tv Lieutenant General Lew Allen Church Committee Testimony CSPAN May 29, 2016 4:00pm-5:01pm EDT
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>> 40 years ago, in the wake of watergate, the united states senate created a special committee to look into the activities of united states intelligence services. it was the senate select committee for governmental operations it quickly took on the nickname of its chairman, frank church and it was best known to history as the church committee. the committee met for 16 months. it reviewed more than 10,000 documents and called 800 witnesses before the committee and its staff. its legacy includes the creation creation of the foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978 which we know as fisa. two former staff members are with us and will be with us to help provide some historical context and understand the significance of the 40-year-old video that you were about to see.
from new york city, frederick schwarz who was the committees chief counsel is with us. here in our studio in washington dc is elliot maxwell who was counsel to the committee as an in pennsylvania. think you for joining us. in this installment of our series of connected work 40 years ago of the church committee into the work of u.s. intelligence agencies, we will focus on the committee's investigation into the national security agency and a fourth -- the fourth amendment rights of american citizens and where they come into conflict. to get us started, let's watch a clip from october 29, 1979. sen. church: this morning, the committee begins public hearings on the national security agency , or as it is more commonly known, the nsa. actually, the agency remains unknown to most americans either by its acronym or its full name.
in contrast to the cia, one has to search far and wide to find someone that has even heard of the nsa. >> 40-year-old video of the church committee's work. that was the chairman of the committee, frank church of idaho and immediately to his right was the 39-year-old chief counsel to the committee, frederick schwarz who was our guest joining us throughout this series. he is with us in new york. elliot maxwell in washington dc. today, in the wake of 9/11, the nsa is something of a household word for anyone that follows the news and politics. -- in politics. how well-known with the agency in 1975? mr. schwarz: hardly at all. the joke was the nsa stood for "no such agency," and was not meant to be discussed at all and was not generally. to have the hearings on the nsa was one of the most hard-fought
issues within the committee. i think it was a quite close vote and again, not all along partisan lines about whether we should have a public hearing but we decided to have a public hearing. there was dispute as to whether we should provide the names of companies that for 30 years has d given every single telegram, every day to the nsa. we voted again very closely to do that. actually, the wonderful staff member who uncovered that, britt snider had recommended that we not disclose their names and i disagreed with him because i said, look, they violated the rights of their customers and they did it for 30 years, and so they deserve to be mentioned. another thing of attitudes, i remember speaking to the general counsel of the nsa when we began getting information and
indicating we needed to get more information, and he said to me, but the constitution does not apply to the national security agency. that was an interesting idea, that the constitution did not apply to a whole agency. i think i know what was in the back of his mind. their work was meant to be foreign. they were meant to be doing things overseas, largely. my rejoinder to him was, of course, the constitution applies to the nsa when you are doing things that affect americans and affect americans within america. elliott may remember more details about that it was a controversial issue within the committee where actually you could not predict who was on what side at all and it was quite a close vote about whether
we should have the public hearings on the nsa or just issue some report without a public hearing. >> while you are thinking about that, wasn't it also difficult to get the nsa director to testify? mr. maxwell: i think that was another issue. the nsa is a peculiar beast. it was the only reference to the legal authority for the nsa was a provision in the espionage act about the disclosure of signals of intelligence. this is a large agency with activities around the world, a giant vacuum cleaner of information, and it rested on the legal authority of a crime to disclose its product. that was an odd thing. at that time, if you went to a bookstore and look for books about the cia or the nsa or
about the fbi, you would come up with one or two. that is all. nobody knew anything about it. nobody knew what was being done or how it was being done, and it was remarkably effective at what it did. it also was a creature of the defense department, and the leadership was a military officer because the primary support was for defense activities. and military officers respond to the chain of command. they do what they are told, absent some really extraordinary reason not to. nsa was being told, and partly in the context of the vietnam war and protests against it, was being told to target people the beyond that which they would
target outside of the country. i spent six months going up every day to nsa, and the conversations i had at the time, which i think were genuine were that we want to know what we are allowed to do. we are not going to fight about the restrictions. we will do what we are told to do. we will honor but we are told to do. we are being told by our chain of command to do these things and there is nothing to say that we can't. that was extraordinary, and they acted inappropriately, acted improperly. they violated the rights of americans, but they were doing what they were told, largely, not aggressively going out and saying, i want to do more and more and more in the united states, but saying, is my -- if my commander tells me to do that, then i will do that. >> much of the work of the church committee, people who are
watching will hear echoes in the recent debates in the post-terrorism investigations, and we have another clip that will also resonate. this is a general alan testifying before the committee about the development of watch lists. let's watch it. >> 1967 to 1973, requirements for watch lists were developed in four basic areas. drug trafficking, presidential protection, acts of terrorism and possible foreign support on civil disturbances. in the 1960's, there was presidential concern voiced over the massive flow of drugs into our country from outside the united states. early in president nixon's administration, he suggested -- instructed the cia to pursue with vigor intelligence efforts to identify foreign sources of drugs and foreign organizations and methods used to introduce illicit drugs into the united states. >> elliot maxwell, it is a must as so we can have the same testimony today. mr. maxwell: absolutely.
i think that is one of the great lessons from the work of the committee, that one has to be constantly vigilant when power can be exercised in secret. whether it is now, then, when the next crisis comes, the same questions will be asked in the -- and the same forces will be pushing for more and more and more, and it is an object lesson that we have to be vigilant. >> before we show a longer portion of this, anything to comment about the context for what we are about to see? mr. schwarz: i think you always have to have in mind that some of, many of the missions of these organizations are important, vital to the country, legitimate. in a way, one of the tragedies of where the agencies go beyond
the bounds of what they should go visit can undermine their ability and their reputation to do the things that we want them to do. >> with that thought, let's watch from 1975, oceans of the -- portions of the church committee hearing on the nsa and fourth amendment rights. this one was recorded by nbc cameras at the time. sen. church: the hearing will please come to order. this morning, the committee begins public hearings on the national security agency, or as it is more commonly known, the nsa. actually, the agency remains unknown to most americans, either by acronym or its full name.
in contrast to the cia, one has to search far and wide to find someone who has even heard of the nsa. this is peculiar because the national security agency is an immense installation in its task of collecting intelligence by intercepting foreign communications. the nsa employees thousands of people and operates on in a norman's budget. -- an enormous budget. it is expensive computer facilities comprise some of the most complex and sophisticated machinery in the world. just as the nsa is one of the largest and least known of the intelligence agencies, it is also the most reticent. it gives out precious little information about itself. even the legal basis for the activities of nsa is different from that of other intelligence agencies. no statute establishes the national security agency or defines the permissible scope of its responsibilities.
rather, executive directives make up the sole charter of the agency. furthermore, these directives failed to define precisely what constitutes the technical and intelligence information of which the nsa is authorized to collect. since its establishment in 1952, as part of the defense department, representatives of the national security agency has -- have never appeared before the senate in a public hearing. today, we will bring the agency from behind closed doors. we have prepared ourselves, exhaustively. we have a particular obligation to examine the nsa in light of its tremendous potential or abuse. it has the capacity to monitor the private conversations of american citizens without the use of a bug or a tap. the intersection of
international communication nsa,ls test the job of the and thanks to modern technological developments it does its job well. the danger lies in its ability to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications. indeed, as are hearings of the houston plan demonstrated, a previous administration and a former nsa director favored using this potential against certain u.s. citizens for domestic intelligence purposes , while the houston plan was never fully put into effect, our investigation has revealed that the nsa had in fact been intentionally monitoring the overseas communication of certain u.s. citizens before the houston plan was proposed and continued to do so. this incident illustrates how the nsa could be turned inward and used against our own people. it has been a difficult task of this committee to find a way to
-- through the tangled web of classifications claimed by national security, however valid they may be. to inform the american public of deficiencies in their intelligence services. it is not of course, a task without risks, but it is the one that we have set out for ourselves. the discussions, which will be held this morning our efforts to identify publicly certain activities undertaken by the national security agency, which are of questionable propriety and dubious legality. general alan, director of the nsa will provide for us today the background of these activities. he will be questioned on the origins and objectives by the committee members. irs, thecia and the nsa had a watchlist containing the names of u.s. citizens.
this list will be of particular interest for us this morning, but we will take up another important subject as well. the dominant concern of this committee is the inclusion by the federal government entity in a legal rights guaranteed -- on rights of u.s. citizens that have been violated the cia, fbi and irs. as the present hearings will reveal, the nsa has not escaped the temptation to have its operations expanded into provinces protected by the law. while the committee has found the work of the nsa on a whole to be of high caliber and properly restrained, and test tremendous respect for the professional caliber of the people that work there, the topics we explore today illustrate excessive and suggest areas where legislative action is desirable.
that is why we are here. >> this complex and sophisticated electronic capability is the most fragile weapon in our arsenal. unfortunately, i cannot elaborate on that because that would not be proper. public inquiry on nsa i believe serves no legitimate legislative the vitalt exposing element of our intelligence capability and unnecessary risks, risks of knowledge and the chairman's own statement. authorize nsa inquiry and this has been done very thoroughly. in closed sessions. in 1967, requested agencies provided names of agencies, some of whom were u.s.
citizens to the national security agency in an effort to obtain information that was available in foreign to medications as a byproduct of our normal intelligence missions. the purpose of the lists varied but all suggest a common threat in which the national security agency was requested to review information available through the usual intercept services. the initial purpose was to help determine the existence of foreign influence on specified activities and interest to agencies of the u.s. government. with emphasis than on presidential protection and on civil disturbances are occurring throughout the nation. later, because of other developments, such as widespread national concern over such criminal activity of drug trafficking and acts of terrorism both domestic and international, the emphasis came to include these areas. during the early 1960's, requesting agencies had asked the national security agency to look for reflections in
international medications of certain u.s. citizens traveling to cuba. 1973, requirements for watchlist were developed in four basic areas. international drug trafficking, presidential protections, acts of terrorism and possible foreign support or influence on civil disturbances. 1960's, there was presidential concern voiced over the massive flow of drugs into our country from outside of the united states. ixon'sin president nex administration, he instructed the nsa to identify foreign sources of drugs and foreign organizations and methods used to introduce illicit drugs in the united states. narcoticshe bureau of asked the national security agency to provide communication intelligence relevant to these foreign aspects.
they provided watchlist with some u.s. names. international drug trafficking in 1971.nts the one instance in which foreign suggest or intercepted for specific watchlist purposes was the collection of some telephone calls passed over international communication facilities between the united states and south america. the collection was conducted with specific request of the bureau to produce intelligence information on the methods and locations of foreign drug trafficking. in addition to our own intercept, the cia was asked by nsa to assist in the collection. the nsa provided the cia names of individuals from the watchlist and was collected for six months. stopped because of concern of the activity exceeding cia statue terry
restrictions. -- statutory restrictions. >> with respect to holy domestic communications, is there any statute that prohibits your interception thereof or is it merely a matter of your internal executive branch? is thenderstanding national security council directive defines our activity with foreign medications and that we have adopted a definition consistent with the communications act of 1934 and therefore i think that is. you areu believe consistent with the statute, that there is no statute that prohibits your interception of communication? >> i believe that is correct. ther.thing fur >> the interception began in 1969 and as we described him as somewhat formalized in the process in which these messages were handled.
that had begun in 1967. >> in the initial communications, is it true that one of the equally important aspects was not to disclose the nsa was doing this? >> that appears in the documentation. >> what was the reason for not disclosing to the other intelligence agencies, because this information only went to other intelligence agencies, what was the reason for not disclosing to the other agencies that were consumers that the nsa was not doing this? >> it is hard for me to answer because i'm not exactly sure as to what the feeling was of the people at the time. my understanding is the concern was that the people of nsa felt it was terribly important that the activity be solely related to foreign intelligence and that by delivering these kinds of messages to an agency which also had a law enforcement function, there was a danger that the
material would be used for purposes, would not be appropriate. therefore, for that reason, there were a set of procedures adopted, which made the material to be handled in a distinctive and separate way to where went only to specified individuals, only marked for background use the void of the kind of designators that are placed on the kind of intelligence information which nsa produces for a broader range of users. >> might there be some concerned this was a questionable legal area and therefore dissemination of who was doing it and how they were doing it might have also been injurious to the agency? >> it is possible. i think the course of concern was, if the material was, the basic concern, as i would
imagine it was in people's minds of the time, if the material were used or some purpose associated with prosecuting or evidence year he basis -- e, the sources used to obtain that evidence would be disclosed so there was a great concern to ensure this material was handled in such a way to minimize the possibility that when -- that it would be used that way. >> if that occurred yesterday, it could occur tomorrow. if we leave it all to executive decision. as i have said, as for the watchlist, the administration agreed to classify the documents as the lieutenant has.
as for the other, the executive branch has opposed public hearings or any other form of public disclosure. >> i really see no legislative basis for this public disclosure. i do not think it is necessary from the standpoint of our legislative mandate. it appears that committee role 7:5, thisonly -- rule rule provides a procedure for ensuring the protection of classified materials. this rule does not authorize the unilateral release of classified information. the proper reading would be the rule goes for disclosure of information, not the classification. is necessaryvote prior to committee release of the material of the classified nature.
vote is enoughty to declassify it is serious. >> it has to do with unlawful conduct that has to relate -- that relates to domestic conduct in this country. >> that is a matter to be debated in an executive session. >> we will debated. good deal. >> those were video highlights from nbc archives, the church committee hearings. the committee was looking into the nsa and is director had testified before the committee, october 29, 1975. elliot maxwell, the body language was so interesting between the chairman and the vice chairman. give us a sensible was going on in that room. mr. maxwell: one of the central issues for the committee in the course of its work was
maintaining pictures from the executive branch. that lack and forth between the committee and executive branch went up to the very end of the work of the committee. were a number of instances in which the executive branch dug in its heels and said, you cannot disclose this. cases, they eventually relented and in others they did not. as frederick schwarz said earlier in the series, john tower had been an active supporter of committee access to material in many early instances but that grew weaker and weaker over the course of the committee. i think in the case of john tower, as things got closer to the military where john tower
had been on the armed services committee for years and was later chairman of the committee, but was not at the time, that was an area where he felt more protective and i think he felt in terms of the domestic activities of the fbi, that was not his area of greatest interest. thatll always be the case the executive branch is more protective about its information in the congress is more aggressive, more or less aggressive about what it does. and one of the lessons of the committee is there has to be a range of progressive deaths on the act of congress to get materials or they will not get materials, simple as that. i do not know how you provide a kind of vaccine against acquiescence for the overseers. there used to be a vaccine that
provides skepticism in general about secret activities, recognizing that many of them are very important, but that you have to keep asking the questions to make sure you do not go beyond what people are required and should be. years ago, april 1976, the church committee wrapped up its work and delivered the final report which is 14 separate reports on the scope of work that the committee had been asked to look at. what are your your remembrances of the release of the report to the public and how it was met in washington, by the news media and by the public? i have a memory of being very excited that we had gotten the work done, that we were finished at least with the committee reports and that we had done a great service. think the general reaction to
our final reports was very favorable, and if you step away from what was done, it was never really partisan. that does not mean there were not differences and elliott described and i did earlier how john tower, toward the end of the there is no real partisan difference on that. the impact of the committee, showing it could deal with secretive information, it could get the information, distillate, describe it to the public, and bring it to the attention of the american public, the importance of the issues we focused on, i think, was a very, very great accomplishment, and i do know that never since then has there ever been anything like it in this country or anywhere else.
host: let me break down several areas. let's pick up on the themes. let me go to the congress responsibility for oversight. what happened with the church committee's work? mr. maxwell: they set up an oversight committee. prior to the church committee, some of thet was senate lions -- the chair of the armed senate committee -- there were eight senators you talked to and that constituted the oversight. after that, there was now a permanent intelligence committee and it would have to wrestle with all of the issues that he was just talking about. keeping it secret and trying to
decide how much to disclose. and there was a requirement that covert action be notified to the intelligence committee, and there is one other piece that for me was particularly interesting. i had written a paper about the disclosure of the intelligence committee budget. host: you were 25 years old, right? mr. maxwell: right. the committee voted, and disclosure of the aggregate budget was defeated by one vote. later in the 1990's, one of the cia directors decided they could release the aggregate budget safely without harming national security. one number was disclosed in 1994. in 1995, they decided differently, that it would harm the committee. it was not until the 9/11 committee that the aggregate amounts that we spend on intelligence was disclosed to the american public.
host: the so-called black budget? and there was a requirement that regular expenditures be disclosed in time to time. if you opened them up prior to -- in 1975, you would not find cia, nsa. it was somewhere hidden in this document. we have some notion of disclosure, some notion of boundaries. i think while the fisa work was extraordinary and was important, we never went further, as i think the congress should have done, to clarify the authority of these agencies, to make it absolutely clear what they can do and what they can't do to bolster the worthwhile and important things that they do, to prevent being pushed by their political masters or pushed by what the technology can do to go beyond their limits.
host: so, fritz schwarz, one of the effects that this had, the fisa law, as we know it. what was the importance for american society and congressional oversight? >> they cannot just wiretap someone. mr. schwarz: the court has approved almost everything that is come before them, but that does not mean the law has not had a positive impact. the kinds of things the fbi and other agents these were doing in terms of surveillance would not be tried now because they would not feel, they would not want to put on paper what they were trying to do. and then after 9/11, the fisa court began being used in a way
the court does not do very well. it was more a sort of public policy agency. let me make a bigger point. there will be another church committee at some point and there should be. when that is done, we will learn that there have continued to be things that are done which we would not wish to be done. there will be surprises, and some of them will be very unpleasant surprises. but the culture and the agencies is a little bit better. secrets tend to last less long for complicated reasons. some of which i talk about in my recent book called "democracy in the dark." but the culture is a little bit better. of course, when there is a new
attack, you get, oh, let's do more by way of law enforcement, and of course we should do a lot by way of law enforcement, but that does not mean you do not need to have appropriate oversight. and the culture in the congress is better than it was -- infinitely better than it was before the church committee. and the public is more knowledgeable about the complexity of these issues and the importance of these issues. host: let me turn to the agencies. the foreign intelligence agencies, nsa, cia -- what happens with those agencies and their operations in the wake of the church committee? mr. maxwell: i guess i would argue their activities oscillate over time.
if you said what they were like right after the church committee and for the next number of years i think there was a lot more internal discussion about what is appropriate and what is not appropriate. there are a lot more recognition of the importance of their central role and the need to the able to constrain their activities to that. in the 1980's, that changed somewhat and it changed because the president wanted it to change and the news and intelligence wanted it to change. there were a number of episodes, if you remember, in the 1980's, where the agencies were involved in a number of things that we as a country have said they should not be doing. after 9/11 and the patriot act,
one saw another swing back to older patterns of behavior and toward doing all that the technology allowed you to do and asserting a kind of general attitude of presidential power and that's almost unlimited. we are being told to use every means necessary to implement the policies of the presidents. so, it moves back and forth with the tenor of the times. i think after the snowden revelations, there was a move that said, these are things we do not want to do. these are things we have to understand what the limits are. we have to respond to those and do the work we need to do. we will always be subject to these oscillations. it's just that oversight as the church committee recommended is
critical, but it's hard to do. it's very hard to do. and it's hard, as i said, to have an attitude of skepticism with people you work with all the time. if you imagine a work place where every time you come into the workplace you are looking -- is she doing something wrong? is he doing something wrong? it's a terrible kind of burden. and yet, oversight is like that. you need to be close to the people to understand what they need to do. you have to give them the authority to do it. you have to encourage them and empower them. at the same time, you have to say, beyond this there be dragons and you cannot go there. i cannot know if there will ever be a church committee, but there will be things that go wrong and they are integrally related to the pressures of the moment. host: when you talk about the oscillation and the tenor of the times, i know we established at the period of time the church committee was looking at, presidents dealing with the
reality of the cold war, the war in vietnam, protesting that war, civil rights. there were things going on in the country that presidents were trying to restore public faith in. can you put that context, the period the committee was observing? mr. schwarz: if you start with franklin roosevelt and run nixon, that is what we covered. there was crisis all the time and there has been. you have to be vigilant to protect the country and you don't want to use the need to protect the country as a device to let you do things that everybody would say are improper. i would like to make two other
other comments in response to elliot's excellent summary of how it vacillates. after the snowden revelations -- and the snowden revelations happen when we have dysfunction in the congress because both parties are unable or unwilling to cooperate with each other -- but the legislation that was passed was completely bipartisan. the senators were senator mike -- a tea party senator from utah and patrick leahy, a democratic senator from vermont. the leader of the house was a very young tea party person and the other sponsor of reform in the house was john conyers, a long-time african-american, democratic liberal from detroit. these issues can bring people together. the other point i would like to
make is, in terms of what the church committee did and didn't do -- on the afternoon of 9/11, james baker, who was bush and reagan member, and bush, hw and ronald reagan member and was principal lawyer for george w. bush in florida and was a real establishment, intelligent person went on channel seven, abc news and said the church committee caused 9/11. that was a very far-fetched thought. at first, if you read what the church committee said, we said, for example with the fbi, that the fbi should increase attention to terrorism and devote less or no attention to american domestic politics.
that they should increase their attention to terrorism and we said the cia should do more to use human infiltration of bad groups and not simply rely on the wonderful technology we now have. so, in making the comment we caused 9/11, did not go back and read our reports or what howard baker had said, which was the investigation had been good for the intelligence committee. the other thing that was sort of ludicrous about baker's statement was, at that point, it had been 25 years from the church committee. ronald reagan and george h w bush and mr. baker himself had been in power. if the church committee had disabled the intelligence
agencies, they could have done something about it. it was interesting, emotional, and i'm sure if mr. baker were questioned today, he would say i was all over iraq on the afternoon of 9/11 and i said something that did not make sense -- i was a little overwrought on the afternoon of 9/11, and i said something that did not make sense and it surely didn't. host: there was a number of think pieces written pointing back to the church committee, saying that intelligence gathering had been sharply curtailed as a result of your committee's work -- what was your reaction? mr. maxwell: i think i share his view that it was nonsense. what was happening, and what the 9/11 commission said happened, was people failing to communicate and follow what the intelligence they could have followed. it had nothing to do with what
the church committee had done. it had been the notion of these isolated towers, for whatever reason, not communicating with the adjoining silo. not responding to the intelligence that was gathered. it was an easy scapegoat. it was saying we can just point to the church committee and say that destroyed american intelligence. so, it was annoying. but you get used to it being annoying. it had gone on with critics of the church committee since 1975.
it will destroy american intelligence, it has the storied american intelligence, it will in the future destroy american intelligence. those people were not wrestling with the issues in the way that i think the committee genuinely wrestled with -- how do we affirm the importance of the secret security agencies? how do we make sure they do not go beyond their writ? and how do we make sure that the rights of americans are protected in a world in which there is danger? by agencies that are, by necessity, secret, but also because they are secret, potentially dangerous to the rights of americans and the well-being of the united states? you get a little thicker skinned about this. but it is, i think, an enormous expenditure of time and effort by a very talented group of people who were genuinely struggling with the dilemma of how do you have secret agencies in a democracy? how do you make sure they
operate in a way we would be comfortable with? host: over the course of our conversations with you, we have talked about the constitutional rights and our need for security. i would like to close on a personal note. i'm wondering how the work that you did with the church committee 40 years ago affected both of you in terms of your careers and your thinking about american citizenship in our society. let me start with you -- you have written two books. this has become something of your life's work. mr. schwarz: it certainly is an aspect of my life's work. i did a lot of work for new york city, being its lawyer and changing its constitution, but definitely the church committee work made a huge, had a huge impact on me.
it gave me a good reputation, which is always a nice thing to have. it did not stick with me as issues that were of great importance to the country. the first one, "unchecked and unbalanced" is about presidential power in the time of terror, and the more recent one "democracy in the dark" is wrestling with something elliot has brought up a lot in this conversation, the importance of secrecy. which is necessary sometimes and abused and unnecessary other times. it certainly affected my work a great deal. host: how has it affected you over the course of these 40 years? mr. maxwell: i stayed to work on
the permanent committee for a while. i had to make the decision whether i wanted to be a national security lawyer where, if i did everything right, only six other people would know i was successful, and if i did something wrong, it would be on the front page of "the washington post." that led to me doing other things. if i look at the arc of my career, it probably is that the last 14 years or so, i have been writing and speaking about openness and the importance of openness to have progress and innovation. i think probably the seeds of that were in the church committee work, which was for a young, not yet bar certified
lawyer an extraordinary experience -- an extraordinary experience to engage at the deepest level questions of importance to the country. here was frank church and barry goldwater and john tower. if there were to be a discussion about the tensions between civil liberties and the needs of the intelligence community and the power of government and security, this is where these things should be fought out. this is where these things should be discussed. this was an extraordinary opportunity, not only for me, but fritz and others. i would like to wrap one other thing up. when we talk about partisanship,
lots ofof partisanship, credit goes to fritz. but the staff director who served for the staff director of the entire committee, bill miller, was an important part of that. his knowledge of the senate and his general optimistic view of the world was very important in achieving that for the committee. so, for me, it was a treat. it was a wonderful, wonderful gift that was given to me and i hope i did what i should do in response. host: on that note, thank you. mr. maxwell, mr. schwarz, for your retrospective on the church committee 40 years ago this month, thanks for your time.
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memorial day. this weekend on the presidency, we discuss the roles of lyndon johnson in the vietnam war area. >> they understand that the torican people were willing devote their resources to vietnam. the basic problem was it was isy difficult to make a case he was important to the nation of security. in importance lay credibility. what are the germans going to think? allies that are more important
to the united states. those promises were made by harry truman and dwight eisenhower and followed up by john kennedy. he was the inheritance of those promises. he did not think he could simply ignore it. he simply could not have done that politically. >> do you all agree with that? wasn't a political impossibility to say that we are going to pull out and let this remain a local issue. >> that was who they trust is the most in the congress. they fell in the emphasizeds that it
the situation escalation. mounted andlties "hey lbj, how many kids did you kill today? i will never forget driving out when evening as the protest was shouted. he leaned over and said he that ithat they knew want peace as much as they do too. watch the entire program at midnight here on american history tv, only on c-span3. >> we will catch up with the
21st century. we watched our house colleagues and the tv coverage of members of our coverage of the house. we create another historic and the relationship between congress and technological advancements in communications through radio and television. this deer ago, our executive branch started appearing on television. today marks the first time that our legislative ranch in its entirety will appear on that medium of communication. >> the televising represents a wide policy.
-- ourst media policy special programming features key moments in the past 30 years. to you thell show body of evidence from this question. we must witness something that has never before happened in senate history, the change of power during a session of congress. the american people still don't understand is that that willthree areas put the government in charge of everyone's health care. >> i am sure i've made a number of mistakes in my political career.
>> next on american history tv, yale university professor akhil reed amar discusses the complex relationship between supreme court justices and american presidents. he looks back at the first appointed chief justice. he argues that historically judges were geographically balanced and there has been a more recent orientation toward demographics and political affiliation. >> we are thrilled to welcome akhil reed amar professor of law and political science at yale university. professor amar clerked for then judge stephen breyer. he is also a recipient of yale's