tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN May 5, 2016 10:31am-12:32pm EDT
>> while we wait for this event to get under way, here's what's happening tonight on the c-span networks. republican presidential candidate donald trump continues on the campaign trail. today, even though he's now the only republican running for the nomination, the new york businessman is going to be in west virginia, which holds its primary on tuesday. he'll address supporters at a rally in charleston and c-span will have live coverage at 7:00 eastern. tonight on "american history tv" primetime, a look at church committee. it was set up after watergate to
look at possible intelligence gathering by the cia and fbi that led to the creation of today's intelligence committees in the house and senate. it begins at 8:00 eastern. right now, waiting for the discussion on how to promote dialogue and understanding between the u.s. and china nuclear weapons policies. live coverage on c-span3.
>> good morning, everyone. my name is bill burns. i'm the president of the carnegie endowment for international peace, and it really is a pleasure to welcome all of you to what i think is going to be an exceptional program today. it's also a great pleasure for me to welcome back to carnegie on our panel a couple of very distinguished alums from carnegie. formerly the director of the carnegie moscow center during the time when i was ambassador in moscow and later a wonderful colleague as assistant secretary. also, evan ma derderos, who a nr
of years ago was a junior fellow at carnegie and has gone on to do wonderful things as a scholar and in government. most recently as president obama's most senior adviser on asia. it's a particular pleasure now that he's the managing director of the eurasia group and also a nonresident scholar here at carnegie. it's a pleasure to welcome back a wonderful colleague and friend over a number of years. he's gone on to make enormous contributions to u.s. national security policy, not only at the white house but at the arms control and disarmament agency and most recently at the department of energy. finally, it really is a pleasure
to welcome a wonderful carnegie colleague, whose article in arms control today last december on chinese nuclear thinking really is the centerpiece for today's discussion for our panel and whose work over a number of years really does embody the very best that the carnegie endowment as a global institution has to offer the world. so once again, thank you, all, for coming today. i hope you'll enjoy me in offering a warm welcome to our panelist. [ applause ] >> well, thank you very much, everybody. thank you, bill, for that very warm introduction. my name is evan. i'm going to be moderating the session today. these issues of chinese nuclear doctrine and strategy are near and dear to my heart, as somebody that's worked on these issues at the carnegie endowment, at the arms control association. so i was very encouraged to see that arms control today remains alive and well, and it was the
host of the excellent, excellent article. most importantly because the nuclear issues are ones that are central to big questions of strategic stability in the u.s./china relationship. they're ones that i worked on when i was at the national security council, so i'm glad to see that scholarship and activism on these issues continue today. what i'd like to do is ask lee to begin with a presentation, 10 to 15 minutes to outline the key issues outlined in his excellent article. invite rose and linton to make some comments. we'll get a conversation going and open it up to you for your ideas and thoughts. thank you. >> thank you, evan. thank you, bill. i'm so honored to have the discussion today. back to 2000, i believe, evan and i had a lot of discussions
on this issue. he was really a pioneer on this subject. to today i'm so happy to explain any ideas and to have discussion moderated by evan. today i'm going to explain how we make calculations behind our nuclear weapon policy, what is our nuclear weapon philosophy. there are several reasons for us to consider this subject. for many decades, china has carved a small nuclear force and low status. there are two theories about why china did so. one theory is that because china had very limited resources and
low-level technical support, so china had to do so. according to this theory, now china has more resources and more advanced technologies so everything will change. this is one theory. another theory that china chose a low-level alerting level because the chinese believe that this is a good choice. china made calculations according to its own understanding about the roles of nuclear weapons. so the research is really important for the international scholars on china's nuclear strategy and philosophy. it is also very important for
the chinese scholars to have public debate we see in china. we have two, one international and one domestic. today, basically i will explain the two issues. i will begin with nuclear terminology in china. the first group of nuclear terms i want to explain include security and safety. in english, security is about how to avoid who we attack. safety is about how to avoid accidents and natural disasters.
in chinese, however, there's only one word. it includes the meanings of the two words. so in china, the assumption is that the consequences of secure problems and safety problems are very similar. so we should treat them together. we should use the same system to deal with two different kinds. here in the united states, people treat two the issues separately. nuclear safety is a safety issue. nuclear security is a security issue. in china, we consider that -- we look at the similarities of the two kinds of issues. so in china, this is caaccordin
theory, we should not only emphasize one side. for example, it allows china to optimize its nuclear weapons system in the big framework. that is to treat safety and security issues the same level. in china, we need to balance the power of nuclear weapons and the safety of nuclear weapons at the same level. this could explain why china chose to have a low release of nuclear weapon launch. because that could significantly reduce safety problems.
another word i would like to explain is nuclear deterrents and nuclear compel lants. nuclear deterrents are distinguishable. we can tell the difference between the two ideas. two coercive actions. deterrence is to maintain the status quo. the definitions work very well for isolated big conflict. if a conflict is isolated and big, then we can indeed tell the difference between deterrence. if big conflicts come from el
escalation -- that is always the case. big conflict comes from small conflicts. small conflicts may escalate to big conflict. so in that case, it may not be easy to tell the difference between them. the reason is that it is very difficult to figure out who changed the status quo first. you use your nuclear weapons to deter the convention responses from your enemy. so in this case, there are two steps. the first step is that you
launch conventional aggression. the second step is you use your nuclear weapons to deter conventional response from your enemy. if we look at only step, all right, it is deterrence. you deter a conditional response from your enemy. but we look at the combination of the two steps. first and second. apparently you change the status quo first. so your nuclear weapons are used to change the status quo. so your coercion is not compliance it's compelance. you believe that deterrence and compliance may not be distinguishable. and china always worries about the effect of nuclear weapons.
arms race, according to the u.s. understanding, arms race is always about security. you develop nuclear weapons to have your national security. i would feel being threatened. so i may want to increase the number of my nuclear weapons to respond to your increase. and there you would feel threatened and then you do the same thing. that kind of epidemic is the reason of nuclear arms race. that is the idea. american idea. but the chinese perspective is very different. in china, people look at another kind of arms race, that is arms race is about global hedge
money. the united states wants to show it was the world leader. the soviet union wanted to show it was a world leader. neither side would want the other side to have more nuclear weapons. otherwise their allies would not listen to them. would not respect them. so this kind of epidemic encourages the united states and soviet union to have more and more nuclear weapons. when the chinese talk about nuclear arms race, it is always about some kind of arms race. arms race fueled by the ambition of global hedge money. china has a commitment that is not to have a nuclear arms race with any other country. this is my interpretation of this commitment that is china would not seek quantative
nuclear parity with the united states that does not mean that china would exclude responses. the united states, developed missile defense and china feels that is a threat to china. china would develop more nuclear weapons or consider the option. china does not consider this kind of dynamic as an arms race. china does not exclude that option. now, i'm going to explain the chinese security paradigm. that is a little different from the u.s. one. all right. in united states, you know, scholars identify national security threat. the national security threat is
purely a foreign enemy that has intention to hurt the united states. if a foreign enemy has the intention to hurt the united states, this enemy is considered to be a big threat. this is a very good paradigm. the reason is that it is easy to use the paradigm and it is easy to answer the paradigm. in china, we have another paradigm, another framework, that is security challenges. security challenges is the situation. it is a dangerous situation for china. it is not an enomy. for example u.s. weapons sale to
taiwan, this situation is a national security challenge to china. so the challenges may be inside china or outside china or both. let me explain a few examples. why does the u.s. project on the warhead? the george w. bush administration had a small project warhead. according to the u.s. security ba ba paradigm, the investment was so small so that project would bring very little new security to the united states. the primarily provost of the project was to counter deeply buried targets in countries.
so for the two reasons china should not worry, you know, without new capability and little aggression against china. according to the chinese paradigm, china worried so much for, you know, important reason. because nuclear penetration warhead is a technical nuclear weapon. united states sends a message to nuclear weapons are usable. that would hurt the nuclear taboo against use of nuclear weapons. it would lower the bar of nuclear weapon use. that would hurt china's national interest. especially china's commitment. for that reason china worried.
another situation is technical lagging. china always worries that other countries would develop more advanced technologies while china does not understand much about the new technologies. such kind of situations is called technical lagging. and most chinese believe that technical lagging would invite aggression from other countries. so a lot of chinese research projects are aimed to understand new defense technologies, that does not mean china has a plan to deploy these technologies. the goal is to to understand the technology. right. one example is neutron bomb. for a while, the chinese scientists believed that neutron
bomb is the third generation nuclear weapons. the first generation is efficient bomb. the second generation is fusion bomb. so neutron bomb would be the third generation. it would be a totally new technology. so china had researched neutron bomb. then the chinese nuclear scientists figured out that neutron bomb is not third generation. it's a small hydrogen bomb. so china decided not to deploy a neutron bomb because it is not consistent with china's commitment. lastly, i will explain china's concerns over missile defense. basically, there are two concerns in china. one is that the u.s. missile defense team would neutralize
china's capability. and we can understand china's -- this chinese consent by both the chinese security paradigm and the u.s. security paradigm. so in the u.s. china nuclear dialogue, we have had so someditiosomeditio discussions in this concern. in china there is another concern that the development of missile defense in united states would bring the united states new technologies, new ideas, you know, new things. they may not be missile defense. they may be something else. but they're new technologies. so china worried that china would fall behind again. so this is a concern about technical lagging. so from the mid1980s china began
to do research on missile defense to understand the technology. the problem was that missile defense technology rather than deploy a missile defense system. because this concern is based on the chinese security paradigm. so in the u.s. china nuclear dialogues we do not have much discussion on this concern. i think i should stop here and very much look forward to the comments on my colleagues. >> thank you. that was a fantastic presentation. i sort of think of both the presentation and the article as a rosetta stone of sorts. i mean, you're highlighting chinese conceptions of security and safety. the difference between nuclear deterrence and compelance.
chinese use of the arms race. focus on security situations. that's all fascinating. i would encourage folks to read the article. there's an additional part in the article, which is the way in which chinese strategists give equal weight to security concerns and economic concerns as they make national security decisions. which i found to be a very, very fascinating insight. so i think what we saw in his presentation is sort of the best of what an institution like carnegie can produce. how many other institutions can bring together both americans and chinese, government, non-government, to work on these kind of complicated issues. so with that, let me ask rose and linten to provide some of their views. i'd ask you to point out areas where you agree or disagree and talk a little bit about the
implications for u.s. china strategic stability and what this meends ans on how the u.s. china should talk about these issues going forward. >> thank you very much y. was always asked to talk about our interactions with the chinese on a government to government level including strategy and doctrine. i'll come to that in a moment. i was fascinated and took a number of notes of the point that he started with on nuclear terminology. i thought was very, very interesting. nuclear terms, security and safety being the same in chinese. that's common for a number of languages. we've confronted it over the years, working on threat reduction programs with countries where they don't distinguish between nuclear safety and nuclear security. often times the same groups of people are working. it's a common problem around the world that we have had to confront. i very much welcome him drawing
attention to the really significant differences that different approaches to terminology can bring. and that need to be teased out through discussion and debates. if i may, i know our p-5 government community has taken a lot of criticism for emphasizing and really in the last several years focusing in on the production of a nuclear glossary. and people have said oh, this is kind of a time wasting exercise. you haven't done anything here. but i think his comments point to the importance as a kind of threshold matter of gaining an understanding of the similarities and differences in uses of technology in this important area. and only then can you get into more of a deep and sophisticated serious discussion of nuclear doctrine and strategy. i want toded to give a shoutout the beginning.
not only to him, but to the chinese government that took the lead in the glossary project inside the p-5 and has been driving it forward over the last couple years. i think it's very important. it is as i said both the threshold through what you get, pass to get to more serious discussions of doctrine and strategy. to my mind, it's also a critical foundation stone. you have to have those kinds of discussions first. that understanding is very very important. now, to come back to the main topic regarding our interactions with the chinese. the 2010 posture tasked the government community to pursue high level bilateral dialogues with china and russia aimed at fostering transparent rip relationships.
strategic stability is a term we use a lot but is difficult to define. when you're talking about the china and asia pacific environments. during the cold war many associated the word stability with destruction. this characterization of strategic stability is ill suited and too narrow to fully capture the strategic dynamic between the united states and china today. in today's world strategic stability must account for more than just the relative balance of nuclear weapons. and include other capabilities that affects stability, such as cyber weapons, global strike and missile defenses. and already he has mentioned several of these phenomenon. strategic stability must also include an understanding of the non-military elements that undergird the u.s. china
relationship that has elements of both cooperation and competiti competition. and here the point about economics being an important factor must be taken into account. i thank evan for bringing that to our attention this morning. discussion on strategic stability with china must account for the very different nature of the relationship between the u.s. and china different to what was the relationship between the u.s.s.r. and united states during the cold war. figuring out what strategic stability between the u.s. and china means is an ongoing process that involves u.s. and chinese experts both in and out of government. as a government policymaker i can tell you what strategic stability is not about in this context. we do not seek in these discussions to gain detailed insight into the operations disposition or location of china's nuclear forces. rather, we'd like to have a conversation about nuclear policy and doctrine that
enhances understanding and there by contributes. it is also not a substitute for broader strategic discussions that address the full range of issues in which our interests overlap. indeed, a broad strategic stability in the context described in the nuclear posture would serve to underpin broader bilateral discussions by reducing the likelihood of inadvertent escalation, misperception or miscalculation, in particular during times of tension or crisis. developing this common understanding of strategic stability is important because it will help us to manage risks across the full range of strategic issues and for the u.s. provide a better understanding of china's threat perceptions and the role played by nuclear weapons in chinese
security strategy. we now have a more urgent issue to address because of china's long term and comprehensive military modernization which includes its nuclear forces. so for that reason, we are very keen to intensify our discussions in this regard, intensify its substantive heft and really dig down deep on these topics. i'll mention a few settings in which these discussions occur. deputy secretary of state anthony blinken shares the strategic dialogue which includes cyber and missile defense policy. i chair a security dialogue with china's foreign ministry that addresses many of these issues as well as arm control non-proliferation and dig armament matters. i'm happy to note the next meeting in this series is happening next week on may 12th. i'm looking forward to those discussions to. wrap up i'll say
a word about the p-5 process. i introduced it at the outset talking about the glossary project. we're seeking to enhance among the p-5 there nuclear doctrine discussions. we are looking to do that in two ways. one is, again, reintensifying discussions among national companies on science of the united states national academy of sciences through its committee on international security and arms control and the chinese scientist group have for many years now had very rich decisions of this matter. we would like to expand it to include all members of the p-5 from the directions of their scientist communities. some have national academies on the model of ours, others do not. there are complexities to be worked out. we see a role for that kind of scientist to scientist discussion. it's been so valuable in the u.s. china realm. and also in the u.s. russia realm over many many years that
we would like to expand it to the p-5 as a whole. also we're interested in p-5 discussions per se on nuclear doctrine and strategy that get to a more intense level, serious and sufiophisophisticated level. i see that as a coming goal for 2016. with that i will wrap up and i look forward to the discussion. >> thank you, that was a fascinating discussion of the u.s. approach to strategic. >> i am a nuclear policy expert desperately looking to gain a minor in u.s. chinese strategic relations. so i'm not going to comment directly on the accuracy of his characterization. i will point out one thing
building on something that rose -- first of all, it's a wonderful article. if you haven't read it you ought to read it. it's an important article. it is in my view, however an important article because with a greatest of respect to rose, it's not clear to the outside observer that the depth of discussion in li-ben's presentation is matched by the quality in the discussion of the -- >> that's fair. >> a number of us look forward to the time when we can have our two governments begin that dialogue. and i think academic discussions and dr. li and i are involved in some of them and i'm involved in
some of the things rose mentioned about the national academy of science are a substitute. but we ought not to misplace the fact that we need some time to have in depth discussions so we can understand each other. because china, unlike the other members of the p-5 has a quite different conceptual basis for thinking about nuclear policy as we've been suggesting. some of you will say why did we spend time talking about terms. and i would argue terms matter. let me give you a very concrete example. security safety. i used to be part of the national nuclear security administration.
it was our goal and we would have been willing to share a lot of u.s. knowledge to improve the security of chinese nuclear weapons. for a variety of reasons those dialogues didn't happen. we would have been ready as we were ready and have shared knowledge of security of nuclear weapons with other states. had any anybody suggested that we share safety information about nuclear weapons, people would have first spoken of the atomic energy act, then taken away my security clearance and then put me in jail. so understanding that this enormously important distinction to us doesn't even exist in the chinese language is important. so don't undervalue the
linguistic aspects. i would push back on one thing he said. i think his intellectual discussion of deterrence and compelance was thoughtful and largely irrelevant. because it is a fact of the last 70 years that the risk of conflict between nuclear arm states is such that we don't have conventional attacks on nuclear arms states. whether or not a conventional attack depending on your nuclear capability to deter response is compelance or deterrence is theoretically interesting. but it's not practical. and the historical evidence is that non-nuclear armed states are perfectly willing to attack nuclear arms state, vietnam and
china, argentina, britain, china and the united states and korea when china was not a nuclear arms state. so i don't know that this deterrence compelance distinction is quite as important as it might seem. the second thing where i would push back -- this is clear in the article than it was in what he had time to say. is this the question of strategic stability. in the article, it suggested that chinese scholars are coming to use the u.s. traditional definition of strategic stability. and i will simply say that has not been my experience in dialogue with them. that quite to the contrary the narrow definition -- rose
pointed out one of the dangers, the risks becoming a sin nm for foreign policy. if you take a narrower definition, it is unclear that the chinese see that any of the strategic stability thinking in the united states built up between equals is relevant to a discussion. i think this is an important thing. i'm on the public record as saying that the term strategic stability has out lived its usefulness in dialogue with china. while we ought to have a dialogue that will lead to what i call strategic stability. it's not worth the effort to work on that term. alterative views are possible. one of the things that was stressed in the article and stressed a little bit in the presentation is a question of
transparency. transparency got hijacked by an erroneous belief that this administration and the previous administration wanted to know where your forces and what time are they there and can i make sure my gps targeting coordinates are correctly set. that was never for either of the last two administrations. what we wanted to understand was what the article was about. how do the chinese think about nuclear weapons. i want to invite your attention to an important thing in the article that suggests sometimes transparency comes through the press. chinese get asked a question and the answer shows up in the press. we don't tend to think of that as an authoritative way because
our press is somewhat chaotic. that's a strength. but for this purpose, it isn't. on the other hand, the chinese press, at least some of it, is more responsive to its government's desires. so i think we need to pay a lot of attention to looking at what the chinese government chooses to put out publicly as a way to look at transparency. there are a lot of areas in which transparency would actually help us. because it would avoid overreaction. technical lagging in the term, the idea that being inferior in science and technology is a serious challenge. quite naturally causes china to investigate lots of things.
knowing only they're investigating those things is consistent with technical lagging, but it's also consistent with those who have been waiting for the great chinese build up sprint to parity and if we had more transparency on what we were doing, that might help. other areas where greater transparency might help is china's investment in sea based strategic deterrence. whose relationship with the what is now called i think the pla strategic rocket forces or -- is not clear, at least to me. and the actual purpose of the ssbn program is not clear at
least to me. a discussion of how we both think about that would be an important area for transparency as would a discussion about how we both think about the regional role. finally, in talking about arms race, i want to make a point, all discussions about arms race look at the united states and another country. and what they fail to account for is the unique extended deterrence role of the united states. that leads many of us to believe that second to none is an important policy. not because the difference between 1,500 and a thousand has any meaning in a large scale nuclear war. but because it may have meaning to some of our allies in whether
or not we're reliable. i would urge my chinese colleagues, as i have in other forums that seeking to prevent ingemany is not the same thing as seeking it. the united states' traditional position for most of the last 30 years at least has not been to seek superiority. but it has been to seek an ekwie equivalent. the idea is to make sure that particularly our allies are not under any illusion that we're an unre unreliab unreliable protector. finally, missile defense, we have jointly walked ourselves into a corner where we will get
the worst of both worlds. chinese reaction in the belief that we have deployed missile defense to threaten chinese forces without defenses that would be particularly useful for that. and does seem to me that some of the ideas that we have suggested for discussion with the russians on missile defense would be entirely suitable for china, were we to have this rich government level dialogue that i am sort of advocating. but nothing i say should suggest that this isn't a very valuable and important article. and that you should look at it for how we can find ways to have a discussion that the
understanding of concepts is the first level. i think that's the important strategic discussion to have. some of us have been working on that for a while and some of us will continue to. thank you. >> thank you very much. i think it's pretty clear that you have a minor in u.s. china strategic studies. so i would highly recommend you begin looking at a double major. because you're pretty close. so what i'd like to do now. i'm going to ask questions of each of the presenters, just to get the -- all of our intellectual juices flowing. i asked the presenters to try and be brief. then we'll open it up for q&a and hopefully we'll have about 30 minutes for that. my question for you would be, given what you argue in the article, do you believe u.s. and chinese views are converging, in other words clearly rose and linten understand the arguments you make in the article. do you think that the communication gap between the
u.s. and china are closing, if so, why do you think -- here i'm asking for purely your personal view -- why is the chinese government especially the pla so reluctant to having this dialogue. i worked on relations for six years. i was in almost every possible high level meeting. the small meetings, super small meetings, meetings we don't admit existed. and very difficult to have serious discussions about nuclear relations. rose, it would be great to hear about how the administration thinks about missile defense in the u.s. china context. because that's in the headlines these days, especially with the u.s. rok decision to begin consultations about deployment. linten, could you tell us a bit
more about why you think strategic stability is not the right focus for the u.s. china dialogue assuming it ever happens. i remember when i was involved in these discussions we would talk about arms race stability and crisis stability as two components. is it those are the wrong concepts or the u.s. china relationship isn't up to having those discussions? i want to draw you out about what aspects of strategic stability you don't think are the right conversations. of course, what is the right conversation? you talked about transparency a little bit. but as you know, the chinese are very reluctant to have a conversation about transparency relate today capability. where should we take the transparency conversation given those concepts. why don't you start with you? >> thank you. i personally very much like to see dialogues between the two countries. i admitted to my pla colleagues
many times. if they want to turn their experts for nuclear dialogues, we like to pretend to be the team to have there. unfortunately, we have not seen that yet. i don't think that this is because the positions of our two countries are so much different. that is not the main problem. the main problem is that we see in china and we see in the united states, there are no concerns. in the united states, some people like to see nuclear dialogue with china. but in some other people try to stop that. for example, you know, rose has me and some other chinese nuclear experts to get u.s. visa
to come to the united states to have a dialogue. some other people try to stop that. in china. you know, some people they like to have dialogues, nuclear dialogues with the united states. some others would say, look, they always want to get to know what we think about. they never tell us what they think about. so, you know, we should stay away from them. so in both countries, we need some, you know, minimum level consensus. that is most important. >> i'd like to make a larger conceptual comment about missile defense in the u.s. china context. it's the kind of discussion i would like to have with china about this matter clearly. linten was very astute in commenting. if we were to build a missile defense system to undermine the
chinese nuclear deterrent, offensive nuclear deterrent we would go about it in a much different way than putting a s.a.d. system in and some limited capabilities to deal with regional missile defense missions against regional threats. i do want to stress again the capability is extremely limited. but we need to be able to make the case more clearly. i think that does include with some convincing measures to convey that difference to our chinese colleagues. but when i think about the conversation we need to have about missile defense. it is in the context of the proliferation of intermediate range ballistic missiles in yur asia. they're violation of the treaty, which is a total bilateral ban
on inf raged systems between 5,000 kilometers that are ground based. we believe the russians have tested, very capable that has been flown to those ranges banned by the treaty. this is a problem, you know, that the russians say themselves is across the area. it's been put about as the public rational why they proceeded down this road. president putin himself spoke about this when he went to crimea in august of 2014. he talked about the general problem of intermediate range missile proliferation as being a problem that the russians are grappling with. i say yes we're grappiling witha similar problem. it's a limited intermediate range missile threat. we have chosen to respond to that limited threat from iran, from north korea. by deploying limited missile
defenses. full stop. we are not eager to get into developing offensive capabilities that first of all would not comply with the ban on systems that we have with the russian federation. we don't want to build and deploy our own inf range missiles as it would violate the treaty to which we are commitme committed. we feel we can tackle the problem with a limited missile defense system. so it's a way to think and talk about the proliferation of inf range missiles that is a discussion worth having and one i think we should pursue generally with countries and not simply in the u.s. china context. it's a general issue. >> why don't i like strategic
stability? i like strategic stability. >> it just doesn't like you. >> what? >> just kidding. >> i just think the term and the definition of the term is so elastic that it makes it harder for us to focus on the kind of discussions that i want to have with china. make no mistake, when they write the history, the will be about the struggle of fascism, when they write the history of the united states in the 21st century it will be how well we managed china's rise to global prominence and whether we were able to do that without war. overall broadest term stability is a hugely important subject. and the nuclear part of it is a
relatively small element. i'm a nuclear guy and i want to talk about the nuclear thing. i don't want it to become a big element. and make the management of relations harder. i have just concluded that labelling it strategic stability like labelling discussions transparency is just not useful. it is not useful to say to china let's have a transparency discussion because it triggers a belief erroneous, but a belief that we're trying to not share anything and gain information. so let's look at the important topics we're misunderstanding could be detrimental to both sides. and have a discussion about that. and i don't care really the late bob linhart there are a handful of people in this room old enough to remember used to say
call it banana, let's just talk about it. >> great. wonderful. let's see, it looks like we have just about 30 minutes for q's and a's. why don't folks put up their hands and i'll start choosing them and we can go from there. why don't we start with this gentleman here in the front. what's the -- yeah. great. we just ask that you introduce yourself and your affiliation before asking the question. >> thank you. i just would like to ask professor li a question. building on mr. brooks' comment about the chinese sea based deterrent, i would like to add to that the multiple warhead deterrent and see if you have any comments about why china is developing the sea based deterrent. i'm a blogger with the diplomat. >> the sea based nuclear force
is simple. i think there are two ideas. why is that? china wants to have a credible nuclear deterrence. and the sea based nuclear force would add some credit to china's nuclear deterrence. so that's about sea based nuclear force. i'm not sure, i don't believe that china has deployed a mers. but there is some calculations behind -- i do not want my country to deploy mers. the reason is that you know, if china deploys mers and china will be in a more dangerous situation. and china would face a situation of use or lose them.
but my guess is that china wants to understand the technology. first. second. i believe that china has developed missile defense countermeasures. and one of those countermeasures is deploying decoys. some people call decoys multiple warheads. but they are not. actually, you know, one missile, one real warhead and many decoys. that does not change strategic stability. this is my comment on your question. >> great. thank you. we'll take right there, back there in the corner, thank you.
>> thank you. i am a visiting fellow from carneg carnegie. my question is to the two americans. assume this kind of nuclear dialogue is some kind of mutual learning process. and the chinese and american side also tries to make some distinction between foreign security threat and foreign security challenges. so i wonder how will america respond to those two different -- respond to these two in different ways. and what kind of condition will you think that security challenge would transform into security threat? thank you. >> linten, over to you.
>> i'm having a bit of a hard time grasping the question. but if i may, let me just say a few words about how we thought about these issues and the value of these discussions during the cold war. with the u.s.s.r. and it was a cumulative process of developing understanding on both sides i would say. i come back to the word, i like to stress the word mutual predictability as being a net benefit to stability. strategic stability or stability period. i think i'll just say stability period. and so over time, although there was, i think, some body of concern shared between the thinking in beijing today and thinking in moscow back in the
1960's and 1970's and then we really began to pick up pace in terms of these kinds of discussions in the 1980s. but those concerns were dispelled over time by the defendants that accrued, particularly in the arena of mutual predictability. over time that also led to assuaging concerns, although, you know, two countries like russia and the united states have large numbers of nuclear armed missiles pointed at each other. you're never going to assuage the security concern completely. at least it became, i think an understanding over time that there is a stability in the deterrent relationship between the two sides that was to a certain extent reassuring about the challenges that we faced
from the u.s.s.r. and the russian federation, again particularly not only on the nuclear front but in terms of the alliance relationships overall. it's a rather imperfect answer to your question. but i think my bottom line is that there is, i think -- speaking of reassurance, there's a reassuring aspect to the history here of how the u.s. and u.s. u.s.s.r. were able to gain a good measure of mutual understanding and predictability over time. we also got into major nuclear disarmament efforts beginning in the 1980's and stretching into the 90s and to the present day. that's a whole different topic that we are not talking about in this particular setting. but the other aspect i would say is there was a relationship between our understanding on the nuclear front and our understanding again of the
conventional standoff in the alliance relationships both in europe, but also in asia as well with regard to russia. so, please. >> so rose correctly points out that transparency leads to predictability and predictability leads to stability. no matter how you define stability, that's true. how does that play in to this distinction between security challenges and security threats? it plays into it by helping the united states to distinguish between what china is doing to make sure it is maintaining its technological capability. and what china is doing for other reasons. it is a feature of american society and the best example is the george w. bush administration in which i served. if you don't tell people what
your plans are, they will make it up. all right? everybody in this room believes that we were developing low yield nuclear weapons in the bush administration. apparently done it at the department of agriculture i was running the nuclear weapons program and i wasn't doing. we didn't counter the narrative. here's the example. china wants to understand submarine technology. and it has deployed the gin class type 094. but right now, that's a system that has no strategic rationale against the united states because it can't reach the united states. except for areas in which i used to drive submarines for a living, it would be vulnerable. it would be a marvelous weapon for coercing japan into saying
no, you cannot allow u.s. ships to port of call in the case of a taiwan contingency. now i sit here. i have a -- perfectly internal consistent explanation for what china is doing that's almost certainly wrong. but absent a discussion about how china is thinking about these, i'm going to believe that. or the me version of me that is in the government is going to believe it. because you sort of pay those in the government to look out for the possibility of threats and do something about it. and so his security challenge unexplained becomes my security threat. and that is, i think, the linkage between the two why the distinction is so important. and yet another reason why some
in depth dialogue between people with authority within their governments is in the interest of both countries. >> yeah, i notice that when the question about security challenges, security threat came out, our two american colleagues you know, felt, what's that? think about this. when the -- in 1980's, the americans asked chinese scientists who is your national security threat? when you develop your missile defense technology? the chinese scientists would have the same reaction. what that? what is national security threat? because at that time, china and
the united states were friends. the chinese missile defense program was aimed to missile defense technology rather than counter any specific threat. so this is a very good example how, you know, we have problems, you know, and complications. and very short response to linten's point, that china's nuclear submarine is good for coercing japan. my response is that if china wanted to use this for nuclear deterrence vees vees avy the yo know, china has to extend the range. china can not jump from zero to, you know, 10,000 miles.
>> i'm hank gaffny, i spent 54 years in defense and three years in the u.s. navy in 1958. i also spent in my 28 years in the office of secretary of defense, almost 13 years intensively engaged in nuclear weapons. i have a question at the end here, i wanted to note, i've never heard in those years anybody in the u.s. government use the word compelance. second, i never have heard in lp all my discussions in international relations anybody talk about u.s. wanting rule around the world.
the word just haven't come up. i've confirmed that with a number of people. a quick reflection on the neutron bomb. i was deeply involved in that. you know the warhead on this small eight inch round was one ki kilo ton. but it was an accident we got that weapon as linten knows. my real question is -- this is supposed to be provacative -- how much in your work do you rely on articles about u.s. nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy on the international relations ir gejournals. i've never found them of any use to me in working on the nuclear problems. >> firstly, thank you very much
for clarifying the u.s. government does not use the word nuclear compelance. and the global hedge money. i fully understand that. all right. so in my article, i try to say united states want to convince allies that united states is able to protect them. that is a way, you know, to provide global protection and to have global leadership. so that's my way. and secondly, i'm not an ir scholar by training. i'm a physicist by training. and fortunately i have friends like rose, like linten, if i'm wrong they always correct me. so i do not rely on ir journals.
>> edward levine from the center for arms control and non-proliferation. dr. li your article is fascinating. i second everybody's [ inaudible ] i'll read it carefully. two ideas that particularly impressed me are despite the previous question, the difference between deterrence and compelance in -- [ inaudible ] and the comment in your article that china sees nuclear weapons as militarily unusable and particularly not relevant to a
conflict that begins as a conventional conflict. when i think of where those ideas might be most applicable, i am drawn to the case of the cargill conflict between pakistan and india where clearly pakistan viewed nuclear weapons as having the ability to deter a nuclear attack and make a conventional war more profitable for pakistan. and i wonder if you could point us to any cases in which china has remmonstrated with pakistan regarding the usefulness of nuclear weapons and the implications, for example, of giving tactical commanders control over nuclear weapons.
>> thank you. thank you very much for your comment and the question. i believe that my comment and the comment and the pakistani comment if they are not part of that, but i couldn't be visit pakistan a few years ago i gave a couple talks there in islamabad and tried to convince them that weapons are not useful. i did not know to what extent they would agree with me, but i have a say that that's good. and some pakistanis want to come to china to work with me. that's very good.
i have sent to pakistan to understand their idea about the roles of nuclear weapons. he has a very interest iing som believe that nuclear weapons are useful. they share the same concept. this is something we should pay attention to. so thank you very much for your question and you have a chance to mention this. >> i want to push back on a word that you used.
we used the term tactical nuclear weapons. that's the empty set. all nuclear weapons use is strategist. they wasn't always true. you can go back into the '60s and it was meaningful to talk about, but strategist by definition alters the overall conflict. and any use of nuclear weapons, whether it's success or not will alter the overall conflict in huge ways. and so this nonstrategic nuclear weapons category that we invented for convenience in arms control is not aiding in intelligent thought because it leads us to believe that there is some nuclear weapons use that
is somehow okay. and that's not right. for at least one reason that nobody has any idea what happens after that because we have zero experience in escalation management after nuclear use and lots of experience in escalation that i wanted actually happening. so i really urge -- ben started out with his comments about the importance of terms. here's a term that the united states uses all the time that leads to misunderstanding in other states and if y'all wanted to just band together and abolish it, that would be a good thing. >> arms control association. my question is what role do russian nuclear weapons play in
china's thinking about its needs for its own force. >> china has -- let me begin with this. my american colleagues explain their ideas about strategy. let me explain my definition about what is strategic, so it means use for weapons. no incentive to have nuclear arms race. i think the two definitions are the original definitions starting from 1960s and today i believe we should adhere to these definitions. the differences are about what
approach was about the nuclear structures and people wanted to have good force structures so neither side would have incentive to launch. this is why i do not want china to control. i do not want to support missile defense. but oversize the importance of transparency i agree to reduce the incentives of arms race and nuclear weapons. but i like to add one more approach. that is to commit use. you would account to nuclear
problems, we do not want nuclear inferences would matter in our relations. >> the arms sale, the u.s. arm sales is conducted according to the taiwan relations act. these acts wasn't enacted by the u.s. congress in 1979 to maintain stability so thank you very much. >> i think we have time for one more question.
so. >> i used to work in the defense department. not nearly as long as hank gaffeny. for this audience, i feel compel ed to emphasize that it's hank and not frank. >> they have no intellectual relationship. i guess my question about no first use is what does it mean? is it an absolute commitment that there is no conceivable circumstance in which a country would use nuclear weapons other than a nuclear attack on itself baring in mind that things can get very bad. by the way, i think the idea that pakistan doesn't regard nuclear weapons as a backstop
against indian pack is not consistent with the history of pakistan and india. but the central question is by the no first use policy, do you mean an ir commitment never to use nuclear weapons except in the context of a nuclear attack? >> we'd like to start. >> i'm not the right person to explain the position of my country, but my belief is the same as you just said. i want to emphasize u another side. we should know that use in two part. one is what you just said. the other part is not to certainly to use nuclear weap s
weapons. that party is very. then significantly reduce the roles of nuclear weapons. so that is a way promote nuclear disarmament globally. >> i want to go back to a fundamental difference between china's security situation and the u.s. and that is the existence of alliance. a chinese colleagues often say why won't you accept no first use? i'll tell you why. because the minute we say no first use, a number of states that don't have nuclear weapons now because they depend on the american umbrella will
reconsider that. i know chi u na doesn't believe it's a threat to south korea, but i don't know that south korea believes that. i know china doesn't intend to threaten japan, but i'm positive japan isn't convinced of that. both of those are capable of developing nuclear weapons. so i understand the community that thinks no first use is a wonderful tool of countering proliferation and the only problem with that is it's wrong. there's no first use on the alliance system won't stop proliferation and it may increase it.
but setting aside it's the real poll circumstanc policy, the policy expressed in the 2014 military doctrine that nuclear weapons use is appropriate for conventional conflicts where the very survival of the state is at issue does not seem to me to be a bad policy. i believe the chinese first use policy. i believe it. what it is factually true that states have gone in and out of that policy in the blink of an eye before.
so it seems to be a thin read. >> i would just like to add one point. i wanted to make the point about alliance relationships, but that has ably done that. the other point i'd really like to underscore is we debated on this matter long and hard, which i referenced at the beginning in my remarks. and it is a matter that people in our government take extremely seriously. i know it has been for multiple whether republican or democratic have grappled hard. that's why ended up with a formulation only in extreme circumstances. that means something to us. it means something to our president. it means something to our planners. but in addition to the alliance factor, there's also a factor for a long time that's been
grappled with that is relating to the deterrence of other weapons of mass destruction use. so again, you can argue with this whether it's a good idea or not whether toustain at least the potential for nuclear use to respond to a biological attack, but this is another factor that has featured heaviy lily on thi matter. it is one among many issues in the nuclear realm of this government takes very seriously and will be debated again in the next administration when the next nuclear posture review is taken forward. >> we have specialists that reside in both the united states and china. we have colleagues like rose and linton who go in and out of
republican presidential candidate donald trump continues on the campaign trail today even though he's now the only republican running for the nomination. the new york businessman is going to be in west virginia, which holds its primary on tuesday. he'll address supporters at a rally in charleston. c-span will have live coverage at 7:00 eastern. and tonight on "american history tv," a look at the church committee set up after watergate to investigate illegal intelligence gathering that led to the creation of today's intelligence committees and in the house and senate. it begins at 8:00 eastern with real america and 1975 testimony by then cia director william colbie.
this weekend the c-span cities tour takes you to san bernardino, california, to explore the history and literary culture of this city located east of los angeles. on december 2nd, 2015, 14 people were killed and 22 were seriously injuried in a terrorist attack at the inland regional center in san bernardino. we'll talk with pete aguilar about the attack and recovery efforts by the community. his district includes the inland regional center. >> when we talk about terrorism, when we talk about the fight against terror, it isn't something that's in the abstract anymore. it's something that across this country means something because this isn't a big city that was attacked. this could happen anywhere. >> we'll also speak with san bernardino city councilman about establishing a permanent memorial to the victims of the
attack. >> it provides a sense of remembrance and highlights their lives and what they have contributed to our local community. certainly it always will be near and dear place for us to provide a place of consolation, serenity. so we're thinking a serenity garden, prayer chapel of some sort in and around this area. >> on book tv, we'll learn about the family of wyatt earp. >> the connection that they have to san bernardino county starts back to 1852 when the father of wyatt, who was the most well known of the family, his name is nicholas earp. he was basically left his family temporarily. he heard him up the gold rush.
before he went back to the midwest, he ventured down to southern california and he passed through the san bernardino valley. and he vowed that one day he would come back to san bernardino. >> on "american history tv," we'll visit the san bernardino history and railroad museum and talk about the importance of the railroad to san bernardino with allen bone, san bernardino historical society vice president located in the 1918 santa fe depot. >> construction was completed in 1918. it replaced a wooden structure that was approximately 100 yards east of here that burnt in 1960. why it was built a lot larger than needed was because they decided to house the division head quarterers at this location at that time. >> watch saturday at noon eastern on c-span 2's book tv. and sunday afternoon at 2:00 on "american history tv" on c-span
3. the c-span cities tour, working with our cable affiliates and visiting cities across the country. in both iraq and afghanistan, i u helped both countries with their constitutions being sort of facilitator of agreement on key issues among iraqis or afghans. your influence is considerable. the heads of state or government are anxious to meet with you when you ask for a meeting. >> former ambassador to afghanistan, iraq and united nations discusses his memoir, the envoy from kabul to the white house, my journey through a turbulent world. >> exploited, although e we then corrected it towards the surge.
killing him at the end to bring about security. violence was way down, but unfortunately, when we left and the vacuum was filled by regional powers pulling iraq apart violence escalated and we have isis now. >> sunday on q&a. james clapper took questions from reporters at a breakfast hosted by the washington bureau of the christian science monitor. he talked about a range of topics covering national security and the intelligence community. this is about an hour.
intelligence. i'm going to talk slowly so you can eat. this is his first visit with our group. thank you for making time in your busy schedule. our guest went into the family business. his father was a career army intelligence officer and our guest grew up on farms all over the world. he met his future wife atten antenna farm, not surprising since her dad was also in the signals intelligence business. she later worked at the nsa. growing up, our guest hacked his grandparent's tv set to listen in on the philadelphia police department and track its operations. he began his military career as a rifleman in the marine corp. reserve and transferred to the r rotc program and economies commissioned when he graduated from the university of maryland. train ed as a signal intelligene officer, he saw service in vietnam where he shared a trail er with his dad, who was also on duty there. later he flew 73 combat missions while based in thailand.
he rose to become a 3 star general and served as director of the defense intelligence agency before retiring from the military in 1995. after several years in executive positions, he returned to government service as the first civilian director of what is now called the national geospatial intelligence agency. he became under secretary of defense before being sworn as the fourth national director of intelligence in 2010. thus end the biographical portion of the program. now on to mechanics. thanks to our underwriter. as always we're on the record here. please know live blogging or tweets. no filing of any kind while the breakfast is underway to give us time to listen to what our guest says. there's no embargo when the session ends at 10:00. to help you resist that selfie urge, we will e-mail several pictures of the session to all the reporters here as soon as
the breakfast ends. if you'd like to ask a question, do the traditional thing and send me a subtle, nonthreatening signal and i'll happily call on in the time we have available. given the keen interest in today's guest, i will limit myself to one question and ask that you restrain the urge to pose kwir ris so reporters as possible can question our guest during the time we have with him. we're going to start off by offering director clapper the opportunity to make opening comments and move to questions from around the table. thank you for doing this. the floor is yours. >> why don't we just go to questions? >> this will be precedent setting, sir. let me start off -- >> i have 270 days left. how's that? >> let me start with a relative softball and move on to my hard hitting colleagues.
the new book "the president's secret" describes presidents as intelligence consumers focusing on the daily brief and how it's evolved. the book describes president obama as reading the pdb alone, but not as interested as some predecessors in having in-person discussi discussions with the intelligence briefers every day and not usually including the briefer in follow on policy discussions with his aids when the corps briefing ends. as someone who briefs the president, how would you describe him as an intelligence consumer and how u have his preferences changed the way the intelligence community deals with the white house? >> well, i can't make in person comparisons with any other president because this is the only one i have done this with. but in my almost six years, i found him to be a very ve rars and astute consumer of intelligence. he is a faithful reader of the
president's daily brief, which unlike in the past, we don't brief him because reads it. i know he does because of the references he makes to the articles in the pdb. that is supplemented by a session we have every day, schedule permitting and if he's in town with additional briefing items that compliment what is in the pdb. so i think having read histories of how before me dci and now this position and engaged with various presidents, each one has his own style, his own method of
ingesting intelligence and so does president obama. >> but you don't feel the agency has neglected? >> no, on the contrary. in addition to engagement -- engagements in the oval office is the fact that we have a whole range of interagency meetings, principles committee meetings, the latter changed by the national security adviser. then national security council meetings, which the president himself chairs. every one of those requires intelligence. the national security apparatus is driven by intelligence. so across the board, intelligence prevads the national security apparatus and its decision making processes. >> we're going to go first to
bloomberg erin kelly. eli, where are you? >> we talked a little bit about. >> clearly this is an ongoing now it's entered into military litigation. so i probably shouldn't -- it's going to be handled in accordance with military justice, so i probably shouldn't comment specifically. any espionage case, particularly one that reaches a point of a prosecution that's by definition serious. >> we're going to erin kelly of
u.s. today. >> i want to ask you about encryption. is the administration going to come out in support of the feinstein bill to compel companies to comply with court orders? >> i really can't answer that. i think the issue of encryption, that is people taking absolutist positions on it. i think we have been, as has director comey have been pretty consistent and are support of strong encryption. somehow we need to find a balance here. i'm not an i.t. expert. i don't know the technicality of how we might arrive there, but that's been the characteristic
of this country is a away of finding the to thread the needle here so we ensure privacy and security particularly on an individual basis as well as security in the context of what's best for the collective good. and that is a holy grail that we're still pursuing, i would hope, and so i'm not going to take on behalf of the administration, i'm not going to take a position on legislation like that. i just would refer to what the president said about neither camp assuming absolutist positions. >> from the post. >> i have a question on the encryption issue. former cia director mike haden said encryption is an issue for
the law enforcement community. how much of a challenge is the encryption for the intelligence community in particular the nsa and cia and did the intelligence community actually try to find vulnerabilities that could help the fbi crack farook's iphone? >> i'm not going to speak to the latter point. i'll leave that to the fbi. but i will tell you that as a result of the revelatio revelations, it was about by seven years. it has had and is having major profound effect on our ability to collect particularly against
terrorists. isil is the most sophisticated d by far user of the internet and the technologies available privately to ensure end to end encryption. and so that is a major inhibitor to discerning, plotting going on principally by others. so with the growing availability of apps that provide unbreakable encryption, this is obviously a challenge for us. >> we're going to go to nbc. there you are. back in the cheap seats. i apologize. >> can you talk a little bit about the 28 pages. these are declassified. however, bob graham said it could be several weeks, maybe a
month before these could be declassified. can you talk about the process? what's going on right now, and how much longer it might take? can you talk about the speculation that there is some tie from the saudi government and charities and 9/11? >> well, thanks for the question. we are in the position of trying to coordinate interagency position on the declassification of the 28 pages. and i mentioned on "meet the press" yesterday that the white house told him we'd hope to have
the session completed by june and i think u that is certainly a realistic goal. i'll probably just stand at that. >> as you know, the nga just recently announced st. louis as the site for the new facility there. there's something of a cross border we're going on now between the delegations there and the illinois delegation is arguing it made more sense from an intelligence purpose and from a security purpose to locate it across the river. can you tell us why it's going to be in st. louis and the decision behind that and what's taken into account now in these new facilities are built in this new age of threat for terrorism. >> the current set up at 2nd street is indexes of any such
facility in the intelligence community. it's very old. the building there is historically preserved. go back to the '40s. it has inadequate electrical system, plumbing, it's next door to a chemical plant. there's a railroad track behind it that we have no incite into what's in there and it's in a floodpla floodplain. other than that, it's a good facility. nga, to its credit, we did all we could to sustain the building facilities in the quality of life for the employees there. so it needs a new facility. . the director of nga and is his recommendation because this
process is not finished yet. the recommendation that they be located in a site in st. louis. obviously, we knew from the get go that one delegation or the other was beginning to be unhappy about this decision making process. so since it's not over yet, i'm not going to prejudice that. i'll say i have no basis for the decision. >> we're going to go to mark thompson of "time" magazine. >> given your extensive background from a marine rifle man to a general in the air force to the head of dia and now it's the director of national intelligence, i know you don't wade into political matters, but given your extensive military and intelligence background, i'm wondering if you canl