tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN May 6, 2016 5:19pm-7:01pm EDT
side while ignoring the other side, for example. the comprehensive security theory allows china to optimize its nuclear weapons system i the big framework, that is, to treat safety and the security issues the same level. and in china we need to balance the power of nuclear weapons and the safety of nuclear weapons at the same level. this could explain why china chose to have a low release of nuclear weapon launch because that could significantly reduce safety problems. another group of words i would like to explain nuclear
deterrence and nuclear balance. according to the u.s. perspective, nuclear deterrence and nuclear balance are distinct. we can tell the difference between the two ideas, two actions. deterrence is to maintain the status quo. the definitions work very well for isolated big conflict, if a conflict is isolated and big, then we can, you know, indeed tell the difference between deterrence and compelence. but, you know, if big conflicts, you know, come from escalation, that is always the case, you know, big conflict come from,
you know, small conflicts, small conflicts, you know, may escalate to big conflict. so, in that case it may not be easy to tell the difference between deterrence and compelence. the reason is that it is very difficult to figure out who changed the status quo first. then, you know, if you want an example, you know, you launch a conventional aggression and then you use your nuclear weapons to deter the conventional responses from your enemy. so in this case there are two steps. the first step is that you launch conventional aggression. the second step is you used your nuclear weapons to deter
conventional response from your enemy. if you look at only the second step, right, your coercion is deterrence. you deter conventional response from your enemy. but if we look at the combination of the two steps, first and second, then apparently you change the status quo first. so, your nuclear weapons are used to change the status quo. so, your coercion is not deterrence. it's part compelence. so, the chinese look at the other side of the issue and believe that deterrence and compelle encens may not be traditional. the third group of word i'd like
to explain is arms race. according to the u.s. understanding, arms race is always about a security dilemma. you develop some nuclear weapons to have your national security. and i would feel being threatened. so, i may want to increase the number of my nuclear weapons to respond to your increase. and then you would feel being threatened and then you'd do the same thing. so, that kind of dynamic, you know, is the reason of nuclear arms race. that is the idea, american idea. but the chinese perspective is very different. in china, you know, people look at another kind of arms race, that is arms race is about global hegemony. united states want to show that
it was the world leader. the soviet union wanted to show that it was a world leader. so, neither side would want the other side to have more nuclear weapons. otherwise their allies would not listen to them. would not respect them. so, this kind of dynamic encourage the united states and the soviet union to have more and more nuclear weapons. so, when the chinese talk about nuclear arms race, it is always about such kind of arms race. arms race fueled by the ambition of global hegemony. china has a commitment that is not to have nuclear arms race with any other country. so, this is my interpretation of this commitment that is china would not seek qualitative nuclear parity with the united states, but that does not
suggest that china would exclude responses to security dilemma. for example, if united states developed missile defense and china feels that that is a threat to china, china would develop more nuclear weapons or consider that option to respond to u.s. missile defense. china does not consider this kind of dynamic as an arms race. so, china does not exclude that option. now, i'm going to explain the chinese security paradigm, that is a little different from the u.s. one. in united states, you know, people, scholars, identify national security threat. the national security threat is a foreign enemy that has intention to hurt united states.
if a foreign enemy has the ability and intention to hold the united states, this enemy is considered to be a big threat. this is a very good paradigm. the reason is that it is easy to use the paradigm, and it is easy to answer the paradigm. but in china we have another paradigm, another united states framework, that is security challenges. security challenges is a situation. it is a dangerous situation for china. it is not enemy, for example, corruption. is a national security challenge for china. for example, u.s. weapons sale to taiwan, this situation is a national security challenge to china.
so, the challenges may be inside china or outside china or both. let me explain a few examples. one is the u.s. project nuclear penetration warhead that george w. bush administration, you know, had this small project on nuclear penetration warhead. according to the u.s. security paradigm, the investment was so small, so that project would bring very little new commitment to the united states, and the primary purpose of the project was to counter deeply buried targets in proliferation countries. so, for the two reasons china should not worry.
it's not new capability and lethal intention against china. but according to the chinese paradigm, china worried so much for, you know, important reason. because nuclear penetration warhead is a technical nuclear weapon. if united states works on technical nuclear weapon, it sends a signal, a message, that nuclear weapons are useful. that would hurt the talks against use of nuclear weapons. it would lower the bar of nuclear weapon use. that would hurt china's national interests especially china's commitment of no use. for that reason, you know, china worried. another situation is technical lagging. china always worries that other
countries would develop more advanced technologies while china does not understand much about the new defense technologies. such kind of situation is called technical lagging. and most chinese believe that technical lagging would invite aggression from other countries. so, a lot of chinese research projects aimed to understand new defense technologies. that does not china has a plan to deploy these technologies. the goal is to understand the technology, right? one example is neutron bomb. for a while the chinese scientists believed that neutron bomb is the third generation nuclear weapons. the first generation is fission
bomb, the second generation is fusion bomb, so neutron bomb would be the third generation. it would be a totally new in technology, so china had research on the neutron bomb. and then china, you know, the chinese nuclear scientists regarded that neutron bomb is not a third generation. it's a small hydrogen bomb. so, china decided not to deploy neutron bomb because it is n not -- it is not in consistency with china's no further use commitment. lastly, i will explain china's concerns over missile defense. basically there are two concerns in china. one is that the u.s. missile defense system would neutralize china's retaliatory capability. and we can understand china's --
this chinese concern by both the chinese security paradigm and the u.s. security paradigm. so, in the u.s./china nuclear dialogue, we have had some discussions on this concern. but in china there's another concern, that is, the development of missile defense in the united states would bring united states a lot of new defense technologies, new ideas, you know, new systems. they may not be missile defense. they may be something else. but they're new technologies. so, china worried that china would fall behind again, so this is a concern about technical lagging. so, from the mid-1980s china began to do research on missile defense to understand the
technology. the purpose was to understand missile defense technology rather than deploy a missile defense system. because this concern is based on the chinese security paradigm. so, in the u.s./china nuclear dialogues, we do not have much discussion on this concern. i think i should stop here and very much look forward to the comments from my colleagues. >> well, thank you. that was a fantastic presentation. i sort of think of both the presentation and the article as a rosetta stone of sorts. i mean, you're highlighting chinese conceptions of security and safety, the difference between nuclear deterrence and compell compellence. the focus on security situations, that's all
fascinating. i would encourage folks to read the article because there's an additional point in the article that we ran out of time to raise which is the way in which chinese strategists give equal weight to both security concerns and economic concerns as they make national security decisions which i found to be a very, very fascinating insight. so, i think what we saw in l li bin's presentation is sort of the best of what an institution like carnegie can produce. how many other institutions can bring together both americans and chinese, government, nongovernment to work on these kind of complicated issues. so, with that, let me ask rose and linton to provide some of their views. i'd ask you to point out areas where you agree or disagree with li bin and then, of course, talk a little bit about the implications for u.s./china
strateg strateg strategic stability and how the u.s. and china should talk about issues going forward. >> very good. thank you very much. i was actually asked to talk about our interactions with the chinese on a government-to-government level on on nuclear policy issues including strategy and doctrine. i will come to that in a moment. but i was fascinated and took a number of notes. the point that li bin started with on nuclear terminology i thought was very, very interesting. nuclear terms, security and safety being the same in chinese. that's common for a number of languages and we've confronted it over the years working on threat reduction programs with countries where they don't distinguish between nuclear safety and nuclear security oftentimes the same groups of people are working, so it is a common problem around the world that we have had to confront and i very much welcome him drawing attention to the really significant differences that different approaches to terminology can bring.
and that need to be teased out through discussion and debate. and if i may, i know our p-5 government community has taken a lot of criticism for emphasizing and really in the last several years focusing in on the production of a nuclear glossary. and people have said, oh, this is, you know, this is kind of a time wasting exercise. you haven't done anything here. but i think li bin's comments point to the importance as a kind of threshold matter of gaining an understanding of the similarities and the differences in uses of technology in this important area. and only then can you get into more of a deep and sophisticated serious discussion of nuclear doctrine and strategy. so, i wanted to give a shout-out right at the beginning not only to li bin for his highlighting this point, but also to the chinese government which actually took the lead in the glossary project inside the p-5
and has been driving it forward over the last couple of years. because i do think it is very important. it is, as i said, both the threshold for which you get -- you pass to get to more serious discussions of doctrine and strategy, but to my mind it's also a critical foundation stone and you really have to have those kind of discussions first and that understanding is very, very important. now to come back to the main topic, regarding our interactions with the chinese on nuclear policy. the 2010 nuclear posture the npr, tasked the government community to pursue high-level bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with both china and russia aimed at fostering more stable, resilient and transparent relationships. but what does that mean? strategic stability is a term we use a lot but one that is difficult to define particularly when you are talking about the china and asia-pacific region,
those particular environments. during the cold war many associated the term stability with what we call mutual assured destruction, a notion that the incentive to initiate nuclear use would be discouraged by fear of suffering and unacceptable retaliatory damage. but this characterization is ill suited and too narrow to fully capture the strategic dynamic between the united states and china today. in today's world strategic stability must account for more than just the relative balance of nuclear weapons and include other capabilities that can affect stability such as cyber-weapons, conventional prompt global strike and missile defenses and already li bin has mentioned several of these -- of these phenomena. strategic stability must also include an understanding of the nonmilitary elements that undergird the u.s./china relationship that has elements of both cooperation and competition and here the point about economics being an
important factor also must be taken into account. so, i think evan for bringing that to our attention this morning. though, a discussion on strategic stability with china must account for the very different nature of the relationship between the u.s. and china, different to what was the relationship between the ussr and the united states during the cold war. figuring out what strategic stability between the u.s. and china means is an ongoing process that involves u.s. and chinese experts both in and out of government. as a government policymaker, i can tell you what strategic stability is not about in this context. we do not seek in these discussions to gain detailed insight into the operations, disposition or location of china's nuclear forces. rather, we'd like to have a conversation about nuclear policy doctrine that enhances understanding and thereby contributes to predictability and stability by preventing
strategic posture that foster ambiguity and uncertainty. similarly, a discussion about strategic stability is also not a substitute for broader strategic discussions that address the full range of issues and which our interests overlap. indeed a broad strategic stability in the context described in the nuclear posture review would serve to underpin i would say broader bilateral discussions by reducing the likelihood of inadvertent escalation, misperception or miscalculation, in particular during times of tension or crisis. developing this common understanding of strategic stability is important because it will help us to manage risks across the full range of strategic issues and for the u.s. provide a better understanding of china's threat perceptions and the role played by nuclear weapons in chinese security strategy. but i would say that we now have a more urgent issue to address because of china's long-term and
comprehensive military modernization which includes, of course, its nuclear forces. so, for that reason we are -- we are very keen to intensify our discussions in this regard, intensify its substantive heft and really dig down deep on some of these topics. i'll just mention a few settings in which these discussions occur. deputy secretary of state anthony blinken chairs the strategic security dialogue which explores nuclear face, maritime, cyber, and missile defense policy. in addition i chair a security dialogue with china's foreign ministry that addresses many of these issues as well as arms control nonproliferation and disarmament matters and i'm happy to note the next meeting in this series is next week on may 12th and very much looking forward to those discussions. to wrap up i'll say a word once again about the p-5 process i
introduced it right at the outset talking about the glossary project, but we are seeking to enhance and enrich among the p-5 the nuclear doctrine discussions. we are looking to do that in two ways. one is, again, reintensifying discussions among national academies of science, the united states national academy of sciences through its committee on international security and arms control and the chinese scientists group have for many years now had very rich discussions on this matter. we would like to expand it to include all members of the p-5 from the directions of those scientist communities. some have national academies on the model of ours, others do not, so there's some complexities to be worked out but we see a role for that kind of scientist-to-scientist discussion it's been so valuable in the u.s./china realm and also in the u.s./russia realm over many, many years that we'd like to expand to the p-5 as a whole
but also we are interested in p-5 discussions per se on nuclear doctrine and strategy that get to a more intense level, a more serious and sophisticated level than we've accomplished up to this point but i see that being a goal for this coming year of work in 2016. so, with that, i will wrap up and i look forward to our discussion. thank you. >> great. thank you, rose. that was an excellent, fascinating discussion of the u.s. approach to strategic study. linton? >> so, some full disclosure. i am not a china expert. i'm a nuclear policy expert desperately working to gain a minor in u.s./chinese strategic relations. so, i'm not going to comment directly on the accuracy of li bin's characterization. but i will point out one thing building on something that rose -- first of all, it's a wonderful article and if you haven't read it, you ought to
read it. and it's an important article. it is in my view, however, an important article because with the greatest of respect to rose, it's not clear to the outside observer that the depth of discussion in li bin's ten-minute presentation is matched by the depth and quality of the discussion in our official dialogue. >> i think that's fair. >> what? >> that's fair. >> a number of us look forward to the time when we can have our two governments begin that dialogue. and i think academic discussions and dr. li and i are involved in some of these, and i'm involved in some of the things that rose mentioned about the national academy of sciences, are a substitute. but we ought not to misplace the
fact that we need sometime to have in-depth discussions so that we can understand each other. because china, unlike the other members of the p-5, has a quite different conceptual basis for thinking about nuclear policy, as dr. -- as li bin suggested. some of you will say, why did we spend time talking about terms. and i would argue terms matter. let me give you a very concrete example. security, safety. i used to be part of the national nuclear security administration. it was our goal and we would have been willing to share a lot
of u.s. knowledge to improve the security of chinese nuclear weapons. variety of reasons those dialogues didn't happen, but we would have been ready, as we were ready, and have shared knowledge of security of nuclear weapons with other states. had anybody suggested that we share safety information about nuclear weapons, people would have first spoken of the atomic energy act, then taken away my security clearance and then put me in jail. and so understanding that this enormously important distinction to us doesn't even exist in the chinese language is important. so, don't undervalue the linguistic aspects. i would push back on one thing that li bin said. i think his intellectual
discussion of deterrence and compellence was interesting and thoughtful and largely irrelevant. because it is a fact of the last 70 years that the risk of conflict between nuclear armed states is such that we don't have conventional attacks on nuclear armed states. so, whether or not a conventional attack depending on your nuclear capability to deter response is compellence or deterrence is theoretically interesting but it's not practical. and the historical evidence is that nonnuclear armed states are perfectly willing to attack nuclear armed states, vietnam, china, argentina and britain, china and the united states in korea when china was not a
nuclear armed state. so, i don't know that this deterrence, compellence distinction is quite as important as it may seem. the second thing where i would push back, this is clearer in the article than what it was that li bin had time to say, is this question of strategic stability. in the article it suggested that chinese scholars are coming to use the u.s. traditional defendtition of strategic stability, and i would simply say that has not been my experience and dialogue with them. that quite to the contrary, the narrow definition, rose pointed out one of the dangers that strategic stability risks becoming a synonym for overall
foreign policy. and if you take a narrower definition focusing on prevention of nuclear war, it is unclear that the chinese see that any of the strategic stability thinking in the united states built up between equals is relevant to a discussion between there. i think this is an important thing. i am on the public record as saying the term "strategic stability" has outlived its useful le usefulness in dialogue with china, it's not worth the effort to work on that term. but alternate views are possible. one of the things that was stressed in the article and stressed a little bit in the presentation is a question of transparency. transparency got hijacked by an
erroneous belief that this administration and the previous administration wanted to know where are your forces and what time are there and can i make sure that my gps targeting coordinates are correctly set. and that was never, for either of the last two administrations. what we wanted to understand is exactly what the article was about, how do the chinese think about nuclear weapons. i want to invite your attention to an important thing in the article that suggests that sometimes this transparency comes through the press, that chinese get asked a question, and the answer shows up in the press. we don't tend to think of that as an authoritative way, because our press is somewhat chaotic. that's a strength, but for this
purpose it's not the same. on the other hand, the chinese press, at least some of it, is more responsive to its government's desires. so, i think we need to pay a of attention to looking at what the chinese government chooses to put out publicly. there is overreaction. technical lagging in the term, the idea that being inferior in science and technology is a serious challenge, quite naturally causes china to investigate lots of things. knowing only that they're investigating those things is
consistent with technical lagging and also consistent with those who have been waiting for the great chinese buildups and parody and so if we had more transparency on what we were doing, that might help. other areas where greater tra e transparency might help is china's investment in strategic deterrent whose relationship with the what is now called i think the pla strategic rocket forces or -- is not clear at least to me. and the actual purpose of the ssbn is not clear at least to me. a discussion of how we both think about that would be an
important area for trans pair sin as well as how we think about the regional role. finally in, talking about arms race, i want to make a point, all discussions about arm race they were able to account for is the unique extended deterence role of the united states. that leads many of us to believe that the second to none is an important policy. not because the difference between 1500 and 1,000 has any meaning in a large-scale nuclear war. but because it may have meaning to our allies in whether or not we're reliable. so i would urge my chinese colleagues as i have in other
areas that seeking to prevent hajemini is not the seam thing as seeking hajemini. the united states traditional position for most of the last 30 years at least has not been to seek supporter. it is to seek some kind equivalence. we change the buzz word by administration. that we're under an unreliable detector. we have jointly locked ourselves into a corner. where we will get the worst of both worlds.
chinese reaction in the belief that we have deployed missile defense to threaten chinese forces without defenses that would be particularly useful for that. and does seem to me that some of the ideas that we have suggested for discussion with the russians on missile defense would be entirely suitable for china, were we to have this rich government level dialogue that i am sort of advocating. but nothing i say should suggest that this isn't a very valuable and important article. and that you should look at it for how we can find ways to have a discussion that the understanding of concepts is the first level. i think that's the important strategic discussion to have. some of us have been working on that for a while and some of us will continue to. thank you. >> thank you very much. i think it's pretty clear that you have a minor in u.s. china strategic studies. so i would highly recommend you begin looking at a double major. because you're pretty close. so what i'd like to do now. i'm going to ask questions of each of the presenters, just to get the -- all of our intellectual juices flowing. i asked the presenters to try
and be brief. then we'll open it up for q&a and hopefully we'll have about 30 minutes for that. my question for you would be, given what you argue in the article, do you believe u.s. and chinese views are converging, in other words clearly rose and linten understand the arguments you make in the article. do you think that the communication gap between the u.s. and china are closing, if so, why do you think -- here i'm
asking for purely your personal view -- why is the chinese government especially the pla so reluctant to having this dialogue. i worked on relations for six years. i was in almost every possible high level meeting. the small meetings, super small meetings, meetings we don't admit existed. and very difficult to have serious discussions about nuclear relations. rose, it would be great to hear about how the administration thinks about missile defense in the u.s. china context. because that's in the headlines these days, especially with the u.s. rok decision to begin consultations about deployment. linten, could you tell us a bit
more about why you think strategic stability is not the right focus for the u.s. china dialogue assuming it ever happens. i remember when i was involved in these discussions we would talk about arms race stability and crisis stability as two components. is it those are the wrong concepts or the u.s. china relationship isn't up to having those discussions? i want to draw you out about what aspects of strategic stability you don't think are the right conversations. of course, what is the right conversation? you talked about transparency a little bit. but as you know, the chinese are very reluctant to have a conversation about transparency relate today capability. where should we take the transparency conversation given those concepts. why don't you start with you? >> thank you. i personally very much like to see dialogues between the two countries. i admitted to my pla colleagues many times. if they want to turn their experts for nuclear dialogues,
we like to pretend to be the team to have there. unfortunately, we have not seen that yet. i don't think that this is because the positions of our two countries are so much different. that is not the main problem. the main problem is that we see in china and we see in the united states, there are no concerns. in the united states, some people like to see nuclear dialogue with china. but in some other people try to stop that. for example, you know, rose has me and some other chinese nuclear experts to get u.s. visa to come to the united states to have a dialogue. some other people try to stop that. in china.
you know, some people they like to have dialogues, nuclear dialogues with the united states. some others would say, look, they always want to get to know what we think about. they never tell us what they think about. so, you know, we should stay away from them. so in both countries, we need some, you know, minimum level consensus. that is most important. >> i'd like to make a larger conceptual comment about missile defense in the u.s. china context. it's the kind of discussion i would like to have with china about this matter clearly. linten was very astute in commenting. if we were to build a missile defense system to undermine the
chinese nuclear deterrent, offensive nuclear deterrent we would go about it in a much different way than putting a s.a.d. system in and some limited capabilities to deal with regional missile defense missions against regional threats. i do want to stress again the capability is extremely limited. but we need to be able to make the case more clearly. i think that does include with some convincing measures to convey that difference to our chinese colleagues. but when i think about the conversation we need to have about missile defense. it is in the context of the proliferation of intermediate range ballistic missiles in eurasia. they're violation of the treaty, which is a total bilateral ban on inf raged systems between 5,000 kilometers that are ground based. we believe the russians have tested, very capable that has been flown to those ranges banned by the treaty. this is a problem, you know,
that the russians say themselves is across the area. it's been put about as the public rational why they proceeded down this road. president putin himself spoke about this when he went to crimea in august of 2014. he talked about the general problem of intermediate range missile proliferation as being a problem that the russians are grappling with. i say yes we're grappling with a similar problem. it's a limited intermediate range missile threat. we have chosen to respond to that limited threat from iran, from north korea. by deploying limited missile defenses. full stop. we are not eager to get into
developing offensive capabilities that first of all would not comply with the ban on systems that we have with the russian federation. we don't want to build and deploy our own inf range missiles as it would violate the treaty to which we are committed. we feel we can tackle the problem with a limited missile defense system. so it's a way to think and talk about the proliferation of inf range missiles that is a discussion worth having and one i think we should pursue generally with countries and not simply in the u.s. china context. it's a general issue. >> why don't i like strategic stability? i like strategic stability. >> it just doesn't like you. >> what? >> just kidding.
>> i just think the term and the definition of the term is so elastic that it makes it harder for us to focus on the kind of discussions that i want to have with china. make no mistake, when they write the history, the will be about the struggle of fascism, when they write the history of the united states in the 21st century it will be how well we managed china's rise to global prominence and whether we were able to do that without war. overall broadest term stability is a hugely important subject. and the nuclear part of it is a relatively small element. i'm a nuclear guy and i want to talk about the nuclear thing. i don't want it to become a big element. and make the management of relations harder. i have just concluded that labelling it strategic stability like labelling discussions transparency is just not useful. it is not useful to say to china let's have a transparency discussion because it triggers a belief erroneous, but a belief
that we're trying to not share anything and gain information. so let's look at the important topics we're misunderstanding could be detrimental to both sides. and have a discussion about that. and i don't care really the late bob linhart there are a handful of people in this room old enough to remember used to say call it banana, let's just talk about it. >> great. wonderful. let's see, it looks like we have just about 30 minutes for q's and a's.
why don't folks put up their hands and i'll start choosing them and we can go from there. why don't we start with this gentleman here in the front. what's the -- yeah. great. we just ask that you introduce yourself and your affiliation before asking the question. >> thank you. i just would like to ask professor li a question. building on mr. brooks' comment about the chinese sea based deterrent, i would like to add to that the multiple warhead deterrent and see if you have any comments about why china is developing the sea based
deterrent. i'm a blogger with the diplomat. >> the sea based nuclear force is simple. i think there are two ideas. why is that? china wants to have a credible nuclear deterrence. and the sea based nuclear force would add some credit to china's nuclear deterrence. so that's about sea based nuclear force. i'm not sure, i don't believe that china has deployed a mers. but there is some calculations behind -- i do not want my country to deploy mers. the reason is that you know, if china deploys mers and china will be in a more dangerous situation. and china would face a situation of use or lose them. but my guess is that china wants
to understand the technology. first. second. i believe that china has developed missile defense countermeasures. and one of those countermeasures is deploying decoys. some people call decoys multiple warheads. but they are not. actually, you know, one missile, one real warhead and many decoys. that does not change strategic stability. this is my comment on your question. >> great. thank you. we'll take right there, back there in the corner, thank you. >> thank you.
i am a visiting fellow from carnegie. my question is to the two americans. assume this kind of nuclear dialogue is some kind of mutual learning process. and the chinese and american side also tries to make some distinction between foreign security threat and foreign security challenges. so i wonder how will america respond to those two different -- respond to these two in different ways. and what kind of condition will you think that security challenge would transform into security threat? thank you. >> linten, over to you. >> i'm having a bit of a hard time grasping the question. but if i may, let me just say a few words about how we thought
about these issues and the value of these discussions during the cold war. with the u.s.s.r. and it was a cumulative process of developing understanding on both sides i would say. i come back to the word, i like to stress the word mutual predictability as being a net benefit to stability. strategic stability or stability period. i think i'll just say stability period. and so over time, although there was, i think, some body of concern shared between the thinking in beijing today and thinking in moscow back in the 1960's and 1970's and then we really began to pick up pace in terms of these kinds of discussions in the 1980s. but those concerns were dispelled over time by the defendants that accrued, particularly in the arena of mutual predictability.
over time that also led to assuaging concerns, although, you know, two countries like russia and the united states have large numbers of nuclear armed missiles pointed at each other. you're never going to assuage the security concern completely. at least it became, i think an understanding over time that there is a stability in the deterrent relationship between the two sides that was to a certain extent reassuring about the challenges that we faced from the u.s.s.r. and the russian federation, again particularly not only on the nuclear front but in terms of the alliance relationships overall. it's a rather imperfect answer to your question. but i think my bottom line is that there is, i think -- speaking of reassurance, there's a reassuring aspect to the history here of how the u.s. and u.s.s.r. were able to gain a good measure of mutual
understanding and predictability over time. we also got into major nuclear disarmament efforts beginning in the 1980's and stretching into the 90s and to the present day. that's a whole different topic that we are not talking about in this particular setting. but the other aspect i would say is there was a relationship between our understanding on the nuclear front and our understanding again of the conventional standoff in the alliance relationships both in europe, but also in asia as well with regard to russia. so, please. >> so rose correctly points out that transparency leads to predictability and predictability leads to stability. no matter how you define stability, that's true. how does that play in to this distinction between security
challenges and security threats? how does that play in to this distinction between security challenges and security threats? it plays into it by helping the united states to distinguish between what china is doing to make sure it is maintaining its technological capability. and what china is doing for other reasons. it is a feature of american society and the best example is the george w. bush administration in which i served. if you don't tell people what your plans are, they will make
it up. all right? everybody in this room believes that we were developing low yield nuclear weapons in the bush administration. apparently done it at the department of agriculture i was running the nuclear weapons program and i wasn't doing. we didn't counter the narrative. here's the example. china wants to understand submarine technology. and it has deployed the gin class type 094. but right now, that's a system that has no strategic rationale against the united states because it can't reach the united states. except for areas in which i used to drive submarines for a living, it would be vulnerable. it would be a marvelous weapon for coercing japan into saying no, you cannot allow u.s. ships to port of call in the case of a taiwan contingency. now i sit here. i have a -- perfectly internal
consistent explanation for what china is doing that's almost certainly wrong. but absent a discussion about how china is thinking about these, i'm going to believe that. or the me version of me that is in the government is going to believe it. because you sort of pay those in the government to look out for the possibility of threats and do something about it. and so his security challenge unexplained becomes my security threat. and that is, i think, the linkage between the two why the distinction is so important. and yet another reason why some in depth dialogue between people with authority within their governments is in the interest of both countries. >> yeah, i notice that when the question about security challenges, security threat came out, our two american colleagues you know, felt, what's that? think about this. when the -- in 1980's, the americans asked chinese scientists who is your national
security threat? when you develop your missile defense technology? the chinese scientists would have the same reaction. what that? what is national security threat? because at that time, china and the united states were friends. the chinese missile defense program was aimed to missile defense technology rather than counter any specific threat. so this is a very good example how, you know, we have problems, you know, and complications. and very short response to linten's point, that china's nuclear submarine is good for coercing japan.
my response is that if china wanted to use this for nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the you know, china has to extend the range. china can not jump from zero to, you know, 10,000 miles. >> i'm hank gaffney, i spent 54 years in defense and three years in the u.s. navy in 1958. i also spent in my 28 years in the office of secretary of defense, almost 13 years intensively engaged in nuclear weapons. i have a question at the end here, i wanted to note, i've never heard in those years anybody in the u.s. government use the word compelance. second, i never have heard in all my discussions in international relations anybody talk about u.s. wanting rule around the world. the word just haven't come up. i've confirmed that with a
number of people. a quick reflection on the neutron bomb. i was deeply involved in that. you know the warhead on this small eight inch round was one kilo ton. but it was an accident we got that weapon as linten knows. my real question is -- this is supposed to be provacative -- how much in your work do you rely on articles about u.s. nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy on the international relations ir journals.
i've never found them of any use to me in working on the nuclear problems. >> firstly, thank you very much for clarifying the u.s. government does not use the word nuclear compelance. and the global hedge money. i fully understand that. all right. so in my article, i try to say united states want to convince
allies that united states is able to protect them. that is a way, you know, to provide global protection and to have global leadership. so that's my way. and secondly, i'm not an ir scholar by training. i'm a physicist by training. and fortunately i have friends like rose, like linten, if i'm wrong they always correct me. so i do not rely on ir journals. >> edward levine from the center for arms control and non-proliferation.
dr. li your article is fascinating. i second everybody's -- i'll read it carefully -- two ideas that particularly impressed me are despite the previous question, the difference between deterrence and compelance in -- [ inaudible ] and the comment in your article that china sees nuclear weapons as militarily unusable and particularly not relevant to a conflict that begins as a conventional conflict. when i think of where those ideas might be most applicable,
i am drawn to the case of the cargill conflict between pakistan and india where clearly pakistan viewed nuclear weapons as having the ability to deter a nuclear attack and make a conventional war more profitable for pakistan. and i wonder if you could point us to any cases in which china has remonstrated with pakistan regarding the usefulness of nuclear weapons and the implications, for example, of giving tactical commanders control over nuclear weapons. >> thank you. thank you very much for your comment and the question. i believe that my comment and the pakistani government have nuclear dialogue.
but i visited pakistan a few years ago. i gave a couple talks there. in islamabad and tried to convince them that weapons are not useful. i did not know to what extent they would agree with me, but i have a say that that's good. and some pakistanis want to come to china to work with me. that's very good. i have sent to pakistan to understand their idea about the roles of nuclear weapons. he has a very interesting some believe that nuclear weapons are useful. they share the same concept.
this is something we should pay attention to. so thank you very much for your question and you have a chance to mention this. >> i want to push back on a word that you used. we used the term tactical nuclear weapons. that's the empty set. all nuclear weapons use is strategist. they wasn't always true.
you can go back into the '60s and it was meaningful to talk about, but strategist by definition alters the overall conflict. and any use of nuclear weapons, whether it's success or not will alter the overall conflict in huge ways. and so this nonstrategic nuclear weapons category that we invented for convenience in arms control is not aiding in intelligent thought because it leads us to believe that there is some nuclear weapons use that is somehow okay. and that's not right. for at least one reason that nobody has any idea what happens
after that because we have zero experience in escalation management after nuclear use and lots of experience in escalation that i wanted actually happening. so i really urge -- ben started out with his comments about the importance of terms. here's a term that the united states uses all the time that leads to misunderstanding in other states and if y'all wanted to just band together and abolish it, that would be a good thing. >> arms control association. my question is what role do russian nuclear weapons play in china's thinking about its needs for its own force.
>> china has -- let me begin with this. my american colleagues explain their ideas about strategy. let me explain my definition about what is strategic, so it means use for weapons. no incentive to have nuclear arms race. i think the two definitions are the original definitions starting from 1960s and today i believe we should adhere to these definitions. the differences are about what approach was about the nuclear structures and people wanted to have good force structures so neither side would have incentive to launch. this is why i do not want china
to control. i do not want to support missile defense. but oversize the importance of transparency i agree to reduce the incentives of arms race and nuclear weapons. but i like to add one more approach. that is to commit use. you would account to nuclear force. to rivals to not use nuclear weapons. china and russia have a bilateral agreement we tried to remove the inference of nuclear weapons. we try not to exercise the
department. not nearly as long as hank gaffeny. for this audience, i feel compel ed to emphasize that it's hank and not frank. >> they have no intellectual relationship. i guess my question about no first use is what does it mean? is it an absolute commitment that there is no conceivable circumstance in which a country would use nuclear weapons other than a nuclear attack on itself baring in mind that things can get very bad. by the way, i think the idea that pakistan doesn't regard nuclear weapons as a backstop against indian pack is not consistent with the history of
pakistan and india. but the central question is by the no first use policy, do you mean an ir commitment never to use nuclear weapons except in the context of a nuclear attack? >> we'd like to start. >> i'm not the right person to explain the position of my country, but my belief is the same as you just said. i want to emphasize u another side. we should know that use in two part. one is what you just said. the other part is not to certainly to use nuclear
weapons. that party is very. then significantly reduce the roles of nuclear weapons. so that is a way promote nuclear disarmament globally. >> i want to go back to a fundamental difference between china's security situation and the u.s. and that is the existence of alliance. a chinese colleagues often say why won't you accept no first use? i'll tell you why. because the minute we say no first use, a number of states that don't have nuclear weapons now because they depend on the american umbrella will reconsider that. i know chi u na doesn't believe it's a threat to south korea, but i don't know that south korea believes that. i know china doesn't intend to threaten japan, but i'm positive
japan isn't convinced of that. both of those are capable of developing nuclear weapons. so i understand the community that thinks no first use is a wonderful tool of countering proliferation and the only problem with that is it's wrong. there's no first use on the alliance system won't stop proliferation and it may increase it. but setting aside it's the real policy, the policy expressed in the 2014 military doctrine that nuclear weapons use is appropriate for conventional conflicts where the very survival of the state is at issue does not seem to me to be a bad policy. i believe the chinese first use policy. i believe it. what it is factually true that states have gone in and out of that policy in the blink of an
eye before. so it seems to be a thin read. >> i would just like to add one point. i wanted to make the point about alliance relationships, but that has ably done that. the other point i'd really like to underscore is we debated on this matter long and hard, which i referenced at the beginning in my remarks. and it is a matter that people in our government take extremely seriously. i know it has been for multiple whether republican or democratic have grappled hard. that's why ended up with a formulation only in extreme circumstances. that means something to us. it means something to our president. it means something to our planners. but in addition to the alliance factor, there's also a factor for a long time that's been grappled with that is relating to the deterrence of other
weapons of mass destruction use. so again, you can argue with this whether it's a good idea or not whether to sustain at least the potential for nuclear use to respond to a biological attack, but this is another factor that has featured heavily on this matter. it is one among many issues in the nuclear realm of this government takes very seriously and will be debated again in the next administration when the next nuclear posture review is
taken forward. >> we have specialists that reside in both the united states and china. we have colleagues like rose and linton who go in and out of government that allow us to to get at some of the core issues at the heart of stability in u.s.-china relations. please join me in thanking them. >> thank you, evan. republican presidential
made at trump tower. i love hispanics. >> he's trying. honestly. he's trying. and i'll tell what you, i honestly think he understands that building and unifying and growing the party is the only way we're going to win. and i think he gets that. >> what did you think about the tweet? >> honestly, i had far more pressing matters other than that tweet. >> what are your plans for the convention? >> it makes things a little more simpler. we don't have to worry about three separate headquarters and hotels and, you know, programming is going to be something we're going to be working through. there's a lot of things already done. i mean the stage is done. there's things that just have to
happen. certainly it seemed like i was genius for moving it up. now we just have to get cruising and get going. >> just some of what rnc chair reince priebus had to say today at an event. you can watch the comments in their entirety tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern over on c-span. other prime time programs including book tv on c-span2 with programming from recent book festivals and on c-span3, it's american history tv with archival coverage of past presidential races. >> book tv has 48 hours of nonfiction books and authors every weekend. and here's some programs to watch for. this saturday and sunday at 1:30 p.m. eastern, book tv is at the 13th national black writer's conference from brooklyn, new york. our two day coverage features panel discussion onz hip hop and
literature with michael eric dice on, author of know what i mean, reflection onz hip hop and race and agenda we are cora daniels, author of impolite conversations as well as panel onz diversity and writing programs and black writers in the digital age. then at 7. 306789 p.m. eastern, pullser prize winning historians examine the intellectual maturation of thomas jefferson from his early influences and his political ideologies in their book blessed of the patriarchs. on sunday night at 9:00, afterwards with "washington post" reporter peter marks, author of "good for the money," my fight to pay back america. he discusses how aig ceo bob benlosher revived the company and helped the company to become profitable again. peter marks is interviewed by bethany mcclean. >> he is the only person that thought this was possible, essentially. i mean the government didn't
think this was going to happen. the company didn't certainly think it was going to happen. he was the right kind of crazy to take this on. >> go to booktv.org for the complete weekend schedule. >> there are other programs aimed at domestic targets. fbi surveillance of law abiding citizens and groups, political abuses of fbi intelligence and several specific cases of unjustified intelligence operations. >> the 1975 church committee hearings convene to investigate the intelligence activities of the cia, fbi, irs and the nsa.
saturday night at 10:00 eastern. the commission questioned the associate counsel and staff to nixon on a plan he presented to president nix ton collect information about anti-war and radical groups using burglary and opening of mail. >> the bureau had undertaken jobs over -- for a number of years up until 1966. he had been successful and valuable again in particularly in matters involving espionage and that they felt that it was something that was given the revolutionary climate, they thought they needed to have the authority to do. >> and just before 7:00 p.m. eastern -- force. >> and he came and she said, you were chosen. she was there for four years in the concentration camp. she spoke hungarian also. and they ask her, what is happening to us?
they're our parents. and she said, you see that smoke? there are your parents. >> holocaust survivor anna gross recalls her family's experiences in the ghettos in nazi occupied hungary. and there was forced hard labor. this was part of the museum's first person series. then at 8:00 on lectures in history -- >> anarchist named alex ander burkeman broke into his office in nearby pittsburgh, shot him twice and repeatedly stabbed him. berkman, however, is one of the great failures in assassination history. not only did he fail to kill frick, he also undermind the strikers for whom he was professing sympathy. because in many ways, public opinion saw this outburst of radical violence as a discredit
to the union movement. >> the university of maryland's robert childs on the labor and social unrest at the turn of the 20th century and then sunday morning at 10:00 on "road to the white house rewind," the 1968 presidential campaign of former democratic governor of alabama, george wallace. for the complete american history tv weekend schedule go, to c-span.org. >> next, a look at mineral production and the obama administration's policy for exploration on federal lands. held by the cato institute this is an hour and ten minutes.
good afternoon i'm the director of science here at the cato institute. one of the things that we look at our influences of government support and government policy on united states and global science and one of the areas that we are interested in, of course, are the areas of energy and natural resources. when the center started up, people asked, well, who are you going to get to work in this interdisciplinary center? and i said, this is such an unusual idea that we have that if we build it, people will come. and ned is an example of that. he had been reading cato's writing, the writing on cato an
science for several years. and one day he said can i come to talk to you? and then i realized that we had just found a remarkable person to eventually volunteer to start working with us. he is a senior scientists, 30 years of experience in energy and minerals. he's been with several prestigious federal agencies including u.s. geological survey, the department of energy and his most recent employer was the central intelligence agency. he won't tell me what he did. he is really highly trained at the best institutions for geology and minerals with bachelors in economic geology from slippery rock. masters in geoscience in university which is as big as it gets unless you're going into
petroleum geology unless you go to texas a&m which where he got his phd, he also has a masters from john hopkins school of advanced and national studies down the street. the street. aside from that he's not qualified to speak on these subjects. then marc humphries is going to follow ned, with the congressional resource service. he's been there about 28 years or so. he's highly experienced. he works extensively with members of congress, congressional committees and staff and author of several congressional research service reports. when you ask about critical minerals and government policy, he's the go-to guy. so ned was able to find him and get him here to comment on subject matter. his areas of interest rare earth elements, critical and strategic minerals, energy development on public lands, offshore energy mining law reform, and mineral development
in asia and africa. he'll be commenting on ned's talk. mid- mid-'s talk is called critical mineral federal land management. you can tell it going to be an interesting talk. all i can say, a lot of people think what comes out of the wall just -- some think -- they are strategic and critical for our science and technology. ned? >> all right. very good. thank you dr. michaels for those kind comments. i appreciate that thank you for visiting cato institute. today my colleague and i marc humphreys are eager to speak on
critical minerals. we look forward to a lively q&a session afterwards. i wanted to start out and let you know that basically as you probably know, much has already been said about critical minerals. beginning with 2008 landmark study that came out from the national academy of sciences national resource council. and that book, i'm sure you've seen it before, the study director was elizabeth ede, colleague of mine, and she couldn't be here today. she was on travel. but this is certainly a book for a serious student of critical minerals. i'll leave these up here afterwards. we can talk about them. you can copy down the title, offer, whatever. beginning in 2008 with the publication of that, we've had almost a string of events without end that have to do with critical minerals. and it has involved usgs
briefings on the hill. involved the national academy briefings. it's involved mineral industry and environmental group congressional testimony. and also think tank hill briefings and the like. and then all of a sudden, well, most of you have probably experienced these things, or some them. then something changed in 2010 and that was simply the huge boost that the idea of critical minerals received when china decided to embargo critical minerals from the country of japan bringing their electronics industry virtually to its knees in very short order. when with that wake-up call, people began to look again at critical minerals. and the media has reported pretty reasonably ongoing, articles, stories, exposes, and all of those sort of culminated
with another boost that we received at the end of last year with the publication of a book entitled "the elements of power" by david abraham. i'll leave this up here, too, for folks to look at. i don't know what it is, early may, i asked mr. abraham to be here, and he wanted to be here but he's on travel as well so we'll just go without the authors. but clearly there's a growing interest in critical minerals. today we want to build on that interest, marc and i. and our challenge is to provide you with a clearer understanding of the broader topics that surround critical minerals and what those include are the following. we want to share with you concepts of understanding mineral wealth, resources versus reserves. that's often -- people don't understand the difference. so we're going to try to set you straight on that. critical versus strategic. that's another one that needs to be sorted out as best we can.
the idea of the geologic distribution in the world for critical minerals as well as i supply and demand. we'll go over that in detail. are there shortages now? and what kind of shortages are there? also, issues that impact the domestic exploratiation and min industry and i'm going to also include a case study entitled "bear lodge wyoming" and if you -- i'm assuming kind of a mid-level understanding in here. some of you have heard about some of these things, but i don't think any of you have heard the latest on bear lodge, so i'm anxious to share that with you. finally in the end we're fwigoi to wrap up with how to better secure our mineral future. so that's our agenda. now, let me tell you about a great quote that i found here in "elements of power." you can read it, but let me read
it with you. this is -- i like it -- mr. abrams has said rare earths are everywhere, from bridges to earphone buds. they're rarely used alone, rather they fill the same role as yeast in pizza. only used in small amount but absolutely essential. he goes on to say, without yeast, there's no pizza, and without critical minerals and their rare earth derivative, there's no high-tech world. that's a quote from his book "elements of pow er : gadgets, guns, struggle for substantial future in rare minerals. i recommend that book to you. again, we can talk about it later. i'm going beyond that book, and i'm going to show you the broad
spectrum of what it is we're talking about as far as the world of geology and mineral economics. these are different classes of minerals. this is more than i have here. some could be combined into one class. consider the following. you have industrial minerals and subset of that. those are important in different areas of the country, different areas of the world. polymetallic, what it says, deposits that have more than one mineral associated with them. nonferrous. rare metals, subject of this book along with critical minerals, precious metals, many of which are critical. and then, of course, critical minerals and when does critical mineral become strategic. these are concepts we want to talk about as well.
the concept is understand savannah guthrie mineral wealth. we can see how much minerals everyone have boosted the wealth of nations. look what they have done for computer chips, for example. '80s, 12 elements. then in the 9 0s iss, 16. four were added. today a computer chip has anywhere between 60 and 70 elements in it. every single yeathat's increasing. same thing with communications. you have the old clunky cell phone. when those things came out -- clunky as they were, now looking back, they still have 30 or 35 elements in them. today's new iphone 6 from apple, 70 elements and they're all necessary. take one for example, indium.
without indium, you couldn't slide, you couldn't scroll. that's part of the screen and that makes that mineral so critical to be able to do that. but for high-tech growth to continue, it's going to require critical minerals and their elements. and it's going to require them to sustain newer and newer technolo technologies, even the green technologies that we're looking forward to such as solar, wind, and batteries and lighting and the like. so they're married and as we have morend more green technology, we're going to require more and more minerals. but what i'd like to do, though, is remind you right now, up front, no matter what side of the argument you come down on, whether you favor no mining or some mining or total mining, whatever, that is not nearly as important as two immutable facts
regarding minerals about which most people agree totally. number one, high-tech and green revolutions create a demand for critical minerals that is absolutely exploding. there is on top of that an absolute mismatch between the demand for critical minerals and their availability in the united states and other developed countries who are producers of the gadgets that we like to buy. and of course, again, in abraham's book he goes over that more carefully. but that is sort of the crux of where we are now. the more gadgets, the more mining, but -- in the end today as we wrap up, we'll show you some other alternatives to mining. i'm an alumni of the usgs. and it's probably one of the greatest taxpayer returns on investment ever. ov