and retain. what drives that our experience suggests is the desire of men and women, whether civilian or in uniform, to be part of something bigger than themselves. to do something that matters and
do something on the cutting edge. that is really what powers the men and women of the teams. i'm always talking to the -- my f fellow indicators, what should we look at that will tell us that trend is changing? there are skill sets within the force that i mention separately that i may in fact come back to the committee with to say, look, there may be some -- >> that would be a good thing to do, come back. i'm running out of time. i agree with you whether you say that the states -- that we watch most closely remain russia, china, iran and north korea. at the same time, i notice that there is an effort -- this came when our fbi director james comey was in contact with these people -- that they were -- china is trying to develop a
closer relationship with us when, in fact, they're the ones that we're going to be watching. you are not entertaining any kind of a close relationship with them that might impair that? >> no, sir. >> okay. good. yesterday in the -- an article came out that says the pentagon doesn't know who is in charge for responding to a massive seib area tack. they go on to talk about the northern command. they talk about what we are doing. they are talking about homeland security. you are familiar with this report that came out yesterday? >> no, i'm not. i'm familiar with the broad premise. >> okay. the conclusion of the report -- i will read this. it says, we believe that by issuing or updating guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities of relevant dod officials, dod will be in a better position to plan for and support civil authorities in a cyber incident.
this is a goa report. i suggest that you look at that and see if we have reached their conclusion so far. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, admiral for being here and the work you do. irpree i appreciate it very much. we face terrorist threats and all the underlying. nearly every briefing about our national security i have asked about the issues of cyber security. and protecting our power grids. it's a very important issue to me and the power that our state produces for this country. in the short-term, which cyber threat is most dangerous to the united states? i guess in our grid, our food supply, our water supply? what is most vulnerable that we should be working on? >> power and basic
infrastructure is something that always concerns me because the potential impact on the nation is very significant should we have significant issues there. i would also argue one sector that i worry about a little bit is, you look at the amount of personally identifiable information that is out there in a lot of areas. healthcare is a good example where the amount of data that we have all provided to the medical world that is available out there on all of us and our families, that worries me about -- that's reflected -- you look at opm, look at the anthem health insurance, large data concentrations are now increasingly become an attractive target. because of big data analytics, massive amount of data that we said no one could comb through that to generate insights or find anything, it's too long, you sure don't have those conversations anymore. >> we talk about cyber, we keep
talking about basically our corporate hacking, if you will. for proprietary reasons. look at the military hacking that goes on for our defense reasons. then you look at just everyday life that we have come to expect that could be probably disrupted with quite an alarming -- >> yes, sir. >> alarming concerns. the other thing -- in your testimony you mentioned the reserve forces are being assigned to all levels of u.s. cyber command. and cyber mission forces. can you elaborate on the national guard, what they bring to the table for the cyber mission? >> well, you are able through our guard and reserve teammates, you are able to access a set of manpower that potentially is using these same skill sets in their day to day work in the private sector. you are able to also access at times a very different
perspective which works out very well, which is one reason why as we were creating this, we were adamant from the beginning it needed to be viewed as a total force. that if we were just going to make this an active only component, that was not going to optimize the full range of capabilities that are out there. so you have seen in the last six months in particular the guard and reserve capability starting to come online and flesh out as well. >> the thing that i'm saying is i have -- the national guard in west virginia, we don't have a base. our guard is everything to us. being a former governor, i understand the importance of our guard. we have been so active is basically an aggressive recruiting and some of our best and brightest and young empeoes coming into the guard for opportunities, especially educational. they can pinpoint for to you bring in some of the really sharp young talents that could help us in defending ourself cyber. >> this is -- the guard is doing
now. >> okay. >> i spend a lot of time talking about lou do we do this in an integrated way. >> again -- the other thing -- in your fem ytestimony you say sas is focused on propaganda. you can elaborate on this and how they have been successful. >> they have harnessed the power of the information arena to promulgate their ideology on a global basis. to recruit on a global basis. to generate revenue and to move money as well as coordinate some level of activity on a large basis. the challenge i look for or that concerns me when i look at the future is what happens if the non-state actor, isil being one example, views cyber as a weapon system? that would really be a troubling
development. >> in a very simplistic way, people ask why can't we shut down that part of the internet? why can't we interrupt isis' ability to go on social media and attract? why are we not able to infiltrate that more? >> i mean, i would -- the idea that you just are going to shut down the internet given its construction and complexity is just not -- >> i've had people ask me, can't you stop that area of world where the problems are coming from, whether it be in syria or in parts of iraq or iran. things that we might have some input and control over. it's not possible? >> it's just not that simple. i wish i could say there's a pafrt i object part of the internet used by a specific set of users. >> i'm trying to find an answer. that question is asked quite a bit. shut her down, turn off your telephone, but it doesn't work that way. thank you for your service.
>> thank you for your service. you are i believe the right person at a very challenging time. you are in the middle of some decisions that have to be made by the united states as sooner rather than later. our congress passed -- carl levin was chairman then. they evaluate vulnerability of our systems and to issue a report to how to defend those. that time passed. but we have issued another legislation last year that said the secretary of defense shall in accordance with the plan complete an evaluation of the cyber vulnerabilities of each major weapons system of the department of defense not later than december 31, 2019. so we have given an additional date there. but not later than 180 days
after the date of of this enactment which i would believe would be play this year. the department -- the secretary of defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the plan of the secretary for the evaluation of major weapon systems, including an identification of i'm system to be evaluated an estimate of the funding requires and priority among the evaluations. are you familiar with that? are we on track to -- is the defense department on track to complete that initial report? >> i am familiar with it. i'm sorry i am not in the weapon acquisition business. so i'm not the best informed as to the current status. i know the effort is ongoing because u.s. cyber command is part of that. if i could take that one for the record. i apologize. >> if you would. this has been going on some time. on a bipartisan basis, congress recognized several years ago that our weapon systems -- it started out for space, missiles
and anti-missile systems being evaluated. then we realized, large segments of our defense capability are vulnerable. we have had a broader report. i believe it is important for the secretary to complete this on time if not sooner. i would hope that would you look at that. in light of chairman mccain's questions and senator inhofe's questions, i would refer to this goa report that just came out. the first line of this article is, quote, the pentagon does not have a clear chain of command for responding to massive cyberattack on domestic targets in the united states according to the federal government's principal watchdog goa. does that concern you? >> first of all, i haven't read the report. so i'm not informed as to its specifics. i mean, i would argue, i'm always concerned about a clear chain of command and clear articulation of responsibilities. >> it lists a number of things
that appear to be unclear in how we respond. the chairman asked you when do we -- aren't we going to need to develop a policy for how to respond to attacks and what we might do in response and how to ratchet up responses relevant to the threats we face. i hope that you would look at that. with regard to worldwide situation as commercial and economic as private companies that are a big part of the entire network of cyber worldwide, many of those impact our allies, other friends and many of those could -- many companies could be based in countries that are not friendly to us. and would like to penetrate our systems. are you concerned that all of our allies, asia, europe need to
be aware of this danger? and are we working to make sure that segments of those systems aren't purchased or impacted by entities that could be hostile to our joint interests? >> i share your concern about supply chain vulnerability. >> that's a good word, supply chain vulnerability. >> and it is growing in probability, if you will. given the nature of the economic world we're living in now. we have a process within the u.s. government to address these issues for major purchases, companies, national security priorities. we have a specific process in place for some components of dod infrastructure like the nuclear world, for example. if you look at its proliferation of the issue generally across both our allies and ourselves, this is an issue that's going to get tougher.
>> could go on for decades. do we need to meet with our allies to develop a unified policy to protect our joint systems? >> it is a discussion we have with our allies. it's much -- as you said, this goes across the commercial sector, dod, government at large. it's out there for all of us. >> well, i thank you for your leadership. it will be a lot of challenges like that in the months to come. you are at the focal point of a critical issue. i lhope you will not hesitate t lead and tell us what we need to do to help you. >> roger that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral rogers, i need some clarification of what your responsibilities are in cyber command. are you responsible for protecting this country from cyberattacks on private networks and corporations or is it simply government? >> dod lahas a responsibilitieso
defend against events of significant cyber consequence. >> for example, if may we had three urgent care centers that were hacked. we had main general health, one of our healthcare. they were hacked is that part -- what's the defendant anythiinit critical infrastructure? >> there are 16 seg toctors. the second component of the definition i gave you is not just the sector that was attacked, so to speak. but also the magnitude of the event. dod, we use the phrase significant cyber consequence. the concern being that the department of defense is not resources nor is it tasked with defending every single computer structure within the united states. so we try to identify where can our finite resources be best applied? so they are focused on the 16
segments designated to the nation's infrastructure. then tripped in those circumstances in which the actions against one of those 16 segments reaches significant cyber consequence. >> in i mean we're being hacked every day in insurance companies, businesses, some of it is cyber espionage but some a criminal. we need to think who is responsible. i understand you don't call out the army, if there is a criminal in one town. you have local police, but there is a gap here. do you see what i'm saying? >> yes, sir. >> there is a gap in our defense because we really don't have the infrastructure of the state police or local police that would protect local interests when they are being attacked and you have the expertise. we have to work out something as between cyber command and local law enforcement, if you will, to
protect us from these repeated and continuous and escalating attacks. >> although, if i could, just to think more broadly, i think the challenge is how do we harness the capacity and capability that's resident in the government structure, contained with the capabilities that are resident in the private sector? it's much bigger than just, don't get me wrong, we're definitely part of this but i urge people we got to think much more broadly -- >> i think that's a good way to articulate it. don't -- we keep talking in these hearing, when will we have a well developed and articulated strategy and i emphasize the word articulate. it's not detour rans but we need definition what is an act of war, what is a mutually assured destruction situation. this seems to me is this in the works and if so, when?
>> sir, i don't have a date for you. that's well beyond the missions of u.s. cyber command. i'm part of the discussions. i'm the first to acknowledge that. i try to provide an input and be one voice what i think is the direction broadly we need to go. i apologize senator, i don't have the specific date or timeline for you. >> seems as a matter of policy, we really need -- this needs to p haen. we've been talking about this long, we aren't there yet and yet, something terrible is going to happen and a lot of people are going to say why didn't we have a policy, deterrent policy. i would urge counsels of the administration to push for a sense of urgency on this question because if we -- if all we do is defense and there is no deterren deterrence, we'll lose the battle. >> yes, sir, a losing strategy.
>> final point and i know you talked about this earlier. i'm finding it harder and harder to justify your holding two jobs given the complexity -- i mean, this arrangement was created in 2009 which in technology terms is a century ago and i just can't -- i mean, i understand the relationship between nsa and cyber command but particularly if we move in the direction, which i think we are of setting up cyber command as its own independent command to have the same person trying to run those two agencies, i just think is impractical and impossible. >> i've been doing it ten years to date. >> you've been doing it well. >> as i've said in my initial comment, i agree that it's something we need to continue to assess. i agree in the long run the probably best course of action is to ultimately put both organizations in a position of capable of executing commission in a complementary and aligned
way than in a more separate way but the reality is we're just not ready to do that today, i believe. don't get me wrong. i get paid to make things happen and i will execute it to the best of my ability. >> i take it you agree we should move -- cyber command should be its own command. >> i do, sir. >> yes, sir, thank you. thank you, mr. chair. >> subject to the will of the entire committee that would be my intention and i want to read and i would propose that on the defense authorization bill. >> i think so, sir. i think that's something we'll consider but i think it's value with the comments today and to consider them as we go forward. >> thank you, senator fisher. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i look forward to the discussion on raising cyber to combat and command and look forward to the
discussions as a committee on the importance of cybersecurity for the country. rogers, in your prepared statement you mention the cyber attack on ukraine's power grid and note you've seen cyber actors from more than one nation exploring the networks of our nation's critical inf infrastructure. do you believe our teams possess the necessary skills relating to controls and systems to be able to stop or to recover from an attack on our power grid? >> we have the skills. the challenge at the moment is one of capacity. what i mean by that is in the two years i've been in command, i've yet to run into a situation where we didn't have the skill set to apply against a problem but the challenge at the moment because we're still in the midst of the bill is sometimes that skill set is embodied in an incredibly small number of people and if we had multiple
events sign tame tan usely, sna chalk today so to speak capacity is the greater concern than capability, if you will, if that makes sense. >> well, i understand your demands on the force to exceed that capacity but as you add those capabilities, how are you going to prioritize and responsibilities you're going to have? how do you plan to prioritize placing that building competency with our industrial control system? is that something you focus on in the near term or is it going to take a backseat to maybe some of the other areas for the cyber mission forces. >> something we're doing now. i would also highlight the very construct of the force by creating a separate section of
the force that is focused purely on defending critical infrastructure was designed for that. how do you ensure an element of the force we're building is focused like a laser on the mission set? it's a carved out separate entity. the national mission force. the general is my component commander doing that. >> do you have a plan to work with services then on building that -- >> yes, ma'am. >> is it near completion? you hear said ton king ask about policy. we've been asking about policy for a long time. we don't have a policy. if we don't have a policy, how will we develop plans? >> i remind people is look, even as we're trying to get to broader issues you've raised outside the immediate mission, look, our mission is generate capacity and capability and ensure we're ready to go as the broader issues are being
addressed. so we're trying to deal with the piece by generating capabilities we think would be part of the discussion by generating the defensive capabilities we think would be part of the deterrent discussion. i don't want to wait for everything to fall in place. we can't wait as perfect as it would be. >> i agree with you, we don't have time. >> yes, ma'am. >> when we look at the department, what level of communication do we have with the different communities within the departments, say the -- with regard to acquisition of instillation to make sure the items we purchased or facilities that we're building are able to take those threats we're looking at from cyber into account? >> i would tell you the acquisition piece is an area we need a lot of work not because people aren't working hard but
i've been struck by the analogy, we would never buy a ship, tank, aircraft without the operational vision driving how we designed it, built it, structured it skpl yet for much of our networks, that has not historically been the model. we built those and bought those and focus on efficiency and price and really focus on operational impact and really didn't think at the time that we would be dealing with a world in which intruders, foreign actors would be using those systems as access points to degrade our missions as a department. we didn't anticipate that decades ago and that's the world we're in now. >> it's happened in private industry. >> right, decades of investment we're trying to overcome. >> last question, do you have any knowledge if our adversaries
targeted any infrastructure on the military bases? >> yes. >> thank you very much. >> yes, ma'am. >> thanks, mr. chairman and thank you admiral rogers for your extraordinary and distinguished service in so many rolls over so many years. i want to focus on the challenges of recruiting young people in an age where the best and the brightest have knowledge have so many opportunities, many highly paid and challenging in the professional issues. young americans are entering the work force with computer technology that's been part of the entire lives not so much for us as a certain age but for them
yes but i wonder if you can tell us how successful you and obviously the incomperbly important forces have been in obtaining talent and what we can do to help. >> i'm very comfortable where where we are on the uniform s e side. the same things that make a person decide to pick up a rifle leads men and women to decide they want to put on a uniform and pick up a keyboard. that's not the biggest challenge. the area we need to take a greater look at is on the civilian side of this because we got our vision is we got to create a work force that is both active and reserve military. so we get the breathe of expertise that you've
referenced. where i need to come back to the committee, can i come up with some different processes or options that would make things more attractive to particularly some very high-end, very small number of skill sets that i don't have huge numbers of but incredibly valuable for us, that's one area i think i'll have to come back. we need to step back and take a look at the piece of it. >> is there sufficient, are there sufficient resources devoted to research, the personnel available to super vice the research and in effect planning for the future. >> right. i'm not going to pretend for one minute you have people and money that you would like. it's -- i would argue
characterize it as reasonable right now. it's not a major issue in the sense i said wow, we have a significant sensibility to execute. i haven't seen that. >> i know you indicated you haven't read it. >> right, right. >> but i wonder focussing on the infrastructure segment you mentioned, transportation, financial, electric, how well are they doing in protecting themselve themselves? >> if you look across the 16 segments designated as critical infrastructure, i would argue some are ahead of others i
probably put financial has access to more than some and come to the conclusion that the ability to move funds through these transactions, if you will that we believe and trust and in their defense, they are quick to remind me our business model is different. we're regulated for example in order to generate and increase our cyber defense and capabilities. the only way for us to do that is raise rates for example. most consumers not enthusiastic about that. most regulatory bodies not necessarily overly enthusiastic about that at the moment. >> those would be electricity. >> power is an example.
there is improvement that you would put at the bottom of that list of readiness? >> there are some i think i've publicly previously talked about health care is one of the examples of the 16 segments i look at and i go, that's an area probably that needs a broader top to bottom look on the first to acknowledge, really outside our immediate mission and i don't bore into it every day. as i look where potentially we'll be tasked to provide our capabilities to partner with, an area i would pay attention to. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral rogers, thank you for your service. i find it interesting that as you work your way through this, you're in a brand-new area trying to determine how to respond and protect. it seems when you lay this out and say you have 16 different
segments within the realm that you're responding to, fair to say that they break out into either information or data systems and operating systems? in terms of the way that we look at what the data is or the different systems that we're looking at as being vulnerable, a data system being the collection of information and individuals and operating systems being those systems perhaps necessary for the infrastructure within our country? a fairway to break out, i guess, that's fair to be honest, senator. i never thought of it that way. not that that's a bad way. >> the reason i would ask, it seems while information systems would contain material or information a private nature, perhaps, a trade secret that may very well be information on an individual such as the information we lost to the federal level and have on
operating system for the utilities and operating systems out there for dams and operating systems for nuclear power plants. clearly they can do significant damage and bodily injury, as well. fair enough to look at it. based upon that, when you look at your role and the role of cyber command do you see your role operation different than data and collection systems? >> our protection scheme is based on two different pieces of strategy. the first component of the strategy is our intent is to go into foreign space to stop the attack before it ever reaches those systems. the second component of the strategy is to apply defensive
capability working directly with each of the individual elements if you will to say if that fails, we also would like to work to show up the systems. the other point i want to make sure i articulate and probably should have done a better job this morning is as a reminder, u.s. cyber command and dod at large provide our cyber capabilities and defensive critical infrastructure in the private sector in partnership and in support of dhs. dhs has overall responsibility in the federal government for the provision of government support to the private sector when it comes to cyber. i don't want people thinking well, it's just cyber command and the private sector. there is a broader set of players we integrate with and support as we execute the mission. >> an attack in either case would be, we don't know whether
or not we'll be able to do it in time and respond afterwards. would you say we have operation systems, information systems we have, do you feel the protocols are there? i'm going back to what senator king was eluding to earlier. i'm not sure we have the definitions prepared yet to allow you to respond immediately within mill la seconds unless we talk about it and lay it out. is it there today? >> in every single component in the private sector, no it's not. cyber is no different than other domains in the sense that the importance of intelligence to provide us insight gives us the knowledge and insight, the warning, if you will to
anticipate and act the event. true for the sitcom commander as me. warning continues to be critical for both of us. >> today if our forces were aware of an attack, they have the ability to respond but if it was property or entities within the united states, do you have the ability to respond today if it is not a military but a civilian or a civil target? >> ishere a process? yes. is it something i can do automatically instantaneously, no. >> that's the case it has to happen first then because for all practical purposes, the attack will be instantaneous. >> we have to get the warning in advance. the importance of intelligence. >> if you get the warning in advance, it would have to be enough time for you to get out and have a political discussion for all practical purses whether or not you can -- >> again, it would depend by the scenario.
there are some elements with mechanisms in place and it's just a process as opposed to a broad -- >> not one that can be done in mila seconds? >> no. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for being here. >> senator. >> let me start with your acquisition personnel. some of the saddest stories of waste within government and a lot of that had to do with knowing when you need to buy and when legacy systems need to be scrapped and how nimble can you be off the shelf? i'm not sure the military with that flexibility to move with the technology. i think these acquisition personnel are important so do you have the ten in place that are suppose -- that we authorized in order for you to
make the wisest acquisition decisions possible in light of a history littered with serious mistakes and lots and billions and billions of dollars wasted? >> i operate and defend. i don't buy. you have been kind enough, the committee and congress has been kind enough to provide an initial capability to do us. we're in the process of hiring. i'm very mindful of as i remind the team it is about generating outcomes, guys. that's why we're granted this authority and need to be mindful of and not interested in spending money for the sake of spending money. it's about generating capabilities that impact the mission in a material way. >> i would be interested in how you are requiring with more detail, if you would provide, how you are finding the acquisition personnel and how competitive are we in finding the right acquisition personnel. if we have the capabilities in
the space a lot of it is people being trained but a lot of it is under lined -- >> yes, ma'am. >> you have to buy the right capabilities. >> so i just -- i'm really worried about getting the right people making those decision sos so i would like to stay updated in the progress. what kind of coordination does your command have at this point with our nato allies, israel, arab allies and particularly interested in any coordination and cooperation you have with nga. >> i'm not going to publicly -- >> obviously. >> classified forum go into specifics. i would only tell you we partner with and have a hand full of nations and have a very direct, real relationship with respect to capabilities, real world operations. i won't go into the specifics of who. one of the challenges i find is cyber like any other mission, we have to prioritize.
when i look at foreign partnerships, i ask where is the greatest return for us as a department, as a dod and where is the greatest return for us in terms of ability to execute the mission. i spent almost as much time with the discussion with the team about what we're not going to do as i discuss what we are going to do and remind them since we're in the midst of build thing capability out, prioritpr. we identified a set of partners if you will. these partnerships are generating capability we're using today. >> great. and maybe in a classified setting i could get more information. >> yes, ma'am. >> what is the ratio of civilian versus military within the command at this point? >> it's about -- we're trying to build 80% military, 20% civilian. at a snapshot, off the top of my
head 70/30, 70% military, 30% civilian. >> what about contractors? is the ratio on contractors and what is your goal on contractors? this could be an area and underlying that is a concern about the actual screening of contractors. what is your goal and to go forward? >> i apologize, i'm trying to do the mat in my head. it's probably 25%. we have over and above the government civilian and military, we have an additional 25% -- off the top of my head, an additional 25% of the contractor base. >> is that where you would like to be going forward or see more relying on contractors -- >> i'm a little leery of over becoming reliant on contractors, why? because i try to remind people, cyber is a domain to conduct a
wide range of military operations and in accordance with the law, those operations need to be conducted by military personnel so i'm not trying to minimize the role of contractors, i just try to remind the team it's not one size fits all. we have to ask ourselves what's the right allocation? i'm pretty comfortable right now. i wouldn't argue it's among my highest priorities. i'd argue now probably priority number one manpower-wise i said the civilian piece. i'm very comfortable with tracking and going the right way in the uniform piece. the civilian area is where i know i'll be paying more attention to in the coming year. >> thank you, admiral. >> yes, ma'am. >> threats nation state wise in terms of who we're most threatened by?
>> i would argue russia and probably in terms if you look at capability, the other four that we have pub welcolicly acknowle china, iran, north korea and non-state actors, the other category where i look that could be a game changer were dynamics to change. >> on the terrorism side, could you give us the top couple of terrorist organizations you're worried about? >> not that i don't know in an unclassified forum. >> we don't end. on the criminal side, what areas of criminality do you worry most about? countries? >> russia probably has the most active criminal element with the most -- with the greatest capability. >> do you think the russian government is doing anything constructive in terms of regulating criminal activity in cyber? >> i would only say it doesn't appear to be getting much better. >> what about iran? is iran better in the last year in terms of their cyber activity? >> yes. >> are they less threatening?
>> i apologize -- >> are they less threatening or more capable? >> i'd argue they are increasing their investment and increasing their level of capability. we have not seen the same level of activity from them that we have seen historically in the past. i have seen some of that same activity directed at other nations around the world. >> are they improving capability? >> yes, sir. >> do you know if the money they are getting is going into the cyber upgrades? >> i don't know for a fact. >> okay. >> is it fair for the country to establish as a policy cyber dominance over enemies that we want to be the dominance of the warfa warfa warfare? >> we want to have the same capability. >> i think that's the goal. so let's march down that path.
the navy is pretty wide? >> yes, sir. >> and the cyber arena, how close is it. >> so the gap of tdominance in seas and cyber is not nearly. >> not nearly the same. >> when it comes to iran when you compare the air force to our air force, what's the gap? >> are the iranians trying to close it? >> they are. >> for a nato point of view, we're familiar with article five in attack against one is attack
against all. is there any such concept in the cyber arena. >> you believe article five applies to all domains. >> do they. >> we're trying to work our way through that. >> i don't know -- >> what's the biggest impediment to us getting there? is it the congress? is it the -- >> no. >> it's as much in someways as my perspective this is just an exercise. this is something we can afford -- >> the defendant of homeland security is responsible for protecting us and the financial service power arena or civilian targets. you're responsible for protecting the military
infrastructure. >> and provide support to the commercial infratastructure. >> but offense. >> they are not going to attack a foreign nation, you would. >> yes, sir. >> so how can we as a nation given the threats that we face in the cyber arena not really have a good answer as to what's the i'm ped mmpediment to rule engagement. >> sorry, sir, you really need to speak to the policy side. >> yeah, but you're an operator. >> yes, sir. >> who do you talk to about hey, guys, let's see if we can get there. >> the secretary of defense or office of secretary of defense. >> how do they respond? >> intellectually, we realize we need to do. >> is there anything congress is not doing that you would like us to do to help resolve this issue. >> no, i can't argue it's
something congress failed to do. thank you mr. chairman, admiral, i know that you talked a little about cyber teams in response to earlier questions and i think the idea to leverage our outstanding national guard and capabilities and capacity and establishing many of the cyber teams is a good idea. as you and your colleagues and as you look at the region, i ask that you look closely at the knees of the asia pacic. in hawaii we have nsa hawaii, various component commands and other agency regional officers that are, offices that are likely targets for cyber criminals as we focus on the rebounds of the pacific.
i wanted to get to a question. last september the u.s. and china did agree that neither government would support or conduct cyber theft of intell t intellectual property. six months down the road, would you say china is living up to this agreement? i don't know how specific the agreement was, frankly. seems like a good idea for the two countries to enter into that kind of dialogue and discussion but really, what is happening with regard to that agreement? >> if i could, what the agreement said is neither nation would gauge in that activity for the purpose of gaining economic advantage for their private sector. we continue to see chinese activity in the regard. the million dollar question is is that activity for governmental purposes or passed from the government to the private sector from my mind, the jury is still out in that
regard. its activity level is somewhat lower than prior to september of 2015. >> is there any way that we can determine whether china is engaging in such activity. are there any parameters? is there anything we measure to determine whether this agreement is being adhered to? >> yes, ma'am. in an unclassified forum, i won't get into specifics how we go about doing that but yes, ma' ma'am. >> maybe in another context we can get to some of the questions. with regard to our ability to support a our cyber capability, stem education is critical, can you talk more about what you are do
doing to train a work force for us. >> let's take hawaii for example. today for example the general for the guard in hawaii is meeting in the complex with the cyber command and elements across the island to look at and include academic sector, how do we generate and more capable work force to meet guard requirements and command and nsa and other elements. how can we partner more effectively in aligning the capability to deal with issues of common interest on the state of hawaii and more broadly. you see that same hawaii is an area where we probably have gone further than others but we can see that same type of activity with a hand full of universities across the united states from
the west coast, something on the order of 60 to 100 between nsa and cyber command tend to partner together a lot. >> obviously that needs to continue because our cyber capability is something that will be an on going effort. you mentioned the importance of the private sector and outside of government approach to cyber needs. how do you envision the private sector's role? the private sector brings technical invasion, broad knowledge of capabilities and
alternative ways to look at problems. those are three things when i look at the private sector, i say you can really add value for us in that regard. what we have done to date is created what we call the point of partnership in silicon valley where i placed a small element on the ground. the part that's interesting to me is i did not want reserves working in their day to day jobs. we started that since last summer that's working out well for us and gives us a chance to get a sense for what technical invasion is going on out there. we approach them with different problem sets and say hey, here is an issue we're still trying to work our way through. how are you handling this or would you give us some suggestions on how we might deal with it? . i'm trying to see if we can
replicate the model. i'm looking at the east coast next as an example, somewhere probably in the greater boston metro area next. >> sounds like more of an informal arrangement now and maybe going forward ins institutionalize it. >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you. >> admiral rogers, i don't envy you with the job you have, the complexity and then the additional challenges, things on the horizon you have to worry about and list ping to the discussion, one thing that's very important we'll never have the perfect weapon. absent the united states coming up with a game changing offensive or defensive capability of the scale of the manhattan project, you can't possibly get inside the decision cycles of the state actors that organize crime, terrorists and
other people and when you think about decision cycles in this realm, you think about every single day you get new malware, viruses, other technology added to your pc to deal with new threats that didn't exist a day or two or week before. how do you really segregate your scope of responsibility, the vulnerabilities of the dod or however you would like to define your scopebility and differentiate that from the broader private sector threat. you have 28 million small business businesses. you have distributed public sector whether electric water or gas and the concern that i have is what we have right now, we
haven't seen and i think that we will see some day a nation, state or organized crime or terrorist organization literally be in position to execute a multi pillar attack if they are smart and are we will do something to disrupt you and disrupt your ability to react by attacking the private sector. so how do we look at this on a global basis as they increase abilities, they will figure out a way to go after communications infrastructure, supply chain, health care, electric, whatever public in, how do we coalesce, do a good job in d.o.d. and create the line and go around it and disrupt you from a different
directio direction? >> you have articulated the challenges of how to operate because the boundaries that we consider this is a dod function, this is a private function, this is a government cyber blurs these lines. so the dod arena is a reason if you look at the exercise in training regime that we put in place, we try to do it within the dod but across a breath of the private sector, cyber guarders are annual exercise it will be in june. we pick a different segment if you will every year. we'll do the power segment in this year's exercise. i think it's something like 20 different corporations, the guard, state, local. >> that's what i'm getting to. it's almost as if your military
exercises have to involve all of these players so they have a better understanding of their vulnerabilities and the nature of the attack that would occur and to what extend are we looking at state and local governments as a way to at least in north carolina serve in the legislature and we were talking about what we could do to work on cyber threats and i saw it also as an economic advantage. as states became particularly good at grid hardening or at securing the physical presence in cyber threats within the state borders, they create an economic advantage to set up business in the state. to what extend are we trying to lead and help make this problem a little less difficult at the federal level by making sure the state and local government are stepping up their game as part of the effort. >> it's a reason there is a big guard component to this effort to ensure we can also try to address this state and local
aspects of this. >> i'll see if i can schedule time in our office, we may have to do some in a secured setting. thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. one of the issues is in fact sort of the services being able near resources to fully develop the units that they will detach to you essentially or provide for your operation control since you won't have organic units. can you give an assessment where they are in terms of doing that across the services? >> that really goes to the heart of readiness, if you will. one of the -- so in september when i was with you, one of the things i said then during that session was that i thought one
of the reasons why '16 was going to be a big game changer, i thought we'd get more involved in the total breath of capability sets, which we are and the other reason was because we needed to shift from a focus on ioc and foc, the generation of capability to actual ready n ness. are we ready to employ this? we spent the last six months working our way through how do you define readiness in the cyber arena down to the individual team level so that i as a come bander have an awareness where the force is and using the same mechanisms we use to assess readiness across the dod i can provide policymakers, here is what this force is really capable of doing. we've just started doing that. i've gone through two strong men with the team. we'll do a third and final one this summer and by the end of the summer in september, i will start providing to the dod on a quarterly basis by team.
here is where we are in terms of true readiness. >> is the nightmare scenario that's one of these nations acquires the capability to shut down satellites? >> i mean, that is a -- there is two scenarios that really concern me. one is the physical shut down and enter diction of capability. the other scenario -- >> explain the first one. >> if you were to shut down -- look at it from first dod perspective because much of what we rely on for our enablers as a department are commercial infrastructure, power, ability to move force for example. if you are able to try to take that away or material impact the ability to manage an air traffic control system, to manage the overhead structure and the flow of communications or data for example, that would materially impact dods ability to impact the mission and economic impact
for us as a nation. the other concern i have is to date, most penetrations of systems that we've seen by actors have either been to steal data or to do recognizance. what happens if the purpose of the intrusion is to manipulate data so you can no longer believe what you're seeing. think about the implications if you couldn't trust the military picture that you were looking, that you're using to base decisions on and let alone the broader economic impacts for us as a nation. >> senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you admiral for being here and for the job that you're doing every day. i wanted to start with does russia have the ability to
inflict serious harm. do we have the capability? >> in a classified discussion, i would rather not get into that. >> let me put it in the context of i assume there is some mutual detouerrence that goes on when we're talking about some state actors. >> again, it's a lot more complicated than just the yes or no. >> i hope we can ask that question in a classified setting. i had the opportunity over the last two weeks to visit astoniya and probably the first victim of a cyber attack by a nation state by russia. it's been acredited by nato and to hear them talk about how they
thi think. can you talk how cyber come works with nato allies? >> i've been there myself and to the center and in brussels for example in december and as u.s. cyber command, i addressed the north atlantic counsel one of the member nations asked to talk to the leaders up at the alliance about implications of cyber and how lengthy and large one voice. i'm the first to acknowledge that. how might the alliance work its way forward as we try to go with the cyber arena. cyber command i tried to partner both with the alliance as a whole as well as specific member nations on specific issues with within. you got to get the house together number one. >> explain a little more what you mean whether you say that. >> much like we've seen on the u.s. side, i've said look, i see
nato as spending a lot of time and that's a good thing focused on the defense of nato's fixed infrastructure but remind them there is value in as nato is creating capability, additional force constructs to be able to apply traditional capability in a much faster way. i've also been part of discussions where i remind them even as you're generating that additional force, that additional capability, you need to think what are the signer vulnerabilities and defense implications of that. we can spend a lot of money on generating capability but inherent vulnerabilities, that's not a good situation for the alliance or us. we're dealing with the same challenges. i had those discussions with the allegiance at large. >> so how do we increase their participati
participation? >> we have some nato nations, the large st and not all 28. over time you'll see more and mo more. we talked about how we might take a look at cyber exercise or training regime. when i was there in december, i said this is something we need to think about. >> one of the things that i was really interested in in estonia is hearing about the defense league. >> defense league. >> and you were talking about earlier in your testimony about the effort to take advantage of the expertise in the private sector to help us as we're looking at cyber issues and i was very interested in one of the things i heard was that the
reality is we can't prevent a cyber attack. we got to be prepared to respond to that attack in the way that is most effective and most fastest and they were talking about their defense league as one way that they are able to do that. is that something that recognizing that we're probably not talking about, but is that what you're looking at what you're talking about the teams that are being set up to help respond? >> it's a little different in the sense that the idea behind the cyber league for estonia is you have private citizens. >> right. >> who on a volunteering basis will apply themselves at specific problem sets as they emerge. kind of after hours, after work on their own time. >> that's kind of model for the cyber league in estonia and use that to argument.
aside from us, that cyber league is a cross for us and our streak tours between the digital service arena, the dod is creating, as well as the kind of guard construct, though, the difference is when the uniformed member of the guard or reserve so it is not exactly the same but the thought process, the idea of trying to tap that is similar. >> thank you, thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, chairman and thank you admiral longers for your service. i wanted to ask you a basic question. you have substantial responsibility in your position. what keeps you up at night? is your worry?
>> i have no problem sleeping but secondly, there is three things generally i highlight. number one is actions taken against critical infrastructure in the united states, damage or manipulation. number two, what happens when actors start to no longer just enter systems to do recognizance or steal but actually to manipulate or change data so that we no longer can believe what we're seeing and the third and final what happens when non-state actors view cyber as a weapon system? and they want to use it as a vehicle to inflict pain and against the united states and others. >> and to the third point you just made about non-state actors using cyber as a weapon system, how grave a threat is that to us k currently? >> i would argue it is not -- i'll say but tomorrow will change. today i will tell you i have not
seen groups yet make huge investments in this but i worry that it's a matter of time because it wouldn't take long. one of the challenge of cyber in addition we proeviously it doesn't recognize boundaries, it doesn't take billions of dollars of investment. it doesn't take decades of time and doesn't take a dedicated work force of tens of thousands of people like you see most nation states deal with. cyber is the great equalizer in someways. >> what are the greatest risks to the extent you can describe them here to our critical infrastructure, the first issue? >> just based on the activity i've seen in some nation state actors, what happens if they decide they want to for some period of time disrupt, pumps.
>> power system, financial system. >> to move money. if you look at the scenario, have one unfold in the united states. i'm not going to argue someone is capable of making the united states go dark but there is capability to cause significant impact and damage. >> that's why you discuss in your opening testimony the need for the coordination across the government. >> right. >> i wanted to ask you the law changed by congress in terms of the nsa -- >> the freedom act. >> yes, ma'am. >> can you give us an update on what is happening with that and whether that's working and any concerns you have? it's an important question for us to check back in with you on. >> yes, ma'am, unclass hearing i won't go into great detail.
i'd say and what i've said to the intelligence oversight committees we have been able to compile and on time. there has been some level of slowness from the old system or new system. >> in terms of how quickly to get information. >> the time duration is minutes or hours. it's not days or weeks. so it hasn't yet gotten to the point where i felt i needed to come back to the congress or administration and say look, i'm seeing a sigma tnificant materi impact because i made the commitment. if i saw that and i believe i owe it to the nation to make that point. i have not seen that yet. >> there is no doubt it's taking longer in someways? >> in someways. it takes longer. >> well, i think it is important for you to come to us with that because given minutes and hours can make a difference in
terrorist attacks and preventing them and taking action, this is important for all of us to understand given the world we're living in. i wanted to ask you a final question about the jcpoa or iran deal and in there there's a provision that said that the u.s. must cooperate with teheran through training to strengthen to protect against sabotage in the nuclear program. admiral rogers as the u.s. helped t-- >> i can't speak for the u.s. government as a whole. u.s. cyber command has not participated in any such effort. >> okay. thank you. >> i missed some of the discussion, i don't want to be needlessly repetitive but want to go to an interchange you had with the chair in opening questions. i met recently with a senior military leader that tried to
basically summer rise his sense of things and said we have o plans but no strategy. i've been thinking about that. i think in your back and forth with the chair you talked about and i think others may have asked you about this, this notion we're kind of reacting case by case to cyber attacks and kind of deciding in each instance what we want to do but the development of a broader doctrine, whether it's, you know, what will a detoerrence policy be in terms of triggering and collective defense obligation, that we're assessing those things but kind of not at the end point. could you talk to us about the kind of development process and working on these questions, they are so important. what might we expect from the pentagon, from cyber command in our interaction, in our oversight in terms of
developme development of doctrines. >> you'll see in the dod cyber strategy for example, a broad over arching frame work from the department how we'll both develop capability. we're part cyber command is part of the broader dialogue within the department about how do we align the capabilities of force with the world that we're seeing today and one of the arguments that we've made over the course of the last six months is we need to take an element of the cyber capability we're generating and focus it very much in the deterrence piece. how do we shape potentially drive opponent choices and behavior before we get to the crisis scenario. we're in the early stages of that but i'm very heartened by the fact we have a broad agreement that's an important part of the strategy and we need to be doing that. we're just starting the early stages of that journey. the department participates in
the broader dialogue within the u.s. government how from a national policy perspective, how will we move forward in addressing some issues you have all raised today. for me as u.s. of the issues that you have all raised today. meanwhile, for me as u.s. cyber command. what i remind our team is we know that capability is going to be part of that deterrent strategy, guys tharks what we get paid to do. we've got to focus own generating that ability today. that's kind of been if you will the focus for u.s. cybercommand at the operational level that i and the team really focus at. >> let me ask you another question, i think senator shaheen may have asked you this with representative nato. another item that's common in this committee, as we look at the postures of other commands, joint training exercises, india does more joint training with the united states than any other nation, we have marines deployed throughout africa and special
purpose of training of african militaries. what's our posture vis-a-vis partners in the cyber area, in the training we do together, in the development of joint resiliency strategies? >> so we do some level of training with key allies. one of the challenges for us, quite frankly is how do you maximize capacity. you cannot do everything with every nation that you would like to do. part of our strategy is how do you focus the greatest return? what are the nations you want to start with? we have done that, the other challenge i find is, this is part of an ongoing internal discussion for us, based on where we are in the journey right now, i can't do so much with the external world that it negatively impacts our internal ability within the department to generate. unlike some mission sets where we have decades of infrastructure capability, capacity and experience, we don't have that in the cyberarena. the same force and capability i'm using to help train and partner with foreign
counterparts, i'm still building every day. that's the challenge for us right now. i don't think it will be as much an issue in the future as that capacity fully comes online. but we're not there yet. >> uh-huh. we trained aviators out of other service branches and then we created an air force academy in 1954 and decide weird going to train aviators, not that we don't train aviators in the other service branches. i think senator mccain may have had some training somewhere in his past we created an air force after world war ii. i've wondered whether the cyber domain would have eventually become so significant that there may be the need to consider creating a dedicated cyber academy. much like the aiforce was created in the '50s. the question is you can train cyber folks everywhere and have them percolate throughout the service branches or you can focus on a particular
cyber expertise and those folks could go into the different service branches. has there been any discussion or thought about that? >> it's been a discussion. my input to that discussion has been i'm not right now based on my experience and what i see a proponent of that approach. my concern is to maximize effectiveness in cyber you need to understand how it fits in a broader context. and i watch at times when i deal that elements in our own workforce, who are incredibly technically savvy, incredibly smart about the aegis of the mission, when i try to remind them, remember we're applying this as part of a broader strategy and a broader context. when you don't understand the broader context, you're not in my experience, not as effective. that's my concern about that approach it will start to make us very, very -- >> siloed. >> narrow and siloed. i'm concerned about the potential implications of that. >> admiral rodgers, thank you for appearing again before the committee. if i heard you correctly, you testified to center ayotte that your three main they'res were
krets to our critical infrastructure, the ability to manipulate systems such that we might not have faith in their operations and third, nonstate actors using cyber as a weapon against the united states. is that accurate? >> yes, sir. >> are either of the islamic state or al qaeda able to do any of those three things at this point? >> i haven't seen them yet. but my concern is that's now. the islamic state has a reputation of being effective online. we we infer online recruiting and propaganda is a skill set from the use of cyber against electrical power grids and so forth? >> yes, sir. >> how hard would it be for a nonstate actor like the islamic state or al qaeda to develop that skill set? is it nothing more than recruiting the right person? >> it would not be difficult. recruiting the right people with the right focus.
it's certainly not be on beyond their ability. i believe. it's not beyond their ability. if they made that decision. >> when we think about other potential nonstate actors, are those, do those groups that have that capability or approaching the capability tend to be associated with state actors? >> in some cases, yes, but not in all. not in all. >> i want to turn now to the ongoing debate about encryption. think data security and cybersecurity is obviously critical in the modern world. most people in this room probably have a smartphone in their pocket. even my 70-year-old father got a smartphone recently. we keep emails, text messages, phone calls, financial information, health information. many other sensitive data. >> he's ahead of senator graham. >> on our phones, i think data and cybersecurity is essential. i think physical security is essential, i would hate to see americans get blown to pieces
because we had an imbalanced priority of cybersecurity over physical security. how do we strike that balance as a society? >> my first comment would be i don't think it's either/or. >> my argument would be we don't serve either viewpoint particularly well when we cast this as well. it's all or nothing, it's either/or. my view is over time we have been able to integrate ground-changing technology in the course of our nation, and to do it in a way that enables the nation under the right circumstances with the right level of control, to be able to access that. for me, my starting position is, what is it that is different about this, that would preclude that from applying here? i don't personally see that. even as i acknowledge there's no one simple answer, there's probably no one silver bullet. it's not going to be a one size
fits all. but i look at the innovation and the can-do approach we have as a nation and i'm thinking we can solve this. >> like for instance a decades-old law known as the communications assistance for law enforcement act. which tells telecom companies of any size if they want to construct a telephone system in this country, it has to be susceptible to a wiretap pursuant to a court order if the court finds probable cause to order a wiretap against a terror suspect or a human trafficker or a drug dealer or so forth. similarly we all expect privacy in our bank accounts, but banks must maintain systems that they it turn over financial information subject to a court order on a potential money launderer. is there any data that says we should treat tech companies different than telephone companies or banks. >> i like you, i just say look, we've got frameworks in other areas, why can't we apply that here? >> these questions have been about the larger debate about encryption going forward, the way smartphones are designed, messaging systems are designed there was a case recently
involving apple and the fbi and the san bernardino shooter in which the fbi requested apple's assistance to override a feature of an iphone, apple refused, fbi found a third party capable of doing so and has withdrawn that case. should americans be alarmed at this kind of vulnerability in such a widely-used device? >> the way i would phrase it is -- vulnerability is an inherent nature of the technical world that we live in today. and if you desire is to live in a world without vulnerability i would say that is probably highly unlikely. >> do you know if we've shared that vulnerability with apple? >> as u.s. cybercommand, sir, i apologize, i don't know. >> admiral, one other point. we know for a fact that baghdadi is sending young men into the
refugee flow to commit acts of terror. wherever they can locate. is it true or very likely that they also know of a website to come up on. secure so that they can communicate back with baghdadi and his tech? >> yes. >> so right now there's a media report that 400 young men had been sent into the refugee flow i would assume then that at least some of them have are armed with a website to come up on once they get to a preferred destination so that they can coordinate acts of terrorism. >> a website or encrypted app. yes, that's probably likely. >> that's a bit concerning,
isn't it? >> yes, sir. >> so what should we be doing to counter that? besides take out isis? >> i think we need a broader national dialogue about what are we comfortable with it's not either/or. we've got to have security and we've got to have safety and privacy, and at the moment we're in a dialogue that seems to paint it as well it's one or the other. and as the dialogue we just had with senator cotton, i don't see it that way. >> yet we know of a direct threat of an attack in europe or the united states technical capability to enhance their ability to commit this act of terrorism. isn't that a pretty tough -- so we need a national conversation? do we need more hearings? do we need to urge the
administration to come up with a policy? what are our options here? >> the worst-case scenario to me is we don't have the dialogue and we have major event and in the aftermath of a major event we decide to do something that perhaps that in the breadth of time we step back and ask ourselves, how did we ever get here? >> i don't think there's any doubt that that's a likely scenario. >> that's what i hope it doesn't come to. to date for a variety of reasons we've been unable to achieve that kind of consensus. we've got to figure out how we're going to do this. and you don't want a law enforcement -- i believe, you don't want a law enforcement individual or an intelligence individual dictating this. just as i don't believe you don't want the private sector, a company dictating this. this is too important from my
perspective. >> is awareness of this threat important for the american people to know how serious this threat is? >> yes. >> senator kipg? >> mr. chairman, hearing this dialogue and the discussion you've just been having, it strikes me it underlying the foolishness of continuing to be governed by budget decisions made six years ago. when this threat was nothing like the magnitude that it is today. and here we are dealing with a major new threat and trying to fit it within, to shoehorn it within a budget structure that was, that clearly did not take account of the fact that we've got a major new threat and a serious one, and it's going to take resources to confront. i just can't help but make that point. it underlying the fact that we're trying to be governed by
decisions made at a time when circumstances were very different than they are today. >> i think senator king, but admiral rogers has made it clear in this testimony that sequestration will prevent him from carrying out completely the missions that he's been tasked with. is that correct, admiral? >> yes, sir. my greatest concern if you went to sequestration would be the impact on the workforce, particularly the civilians. who would argue is this what i want to be aligned with? i can replace equipment. it takes us years to replace people. >> there is a real likelihood that if we continue the sequestration, that you will have to -- you will not be able to continue to employ these outstanding and highly selective individuals? >> yes. >> sometimes, admiral, i do not want the american people to see what goes on at these hearings. the old line about laws and sausages. i certainly wish the american
people could hear and see your statements that you're making today. rather than as you just stated, an attack and then we always overreact. that that's just democracies are all about. and so i thank you for your good work. but i also want to thank you for your straightforward answers to questions that were, that were posed by the members of this committee. we thank you. the hearing is adjourned. >> thank you.
>> olivia golden talks about workmandates that are taking effect in over 20 states and may cause as many as $1 million americans to lose their food stamps. then patrick mclaughlin, senior research fellow at the george mason university center on their report that ranks 50 states and the district of columbia by the effect of federal regulations on a state's economy. anticipate brian simon, state government reporter on the articles of imimpeachment filed in the alabama state legislature
against governor robert bentley, following reports of an inappropriate relationship with a former staffer. be sure to watch c-span's washington journal beginning live at 7:00 a.m. eastern thursday morning. consumer financial pro-protection bureau richard cordray on his semiannual report before congress. it will star live 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span.
>> what we see is new factors making emancipation desirable. all kinds of obstacles falling by the wayside with the result that by august lincoln will announce a new war effort. >> wheaton college history professor tracy mckenzie on the evolving war goals of the civil war. and on "real america" -- >> how was it possible for america to achieve such pro-duction and at the same time build an army? 20% of american industrial manpower was woman power. legions of american women were
amassing to stop advance across the world. >> this 194 4 war department film documents how women in world war ii helped the war effort, alluding that the hidden army of american women working in war manufacturing are a main reason germany lost the war. sunday evening at 6:00 on kp american artifacts" we visit the daughters of the american museum. >> one thing that stands out in this time period is this creation of this imagery of the apotheosis. that's an old concept that goes back to ancient times from a warrior is made god-like by lifting him up and celebrating him.
it is worth highlights key facets james madison who followed jefferson as the fourth president of the united states owns over 100 slaves while he occupied the white house. he exposes expanding the 3/5 compromise, which guaranteed the south held a disproportionate influence on congress to preserve and uphold slave-owning interest. >> tyler perry, african-american studies professor at california state university fullerton on the 12 american presidents who were slave owners, eight of them while in office. >> defense secretary ashton carter unveiled the defense department's plan to reform its command structure. the changes are aimed at
updating language of the 1986 goldwater/nichols act to meet the demands of modern warfare and to add cyberinto the command structure. this is 50 minutes. >> welcome. we're delighted to have you here. it shouldn't be this cold in april. i came down from new york this morning and it was snowing in wilmington. what the ll? but we're going to warm it up this afternoon. we're going to have an excellent opportunity to talk with secretary carter. thank you all for coming. a brief security announcement. he has a security detail. they're going to watch out for him. i'm going to watch out for all of you. if we have a problem, i would ask you to follow my
instructions. our exits are right here behind us. this is the door that's closest to the steps that go down to the street. if there's a problem out in front we're going to go in the back and go over to the national geographic society. we have an arrangement with them. if there's's a problem in the back we're going to go up front and go to st. matthews cathedral, count heads and say grace. anyway, we're going to be fine, but please follow my instructions. ash carter had the privilege of working with for almost 30 years. he interviewed me and decided i really wasn't up to what it took to be a successive p.a. i do not resent that. since that time we've had the privilege of working closely together for many years.
i'm honored h he's here. he's doing a spectacular job. please welcome ash carter and thank him for coming today. >> thanks very much, john, for that warm introduction. but more importantly, for many, many years of friendship, of guidance and wonderful service to our country over so many years. not to mention your leadership of this institution. i'm glad to be here. since this institution was founded over 50 years ago, the center if strategic and international studies has become to be considered one of the preimminent security-focused think tanks here in the nation's capital. you provide important ideas on pressing issues from defense strategy and budget to america's
strategic future in the asia pacific, to the growing threats we face in the domain of cyberspace, to reviewing the goldwater/nichols act that makes up much of dod's institutional organization. and it's because of that last piece of scholarship that i wanted to come here today. as many of you know, i recently issued my posture statement for the defense department for fiscal year 2017. the first to describe how we're approaching five strategic challenges -- russia, china, north korea, iran and terrorism. it is in context that i want to speak to you today about key long-term strategic management questions. the dod will be detailing and discussing with congressional defense committees in the very next coming weeks. >> the u.s. military has a long history of striving to reform
our command structures and improve how our strategies and policies are form lated, integrated and implemented. indeed, even while world war ii was still being fought, and before the defense department was even established, military leaders and policy-making officials were discussing how the military services could be unified and exploring ways to develop stronger policy processes and advice. the result was the national securities act of 1947 and its amendments, which among other historic changes established the position of the secretary of defense, the joint chiefs of staff, and the national security council. later reforms helped strengthen the offices of the defense secretary and gave new authorities to the chairmans of the joint chiefs. but it was the goldwater/nichols act enacted 30 years ago this fall that's most responsible for
today's mill tar and defense institutional organization. with the vietnam and the raids still fresh, officials and policymakers again considered reform. and after nearly four years of work, not to mention sfrong opinions by my former boss, then defense secretary casper weinberger, the resulting transformation is what we now refer to as goldwater/nichols. it solidified the chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. it affirms civilian control of the military by codifying in law the chairman of the joint chiefs of star is outside the chain of command. inrder for him to provide vital, objective, independent military advice to the defense secretary and the president. and at the same time, it also strengthened the chairman's role, created the position of
the vice chairman of the joint chiefs and centralized the role and voice of the come bah tant commands. and reasserted the concept of jointness, especially with respect to the career of senior officer, by requiring them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order to advance further in their careers. all senior officers know these policies today. they reflect the reality of how we fight every day as a joint force. right around this time, albeit unrelated to goldwater/nichols itself, important changes were made to reform defense acquisition. these were based on the packard commission, led by former deputy secretary of defense dave packard. as it happens, implementing the packard's remit remd dagss was
another one of my first challenges i worked on early in my own career. as a whole, all of these changes were overwhelmingly beneficial, a credit to the work of not only the members of congress who passed the legislation, but also their staffs john henry being among one of them, i must say. what they put into law has given us generations of soldier, sailors, airmen and marines who have joined accustomed to operating as a joint force. overcoming friction of decades before, and has led us to draw benefits from many chairman. from colin powell during operation desert storm to general joe dunford today. this year, as goldwater/nichols turns 30, we can see the world has changed since then. instead of coldwar and one clear
threat, we face an environment that's dramatically different. it's time we consider practical updates while still preserving its spirit and intent. for example, we can see in some areas how the pendulum between service aek bytys and jointness may have swung too far. as in not novembering the service chiefs enough and acquisition decision making and accountability. or where subsequent world events suggest nudging the pendulum further. as in taking more steps to strengthen the capability of the chairman and the joint chiefs to support force management, planning and execution across the combatant commands. particularly in the face of threats that cut across regional and functional combatant command areas of responsibility, as many increasingly do. last fall, i asked peter levine and lieutenant general tom
walthauser of the joint chiefs of staff to lead a comprehensive review of these issues. spanning the secretary of defense, the joint staffs, combat tabt kmaenders and the military department, to identify redundancies, inefficiencies or other areas of possible improvement. and i would like to discuss that review's preliminary recommendations with you today. >> over the coming weeks, with ewill execute some of these decisions under our own existing authority. where legislation is needed, we will work with the house as they consider this year's national defense authorization act. of course, both committees have their own important reviews of this issue under way as well. making this area ripe for working together, something i'm pleased to worth we've been doing effectively and will continue to do on this topic. i applaud chairman mccain, senator reid, chairman
thornbury, each of whom i was able to speak to earlier this morning. and also congressman smith. and i look forward to continuing to work closely with all of them in their committees. and it comes to these fundamental matters, that's what we have to do -- work together. let me begin with transregional and transfunctional integration and advice. imperative considering the challenges we face today areless likely than ever before to confine themselves to neat, regional or functional boundaries. our campaign to deliver isil a lasting defeat is one example. as we and our coalition partners have taken the fight to isil, both in its parent tumor in iraq and syria, and where it's metastasizing, our combata commanders from central european command, africa command have had to coordinate efforts more than
ever before. increasingly, i've also brought strategic command and cybercommand into these operations as well. to leverage their unique capabilities in space and cyber to contribute to the defeat of isil. and beyond terrorism, we also face potential future nation state adversaries with widening geographic reach, but also widen, exposure. something we may want to take into account in order to deescalate a crisis and deter aggression. and in other cases, we may have to respond to multiple threats across the globe in overlapping time frames. an increasingly complex security environment like this, and with the decision chain that cuts across the combatant commands only at the level of secretary defense. we're not postured to be as agile as we could be. accordingly, we need to clarify
the role and authority of the chairman, the joint chiefs and staff in three ways. one, to help synchronize sources globally, for daily operations around the world. enhancing our flexibility and my ability to move forces rapidly across the scenes between our combatant commands. two, to provide objective military advice for ongoing operations. not just future planning. and three, to advise the secretary of defense on military strategy and operational plans. for example, helping ensure that our plans take into account in a deliberate fashion the possibility of overlapping contingencies. these changes recognize that in today's complex world, we need someone in uniform who could look across the services and combatant commands. and make objective recomme recommendations about where to
allocate portions around the world and abortion risk for maximum benefit for our nation. and the person best postured to do that is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. we will pursue these changes in line with goldwater/nichols original intent. to enable the military to better operate in a seamless way while still preserving both civilian control and the chairman's independence to provide professional military advice outside of the chain of command. some have recommended the opposite course, to put the chairman in the chain of command, but both chairman dunford and i agree that would erode the chairman's objectivity as the principal military adviser to the president and the secretary of defense. and we appreciate the csis reached the same confusion in its own review of goldwater nichols. secondary, where we need to make updates is our combatant demands, adapting new functions
and continuing to aggressively streamline headquarters. adapting to new functions will include changes in how we manage ourselves in cyberspace in accordance with the emphasis i placed and the president made in his fiscal year 2017 budget. there i made clear in each of the five challenges facing dod, we must deal with him across all domains. not just the traditional air, land, sea and space, but also cyberspace. there your reliance on technology has given us great strengths and great opportunities, but also some vulnerabilities that adversaries are eager to exploit. that's why our budget increases cyberinvestments to a total of $35 billion over the next five years and why we should consider changes to cyber's role in dod's unified command plan. some of you may know, dod is currently in the process of reducing our management
headquarters by 25%, a needed step. we're on the road to accomplishing that goal, thanks to the partnership of the congressional defense committees, which once again we deeply appreciate. we can make these targets without combining northern command and southern command, or combining european command and africa command. actions that would run contrary to why we made them separate. because of their distinct areas of emphasis and increasing demands on our fourss in them. and indeed, those demands have only further increased in recent years with each command growing busier. so instead of combining these commands to the detriment of our friends, our allies and our own command and control capabilities, we intend to be more efficient by integrating functions, like logistics and intelligence and plans across the joint staff, the combatant
commands and subordinate demands, eliminating redundancies while not eliminating capability. and much can be done here. additionally in the coming weeks, the defense department will look to simplify and improve command and control where the number of four-star positions have made headquarters either top heavy or less efficient than they could be. the military is based on rank hierk i can, where juniors are supportive and rank to their seniors. this is true from the platoon to the corps level. but it gets complicated at some of our combatant and component command headquarters, where we have a deep bench of extremely talented senior leaders. so where we see potential to be more efficient and effective, billets currently filled with by four-star general and admirals will be filled by three stars in the future. the next area i want to discuss today is acquisition. 30 years after the packard commission's recommendation led to the establishment of an
undersecretary of defense for acquisition, serviacquisition executives and program managers, it's clear we still can and must do more with military capability while making better use of american tax dollars. six years ago when i was secretary of defense, dod began what i would call better buying power, an initiative to improve our acquisition system. and under the current undersecretary, frank kinnal, we're now on our third it ration, better buying power 3.0. while we're seeing compelling indications of positive improvements including reduced cost growth and reduced cycle time, there's still a constant need for improvement. particularly as technology, industry, and our own commissions continue to change. one way we're improving is by involving the service chiefs more in acquisition decision making and accountability,
consistent with legislation congress passed last year. including giving them a seat on the defense acquisition board and giving them greater authority at what's known as milestone b, where engineering and manufacturing development begins. that is, where programs are first defined and a commitment to fund them is made. as i discussed with the service chiefs, with greater responsibility comes greater accountability. they need to sharpen their skill set to be successful inform discharging their new acquisition responsibilities. many of them in war where speed and agilenity are critical.
the other way is we streamline the acquisition system itself, evaluating and where appropriate reducing other members of the defense acquisition board. it's currently composed of about 35 principipals and advisers, eh of whom is likely to feel empowered as a gatekeeper for acquisition. >> these layers will free up staff time on overcoming real obstacles to program success rather than bureaucratic hurdles. we also intend to reduce burdensome acquisition documentation. in case where is the defense t acquisiti acquisition, 14 separate documents be coordinated within the department. reducing this paperwork requirements in a meaningful way
and pushing approval authority lower down when a program is on the right track will eliminate redundant reviews and shorten review time lines, ultimately getting capabilities fielded to our troops sooner, which our service chiefs and our combatant commanders desire and deserve. the last major area where we need to update goldwater/nichols is making changes to joint personnel management as part of what i call the force of the future. a endeavor began to make sure our volunteer force is just as fine as the one i have the privilege of leading today. even as generations change and job markets change. we've taken several steps there are, building onramps and offramps so technical talent can more easily flow between dod and america's great innovative communities.
opening combat positions to women who meet standards. aechb opening access to 100% of our population for all the all-volunteer force. and to do more to support military families to improve the tension, like extending maternity and paternity leave and giving families is the foblt of some geographic flexibility in return for addition commitments. within of the hallmarks of goldwater/nichols is it made giant duty required. in so doing, it led to great advances in jointness across the military services. such that almost all our people know why and how we operate as a joint team. and it's also significantly strengthened the ability of our chairman, our joint chiefs and our combat at that particular
time commanders to accomplish their joint responsibilities. as we've learned over the years what it takes to operate jointly, it's become clear we need to change the requirements for joint duty assignment, which are more narrow and rigid than they need to be. accordingly, we're proposing to broaden the definition for positions in which an officer can receive joint duty credit. going beyond planning and command and control, to include joint experience and other operational functions, such as intelligence, fires, transportation and maneuver, protection and sustainment, including joint acquisitions. for example, a staff officer in a combatant and command will get joint duty credit. an officer in a combined air operation center accordingly service members in all different uniforms call on air strike against isil might not. in the other case, cyberairmen
work at a combatant command when cyberplans and gets joint credit, the other does cybertargeting and doesn't. what we're proposing will fix these discrepancies and fulfill the true purpose of goldwater/nichols which was to ensure meaningful joint experience. additionally, we're also proposing to shorten the amount of time required to accumulate joint duty. from three years to two year, so top personnel have more flexibility to take on command assignments and other opportunities to broaden and deepen their careers. now, going forward, it's important to make all these updates under the guiding principle of do no harm.
goldwater nichols took four years to write. and it's been incredibly successful over three decades to the credit of the reforms it put in place. which are not driven today by a signal failure, like desert one. on the contrary, i'm deeply proud of how our people operated in iraq and afghanistan over 15 years. the updates we make now should not outdo the positive benefits goldwater/nichols had for the dod. instead it must build on them. let me close today on why we're doing this. why it's important that we deal with all the prezzing challenges and threats we have to deal with every day and as we do that, we take a moment to address the
topic of our own organizational structure. we do this because our service members and the nation they protect deserve the best defense department and military we can give them, because they're giving their best day in and day out all around the globe. both sides of the aisle need to come together and give our men and women in uniform what they need to succeed from the right experience to the right capabilities to the right leadership structures to the right strategic thinking. is as long as we do, i'm confident they will continue to excel in defending our great country and making a better future for our children. thank you.
>> i don't want people to think we don't pay our bill and that's why the lights went out. someone leaned up against them in the back. you were very gracious about my being on the armed services committee, but we have john warner over here, and he was one of the architects. we should say thank you to john warner. i'm going to ask you to stay here as we get the secretary out. very substantive speech. so much we could zrau on. we don't need speeches which is what we get when we ask people to ask from the floor.
write down your questions and i'll come get them. you talked about a new cybercommand. and this is a complicated thing. probably any future war we fight will probably begin in the cyberspace, really. how do you see we integrate the physical fight that's kind of led and planned and coordinated by regional combatant commanders with a cybercommand? we have a cybercommand today. and i've given cybercommand in the counter-isil fight really its first wartime assignment. and we're seeing how that works out. and what that means is to bring the fight to isil in syria and in iraq. and what does that mean? it means interrupting their ability to command and control their forces.
their ability to pay their people, dominate the population in the territories they have tried to establish this nasty ideology. all that we can approach in cyber. now you ask what does that have to do with cent com. indeed, what it means is cybercome is in the service of that geographic commander. but it's more complicated than that, as you well know, john. we're increasingly finding the problem, not just of interregional integration, but of regional functional integration.
you have to divide up the pie somehow. that's what i'm looking to the chairman for. the reality is i'm looking to joe dunford for that every day any way. so as a practical matter i've got to have that. i depend on his professional military advice and his being in constant contact integrating across them, but that's the role i want to make sure i clarify and strengthen. i don't think that was as apparent to people back in the day but the world has gotten more integrated and we need to get more integrated, too. >> nobody questions the primacy of the secretary. but then there's the question of
how important and how powerful is the chairman. how important and how powerful are the service kwheefs. how important and powerful are the combatant commanders. what is your view of the right balance of this geometry? >> i look to each of them. i don't personality -- and we look at -- they have different principipaiplipal responsibilit. let me give you an example. this afternoon, i'll be going with the whole gang, all the service chiefs, service secretaries, seen yrs, civilians, over to meet with the president. spend the afternoon with him, have dinner with him. tomorrow we'll spend all day together, talking about everything from budget and programs through the wars and
contingency planning and the whole deal. i'll just take each of the ones you name. the service chiefs, i look at to be multidimensional. and they are. these are fantastic people. i've had a whole bunch of compliments, by the way -- this is an asigh but it's worth saying. i've had to name almost all joint chiefs. people seau wow, you have really great guys. i said you're right. they're amazing. but if i gave you my second choice, you would say the same thing to me. these are incredibly difficulted people. they didn't get there for no reason. and so i look at the chiefs to operate as the joint chiefs, helping the charmt provide professional military advice on operations. i looked at them to help manage what their service secretaries, their individual services. i look at them to take care of
our people is because that makes our military the greatest. they play a role that probably wasn't as apparent early on in what we buy and how we organize, train and equip. i ask the senior people to do it all. most of them, without exception, they're capable of doing that. i aults say, look around the room, gang, it's just us. when you look at it that way, it doesn't seem like a large group of people. you're happy to have all the help you can go.
we get a radical jihadist element waging a conventional fight in syria, iraq. that's in a different command, african command. it's attacking our allies in paris and brussels? it's suggests that you're going to have to put a greater focus on a chairman. could you amply fie that? >> i'll give you a few examples. we try to move things from one day to another.
i desperately need it all. it's human nature and that's what you want. they want to do everything they can to accomplish the mission. it's made clear he's the military adviser to the president. that advice on how things ought to be used. as a practical matter, everyone knows i look to joe dunford to do that.
there will be others who come alock later, and it's important to clarify that is a requirement. the secretary of defense will make the chief of staff in today's world. is there a battle here against isil. there have been some very encouraging press reports. yet also it's a metastasizing threat. would you share with us how you're currently looking at this? >> yeah. we've got to get these guys beaten. as soon as possible. we're looking for every opportunity we can take to do that.
you have to look ahead to the w with local forces. where they can be made capable and motivated and that's difficult in someplaces, but that is necessary, it's a necessary part of the strategy. but we are doing more every day and john, we are looking for opportunities to do yet more. because we need to get this over with. so i'm confident we will defeat isil, no question in my mind about us. but the sooner the better. and what that has us looking at is every conceivable way that we can do that. that's why i mentioned cyber for example, that years ago, even a very few years ago, would not have occurred to a secretary of defense, hey, let's get cyber in the game, these guys are using the tool and we need to take it
away. from them. that in addition to everything that we do in the air, and on the ground, and so forth. and yes -- you know, we are accelerating it, we are gathering momentum, but i want to see it over with, first of all in syria and iraq. >> yep. >> and then, everywhere around the world. >> secretary, i'm not going to drag you in to american politics, it's startling to hear the candidates talk about how nato is no longer relevant. i know you met yesterday with the secretary general. how important is nato now for our future? you described a very challenging world. and where does nato fit in at? >> i will tell you that, in one minute, since you raised the former subject. let me say, once again i said on a number of occasions and i really mean this both on my own behalf and everyone in my department. i know it's an election year.
we have a tradition in the country, we in the defense department stand aparted from that. and so, i'm going to be very careful about addressing anything as part of the political debate. still less do i want any of our uniformed personnel put in that position. i need to preface anything that i say on that basis. i did meet with secretary general stoltenburg yesterday, he was in town and he met with the president also and last night, i had dinner with him and secretary kerry, and national security adviser rice, and we were talking about the things that nato is doing, and do, going forward. and if you think about nato, john, as you know, and you and i did this, nato waged and i would say was successful in ending the cold war in a peaceful and principaled way and there's a
lot of question at that time what will be next and then the balkans came and nato turned out to be instrumental in that, and afghanistan and they are still that way in that. and in many other ways around the world, and today, we are looking to it for two particular things. which are very necessary. one, is to stand tall against the russian -- the possibility of russian aggression in europe, which i'm sorry to say that has become again something that we need to be concerned about that we weren't for a while. and i regret it, but it is what it is. and also the possibility of so-called hybrid warfare, little green men, phenomina, and then
helping our friends in the counter-isil coalition. so you say, what difference does it make having nato as nato in the counter-isil fight, to add value, for a lot of the smaller countries, it's hard for them to do anything on their own and to join something ad hoc, if they get in a nato structure, it's easier for them to make a contribution. and we are looking for all the contributions we can get. we will lead the way, but as always we want others contributing and nato is a mechanism for doing that. it turns out that even after the founding mission was so to speak accomplished that there's proven to be lots of ways where and europe have found it not only possible, but necessary to come together and i guess one last note on that, you know, you can't take for granted that, you
know, one of the reasons that i think we do so well as a military, and i'm just going to brag on the institution here a bit is. you know, as i said, first and foremost, it's people and second that it lives in the world's e pre-eminant society, and the other thing is what we stand for. and i don't just say that and -- my evidence of that is that we have a lot of friends and allies, and why is that? it's because they like what we stand for. they like our people. they love working with american service members. they think they conduct themselves well. they are not only competent, but conduct themselves well. and i think it's a great credit to the young men and women, how much liked they are to work with. you know, you can look around the globe and you say, where is
it that we deeply share views to which we are very committed and europe is a place like that. so, something that brings us together, protecting something we share, is pretty important. so for all of those reasons we had a lot to talk about yesterday. >> secretary, you have -- you are testifying these days on your budget. you have a bit of a reprieve this year, because there was a two-year agreement, but the program of record is larger than the budget caps. >> hm-mm. >> that are in law. >> yeah. >> you know, your success or is going to have to wrestle with a very difficult problem. we don't have enough money to do the things we have to do. what do you say to the american people? >> that we need to come together as we did in the two year way for the bipartisan budget
agreement. it's the only way, and i can't do much about that as secretary of defense, but as a citizen, and if you have your eyes open, you know that -- well secretary of defense, what i do know is our biggest strategic risk is the collapse of a bipartisan budget agreement. >> yes. >> going forward, the restoration of the equekwe sequ caps. we have to avoid that. we have a prieve i'm grateful for people coming together. very grateful that people came together. we can do the math, john, you can't balance the books on the backs of the discretionary spending. >> right, right, right. >> so you have to get in the other parts of the budget. now, that is much bigger than a -- somebody who has an executive branch responsibility, even a vital one like mine, can
influence. but that is the way it has to be. and if we get back to sequester, we are in real trouble. so for me, and the rest of the department, our biggest strategic risk resides in the possibility of the collapse of bipartisanship and a restoration of the sequester caps. we are in real trouble if that happens, as you know. >> there's a personal comment, i'm disappointed this presidential debate is not more about our national security obligations. it's a very, very big thing. secretary, i know you are going to asia a couple of times this summer. we have got continued island building in the south china sea. a lot of questioning about people in the region, where is america as the pivot reel, can you share your thinking here? >> well, we have a new phase of
the rebalance. it's in a posture statement. so we are doubling down on some of our investments, both qualitative and quantity. it's essential. and it's important there as everywhere else that there be a system of peace and stability. now america has been and american military power has been a criticedi critical ingredient for 70 years. we want to keep it going, but it has to be different, because the dynamics are different. we have been instrumental to an environment. if you think about it, john, first, japan rose, there was a japanese miracle and a south korean miracle, and then a taiwan miracle, and now a indian
miracle. which is great, but you cannot take for granted that every environment that people were able to rise and fulfill themselves in their own way. this is a region with no nato, where the wounds of world war ii are not healed. you cannot take it for granted. and the south china sea is one example of that. that's a number of countries that have claims in the south china sea and some of them are pursuing military activities. china is not the only one, by far and a way, particularly over the last year, china has been the most aggressive in that regard. now, our president and president were talking about this a couple of days ago, and we will see if china keeps the word that it made last time the president was here about military activities.
but we, for our part are reacting. and we are reacting as part of the rebalance unilaterally, but the most important thing is countries in the region are reacting. that is why we are being asked so much more to do so much more. you are right, i will be traveling out in the region, what will i be doing? i will be working with countries that want to do more with the united states, particularly in the area of maritime security. they are wanting the do it to keep a good thing going. and we are committed to do that and we will do it. >> you mentioned india and they have been an awkward partner in the years and increasingly getting close. i know you devoted a lot of time thinking about it. your thoughts? >> well, i do spend a lot of time on it, the word i used with respect to the united states and india are destiny. here are two great nations, that
share a lot. a democratic form of government. a commitment to individual freedom. and so forth. so i talked about values earlier on, and india is a place where -- sure, it's a different culture, it's actually many cultures. like us, it's a multi-cultural melting pot determined to work together. so we have a lot of things in c common in spirit. and one of them is to keep a good thing going. and so we are looking to do more with india. indians are like many others, also proud. so they want to do things independently and they want to
do things their own way. they don't want to do anything just with us. and that's fine, but we are looking for a closer and stronger relationship as we can, because it's geo-political ly grounded. we are doing two things. one is the rebalance, so to speak, westward from the united states and they have act east. which is their approach eastward, these are like two hands grasping one another and that's a good thing. and a second, our defense technology and trade initiative, john, which is an effort to work with india to do something they want to do. which is they want to improve the technical capabilities of their own defense industry and their own defense capabilities. but they don't want to be just a buyer. they want to be a co-developer and co-producer. they want that kind of relationship. that very much and that's what we are working with them on and
that matches very much up with the prime minister initiative. and so, in -- we are very much aligned in terms of what the government there is trying do strategically and economically and what we want to do with the defense. we have a lot of stuff to do, when i go over there, we have a bunch of things that we will be announcing at that time, that are new milestones in the relationship. >> we are coming to the hour, secretary. let me shift very different to say, a lot of concern about our dep dependence on space and the depending on space assets. how do you think of it? >> it is a great strength, but it's a vulnerability. when you have them in your military system and it works like that, a satellite is a fixed target. in essence, right?
it's a fixed target. you know where it will be at all times. and there's no terrain to hide in. you can't dig a hole or anything up in space. so there you are. and so, it's an inherently vulnerable situation. that said, there are things you can do. electronically and in terms of orbital maneuvers and so forth to make it difficult for somebody to interfere with yourself function and we are doing that. but, at the same time, you have to ask yourself, if, what if it's disrupted or destroyed, what do we do then? to make sure that we can accomplish something like the same function in some other way. operate through. so, we are looking both at defense, if you like, and operate through, and one thing i will note for you, john, that you are probably aware of but others don't. but because you know so much about what is going onin the
department. we set up an operation center if first time we have have one. i will be there in a couple of weeks in colorado springss to see how they are doing. whose job is specifically to do that. i mean, the phrase is fight the constellation, if you know what that means, it means, protect it insofar as that is possible from disruption or destruction and then think through what you will do if despite anything, the enemy has success against that constellation, what do you do next and make sure we have a good operational answer to that. >> i had the privilege of watching this remarkable intellect for 30, 35 years. thank you, and we are at the hour that we have to let you go. would you all please join me with your thanks and say thank you. [ cheers and applause ]
olivia golden, talking about workman dates and may cause as many as one million americans to lose their food stamps. then patrick mclaughlin, senior research fellow, on their report that ranks 50 states and the district of columbia by the effect of federal regulations on a state's economy. and brian lyman, state reporter for the montgomery advertiser, following reports of an inappropriate relationship a former staffer. be sure to watch c-span's washington journal, beginning live at 7:00 a.m. eastern thursday morning. join the discussion. coming up thursday, a hearing on the u.s. army force posture and readiness level. acting army secretary patrick murphy and general mark millie
testified before the senate armed services committee, you can see it here on c-span 3. thursday, president obama returns to the university of chicago law school, where he once taught, for a townhall meeting on the supreme court and judicial system. we will bring it to you live at 3:30 eastern on our companion network, c-span. this is everything that
i have. my family. i got to see my dad die on national tv. they don't know what they took from us. people are dying. we need a president that is going to talk about it. i believe bernie sanders is a protester. he is not scared to go up against the criminal justice system. he is not scared. that's why i'm for bernie. >> i'm bernie sanders and i
approved this message. one of the newest campaigns now on air two weeks before the primary in that state in the new york media markets. and joining us is nick corasaniti, thank you for being with us. >> thanks for having me. >> what is the message in this ad? >> it's one that was run by the sanders campaign at a longer length, it's a 2:00 ad in south carolina. he is the daughter of the man that died after being placed in a whochoke hold. they talks about her life as an activist, and after she said that, the ad switches to pictures of bernie sanders as a young man in the chicago civil rights protests in 1963. and she said something like, i
believe bernie sanders is a protester. it's a message that he is one of us. it's a message that the clinton and sanders campaign has been doing when they are campaigning to african-american communities. so, the underlying message of the ad is when eric garner said, i believe bernie sanders is a protester. that is her way of saying, he is with us in the fight. >> it sets the stage for a primary in new york that will get a lot of attention, a lot of media attention, in light of the front page story with the meeting that took place with bernie sanders, guns becoming a personal issue to new york voters. >> it will be an issue that will come up in the new york primary. and it will be interesting to just see how the candidates goes great navigating the wisconsin media market to the new york
media market. secretary clinton being a senator here, is familiar with the state, she knows how to navigate both the tabloids and the major newspapers and the networks. has deep connections to up state, where as senator sanders, while he was a resident of new york city for 18 years in brooklyn, he is not as familiar, both to the voters and also with the current state of new york politics and the new york media. so, i think you will see from that interview with the daily news, and a few other ways that he has been reintroducing himself to new york, he is coming a a disadvantage. not being the former senator of new york and not having an office in harlem until 2011. that will be part of the initial stages of the new york primary between the two. >> clearly the candidates want to win. as we saw in wisconsin yesterday, even though hilary clinton lost the state, she picked up some delegates. for the sanders campaign, they
want to win new york, but is it more about the delegate math? >> it's about the delegate math the not just as much or more so than the momentum that comes off of a win. they are both looking at a place to pick up delegates and protect the lead and keep the race where it is. a clinton loss in new york would be humiliating and frustrating for the campaign. create new worry about her strength as a candidate in the democratic party. and her campaign has been saying, not directly but hinting, senator sanders would need a significant delegate win to close the gap. if it's like wisconsin or anything, the delegate math is still heavily in the clinton campaign's favor. while sanders would love a win in new york, and get that momentum or big multipomentum t
going, a lot of it is picking up the delegates. >> so based on all of that, you have been looking at the latest polling in new york, what did the polls tell you and how different is it between the new york city area and up state? >> well, it's certainly very different and you still see the clinton home state advantage in terms of her being a former senator here and being very familiar to the people of new york as a resident recently. she still has a pretty commanding double digit lead in most of the polls and she also has a good network built in the state. when she was senator, she was certainly known to new york city and kicked off the campaign doing a up state listening tour. she has made a lot of the campaign platforms off of her experience as a senator. her agriculture experience comes from dealing with new york state farms. she talked about on the camp obtain trail that she learned
there's nmore than 1 cow in new york. now, she will obviously do well in new york city with her reputation among the african-american and other minority communities. she will be strong in some of the up state cities like buffalo and rochester as well, because of her tenure as senator, she has a strong base among some of the more rural areas. that is not to say that senator sanders does not have strong ho holds. he does well in college towns, there's a lot of young people that moved in to new york city. it will be interesting to see how it plays out. how he is able to cut in to secretary clinton's long established roots in new york and new york city. ? we will look for your reporting online, nick corasaniti, who is following the story for the "new york times" thank you for being with us.
we appreciate it. >> thank you for having me. >> book tv has 48 hours of nonfiction, books and authors every weekend. here are some of the programs to watch for. starting saturday, 1:30 p.m. eastern, book tv is live at the 21st annual los angeles times festival of books. then at 10:00 p.m., afterwords with jc watts. he talks about his latest book. dig deep. seven truths to finding the strength within. which outlines the guiding principals he has followed throughout his life. you are going to have to over come adversity and you will have to have humility. i have learned to try to run my race and maybe, maybe i was you know, in athletics, i was so
focused. really wasn't -- i told that reporter, i said, if my skin color was an issue, that was everybody else's issue. that wasn't mine. >> on sunday, at 10:00 p.m. eastern, gillian thomas talks about her book, called "because of sex," which talks about the civil rights act that made it illegal to discriminate based on sex and working women. go to the website for the complete working schedule. the sixth amendment clause guaranteeing the right of a speedy trial is the subject of the oral argument of betterman versus montana. they heard betterman's plea and he then spent 14 months in a montana jail waiting punishment. this oral argument is about an hour.
i will hear argument next in case 14-1457. bett betterman versus montana. mr. rowley. >> the speedy trial clause applies to a criminal prosecution through the culmination and sentencing. it's not cut off when the defendant pleads or is found not guilty. the clause guarantees a early and proper disposition of a criminal charge and that applies to the guilt stage of a prosecution when most defendants plead guilty and to the sentencing stage, which may be the only place in a crina prosecution today, when a defendant mounts a defense. >> does the federal speedy trial act, does it cover sentencing or limited to trial? >> your honor, my understanding is that it's limited to trial.
the court has recognized specific interests that are protected by the speedy trial clause and those interests apply not to presumptively innocent defendants, as the state and government suggest, but also to guilty defendants. the clause is the s that is interest in rehabilitation and that a pro longed period of detention in jail can affect a defendant's rehabilitation. well, that is specific to a guilty defendant. and in smith v huey. the court noted that even though the defendant had been incarcerated in federal prison that defendant could still be prejudiced by a pro longed delay in the state prosecution that followed because it could affect his ability to seek a concur ant sentence. that interest also is specific
to a guilty defendant. the sharp line between the guilt stage of the prosecution and the sentencing stage of a prosecution is not supported by this court's speedy trial precedence. >> what do you do with -- all of the speedy trial decisions say that's one remedy. and that is, case over. dismissal is the only appropriate remedy. but you are -- you are not arguing that, i understand, with respect to sentencing. >> he is why, your honyes, your. >> you are arguing that? >> no, we are not arguing that. >> it's different, the speedy trial clause, if you do not comply with the speedy trial, dismissal. you are saying sentencing is not the same to that extent t remedy is different. >> at the guilty stage of the prosecution, the outcomes are binary so the defendant is
either guilty or innocent. so there's two possible outcomes. sentencing the situation is different. there's greater opportunity for taylors which is what the court requires per morrison. and there may be a greater need for tayloring, because the defendant has been adjudicated guilty. in the sentencing context where the courts have a range of possible sentences and outcomes tallering -- there's a greater opportunity for tayloring. >> would the remedy be in a case like this? >> we submit the proper remedy would be to reduce mr. betterman's sentence by the period of delay. and the montana supreme court clk concluded the unjustified delay was 14 months. >> he wias serving a sentence fr
another crime. >> yes, he got time served the other sentence, that period of delay, the 14 months was not credited to his sentence on the bail jumping sentence, which is the sentence that is at issue here. and we submit that a proportionate or appropriate remedy would be to reduce that sentence for the period he was denied access to rehabilitation programs and suffered the anxiety that is detailed in his affidavit, and that would be a way to go. the lower courts have applied that sort of remedy to sentencing delays. and another possible outcome and another case would be a simply to vacate the remaining portion of the defendant's sentence. but here we submit that a taylored remedy would be just reducing his sentence. >> what do you make of the fact that the sixth amendment said the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury. >> we no that does not limit trial, the public trial right might apply at a suh presentati -- at a su. -- if you go back to the purpose of the impartial jury clause, which was to prevent jurors from offering evidence against the defendant, it makes sense that it applies to the stages to a criminal prosecution where a jury is convened. >> if we were to disagree with you and say there's no sixth amendment right and there was only a due process right. have you waived any argument that you meet the due process
standard? >> we did not include that in the question presented, in the montana supreme court, rejected that challenge. it applied a due process test and concluded that under a due process analysis, mr. betterman would not be entitled to relief. and that gets to an important point. >> i understand that, you are admitting that you are giving up, that the analysis under the due process clause may have been wrong. >> your honor, we are not advancing that claim here. and so, there's the significant difference we submit between the due process analysis and the barker test that this court has applied under the sixth amendment speedy trial right. and that is, under a barker analysis -- criminal prosecution, the test that is applied under a due process analysis does not address -- >> i agree, why do you think
lavaskco applies at all, that is preinindictment where we were creating an exception and saying, generally the state has the period of a statute of limitations to bring in action. if you want to cut them off from having that right, you need to show actual prejudice. >> that's the test that the montana supreme court applied below. it is the test that other courts that have rejected the sixth amendment speedy trial right to application at sentencing, they have pivoted to the due process test in lavasco, and that creates a significant burden. >> just to continue in this line of questioning, there's another case that we had that dealt with civil forfeitures. where it said, we will do a due process analysis, but we are
going to take the barker factors as our test for that due process analysis. so i think one of the questions that the justice is asking, why wouldn't that be equally appropriate here. in other words, even if and i'm not saying this is right, but even if, there's, this is falling within the due process box, rather than the sixth amendment box, that there's still a further question as to whether the lavasco approach is right, or whether this u.s. currency approach is right. >> your honor, that is what the montana supreme court attempted to do it. it modified the lavasco test and tried to draw a barker principals in applying it. if you compare the result in the case, to the result in the burquette case, where the court analyzed the specific forms of prejudice that are at issue in a
pretrial. and if you don't, if you presume prejudice or require the state prosecution to rebutt. the court from found a violation and the court here, despite modifying lavasco, did not find a violation. so, the test is still inadequately protective. >> i'm not sure what you mean by this. in the other case, the civil forfeiture case, we just said, we are going to apply the four factors of barker and if that were the result of the due process approach -- i mean, it would not make any difference which box it was in. >> that is true, your honor, but that is not what the montana supreme court did. they did not apply all the factors in barker. they did not apply barker in a straight board fashion. they approached it the same way that lavasco did, it required
that the showing be substantial. and that is different from the barker test and we submit also that given the specificity of this right, that it's eenumerated in the sixth amendment that it would not be appropriate to put that in the due process test. the better process is to do what the lower frame works have done. apply it in straight forward fashion to a delay at sentencing. >> but you are not asking us to do it in a straight forward fashion. that is what justice ginsburg asked you. you are giving up the barker remedy. great your honor, the lower courts in alying barker to the sentencing contest have fixed, more taylored remedies. in recognition of a fact that there may be a difference between a delay at the guilty stage and a delay at sentencing because now the defendant has been convicted. so the lower courts in applying barker have done this.
they have taylored remedies they have applied remedies that leaf the convictions standing and it will try to fix a proportionate remedy for the delay. >> so why don't you think they have done the same thing under the due process clause? recognizing that it is unfair to undo a conviction merely for sentencing delay, because you are no longer presumed innocent. you are now guilty. >> the key -- >> um, why isn't the due process test that is being applied, that modification? your honor, the reason why the due process test as it has been applied by the lower courts does not do the job, is because they continue to require an affirmative showing of prejudice. so they don't presume prejudice, which may be significant. washington, the case out of the
fifth circuit illustrates this, the court there did not presume prejudice. it may be important to presume prejudice, because it's hard to show the effect of the delay on the defendant's defense or other forms of prejudice. and so, even the courts that have alapplied it, and modified it, still don't presume prejudice or require the prosecution to make a showing in response to articulated prejudice. so, even this modified version that you see in the montana supreme court opinion below, we submit is inadequate. >> when you say prejudice should be presumed, do you mean it should be presumed conclusively, could it be rebutted? >> yes, it could be rebutted and indeed in a case like this,
where the defendant has articulated specific forms of access. the state should be able to come in and rebutt those claims. the state did not offer that evidence in the case. the first evidence that we saw was in the briefing on the merits in the court. so, the state did have the opportunity to make a showing, and it didn't do that. >> when you say that the remedy should be taylored, taylored to what? what is the court supposed to do in your view, select a punishment that is appropriate to deter the state from doing this again? or select a remedy that in some way undoes the damage of the prejudice that has been done to the defendant? >> your honor, morrison speaks to this. and it requires that the court fix a remedy that is taylored to
the injury suffered from the constitutional violation. >> okay, in that situation, i don't know why reducing the sentence by the length of the unconstitutional delay that is supposedly unconstitutional delay, undoes the damage that has been done by the dey. >> your honor, it's a proportionate remedy because the defendant was denied. mr. betterman was denied access to the rehabilitation programs. that were not only good for themselves, but bears on his case for parole or early release. the fact that he was denied access to them bares on his ability to win early he release and this court recognizes that any amount of time that is spent -- we say it is
proportionately taylored. >> when justice begins asked you about the federal speedy tri act, and you said that does not cover sentencing. but there's provisions of montana law that do cover sentencing. why didn't you seek relief under those? >> your honor, there's montana statutes that require that sentencing be placed within a reasonable amount of time and for close on reasonable delay. we have been unable to find a case, where the defendant was able to win some kind of relief on the basis of those statutes. on the montana supreme court decision below reflects. the court's view, that they had due process principals. so it was due process principals that provided the relief. and we have not found a case that gives free standing, independent, relief on the basis of the statutes. if you look at the rule 32 cases -- >> did you bring a claim under those statute ss? >> we did not, we did not.
>> would it be appropriate if i'm mad to respond, yes, there's -- but he had advantages too from being in jail, he was encloseser to his family. he was closer to his council to confer more easily with council. when we have to consider, we have to consider the plus as well as the disadvantages. >> certainly, your honor, if the prosecution offered that kind of evidence, it would weigh in the balance. and barker discussed that, notes that the speedy trial clause is unusual in that delay in some instances may benefit the defendant. but here, where mr. betterman has submitted an affidavit and also in the initial motion detailed the prejudice that he suffered. from this delay. in ability to access the programs that he was ordered to complete and that under montana regulation would bear directly
on his case for parole. the prejudice is palpable and resonates with other cases. where the court noted that even if you are inkacarcerated on a prior charge, you may have this problem. back to justice sodamayor's question. if you compare the outcome here and compare the outcome in verkette, verkette advanced a theory. it was that he was denied rehabilitation programs and he suffered anxiety. the defendant testified to that affect and the third circuit concreted that in the absence of contrariy evidence that was enough to state or show a sixth amendment violation. whereas in the decision below, the montana supreme court placed
the burden squarely on mr. betterman to make an affirmative showing of substantial prejudice. even though he submitted the affidavit that detailed the prejudice. the montana supreme court deemed it speculative. >> my problem is with the use of language. prejudice is prejudice. and i -- they seem to be arguing that substantial prejudice means something like actual damages. that you can point to something that i have actually been damaged by either having served longer than the sentence that is imposed or something else like that. why you are taking on the substantial damage definition? why aren't you arguing that prejudice is prejudice? >> well, it is, your honor, but lavasco uses the word actual, so the test that was applied -- >> you are still in the lavasco
test. >> that's the court that the due process test that the court has alie aapplied, now if the court said that the barker test including the way that barker approaches prejudice could be actionable under the due process clause, that would be a different story. but simply not the way that lower courts have companion hav that would give a defendant sixth amendment relief under the due process clause. but that is not what the montana supreme court did it. >> and that's not the way you are arguing the case. >> we did not preserve a due process challenge. it's solely under the sixth amendment and set forward in the question presented and indeed, in the lower courts we pressed the sixth amendment right. but, to your honor's question, if the court were to take that sixth amendment analysis and drop it in the due process context, the defendant would get the same relief. but we submit that just given that the right is eenumerated in
the sixth amendment. that the relief ought be granted under that clause and not shunted in to due process. >> there are no further questions, i would like to reserve the balance of my time. >> thank you, council. mr. schowengerdt we are trying protect a innocent defendant from a criminal charge. it's consistent with the text and history of the clause. and it's consistent with the remedy that must be applied. it leaves them with other ability -- if the government,
unjustify ably delays and forfeits the right. which is why a dismissal is the remedy. sentencing delay does impact the validity with trial. and after conviction, none of the interests that are supported by this speedy trial clause apply. for example, there can be no anxiety over public accusation, because the accusation has been confirmed, at the moment of conviction, the defendant's liberty is justly deprived that is why bail is not available at that point. >> when in your view, let's say, we agree with you that speedy trial is not the right ruberik,
when would a delay in sentencing be a problem? >> if a defendant was not able present mitigating evidence. that could be an example. if he is serving a -- awaiteding sentencing for a time longer than the maximum sentence for the charge. that would be another example. good but you would not count factors of the time that were raised here, that is, i could have gotten in to a drug treatment program in the penitentiary that is not available in the jail? you would not include that? >> that is right, it's too speculative a basis. it's speculative, whether
rehabilita rehabilitateive programs were available. and whether they would take them. the defendant was offered parole conditioned that he would fill -- fulfill rehabilitation program. he started the rehabilitation program and 16 days later he quit it. so, his pa roll was rescinded. that is the part of speculative basis, it's too speculative to give a remedy. but the defendant is always able to file a claim if the sentence is harming him. he can first ask to be sentenced, the defendant in the case, didn't mention it until nine months in to the process. >> there may be some real differences between the pretrial context and the presentencing context. but one which seems quite similar is the potential of delay to impair the defense. so, i guess i would like you to
address that because, you know a the petitioners point out, in most cases these days. most of the adjudication goes on in sentencing rather than at the trial stage given that we don't have many trials anymore. and they made it clear that it was an important interest in thinking of the speedy trial right. >> a few points. first of all, i would say that you know, had that danger is equally at issue in preinindictment delay, delay involving appeal, which is not included in the speedy trial analysis. second, so that can be remedied by due process, even if it's a similar interest. second -- >> well doesn't it talk about a whole different set of
considerations in the pretrial context, that does not apply once the accusation has been made? >> perhaps not, i think it will apply in the appeal context and even apply at the retrial order in a remanded case. that is interests that the due process clause can remedy. the other point is sentencing is different. i mean, the same rules do not apply and usually the same facts are not at issue. i mean, given plea agreements, that the real action is in the plea bargaining anyway. and the prosecutors and the deficit agree on a sentence or a range of sentences and that is implemented by the judge. >> sometimes, but there may be real factual disputes, it could be about the amount of loss or prior bad acts or a range of
things that are the kinds of of things that we typically think of as contested issues at trial. >> that is true. i would argue that the due process provides adequate remedy in the situation. there's a different standard too. the rules of evidence doesn't apply. the confrontation clause does not apply. there's no burden to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt and the argument is that due process can remedy any -- >> that's the problem, how do you prove, i mean, let's take a sentence like this one where you have the possibility of a sentence between zero and ten years. how does the judge know whether if the defendant is brought before him at year eight, 8-1/2, 9.
how does the judge know that if the defendant was brought to him in year five, you would have given him a six-year sentence rather than an eight? don't you think there's a lot of pressure on the judge if the defendant's hearing is delayed for eight years to say, time served? that really -- don't you think there's prejudice in the fact that an unexplained delay caused by the state, more likely than not had some sort of affect on the sentence? >> i think in that case, the defendant should. if it's that length ofy of a de, he can file a petition in that context. >> well, this defendant asked to be sentenced faster. he was told there was other issues that the court was dealing with. so a couple of the months were not his fault clearly not his fault. it was an administrative fault. >> that is true.
there was not all the delay was his fault. but he didn't mention anything about wanting to be sentenced until nine months in to the process. >> well, that may go to the issue of whether under a barker analysis or any analysis he should be heard to complain about the delay. but, i still, not quite sure why your definition of substantial prejudice or actual prejudice should be the controlling one. >> i think, the courts have, even the lower cuts that have applied the speedy trial clause to sentencing delay, the tenth circuit for example in prez bisullivan, they assume that it applies on the one hand based on the decision in pollard and on the other one, they recognize that the interests don't apply. in order to fashion a remedy, a defendant has to show prejudice. and in addition, it takes in to
account that the balance has shifted. that the person is no longer accused but convicted and his presumption of innocence has vanished. >> assume there's a prompt trial and a substantial delay thin sentencing and then there's an appeal. and the appeal results in a new trial. does the speedy trial act then apply when the defendant says, that my second trial was delayed? fr are there case on that? >> i don't think so, generally when the lower courts are applying delay, they apply due process. i cannot think -- >> if that delay were attributable to the state, it seems to me that there would be a speedy trial act violation in that connection. >> there may be, and lower courts when they are looking a delay or delay in sentencing, it's a similar test as far as the speedy trial clause is
concerned when they are applying it presentencing because it needs a showing of prejudice. >> you are not aware of any cases of the kind i've indicated that the speedy trial act clicks in under the second trial? >> under montana law, how do they get relief if they have inordinate sentencing? >> there's specific procedures that are put in place. >> but mr. rowley indicated there are rules there and no defendants have had the benefit of getting their sentences shortened because of those. >> well, i'm not aware of any defendants pressing claims any reported decisions on those claims one way or t other. but a defendant has that option.
i think, fashioning a remedy just for delay is difficult. my friend, mentioned 14 months, but the delay was not 14 months of unjustified delay. like i said he does not make his claim until nine months. but before that there will be delay in sentencing. >> the court did say that it -- the delay was principally caused by the courts institutional problems. >> there was, a court took a while to decide post conviction motions and then it was institutional delay. i don't disa agree with that. my point is, there will always be delay in the process. to figure out what the remedy would be, simply by including the entire 14 months, i think would be a wind fall. especially in the case, where he was receiving credit on his sentence. >> that typical? is that typical for a sentencing
court to give credit for time served? >> yes, in fact, it's statutory. >> can they do it with a indetermined range of sentence 0-10. could they do it and say it should be 0-9 in the case because of the delay? >> i think a judge could do that. in his -- in the petitioner's first conviction on domestic assault. he was given time and it was applied against his sentence. >> you think the courts, the judges are incapable of making determinations of a remedy? >> certainly not. no, i think, and i think under due process, you know, that's the, that's the advantage of due process. if courts can fashion a remedy to target the specific prejudice and i think they are well equipped to do that. >> where did it come from the
barker versus wengott, where prejudice is supposed to be assumed. they don't say that, they analyze prejudice. >> that's right, the court only assumed prejudice in one case. >> we held it? >> you did, and it was two things, extraordinary delay, it was an 8-1/2 year period where they were indicted and brought to trial. and there was no justifiable reason for that delay. >> no, no, my question is, your council says that barker versus winggo, if it applied would be presuming prejudice. i have been looking at that, in the casist, it does not presume prejudice. i want to know where it comes from. the first factor in barker is --
>> i know the four factors, i have them in front of me. >> that is the presumptive prejudice factor gets you to the test. it triggers the test. my friend is citing doi ining d >> it's a 20-year delay, the person will not remember who he was going to call and all the witnesses will be gone and so forth. so, i think it's fair to say that there was prejudice in such a case if that is what it's about. if it's not presumed all the time, do you have any objection as he apparently does not have an objection to us saying you are right, it's the due process clause. now, in applying due process clauses to cases where the sentencing has been undoily
delayed or that was the claim. the court should apply the factors that are set out in barker versus wengo. >> there's a couple of problems with that, barker was designed to take in to account the pretrial interest. so it fit in that context. so, applying barker, courts have done it -- >> i'm sorry, that was a forfeiture case and that was a penalty after adjudication. the forfeiture does not start until someone has been found -- >> i'm sorry, it was a pre -- basically, property was taken before -- >> whatever the case is, i would like to get an answer to my question. it says that the court should balfour factors, length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendants assertion of its right and prejudice to the defendant. now, if i quote that sentence, and say those are the factors
that should be taken in to account under the due process clause, do you have any objection to that? >> prejudice needs to take the forefront in that analysis. >> i should reverse it? >> the problem with barker is that none of the factors are necessary. so, prejudice does not necessarily have to be shown in barker. lower courts have modified that and said, in the post conviction setting a defendant has to show prejudice in the test that lower courts use, the modified barker test looks a lot like lavasco and i would say, it's not distinguishable because of prejudice. and prejudice is the key to the answer to your question, that in the post conviction setting, had that is what is necessary. >> it also, my friends point that the petitioner made a claim of prejudice in the space of a
couple of paragraphs and this sort of illustrates the problem the state has in rebutting claims of prejudice that are not s substantiated, he did not file it until three months after he filed the motion and it was denied. the motion to reconsider. defendants have to come forward with some showing of prejudice. >> that might prevent some challenges, but there are challenges on the other side. it's often hard to show that people have forgotten things. that's the -- they have forgotten them. so, unless there's something like a witness dying, it's very difficult to make the kind of showing that you are suggesting. and that's why barker, you know, left things flexible. and said, you know, in most cases, we really are going to look at prejudice and see what you have to say for yourself. in some extreme cases we are not going to do that.
i am back with justice briars question, saying yes, it's a different context, why don't all the same considerations apply. >> the court has never presumed prejudice. >> i was not subjecting presumed prejudice, because barker does not suggest presumed prejudice. as you say the difference that barker has, with respect to your test is simply that barker said it's not always necessary to show prejudice. that there's extreme circumstances in which we will just take it for granted. >> i don't think that takes it in to consideration the change that happens at conviction. there's a substantial change. the interest of the society takes the forefront. and i think it gives the defendant a windfall, if he can come to court and say, this delay is prejudiced to me -- >> if you think that a very significant part of this rule has to do with impairment of the ability to defense yourself.
and if you think that kind of consideration applied just as well at the sentencing stage as it does in the conviction phase. given that the action takes place in the sentencing phase. i would not see why there's any need for a different rule. especially given the level of flexibility that barker gives. it's not like barker is saying we are presuming innocence in all circumstances, he is saying that prejudice is one of the four factors and it's an important one, and usually we will expect people to come in with a showing. >> i think it comes down to remedy. the remedy is dismissal. ? that's what we said in barker. a remedy in the case would be different. if a defendant does not have to show prejudice. i'm not sure what the court would remedy. and that is one of the reasons
that prejudice should be required. because there has to be something that the court is actually remedying. even in the speedy trial cases. when it comes to the deferm nation of facts that are relevant at sentencing. and that does not take place exclusively and probably even does not take place primarily at the time when the sentence is pronounced. correct? it takes place during the preparation of the presentence report. at least in the federal system, is that true in montana as well? >> yes, yes, that is exactly right. most of the facts are analyzed through the presentence report and sentencing hearings are drab affairs because most of the facts were resolved. thank you, council.
>> mr. had chief justice, and may it please the court to go right to justice kane's concern that a possibility of the defendant's defense at sentencing could be impaired we think the due process analysis is adequate to address it. although the defendant has to show prejudice, the standard should be the same one that applies in violations of constitutional rights. the defendant should have to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different. it's the same standard in cases of brady violations, it's one that does not require the defendant to show by a prepo prepondrence, when you take it all in to account it puts the outcome -- >> how do you see it as different from what goes on under the barker analysis? >> under barker the court a blues prejudice to be presumed so the defendant does not have