tv Hearing on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter CSPAN April 26, 2016 10:00am-12:31pm EDT
stirring in our hearts. well, we're out of time, we can't talk anymore. thank you very much for your time, click. i wasn't hang dog enough, i guess. so, two things maybe from that -- let's go home and rekindle some other spirits of fire, liberty. do it in the way that christ would, loving ly gently, caringly, passionately. let us also realize we're a vanguard. the group's not nearly as large as i would have liked to have seen it, but we are united in our desire to have this go forward, and we can together plough the ground and set the path and mark the way so that the others that follow will say h say we have again found that great cause for which this land was established, we may become again that light on the hill
that i believe god intended this nation to be, not conquering by the sword or by bribery, but by example. when they will flock to us, too, seeking the great blessings of liberty that we have been bequeathed at such great cost. i am honored, i'm humbled, i'm overcome. but we're in this together and we can do it. please, as ben franklin said, we must all hang together, or surely we shall all hang separately. thank you. [ applause ] and we are going live to capitol hill now on this tuesday morning as the senate armed
gilmore, program executive officer for the f-35, lieutenant general christopher bogdan, and director of acquisition sourcing management for the government accountability office, michael sullivan. the f-35 joint strike fighter program is the largest and most expensive acquisition program in the department of defense's history. the full capabilities of this aircraft will eventually provide are critical to america's national security, our ability to deter our potential adversaries around the globe, and if necessary, respond with overwhelming force to any future conflicts that may require military intervention. at the same time, the f-35's program's record of performance has been both a scandal and a tragedy with respect to cost, schedule and performance, and it's a textbook example of why this committee has placed such a high priority on reforming the broken defense acquisition system.
the f-35 schedule for development has now stretched more than 15 years. costs have more than doubled from original estimates. aircraft deliveries amount to no more than a mere trickle relative to the original promises of the program. the original f-35 delivery schedule promised 1,013 f-35s of all variants would be delivered by the end of fiscal year 2016. in reality, we will have 179, because the air force, marines and navy were all counting on the f-35s that never appeared, combat aircraft and strike fighter capacity shortfalls in all three services have reached critical levels, severely impacting readiness, and ultimately, limiting the department's ability to meet the requirements of the defense strategy. in the department's fiscal year 2017 budget request, dozens more aircraft are deferred from the future defense plan, resulting
in a situation where the last f-35 will be delivered in 2040. i cannot fathom how this strategy makes any sense. purchasing combat aircraft with a 40-year-old design in light of all the testimony this committee has received about how our potential adversaries are rapidly catching up with and in some cases matching america's military technological advantages. those f-35 aircraft being delivered are not being delivered as promised. they have problems with maintenance, diagnostic software, radar instabilities, sensor fusion shortfalls, fuel system problems, structural cracks from service life testing, engine reliability deficits, limitations on the crew escape system that caused pilot weight restrictions and potential cyber vulnerabilities. this list is as troubling as it is long. at long last, we are approaching the end of the long nightmare known as "concurrency."
the ill-advised, simultaneously development testing and production of a complex and technologically challenging weapons system that the department estimates will end up costing the american taxpayers $1.8 billion. but many questions remain, such as the total number of these aircraft the nation should buy or can even afford, the costs of future upgrades to keep these aircraft relevant in the face of an ever evolving threat, and the management and administration of a so-called joint program that general bogdan himself has admitted consist of aircraft that have only 20% to 25% commonality across the three variants, as compared to the original goal of 70% to 90%. the f-35a, f-35b and f-35c are essentially three distinct aircraft with significantly different missions and capability requirements. the illusion of jointness perpetuated by the structure of
the f-35 joint program stifles the proper alignment of responsibility and accountability this program so desperately needs. there are also questions as to when the system development and demonstration phase, or sdd, will actually be completed so that initial operational tests and evaluation can begin. originally scheduled to conclude in 2017, we have every indication the scheduled pressures will likely extend sdd well into fiscal year 2018. i'm very concerned the department may attempt to take short-cuts by deferring mission capability contest into later block upgrades, and by doing so, short-change the war fighter once again by delaying necessary capabilities. the f-35 was designed to replace multiple aircraft of all three services -- the a-10, f-16, f-18 and the harrier. that's why the operational testing and evaluation must be
of such high fidelity. there can be no question in the minds of the american people that their gigantic investment in this program will pay off with greatly improved capabilities that far surpass the mission capabilities of all those individual combat aircraft. the congress will not likely allow any more of these legacy aircraft to be retired from service until there is no doubt the f-35 can adequately replace them. nor is the congress likely to entertain a "block buy" or other multiyear procurement schemes until the initial operational test and evaluation is completed. and a positive milestone decision is made to commence full ray production, both which i understand are scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2019. the department appears to be considering managing the f-35 follow-on modernization, which
is estimated to cost over $8 billion for the first block upgrade within the overall f-35 program. this is incredible given the department's dismal track record on these upgrade programs as the f-22a modernization and debacle showed. i've seen no evidence that dod's processes have improved to a level that would remove the need for a separate major defense acquisition program that would enable close scrutiny by congress. moreover, i expect the department to use fixed-price contracts for the f-35 modernization effort in order to protect taxpayers. despite this program's many stumbles, there are some positive signs for the f-35. the marines declared national operational capability or ioc last july in yuma, arizona, and are preparing for their first f-35 overseas deployment next
year. personnel at hill air force base in utah who maintain the aircraft are preparing for air force ioc this fall. they report that the latest lots of f-35as are flying very well with a significant jump in reliability and war fighting capability as compared to earlier aircraft. general bogdan has steady pushed down procurement costs, deliveries are on the rise and possess increasingly effective war fighting capabilities. all of this is a testament to hard work of military and civilian personnel inside this program today. they're doing their best to overcome misguided decisions taken long ago, and they're having success in important areas. however, there is a lot of development left to complete in this program, and with it comes the potential for more problems, scheduled delays and increased cost. this committee will remain steadfast in its oversight responsibilities to ensure our war fighters get the
capabilities they need on time and at reasonable cost. senator reid. >> thank you very much. >> hold just one second. i ask the committee to consider a list of 920 pending military nominations, including in this list are the nominations of general vincent k. brooks, usa, to be commander united nations command combined forces command u.s. forces korea, general skap rottie, usa, to be u.s. europe command and supreme commander europe, and general laurie j. robinson, usaf, to be commander north american aerospace defense command. all these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. is there a motion to favorably report these 920 -- >> so moved. >> is there a second? >> second. >> all in favor, say "aye." >> aye. >> motion carries. senator reid. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. let me join you in welcoming the witnesses today.
we're grateful for your service. thank you very much, gentlemen. today we will seek a better understanding of the progress that the department is making in fielding the joint strike fighter, what actions the department has taken to ameliorate problems with the program and what judgments are the best in how effective the actions will be in preventing problems with the program, including additional cost overruns and delays. overall, the production program has been delivering on expected cost reductions on aircraft lots. however, we still have to complete the system develop program that is expected to deliver complete war fighting capability in each of the variants of the f-35. we may not have seen all of the potential schedule changes in sdd since not all the program's difficulties are behind us. according from dr. gilmore's prepared testimony, "although the marine corps has declared national operational capability ioc and the air force plans to do so later this calendar year, the f-35 system remains immature and provides limited combat capability with the officially
planned start of initial operational test evaluation iot&e just over one year away." dr. gilmore also assesses that the f-35 program will not be ready for iot&e until calendar year '18 at the soonest. and these assessments are of concern. several years ago, we required the department to estimate the dates for initial operating capability ioc of the three variants of the f-35 -- the marine corps declared ioc last year in july, the air force is scheduled to declare ioc later this year, and the navy is scheduled to declare ioc in 2018. the marine corps ioc was based on a version of the program software called black 2b. the air force's declaration of ioc will be based on the block 3i software. the navy's declaration will be based on the block 3f software version. until recently, in order to support the ioc dates, the program office has been working on versions of both blocks 3i
and 3f of the software simultaneously. the block 3f software depends on having a stable baseline for the block 3i software. with the contractor team working on multiple repleases of software, correcting deficiencies and achieving software stability has proved elusive. working on the two software pack simultaneously was intended to save time, but that time was lost when the project had to be redone because of mistakes stemming from the concurrency. within the past year, the program executive officer halted works on the block 3f software until the problems with the block 3i software could be sorted out. we need to understand what effect this altered approach may have on the overall program schedule. beyond that, we are planning for sizable upgrades in f-35 capability through spiral development efforts to the block 4 program. the block 4 program will likely be a multibillion dollar effort. we want to make sure that we do not repeat past mistakes. beyond that program, there is an even larger issue of the cost to sustain the f-35 once we have
bought it. these estimates are at one point as large as $1 trillion. we need to understand what the department is doing to reduce these potential costs. if we do nothing, we run the risk of allowing increased costs to sustain the f-35 to reduce the funds available for investment in the future force. this committee has been a strong supporter of the jsf program from the beginning. however, we must continue our vigilance on cost so that there's a proper balance between f-35 and other important dod acquisitions. thank you very much for calling the hearing, mr. chairman. >> thank you. i welcome the witnesses, secretary kindall. >> thank you, chairman mccain. chairman mccain, minority leader reid, members of the committee, i'm happy to be here today with general bog den, the program executive officer for the f-35 program, as well as with dr. gilmore and mr. sullivan to discuss the status of the program and the president's budget request for fy 2017. my opening comments, i'd like to discuss my own involvement with the f-35.
general bogdan will provide more detail on the state of the program. my first exposure to the f-35 was in fall of 2009 as i was awaiting confirmation to be the principal deputy undersecretary for atnl. i was briefed by a member of dr. gilmore's staff, and my reaction at the time was one of surprise at the extremely long period of low-rate initial production, approximately ten years. a high amount of concurrency in the program, as you mentioned, mr. chairman. the currency being the overlap in this case between development and production. it was one of the highest, and therefore, one of the most risky that i had ever seen. production was started in 2007, well before the stability design could be confirmed through testing. i later called the decision to start production acquisition malpractice, a phrase which seems to have stuck. in early 2010, also before i was confirmed, the program manager was replaced. the new program manager was admiral dave vanlet, a seasoned and competent professional. at that time, the f-35 went
through a mccurdy review as a result of the cost increases. and it was brought to the baseline it is operating against now and has ever since. in 2010, my predecessor, dr. carter, ended the use of cost-plus contracts for production, starting with lot 4. in the fall of 2011, i became the acting undersecretary. one of my early decisions was to bring lieutenant general bogdan in to replace vanlet. he has proved to be a highly competent and professional program executive officer. in the fall of 2011, based on early operational assessment reports from dr. gilmore's office, i commissioned an independent review of the technical status of the program, focused on the design stability of the program. at that time, the extent of the open design issues and the risk of high concurrency costs for retrofitting aircraft that ogden produced and were fixed later led me to seriously consider
halting production. based on several considerations, i made the decision to hold production constant at 30 aircraft per year for the next two years and to assess progress before increasing production at that point. under lieutenant general bogdan's leadership, the program's made steady progress for the past four years. cost and development have remained within the baseline. production costs have steadily decreased, beating the independent cost estimate each year. the cost of sustainment has also been reduced by approximately 10% since the program was rebaselined. there have been a few months of scheduled slip, primarily due to software complexity. while i do continue to monitor progress monthly and conduct annual program deep dive reviews, the f-35 is no longer a program that keeps me up at night. there are some design issues that still need to be resolved. the test program is about 90% complete, and i do expect additional discovery, but i will be surprised if a major design problem surfaces at this point. our task now is to complete the test program, achieve ioc for
the air force later this year, and the navy in 2018, complete ot&e, and support our many partners and foreign sales customers as they become operational over the next few years. we also need to move forward with a follow-on development. and i appreciate this committee's support for authorizing and funding that important work. the f-35 is a game-changing, state-of-the-art weapons system, but our potential adversaries are not standing still. threat advances in areas like ingraded air defense systems, air-to-air weapons and electronic warfare must be continuously countered. we must continuously improve the weapons system to keep pace with emerging threats. and i thank the committee for its support and look forward to your questions. >> thank you. general bogdan. >> thank you, sir. chairman mccain, ranking member reid, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity here today to discuss the f-35 lightning 2 program. my purpose here today is to provide you an honest, balanced assessment of where the program
stands today. that means i'll tell you the good, the bad and the ugly about the program and tell you what my team is doing to reduce costs, improve f-35 performance and meet our scheduled commitments. the f-35 lightning 2 is of vital importance to the security of the united states, and as the program executive officer and program director, i'm committed to delivering an affordable, reliable and sustainable fifth-generation weapons system to our war fighters and those of our international partners and foreign military sales customers. overall, the f-35 program is executing well across the entire spectrum of acquisition to include development and design, flight test, production fielding, base stand-up, maintenance and support and building a global sustainment enterprise. the program is at a pivot point. it is now rapidly changing, growing and accelerating. we will be finishing our development program in late 2017 and begin a transition to a leaner, more efficient follow-on modernization program. we'll see production grow from
delivering 45 aircraft in 2015 to delivering over 100 airplanes in 2018 and up to 145 by 2020. additionally, in the next four years, we will continue a stand-up of 17 new operating f-35 bases all over the world. we are also accelerating the creation of our heavy maintenance capability and supply chain in the pacific, european and north american regions, creating a truly global sustainment capability. however, the program is not without risks and challenges. as these come with any program of this size and complexity. but i'm confident the current risks and issues we face can be resolved and we'll be able to overcome future problems and deliver the f-35's full combat capability. i've often said that the mark of a good program is not that it has no problems, but rather, that it discovers problems, implements solutions, improves the weapons system, and at the same time, keeps the program on track. i believe we've been doing that for a number of years now. let me highlight a few of our
recent accomplishments. last year we began u.s. air force and partner pilot training at luke air force base in arizona, where a blend of u.s. and partner f-35 instructor pilots are helping to train u.s. air force and other partner pilots. and the air force is now receiving f-35as at hill air force base in utah and training is under way to ready its first combat-coded f-35 squadron to be operational later this year. also, the united states marine corps is successfully flying and deploring to a steer sites for training and dropping live weapons with the b-35 today. in addition, successfully delivering 45 airplanes last year, including the first aircraft produced in the italian assembly facility in cam erie, italy. from a production perspective, we've delivered a total of 176 of our test operational and training aircraft to date. on the cost front, the price of purchasing f-35s continues to
decline lot after lot, a trend i believe will continue for many years. i expect the cost of an f-35a with an engine and fee in then year dollars to be less than $85 million in fiscal year '19. as i said before, the program is changing, growing and accelerating, but it is not without risks, issues and challenges. let me highlight some of these areas and what we're doing about them. on the technical front, we have a number of risks i'd like to mention. at the top of my list are both aircraft software and our maintenance system known as the autono, ma'amic logistics system or als. we've seen stability issues with our block 3 software. however, we believe we have identified the root cause of these problems and have tested solutions in the lab and in flight tests, and are now completing our flight test with these solutions. our initial indications of this flight testing is positive and we see software stability improve to two to three times better than what we've seen in
the past. by the end of this month, i am encouraged that we'll have enough data to consider this problem an issue closed. we've also experienced schedule issues with the development of our next version of als, version 2.02. i'm prepared to discuss this issue as well as topics such as our egress system, u.s. air force ioc, initial operational test and recent u.s. air force and u.s. marine corps deployments and the status of our partners and fms partners during the questions and answers. in summary, the f-35 program is moving forward, sometimes slower than i'd like, but moving forward and making progress nonetheless. we're nearing the completion of development and flight tests in 2017. we are ramping up production, standing up new bases and growing at global sustainment enterprise. we've also stabilized and reduced the major costs on this program. as with any big, complex program, new discoveries, challenges and obstacles will occur. the f-35 is still in development, and this is a time
when challenges and discoveries are expected. however, we believe the combined government-industry team has the ability to resolve our current issues and any future discoveries. i intend to continue leading this program with integrity, discipline, transparency and accountability. it is my intention to complete this program within the resources and time i've been given, and i intend on holding my team and myself accountable for the outcomes on this program. we never forget that some day your sons and daughters, your grandsons or granddaughters will take an f-35 into harm's way to defend our freedom. delivering them the best possible weapons system is a responsibility i and my team take very seriously. thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the program. i look forward to your questions. >> mr. chairman, senator reid, members of the committee, i'll focus my remarks on readiness for operational tests and evaluation and achievement of full combat capability. my estimate is the program will not be ready to begin
operational tests and evaluation until midcalendar year 2018 at the earliest. that's about a one-year delay relative to the program's objective date and six months relative to the threshold date. there are a number of reasons that that's my assessment. the most complex mission system testing remains, as does verification of fixes to a number of significant problems. in-flight stability of missions systems with a new technical refresh 2 processor has been poor, but there is recent indication of significant progress in achieving stability, although those stability issues, while they were being fixed, led to delays in block 3f development, which provides full combat capability. nonetheless, there is good news on the stability front. significant ground start-up instabilities persist. however, inadequate fusion of sensor information from sensors on a single aircraft as well as among a four-ship of aircraft resulted in cluttered and confusing displays are still a problem. for ships will be frequently
used in combat to ensure key multi sh multiship combinations used to deal with the increasingly complex and stressing air systems potential adversaries began fielding in the middle of last decade. shortfalls in electronic warfare and electronic attack, measures persist. there are shortfalls in the performance of the distributed aperture system, including missile warning and situational awareness. long aerial refueling times, up to two to three times those of legacy aircraft. lack of viable moving target capability, which is crucial for successful conduct of close-air support and other missions. lack of display to pilots of failures in critical mission systems components, which is unacceptable in combat. and there are other issues that are classified. regarding mission systems, the program has now changed its approach, as has been discussed, from executing parallel, schedule-driven software releases to a serial capability based approach, which does take longer, but that approach has
been validated in the recent achievement of improved stability with the tr-2 processor. that approach, the new approach, allows the extra time needed to actually fix problems, and as i mentioned, has been validated by the progress recently seen. stealth care craft are not visible. missile systems and fusion must work in a reasonable sense of that word. they don't have to be perfect, but they have to work to prevail in combat against the modern, very capable and mobile systems potential adversaries have been fielding since last decade. this is a key rationate for this $400 billion program. to continue with other reasons that there may be a delay in operational testing. time is needed to complete and certify full weapons uses through the flight envelope. estimates are october 2017 for f-35a, and may 2018 for f-35b,
and these estimates assume the rate at which tests are accomplished. that may be a challenge to achieve. as mentioned, there are problems that continue with the ann no, ma'amic logistics systems or als, which contains work-around not acceptable in combat. under the current schedule, the final version of als 3.0, the full capability version required and full combat capability will not be released until the first quarter of calendar year 2018, but this schedule could be delayed by the ongoing problems with als 2.0.2, which attempts to integrate the engine data and incorporate other functionality and fixes. in currency-driven, extensive modifications would be required the early lot aircraft that had originally been bought for iot&e when it was planned to begin in 2013. the current unmitigated schedule for accomplishing those modifications, including those for the gun, which is turning out to be very problematic,
extends into the third quarter of 2019. the program is working on a multipronged approach to pull those modifications to the left that includes taking production aircraft slated for operational use and taking hardware from recently fielded aircraft, and a decision on that approach is needed now. there are inadequacies that remain in the u.s. programming laboratory that are precluding the ability to generate combat-effective mission data files enabling aircraft to deal with the air defense threats i mentioned, and they're only going to worsen in the future. current schedule shows usrl hardware required to help threats that extend into calendar year 2020. the program has and can deliver mission data files, but they are not optimized or fully tested to handle the current threat because of operational deficiencies. the schedule is validated, but probably unable -- and this assumes we receive the
functional lab version this month, which may be problematic. for all these reasons, delays to iot&e and full combat capability of likely, and i remind everyone that iot&e will constitute the most realistic and stressing test of jsf that will be performed. therefore, discovery of new, significant deficiencies during iot&e, as was the case with f-22, is pretty much assured. thank you. >> mr. sullivan, welcome. >> thank you, chairman mccain, senator reid, members of the committee. i have a written statement for the record, but i'd like to just take this time to briefly highlight what we consider to be the most important challenges facing the program moving forward. in addition to my written statement, i report to this committee and others, issued on october 14th, contains more details on the program's progress to date. first, although the program has managed cost very well since its
nunn-mccurdy breach and subsequent rebaselining in 2012, it still poses significant future affordability challenges for the department and the congress. as the program begins pro curing more aircraft, the department is expected to spend on average about $13 billion per year over the next 22 years until all plan purchases are complete in 2040. these annual funding levels will present challenges as the program stacks its funding priorities against other large acquisitions, including the b-21 bomber, kc-46 tanker, the ohio class submarine replacement, a new carrier and many more. second, the department now plans to add new capability, known as block 4, to the f-35 that is beyond its original baseline
capability, and it is planning to manage that effort as part of the existing program, rather than establishing a separate business case and baseline for that effort. this has significant implications as far as the congress' ability to provide oversight and holding the program accountable. the new work has a projected cost of about $3 billion over just the next six years, and that price tag alone would qualify it as a major defense acquisition program in its own right. we believe it should be managed as such with its own separate business case to allow for transparency and accountability. third, the f-35 software development is nearing completion, but the program faces challenges in getting all of its development activity completed on time for operational testing, as we just heard dr. gilmore talk about. it has completed over 80% of its
developmental flight tests and is now working to close out flight testing of its final block of software, block 3f. this final block is critical, as it will provide the full war fighting capabilities to the aircraft. program officials have estimated as much as a three-month delay right now to completing block 3f testing, and our own analysis indicates it could be closer to six months. i think dr. gilmore's analysis, as he just stated, has it more than that. getting that developmental testing is critical, of course, to getting operational testing done and ioc'ing the aircraft. with regard to technical risk, the program has found fixes for earlier problems, problems such as the helmet display and the engine, and it's looking to find solutions to two other challenges, the ejection seat problem and the carrier variance wing structure. there's cracks in the wing
structure. perhaps the biggest outstanding technical risk for the program today, though, as discussed already, is the aunonomic logistics system, known as als. that's a system that supports operations, mission planning, supply chain management, maintenance and many other processes. in our companion report also issued on february -- on april 14th, we documented several issues with als, most importantly concerning its inability to deploy right now and a lack of needed redundancy at this point that could result in operational and schedule risks in the future. finally, manufacturing and production data continue to show a positive trend towards more efficient production, and that's good. the amount of labor hours required to build each aircraft continues to go down. the engineering changes coming out of the test program have been reduced significantly.
and the contractor's now delivering aircraft on time, or in some cases, ahead of schedule. we continue to monitor the measures for aircraft and engine reliability and maintainability. and while they still fall short of expectations, they continue to improve, and there is still time to achieve the program's required goals in that area. i will close with that, mr. chairman, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. i thank the witnesses. general bogdan, how many military government civilians and full-time equivalent contractor positions are assigned to the joint program office, and what are the annual costs to operate the office? >> sir, today, if you include the test force at pax river and the test force at edwards air force base, which are not necessarily part of my program office, but i pay for them just like i do support contractors, the number is about 2,590.
and the annual cost to operate the jpos about $70 million a year. and that includes pay for salaries, that includes leasing facilities in space, computers, i.t., everything wrapped up. >> the information that i have is it's nearly 3,000, and the cost is $300 million a year. maybe you can but $70 million a year to run a office of a program is pretty disturb iing. secretary kindall, last year, there was report language that required the secretary of defense to either revalidate the total by a quantity of 2,443 for all variants or submit a new number by may 25th, 2016. does the department intend on meeting this requirement on time? >> mr. chairman, as far as i know, yes, we are.
>> i was interested, mr. sullivan -- dr. gilmore, you said that the ioc is likely to be delayed. do you have any idea of how long that delay would be in ioc? >> are you speaking, mr. chairman, about the ioc with the air force with block 3i? >> yes. >> i think it's unlikely the air force will meet its objective date, which is mid-2016, but it could meet its threshold date, which is later in the fall. >> in this issue, mr. sullivan, of the pursuing a block by, can you provide any examples of a program pursuing a block buy or multiyear procurement strategy prior to full right production decision?
>> you're referring to kind of the proposal right now to buy aircraft in a three-year buy. >> yes. >> no, i don't have any examples of that. the only example i know of a block buy situation is our usual multiyear procurements, which require a lot of criteria to show that the industry base is stable, the design is stable, they're ready to produce. usually it comes much later in a production line. so i've never heard. i don't think there's even any criteria for that kind of a block buy. >> dr. gilmore, in your stateme statement, you said the limited and incomplete f-35 cyber security testing accomplished to date has nonetheless revealed deficiencies that cannot be ignored. can you elaborate on that? >> i'd be happy to do so in the appropriate forum. it would require the discussion of classified information.
we treat cyber vulnerabilities, the details of them as classified, but they are significant in my judgment. >> general bogdan, mr. sullivsullivan, dr. gilmore believes there will be a delay in the ioc of the air force version. what's your response? >> sir, there's many things that the air force needs me to dlir to them before they can declare ioc. all of the things that are necessary for them to make that decision are on track for a 1 august 2016 declaration with the exception of als. i believe als is approximately 60 days behind, and therefore, i would put als delivery, which is a criteria for them at about 1 october 2016 as opposed to 1 august. they have until december, which is their threshold date. so, i think they will meet their ioc criteria within that period but not exactly on 1 august.
>> the fiscal year 2016, general, limited funds for the procurement of f-35as until secretary james certified that the f-35a aircraft delivered in 2018 will have the full combat capability with block 3f hardware, software, weapons carriage. have you recommended or do you intend to recommend to secretary james that she make the certification? >> yes, senator. i am preparing the package now to forward to the secretary of the air force with my recommendation that she make that certification. i needed a few pieces of information before i could feel confident asking her to certify. and one of those pieces was that the software stability issues that were spoken about before were behind us. i believe they are now. therefore, i believe that 3f will be delivered in fiscal year 2018 with the full capabilities,
so i will forward that package to her now. >> finally, dr. gilmore, given the size and cost of block 4, would you believe it should be treated as a separate program for nunn-mccurdy purposes or as part of the -- just as part of the f-35 program? >> well, senator, i remind you, that's not my decision. however, in taking a look at what i've seen in the current plans for block 4, as i mentioned in my written statement, they need to be scrubbed rigorously, in my view. and so, anything that will help in that rigorous scrub and bring clarity to performance, desired performance and cost would be useful. so i think that would be a good idea. but again, i'd hasten to say it's not my decision. >> senator reid. thank the witnesses. >> mr. chairman, with your permission, i will yield to senator donley. he has a pressing situation elsewhere. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the witnesses.
secretary kendall, from 2006 to 2007, as the f-35 was under development, dod supported an alternate engine program. the push for the f-35 engine was controversial in later years, but i'm interested to hear from you and others with thoughts on this, do you believe the alternate engine program was a smart strategy in the early r&d years? >> the question of the alternate engine -- and i was in my position for the last couple of years on that debate. -- was really a question of the economics associated with it. basically, a decision was made that the economic case was not there to carry a second engine. that entails taking some risk, of course. you can only rely on one. that's proven out. the engine, the f-135 is performing. we're getting costs out of that, not as quickly or as much as we'd like, but we think that the strategy we've embarked on is working. we are also funding some advanced development for follow-on engines. that's competitive development at this point.
that could be cut into the production several years from now if we could fund an emd program for that. but affordability's been a major constraint on the program overall, including on the engines. >> general bogdan, i'm particularly concerned about the performance of the f-135, given that pratt and whitney was recently selected to build the engine for the b-21. i'm concerned that looking back on the history of the f-35, the f-16 and others, there is performance issues. and i quote from the department of defense's annual report -- "recurring manufacturing quality issues" that have been an issue with pratt & whitney for the f-35. could you comment on that, please? >> yes, sir. the quality issues that you're talking about are primarily now at the pratt & whitney level. they're at their supply's level. nonetheless, pratt & whitney is responsible for those suppliers. over the last few years we have improved our on-time delivery of engines significantly. but early on in the program, you
are correct, sir, that we were seeing quality escapes and manufacturing issues with the lower tier suppliers. i think at this point in time, the manufacturing of the engine is much more mature than it was a few years ago. relative to the performance of the engine, today the f-135 engine has about 52,000 fleet hours on it, and it's maintaining about a 94% full mission-capable rate. that is a very, very good number. in the end game of the program, we were shooting for 95%. so here we are less than a quarter of the way through the full maturity of the airplane, and we're just about achieving that reliability we're looking for. however, that's not to say that there are issues we're dealing with the engine right now and changes we're making to make it more affordable, more produceable, and increase the reliability. but from that perspective i've
been fairly happy with the performance of the f-135. >> mr. sullivan, they've talked that their engines are well ahead of 2020 requirements, but in your report last month, gao wrote that the f-35a and 35b engines are at about 55% and 63% of where the program expected them to be. can you explain the difference in that assessment, sir? >> i don't know that i can explain the cause of that, but we have found that the engine reliability and maintain -- you know, the measurements that we look at in terms of coming up with a reliability growth curve of an engine during development. pratt & whitney has been pretty consistently below where they had expected to be but i would say they've been improving in the last two or three years in that respect. seems like they're beginning to retire some of that risk. >> this is to all the panelists.
what's the toplesson you've learned through the f-35 acquisition process that can inform future major acquisitions across the services? mr. sullivan, i'd like to start with you. >> well, i think obviously, the first thing that we've learned with this is that you shouldn't have a concurrent -- you shouldn't concurrently develop technology with a product and you shouldn't concurrently buy aircraft while you're still developing them. that's the number one thing. >> dr. gilmore? >> the f-35 is an extreme example of optimistic, if not ridiculous assumptions about how a program would play out. the decision to begin production before much of development had really been accomplished was a really bad one, as mr. kendall has discussed. but although an extreme example, it's not unprecedented, because the department is typically
optimistic about, very optimistic about schedules and costs, which then sets up the program managers who are put in charge of these programs to look like failures from the outset. which is a terrible thing to do to them. a terrible thing to do to them. >> thank you, i'd love to hear the other two but i'm out of time, thank you, mr. chairman. >> i think the question i was going to ask may have been answered in the second sentence in the opening statement when it says the f-35 will form the backbone of the u.s. air combat superiority for decades to come. we keep hearing things to the contrary, you might remember when the secretary hagel that was just in february of '14 he said american dominance in the seas, in the skies and in space can no longer be taken for granted.
general frank corant, the usafe commander says september of last year, the advantage that we had from the air i can honestly say is shrinking. this is not just a specific problem it's a significant -- it's as significant in europe as it is anywhere else in the planet. i don't think it's controversial to say they've closed the gap in capability. general, do you agree with that? >> i would agree with that. our adversaries today are full speed ahead and accelerating the development of significant military capabilities to thwart ours. both in air to air and air to ground. i believe the f-35 is absolutely necessary now and in the future to give you and the nation options to take an airplane and
go anywhere on the face of the earth as a time of our choosing and be survivable and hit a target. i do not believe there's any other airplane in the world that can do that today. only the f-35 can do it and will do it for many years. >> you're talking about fifth generation from russia and china. you have the t-50 and the chinese have the j-30 and j-31 or something like that maybe. now, when you compare those, normally they talk about we're going to be stealthier, going to have better radar. once you give us an idea of what the opposition is doing right now and how it's specifically what areas we are better. >> senator, i'll try and do that without walking across the line of sensitive information or classified. one of the things that folks
like to think about when they look at those adversary airplanes they look a lot like ours. that's a true statement. much of the design of those airplanes came on the outer mold line from what we've developed in our f-22's and f-35's. what makes us better and special is what's on the inside. the radar, multisensor fusion, our ability to take information into battle space and provide it to the pilot so he knows what's going on 360 degrees around him and the weapons to employ that knowledge are what makes it different. >> that's good. recently they were talking about some pretty high individuals talking about the fact on the f-22's. they're using those a lot more than we anticipated -- this is is for anybody here -- and yet,
in your presentations you talk pretty specifically about the numbers of copies we're going to have of a's b's and c's. it's -- most of us here on this side of the table remember we went through this with the f-22's. it was going to be 750, 380 some then 187 ultimately. now, that's quite a deterioration from the original numbers. is there a reason that you don't believe we'll experience the same thing with the f-35? >> sir, i can't assume in the future what the u.s. services will do. but what i will tell you is that the major difference between an f 22 type program and the f-35 program are significant in that we have many fms and foreign partners who are also buying the airplane. if they continue to buy the
airplane, the price will continue to come down. >> yeah. >> so that stabilized -- >> that's where you come up with the $185 million. one last thing we were disturbed two years ago when we thought we thought it was going to be a b model and last minute we had to bag it. and of course we didn't have anything at france in paris. are you confident we'll have -- it's going to make the farm bill this year? >> yes, sir we're planning a deployment of five f-35's two a models and three b models. >> how many will be flying? >> we'll fly all of those. >> look forward to it, thank you. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to classify one of your comments. you were talking about i think
the difficulty of operating with four air craft and the aircraft operating together. is that -- >> four ship will often be used that will provide information from four aircraft that must be fused in order to provide the situation awareness that general bogdan mentioned is so critical to dealing with future and current threats. >> there is a current difficulty in making those systems even if they operate in a single aircraft operate effectively together. >> fusion has been a challenge. to make work well. it will based on what i've seen continue to be a challenge. it's a very hard problem. it doesn't surprise me. that it's turning out to be a hard problem and to make the fusion work well. because you get information from different censors, on the same
aircrafts as well as different aircraft. you have software that sorts through all that and this signal that i got from this sensor is from the same target as this sensor on another aircraft. that's a hard physics problem. it's not matter of writing code for a graphical user interface. it involves detailed understanding of physics and propagation of signals and so forth and the errors in the signals. so that's going to continue to be a challenge it will require a lot of test fix test where you guess at solutions and use subject matter to test them see how they work. that's a time consuming process. >> in the ioc status, do you really get into that multiaircraft fusion issue or is that simply the aircraft being able to fly, you know, essentially -- >> well, you know, the air force is the one ju-- sets the standas for determining what constitutes
sufficient performance for ioc. i can't remember the details of what the air force has said about fusion. obviously, the more fusion capability they have the better. it will be limited because block three i provides the same capability that block 2 b did. there were shortfalls that block 3 f is meant to surmount. >> thank you very much. mr. secretary, from your perspective, what do you think the most significant challenges are -- i know general bogdan talked about als as a key issue in terms of resolution. any others that you would identify, you're focused on and your approach to dealing with them? >> i think als is kind of the leading problem in terms of achieving ioc for the air force on time. the issue that was mentioned earlier on stability i think was a concern. but that seems to be getting under control. there are a number of concerns
with just the pace of testing and how much has to be done. some steps the general is taking to alleviate some of the schedule pressure that he has. i think it's a suite of a lot of things that have to happen. at the end of the day, the air force will make the decision as to when they think it's ready to clear ioc. my experience with the marine corp, i think the air force will be exactly the same. they're not going to do that until they're comfortable with the product they have. >> one of the major issues long term is the sustainment cost of the aircraft which seem to be quite significant. can you describe steps you and general bogdan are taking to lower those costs? we want to lower the costs across the platform, but we want to lower it long term. >> we've been able to take 10% out of the cost estimate at the time of the rebase lining. a variety of things to do that. we're looking at various ways to structure the business case if you will for the sustainment. and that's a work that's still
in progress. we don't want to remain in a sole source environment for anymore than we have to. introducing competition is a big part of t. we're looking for creative ways to work with our partners so that we do things together as opposed to separately. there are cost efficientss with that. >> give me your top two or three. >> we started a fully funded reliability and maintainability program two years ago where we looked at each and every component on the f-35 to determine if it was maintaining its performance on the airplane at the pace at which we needed it. that has proven to be very cost effective for us. we're going after those piece and parts on the airplane that aren't performing well. we have a cost war room where we look at every idea that comes from the field on how to better maintain the airplane. perfect example of that is the original concept for tires, wheels and brakes on this airplane was to ship all that off to a contractor somewhere.
the u.s. air force, navy, marine corp have that capability today with their legacy systems at their basis. we're moving that work to them. that reduces about 40% 50% of the cost and the turn time of fixing things like that. we're going about systematically trying to get every piece of cost out of the program. >> thank you. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you, chairman. general bogdan i wanted to ask you, recently general welch came before our committee and said that the mission capability of the a-10 will not be replaced by the f-35, yet the website for the joint strike fighter program says the program -- that the f-35 will replace the a-10. can you answer this question for us? there's an inconsistency and i would like to know is general welch right or is your website right?
>> thank you for that question, ma'am. first, the structure of the u.s. air force and its fighter inventory is well beyond my purview. so i won't try and explain what general welch said or what the decision making process is for the air force on replacing their fighter inventory. >> but, general, i think this is an important question, so if general welch comes before our committee and says the f-35 a is not going to replace the a-10, and yet the joint strike fighter website says that the f-35 a will replace the a-10. pretty important as we think about the capabilities of the a-10. secretary kendall. >> i can't say what he was speaking to but -- first of all both statements are correct. >> both statements can't be correct? >> we will in fact replace the
a-10's with f-35's that's the plan. the f-35 will not do close air support mission. it will do it differently. the a-10 was designed to be low and slow and close to the targets it was engaging relatively speaking we will not use the f-35 in the same way as the a-10. it will perform the mission differently. >> let me ask dr. gillmore. so it's going to perform the mission very differently, is it not important that we understand how the two compare? and so i would ask you, how will -- will there be comparison testing, not just with the a-10 but with other comparative air frames that the f-35 is going to replace? how will the operational testing comparing the closed air support capabilities be conduct? >> i have here the operational requirements for f-35 and on page two it says the f-35 a will
rely on the a 2 for assistest. that's in the operational requirements document. >> it's a pretty darn important role to our men and women on the ground. so what about the flyoff? how will that go down? >> we are going to dpooo a comparative test to perform search and rescue missions. we're going to do a comparison test of the ability of the f-35 to perform suppression and destruction of enemy air defensewidefens defenses. this document has numerous citations to the performance expected of a-35 in relationship to the aircraft it's going to replace. that operational testing is
entirely consistent with the operational requirements document. it's also the comparison testing is also not unprecedented. there was comparison testing between the f-22 and the f-15. and there's been comparison testing as part of other operational tests including things like tactical vehicles like the joint light tactical vehicle and the humvee. comparison testing makes common sense. if you're spending a lot of money to get improved capability, that's the easiest way to demonstrate it. is to do a rigorous comparison test. with regard to kas we'll do it under all the circumstances we see it conducted, including under high threat conditions, in which we expect f-35 will have an advantage and other conditions requiring loitering on the target, low altitude operations and so forth in which there are a lot of arguments that ensue about which aircraft might be -- have the advantage, the a-10 or f-35 that's what the
test is meant to show us. >> i think that's important so we can understand the capability comparisons there. so general bogdan, i wanted to ask you, i'd asked a question of general welch in march as when do you expect the sdb 2 to achieve a demonstrated full mission capability for the f-35 a. >> ma'am our program of record has the sdb 1 coming in in the end of block three f in the 2017 time frame. sdb 2 which is a much more enhanced capability for that precision weapon is planned for the first increment of our block four and that's approximately in the 2021, 2022 timeframe. >> that's an important issue as well. the sdb 2 provides f-35 a an ability to kill multiple targets
in bad weather. i think that's important. >> the comparison testing will be done with mobile targets and targets in close proximity to buildings and as i mentioned right now the mobile target capability of the f-35 is problematic and how much it will be corrected as we get to block 3 f remains to be sade. sdb 2 will provide a weapon that can follow the target. before that in 2020 may help. but the current moving target is limited >> one of the things that continues to worry me is under the air force's plan the a-10 are retired by 2022. seems to me these are important questions that remain that matter to our men and women on the ground. thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank all of you for your service.
general bogdan, the gao's report recommends an approach in which new developments efforts are managed as separate acquisition problems. it was recommended this type of program for the f-35 block four following modernization efforts. however, dod has not concurred with the gao's recommendations. and plans to include the f-35's block four following modernization efforts under the existing costs plus contract. if dod did not adopt gao's recommendation, would that help eliminate cost plus for the block four phase of the program? why would that not? i don't know why any of us don't pay attention to gao? why the department of defense does it makes no sense. >> strategy level i'm going to defer to mr. kindall. >> i think we're talking about a distinction here that may not have a difference.
the label m dap brings with it a lot of statutory oversight. we plan to do with block four is insure it's accounted for spr separately. there's a full transparency and visibility into what we're doing. it's a -- all the things that i think are being asked for will be supplied. but if we add to that the label of a major defense acquisition problem that will bring additional costs i was hoping to avoid that. >> i agree. i would ask mr. sullivan why would they make that report if you thought it was going to throw more bureaucracy on top of you. >> we wouldn't want to see any bureaucracy on top even. we did a report last year, looking we call it our efisha
efishiancy report. let's reduce the bureaucracy they have to deal with. the reason we think it's important here is number one, the dollars involved are such that even according to current law that they meet the threshold for an m dap program. the other thing is on the f-22 program we saw something very similar to this when they decided to base line new capabilities into the program they did it under the existing program. very quickly a $2 billion estimate for development of those new capabilities became about $11 billion. and there was no track over it. there was no accountability over it because it was in with the baseline program. >> i feel -- i appreciate the job the gao does, i really do.
i have to make apologiies why w don't take your recommendations more seriously. you must have considered if the bureaucracy versus cost and the contract had to be significant savings. >> yes, we sympathize with the desire to not have to go through so many reviews and so many offices and comments and everything else. we did the report on that and it was eye opening for uses to what they have to go through. to me, that's not -- they said if they had to go to a major defense acquisition program, it would cause a year's delay in getting that development effort going. and i just don't understand why that would be the case. they're doing many of the things that they'd be required to do. >> thank you. let me go on. yesterday it was announced we're sending 250 special operations
forces to syria. i understand that the cost is approximately $1 million to $1.5 million to train one special operator equaling to $375 million for the 250. general, you indicated recently that the f-35 cost $108 million per aircraft. it will come down to $85 million you're hoping. if we traded in ten jets, just ten, we could increase the size of our special forces community by over 650. this is after the general came here and said that we're about 220,000 short of in strength ground troops we're looking for ways to make sure we can meet the imminent threats we have. the f-35 pilots helmet alone cost $400,000. that's $10 million for 2,500. most of this is ground threats we're facing and fighting, does it make sense to spend so much
money on f-35 while we currently depend so much more on our special op forces around the world? since we have to make choices. >> senator, what i will tell you is, that the department has many different kinds of choices they have to make and try and balance their requirements with the resources that they have. i will tell you that the f-35 is a long term investment. in the defense of this nation. and our future adversaries are not sitting still. and in the next 10, 20, 30 years, we may very well need the capabilities the f-35 will provide us to maintain our leadership in the world. i consider the f-35 as an investment in the future. >> and i appreciate that. my time is up. i'm saying we have 2,500 scheduled to be built, correct? is that the number? >> the u.s. services will build
2,443 sir. >> for ten less aircraft we could put 650 special ops people on the front lines. >> i believe your math is right, sir. >> thank you, sir. >> dr. gillmore in your prepared testimony you state that cyber security testing is revealed deficiencies and that full testing of the logistics operating unit and the logistics information system has not been permitted. can you give us an overview of the planned cyber security tests and whether based on the deficiencies discovered so far you believe the testing will be adequate? >> if we execute the plan that my office has been working on with the joint operational test team and the program office over the next couple of years, that will be a very thorough rigorous set of cyber security tests. the problems that we're running
into as you mentioned are that the program is reluctant to let us test on live systems for fear that we might damage them. and they had not made provisions for backup, if the systems went down. they are working on that now. so up to this point and in the immediate future, we will have to test on surrogate systems and laboratory systems. the office is making those available to us. that's better if we're going all testing and we're learning from that. as is mentioned in my annual report and in my statement. we need to do much more than that. we need to test on the live systems, we're going to have to find a way to do some sort of cyber security assessment of lockheed systems, information systems because als is plugged into the lockheed corporate naetwornaepenet
work. over the next couple of years i expect we have done adequate rigorous testing. we're at the beginning of it. >> and general, how is the program office working to address these issues? the doctor mentioned some accommodations, but there's still the need for the live testing. how are you addressing all of this? >> yes, ma'am. what i will tell you today als, our logistics information system is operating on the dod networks. in order for me to be able to put the als system on the dod networks it has gone through over the last three or four years vigorous cyber security testing and certification from agencies outside, including the nsa and dsa. the idea that the als system today is somehow untested is not an accurate statement. however, having said that, dr. gillmore is correct. i was hesitant last year to give the operational test community
the authority to test end to end the operational system because wee didn't have redundancy in part of the system. if the testing were to knock off that part of the system, i didn't have a backup. we are building that backup today. and as soon as that backup is in place, we will give the operational test community full authority to test the system as it operates in the field today. and that should happen about the end of the year. >> before the -- >> before the end of the year ma'am. >> i would like to comment, senator, that we do operational testing as an integral part of operational testing that have been through diocap certifications and we get into them every time. so i'm not arguing against the certifications which are specification based kinds of assessments. they're certainly necessary but hardly sufficient. and commercial organizations such as microsoft have said in
their advice, the advice they provided to our customers assume that you have been penetrated. and do continual red teaming, which is what we do in our operational tests. the certifications that the general talks about are certainly necessary but are hardly sufficient. >> mr. secretary, overall what are the lessons learned from this process? what are we applying to other acquisitions and how is cyber security going to be included in the requirements process? basically what are we doing to integrate requirements for cyber security into the whole acquisitions process? >> cyber security is both aubeiquitous and an ommitt present prom. our guidance to the acquisition work force is you have to take security into account throughout every phase of the life cycle
and every aspect of it. the department is maturing its capabilities in this area. i think it's -- we still have a long ways to go. some of our older systems in the field were not designed with cyber security in mind. we have to take corrective action on those. f-35 that are in developments we have to integrate it into design process as we go. it's a pervasive threat. i worry particularly about loss of unclassified information which is much easier to extract and attack. in a logistics system that's a particular problem. you want to connect to the internet so you can order parts and so on. it's not going to be cheap to fix it it it is not going to quick to fix it. but we have to do so. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator cotton, please. >> thank you. i know that senator donly asked
about lessons learned from the f-35 program and what we might take forward in this program given the challenges goes back through some member's high school years. i would like to hear the answer to that question from secretary ki kin kindall. >> at the end of the day, having a successful program depends on a handful of things they're difficult and complicated. it starts with reasonable requirements. then you have to have professional management that is empowered to do its job. you have to have adequate resources. you have to have a system that basically will support people doing the right thing. in our system, as i think others mentioned, there is a very strong bias that is sort of built in towards optimism. it's easier to get a program
funded if it costs less. people want it faster cheaper and be able to do more. most of the problems i've seen stem from being in a hurry and being convinced for whatever reason that things will be cheaper, better faster than they will actually be or that history would indicate they would be. my office was formed in 1986 because this problem was so pervasive. i think we've had frankly a mixed record of success. one of the things i hope i've done over the last several years is to put more realism and more structure programs with a highly likelihood of success. a lot of things we do are incredibly complicated and difficult. development is risky. wht you create something that's never been created before and you do it with cutting edge technology that's a process that has a lot of unknowns in it. no matter how much risk reduction you do ahead of time. i think support for sound management insuring that
professionals are in place. resisting the tendency to spend the money because it's in your budget. and you're afraid you'll lose it if you don't spend it which i think is what happened when we started production of the f-35. something that has to be reinforced throughout the chain of command. >> general bogdan? >> thank you, senator. i won't elaborate the concurrency and the optimism piece. i'll give you two other things, sir. when you set up a large acquisition program like this you must insure that the risk between industry and government is balanced appropriately. if the risk is all on the government or if the risk is all on industry you'll get bad behaviors from both sides. so it is very, very important to make sure you have the incentive structures right and the risk balanced appropriately between the government and industry. we did not get that right at the early part of the f-35 program. mr. kindall, under his
leadership i have been trying to do that for a number of years now it has proven to be helpful. people do not talk about much is leadership continuity. if you have a very large program and very complex like the f-35, it will do you no good to put leaders in place that are there for only two or three years. it takes them a year just to understand what's going on. i would tell you our bigger acquisition programs need stable leadership at the top for many many years to help. >> are you talking about uniformed leadership or civilian leadership? >> either one, sir. they're both -- i believe government civilian and military personnel are capable leaders. you've got to leave them there in place for enough time to make a difference. >> to the extent it's uniformed leadership is that an acquisition challenge or personnel challenge? >> it is both, sir. it is absolutely both. how do you provide the incent e incentives for a military person to continue moving up in rank if you leave him in a job for five or six years?
but that's sometimes what's necessary for very big complex acquisition programs. >> i've heard it from some of our partners overseas, when talking about acquiring certain weapon systems because they're small compared to the united states. they worry about being a plane with a country rather than a country with a plane. what's the risk that some of the partners in this program face in terms of the cost of this aircraft and the ability to acquire the number of aircraft needed to contribute meaningfully to the program? how many joint strike fighters need a country acquirer to have a meaningful contribution to their defense? >> that's an interesting question, senator, i think it really goes to what each country cares about in terms of its resources and what they care to defend. even our smallest nations on the f-35 program are looking at at
least two squadrons of f-35's. and the idea that the partnership will be working together to sustain maintain and train the airplanes, is a huge deal for them. because, otherwise they could not afford a fifth generation capability like they are today. >> thank you. >> thank you, sir. dr. gillmore, i'm concerned by your testimony that the marine corp found they weren't able to achieve aircraft repair capabilities at the unit or intermediate levels that would support warfare. can you expand on this and give your assessment on als or the automatic logistics system is mature enough to support the sustained operations with a land or ship based forward deployed squadron? >> at this time it is not sufficiental sufficie sufficiently mature. there are a number of improvements planned as the
program moved forward to als 3.0. and if those improvements are realized, they will address a number of the issues that are mentioned in my testimony. but currently, there are immaturities in the system, time consuming work rounds that are required in order to keep aircraft flying. heavy reliance on having contractors present again. when we move forward to als 3.0 the plan is to fix many of those problems. there's a concern i think general bogdan alluded to. there's too much reliance on sending parts back rather than repairing them closer to the front lines. but, again, the program is working on those issues. and so we'll see how well als 3.0 does when we get to operational testing. my estimate will be in 2018. >> lieutenant general bogdan,
can you comment on dr. gillmore's assertion that with the current number of aircraft planned for testing use, 80% aircraft availability rate is needed to accomplish the test and evaluation on schedule. what would you assess is the current aircraft availability rate and does the jbo's current estimation the rate will be up to 80% by the time it's scheduled to start? it seems right now you're not making that and you'll have more challenges between now and then to meet that. how are we going to meet the testing guidelines that are laid out in order to meet the deadlines that you've laid out? it doesn't appear as though it's possible. can you comment on that and give us your thoughts, please? >> yes, sir. i'm not sure where the 80% comes from. but i think if you take -- >> in order to have the number of aircraft for the number houfrz ahours you got to do you have to be
80% -- >> to finish iot you need it within a year. you're correct. i don't think we will be near 80%. the fleet is hovering around 60%. aircraft availability. the best we've seen so far is the u.s. air force airplanes at hill air force base which they deploy to mountain home this winter they achieved 72% aircraft availability rate. our newer airplanes are doing much better. i will tell you there is -- very unlikely that we would get to 80%. what that means is, iot may take longer than we anticipated. and that would be the major result of that. >> that's interesting. we've talked a little bit -- i'm going to follow up on the questions concerning the a-10. as i look at the information that's been provided to us. if you compare the two aircraft today, the a-10 time on stations
hour to an hour and a half, f-35 b -- this is from what i can see the plan to operational capabilities of 25-40 minutes on station. with weapons, the a-10, air to surface weapons, f-35 b under the two b software two air to surface weapons. the fuel burn under the f-53 a and b. 10% to 20% higher. it would suggest we need additional capabilities just to service them close by those areas. on the gun itself, the f-35 -- this is the way it was designed in the first place apparently. f-35 wasn't designed with a gun in mind. 402 rounds total or about a four second burst. a-10, 30 millimeter cannon. 17 seconds.
a-10 round is double the weight of that carried by the f-35. when we talk about having a similar mission we're talking about doing the job and completely different ways, would that be a fair assessment? >> yes, the f-35 when you're talking about close air support it will do it much differently than the a-10. we'll do the comparison tests of the ability to form casts as an integral part of testing. we're not going to say that, you know, the f 35 has to perform casts the same way the a 10 does. we'll let the pilots take advantage of the systems on that aircraft. deal with some of the limitations you mentioned as well as they can. and see how well the missions are carried out in terms of the ability to strike targets in a timely manner and accurately and then report on that. and there are numerous arguments about how well each aircraft
will do under different circumstances and different threats, clearly the f 35 should have an advantage in higher threat environments than the a 10 does. and so the comparison testing and our report will illuminate that. >> i'm out of time. secretary kindall looks like he wants to respond. i think we ought to give him an opportunity. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm a huge proponent and fan of the a 10. i'm an army officer. it was purpose designed to be a close air support aircraft. it was a good design for that purpose. if you asked an a 10 to do air to air it's hopeless. the f 35 is designed as an aircraft that can do a variety of missions. air dominance, strike, and close air support. it does close air support differently. it doesn't have the features you mentioned. those are real world numbers i think you gave. what's different now than when the time the a 10 was conceived
is the use of precision munitions and the ability of a wide variety of aircraft to put a bomb exactly where they wanted it to go. the air force does close air support with one bomber. so times have changed. if we could afford it i think everybody would like to keep the a 10 in the inventory because it's such a good special purpose aircraft. given the constraints we have on the size of our structure and the financial resources we have, maintaining a one mission aircraft in the air force is not something that could fit into the balance we were trying to achieve. >> thank you. thank you mr. chairman. >> senator lee, please. >> thank you for calling this hearing and thanks to all of you our witnesses for your testimony today. the delegation has had the opportunity to witness first hand the rollout of the f-35 in the air force. as the 388th and 419th fighter wings at hill air force base in
ogden, utah prepare to reach operating capacity later this year. we've also been able to see the development of the logistics and maintenance functions of the f 35 a at the ogden complex which has been so effective that they've been called to assist both the marine corp and the navy in meeting the modernization goals for their respective variance of the f 35. we're very proud of that. the men and women who are working to train on test, and to keep these jets in the air are models of american engenuity and hard work and dedication at its very best. i hope the congress will provide them with the resources they very much need in order to continue succeeding in their mission. general bogdan, one of the main obstacles for the f 35 a reaching it's ioc goals this year, of course, involves the
continued development of als. which is, of course, used to mask t manage the logistics for maintaining the f 35 not just now during the roll out but throughout its lifetime. how is the joint program office working with industry to insure this capability is functional and is fully integrated into this weapons platform in a timely and effective manner? >> thank you, senator. the als system right now that the air force needs at hill air force base is on track to be about 60 days later than we planned. and the biggest issue we have right now is getting the maintenance and supply chain and configuration management of the engine, f 135 integrated into the als system. that has proven to be more difficult than we had
anticipated. because it requires both lockheed martin and pratt and whitney's back end planning systems to talk to each other and to connect with als. we've sent -- we've worked with lockheed martin across the whole company as well as some of their teammates. and we have brought in some software experts from within dod to try over the last few months to figure out where those difficulties lie. the good news there is we understand where the difficulties are. now we just have to go and execute and like i said, i think we're probably going to be about two months late getting that done. but i think we'll be able to get it done. >> good to know. good anytime you can contain a delay and look forward and conclude that you've got a known quantity. because of budget reductions and the inability to retire the a
10, the air force is concerned about a potential shortfall of experienced uniformed maintainers to transition to f 35 units and keep those weapons safe and to keep them functional. general bogdan, has the air force been able to resolve this problem in the short term? what long term complications do you see that might still exist for insuring that a generation of maintainers is being trained to keep pace with the process of integrating the f 35 into the air force? >> yes, sir, in the short term, when the air force was faced last year with a shortage of maintainers for their ioc capability at hill air force base, they asked the program office to populate an entire squadron at luke air force base with contractor logistic support personnel. and we did that, the 62ened squadron at luke air force base today is maintained with
approximately 110 contractors as opposed to blue suit maintainers. that gave the air force the flexible to transfer them to hill air force base for ioc. that's a band aid and a short term fix in the long term i believe the air force needs the ability to move maintainers around for the growing fleet of f 35's. and we're committed to working with them to increase the through port of maintainers through the school house and to work with our partners. and to work with the reserve in the air force who can provide man power. i'll defer to the air force on those solutions is. >> let me ask you one more question as my time is expiring, did the department of defense originally intend the f 35 to be a direct replacement for the a 10 in close air support
missions? or was it designed to work with other air force and joint forces systems to fulfill the department's needs as far as close air support goes? what's your assessment of how the services will be able to work together to meet close air support needs through integrated and joint operations? >> sir, what i will tell you is over time, the evolution of the way we conduct close air support in the department of defense has evolved. it is no longer a single airplane out there talking to a ground controller and dropping a single weapon. it is a much more integrated fight, it is much more reliant on multi platforms with the ground and the air. g the f 35 today and in the future will have the capabilities to seamlessly integrate into the network to perform close air support. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> the chairman is on his way back from the second vote.
let me once again on behalf of the chairman call the hearing to order. at this time recognize senator cain for his questions. senator cain. >> thank you. one of the concerns i have and it's been touched on in this hearing the length of time this platform is expected to serve, 20 years from now, 30 plus years from initial inception. i think back to any product that i may have bought in 2004 i was originally thinking of senator graham's flip phone. i wouldn't want to be flying that in 2040. are we building upgradability
into this airplane so that it can keep up with the times? in other words is it designed with that in mind? >> that's a question to me, senator? >> yes, sir. >> well, i will defer the details to general bogdan. this aircraft is going to be much more upgradable than the f 22 was. but having said that, we've already identified the need for an upgrade from the current -- well, from the now being installed technical refreshed two processor. which provides additional capability relative to the processors that have been in the aircraft bought to this point. we've identified a need for an upgrade to that. a technical refresh three processor. in this program, moving from one
processor to another is not nearly as arduous a problem as in the f-22 was there was a lot of software that was developed that was developed with features that were tied specifically to the processors in other worrdero maximize -- so up gradability is being is being built in. that doesn't mean it's going to be trivial to execute. is. >> okay. general bogdan, quickly because i've got several other questions, what's your thought about are we going to be able to upgrade this airplane so it's not going to be obsolete in 2025? >> i believe we will, sir. there's a few points i'll make. one, is when we do replace the next version of the computer or the brains in the airplane, we are requiring open standards and an open system architecture will
allow for the incorporation of new censors and new capabilities much easier. second, when we first originally designed the airplane we knew many of our partners and customers would want to put unique weapons on the aircraft. we've created a system that will allow us to integrate multiple kinds of weapons on the airplane. not trivial but in a easier way. from those perspectives i believe the airplane is growable. many of the capabilities inherent in the airplane today that make it special are software based. therefore, in the future as new capabilities come on like electronic warfare and electronic attack we'll be able to upgrade the software in a easier way. >> this has to be an important part. we've buying 40 year assets. mr. secretary kindall was the attempt at jointness in this
project a mistake in retrospect? >> it's a good question, senator. i think the honest answer is i'm not sure. i was present at the inception of f 35. it started out as a technology program that was instituted by one of my predecessors when i was on the staff. we are now thinking about the follow on aircraft for the navy and the air force. and i don't think we're going to repeat this. i think that first of all i think the design parameters will be quite different for the following aircraft for the two services. we did get some benefit from commonality. there is very little caommonaliy in the structure. i think we could still get benefits without having to have a single program. >> you could get benefits in term of -- >> common sensor systems and so on. i think those could be achieved without having a common program necessarily. i think you'd have to make that decision kind of as your plans
for modernization or acquisition became more real and material as to whether or not it paid off or not. i think it's astonishing to me, frankly that we have been able to keep this program together for so long, keep the three services fully committed, and keep all of our international partners fully committed. we have two that are on the fence right now, but at this stage of the game everybody is still in. pulling all that off is not a small achievement. that's very hard to do. so i think we have to think carefully about that. the more complexity you have in a program the more risk you have. i don't know that the savings are necessarily worth that complexity and the risk that goes with it. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thanks mr. chairman. i thank you all for your being here today and for your insights on this very challenging program. it is as complex as it is
critical to our national defense. and we should expect on this committee and the american public should anticipate that a weapons platform of this complexity will also have bumps in the road in its development and research. i take it none of you would disagree with that basic proposition. despite that bumpy road at some point, the f 35 as a whole has already made significant advancements in a number of areas, in particular the f 135 program provides truly a fifth generational power capability to the fleet. every low rate initial production lrip contract as i understand it for the f 135 has been on or below cost. the recent announcement of the lrip lots nine and ten will bring the price down another
3.4% from the lrip eight. to date the 135 f 135 conventional takeoff and landing engine cost has been reduced by 47%. since the initial flight test engines. the stovepall engine cost has been reduced. pratt and whitney has already identified technology improvement options that will increase the thrust durability and fuel efficiency that could ultimately save billions of dollars for this program. the f 135 is meeting the key fy 2020 milestones. again, my understanding for mission capability and engine reliability. are those facts that are accurately stated so far as the
panel knows? >> very accurate. >> thank you. all that said, i know that questions have been raised general bogdan about the f 135 performance. and i take it that from your testimony that quality has not been an issue, so far as the pratt and whitney supplier performance has been concerned? >> sir, two or three years ago i would have told you i was worried about that. i will tell you that pratt and whitney has done a good job of standing up a quality organization within pratt and whitney military engines. that has dug down deep into their supply chain and helped improve that significantly. >> thank you, well their supply chain is a lot of it based in connecticut, and i can tell you from my experience in
connecticut, that our suppliers and manufacturers have recognized the challenge we face for this century literally this weapons platform will be critical events throughout this century. we can look back and draw lessons, and we should from the challenges that cause that improvement to take place, and maybe even the overall conceptual framework, as you suggested, secretary pendle, should there have been more individualization of the platform for different services? but i can well recall that the conventional wisdom not so long ago was that the services ought to get together and collaborate and buy a single buyer, and that was the wisdom du jour of contracting in its day, and now maybe lessons point in a different direction. so i hope that we will learn
lessons from this procurement experience. but there is, i think there has to be a recognition that this weapons platform will do things that no fighter engine or platform has done in the past, would you agree, dr. gilmore? >> the investment ranking is large, and need that we have is large to deal with the threats that currently exist. and if the f-35 doesn't succeed, we'll be in a pickle. >> we have a common national interest, making sure it succeeds, correct? >> yes. >> would you agree, mr. sullivan? >> yes, i would. we definitely need to have this moving forward. this is the fifth generation. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> well, let me just say in summary, it's been a scandal. and the cost overruns have been
disgraceful. and this committee in our authorization responsibilities will take whatever actions we can to prevent a recurrence. it should not take 15 years and still not have an aircraft ioc with the cost overrun after cost overrun. so i guess my question finally, mr. sullivan, do you think that we have learned the lessons and taken sufficient measures to prevent a recurrence, or do we need to do some more? >> i think there's always room to do more. i don't think we've learned all the lesssons yet, but i would sy that if you go back five or six years from now -- or go back to, say, 2010, we're not seeing as many f-35s or, you know, these big programs with requirements that aren't achievable. so i think we're learning some lessons that way.
some of that could be because of budget constraints. some of it is from the work that the congress has done, and frankly, i think the department has done a good job of trying to implement and drive down into the culture some better practices that talk about their better buying power initiatives. we've got a long way to go, though. i mean, there's still way too much cost growth on these programs. we're not using enough looking at requirements in an incremental way, using open systems, as senator king was talking about. there's a lot of things we can do to create more efficiencies. >> dr. gilmore? >> well, i think block four will be a good test. of whether we've learned lessons. as mentioned in my written statement, i see a lot of unrealistic expectations. as the secretary and general take a look at how to structure
that program, if they take a look at those issues, that will be a good test. >> secretary kindle and general bogdan, i hope you'll pay attention to dr. gilmore's words particularly given his responsibilities to the department of defense as well as to the congress. i thank the witnesses, and i believe that most of the takeaway from this is that we are making progress, that we have challenges that lie ahead, but there has been some significant improvements as opposed to some years ago. so i thank the committee for their hard work -- i mean the witnesses for their hard work, and this hearing is adjourned.
republican presidential front-runner donald trump is above the 50% mark nationally for an in-line/online poll. the billionaire businessman added four points to reach 50% in the latest nbc news survey monkey weekly poll which was released this morn. it's the first time he's reached that threshold since the poll launched late last year. can you read more about that at thehill.com. five states are holding primaries today. here's more about that. >> good morning to you. >> caller: good morning. >> so take us through these five states. it seems like from the polling, it's going to be a good day for the front-runners. >> caller: that's right. donald trump and hillary clinton are both entering as the favorites in their respective parties for the five states holding primaries today, all in kind of the northeastern part of the country here. and the state that's going to be offering the most delegates today is going to be pennsylvania. but the rules are a little quirky on the republican side. so even though donald trump did
the polls show him with a double-digit lead, it doesn't necessarily mean he's going to walk away with the lion's share of the delegates up for grabs because only 17 of those delegates will go to the overall statewide winner. the other 54 delegates are actually elected directly on the ballot. so voters, when they enter the polling stations today, they're going to vote for someone for president and in each congressional district they're going to vote for three delegates to send to the national convention. and they're actually going to be unboubd. so they'll be able to vote for whoever they want on the first ballot. so that chunk of 54 delegates in pennsylvania could wind up playing a pretty big role if we get to the convention and donald trump doesn't enter with that majority, that 1237 number. >> and for viewers who might have some questions about all of that and those strange or unique delegate rules in pennsylvania, i would encourage them to stick around because we're going to spend 45 minutes talking about that in our next segment with terry madonna. but adam, if there's an upset
today in one of those five states, what is the state that you would put your money on? >> caller: well, it's really tough to say right now because especially on the republican side, all five states are just really not very favorable territory for ted cruz especially who's kind of emerged as the most viable trump alternative just because he's relied pretty heavily on an evangelical base. and these are all going to be electorates where it's relatively light on evangelicals. on the democratic side where bernie sanders might be able to do a little bit better than others is rhode island simply because unaffiliated or independent voters will actually be able to cast ballots in rhode island. most of the other states voting today are closed primaries, meaning that only registered democrats can vote. and those have been contests where bernie sanders has especially struggled. so rhode island could be one where maybe it's a little bit closer to hillary clinton. but still, trump and clinton really do enter all five states
as pretty considerable favorites. >> and back to the republican side for a minute, yesterday we saw a lot of reporting about this agreement between the cruz and the kasich's camps to look ahead to three upcoming primaries and try to divvy them up. some reporting today, though, that that agreement already seeming a bit shaky. >> caller: yeah, it is. you know, less than 12 hours after that deal was announced, you have to kind of wonder exactly what the parameters of this are. john kasich yesterday said that, you know, it doesn't necessarily mean that his supporters in indiana should vote for ted cruz, just that he's not going to be spending a lot of time or money there. and then ted cruz's super pac is still running an anti-kasich tv ad in indiana ahead of that may 3rd primary. so clearly neither one of them are necessarily going to be ceding these states, which i think was kind of the way that these announcements were phrased
that you kind of thought that, okay, john kasich is going to stay completely out of indiana. and then ted cruz is going to stay completely out of new mexico and oregon later on in the calendar. but clearly these are two candidates that haven't always gotten along on the campaign trail. and their supporters, you know, there isn't a lot of crossover there. so i think it would be difficult even if john kasich wanted to to convince all of his more moderate-leaning supporters in indiana to vote for a much more conservative candidate like ted cruz, in the end goal of stopping donald trump. >> adam wollner covers it all for "the national journal." we'll be covering today's primaries in pennsylvania, rhode island, connecticut and delaware. thanks so much for your time this morning. >> caller: thank you. >> again, results from today's primaries in connecticut, delaware, maryland, pennsylvania and rhode island will be part of our campaign 2016 coverage this evening. we'll also hear from the candidates. we'll take your phone calls. we'll get reactions on facebook and twitter. it starts live tonight at 8:30
eastern on our companion network, c-span. and now the role of intelligence in national security in counterterrorism efforts. officials talk about how the intelligence community can improve its work by embracing innovation and enhancing cybersecurity. and later another panel will focus on counterterrorism, information collection and whether current laws can remain effective with the constant development of new technology. >> good morning. welcome to the heritage foundation in our douglas and sara allison auditorium. we welcome those who join us on our heritage.org website. i would ask guests here in house if you'll be so kind to check that our mobile devices have been silenced or turned off as we prepare to begin, it is always appreciated as a courtesy. and of course, we will host the program on the heritage home page following today's events for everyone's future reference. our internet and other viewers outside the auditorium are
welcome to send their questions or comments at any time. simply e-mailing email@example.com. opening our program and holding this session today is charles stillson, cully stillson is our law program and a senior fellow in our katherine and shelby kol lum institute for national security and foreign policy. he was a nationally recognized expert in national security, homeland security and crime control, focuses on the policy issues of military detention and commissions, intelligence, criminal law, immigration and the war on drugs. please join me in welcoming c l cully stimson. cully? >> thank you very much, john, and good morning, everybody. i want to welcome you to the heritage foundation for what we expect to be a fantastic day. david shedd and i were walking
back i think from the hill one day several months ago, and we thought, you know, we really need to do an all-day program explaining the positive case for the role of intelligence. we've been through the snowden episode. we had the reforms to section 215. next year we'll have hopefully the reauthorization of section 702. the privacy and civil liberties oversight board had issued their reports on section 215 and 702. they gave their assessment report recently. we expect they'll be issuing their executive order 12333 report at some point this year or next. and we thought that given the turnover in congress and the number of staff who come in and out of the hill, it would be very helpful to put the nation's top minds in front of you on the hill to explain the role of intelligence. and so i'm particularly pleased
and honored to welcome all the guests today. and you know who they are. we're not going to spend a lot of time -- in fact, any time introducing them. but i will take the privilege of introducing my colleague, david shedd, who is a visiting distinguished fellow here at heritage. he served as the dia's acting director since 2014 until he recently came to heritage. he served as the deputy director for dia for four years. and he had other roles in the central intelligence agency, the dni and the national security council. and so i turn the program over to my colleague, david shedd. >> thank you, cully. thank you very much. it is indeed a privilege. and as cully said the opportunity to talk about the value of intelligence is why we're here today. and be thinking about questions that you may have after i have exercised the prerogative after
introducing our two guests to -- in asking them their questions to what is on your mind. and i think that is important to address. while immediately to my left, he really needs no introduction. general mike caden is someone who is a stalwart for about 120 years in the intelligence community. not quite that long. but i think i've known you about that long. and as former director of nsa and i think the longest-serving director of nsa. >> at that time. >> at that time. and then i think your successor beat you out by a year or so. and then as the principal deputy of the newly stood up in 2005 director of national intelligence bringing that breadth of experience from the intelligence community to that new office that was created under the intelligence reform
and terrorism prevention act of 2004 went on after about one year there to head up the cia. and i could think of no one more qualified to make that transition from nsa, odni and then to cia. and in his spare time since leaving cia in early 2009, he has dedicated himself to speaking and writing. and he is, as i said, one of the great stalwarts of intelligence that we have. and it's a real privilege to have mike to my immediate left. ben powell once removed there is someone -- and you know that you have a lawyer at the other end when you write off his bio at four pages long. very distinguished lawyer with wilmer hale now but goes back to
our life together in the national security council staff in mid-2000s, early to mid-2000s, was very instrumental in terms of his role in the irtpa, the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act. as my principal lawyer as i sat down to quarter from him at the national security council staff. anything that came out wrong in irtpa, blame him. i tried to get it right. but -- and no good deed goes unpunished, went on to become general counsel at the dni as the first general council under mike and mike caden and myself as chief of staff there at the time. and then the no good deed goes unpunished was very instrumental in shaping the amendments, the executive order 12333 that if you know your history goes back to 1981 but was updated then and signed by george w. bush as
president in july of 2008. as a colleague, there is a commonality between the two of them, and they're both air force in terms of their backgrounds. and so it's absolutely a delight to have them here today. but as cully admonished us to do, we'll keep that part of introductions short and get right into the questions that i have for you today. and the way i've structured the questions and then the outline of what i'm going to cover, i'm going to start with the why is intelligence needed by way of the questions that i ask? then i will get into what impact so that why to the what impact does intelligence have on decision-makers. and then how well does oversight actually work? one of the reasons we're here today in terms of as we see into
the future the hope for reauthorization on 702. and then i have a couple bonus questions that i just want to throw their way. so starting, mike, there are a lot of cliches that are thrown out there in terms of intelligence. current and former professionals in the intelligence business use cliches such as in zroibing why intelligence is needed for the nation and such things, and you've probably heard this, intelligence is our first line of defense. or intelligence creates decision advantage. well, we throw them around as professionals believing everyone understands what we're talking about. but mike and then ben, give us your sense of, in fact, what is the value of intelligence? as our chrn or might say or in my case grandchildren, your
children, ben, so what difference does it make? so over to you. >> okay. i guess i would begin with something like contributing to understanding. now, part of that might be prediction. but i don't mean to oversell that, yogi berry's line, predictions are very hard, particularly about the future. and i don't think -- i don't think the final grade on an intelligence enterprise is simply based on predicting future events. i'm very fond of saying, you know, if i go into the president and say many president, that thing there, that has about a one in ten chance of happening. and if it happens, it doesn't mean i was wrong. right? i mean, it's that kind of soft science. but understanding something different. all right? understanding is something that you can deliver. understand in general, what i've taken to saying, dave, out of government, david, is that intelligence creates the left
and the right-hand boundaries of a mature conversation with regard to a policy decision. it's rare where you go in there and say, well, mr. president, one, two, three, four. whereas, whereas, whereas. and the president says, well, mike, therefore, therefore. no. left and right-hand boundaries of legitimate policy discussion. that should not appear to be a low bar to you. i'm not trying to say this is easier than you thought it was or i'm claiming don't hold us to a high standard. i actually think that's a particularly high standard. because it requires the intelligence officer to really have a deep understanding of what it is he or she is laying out to the policymaker. very briefly, historically, the stuff that comprised understanding had a high percentage, a high quotient of secrets that had to be stolen.
and one of the major changes in intelligence that i know we're going to get to, david, is that that's still important. and there are still secrets that have to be stolen. but in terms of the totality of information to create understanding in today's world, a lot more of that is generally available if we know how to harvest it. put another way, if the intelligence guy thinks that he gets to talk first in the meeting because he's the teller of secrets, i actually think he's role is going to diminish a bit. if he understands that he is the, in general, is the storyteller, the one, again, that creates the context of the left and right-hand boundary and is willing to embrace all sources of information including that which remains secret, then i think he gets to talk first for a long time. again, setting the broad context for the tough choices that follow. david, there's a lot more i
could say about that, but that's enough to start. >> sure. great. ben? >> fundamentally, the free world still largely depends on the u.s. intelligence enterprise for warning, for understanding intentions, for understanding capabilities of adversaries. we still largely live with many regimes who are nontransparent, opaque, at best. and as general hayden says, intelligence is absolutely critical to setting those boundaries of the policy discussion while there is -- and i think we're going to get into this -- huge sources of information that are available out there in the open. there still remains the fact that many regimes and adversaries and others around the world fundamentally operate in opaque and nontransparent ways. and there's a reason why they have their secrets. and a number of the secrets have
to do with wanting to do harm to the united states and our allies. and it's absolutely critical that the country learns those secrets. >> i would simply add in response to my own question is that -- and i want to pick up on general hayden's point about knowledge. it really is the acquisition and then the transfer of knowledge to everything that he and ben described when it comes to the value proposition associated with intelligence. and i'm going to put a plug in for the latter part of my career which was to support the war fighter in addition to the policymaker. so the same decision tree that might describe for the president in what you're bringing forward or in that situation room where you're talking about a policy lead decision that intelligence is going to contribute to making that decision applies to the four-star commanders at nine
combat and commands and two subunified commands for 11 four-stars that are around the globe along with a war fighter that supports them and increasingly in the area of counterterrorism to the law enforcement community as well in terms of what you bring to them. and so really it is about this left and right boundary of knowledge around that. so that actually brings me into my second question. and certainly you can elaborate on the first one as i segue into the question of intelligence collection and intelligence analysis in an open society. and mike, you mentioned, of course, that more and more of what is out this, if we know how to harvest that information, is in open sources, we call it. it's readily available, readily being in quotes because there's, of course, challenges to acquiring that. so how do you reconcile still stealing secrets on the one hand, yet this growing amount of
open-source data that can very easily contribute to warnings, as ben described, if you collect all the social media, you may get very good warning information. so describe a little bit, this tension between an open society and intelligence and stealing secrets. >> oh, that's a softball. okay. so, i mean, if i create a circle out here of all the stuff you would like to know or stuff that's available to know, i've already posited that the slice that is secret is smaller than it used to be. i would also say that slice that is truly secret is even more secret than it used to be. it is harder to retrieve. and as a product of the same global dynamics that create more information here, the same technology is creating that
slice of secrets to be stolen is simply making it harder to steal. so one of the cultural problems we will have as an intelligence organization, organizations, is how do we remain permeable enough to the broader society in order to harvest that which can be harvested while maintaining very narrowly crafted trade craft that really, really has to be secret in order to go after that irreducible amount that has to be stolen against very, very talented adversaries. those are cultural lines that are running across one another. so that's one way of looking at it. a second way of looking at it is how i treat my class at george mason across the river. i begin every semester, classes in intelligence and policy. and i actually begin with plato's parable "the cave." can you know truth? the fire, the sounds, the shadows and all that. can you know truth? yes, we can know truth. or we should pursue truth.
and then i quickly ratchet the discussion down is so is the secret pursuit of truth, all right, compatible with a democracy? which, again, relies on open processes for its legitimacy. and they bat that around for about 20 or 25 minutes. every semester for seven years in a row, they come up with yes. the secret pursuit of truth, espionage is indeed compatible with a democracy. i think it has my something to do with being the former director of the cia and they're being totally dependent on me for their final grades. and then i double down. i say, okay, i think you're right. you got that one right. let me give you another one. it's not just compatible with a democracy. it is essential to a democracy. and as ben pointed out in a still-very dangerous world, in a world in which actually, although we may be spirited a bit of a catastrophic threat, most of us have lived a dec and plus ago, the immediate threat
is actually more personal and more likely to touch us than it did 20 and 30 years ago. my point is it's not just compatible with our democracy. it's essential to our democracy. and the line i use has frightened people don't make democrats or republicans, i mean, shamall d, small r in bot cases. you have seen what we do when we're frightened. so one of kind of the moral compulsions i felt we operated under when we were together in government is that we've got to do what we do well, not just to protect american security, but there will be serious damage to american liberty were we to fail -- were we to fail in our task. all that said, i was fond of saying well, i was director of nsa. but the only thing i needed to be to be successful was to be secretive and powerful. inside a broader political culture that distrusts only two things.
secrecy and power. and so there will be this constant tension between what it is we do and the essence of it, frankly, and a broader society. i asked carly fiorina who was head of my civilian advisory board at cia, '07, maybe early '08, but this is way pre-snowden. i said, carly, i've been wondering. will america be able to conduct espionage in the future inside a broader political culture that every day demands more transparency and more public accountability from of aspect of national life? and carly went, mountaintop with some other key folks, talked to some folks around town, came back, sitting in the office across from the suite on the seventh deck at langley, walked across, okay, carly, will america be able to conduct espionage with more transparency and public accountability? and she looked me in the eye and said "close call." that was the answer. that's what they gave me.
and so this is a no-fooling issue for the republic. how much of what it is we do must we make available to the general population in order to get their sanction for what it is we do without making what it is we do not worth doing in the first place? and we are now involved in that debate, all right? and the former answer was to default to representative government, the oversight committees, the fights of court, the president, and after snowed. and the 215 program, a lot of americans is and not all of them wearing tin foil on their heads. a lot of kind of middle-of-the-road americans said the oversight committees knew and actually were pretty enthusiastic the court was doing oversight, too.
but you know what? i'm not so sure that any longer constitutes consent of the government. that might actually be consent of the governor. in other words, you told them, but you didn't tell me. okay. that's where we are, david. that is right where we are right now. and so the challenges as we go forward with 702 and 12333 and all of these broad changes, how do we build a certain sense of comfort in the large-body politic without being so public that we actually destroy the enterprise that we're trying to leg legitimate? i'm sorry, that's too long. >> before i turn to you, i'd just interject here that for the better part of 60 years, the rest of the world has followed our lead on this. so it is not really just constrained to a debate inside the united states. our european, asia-pacific, latin america partners, african partners all look at this and say, how's the u.s. resolving
this tension between the protection and secrecy and openness with their societies? because our partnership will be guided by, if not actually defined by that relationship related to that. >> yeah. i've got to add, david reminded me of a very important point. everything i just said i believe in. i really do. i also believe that we are citizens of a nation with the most transparent intelligence communities -- community on the planet. all right? so i mean everything i said about where we have to go. but our line of departure here is way ahead of any of the other western democracies. the reason european parliamentarians wring our hands about nsa is because they aren't allowed to know anything about what their own countries do. so they just kind of pick on us. by the way, that's pre-snowden stuff. all right?
and so interesting reality, right? our political culture demands us to be more transparent, the cost of doing business. we're already more transparent than any other service on the planet. >> general hayden, is it even close? >> no. >> i mean, is it even close? >> the story we tell -- we'd have american congressmen go to country x and want to go to installation y. and we'd go oh, can't go there, big guy. what do you mean? we've got a y over here in the american west. i was just there two months ago. yes, sir. and you're happy to go back to that installation in the american midwest. you can't go to this one because we share it with our allies, and no parliamentarian has ever been allowed to go to that facility so you can't go. that is a routine occurrence. >> if you wanted to get attention in the dni's office for foreign intelligence services, just make it known that you're going to meet with the visiting parliamentarian
delegation from a foreign country, i never received as much attention and phone calls from lee yeason services as i did when it was known that i was going to meet with parliamentarians for their country. what are youing about to talk to them about? are you going to talk to them about u.s. oversight and the numerous amounts of information you have to share with your oversight committees and others? and say oh, no, i'ming if to talk about how wonderful their country is, the food, the beautiful places to visit in their country. okay, you're not going to mention anything like the national security act of 1947, are you? oh, no. because that would be very -- that would be classified or very sensitive. i'd say it's kind of in the statute books. it's not really secret that we have these committees. okay, you're right. it's not secret. but it's sensitive. it's sensitive. you're not going to go into that, are you?
so when you talk about oversight mechanisms and what we have in america, no one else even comes within many, many, many miles or even within a continent of what we have here. so it's easy for a lot of countries to throw stones publicly at the united states while privately knowing that they are very dependent on us and also know that we have the kind of transparency and overnight mechanisms that no one comes close to meeting. >> it still may not be enough. >> it still may not be enough. >> because we have to accommodate to the broader society in our law of kind of reality here. >> still under the section of why is intelligence needed, my final question to both of you is can you draw any parallels to the just war theory as it applies to intelligence by way of proportionality and the use
of it, overextension in the use of intelligence means or capabilities where facing those adversaries that i think this entire auditorium knows that we're facing, what should those limits be within the boundaries of what was applied by augustine and the just war theories applicable to the use of force but applied to intelligence? ben, why don't you as a lawyer talk about that. >> well, first when you talk about just war in terms of self-defense and the defense of others fundamentally intelligence is about that. and so that's critical to it. second, you hope you don't get to a just war type of situation because good intelligence fundamental you hope is going to help you to either prevent conflicts. or if you have to enter into conflicts, part of just war thinking is, you know, you hopefully are getting to a
situation of peace as quick as possible. and that's part of proportionality. that's part of fighting that war. so fundamentally intelligence is fundamental to both of those pieces in terms of hopefully preventing war and conflict. and second, if you do have to enter into war and conflict, that you have the necessary intelligence that's going to allow you to prosecute that in the most efficient manner possible. that will also result in perhaps a less loss of lives. and fundamentally war is going to be about taking lives. so to the extent you can reduce that intelligence is going to be critical to doing that quickly. in terms of the other theories around just war in terms of proportionality and those types of issues, that runs throughout the intelligence guidance that you see if you look at the underlying documents in terms of the types of means that the intelligence community uses. a consideration particularly when you're talking about u.s.
persons in terms of using the least restrictive means necessary in some cases or the least broad means necessary. now, there's exceptions to that. there's lots of things we could talk about underlying those doctrines. but fundamentally when you think about broader concepts like just war and then you look at documents like executive 12333, for those of you who don't know is really kind of one of the fundamental charter documents promulgated for the intelligence community. if you read that document, you will see these kind of concepts throughout it and you'll see it throughout our staff sheets. >> mike, do you have any examples -- do you have any examples of where you kind of came across that issue in terms of where the line is drawn? >> sure. and in actuality, as ben suggests, the just war principles of necessity and distinction and proportionality apply to this and give you a decent moral framework through which to view. and the line i use is look,
these are hard questions but they aren't new. free peoples always try to balance security with privacy, safety with liberty. and the point i try to make to audiences is those are all virtues. we want them all. this is not the forces of light and the forces of darkness of the security guys dressed in black and the liberty guys get to be dressed in white. no. these are all the reasons we organize governments among men. and so we have a history of trying to balance what are actually desirable virtues. how do you do that? how do you make the balancing? i see judge mccasey over here. he and i have talked about this from time to time. it is based on the totality of circumstances in which you find yourself. that fulcrum moves based upon the broader external environment and appreciation of which is created by good intelligence.