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tv   Politics and Public Policy Today  CSPAN  April 19, 2016 9:09am-11:10am EDT

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vice president president joe biden spoke out against sexual assaults against college campuses recently. he talked about his violence against women legislation. this white house event is 45 minutes. [ applause ] thanks, folks, how are you? i'm going to talk about each of these champions, but i also want you to meet what we're referring to as the influencer. this group over here you've seen on youtube, you've seen on the internet, 40 million of you and americans around the world watch what they do and these folks
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have stepped up and are fighting to help promote this whole effort of its on us. i wanted to publicly thank them all. i'm not going to everybody to stand here, you can go get a seat. i wanted you to see not only the champions of change. but these guys are champions of change. they're having the nerve to stand up and tell the entire community at home and abroad, hey, man, enough is enough is enough. so thank you all very much. why don't you go get a seat. [ applause ] watch your step. folks, look, thank you for the introduction. it doesn't make me feel old that you were not born when i wrote the law. i just want to think about this.
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lisa flew all the way from south africa where she's studying abroad this semester to be here today. and i want to thank you i never financed your trip, because it's a long way and it's an expense and you do us a great honor, lisa, being here today. you know, what you saw standing behind me today represents, with all of you, you wouldn't be here, my guess is, represents a lot of passion. and lisa has produced a documentary on her experience and experience of african-american women or sexual assault survivors at howard and it's powerful. it's powerful. hope you're all going to get a chance to see it. lisa and all the champions of change here today, we owe you my
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four granddaughters, one who is graduating from college and three who aren't there yet, owe you, owe you. every young woman in america owes you for calling attention to what is a scourge. folks, last week, matt and i went to pitt and then at unlv for this on us event. i think there were 12, 1,500 students at that one. and then we went to unlv and i went to lady gaga who has become a friend who is deeply engaged in this for real. she means it. it's not a publicity piece. if you heard her rendition of until it happens to you, you'll have no doubt about how deeply, deeply, deeply she feels it and how she has suffered as a consequence of being abused. y
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you know, by an individual on campus. i'm not sure it's on campus, but being abused by an individual when she was a college age. at the university of colorado, bolder, there were close to 3,000 students, if memory serves me correctly, and damon johns on "let's -- "shark tank" was along. because, by the way, he has -- he's experienced with his family the abuse that has taken place against women in his life. i've traveled to colleges all across the country from the northeast to the southwest, been to everywhere from the naval academy to where i met shaq, morehouse, spellman college where i met -- any way, i won't go through it all, clemson, i met joey wilson, my alma mater,
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syracuse, samantha, ohio university, i mean, ohio state and ohio university, university of illinois, just all over the country. and i went for a simple straightforward reason, nothing complicated about it. i believe that we have an opportunity, if we commit ourselves, to do nothing short of changing the culture as it relates to how women are treated, not only over all, but on college campuses and in high schools. i honest to god believe we can change the culture. you know, when i wrote the violence against womens act, i
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was absolutely certain, even though it had been tried before, to focus on this. i was absolutely certain that the american people would respond if it became culturely permissible to respond. that sounds strange when you think about it. but at the time i wrote the legislation, no one would support it, not a single woman's group in america would support it, not a single civil rights would support it, seriously. i know that sounds bizarre, they were worried it would take the focus off of choice, gender, equality and other issues, legitimate concern, on their part, but not legitimate to stand back. finally, when a woman who was a founder of "now" came along and said what are we doing and she endorsed everything that started to come in place. i knew what i wanted to do because i literally wrote it myself. it wasn't like i had a committee
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to sit and write it with me. one of the things i really misunderstood, i thought, if i wrote a law that was strong enough that would provide more physical protection, police protection, help once abused, medical help, housing, et cetera, that that would be the thing that would really make a difference. but it wasn't until -- and the way i was convinced we could change attitudes was to pull back the mask on this dirty little secret that everybody knew that was going on, no one wanted to admit. it was like, i don't want to deal with that, too complicated, too complicated. well, when he grabbed her and bent her wrist as she went down. well, he didn't -- it didn't really mean that and maybe she
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said something that made him angry. her and her husband smacked the wife because dinner wasn't on the table. i was told it was a family affair, literally. my wife says google it, go back and look. biden's violence against women's act was attacked by conservative elements, religious, as well as cultural, because i was interfering in the family. i hate the phrase "domestic family" it makes sound like a domesticated cat. it's the ugliest form of violence there is. when a woman is abused, or a man, by husband, wife, lover, or
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someone they knew, an acquaintance, it's the most difficult to recover from, not just physically, psychologically because all the psychiatric studies show the woman said, well, what did i do to make him think he could do that, what, what, what, what, what? and so i started the hearings and i had two really -- i'm not being solicit tif whitve, two courageous young women there to testify. i briefed them way ahead of time, don't move -- i briefed them ahead of time because i knew they would be tried in the court of public opinion when
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they testified. too many women were raped by an individual and then raped by the system. and so there was a lovely young woman named marla hanson, y'all are too young to remember, but your parents would. this was 23 years ago, she was a model in new york city, a beautiful person, as a person and also a beautiful model. and she lived in an up scale -- not an upscale, a first rate apartment complex in manhattan. nothing down and out about where it was. and on the first floor of that apartment building, like many places in manhattan, chicago, philadelphia, new york, excuse me, los angeles, it had a
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restaurant bar. and she had an efficiency and she wanted a one bedroom apartment. and every time she would go to speak to her landlord, he would hit on her, be suggestive. she's decided she was going to get the hell out of there. she was on location. this was her testimony -- she was on location and she got a phone call saying that he had a one bedroom apartment and if she stopped in the restaurant bar downstairs on her way to her apartment she could sign a new lease. so she did stop, he hit on her again. she gets up to leave and as she did, this coward, this thug had hired two guys with razors, straight razors to slash her
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face, which they did, and she walked out. i remember asking her, preparing her ahead of time knowing, so she wasn't surprised, what did your mom say? she asked me, why was i in a bar? what's your girlfriend say? were you wearing a bra? how short was your skirt? what did you say to provoke him? that's when i realized, we had to do more than provide protection, we had to change our culture, change the way we think
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and talk about women and girls. how many of you know the derivation of the phrase "rule of thumb" raise your hand? it's more than most audiences. the part of our culture, i apologize for you having to hear it, late 13 hundreds, too many women were dying at the hands of their husband because husbands were allowed to chastise their wives because they were property. they were chattel, no different than the dog in the front yard or the horse in the stable. too many were dying. so the english common law, those lawyers know we developed our low, it wasn't a codify case of a code like in france, it was
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developed over courts. what was developed a man could not beat a woman with the rod thicker than the circumference of his thumb. western civilization. we know about honor killings that are horrible, genital mutilation and other things that go on in other cultures, but it's inviewed in our culture. we have to change the culture. and that's when we -- i was very proud of the fact that after -- i we wrote the "violence against act" i wrote it, we passed it, violence against women dropped over the last 20 years about 60
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something percent, more women reported, all good. the one thing i asked the president when i became vice president, he said is there any particular thing you want, i said, yeah, i want to maintain control over the violence against women's office, i wanted to bring it to the first time out of attorney general's office. the attorney general still does the press, but i wanted to be able to name the people who ran the departments. and he happily did that, as did the attorney general support it, the last one and this one. so i had a really -- i've had a number braef women ve women to show for me. one is woman name cynthia hogan, really bright strong woman. i remember when rice was the guy, dragged his wife out of a
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elevator by the hair, the nfl realized they had to get their act together. they hired cynthia, she left me and went over there to begin to get their game in shape. by the way, that happened 10 years ago, nothing would have happened. so things are changing. so i said to cynthia, i said, check -- what she would do every year, tell me how we're doing. and she came back with most discouraging news i've received as a u.s. senator or as vice president and he said, we're getting better everywhere except girls between 14 and 24. when you wrote the law, one and four of them were being raped or abused on college campus and the number hasn't changed at all. and then it was in 18 years, now 22 years. so went to the president and that's when we started with tina chin who runs the office of
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women and girls here, a program called" it's on us." because what i did was, after we did that, i did virtual town meetings. i asked the question: please let me know what one or two things you think we could do to make it safer for you in your high school or on your campus. i expected that i would get legitimate things like, you know, better lighting in parking garages, more lighting on campuses, more police escorts, campus police from the library to my dorm, et cetera. no, i got back more than anything. get boys and men involved.
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and i felt foolish, because why had i not focused on that more. that's when we started the program, it's on us. that's why all of these folks up against the wall over here who run, who are viewed by millions of people a year and some of the famous equally famous actors and actresses made public service announcement, the ncaa and all range of sports organizations doing to call to attention the young men in america what constitutes being a man, what constitutes appropriate behavior. you know, those who have gone to college, my guess is most all of you have, some of you guys and all of you women, when you got dropped off at that curb at the college by your mom and dad had
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exceedingly high hopes for you, that you do well academically, learn a great deal, be empowered intellectually. but they also, every one of them, go back and ask them, you think i'm exaggerating, had this nagging fear in the back of their mind. will she be okay. not a joke. will she be okay? everything from bing drinking to flat stranger rape, generates excuses and rationales as to why it's okay. f -- for a man to lay on a woman
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without her consent or her ability to give consent. . i've got a goal, and i mean this with every fiber in my being, when i leave this foundation to continue this, i've got a goal and i believe it can be met. within your generation we reach the point, although we'll never end violence over all, when you drop off your daughter or vulnerable son, and homo sexual rape is real on campuses, that you're not going to have that nagging worry in the back of your mind is my daughter one in four or one in five. she's transgender, does she have a 38% or excuse me, 24% or
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bisexual, 30 something percent chance of being the victim of abuse. so, folks, i'm here to thank every one of you, particularly the champions of change for us being able to get a little bit closer to the goal. i'm often asked why am i so passionate about this. they think that maybe god forbid my mom was abused or my sister or deceased wife or my wife. i was passionate about this because i was raised by a truly graceful man who never, never raised his hand to any one of his children or anybody i'm aware of. he's a big man. with a thought and we would talk about not one of my siblings or any of my friends and everybody who hung out at my house would not be able to repeat my father's mantra, the greatest sin of all sins is the abuse of power and the cardinal sin among
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those is for man to raise his hand to a woman or a child, someone physically weaker. that's why i wrote the violence against women act. thousands of hours of hearings, issued a report the day in the life of. we actually went out and took actual cases, 365 days and put an actual case on a big -- a big report we did this big, the pages, 8.5 by 11 with what some actual case that happened that day, that year, for people no longer to be able to go, you know, well, you know -- they say we held hundreds of hours of testimony, advocates, experts, opponents, as i said, survivors.
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that's when, as i said, not only i but the public begin to realize, you've got to do something about the culture. we have to do something profound to change how we think about these things. and so, folks, as i said, we have made some progress. since the president and i started this program "it's on us" we're 350 people literally raised their right hand and taken an oath. and if i say it, i'll do something about it. if consent is not or cannot be given, it is a crime. a definition of what constitutes lack of permission, whether it's in a bedroom, a ballroom, on a
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campus green, no means no no matter when it is stated, even in bed and you change your mind, no means no. anything that follows after that is a crime. so, the next piece that's happened and you all are so important in this effort, is no also means no when you can't give consent, so as i say in college campuses, you see if brother walking a drunk coed up the stairs, have the gumption to
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walk over and say, hey, jack, not on my watch, not on my watch. look at this like, if it were your mother, your sister, your younger vulnerable brother, what would you do? it takes a lot of courage. i'm not expecting everybody to be able to do what some of these incredible folks have gone out and done. but i do think that, i know everyone can do something holler, steps away so no one can see, scream, sometimes legitimate worry that there will be reprisals against you. but everybody can do something.
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there's a recent film being done by a woman in south africa who has the same kind of program she shows a woman being raped and there were seven occasions where somebody would have said something it would have stopped or intervened without somebody being intervened, being taken by a doorman and being dragged in an elevator. doesn't require heroics. and by the way, it's not just men who ought to end this. women abused on a campus, only 2.5% go to the authorities on the campus and only three in a one%, i think it is, a little less than one and a quarter%,
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report to police. 65 or 67 over 65% tell their roommate, their girlfriend their sorry ro sorority sister, their teammate, so you women have an obligation to say something, to find them help. find out where the help is available. . as i say on campuses when i was going to law school, there was movie called the "paper chase" by e.a. houseman who was the star and there's a line in it that says "gentlemen look to your left and look to your right and one of you will not be here next semester" don't look to your left and don't look to the right, look in the mirror. look in the mirror and ask
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yourself, am i doing everything i can and i don't have to be crew said or rabbit i don't have to be the person that's going to change the world. am i doing everything i can to change this culture. you know, we had a great -- we have great sex education now. we had a truly great sector of education, the guy has become my close friend, great basketball player at harvard. i think it was harvard he went to. he played basketball at the pros in australia, yeah, australia. his name is arnny duncan, secretary of education. and arnny with the encouragement of the president came up with an idea. we give tens of millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars to universities to maintain their campuses and their students.
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all the student aid you get, all the direct assistance, everything -- there's a thing called title nine you don't get -- title ix you don't get that unless you have equal opportunity for women. we took a look at it and had our lawyers look at it and we had our lawyers saying, guess what university, if you don't have a system to demonstrates if you were looking out for the physical safety and the mental health after god forbid something happens of your students and acting, we will deny you tens of millions of dollars in aid. you know, we have 172 national universities under investigation right now. you read about it every day, i'm not going to name any particular university because the cases
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aren't adjudicated. some of the schools you went to, go back and ask, what reporting system do they have? how much do they encourage women to come forward. when they come forward, are they going to speak to a professional as if you showed up at a rape crisis center, or if you showed up to a professional on the civil side. we have horrible cases of college universities and president's office is asking, what were you wearing? how much did you have to drink? not what happened to you? where did it happen? it doesn't mean we eliminate the persumption of innoncence, we can never do that in america. but all things should be taken seriously. you realize more women drop out
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of college because of sexual abuse than any other reason. so the point is, we're going to keep it up the remainder of our term here, but we need to engage you all because folks, once all university start reporting, one of the things we're considering doing is assist -- not done yet -- assisting all universities do climate surveys anonymously. so they can't pretend they don't know what's happening on their campus. every student fill out a form, if they choose to, have they been abused? do they know someone who has been abused? if they were abused, where were they abused. there's a thousand things we can do and just like in domestic violence over all dropping 64%,
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we can begin to change what's happening on our campuses. there's a -- an old chinese proverb and it goes like this, it says that, women hold up half the sky. women hold up half the sky. what kind of studies. if as many women were employed not even in equal pay as men worldwide, the international gdp would increase by $27 trillion. p president and i are pushing hard for tripling the child care tax care and two wager to $500 tax credit, that will put
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$500,000 more women in the workplace significantly increasing our gdp. my generic point is, you don't have to think of it -- think of it just as, how much money averted cost to the public we have violence against women's act, every study points out $12.6 billion a year in overted social cost, medical bills, cost associated with loss of productivity in the workplace. the reason why id said it 22 years ago, i couldn't prove it, but i can prove it now. the ccd in atlanta -- the cdc in atlanta, the center for disease control has done an extensive survey, women who have been abused suffer from long-term
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immune system compromises heart disease diabetes, posttraumatic stress. if a guy comes home, you're married to him for ten years and every night you're slightly off and he smashes your head against the wall, there's no different than that in the military you being held someone smashing your room every night and smashing your head against the wall. my generic point is, you've got to change situation on campuses, not only is the morally right thing to do. we're wasting an enormous enormous, enormous resource to make us better, stronger and more capable. so the champions of change here, and i'm going to ask each one of
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them to stand up. i'm going to ask them each to walk on the stage. i'll be very brief. okay. jessica davidson, university of denver. she had the courage to -- come on up, jessica, challenge the university to adopt clear affirmative consent policies. they didn't want to talk about it. they didn't -- right am i exaggerating? >> no. >> she's a survivor and with the bravery and not it's not high herbally, the bravery to tell the story. >> you're making a difference, kiddo. >> thank you. >> and it was great to see you last night and that's where i met matt who handles the buffalo who pulled a guy off a young woman and had the courage to do it. also, valerie holsted,
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university of miami. valerie, come on up. if there are any angels headed by the way been great consumer of health care, losing wives and children in hospitals, they're nurses. doctors make you, but nurses, i'm serious, you're the single most under estimated profession in the world. you change people's lives in terms of their attitudes and that makes a difference. valerie making sure campus health centers, because a lot of campus health centers you go to, they're not equipped or prepared to deal with the psychological. you may come in and they'll send you to hospital, most don't have rape kits, most don't have, well, guess what -- what she's doing. she's helping schools come up with a standardized procedure whereby you have at the school infirmary qualified people to
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deal with the problem. my mother would say, god love you, kid, you're doing god's work. also, we have melana hossman. am i pronouncing it right? >> you can call me joe bitten. come here. >> a for effort. >> you're getting a for effort. look, talk about taking on a tough charge, she's at grand valley state. she is confronting -- maybe not confronting, engaging the greek community for on campus to step up because there's an awful lot of evidence, not because anybody belongs to fraternities per se is bad, but because the nature of it being either off campus or out of sight and the drinking
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that goes on on, an awful lot of young women are victimized, thank you for making them look in the mirror, it's important, appreciate it. also we have claire kell virginia tech, a phd statistics, she's about to be, she has a brilliant mind as big as her heart and she's figuring out how data in analytics, this stuff makes a difference. how data in analytics can help us find patterns, patterns, it doesn't mean it provides for irrational of guilt or innocence in a court of law, because you can't convict in a pattern, you've got to convict on showing specific intent. but patterns as to where, how, what circumstances these situations occur, to solve what
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is basically an epidemic. same thing you're doing in cancer research, same thing they're doing in astronomy, establishing the patterns, i tell you what, i wish i was as bright as you were, i would have done a better job than i've done before. thank you for what you're doing. >> thank you. >> stay with it. stay with it. >> we have selene lopez, she had the courage to ask some pretty tough questions to her dog. her dog answers. i want you to know, her dog speaks like mine. both our dogs talk. she had the courage to ask some really tough questions to change the conversation on her campus about what constitutes consent. uncomfortable conversation to have. literally, to actually put up posters on campus and begin a discussion, what constitutes consent, because, by the way, 10
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years ago, that was just private, don't want to talk about that. because you've got to educate young men, even the ones who aren't bad guys. i really mean it. bad guys. i really mean it. and most aren't. what constitutes consent. thank you, kiddo. also megan yapp, university of california san diego. when i die that's where i want to be reborn. i love san diego. i was speaking at the university of california san diego. is it nazarene college up the road? >> it's close by. i was speaking at nazarene after speaking at your college andfuls in a natural amphitheater and all the students were sitting on a hill, the ocean with you behind them, and this -- anyway, i'm standing talking to all the
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students and there are about 300 and they're going like this, looking over my had ed. next thing i know, three people glide over my head in kites. only in san diego that would happen. megan -- she's an emt, and she literally is on the front lines caring for victims. she sees the look of fear in her eyes, seeing the damage that's been done, and it's hard. it ain't easy, and when you see it, and the compassion and empathy that you brought your policies all across the country, and your intent is to hold schools accountable by making sure they have certain basic standards. thank for you what you're doing.
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>> thank you. and three many our honorees are men who have been leading the way of getting men involved at their universities. boston university, he has some steel in his backbone trying to get the fraternities and athletes involved. that first conversation, you walk in the locker room, hey, guys, i have a great idea, and they're like what are you talking about, man. >> precisely. >> it's changing. it's moving. when men stand up, by the way, you know, as i was saying to some of our folks who are there were, it used to be ten years ago if you were -- if there's a business luncheon in some major metropolitan area and a waiter came up with a lisp and one of
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the wise guys would say, let me tell you and made fun of it. no one would say anything. if today that happened, they would say get the hell out of here. what's happened, as we've liberated, the movement to liberate, the lbgt community, we've liberated a lot of straight people from knowing they are not going to be ostracized. what this guy does, when you walk in and you get athletes to start talking about it -- and by the way, the guy who sits there and next guy -- two calls that call up that know about this, said, man, i did this last night, i got -- usually that's the guy who couldn't get a date on a bet, and has basically no sex appeal. no, you think i'm kidding. am i joking, guys? well, until we end the circumstance where it's appropriate to tell a joke about rape, to tell a joke about
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vulnerability, until that happens we're not changing the culture. this guy walking into those locker rooms, this guy walking into the fraternities trying to organize, you're making a dimples, man. we owe you. thank you. the next guy is a little guy. he's significantly intimidated by men who might threaten him, but cody mcdavis. he played at the university of northern colorado, is now out, and this is the guy who continued -- was then and continues now challenging to athletes to step up and say something. as i go around the campus, i was at clemson university, a guy a bit taller and about 30 pounds heavier, captain of the football team, he's leading the effort on
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campus, making it clear this isn't about, you know, trying to be cool and, you know, the in-house feminist. it's xhanging. we're changing attitudes i want to thank you man, for stepping up as you have. >> yes, sir. lastly, but not the least, i want to say to -- this is all about cadet first class for the united states military academy, sir, get your rear end up here, i'm still your -- i want you to meet carson warnberg. he's taking the case to the academy. you all know there's much too much sexual assault in the military. i was just at a campus equalitily consequence quenchally. he won't adwrit in, annapolis,
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meeting with the midshipmen. they're not waiting for commanding officers to begin to change the culture. if you change the culture in the cadet corps, you have an exponentially greater opportunity to change the culture throughout the military. and by the way, i want to make it clear, i'm not joking about this, a woman can do anything, anything, anything a man can do. i sat at my home with my wife, who's involved with military families, we're a military family, with two women who just went special forces training. you look at them, they look like two of the young women on the -- our olympic soccer team. they're attractive, polite,
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straightforward, look like ordinary people, but guess what? they went through ranger school. guess what? back when i was a young senator, i got elected when i was 29. it was only then that they started to allow the academies to accept women. i appointed women to -- i was one of the first to appoint women to all the academies. i was -- one of the great honors as vice president, the president and i rotate commencements, so i have done every academy, and i'm going to be up your way, buddy at westpoint. but i was air force academy two years ago, and they have an outfit -- john, what do you call those guys who fly the planes real quick? where is -- i was kidding the colonel. where are you? i guess he left. he's gone. anyway, they have the
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thunderbirds and the blue angels? it takes enormous skill. they wanted to meet me. they do a fly-over at graduation -- the night before. guess what? two of the pilots are women. my generic point is we've got to change. we've got to change attitude in the military for a whole range of reasons, not the least of which is women are carrying a significant portion of the burden in protecting the security in our country. so, folks, these are real champions. these are people that i'm honored to stand with. i hope you feel that way, and that's what it's on us is all about. it means students, it means
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faculty, it meeps coaches. it means your college presidents. it means your deans, your law enforcement community on the campus. it means the infirmary. it's on telephone one of us. if we do what constitutes being decent, we can change this culture, and my granddaughters are going to be all better for because of you. thank you all so very very much. we take you live now to the rayburn house office building for a hearing on data encryption and law enforcement. we will hear from officials from the fbi, new york city police as well as apple's top lawyer and
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law enforcement officials from texas and indiana. \s good morning, and welcome to the oversight investigation subcommittee here on deciphering the debate over encryption history and law enforcement. i want to let everyone know weft multiple hearings, so you will see people coming and going, so for our witnesses, that you don't think it's chaos, we have members trying to juggle a lot of things. it is chaos, okay. i stand corrected. we're meeting today to consider the deceptively complex question -- should the government have the ability to lawfully access encrypted technology and communications? this is the question at the center of a heated public debate
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catalyzed whensh apple to insist using by one of the san burn dino terrorists, but this isn't a new question. strong encryption has existed for decades. for years, motivated individuals have had access to the tools necessary to conceal their activity from law enforcement, and for years the government has repeatedly tried to limit the use of or obtain access to encrypted data. the most notable occurred in the 1990s, when it sparked fears that the government would lose its ability to conduct lawful surveillance. in response the nsa developed what was called the clipper chip. it would also provide the government with key to access those communications if necessary. this so-called back door sparked intense debate between the government and the technology community about the benefits and risks of government access to encrypted technology. one of the principal arguments of the technology community was
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such a back door would create a vulnerability that could be exploited by actors outside the government. this concern was validated when a critical flaw was discovered in the dhip's design. i should note that one of our witnesses today identified that vulnerability which made the back door more akin to a front door. as a partial solution congress passed the act called calia. calia addressed concern that rapidly developing technology -- by. >> reporter: telecommunication providers to provide assist tansz in executing authority authoritied surveillance. however the law included note at cavea caveats. after the government relaxed export corrosion on encryption in 2000, the crypt owars entered a period of relative quiet. what has changed in recent years?
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part of the concern is once again the rapid expansion of technology. at its core, however, this debate is about the widespread availability of encryption by default. well, encryption has el, it took effort and first conveys to employ its benefits, but because of this, law enforcement was still able to gain action to the majority of the digit at evidence they discovered in their investigations, but now the enkrimgs is the norm, it's the default. this is a natural response to skating concerns both from government and consumers about the security of digital information. the decision by companies like apple and the messaging application whatsapp mean more than a bill won naeem have bennett easy and relooblt encryption. at the same time they have a secure means of communication and they will know it and use it
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as their own mission control center. that is the crux of the recent debate. alleges to secure technologies beyond the reach of law enforcement no longer requires sophistication, is available to anyone and everyone. at the same time, however, as more of our lives become dependent on the enter in the, the availability of widespread encryption is femme critical to our personal economic and -- and may echo those of decades paths, the circumstances of change and so too must the discussion we no lorener have a choice of black and white. if we take that approach, the only outfor come is we all lose. this requires a very thoughtful approach. that is why we're here today to begin moving the conversation from appear the versus the fbi or right versus wrong, to constructive dialogue that recognizes this is a complex issue that affects everyone and
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therefore were all in this together. we have two very strong panels. i expect each will make strong arguments about the benefits of strong encryption and the challenges it presents for law enforcement. i encourage my college to embrace this opportunity to learn from the experts to understand the complexities of the issues. it is time to begin a chapter in this battle, one which i hope can bring some resolution to the war. this process will not be easy, but if it does not happen now, it may reach a time when it's too late and success becomes impossible. so for everyone on calling on congress to address this issue, here we are. i can only hope you will be willing to join us at the table. i recognize the ranking -- >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you for holding this. issues surrounding earn crips and particularly the disagreements between law enforcement and the tech community gain significant public attention in the san bernardino case, but i'm not
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particularly interested in relitigates that dispute today. as you said, mr. chairman, the conversation needs to be broader than just that one case. let me stay unequivocally that i, like you, and the rest of us here today, recognize and appreciate the benefits of strong encryptions in today's digit at world. it keeps or dmun indications security, the critical infrastructure safe and bank can get from being drained. it also provides each one of us with significant privacies protections, but also like you, i see the flip side of the coin. while encringe did probably they invaluable protections, it can also be used to obscure the communications of criminals and terrorists and increasingly great risk. it's our task to help find the proper balance between those competing interests. we need to ask both industry and law enforcement some hard questions into. last month the president said,
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for example -- we want strong encryption, because part of us preventing terrorism or preventing people from disrupts the financial system is hackers can't can't get in there and mess around, but if we make systems that are warrantproof, how do we to have terrorists. if we can't cram the system, then the president said everybody is walking around with a swiss bank account in their pocket. i've heard ma invite proposals will undermine the encryption that, and a back door for good guys ultimately becomes a front door for criminals. the tech community has particularly vocal about the negative consequences of the proposals to address the encryption challenge. i think many of the arguments are valid, but i've only heard
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what we should not do, not what we should do collectively to address this challenge. i think the discussion needs to include a dialogue about how to move forward. i can't believe this problem is intractable. i don't promote forces industry to build back doors or other circumventions that experts will tell you will undermine security or privacy for all of us. at the same time i'm not comfortable with impenetrable warrantproof spaces where criminals or terrorists can operate without any fear that law enforcement could discover their plots. what i want to hear is from both law enforcement and industry about possibility solutions going forward.
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what are the policy options? what happens if -- if encryption is the reason law enforcement can't solve on or prevent a crime? if the holder or transmitter of the data or device can't or won't help law enforcement, what are the options? last week "the washington post" reported that the government relied on gray hat hackers to circumvent the san bernardino phone. thank goodness? i don't think so. yolk relying on a third party is a good option. i intend to ask both panels what additional resources and capabilities the government needs to keep pace with technology. while providing government with more tools or capability require
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additional discussions regarding due process, and the protection of civil liberties. enhancing the government's technical capability is one potential solution that does not mandate back doors. finally the public, the tech community, and the government are all in this together. in that spirit, i really do want to thank our witnesses for coming today. i'm happy that we have people from law enforcement, academia and industry and i'm happy that apple came to testify today. your voice is particularly important, because other players like facebook and whatsapp decline our invitation to be a part of this panel. now, the tech community has told congress we need to solve this problem. we agree, but i've got to tell you, it's hard to solve a problem when the key players won't show up for the discussion. i'm here to also tell you as a longtime member of the subcommittee relying on congress to on its own pass legislation
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in a very complex situation like this is a blunt instrument at best. i think it would be in everybody's best interests to come to the table and help us work on a solution. thanks again for holding this hearing. i know we won't trivialize these concerns. i look forward to work with everybody. i yield back. >> mr. upton for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. for months we witnessed answer intense and important debate about encryption. while much of this recent debate is focused on the fbi and apple, this issue is certainly much beggar than any one entity or piece of technology. at the very core, this is a debate about what we pass a society are willing to accept. it might appear to be a black-and-white choice. we either side with law enforcement and grant them
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access, or we can side with the technology community and prevent law enforcement from accessing encrypted technologies thus creating a warrantless safe haven for terrorists pedophiles and other evil and terrible actors. it's important that we move beyond the us versus them mentalitity that's encompassed this discussion for far too long. this debate is not about picking sides, it is about evaluating options. it begins by acknowledging the equities on both sides. from the technology perspective there's no doubt that strong encryption is a benefit to our society, as more of our daily lives is critical to the security and privacy of our personal and corporate secret as evidenced by the data theft can have a devastating effect on our personal privacy, economic strength and national security.
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initial, encryption doesn't just enable terroristed and wrongdoers to do terrible things, it provides a safe haven for those who wish to remain hidden for noble purposes. including such things as our cars, medical devices and the electric grid, the encryption will play an important role in minimizing the risk of physical harm or loss of life should these technologies be compromised. from the law enforcement perspective, while strong encryption helps protect it was prevents a serious risk to public safety, as a strong enaccessible encryption becomes the norm, law enforcement loses access to valuable tools and evidence necessary to stop bad actor from doing terrible things of the as we'll hear today, this cannot always be offset by alternative means. there are certain situations
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such as identifying the victims of child exploitation, not just the perpetrators, where access to content is critical. this leads us to the question, what is the answer? i don't have the answer, nor do i expect we'll find it during this hearing. this is a complex issue which will require a lot of difficult conversations, but that is not an excuse to resort to default positions. we need to confront heads issues head-on. they won't go away and will only get more difficult as time continuing to tick. identifying a solution to this problem will involve tradeoffs and compromise on both sides, but ultimately it comes down to what society accepts as the appropriate balance between government access to encryption and security of encrypted technologies. for that reason and others, many have called on us -- us, this committee to confront the issues
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here. that's we're we're holding this hearing, and while we established a bipartisan joint committee working group to examine this issue. in order for congress to successfully confront the issue it will require patience, create activity, courage and more importantly cooperation. it's easy to call on congress to take on an issue, but you better be prepared to answer the call when we do. the issue is too important to have key players sitting on the sidelines and therefore i hope all of you are prepared to participate as we take to heart what we hear today and be part of the solution moving forward, and i yield back. i recognize mr. p.m. ollone. >> i welcome the opportunity to hear today from both law enforcement and the tech community as we seek to understand and develop solutions to this debate. it en -- it also creates
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challenges for those seeking to protect us. law enforcement has a different job of keeping our nation safe and finding that some programs are oeven when they obtain a warrant, they find themselves unable to access information. this raises questions how comfortable we are with these dark areas that cannot be reached by law enforcement. at the same time, the tech community helps protect some of our most valuable information and the most secure way to do that is by yoon end-to-end encryption mean the manufacturer does not hold the key to that information. when the tech community tells us that providing back doors will make their job of protecting our information that much more difficult, we should heed that warning and work towards a solution that will not solve one problem by creating many others. it's clear that both sides in this discussion have compelling arguments, but simply repeating those arguments is not a sufficient response. i hope today's hear is just the
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beginning of that conversation. in the last several months and years we have seen major players look to congress for solutions. in 2014, fbi director comey said, and i quote -- i'm happy to work with congress, with our partners in the private sector and with my law infersment and national security counterparts and the people we serve to find the right answer, to find the balance we need. in an e-mail to apple employees earlier this year, ceo tick cook wrote about his support for congress to bring together and i quote -- experts on intelligence technologies and civil liberties to discuss the implications for law enforcement, national security, privacy and personal freedoms and he wrote that apple would gladly participate in such an effort. if we have any hope of moving forward, we need all the parties coming together, and the witnesses today should serve as models to those who have been reluctant to participate.
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both sides need to recognize this is an effort to strike a balance between the security and privacy of personal data and public safety. the public needs to feel confident that their information is secure, but at the same time we need to assure them that law enforcement has all the tools it needs to do their jobs effectively. mr. chairman, i would like to yield the remaining time to the gentlewoman from -- >> i would like to -- many refer to the new york city police department as the country's finest, but i like to think of them as the world ace finest. welcome, mr. galati. it's about balancing power, and the rights of individuals. through the years, getting that balance just right has been challenging, and at times tension-filled, but we have done
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it. we have prevailed. the encryption versus privacy rights issue is simply another opportunity for us to, again, recalibrate and finetune, and as the old cliche states, democracy is not a spectator sport, so it's time for all of us to participate. it's time to roll up our sleeves and work together to resolved this issue as an imperative, because it's not going away. so i'm glad that we are having this hearing today, because i do believe that working together, we can find a way to balance our concerns and to address this iss issuele if physical security with our rides to -- >> our witnesses, the perspective of our witnesses today and i yield back the remainder of my time. that i you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. i would ask unanimous consent
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the written statements be entered into the report. without objection, the documents will be entered into the record. now i'd like to introduce the witnesses of our first panel. the first witness on the panel is ms. amy hess she's the director of the technology at the federal bureau of investigation, responsible for the executive oversight of the criminal justice information services laboratory and operational technology divisions. ms. hess has logged time in the field as an fbi special agent as well as the bureau's headquarters here in washington, d.c., and we thank her for preparing her testimony and look forward for your insights. we also want to welcome chief thomas galati, a 32-year veteran of the new york city police department, and currently serves as the chief of intelligence. as chief of intelligence, he is responsible for the activities of the intelligence bureau, the
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western hemisphere's largest municipal largest intelligence operation. thank you, chief galati, for your testimony today. finally for the first panel captain charles cohen, indiana state police, currently the commander of the intelligence office and, where he is responsible for the cybercrime, electronics and internet crimes against children. we appreciate his time today. unfortunate unfortunately on you prayers and thoughts are with the people of houston. we know there's been several tran did is there. we wish sheriff hickman could be with them, but we understand that travel logistics sometimes make things impossible. i would ask that his testimony be entered into the record. now to our panelists, as you are aware. when doing so, take testimony
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under oath. do any of you haves in objections? all say no. the chairman advises you until the -- do any of you desire to be advised by counsel? all say no as well. in that case, would you raise your right hand, i'll swear you in. do you swear the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you. you may be seated. all witnesses answer in the affirmative, you are under oath and subject to the penalties of the united states code. you may now give a five-minute summary? thank you. >> thank you for the opportunity to -- transform our society,
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most notably, facilitating e-commerce. it's essential we, to promote free expression, and safeguard sensitive information. encryption is not the only challenge that we face. however, we face significant obstacles in while containinging from a known wifi service, to wifi hot spot. they can move from one d. and carry the same conversation or multiple conversations simultaneously. or guidelines and without historical data it's very difficult. some foreign communication providers have millions of users in the united states, but no point of presence here, making it different, if not impossible to execute a lawsuit court
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order. and if we can not attribute communication and actions to a specific individual, critical leads and evidence may be lost. the problem is exponentially increased when we face challenges on top of one another. we've had a reasonable expectation of privacy. this means that only with probable cause and a court order can law enforcement listen to a private conversation or enter private spaces, but when changes in technology hinder or prohibit our ability to use authorized investigative teals, we may not be able to root out chi pretty torres or violent criminals. we nay not be able to identify and top terrorists uses today's platforms to plan and execute attacks in our country. we're in this kwanry trying to mac mize security where increasingly the numbs is beyond the reach of judicial authority
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and finding the right balance is a complex endeavor and should not be left solely to corporations or to the fbi to solve. it must be publicly debated and deliberated. the american people should decide how we want to govern ourselves in today's world. it's law enforcement's responsibility to inform the american people that the investigative tools we have successfully used in the past are becoming increasely less effective. the conversation is highly charged at times, because people are passionate about privacy and security, but this is an essentially discussion which must include a productive, meaningful and rational it dialogue, how it -- law enforcement 'ability to do its job. as this the discussion continuing, we're fully commit to do working with industry and other parties to develop the right solution. we have an obligation to ensure that everyone understands the public safety and national security risk that is result from the use of new technologies and encrypted platforms by
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malicious actors. to be clear we're not asking to expand the surveillance authority, but to ensure we can continue to gather evidence pursuant to the authority that the congress that is provided to us. there's not a one size fits all solution. the fbi is pursuing multibalance avenues, but we realize we cannot overcome these challenges on our own. mr. chairman, we believe the shies are grave and extremely complex. we must therefore continue the public discourse on how best to ensure that privacy and security can coexist and reinforce each other, and this hearing is a vital part of that process. thank you for your time and attention to this important matter. >> thank you, ms. hess, now captain galati? >> thank you. on behalf of mayor and police commissioner and myself, thanks for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. years ago criminals and their
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accomplices stored that information in close either, drawers, safes and glove boxes there was and continues to be an expectation of privacy, but the high burden imposed by the fourth amendment, which requires lawful search by warranted and authorized by a neutral judge has been deemed -- against roam search and seer injures. now it seems that that legal authority is struggling to catch up with the times. because today, nearly everyone lives their life on a smartphone, so evidenced that once would be stored in a file cabinet is now archived. the same exact information that would solved a murder, catch a rapist or prevent a mass shooting is now stored in that device. where law enforcement has legal access to the file cabinet, it is shut out of the phone. now because of the constraints built into the law, about you rather limits imposed by technology. when law enforcement is unable to access evidence necessary to
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the investigation, prosecution and prevention of a crime despite the lawful right to do so, we call this going dark. every day we deal with this evidentiary dilemma on two fronts. first all what we know as data at rest. this is when the actual device, the computer, the tablet or the phone is in law enforcement's possession, but the information stored within it is inaccessible. in just a six-month period from october 2015 through march of this year, new york city we have been locked out 67 apple devices lawfully seized pursuant to the investigation of 44 violent crimes. in addition there are 35 non-apple devices. of they apple devices they incidents includes 23 felonies, 10 homicides, two rapes and two police officers shot in the line of duty. in every case, we have the file cabinet, so to speak, and the legal authority to open it, but we lack the technical ability to
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do so because of the encryption protects its contents. in every case they crimes deserve our protection, too. the second type of going dark is an incident known as aider in motion. in these cases, law enforcement is legally permitted through a warrant or other judicial process to intercept and access a suspect's communication, but the encryption such as whatsapp, telegram or wicker and others thwart this type of lawful surveillance. we may know a criminal group is communicating, but we are unable to understand why. in the past, a phone or a wiretap, again legally obtained from a judge, would alert the police officer to drop off locations, hideouts and target locations. now we are literally in the dark, and criminals know it, too. we recently heard a defendant make a call from rikers island where he exalt the apple ios 8 and the encryption software as a gift from god.
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this leaves the police, prosecutors and people were sworn to protect in a precarious position. more alarming, the position is not dictated by the ecelebritied officials or judiciary system or laws, instead it's created and controlled by corporations like apple and google who have taken it upon themselves to decide who can access critical information. as a bureau chief in our nation's largest municipal police department, an agent charged with protecting 8.5 million residents and on millions of tourists everyday, i'm confident that corporate ceos do not hold themselves to the same -- how do we keep people safe in the answer cannot by warrantproof encryption which creates a landscape of criminal information outside the reach of search warrants, and outside legal authority to establish over centuries of jurisprudence, this has not always been apple's answer. until 19 months ago they held
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the key to overrite did many apple use used this master key to comply with court orders. there was knolls documented incident or code getting out to hackers or government. if they were able to comply constitutionally legally court orders, why not now? ramifications to this fight extends far beyond san bernardino, california, and the 14 people murdered there. more than 90% of all criminal prosecutions are handled at the state or local level. the cases involve real people. families, your friends, europe loved ones. they deserve police departments that are able to do everything within the law to bring them to justice and they deserve corporations to appreciate the ethical responsibilities. i applaud you for holding this hearing today. it is critical we work together and across silos, because criminals are not bound by jurisdictional boundaries or industry standards, but increasingly they are aware of the safety net that the
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warmthproof encryption provides, and we must all tailing responsibility for what that means. for the new york city police department, it means invest more in people's lives than quarterly earnings reports and puts safety back into the hands of the brave men and women who have been sworn to defend it. >> chief, you are recognized for five minutes. >> my name is chuck cohen. i also serve as indiana interneat crimes task force commander. i would not be here for today if not encounters serious problems with encryption. we need your help and it's, as far as i know, the fbi is not exaggerating or trying to mislead anyone when they say there's currently no way to recover data from newer i phone apple has intentional designed a system that d. the sensitivity of the personal information people keep stored in that you are phones should be compared to the sensitivity of information
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that people keep in bank deposit boxes and bedrooms. criminal investigators with lawsuit authorization have the technical means to access -- but we lack the technical means to access newer phones we are often asked how it hinders law invitement's ability -- there are numb recent encrypted phones waiting for a solution, legal or technical to the problem. some of those phones belong to murder victims and child sex crime victims. earlier this year a mother and son were shot to death. i'm confident if they were able, both would give consent for us to forensically examine their phones to help us find their killer or killers, but unfortunately being deceased, they're unable to give consent and they chose to buy phones runs encrypted systems by default. i need to emphasize we are talking about not just suspect's phones, but also victims' phones
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and also exculpatory evidence that cannot be recovered. it is always difficult to know what evidence and contraband has not been recovered. the child victims that are not being -- and the child sex offenders not being arrested as a result of encryption, but the investigation, prosecution and federal conviction of randall r. fletcher helps to shed light on -- fletcher lived in northern indiana. during the course of an investigation for production and possession of child pornography, computer hard drives with encrypted partitions and thumb drives were seized. it was not possible to frensicily examine the encrypted data despite numerous attempts. a federal judge compelled fletcher to her provided law infers, but not the encrypted thumb drive. in the newly opened data, there were thousands of videos and images. to this this day varieties believe the thumb drive contains
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home-made pornography. fletcher had continuing and ongoing access to children, including a child he previously photographed in lascivious poses. fletcher has previous convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and child sex offenses detailed in my written testimony. there's good reason to believe behave hardened encrepes, additional crimes committed by fletcher cannot be investigated and prosecuted. that means additional child victims cannot be provided services or access to the justice they so richly deserve. i hope that congress takes time to truly understand what is at stake with the going dark phenomenon, there's costs with the scheme that allows unlawful access. but there's a much greater and very real human cost we sigh a across the country because of the investigations that fail due to default hard encryption. in my daily work, i feel the impact of law enforcement going dark. it's a strong feeling of frustration, because it makes
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the detectives and forensics examiners less effective everybody bus for crime victims and their families, it's all together different. it is infuriating, unfair, and incomprehensible while such critical information should be allowed to be completely out of reached. i have heard some say that law enforcement can solve crimes using metadata alone. that is simply not true. that's like asking a detective to process a crime scene by only looking at the street address on the outside of the house where a crime was committed. i strongly encourage committee members to contact your state agency or local police department and ask about this challenge. i greatly appreciate your invite action to share my perspective and happy to answer questions today or at any point in the future. >> i thank the panel. i now -- ms. hess, i think sometimes the fbi's concerns about encryption are broadly characterized as being against encryption. consideration the fbi's work on
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investigations like the sony data breach or recent attacks on hospitals, i have a tough time believes your organization is against -- so to clarify, does the fbi agree that strong encryption is important to the security and privacy of our citizens for commit strength? >> yes, sir. >> and also of the law enforcement, can you elaborate on that? >> yes, sir. yes, you are correct. as i stated in my opening statement, we do support strong encryption. it does all the things you just said. we also recognize that we have a continuing struggle and increasing struggle to access readable information, to access content of communications caused by that encryption that is now in place by default. >> so it brings this question up then, are you witnessing an increase in individuals intentionally or even unintentionally evading the law through availability of default encryption?
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>> i think it's difficult to discern whether or not they're intentionally doing it. however, we -- we -- are significantly seeing increases in the yew and deployment of encrypti encryption, because it is a default setting on most devices. >> related to that, chief galati, when you say default application can create significant problems -- is that the issue, it's the default one? >> yes, sir. >> a lot of the apps being used today, even with legal process or, you know, coverage on the phone, you cannot intercept those conversations. obvious we hear criminals both in criminals and also in the terrorism cases we do, people encouraging participants to go to app like telegram, wicker and so on. >> you know, captain, your testimony was very moving about the cases you described, people
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involved with murder and victimizing children. you know, this debate is oftentimes been about picking sides, the most notable apple v. fbi, so either you support law enforcement or you support the tech community. that feels like a loser's proposition. i understand people want encrypted technology, but based upon the responses captain you heard from ms. hess and the chief, do you think this is an us versus them debate? do you think there are answers? you are on the front lines dealing with these terrible cases. is this an us versus them? >> i do not think it's an us/them. what we see is a challenge with default encryption that functionally cannot be turned off. you don't eastern have the option to disability it. the the example i gave you was that after two prior convictions, he then learned that he needed to do something to protect himself, and then went out in search of, we
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assume, encryption and ways to do that. the difference is now what we are seeing increasingly, with your question to ms. hess as well, a discussion among wide variety of criminals, and i see it daily, those who extort children online, trade in child pornography, the best possibility systems to buy, the best combination of cell phone and operating system to buy to prevent encryption. please make no mistake that criminals testimony, and learning from it they're learning which technology to use, and which messaging app is located outside the united states and has no brick and mortar location here in the united states, which ones are located in countries with which we have mutual -- and criminals are using this as an education to make themselves more effective at the criminal tradecraft. >> so giving that, ms. hess, what answer do we have there?
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we're, or it is a child predator? will there be an answer for this? >> yes, sir. to clarify my earlier statement, too, we do see individuals, criminals, terrorists encouraging others to move to encrypted platforms. the solution to that, for us, is no investigator, no agent will take that as an answer to say they should not investigating. they will try to find whatever workaround they possibly can, but those are time intensive, may not be effective, may provide an additional amount of resources or skill to get to those solutions, but primarily we are in usually a race against the clock, and that's the key component of how we're finding additional solutions around this problem. >> i know this is a frightening aspect for americans, we understand privacy, but if
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there's some child predator hiding in the bushes by the playground, watching to snatch a victim, you can find them, but now given this cloak of invisibility, it's pretty frightening. we better find an answer. my time is up. thank you. >> just to follow up, the problem isn't default encryption, because if -- if you eliminated default encryption, criminals could still get it and they do. isn't that correct, ms. hess? >> yes, that's correct. >> the problem is criminals can have easy access to encryption, so -- and i think we can stipulate that encryption is really great for people like me who have bank accounts who don't want them to be hacked, but it's just really a horrible challenge for all of us as a society not just law enforcement when i have a child sex predator who's trying to encrypt or just as bad
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really, a terrorist. so what i want to know is what are we going to do about it? and -- and the industry says that if -- if congress forces them to develop tools so that law enforcement can get access to that data, that then will just open the door. do you believe that's true, ms. hess? >> i believe that there are certainly will be always no such thing as 100% security. however, industry leaders today have built systems that enable us to be able to get or receive readable content. >> and chief galati, what's your view on that? >> i believe that in order to provide -- and i don't want to call it a back door, but rather
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a front door, i think if the companies can provide law enforcement, i don't believe that it would be abused. >> why not? why not? >> we have the calia law from '94, and that was not abused. >> what they're saying is the technology, once they developed that technology then, anybody could get access to it and they could break the encryption. >> i believe if we look at apple, they had the technology going back to 18, 19 months ago where they were doing it for law enforcement, and i am not aware of any cases of abuse that came out when apple did actually did have the key, so i can see if they still have the key today -- >> i'll ask that, because they're coming up. captain cohen. i think we look for analogies. if you look for an iphone or android as a safety-deposit box,
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the keep the customer holds, that's the -- but the bank builds firewalls. there's a difference between encryption and firewalls. >> you think the technology exists? >> it does. >> i'm sorry, i don't have a lot of time. now there's something else that can be done forcing the industry to comply, or like in the san bernardino case, the fbi hired a third party to help them bread the code in that phone, and that was what we call gray hats. people are sort of in this murky market. what do you think about that suggestion, ms. hchbess? >> that's one solution, but it takes me back to the prior answer, but these solutions are case by case specific. they're very dependent on the fragility of the systems and vulnerabilities, and they're
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also time intensive and rear source intensive which may not be scalable to enable us to be successful. >> do you think there's any ethical issue with uses they third-party hackers? >> certainly there are vulnerabilities that we should review to make sure that we identify the risks and benefits of being able to exploit those vulnerabilities in a greater setting. >> i understand you're doing it because you have to in certain cases. do you think it's a good policy to follow? >> i do not think that that should be the solution. >> one more question is, if third-party individuals can develop these techniques to get into these encrypted devices or programs, why can't we bring more capabilities in-house to the government to be able to do that? >> certainly these types of solutions, and as i said this
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should not be the only solution, but these types of solutions that we do employ and can employ, they require a lot of highly skilled specialized resources that we may not have immediately available to us. >> can we develop those with the right resources? >> no, ma'am, i don't see that possible. i think that we really need the cooperation of industry, we need the cooperation of academia, we need the cooperation of the private sector to come up with solutions. >> thank you. i now recognize the gentle lady from -- >> thank you, mr. chairman. i began work with the indiana crimes against children task force, which was led primarily by assistant u.s. taern steve dabroda working hand in hand with you, captain cohen, and thank you so much for being here. prior to that time, i would say i was certainly not aware about what really went into and what
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horrific crimes really were being perpetrated against children back at that time in 200-2002. when we talk about child exploitation, we need to realize this involves babies up to tangs. this is not all about just willing teenagers doing these times of -- being involved in these types of acts. these are people praying on children of all ages. i want to walk you through, captain cohen, what some of the on bements are, how this on works. and also want to may insure we have time for you to explain your thoughts about the firewalls. first of all, if you could please walk through with us, and i'm talking about offend respect, older children who have access to social media. offenders, perpetrators are making connections through social media platforms, correct?
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>> yes, ma'am. those are typically encrypted. >> two years ago typically unencrypted, now encrypted. >> i left my service in 2007, so i think things have changed dramatically. in the second step,ed second conversation moves to encrypted discussions, they encourage particularly young people to go to app like whatsapp, kick and others. >> generally they go trolling for a victim, once they think they have a victim, they they moved to an encrypted communication app. >> would it be fair to say through the relationship that's been developed, they typically encourage them to send an image? >> correct. >> they want that victim to do, one, compromise an app that they can then exploit. >> that image is sent typically from one smartphone to another or from one smartphone to a computer? >> generalry one smartphone to
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another, involving an android phone or iphone. >> but this doesn't just happen in our country, correct? >> correct. it's possibility for to victimize a child another country to victimize a child in the u.s. >> we have out of country perpetrators as well as incountry perpetrators focuses on out of country victims as well? >> correct, yes. >> are those typically incrypted, the transmission of those photos are incrypted? >> yes, that's one of our challenges the transmission is incrypted and the data at rest on the phones is incrypted there as well. >> you presenting that image to a jury if an individual is caught and prosecuted, it is imperative, is it not for you to present the actual image to a jury? >> yes it's the content of the communication. it's the images that were sent and received. >> so if you can't get these
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incrypted image and the incrypted discussions what do you have in court? >> we have nothing in court. we can't complete the investigation. >> how do you find the victims? >> oftentimes we don't have way of identifying the victims. they go unserved. >> and can you please talk to us a bit more about why -- what it is that you actually do to find the victims? >> i would do everything we can. we try to look for legal solutions meaning trying to get records, service providers from the technology companies, trying to identify them through that. the challenge we encounter many times is because of retention periods the records no longer exists. and then we try to get the content and the communication to show who was talking to whom and we're unable to do that because of encryption. >> when you find one of these phones or computer or perpetrators there are usually
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thousands of images involving multiple of victims? >> hundreds of thousands and in dropbox and one drive and google drive. >> expand on what you previously started to answer potential solution with respect to fire walls. >> to provide a better fire wall. think of it a vault door, the doors to a bank. so while you think of the actual locks on the bank deposit boxes as encryption, build fire walls around that. they can with legal process be opened up and go inside it t. like a safety deposit box if we go to a bank with a search warrant the bank uses their key and we drill the lock. i've done that dozens of times. the difference is with encryption, my drill doesn't break the lock. >> thank you, i yield back. >> now, recognize ms. clark for five minutes. >> i thank you mr. chairman and
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i thank our ranking member. in october of 2014 fbi director comey gave these,s about encryption. we in the fbi will continue to throw every lawful tool we have at this problem. it's costly. it's inefficient and it takes time. we need to fix this problem. it is long past time. we need assistance and cooperation from companies to comply with court orders so criminals around the world cannot seek safe haven. we need to find common are ground and we care about the same things. so, ms. hess, i'd like to ask this question of you, other than tech companies creating back doors for law enforcement, what do you believe are some possible solutions to address the impasse between the law enforcement and the cyber security benefits of strong encryption? >> yes, ma'am.
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and as previously stated, i really believe that certain industry leaders have created secure systems that they are still yet able to comply are lawful orders. they're able to access the contents of those communications to either provide some protection for their customers, against malicious software or some other types of articles. in addition to that they're able to do it for business purposes or for banking regulations for example. in addition to those solutions, we certainly don't stop there l. we look at any possible tools we might have in our tool box. that might include the things we previously discussed here today. whether that be individual solutions, mata data surveillance. all of those things are not as responsive as being able to get the information directly from the provider. >> do you believe there is some
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common ground? >> i do. >> to the other panelists are there other solutions you can see that might solve the himpa e impasse. >> the solution we had in place previously in which apple did hold a key. the chief mentioned that was never compromised. they could comply with the proper service. apple solved a problem that does not exist. >> i would say by apple or other industries holding the key, it reduces at least the law enforcement having to go outside of those companies to find people that can get a solution. so as mentioned earlier about the gray hat hackers, you know, they're going to be out there. if the companies are doing it, it reduces the risk i believe. >> very well. in the san bernardino case, press accounts indicate the fbi has used the services of private
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sector third parties to work around the encryption of the iphone in question. this case raises important questions about whether we want law enforcement using non-governmental third party entities entities. i have questions about whether this is a good model or a better model exists. suming press accounts are true and you procured the help of a third party, why were you not able to solve this problem on your own? >> for one thing, as previously discussed, technology is changing very rapidly. we live in such an advanced anyone of technoloage. we require the services of specized skills we can only get through private industry. that partnership is critical to our success. >> this is to the entire panel. do you believe that the u.s. government needs enhanced technological capabilities?
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>> i think it does. private industry provides a lot of opportunities. so i think the best people that are out there are working for private companies and not working for the government. >> okay. >> i agree with the chief. essentially we need the help of private industry both the industry that makes the technology and others. we need industry to act as good corporate citizens and help us. because we can't do it alone. there are over 18,000 police agencies in the united states. and while the fbi may have some technical ability internalally those other agencies do not. over 90% of investigations are handled at the state and local level. we need industry's help. >> very well. i'll yield back mr. chairman. >> now, recognize mr. griffith for five minutes. >> thank you all for being here for this important discussion we're having today. i will tell you, we have to figure out what the balance is both from a security standpoint
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but also to make sure that we are fulfilling our obligations under our constitution. which was written with real-life circumstances in mind. where they said we don't want the government being able to come in and get everything. they were aware of the situation with general warrants, both in london, used against john wilkes and the rebellion and the founding fathers were aware of james otis and his fight in massachusetts which john adams said sewed the seeds of the revolution when the british government wanted to go from warehouse to warehouse looking for smuggled goods. it's not an easy situation. i do have this question, though e. apparently some researchers recently published the results of a survey of incrypted products that are available online. they found 2/3 of them are foreign products. so the question would be, given
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that so many of the incrypted products could be from companies not located or headquartered within the united states of america, if we force the companies that we do have jurisdiction over to weaken the security of their products, are we doing little more than hurting american industry and sending the really bad actors like mr. fletcher who is the child pornographer to a different format we don't have control over? that's a question i would ask all three of you. >> right now, google and apple act as the gatekeepers for most of those incrypted apps. the app is not available on the app store. if the app was not available in google play. a customer in the united states cannot install it. some of the incrypted apps like telegram are based outside the united states. u.s. companies act as
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gatekeepers as to whether those apps are accessible to be used. >> chooeief? >> i would agree. certain apps are not available on all devices. if the companies outside the united states can't comply with the rules and regulations of the ones that are in the united states and they shouldn't be available on the app stores. for example, you can't get every app on a blackberry you can on an android or google. >> yes, sir what you stated is correct. and i think that certainly we need to examine how other countries are viewing the same problem. they have the same challenges as we speak and are having similar deliberations as to how their law enforcement might gain access to these communications as well. as we move toward that the question is what makes consumers want to buy american products. is it because they're more secure or because they actually cover the types of services that
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the consumers desire? is it just because of personal preference? at the same time, we need to make sure that we balance that security as well as the privacy that the consumers have come to expect. >> i appreciate that. captain cohen. you talked about the fletcher case and indicated that the judge orders he give the password to the computer. but then you didn't get access to the thumb drive. was the judge asked to force him to do that as well? >> the judge -- in that instance the judge compelled him to provide it. he said it was not incrypted. the thumb drive was not incrypted, his defense expert disagreed and said it was incrypted. he provided a password and failed a stipulated polygraph. every indication is he intentionally chose to not give the second password for that device. >> and was he held in contempt for that? >> not that -- i do not believe he was.
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>> all right. i mean, look, obviously, if you can get the images you have better chance of finding the victim. it's true before encryption there was great difficulty in finding victims even if you found a store of photographs in a filing cabinet. it was sometimes hard to find the victims? >> it's hard to find child victims. >> it is. it's a shame. i like the concept, the visual of you're able to drill into the safety deposit box but you can't get into an incrypted telephone or computer. one of the things i know apple has had they don't want a back door to every single phone that other folks can get ahold of, or the government. do you know of any such a product that would give you that specificity? >> it would be similar to what
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we had. the legal process served on apple as an example and apple is the one to use the drill, not law enforcement. that helps provide another layer of protection against abuses by governments other than ours. while they have that capability because they're inside the fire wall. those outside the fire wall, outside the vault would have no ability to get access. >> i appreciate it. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> recognize mr. walsh for five minutes. >> thank you very much. i want to thank each of you for the work you and your departments do. it's astonishing times when the kind of crimes that all america is exposed to are happening and the expectation on the part of the public is somehow someway you're going to make it right and make us safe. so i think all of us really appreciate your work. this issue as you've acknowledged is very difficult. if any of us were in your position what we would want is access to any information that the fourth amendment allowed us
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to get in order for us to do our job. but there's three issues that are really difficult. one is law enforcement issue that you've very clearly annunciated. you have probable cause, you go through the process of getting a warrant. you're entitled to information that's on the phone or in the house. because of the technology we have impediments. i think we want you to be able to get the information you rightfully can obtain. the second issue that makes it unique almost is that in order for you to get the information, you have to get the active participation of an innocent third party who had nothing to do with the events. but who potentially can get the information for you. that's the whole apple case. but it's not -- very complicated situation. because it's not as though if you came with a warrant to my house for me to turn over information i had h. it's one
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thing if i go in my drawer and give it to you. it's another thing if it's buried deep in the back yard and the order is i've got to buy a backhoe and go out there and start digging around until i find it. normally that would be the burden on the law enforcement agency. so that's the second issue. how much can the government require a third party, a company or an individual to actually use their own resources to assist in getting access to the information. and then the third issue that's really tough, that mr. griffith was just acknowledging, we get a back door key, we trust you, but we have other governments our businesses are doing business with and they get pressured to provide the back door key. the key is lost and then things happen with respect to privacy and security. that you don't want to happen and that we don't want to happen. this is a genuinely tough situation.
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frankly i'm not sure there's a quote, easy balance on this. so just a couple of questions. ms. hess, what do you see as the answer here if -- i know you want the information. but if the getting of the information requires me to hire a few people to work in the yard with a backhoe or apple to really deploy high cost engineers to come up with a entry key. are you saying that's what should be required now? >> yes, sir i think the best solution is for us to work cooperacoo cooperatively and with amdemia to come up with the best possible solution. no investigative agency shouldfore go that for all other solutions they should continue to drive forward with all solutions available. >> chief, you are on the front
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line in new york all the time. and is it your view that the right policy now would be for you when you have probable cause to protect us and, you know, we're all on the same page there, to force a technology company at significant effort and expense to assist in getting access to the information? >> so, i would say up until a couple years ago, most of the technology companies, and they still do, have law enforcement liaisons we work closely with. for example, facebook or google or apple where, you know, we have the ability to go to them with legal process and they're providing us with the search warrant. >> right. my understanding from talking to those folks is that if it's information like that's stored in the cloud -- this is a situation in san bernardino. there was a lot of stuff that was relatively easy to retrieve.
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and they do provide that. they do cooperate as long as you have the warrant, they do everything they can to accommodate those lawful requests from law enforcement. has that been your experience? >> yes. the cloud does have some issues because things can be deleted from the cloud and never recovered. if the phone is not uploaded to the cloud, things are lost. there's a very -- >> would you just acknowledge there's a significant distinction between a company turning over information that's easily retrievable in the cloud comparable to me going to my house and opening a drawer and giving you the information you requested. versus a company that has to have engineers try to somehow crack the code so that they're very energetically involved in the process of decription? that's the difference, you would agree? >> yes, it's a difference. i believe when they create the operating system, that's where they have to make that key
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available. so that they don't have to spend the resources to crack a code. rather have a new operating system -- >> thanks. by the way, thank you. i'm over? all right. i just want to say i thought what representative clark said about resources for you to let you do some of this work on your own makes an awful lot of sense. some of these conflicts are going to be frankly as much as we want to say they're resolvable. they're hard to resolve. >> recognize mr. mullen for five minutes. >> as you can see, i think both sides on this -- up here on this -- in this committee you can see we want to get to the real problem. we want to be helpful not a hindrance. all of us want to be safe but we want to make sure we operate within a constitution. and the technology is changing at such

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