tv Vietnam War Commanders in Chief CSPAN May 29, 2016 8:00pm-9:06pm EDT
senate0 years of up next on the presidency. presidential aides to discuss the role of lyndon johnson and richard nixon during the vietnam war. alexander butterfield and tom explore the foreign policies of the presidents they worked for. emotional burdens they faced during the conflict. part of the three-day conference at the lyndon b. johnson presidential library. cold vietnam war summit. you can find schedule information at c-span.org. an hour.ram is about
please welcome the director of the lbj presidential library. the: on may 22, 1971 crowd assembled on the university of texas grounds to dedicate this library. 2100 antiwar protesters were kept from interrupting the proceedings by a phalanx of highway patrolman. warr chance of no more carried by high winds and accompanied by the pounding of trashcan lids were clearly heard. by former president lyndon johnson and his assembled guests
including president nixon. it was an apt metaphor. had filteredar into the administrations of both johnson annex in. johnson and nixon. when johnson took his turn at the podium he proclaimed it is all here. the story of our time. with the bark off. there is no record of mistake or an unpleasantness or criticism that is not included in the files here. he wanted us to learn from them to build a better america. the lbj presidential library hosted the historic civil rights summit to mark the 50th
anniversary of the signing of the civil rights act of 1964. lbj had championed that had signed into law. four u.s. presidents attended the conference. president obama, george w. bush clinton and carter. along with many civil rights heroes. just as we celebrated the feats of civil rights is altogether fitting that we in keeping with president johnson's vision take a substantive unvarnished look at the vietnam war. our goal is to shed new light on the war and its lessons and legacy. it is also our intent to recognize and courage and sacrifice of the men and women who served in vietnam.
cloud of the vietnam war hung over this country long after the last shots were fired of the passage of years offers greater perspective. to look at it with the bark off may help us to move on stronger and more united. we open this summit with a series of three panel discussions. commanders in chief. we will explore the role the presidents played in the war. how their leadership affected its outcome. h w brands is a best-selling
author. alexander butterfield joined the air force in 1949 and commanded the squadron of low-level reconnaissance aircraft in the vietnam war. he was awarded the distinguished flying cross. deputy on to serve as assistant to president nixon. house heving the white was appointed as the administrator of the federal aviation administration. tom johnson was in the first class of white house fellows in 1965. he remained there for the balance of johnson's administration.
>> thank you for that. thank you to all of you for being here. i take particular pride in having been fortunate enough to having been part of the civil rights event. we learned a lot with the community coming together. i like to pay welcome to the patriots who served in the military overseas. thank you for being here today and being part of this conference. [applause] to give an overview of what role the leaders in the white house plays with the decisions they made that shaped american foreign policy.
our growing and deeper involvement in vietnam. through the lens of the johnson and nixon administrations. going back to the global realignment after world war ii. to the ministration of president truman. give us a sense of what the world was like starting back down. what was the chain of events that came forward that would've put pressure on subsequent administrations to give us a sense of how leaders were thinking at that time. >> there are two movements that came out of world war ii. the anti-colonial movement.
countries that have been colonies of european powers wanted their independence. them thatii taught they could demand it. and they can expect to achieve it. that was one aspect of what would be the long-running vietnam issue. the emerging cold war. the cold war pitted the united states and its allies against the power of the soviet union and its allies and the philosophy of communism. if either of these had been in existence alone than american involvement in vietnam would either not occurred what occurred quite differently. the problem for american truman eisenhower kennedy johnson nixon and ford, we havecan history
traditionally supported anti-colonial nationalist movements. to the extent that ho chi minh nationalista movement unites states was inclined to support them. we had supported ho chi minh during world war ii. but they were not silly nationalist, they were communists. harry truman gave a speech in 1947 in which outlines the truman doctrine. he said the world is divided into the democracy sphere atmosphere of communism.
and if you are on the communist side we are against you. truman was not thinking about vietnam at the time. he was looking about greece and turkey. he laid the philosophical basis for intervention against communism. the korean war broke out in 1950. it heightened the threat of connie's imagination. would go directly to in a china. the united states first gets , headed in vietnam taken the position it is supporting anti-communist position in vietnam. dwight eisenhower becomes president in 1953. eisenhower's the opportunity and the inclination to get more deeply involved. partly because eisenhower was a military man and he understood
what military force can and can't accomplish. he kept his distance. he didn't send troops. john kennedy is now president. time -- by this time the force of the revolution in vietnam is gaining strength. kennedy, lacking eisenhower's military background, felt greater pressure to follow the advice of his military advisers who said we need to send military force into vietnam. or we will risk losing vietnam to communism. i will stop here. the premises on which the united states initially sided with the anti-communist forces in vietnam were an artifact of the 1940's. what was not outlandish to believe that communism was it
unified threat to the united states and a victory for communism anywhere was a threat to democracy everywhere. by the 1960's that was coming into question. because harry truman and dwight eisenhower and john kennedy had they feltthis marker obliged to live up to this promise. >> i want to reinforce what is justin said. i especially was like to urge you to read a book called the brothers. it is i think the finest book on how we got to where we were and to some extent where we are. john forster dulles actually rejected and went over ho chi
minh to try to look at ways of perhaps we can work together. united states and that governments and it was forcefully rejected on our side. the brothers. >> alex you had been a military advisers secretary mcnamara. you have been a veteran served overseas. before you came into the crucible of the white house, what we are personal opinions about vietnam? >> i was in the junior rotc.
and the senior rtc in georgia. south i feltn the a special obligation to serve. i also felt that presidents do the right thing. strong belief. the presidents do what was right for the nation. >> and other presidents want to do the right thing. experience really 1959.in the fall of i was a senior aide to a great guy named rosie o'donnell. of home start chief based in hawaii. jobsid to me one of your
and some of their aides. the command, little man, medium-sized men. all the generals. fred nolting. general o'donnell and made. i was like a fly on the wall. the news was never good. attackalways a surprise or the supplies were still coming down the ho chi minh trail. they needed a more modern type of aircraft. on each occasion we would a more advanced training
equipment. some other kind of like airplane. not a very fast combat airplane. in this jungle warfare everything was different. radius of turn meant everything. the better the radius of turn. you can operate that over the ground forces. that's what we did. we gave them a peach 28 at one time. on the next visit wasn't working out for a well and we said no american pilots will be in there. ok will elect american pilots be in the backseat but they can't touch the controls.
we recognize that is an ongoing problem. the best andt into the brightest area. we were on the phone all the time. he was over in the white house and i was in the pentagon. that is when the best and the brightest were doing their damnedest with this thing trying to figure it out. no one could really get a handle on it. we just underestimated we could , be resolved that they had in the persistence they had. the determination. the viacom, talking about. vietcong, i am
talking about. >> in an effort to get inside the heads of the presidents. what was the options that were available to them. what was their information. i want to jump off on two things. we can never quite get a handle on it. that is one thing i want to explore little bit is this notion of where the presidents ever really able to control the events or to the events control them? did they make proactive decisions or reactive decisions? iem.mentioned president d when you think of the national tragedy that we suffered with the killing of president kennedy he already had his eye on certain things they were very important, civil rights and the
tax bill. but johnson was also trying to manage events in vietnam. of united states was aware or had approved of the assassination of diem. can you put yourself inside president johnson's head and say how he was handling this information, what options were available? my role during those years was primarily that of a notetaker. weeks withpast six the help of a young georgia tech through have gone several hundred of the notes that i took that were
we had treaties that down this to come to the defense of the nations that were signatories to it. the leader of singapore said that he thought that all of southeast asia could fall if we did not protect south vietnam. we stayed here about the domino. . it was the view of many people .t that time the domino theory. president johnson always worried about china and russia intervening on the side of the north vietnamese. especially if we accidentally russian or chinese ships in the hanoi or haiphong harbor. he often said it will be a young pilot from johnson city texas
who will accidentally start world war iii. the experience of korea where the chinese came down en masse to support the north koreans was constantly with him. in aorry that we might chinese airspace. it was there. lbj anguished about that war. every single day. that is not an overstatement. the daily body counts. the calls either to or from the matchion room often had 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. to see if the carrier pilots had returned. the regular tuesday lunch meeting that almost always consisted of the secretary of defense secretary of state the
cia director the national security advisor the press secretary and a notetaker. [laughter] specific bombing targets were reviewed with him. he did not want to bomb the dikes . he did not wish to bomb the cities. bomb the foodh to sources. only military targets. deeply personal. in combat sons in law zone areas. letters and tapes that were sent back to his daughters were at times confiscated by president johnson or one of us and he piece often to them the best report he had in robb.m was chuck
once i amre than dammed if i do and i am dammed if i don't. as he considered troop , bombingns, halts intensification. he wanted his commanders in the field especially general westmoreland to have the troops and the munitions that they with 500,000 troops on the ground general westmoreland in 1968 asked for 200,000 more. point on the advice of a group of wise men he assembled and clark clifford he said he would not approve that request.
issue out about what was his biggest single word in the war. it was that we might have incident for the french were overrun by the north vietnamese. the loss of that base led to the french losing the war. sanh was in such grave danger in 1968 with divisions of north vietnamese troops assembled in the area. they developed a contingency plan for the tactical use of nuclear weapons.
>> my understanding from some of , governoriews connally among them, suggested you win the war by winning it. if that required nuclear weapons then so be it. so there was a wide range of advice. >> i assure you from being in the room that president johnson never would have used nuclear weapons. he demanded a written letter from all members of the joint chiefs of staff, a formal written document which is here in this library from the joint chiefs of staff assuring him in khe sanhthat would not be overrun. we had a new fragmentation weapon that was used to have much like the top -- type of
weapon, the so-called barrel bomb. >> when lyndon johnson took off the table the possibility of invading north vietnam he basically insured that united states could never definitively when the war. avoid to keep fighting to losing the war. johnson did this for very good reasons. the senate in 1951 allowed the invasion of north korea that brought the chinese into the war. the 1960's china nuclear weapons. if the united states found itself directly up against china in the 1960's it could have been
world war iii with nuclear weapons. he was not going to go there. >> we've talked about the possibility of escalation and a land war. could we come back to an earlier part of the administration, the momentous summer of 1964 were president johnson has not yet run for reelection. he is being very careful about how he is handling things. billg ahead with the tax and the civil rights act. it was a little bit trickier to manage. did that set the stage for something in terms of the way that we were explaining to the american people what was happening or not happening. what later became known as the this erosion of
america's belief that what they were hearing was accurate. that the american people were not going to believe despite being told this was a military victory for the north. it was very difficult to accept that. you are a president but not fully present. still in president kennedy's shadow. in a sense of wanting to fulfill some of the legacies that he had set forth. he didn't want to run from any commitments that president kennedy had made. tom: i arrived in 1965. so all of my information is based on the records that are here and are at the pentagon.
clearly the tonkin incidents played a significant role in the decision to dramatically increase and i think we will all go to our graves with different versions of that event. levinson is very trusted , he reviewed that and califano, tooe colopho understand the decision-making process and the politics of the time. senator goldwater was taking such very strong military positions. were answered by the little girl pulling the pedals off the daisy.
as a nuclear mushroom cloud erupted in the background. you had this incredible group of we've who were just felt been successful virtually every war. america's military power prior to that was just so awesome. it was unbelievable. we never released fully our capability in vietnam. the little statements the johnson made about not sending american boys to fight a war that should be for by asians. that was a significant part of the credit of the issue. >> lyndon johnson was a colding
warrior. politics for domestic reasons. he wanted to build the great society. he couldn't afford to lose vietnam because he is a once he started losing vietnam he would lose congress. nor was he willing to go all out and put anything else aside and put the country on a war footing and saying do first. he had two very good reasons for not doing that. a concern that the war in vietnam would escalate into a war between the united states and soviet union and/or china. and no point did anybody in the white house think that vietnam was worth a war with the soviet union or china. thing, johnson and nixon understood that the torican people were going devote only so much in the way of resources and energy and time to vietnam. the basic problem was that was very difficult to make the case
intrinsicallyas important to american security. it had some importance but the importance lay in its relation to american credibility. if the united states had said we're going to defend south , then one of the germans going to think. what will the allies think. allies that are more important to the united states. johnson wasn't the one that made those promises. those promises were made by harry truman and dwight eisenhower and john kennedy. johnson was the inheritor of those promises. but because those promises have been made to think he could simply ignore them. it would've been politically impossible for johnson to say, this is a bad place for america to be involved in. going to pull the troops out. he did not done that politically. -- he could not have done that politically. that is the way that johnson
hey hey lbj how many kids did you kill today? he said i just wish that they knew that i want peace as much as they do. peace as much as anyone. i mean that. who was aot a man hawk or a dove. dowas a person looking to what was right. he continued to say it's not doing was right is knowing what to write. he was trying to navigate issues.these using secret channels one of which was the philadelphia channel where this relatively young professor from harvard made contact with a group of french in paris to conduct back channel discussions with hanoi.
lbj so wanted to get ho chi minh in a room and negotiate with them the same way he negotiated with everett dirksen and gerald ford. he was accustomed to that hands-on negotiation process. the will in america to stay the course continued to be rude. -- the road. erode. there was an unshakable will coming from hanoi despite the bombings despite the loss of life.
the americans never lost a battle. tet.n never did american forces lose a battle in that war. there were setbacks and there were huge casualties. [applause] to those of you who served and , people like jan scruggs that were served and were wounded. we ou an incredible amount of thailandas you visit and laos and singapore of the places today there are many people who think that communism could've replaced the kind of democracy that flourishes there. i guess we will never know. alexander: your comment about the 1964.
and the gulf of tonkin. august 4 of 64. when the two destroyers were .resumably attacked they said they were under attack. that happens to be the last day that i was there. i was commanding all the low and medium level reconnaissance forces. in southeast asia, including laos and thailand. .hat is the day i left we took off at 6:00 and flew okinawa which was my home base. i had no idea what the president's thinking was at that time. when i wasding to
there in washington in 1965. when i do tom. the best and the brightest were we felt we damnedest had no choice. increase the size of the forces. by 1968 just prior to make some taking office there were 543,000 people there. we were losing 300 soldiers a week. president nixon, and i have read some of the things he wrote during the campaign. well that i was going to be something huge. that he would have to deal with. although i will say he devoted
the first couple of months of his presidency to visit europe centric in his thinking. march that he start the secret bombing of cambodia. country and that was serious business. tom: we had gotten covertly over. earlier. alexander: but the bombing proceeded what we put our people in their one year later. a number of people on the national security council staff quit. state.son for kent
students all over with demonstrating. then quickly got into vietnam problems that went with it. kent state was huge because for students were killed. that was may 4 19 70. the secret bombing started in 1969 right after next and took office. ice to say we were paranoid about communism. ever since the cold war. today we don't think very seriously at all. we did then based on the theory that international communism insists on, isn't being universal. with its universal that is to say that we are for the overthrow of your country. that is the reason that we try
to avoid if we can these little countries becoming communist. your neighbor became communist the thought was that there was all the more chance that you would. that johntter, speech kennedy gave back when he was a senator long before he was president, in 1956. giving a speech to the friends of vietnam. jfk to theven by american confederation of friends of vietnam. about actually passionate vietnam. diem.out president
he was a real soldier. did a lot of good things. he was the first president of vietnam. he believed in peace. he stood up to the communists. he didn't want any monkey business on his staff. he was very open about that. ofwas the first president the republic of south vietnam from 1955. kennedy's speech talks about vietnam being the cornerstone of democracy in asia. thailand and cambodia and even japan and the philippines were really at risk
south vietnam didn't hold fast. he was all for it. tom: president nixon and president johnson were very much that.er on president nixon's positions in 1968 were far more aligned with johnson then at times with the positions of vice president human country. -- hubert humphrey. there are many examples of that with speeches that brought tension between humphrey and johnson. office continued to confer with president johnson. he had a jet star sent to bergstrom every friday with a packet of materials from
,issinger and general haig briefing papers for president johnson to read. just as president johnson conferred secretly with dwight eisenhower. there was a continuity there. you can argue it one way or the other. we do not want to go with the massive b-52s. those sanctuaries contained significant numbers of north vietnamese soldiers.
it was reinforcements to attack americans. those two countries proclaimed to be neutral. they were not neutral and all. for were providing shelter the north vietnamese. it was a very tough decision to escalate. i know many of the veterans out here think we should have gone absolutely to the mat but the china issue and many others, far more complicated. ultimately a very dark challenging year for the united states. we had assassinations at home. march 68.vil unrest
president johnson having won a landslide in the mandate in 1964. we saw in 1968 was whisker thin between richard nixon and hubert humphrey. there was a political impossibility of pulling out of that point. was there another way coming after that. was he obliged to stay the course? alexander: nixon laid out very clearly during his campaign in 1968 that he didn't want it to
, he wanted an honorable peace. he faced up to the fact that we're going to have to deal with thenietnamese and his idea , he had it in 1968. he put it to the test. it did seem to work. ization.is asia we would gradually withdraw but only as our training of the viennese people and supplying them with arms and munitions and better weapons and that sort of thing.
as we gave them better weapons we would pull out. june 8, 1969, he pulled out 25,000 was the initial thing. 40,000.september another 45,000. sweet pulled out of a hundred 15,000 in that first year state and 69. -- 1969. presumably the vietnamese were taking over more of the battle. one thing we haven't mentioned everyone wonders why the french lost it in 1954. starting to fight these trench warfare battles in the jungle.
putting so many times on an elephant's back and go through the jungle. the jungle was used to their advantage. you can fly over there and see. we continue to do that letter of kennedy's with a speech he gave in 1956 praising the country and south vietnam. he likens the u.s. forces to a volunteer fire department. when they come in and put out the fire and they are able to go to the next fire. they leave the people who are now homeless to clean up the mess and rebuild. we go on to another conflagration. tom: i think you and i are good are friends that can hit you with a hardball.
about thisontroversy one. get968 we were working to the parties to the conference table in paris. reasons the south vietnamese pullback and showed reluctance. can you tell us today, you were not there in 1968. that episode and what you know about it? historians or chip -- are still trying to sort it out. alexander: i know and i quite well. she was delivering a message for nixon.
>> having access to free officials and south vietnam there is a real question as to whether or not there was interference by the next -- by the nixon campaign in the peace process. table take this off the and nixon is elected you will get a better deal from president nixon. there were a lot of stories to that effect. one was on the nixon presidential library website. you have any insight into that? i know she ended up not speak in connection. she was very upset with him. anna. >> something similar was alleged against the reagan campaign of 1980. that they had contacted tehran
and said if you keep the hostages until after the election you will get a better deal from the new administration in the case of reagan is not clear whether this had any authorization. in the case of 1968 you didn't have to be a political genius if you were the leader south vietnam to thank, we are going to get a new president anyway. there's no point in going out on the land for president was going to be leaving office. let's hold out and see what we get from the new president. i don't think it's that important. common sense would say don't give any concessions because you are going to deal with a new president and there might be a new ballgame. the transition from johnson to next. nixon.
nixon was going to initiate the policy of detente. he was going to go to the russians and the chinese separately. the basic premise the truman and justifyer had used to american intervention was that the communist movement in the world was essentially a monolith. a victory for any communist party in any part of the world was a victory for the soviet union itself. nixon late 60's richard was the first president to exploitdge and try to the communist movement had come apart. there's no reason to think that a communist victory in vietnam would augment the strength of the soviet union. in fact there was probably a reason to think it might be just the opposite. but even these were aligned with the chinese that the russians.
he was trying to split the communist countries and get them to withdraw their support for north vietnam. they were getting resupplied from the soviet union. if nixon could talk moscow and beijing into withdrawing their support that the plan of the vietnam policy of the troops pulling out that was feasible. in fact he never did get the soviets and the chinese to go along with it. tom: one major elephant in this room. the role of the media. to samplef you were the american press which i've tried to do there was enormous support from the publishers of america who were very pro- american intervention. many of the early correspondence were reporting a more favorable
story about it. thanks to some extraordinary , peter arnett is an example. up prize-winning reporter for the associated press. incredible photographers that were there. television and print. those images on the cover of life magazine. the impact of television. dan rather will be a part of this program. as you know. as those images continues to come across on the tvs and in the newspapers of america it had profound impact on the policymakers. profound impact on the people in the streets. muchglad that we have as of the program that is to calm that will look at the impact of
the media because it was extraordinary. >> that is a nice place to leave it. we could go on for another hour easily but we are at the end of our time. thank you gentlemen. thanks to the lbj library. please give a big hand to our guests. alexander butterfield, tom johnson and build brands. thank you for joining us. thank you very much. [laughter] [applause] [applause] [applause] >> to watch a more from the summit, please visit to our website. archivedrence video is
there and you can also find our schedule. this is a american history tv, only on c-span3. this week on american artifacts, a tour of some of the oldest rooms in the u.s. capitol. here is a preview. with the up to visit friends i had made in the summers. the next summer, the summer of 1965, i happen to hit on the right day. i was sitting in the outer office of senator coopers reception area helping -- hoping to get a chance to see him. he walked back, she grabs him by the arm and says, i'm going to take you to see something really important. we come over to the rotunda and their iam in the back of the lyndon baines johnson signed the voting rights act of 1965.
than i didter seat for the martin luther king speech. 2008 ire anecdote, in was in the rotunda and we were celebrating the 100th anniversary of the birth of lbj in i met lucy johnson, who i had never met you for. i said, lucy, i was here on the day your dad signed the voting rights act. i was, too. i said, really? i'm sure no one knew i was here but i am positive everyone knew you were here. and here's what she told me, she said her dad said, come on, get on the car i am taking you to the u.s. capitol there's something important. on the way down, he explained to her that all these people would signed them when he
bill and she said, daddy why would you have all these people. and he said, it is important the american people say it is done a bipartisan people and the american people are much likely to accept what we are doing if they see we are all involved and that is the story she told me on obj possible birthday. thing getd this whole started for you? senator mcconnell: probably in high school. i read for the student body. if i am lost i probably would've done something else. >> was there a mentor? were you following politics? fifthr mcconnell: in my picture, you know those mugshots every year? an "ififth year i had like ike" button on.
my dad had served in world war ii. he was a foot soldier under eisenhower in decided to vote for eisenhower. dad was a great admirer of the commander and so i sort of began to identify with republicans a little bit. were inrs later we kentucky and the even though it was a democratic state and republicans occasionally one, my dad was republican so identified with republicans and decided to take a shot at it. i ran for president of the student body in college, too. clean sweep. you can watch this or any other "american artifacts" program any time by visiting our website at c-span.org\history. on wednesday and thursday, june 1 and june 2, we
will be live in laredo, texas, border to.-mexico talk about issues affecting our countries. then we will talk with the managing editor for bright art texas. he talks about the flow of immigration in the area, the players, and his attempts to cover humanitarian aspects. we will discuss practicing immigration law with a local ander, who she represents, the laws on the books for immigration.nd and we will talk with a reporter from dallas about his book, " midnight in mexico: a reporter's journey through a descent into darkness." reporter from the san antonio express will talk about the flow of trade across the border. a senator will join us to
talk about how trade benefits laredo and the country. and the state director for the texas fair trade coalition and day nafta critic looks at how the deal took jobs from the united states to mexico and however hurts mexico as well. herh these wednesday and state june 1 and two from laredo, texas. join the discussion. andrewer: next, author gyory discusses his book on how chinese stereotypes helped shape in history in the late 19th century. it is about 50 minutes. >> thank you. before i go any further, i want to acknowledge the