tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN May 9, 2016 12:08pm-2:09pm EDT
coming up in about 20 minutes, author of a book about islamic terrorism in europe talks about recent attacks in paris and brussels and how militants operate in and around europe. new america is the host of this event. it's set to start live at 12:30 eastern on c-span. the u.s. senate is back on this monday afternoon. senators will continue work on a water spending bill. a key procedural vote at 5:30 eastern this afternoon. you can see it live. the u.s. house is back tomorrow. we'll take up a series of measures designed to combat opioid use including grants to states for abuse prevention and treatment programs and later in the week members plan to amend the bill and then vote to go to
conference with the senate. live coverage of the house is on our companion network c-span. coming up at 4:00 p.m. eastern, it's a look at programs for military members including medical care, education, housing and legal services and how effective they are and whether they should be privatized. the wilson center is the host of this event, live coverage is on c-span. also at 5:30 eastern the federal reserve, how much it's changed since its inception and what its role is today and in the future. this from "the washington post" today, north carolina governor filed a lawsuit against the united states justice department asking a federal court to rule its so-called bathroom law is not discriminatory. he complains the federal
government of baseless and blatant overreach. bypassing congress by attempting to rewrite the law and set poll tis for employers across the country not just north carolina. this is now a national issue that applies to every state and it needs to be resolved tejada federal lovely. you can read more about this in "the washington post" today. go to washingtonpost.com. donald trump has named chris christie to lead his transition team n. a campaign news release he said governor christie is a knowledgeable and loyal person with the tools and resources to put together an unparalleled transition team. i'm greateful to governor christie for his contributions to this movement. north carolina held its first conference this past
friday. regional specialists talk about the event and answered questions about the future relations with china and its nuclear program. the wilson center here in washington is the host of this discussion. good afternoon. welcome to the wilson center. both those of you who are physically here as well as those of you who are looking in remotely. the wilson center for those of you who are not physically here and might not know is the nation's official memorial to our 28th president. it seeks to commemorate woodrow wilson's passion of good policy and sound scholarship. i think by the time you leave here this afternoon or leave us this afternoon you will get a very good example of merging
those two interests in what we're going to have with us today. we are looking at the seventh party congress of the korean workers party which is to, again, on friday, the sixth congress to place 36 years ago so many of us in this room, not me but many of you in this room weren't even around the last time there was a party congress which raises a whole host of interesting questions as to what to look for, what we should expect. and i have no doubt our two experts today will provide us with many insights into those questions, those and other questions. i think it was mark twain who allegedly said, although i don't think he actually did, that
history may not repeat itself but it usually rhymes and i have a feel that if we look back at previous congresses we'll at least get some inkling as to what to expect. for the congress that starts this friday. we will be assisted in this enterprise by two of this country's genuine experts on the democratic people's republic of korea, dprk, and there are few experts in this country. i'm privileged to be flanked by two of them. we'll be hearing first from james person, whose title is such that i can't remember it so i have to read it. james is the coordinator of the hyundai motor center for korean history and public policy here
at the woodrow wilson center. he is also deputy director of the center's history and public policy program james is completing a book on the evolution of north korea's political and ideological systems. after the korean war he has been a visiting professor among other places at two different universities in seoul. the university of north korean studies and korea university. james will introduce us to some documents that he has -- he and his colleagues have recently unearthed that will not only shed light on the post but probably on the future as well. after james finishes we'll then be talking to or listening to bob carlin, robert carlin, a visiting fellow at stanford university. bob had a long and distinguished
career in the u.s. government where he was universally, and i mean universally recognized as u.s. government's go-to person on north korea. bob has been to dprk more than 30 times so that would suggest some reason why he is so highly regarded in the field of north korean studies. among his recent accomplishments is the revision and updating of a book which almost all of us have read, entitled the two koreas now released and updated and revised. >> james, we turn things over to you. >> thank you very much, bob. i want to start by saying a few words about the work we do here at the wilson center on korea and to announce the release of a
new collection of documents on the party. the hyundai motor center for korean history and public policy goes into international archives and gathers documents. we then translate them and release them on our portal which is part of our digital archive. we do this for two reasons. first, because we want to get a better sense of what happened in modern korean history. we also recognize that these documents that we're gathering have a great policy relevance and we try to use them to inform policy, it particularly useful when looking at north korea. it helps us -- it puts us in a
better position to more accurately interpret the actions of the regime today. we released these materials on the digital archive and we are actually just releasing today a new collection that features documents on congresses of the past. these materials are assembled from the archives of russia, china, hungary, albania and a few other countries. the collection shows which issues have mattered most to -- at past congresses of the korean workers party and what north korea's leaders have sought to achieve through the congresses. as it suggests, past congresses were used by kim il sung for
ideological control and to lay out his road map for the country's economic development. the last congress in 1980 was used to anoint his son, kim jong il as auch ssuccessor. you can access this by going to the digital archive or type into any search engine modern korean history portal and look through the collection. some great findings here, again, from all six of the congresses up to now. so -- all right. so in my talk i'm going to do a couple things. first i want to give background on congresses, the function, the purpose of congresses in north korea, and then i'm going to offer some suggestions based on
trends, what we might expect from the seventh congress. so what are congresses? according to the socialist constitution, the constitution that's been in place since 2012, the democratic people's republic of korea, the official name of north korea, carries out all of its activities under the korean workers party. what this means is the party leads the state in an arrangement known as the party state system. according to clause one, the congress is the supreme leadership organ that leads the democratic people's republic of korea. as such the congresses are the most important political event. you don't have anything else.
as important. they're not once-in-a-lifetime events or once in a generation events and they shouldn't be. this is something you see in the press a lot when describing the upcoming congress. in theory until 2012 congresses were to be held every five years and the north koreans held them much more frequently in the past but this was amended in 2012. as noted the last couple was 36 years ago in 1980. though i really expect them to be -- to be happening at a much more frequent basis moving forward. kim jong-un, the leader today, seems to be continuing to elevate the role of the party. this is a process start ed by hs father just a few years before he died and i think the resumption of the congresses seems to be a natural act.
so the primary purpose or function of the congress is to elect a new central committee, delegates from around north korea attend the congress and each delegate represents certain number of party members, a ratio of 1 to 1,000, one delegate for 1,000 members. i'm not sure what it is anymore. they would elect the number of members to the central committee authorized by the congress. and that number has grown. in 1946 the first congress, there were 43 members of the central committee elected. in 1980 i think it was 124 members. you also have candidate members of the central committee, people who can attend the congresses but they don't have voting rights. but if you include them, it more
or less doubles the size of the central committee. while the congress is the party's supreme lead ership orgn they are to meet in between sessions. they're supposed to do this for regular operations and at party business. this is supposed to happen at least three times a year through plenary sessions but that's in theory. this hasn't been the case for the past 3 1/2 decades, though. another function of the party congress is to amend the party charter which sets out how the party is organized, how the various bodies in the party relate to the north korean government, the military, to
society and to the economy. and some of these smaller bodies that are part of the central committee are, for example, the standing committee, the name changes, you also have another body that's part -- that is the central military commission which seems to be under the authority of the party again. you may say that the party charter is an ideological documents. it contains a preaimable that gives a broad definition of the party's views on many diplomatic and international issues. the views expressed in the preample, the policies of north korea between congresses. in lieu of full congress, the party can also convene a party conference. you may recall that in 2010 and
again in 2012 you had party conferences. there have been a total of four conferences in the history of the korean parkers party. i have these listed in the power point here. so what is the difference between a congress and a conference? well, for one, less can be achieved at a conference. for example, in theory only one-fifth of the central committee can be replaced at a conference. in practice there's some flexibility. at the third conference in 2010 a larger number of members of the central committee was replaced. this could be because many had died or were purged from the last meeting in 1980.
also, a conference cannot declare a new term of the central committee. despite the fact there have been two conferences, the korean, woulders party is operating under the sixth central committee which was elected at the last congress in 1980. the founding of the party, this is something that's up for debate, the north koreans celebrated last october, the 70th and veniversary, the found of the northern korean communist party, the korean workers party was founded in 1946 when the korean -- when the communist party merged with another progressive party called the new people's party. this was done at the suggestion of joseph stalin. in a meeting in july of 1946 in
moscow. kim returned to pyongyang and the merger took place at the first congress in august '46. the second congress took place less than two years laettnt lat march of 2008. this focused on putting the party in order, passed new bylaws. patterns began to emerge in congresses from the third congress which happened after the war in 1956. topics discussed included from this congress and moving forward included international relations and inter-korean relations. at the last two in 1970 and 1980 ideology played a major role and, of course, there have been
significant displays of loyalty to the kim family. conditions are not ideal. the tone in october when the -- this is when they just celebrated the 70th anniversary, what they claim to be the 70th anniversary of the party. the tone of the announcement that a congress would be called was pretty upbeat. since then north korea's status quo has become unfavorable. relations have worsened. the kaesong complex, the last economic link between the two koreas was shuttered. relations with china are still on the rocks especially after the incident which in december was sent to china to have a couple concerts.
the ban was brought back to north korea and the concerts were canceled. if you believe the north korean official media, the korean central news agency, kim jong-un gave orders in the wake of this incident. it seems the failure to improve relations with beijing and seoul led to thinking the regime needed to demonstrate strength and power to the people of north korea and they decided to do this through their nuclear program. to be sure the activities have surged since early this year. in january, of course, they conducted their fourth nuclear test and the following month
conducted the test of a long-range ballistic missile that could carry a nuclear weapon to hit the united states. north korea claimed to have tested a more powerful rocket engine that -- and also they've claimed to have miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit on the tip of a missile. they made three attempts at launching the medium range missile. the missile tests have all failed, as we know, but it's not certain the north korea people are aware of this. all you have to do is visit to get a sense of how truthful they are to the people you just have to visit the museum of the three revolutions in pyongyang and you
see they claim every missile they ever fired is successful and you have satellites in orbit broadcasting the songs of the general kim jong il despite we know the tests failed. what can we expect from the congress? a lot of things that have been on the agenda in the past, i think. can we expect any major policy a announcements? the soviets and the chinese used congresses to unveil policies. the chinese communist party in 1982 to put forward the idea of developing socialism. in 1956 the 20th communist party of the soviet union to launch
de-s it talin-ization. the 27th congress to announce the reform and opening policies. but what we see from the documents, what we see from these reports on past congresses is that the north koreans have not really used congresses for the same purpose. congresses have been scripted events. i really want expect anything new. as the hungarian ambassador wrote in 1980, congresses traditionally serve only for endorsing the politics created by a narrow political group and not for discussing, developing or introducing meaningful political directions suitable for the new circumstances. so do not expect debate and discussion. what you should expect is lots of grandiose statements about
nuclear capabilities, support for kim jong-un and the unitary leadership system. internal cohesion and perhaps economic development. so we'll see kim jong-un delivering a report on in theory what should be the accomplishments since the last congress in 1980. i expect in addition to a report on the accomplishments new policy directions. i expect it to be brief and more of a focus on what to -- what the new policy directions will be. you wonder if the lack of accomplishments is why. i would venture to guess the
north koreans will talk about the policy of equal emphasis of a nuclear program and consumer goods industries this is a modification of a policy that was launched in 1962 by his grandfather. for the senior kim, he was about the simultaneous development of heavy industry. for him it was steel and guns. it will likely be much talk about the successes and the development of the nuclear weapons program and along with that the speeches will perhaps outline how they plan to make the butter. according to a report by the north korean press on saturday,
the dprk proudly joined the ranks of advanced nuclear and space powers while demonstrating the might of the political youth power and is now dashing ahead forward to a socialist economic power and highly civilized nation. now does this mean policy shift or adjustments to the old system? congresses have never really launched or been used to launch new and transformative policies. i expect tweaks to the old system and i think the 70-day campaign launched as a runup to the congress is a pretty clear sign of this. when times were tough, as they are now because of sanctions, the north koreans mobilized
human and material resources. the results looked impressive qualitatively but led to resource distribution and undermined the economy's base. a new campaign, a new -- they launched new expression. it is derived from a mid-1950s campaign. the movement fgs lost when they unveiled their five-year plan after the korean war at a time when aid from the socialist camp was in declined. they were forced to immobilize to achieve the goal. a flying horse, a pegasus, that could travel 500 kilometers in a single day.
4,000 kill ometers in a single day. so they're asking the north korean people to, you know, do ten times the work in a single day. the speed battle campaigns are focused on short term goals. seems to suggest that as a result of sanctions we should not expect the announcement of plans for economic development through a new five-year plan or seven-year plan. that said, the north koreans are stillful at getting around sanctions and there are, of course, doubts. doubts persist about the commitment to enforcing sanctions. but i think in the end any improvement in consumer goods, any focus on consumer goods, however small it may be, would still be a major improvement to
north korea. since 1953, the north koreans have been focused single-mindedly on the development of heavy industry and defense capabilities. so the congress will also likely bring to an end, i think, i hope, many of the changes, the top levels of leadership including dramatic purges and even executions, rumored executions, with the election of the new central committee, we'll have, i think, a better understanding of who is in control and i wouldn't be surprised to see a younger generation of members. congress is going to give kim jong-un the opportunity to bring about generational change. through the election of a new central committee. but i think we'll also see a lot of stress on the unitary leadership system which is again a throwback to an earlier time,
1967 when after a debate within the korean workers party the grandfather of the current leader launched something called the monolithic leadership system that made the word of the sovereign, i.e., which ever kim is in power, absolute. and i expect that you're going to see a lot of discussion of this again. which will discourage any difference of opinion. now on inter-korean relations we may see rifrns to the principles of the july 4, 1972, declaration, inter-korean declaration. kim jong-un brought these three principles up again in his new year's address. he suggested that the need to show a willingness to respect
and implement the three main principles of the fatherland. these principles, again, are autonomy, peace and solidarity and -- i'm sorry, youautonomy, peace and solidarity of the korean people. but given the state of inter-korean relations today i would be surprised if there was anything beyond that. we saw the north koreans talk about the confederation system. to bring about unification. i would be surprised if there was any discussion beyond that. so to summarize i don't think we can expect any major changes. nothing new. an express of support for kim yong un and his line through the nuclear program and through the promise to focus more on economic development.
unity around the leader. so thank you very much. >> thank you, james. [ applause ] we now turn to bob carlin. >> i was, as i think many -- or at least some of you were, i was at a meeting earlier today looking at the future of the korean peninsula and the problems with north korea. that's pretty dismal. going back and looking at the past is actually exhilarating and a lot of fun because what it demonstrates is we actually do know something and there are some windows into the soul of pyongyang that should help us understand, as james said, what will be happening on friday. you are going to be seeing in
the newspaper commentaries and on the news, i'm afraid, a lot of baloney about the congress, a lot of report eers don't have a lot of familiarity with north kor korea. i don't know how much homework some of them did. some of them did a fair amount, i think. but so what i wanted to do is based on some of the documents that james has put together primarily the hungarian documents on the fourth and the sixth congresses, some sense of perfect spespective for what yo going to be seeing or what the report is you're going to be seeing this time around. and you can, for yourselves, make the comparisons about what's the same old and what's very new. the first thing to note, of
course, is that what's important, and it comes clear in these hungarian documents the lens that you bring to the congress is going to influence your interpretation of what's going on. it's not great insight but you have to bear that in mind. the lens the north koreans bring is not going to be our lens and so our interpretation is liable to be different from the way someone in the north korean leadership and the man on the street is going to see it. there is some utility to comparisons between and among the various congresses. but you have to be careful because the congresses are often context specific. they depend on what was going on and around north korea at the time.
the absolute comparisons will not get you as far as you might hope. but just let's go through a little list here of the sorts of things i bet are going to jump out at people this time around. and looking back at the fourth and sixth congresses you discover they were there, too. the first thing that's going to jump out is what i call the bad apple section of the speech, a reference to anti-party elements. this doesn't only show up in congresses but is the meet and potato where the party is and how far it's come. why is this important? because sure as shooting, because of the sort of bias that has crept into observers' view of kim jong-un's grasp of power a lot of people are going to say, aha.
they're talking anti-party elements because it means they've had problems establishing his rule or there are still problems in his base of support. well, that might be but the fact is certainly in 1961 and again in 1980 and i'm sure in 1970 there are references to crushing the anti-party elements in the party. somehow you have to make a judgment on whether this is new and different. is there something about the wording of it that's really different or is this just thr a throwaway lines that belong in the speech. the same thing, criticism of moscow and beijing. if there is, for example, criticism of the chinese either implicit, probably isn't going to be explicit, a lot of people say, aha, you see, china and
pyongyang are having this terrible fight these days because jinping doesn't like kim jong-un and the chinese are angry because the north koreans are not showing them the proper respect in developing their own nuclear capabilities. well, if you look at the congress in 1980, there was loads of criticism. of both the soviet union and china. and not very thinly veiled either. dominationism, which was a reference, a very clear reference to the soviet union, complaints about the superpowers, guess who that is, assertions that there should be no unprincipled compromise with the imperialists -- well, who had been engaged in that up until that point, if not beijing and moscow. people shouldn't have illusions about imperialism. the same thing.
so this is -- this comes with mother's milk in north korea. this sense of independence from the big powers, the need to forge their own path and their need to push back what they see as the big neighbors -- big neighbors stepping on their own prerogatives. i'm pretty sure we'll see it again. it's a constant theme in north korea and so we shouldn't jump too far in making conclusions about what it tells us about the present day. the generational change, which james mentioned briefly in the six-party congress, there had to be a change in the composition of the leadership to reflect changes in the composition of the party, the generations.
so as james suggested, you're probably going to see more of it this time than in the past. it's not a brand-new theme and, in fact, the turnover in the north korean leadership at each party congress tends to be or has in the past tended to be much more than you used to see, for example, in the soviet party. i can remember, and i don't remember where i saw this but i remember that i saw it, i'm jealous that these party congresses. you get to change all those people. i'm stuck with all this dead wood. it's too hard for me to do. so it's not unusual. it doesn't mean purges, just means this is what they do in north korea. they change the leadership. now between congresses, frequently there's not a lot of change.
at the congress you may see more. you may see suddenly it grow from the numbers that we have now to they may add six, seven, eight people. he's not packing the court. it's the tradition of the way that they operate. on unification, i know in the documents we were looking at, the hungarian ambassador in 1980 had some very unkind things to say about a proposal that the north koreans made for a democratic confederate republic of korea, dcrk, which didn't look to be all that new. and, in fact, the hungarian ambassador said it's difficult to support such bull. i won't say the whole word, but that's what he said. and he said, and the suggestion is not new, exclamation point.
well, actually it was. and it annoyed and amazed the north koreans that people didn't seem to grasp. the dcrk was, in effect, a new definition of reunification. in the past the north koreans had put forward the idea of a confederation as a way station on the way to total unification we'll go through the phase of a confederation. the dcrk was the new definition of reunification and, in fact, that held pretty much true, in fact, it did hold true, through the 1980s. the concept, therefore, allowed them to deal more directly, more openly, more formally with the republic of korea. such that in the late 1980s when the two prime ministers met the
north koreans referred to him by his full, proper title, the>> reporter: of trepublic of korea. my view, and as a matter of fact, i was around in 1960. i did the analysis groups analysis of the six-party congress. i remember chewing over this thing and going over it for a while. my view is that we might see something pretty important but subtle at this congress in terms of principles or underlying philosophy which would then govern new initiatives poured south korea even though things are terrible right now but kim jong-un is looking in the long term. he's going to leave her in the rear-view mirror in only a few years so he needs to have a philosophical basis for, i
think, a new approach towards south korea. same thing with the economy. you may not get something quite as startling as gorbachev's approach at his party congress. kim jong-un is pretty far down the road on a philosophical basis on the economy. the problem is it hasn't been codified. the problem is those people operating on the markets on the basis of the new idea don't have any top cover. nobody wants to go too far. do the max on this. did he pro vietd a philosophical basis that provides a floor now. you can operate at that level.
he may do it. i'm not predicting, if we get it it's liable to be nuanced. and it will be very easy for people to say there's nothing here. kwee bwe better look at that. oh, a couple of real simple things, and i am sure to see on the television shots of the fireworks or buildings in pyongyang that have been pointed and people will talk about how people will work 14 hours a day fixing up pyongyang in order to make it pretty for the congress. well, yeah, they did that for the sixth congress and for the fourth congress and that's what they do. so for us in the outside we may say, well, what is an
extraordinary, depressing use of labor. koreans are -- north koreans are used to this. they grumble. the north koreans always grumble and nothing comes of it so i'm not surprised. the city will look better. under kim jong-un, the character of the city has changed completely. now that's just an external. i'm not making a moral judgment, i'm simply saying the city looks very, very different. there are commercial establishments. there's going to be a big parade. there always is. the fireworks are going to last however long, an hour, two hours, three hours. back in 1961 the hungarian ambassador noted that it was an extraordinary display of fireworks, so extraordinary that the among goalians asked to use
the expertise. the north koreans have. they put out the playbook from the last congress. we did this check, we did this and that. this young man going to get a six hour speech. okay. we're done here. that's his approach to organizing his party is like. last thing. last thing. no, i guess that's it. i will just advise you to tune your antennae as you begin to see the press reports coming in and sort of mentally say to yourself, okay, i know that that hashed happened before. i'm not impressed. oh, this looks new. i wonder what this is about. thanks.
since most of us are not qualified, maybe we'll just bring these two gentlemen back in a week or ten days and let them tell us. before we open up the floor to our audience, i have a question of both of you. clarify why in may of 2016 as opposed to the conference two years ago when i held the last conference two years ago or another 36 years. why is it necessary or beneficial to do it in the spring of 2016?
>> they had tried to work in the process of moving back towards a more normal situation with the party. the party conference was the first step of 2010. 2012 conference it was too soon for there to be a congress for kim jong-un but it was a very important meeting so i'm not quite so surprised that he's having one. i'm not sure of the exact timing. we never shall. he may have been better with the south koreans. it may be more propicious.
don't forget real briefly last august there was an incident in the dmz, there was a kerfuffle and buildup of tensions. it suddenly resolved itself and be it looked like north/south relations might even move ahead. then they fell apart. i think the north koreans were very disappointed by that. kim has had to adjust. if you wait for the right moment on the korean peninsula, you'll be waiting for a long time. >> i agree with bob. you know, as i said -- mentioned before, there is this process -- ongoing process of restoring the party -- the thoert of the party. the conferences have much more
limited -- much more limited function. there's only so much that they can accomplish. it was something that we could have predicted. you had to have the authority. the conferences again in theory are only supposed to replace up to 1/5 of the central committee. again, why now, who knows, but certainly it's something that we should have been aware. it would have been in the works. >> one last question for me. the lead up to this conference,
bob carlin has warned us about the baloney we're likely to read, so maybe i've been reading baloney already, but certainly some of the press reporting has emphasized the great number of foreign delegations, including heads of state who have attended previous conferences. related questions. was that true of all previous conferences and assuming the speculation about the new conference is correct and that there will be very few, at least senior foreign leaders there, what, if anything, are we to make of that? >> what about all previous congresses? >> i believe there was one where in fact they didn't invite as many foreign delegates to. it was either the fourth or the
fifth. i don't remember, but certainly the eighth there were a large number. mugabi was even there. he's still in control today. of course there are only a few communist parties in the world today so you expect there to be a smaller number of delegates. i suspect the number of international press will make up for that, for the smaller number of other delegates of workers and communist party. but, yeah, seeing the same thing, that, you know, they expect very few people. i don't think this is an indication, delegitimizes the
congress in any way. the attendance of foreign delegates was largely ceremonial and, you know, they would -- they would give these very, you know, celebratory speeches that really, you know, there's very little substance to it. talk about the friendship of that country with the korean people and whatnot. that was -- that was sort of the meat and bones start, the real important stuff. meat and potatoes of the congress started with the leaders. kim il-sung's speech, for example, his report on the history and that was often after a lot of the speeches delivered by these foreign guests. we may expect that it will be a shorter congress because of the limited number of delegates from
other countries. >> let me agree. this is a communist party event. you don't want to invite heads of state to a communist party event. so our second thing is in one way i think that koreans are -- north koreans are relieved because they used to have a heck of a time figuring out the protocol between the soviets and chinese. they'd try one thing, then another, but somebody would always have his nose out of joint. so they don't have to worry with that this time. just looking ahead, it occurred to me if you want to get some sense of the themes that probably are going to show up in kim jong-un's speech, on april 30th there was a government party and a minor party issued a joint statement declaring their victory at the end of the u.s.rk
joint exercises. it wasn't very long. the text of it was quite long. i think it contains many of the themes we're going to see about how they built up the military and how that now provides the opportunity for them to concentrate on the economy, what they've accomplished in the economy, where they think they're going to go. i don't know if you can get ahold of it, it would be good to have. then you can just check through it and see how close that is and how much of a taste they want to give us a few days ahead of time. >> no, that's right. >> okay. let's open it to those in the room. i would ask you to wait until we get a mike could he phone to you. i would ask that you identify yourself and that you keep your comments and/or questions brief please. who would like to go first?
kathy. saw you and then i'll go there next. >> thank you very much. great to learn something rather than just comment on something. >> we know who you are but -- >> sorry. kathy moon. bookings institution and former alumna of the wilson center fellow here. one comment and one question. the comment is regarding bob's question about the expectation that there will be few foreign leaders. aside from the fact that it's a party event, it's also true that the u.s. and other countries, western countries, have been
wagging diplomatic pressure to vietnam, laos and places like such to urge them not to send members or not to go at all. as part of diplomatic sanctions one could say, not just the economic sanctions that are in place. some countries, it's not the u.s. countries, they also feel they resist that showing up. the question is there are lots of people that are going to be descending upon pyongyang from all over the country. who are these delegates and what do they do on a day-to-day, month-to-month, year-to-year,
decade-to-decade conferences. they seem to have little occasion to meet so what do they do? are they expected to -- what are they expected to do when they return to their local areas, expectations from the pyongyang ruling elites, and also might there als be expectations from the local level that they are expected to meet. you know, i'm looking at them as a bridge in a way, not just as people who are going to go and party hardy and listen to kim jong-un and then just return home. they're going to do something, so what is it? >> who would like to -- >> well, the party is a conveyor belt, right? the party is the way the center sends instructions down and gets feedback back again. that's why i think king jong il
decided that was fine. especially if you're going to make economic progress from the control from the center, you need to listen to what's going on and transmit orders. these people are the ones who were designated. if you're a central committee member, you have some clout. you're listening to who's above you and you're giving orders to people below you. these come from these local party cells, local party committees. they're elected to go as a delegate to represent, again, it used to be one delegate for every 1,000 members of the korean workers' party. they would be elected to go to attend the conference and then
they would go back. they would submit materials of the congress gress to the people. the discussion from the local party cells, what had occurred transmitting the message. >> that became more and more clear that the machinery intended to facilitate the smooth operation of the economy and other things was getting very creeky.
it was guiding what was going on. kim jong il would go on on sight guidance things and so would the prime minister. it would re-energize the economy. don't forget also they were still recovering. it would wreak havoc with central control. >> thank you for the very interesting talk. i'm an intern at the carnegie institute of america. i have two questions on the upcoming congress. you mentioned about whether kim
jong-un will -- i wish for you to elaborate. i believe north korea had endorsed the idea supporting the idea of improving the military at the same time. what other philosophical basis can he provide to the people. second question is regarding so panels expected that there will be not much difference compared to the last congress. if there's going to be any differences, if kim jong-un can make any differences, what can he do? especially when now we pass the iran resolution which is considered as one of the toughest sanctions that we ever placed on north korea. and china is now showing pretty
different attitude compared to previous sanctions. now china is showing more. the korean government places more effective sanctions. if there is going to be any differences from kim jong-un, what kind of words, phrases, actions can we expect in the congress. >> do you want to talk about the philosophical basis? >> i think bob was talking about that. i don't know that -- that's not -- that's not the cover that these people need. as you said, these people out in the markets, it all seems so temporary. at any moment it could all be -- you know, they could all be kicked out and arrested. this is a practical policy that originated, as i said, in 1962 when kim il song in '61 after
the cuban missile crisis, kim il song felt the need to develop further the military. they scrapped the seven year plan which was at that time supposed to focus on consumer goods and light industry. instead decided to simultaneously continue the development of heavy industry which from '53 -- and at the same time simultaneously develop national defense industries. this is a modification of that policy that was needed at the time to deal with the external security environment. >> you know, they've come up with this new concept we've called self-development. it's different. it's only come up in the last six months or so and kim jong-un
has very much identified -- it's identified with him and the concept is you don't need imports. in fact, it's better to replace domestically made goods for the imports if, for example, that is amplified so that people are encouraged to focus the economy on domestic. in order to make that work they have to be given the incentives, et cetera, et cetera. i'm not making any predictions. it's a wait and see. i do think you might pivot. i've said this before. i think he might say our nuclear
is strong enough. we are -- we have hydrogen bombs and, therefore, we have enough of a defense aboard that that pord of dong jin has been fulfilled. the economic development is where our focus is going to be. not that they're going to give up nuclear, but it gives them space to focus on it rather than focusing on the economy. >> coming right now. >> hi. i'm with the office of current affairs with the state department. so the public support is much higher than prior. he has done much better in terms of cultural allocation and what you said on external infrastructure, the building infrastructure. is the public aware of the
affects on sanctions? a lot of ngos are experiencing this. how will sanctions play into the party politics? >> if you look at the joint statements about how ho, ho, ho the sanctions are good for us. like spinach, it makes us work harder. you can't catch me. like the road runner. they're not going to ignore it. like the people, this is going to start to bite. we don't need all of these goodies coming in. we can live without it. i don't know that they felt it. there are still traffic jams in pyongyang and i am amazed. i don't know how much the regime is going to try to buffer this stuff. >> i think they've already
warned about the possibility of another arduous march. the economy hand grenade is what they used to describe not only the famine -- actually, i think this would be the third or fourth arduous march. in 1956 during this in the party, then they use it again during the famine. but it's a period of -- i think recently they've warned of the possibility of another arduous march. so i think they realized that, you know, they could get hurt but they're not necessarily making a secret of it. >> who's next?
>> hello. i'm from woodrow wilson center. i was particularly interested when you talked about the confederation system by the dpfk and the current situation regarding south korea and the united states. it hasn't been very great with the peace talk and how north korea wouldn't denuclearize. how do you think they will bring that into the talk in terms of talking about their foreign policy? >> your last item, their stance was that it needs to be replaced and they need to discuss that
with the united states but they did not in any way, shape or form indicate that the nuclear issue could not be on the table. they were simply silent on that, implication being -- and, in fact, they said as long as you ignore our proposal, our nuclear strength is going to grow. implicitly, implicitly, if you deal with our proposal on the armistice, our nuclear strength will not grow. that's still out there and the question is only going to be whether he -- i think whether he wants a congress to make a formal proposal or as sometimes happens for example in his new year's addresses, again, he lays the groundwork in a couple of
sentences and then five days later the formal proposal comes out which will be along the lines of how can you expect the nuclear issue to be resolved as long as there's no peace mechanism in place? we have to deal with that issue and then all concerns of the united states will be satisfied. and it's going to be up to the united states to decide whether this is something worth probing or if, once again, we're going to throw it to the side as the president said, not good enough. come back with something better. if kim jong-un doesn't want to be in the position of having something he proposes rejected. that's a bad idea so leave it to somebody else. let the foreign ministry get rejected, you know?
>> i wanted to -- well, not about that but i completely agree with that point that rather than stick his neck out he may reference it. i was thinking as you were talking, bob, earlier about the bad apple section of the speeches that i was just sort of running through the congresss in my head and every sgle congress there was a bad apple component. 1948 it was the south korean congress who came up. foreign minister after the establishment of the dprk.
56, this is when the personality was being criticized by the soviets. the north koreans denied the existence of a cult anymore. they said there had been a cult. he came up from university. i can't explain. '61 you have an anti-party group. '70 you have the last group that was purged. it was from this time that you have, of course, the monolithic or unitary leadership system that's created as a way to eliminate different opinions in the party. and it's usually when you have different opinions as part of the book of working that bob mentioned earlier. you have this notion of faction
al i factionalism and it's the lens that we view the party. if you look at each of these cases where kim il song and his successors are talking about factions, it's more a difference of opinion and you don't have these horizontal and organizational units to create actions. when they are against those of the leader, the people are purged, labeled factionists and they make the bad apple part of the speech. something elsewhere we need to develop how north korean policies work.
it's closer to the lens of factional rivalry. we questioned the legitimacy of the leaders and their strength. >> other questions? comments? don't be bashful. yes, sir. microphone coming right over the table. find you. >> thank you very much. i'm benjamin tour, retired foreign service officer. i don't know very much about the north korean system, but certainly in the soviet system there's a party structure and there's a government structure so at every level -- if it's same, if it's similar, there
would be people in the north korean system running things. it seems to me what's happened is that simply the party structure, which is supposed to provide oversight, vigilance, all of this sort of stuff, has simply atrophied. you've both suggested that to reinvigorate it that perhaps the governmental structure has not produced results. could you comment on that? >> this red expert thing is pretty interesting in north korea because there were some signs that kim jong-il and then subsequently kim jong-un was giving the nod to the government to actually take control of some of this economic development implicitly telling the party and the ideological types, stay out
of this. this is for the government to do. it's never been clear how sharp that was and how carefully that was reinforced. maybe that's something to look for in this congress to see if somehow the implication is that expertise should flourish and ideology is running the whole show. >> thank you very much. my question is i have read some chinese reports -- news reports kind of complaining that chinese has -- come knmunist party leadership has not been invited
or discussed at all with dprk worker's party regarding the worker's congress. i want to hear your comments on what is the view on the china dprk china extensions. the second part of the question is do you think king jong-un is interested in improving relationship with beijing? >> i will start. i imagine both of you have something to say. james? >> how much time do we have. one thing to be mindful of is that -- this is something that comes out -- emerges through the documents over the past 70 years is that the relationship between china and north korea, despite what we think in washington, we tend to buy the propaganda that they're as close as lips and teeth.
there is a profound sense of mistrust going both ways, especially towards beijing. there's a sense that china has been overly interventionist over the years medaling in north korean affairs on more than one occasion. there's also the sense that china is less than respectful of north korean sovereignty and the north koreans pick up this -- remnants of this middle kingdom mentality where, you know, they feel that china's trying to re-assert its traditional hegimony over korea and of course leads to mettling. so it doesn't surprise me when relations sour or -- and i'm shocked more by the fact that
people seem really perplexed by the souring of relations between north korea and china. even as recently as the mid 2000s china's aide to north korea was not steady and was up and down. it hasn't been consistent. there have been periods of intense mistrust and, you know, souring of relations. this is something -- you know, again, something else to keep in the back of your mind as you're reading reports in the newspaper about the relationship, you know, with china and north korea that, you know, again, over the past seven decades the relationship has -- i wouldn't say -- at one point i actually went through and tallied up and sort of came up with, you know, out of the past 70 years this is when relations were, you know,
pretty good versus, you know, just okay versus really bad and it was -- in fact, i would say that the majority of years, i unfortunately don't remember off the top of my head right now, the relationship was not so good. the north koreans, it took them a long time to get over perceived defenses or medaling in their affairs. bob, did you -- >> that's right. things aren't good now. kim jong-un -- kim jong-un does not seem prepared to kiss and make up with the chinese, even if the chinese had wanted to actually i think through most of last year before the test, and it was -- it was the north koreans who were holding back, not the chinese. people tend to think the dynamic is the north koreans are begging the chinese to let them back in
the house. no, it's really the other way around. and the chinese were pushing, pushing to try to get back in and the north koreans were not having any of it. now because of what james said, they've been through this so many times. they live next to each other. geography is pretty powerful predictor of the future. so they always make up because they have to. they absolutely have to. every time things go bad, people say, this is it. the chinese are through the north koreans. so far the cycle has come back to a more balanced approach and then it gets a little bit better, then it gets worse again. so we're in the middle of a cycle right now. the north koreans are not
completely crazy enough to selfer the self -- sever the relations and they just shrugged it off. they'll live through this period presumably and five years from now we'll be back to normal. >> if i could -- there are two documents. if i could get everyone to read these two documents, just make things so much clearer. there's a 19 -- october 1973 conversation between kim il song and a bulgarian. and an east german report on relations between china and north korea. there's a third i would like to add to it. a 1986 conversation between kim il song and a mongolian official. the second one was a 1977 -- it's a gdr, east german report on the relati.
>> maria: relationship between north korea and china. they're very consistent about their message. the relationship went bad at this time because of this. they keep adding onto it. the message is pretty clear. we don't trust china. we probably never will. we deal with them because we have to. if people will deal with these three documents it would save us a lot of time and it would read to some understanding of our policy of north korea. there's even a section on the digital archive here on si sino dprk relations. it's a curated collection of
documents. right here. where there are several hundred documents on the relationship over the decade and you can see here these three conversations. look at all of them. they're great. fascinating stuff. those three conversations in particular or three records i hope people look at. >> and a reminder, digital archives.org. >> org, correct. >> in the back there. >> hello. steven costello with the a and e east project. could you guide us on the purges in north korea since kim jong-un came to power. what should we take from the number, the seniority of the officia officials, the reasons given, so on like that. how should we view the purges in the past? thanks. >> i think some of it -- there
are -- you know, i've only seen what is available through, you know, the public and i haven't seen anything classified. but my sense is that in some of these cases, including the case of, you know, his uncle, it was a difference of opinions again. here was a guy who was promoting something that for many north korean officials is unconscionable, that is opening and reforming the economy like china. getting closer to china and perhaps even following the china model, which would lead to a loss of freedom of action, would -- would put the system at great risk. how do you convince them that they could -- when you are so vulnerable you could open and reform and let bigger powers come in and tell you what to do and whatnot to do when they
didn't even join the council for mutual economic assistance in the '50s and '60s for precisely that reason, because kim il song was suspicious of the chinese, its allies, and afraid they would come in and dictate to them. you would see them in conversations in this brief period of interkorean dialogue in the early '70s. we told them that we're not going to join the council for mutual economic assistance because we don't want to be a small country with lots of holes in the ground. to other people they were saying, when we're no longer allies with the soviets and the chinese, same thing, we're going to be a small country with lots of holes in the ground. so i think -- and the purges back in the '50s and '60s were because you had different opinions. i think it's the same thing here where you had a different opinion and the north korean solution to this is to simply purge these people.
in the case of john, it was because he was perceived to be that much of a threat that even in exile they felt the need to get rid of him, the execution. but i would -- i would say that in many of these cases it's, again, purges because of differences of opinions. >> bob, do we have a very good understanding of the internal dynamics that gets to this question? not simply on who's being purged and why, but more generally what can you tell us, you've been out of government for a long time, what can you tell us how -- do we have a clue or are we all guessing? >> on this, i think we're guessing. but the part that you don't have to guess about is that it's a -- it's a totalitarian system with
a single individual at the top who has the full range of human emotions and nothing to hold him ba back. you know, lyndon johnson had a temper but he wasn't allowed to execute people so he didn't. kim jong-il used to execute people but it wasn't a big thing. we didn't get the feeling, oh, god, this guy is out of control. the jong son ted thing was so unusual, so dramatic that -- and then you had these silly stories about the dogs tearing them apart and everything that it has sort of solidified or crystalized in people's minds that this is a monster. we don't actually know. i know that south korean intelligence says it's 70 people
which isn't that many but it's less than texas executes. we don't know how many people have been executed. people disappear. on a few occasions they've shown up later wearing their uniforms and still having stars on their shoulders but they have other -- they have other responsibility. so we need to sort that out. we need a better sense of who's actually never coming back and who is still around and whether or not kim jong-un has changed the normal procedure under kim jong-il of sending people to the countryside for three months, or a year, or two years and then when they're reformed, they come back to pyongyang and boy will they behave themselves. we haven't quite seen that yet. we saw it once with tai yu tai yung hei. we don't know if he's going to
fall into that pattern of dealing with his people. >> but i think with the election of a new party congress, i think we're going to -- i'm sorry, not a party congress, central committee. with the election of a new central committee i think we're going to have a better sense of who is in the upper echelon of the power in north korea and who is no longer there a you will though as bob pointed out, they sometimes just change and you can't look at that and necessarily, you know, interpret it as well this guy was purged because we threw away -- >> well, we threw around the word purge. >> yeah. >> and all we're talking about in some cases is replacement. >> right. >> or head room or whatever you want to call it. so we just have to be careful with that. >> well, that is a good note on which to conclude. aim
the u.s. senate is back on this monday afternoon. senators will continue work on an energy and water spending bill. they'll take a key procedural vote at 5:30 eastern. you can see the senate live on c-span 2. the u.s. house is back tomorrow afternoon about opioid use. later in the week members plan to amend the senate passed opioid bill and then vote to go to conference. live coverage of the house is on our companion network, c-span. coming up today at 4:00 p.m. eastern, it's a look at programs for military members including medical care, education, housing and legal services and how effective they are and if they should be privatized. the wilson is the host of this event. live coverage is on c-span.
also on c-span live at 5:30 eastern, the federal reserve. how much it's changed since 1913 and the future. the american enterprise institute will host this this afternoon at 5:30 eastern on c-span. coming up next, the conference on national security and counter terrorism efforts. the department of homeland security's under secretary for management outlines his agency's initiative to combat cyber threats. george washington university held this forum last week. so welcome back for the afternoon session of our strategic conference. thank you all for coming back
after lunch. there will probably be more people trickling in slowly from their lunch break and have a good session of two panels and a final keynote from admiral blaire this afternoon. thank you for coming back. this panel is it entitled, organizing dhs, strengthening the effort and preparing for transition. joined by three distinguished panelists to discuss these issues. first of all, on the far end of the panel, the honorable russ theo, under secretary for management at the department of homeland security. mr. diel was confirmed to the position about a year ago. has a long, distinguished career at johnson and johnson in the private sector. secretary johnson pulled him in to draw on his experience there to address many of the management challenges physicianing the department of homeland security. to his left, my right, admiral
rosa, retired u.s. coast guard. now at the johns hopkins applied physics laboratory. a senior fellow. jordan cohen, noblist, working on homeland security issues. former security official as the science technology director in the department of homeland security. jordan, fred, a number of other senior fellows and border members and others are going to be working from now through the end of this year through the election and transition period and inauguration to address the issues we're going to talk about today in terms of helping, you know, whoever -- whatever administration gets elected in november be ready to take on the challenges of running dhs and also to ensure that there is a clear understanding of where from a management standpoint, organizational standpoint key
initiatives that have been undertaken in this administration can be preserved and continued into a new administration. obviously any new administration will want to set some priorities from a policy standpoint and on a number of key issues, immigration, cyber security, different counter terrorism issues. integration, organizational efforts, it's been a lot of work that's been done by this current leadership team that wants to look and see it preserved. i guess i'll turn first to under secretary deo to talk about as the department is preparing for this transition, first of all, what are -- what is the process for the transition and then, you know, second question which we can come back to later is to talk a bit about uni's effort which is two years old, where that stands, what's meant in terms of operational integration across the department. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to be here and see everyone.
transition is, as you point out, really critical, particularly for homeland security. you can't afford to have a serious event and not be in a position to manage it well. that's harder when people are leaving and new people are coming, but we are absolutely dedicated to have a very smooth transition. for me, it's about having the right people in the right positions and then have as straightforward and simple processes as possible and making sure people are trained to deal with it. so we have already put together our transition committee. each of the components have identified a critical full-time government employee to serve as the point person. this team has already met once and will be meeting again and are already working on the transition process. obviously we need to train these individuals so that they're prepared for whatever might come up from their components and
also having to collaborate and work together. we have a transition team that's in place. we want to be very pro active in front of it. i think we're ahead of where some agencies are. we're training the identified individuals from the next administration about what roles they'll have. we want to make sure we have up to date information on critical issues that they might be facing. have appropriate training for them. important, as you point out, make sure they understand unity of effort and some of the improvements we've made that will actually help them make policy changes. so it's about process, it's about the right people, it's about the right training and then component by component building up to more strategic look, what are the critical issues. let's make sure we have up to date information as we're going into the process. it's also about connectivity. we need to make sure that the strong communications that takes place not only across component in dhs but to other agencies and
to other governments and to local law enforcement, et cetera, remain embedded and working all the time. >> can you talk a bit about where that -- you know, where that effort stands two years later? obviously there's a number of different pillars in terms of the acquisition side, in terms of the operational issues, joint council. provide a bit of context on a couple issues. >> if you don't mind, i'll take a couple of minutes to frame that issue and then -- >> okay. >> so as was pointed out, i came from johnson and johnson, which is a highly decentralized company with broad operations on a global basis, and one thing i learned at j&j, you have a lot of different companies with different cultures. nutrogena is very different from the brussels based
pharmaceutical research organization. you have to understand what it makes sense for people to focus individually or cooperate. dhs is more complicated than johnson and johnson. there's multiple components with completely different cultures, some military, some law enforcement, civilian, coast guard, fema, immigrations customs enforcement, all quite different, tloenl together -- excuse me, brought together 13 years ago without an obvious approach to that connectivity. i think the approach that unity of effort follows is exactly right for connectivity. you've got these components that have very -- in some cases very clear missions, cultures that work a lot of pride. there's many things they should do independently, but there's also many things where there should be strong collaboration
and a direct approach. it's on those situations you need to make sure people are working together. my view is that the unity of effort is is that right blend. i will give you a quick synop s synopsis. you need the teams where all components are together and working together. we have a senior leadership council that meets twice a month. all the leadership and other senior leadership meets with secretary johnson to talk about the issues and areas where we need to work together. i will give you an example in a second. we have the d mag and got the deputies of all the components on it. both of the groups had candid conversations and you have policy that provides the support from a strategic financial
support element. and they help you with the implementation meeting on a regular basis. let me give you an approach to unity that is in place. the slc approved these three joint task forces to focus on the southern border created three joint forces. east, west, and one focused on investigations. coast guard, the cvp, ice, all working together on the critical issue that this border creates from drug interdiction to dealing with different kinds of migrations from different areas. all those areas working collectively. i was in san diego a few months
ago and i saw the collaboration in the harbor adjusting in a pro active way that changes in drug transfers into the united states. adjusting their strategies and approach and sharing data and making a huge difference. it starts at the leadership level. a couple of examples is the joint requirement council that i may talk about later, but this was in the acquisition space and where there has to be a common process. the minimize and maximize making sure that increase the capability needs of the department. the joint requirements council consists of component membership and the first leader was an admiral from the coast guard focusing on the needs phase. what are the capabilities we need to acquire to help us achieve our mission and let's do it in a cross component way to
make sure we have what we need. this group does not passan acquisition until we identified the right capability and we can finance and measure success. only then does it go to the next stage. a member of the joint requirements council sits over $300 million for the life of the acquisition. the member sits on it to keep track. a huge change of how we manage acquisitions gaining alignment and transparency to maximize the likelihood of success. one of the things they worked on is biometrics and sharing and that process being worked through. and they are going deeper down.
when i joined i paid a lot of attention to that and i went to the meeting and the representation of this chief information officer across all of the components and we discussed this topic of improving our cyber security. the common road map and metrics and the score card. we measured each component and saw where it was. clearly cyber security had to be a number one priority despite the differences in the components. quickly established it. we made enormous progress in improving the cyber security of the dhs systems. from that experience earlier this year, the cio met at the
cio winter study to look at the infrastructures across the components to make sure the information and infrastructure is up to date, working and delivering the necessary services. we did a review and came up with a common approach to measuring and testing the analytical approach to see what works and what wasn't prioritized. it might be that they agree mema needs this before i need this because it's so critical and gained alignment on how to improve the infrastructure with much more commonality and an approach going forward. based on the discussion and the openness and the clarity. we are in the process of using the funding we have to most importantly prioritize about how we are improving infrastructure.
i hope these underscore the opportunity to collaborate when it makes sense and still remain independent when it makes sense. the last piece of this is every employee, every colleague shoo shfeel i'm proud to be part of the coast guard. i'm proud to be part of cis, but i'm also proud to be part of dhs. we have a short video called a day in the life showing every new employee that describes the amount of positive things taking place across dhs. we are making progress in how we are doing it. i can't help myself. we will do one more and let the other people speak. dhs used to build their budget component by component. we are building a budget that is mission focused and have gone from over 70 appropriations to
four. through that d mag discussion there is alignment on where the money should be focused and how we should do it. much more of a spend where it makes sense to deliver on the mission. that is a dramatic change. we have three clean audits over the last three years. dramatic change. we are establishing the systems processes and working collectively. working collaboratively to make us more effective for future administrations. sorry to go on so long. >> turning to what we discussed with this in terms of issues, if you want to reflect on the things that the secretary said and other issues that when we are looking at the reviews, we should be thinking about it. >> in terms of bottom lineup front, there is a tremendous
amount of positive momentum that it will be important to carry forward to the next administration. more by way of a preliminary. i would offer that i have a perspective on dhs that extends back approximately 25 years. that may seem odd in as much as the department has been in existence for not yet 15. i say that because i served in some senior operational and also two different national security council positions in the years before dhs. in all of those assignments, i had responsibilities that took me across the executive level of what is today's homeland security mission and belongs not exclusively, but primarily to dhs. it was dramatically different and dramatically less positive,
less effective and efficient for the american people. fast forwarding, i had the opportunity during the tenure to in one instance return to the white house on the homeland security council staff and working the intelligence community and also have responsibility for the coast guard for the mid-atlantic region as the final assignment of my career. there is no question in my mind that enormous strides have been made by the department in terms of organizational maturity and real world progress in the not yet 15 years of existence. the unity of effort initiatives that the secretary reviewed for us and given us highlights, i think absolutely not only the right things to do, but the right pace. i really would want to
underscore how different the cultures, the missions, the orientations and the languages are and have been for the -- you have now seven components if an organizational change is fully implemented and you have an eighth down the road. and now you have a unity of effort initiative doing the right things and i think at the right pace. for example, one of the first areas in which they wisely decided to focus was an issue that i am very familiar with because of my operational background. military patrol aircraft. turns out that the executive under the level would be thankful for. you have two leading components,
large, influential and well funded. well supported. respected on the hill. that have needs for maritime patrol aircraft for complimentary and distinct missions. perhaps august that we now have a dhs signed off operational requirement document that defines what it is the dhs will go out to procure in order to meet the mpa requirements for all of the department of homeland security and components. i think there is positive momentum and we can talk about specific examples. one of the issues that we are
looking at and within the administration is reorganization within the department of homeland security. with the budget request this year, the very stage, there is a bernie director that integrates the office and there is a proposal sent to the hill the eighth operational director that fred alluded to. these proposals come forward at a time right before a transition. i guess first off, how should people be assessing these proposals on the hill among other stakeholder and how does that factor into transition and reactions to the earlier speakers. >> thanks, christian. i think a few things bear mentioning. if you think about the
description and the discussion of the effort, the secretary talked about this. one way is almost implementing or establishinga i new set of ground rules for how the department will operate. what a great time to operate. i don't know how many of you lived through raising teenagers. i have done three so far. this comes at a great time where it's around 11, 12, 13 years old, there is a new set of expectations and requirements and new people to engage with. i can see a tremendous analogous story to establishing ground rules and rules for how you engage. the effort and activity could not have come at a better time. the timeliness was right and as we know, policy making and politics can be messy and challenging and they are important in finding the time and as the admiral said the pace to do it and that makes a
tremendous amount of sense. as you mentioned, a number of other initiatives coming forward in the department revolve around additional sets of organizational changes and organizational restructuring. as we heard earlier today, we talk about the new nppd organization. there is no cyber without physical. no physical without cyber. looking at the way that the national protection of programs director forms and reforms to address what that next evolutionary set of challenges is could not come at a better time. the vulnerabilities are more widespread as they heard the things and 50 billion devices and every one creates a new vulnerability or new vector for vulnerability and the time could not be better for us to look at and examine and explore how the department organizationally is going to face these new physical cyber threats that are really
joined together. if you look at the evolution the department has and if you look back historically overtime, you see an organization that was established to address a number of different first components of the life cycle. you have threat detection and you have mitigation and response and information sharing and all those things when they exist in separate organizations and separate components, even if you can enforce or request consolidation, it's not always going to be the easiest to make sure that the requirements that are established on that side get implemented. they have the development activities. they have the new look for the organization and it is still working through. having a fresh look or a fresh start at how we face that threat
and that environment is also quite timely and the timing cannot be better. >> turning back to you, the reactions to what they have been. i think the core issue is this issue of sustainability. as far as i have looked at it, the effort has made progress and the things that fred said echo in terms of addressing the challenges that i had looking at the department and wanting things to work together consistent with the department of being some that is greater than the whole of its parts. progress has been made towards that, but sounding like that report here that is still a lot of work to do. what are the ways mechanically that we can make efforts such as this and other things throughout the department on workforce issues and the things that have
been done to try to address morale issues or the other acquisition issues to sort of ensure that they are -- when a new team comes in in terms of a small political issue with the career, civil servants who are invested and can run them and you have that operational continuity that you have in other parts of the government that are lesser reliant on leadership at the top and have that in the military, the foreign service and the statement part of that. they can continue core operations through a transition process. >> i agree with everything my two colleagues said. thank you. i agree first of all that we are 13 years old. we are a teenager and there is confusion that comes with that. we want to make a comment that the work that the secretary and
the rest of us are doing is built upon prior administrations and good work they did. this is a continuum of improvement. i don't want to act like we started fresh. it is a process. it's a complex process because these are large components. so to make them sustainable is a challenge. let's be honest about it. there was a j.r. c in the past and we have a new j.r. c and we want it to continue. this is just muscle memory for people to see the benefit of it. the j.r. c is meeting on a regular basis and they are having successes and involved in the oversight. we have very positive feet back from both the ig and the gao about the j.r. c and the acquisition process. they are giving