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tv   Vietnam War Commanders in Chief  CSPAN  June 4, 2016 12:00pm-1:06pm EDT

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www.c-span.org >> up next on the presidency. presidential aides to discuss the role of lyndon johnson and richard nixon during the vietnam war. alexander butterfield and tom johnson explore the foreign policies of the presidents they worked for. emotional burdens they faced during the conflict. this program was part of the three-day conference at the lyndon b. johnson presidential library. it was called the vietnam war summit. you can find schedule information at c-span.org. you can find schedule information at c-span.org. this program is about an hour. >> please welcome the director of the lbj presidential library. [applause]
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good afternoon and welcome. mark: on may 22, 1971 the crowd assembled on the university of texas grounds to dedicate this library. 2100 antiwar protesters were kept from interrupting the proceedings by a phalanx of highway patrolman. chance of no more war carried by high winds and accompanied by the pounding of trashcan lids were clearly heard. by former president lyndon johnson and his assembled guests including president nixon. it was an apt metaphor. the vietnam war had filtered into the administrations of both johnson and nixon.
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when johnson took his turn at the podium he proclaimed it is all here. the story of our time. with the bark off. there is no record of mistake or an unpleasantness or criticism that is not included in the files here. accordingly, he wanted us to learn from them to build a better america. two years ago, the lbj presidential library hosted the historic civil rights summit to mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the civil rights act of 1964. lbj had championed that had signed into law. four u.s. presidents attended the conference.
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president obama, george w. bush clinton and carter. along with many civil rights heroes. they paid tribute to lbj's legacy on civil rights and those who waged the civil rights movement. just as we celebrated the feats of civil rights is altogether fitting that we in keeping with president johnson's vision take a substantive unvarnished look at the vietnam war. our goal is to shed new light on the war and its lessons and legacy. it is also our intent to recognize the courage and sacrifice of the men and women who served in vietnam. the dark cloud of the vietnam war hung over this country long after the last shots were fired .
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the passage of years offers greater perspective. to look at it with the bark off may help us to move on stronger and more united. that would've been president johnson's hope, just as it remains ours. we open this summit with a series of three panel discussions. in our first, we will explore the role the presidents played in the war. to introducesure the dissidents. h w brands is a best-selling author.
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several of his books have been wo finalistsand to for the pulitzer prize. alexander butterfield joined the air force in 1949 and commanded the squadron of low-level reconnaissance aircraft in the vietnam war. he was awarded the flying cross. he went on to serve as deputy assistant to president nixon. after serving the white house he was appointed as the administrator of the federal aviation administration. tom johnson was in the first class of white house fellows in 1965. he remained there for the balance of johnson's administration. he went on to become ceo of america's most respected news organizations, cnn and the los
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angeles times. he is chairman emeritus of the lbj foundation board of trustees. finally, moderating the discussion is brian sweeney. he became editor of texas monthly. he has served in many roles, including director of the political coverage. gentlemen, please welcome our guests. [applause] [applause] >> thank you for that. thank you to all of you for
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being here. i take particular pride in having been fortunate enough to having been part of the civil rights event. we learned a lot with the community coming together. i like to pay welcome to the patriots who served in the military overseas. thank you for being here today and being part of this conference. [applause] is totle of our panel give an overview of what role the leaders in the white house plays with the decisions they made that shaped american foreign policy. our growing and deeper involvement in vietnam. we are going to look at that through the lens of the johnson and nixon administrations.
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it would not be right to begin this conversation without trying to frame the discussion of the roots in southeast asia. we have to go back to the global realignment after world war ii. to the ministration of president truman. i thought we would open up with you. give us a sense of what the world was like starting back down. what was the chain of events that came forward that would've put pressure on subsequent administrations to give us a sense of how leaders were thinking at that time. bill: there are two movements that came out of world war ii. the first was the anti-colonial movement. ,he nationals movement countries that have been colonies of european powers wanted their independence. world war ii taught them that they could demand it.
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they can expect to achieve it. that was one aspect of what would be the long-running vietnam issue. the second aspect was the emerging cold war. the cold war pitted the united states and its allies against the power of the soviet union and its allies and the philosophy of communism. if either of these had been in existence alone than american involvement in vietnam would either not occurred what occurred quite differently. the problem for american presidents truman eisenhower kennedy johnson nixon and ford, the problem was in american history we have traditionally supported anti-colonial nationalist movements. to the extent that ho chi minh was leading a nationalist movement unites states was inclined to support them.
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because the united states had supported ho chi minh during they had ii, expectations. nationalistt simply they were communists. , harry truman gave a speech in 1947 in which outlines the truman doctrine. it essentially said the world is divided into the democracy sphere atmosphere of communism. and if you are on the communist side we are against you. truman was not thinking about vietnam at the time. he was looking about greece and turkey. he laid the philosophical basis for intervention against communism.
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the korean war broke out in 1950. it was not about southeast asia. it was about northeast asia. it heightened the threat of communism in asia. american aid had been going through france. american aid would go directly to in a china. the united states first gets involved in vietnam, headed taken the position it is supporting anti-communist position in vietnam. dwight eisenhower becomes president in 1953. eisenhower's the opportunity and the inclination to get more deeply involved. partly because eisenhower was a military man and he understood what military force can and can't accomplish, he kept his distance. the united states supported the government of south vietnam
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militarily. we didn't send troops. john kennedy is now president. by this time, the force of the revolution in vietnam is gaining strength. kennedy, lacking eisenhower's military background, felt greater pressure to follow the advice of his military advisers who said we need to send military force into vietnam. or we will risk losing vietnam to communism. i will stop here. i will just say one thing: the premises on which the united states initially sided with the anti-communist forces in vietnam were an artifact of the 1940's. it was not outlandish to believe that communism was it unified threat to the united states and a victory for commism anywhere was a threat to democracy everywhere. by the 1960's that was coming into question.
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but because harry truman and dwight eisenhower and john kennedy had laid down this marker they felt obliged to live up to this promise. >> i want to reinforce what is -- has just and said. i especially was like to urge you to read a book called the brothers. it is i think the finest book on how we got to where we were and to some extent where we are. john forster dulles actually rejected and went over ho chi minh to try to look at ways of perhaps we can work together. united states and that governments and it was forcefully rejected on our side. the brothers.
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>> alex you had been a military advisers secretary mcnamara. you have been a veteran served overseas. before you came into the crucible of the white house, what we are personal opinions about vietnam? i am curious from a personal point of view. : i was in the junior rotc. and the senior rtc in georgia. south, many of us in the
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i felt a special obligation to serve. i also felt that presidents do the right thing. i have a strong belief. our presidents do what was right for the nation. >> and other presidents want to do the right thing. my vietnam experience really began in the fall of 1959. i was a senior aide to a great guy named rosie o'donnell. he was a four-star chief of home based in hawaii. he said to me one of your jobs will be to see to it that we never stay on this island more than 30 days. we were based in honolulu. our beat was the far east.
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over a 33 month time, we made trips to the far east. we almost always hit vietnam. it was important at that time. we visited there at least 22 or 23 visits. visit, we would meet with our ambassador and the president and one or two of his aides. there would be a general or two. all the generals. fred nolting.
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general o'donnell and made. -- and me. it made.i was like a fly on the wall. i remember that original flavor. the news was never good. it was always a surprise attack or the supplies were still coming down the ho chi minh trail. there was no way of stopping them it seemed. they needed a more modern type of aircraft. on each occasion we would promise a more advanced training equipment. some other kind of like airplane.
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not a very fast combat airplane. in this jungle warfare everything was different. radius of turn meant everything. in an airplane, the slower it is the better the radius of turn. you can operate better over the ground of forces. that's what we did. we gave them a peach 28 at one time. on the next visit wasn't working out for a well and we said no american pilots will be in there. we said ok will elect american pilots be in the backseat but they can't touch the controls. , that's thevisit way it went. >> things were incremental. left, what are we going to do? we recognize that is an ongoing problem. this led right into the best and the brightest area.
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i don't want to get ahead arid that's when i met this guy. we were on the phone all the time. he was over in the white house and i was in the pentagon. that is when the best and the brightest were doing their damnedest with this thing trying to figure it out. no one could really get a handle on it. one more thing i will say, our problem was we just underestimated we could not understand, be resolved that they had in the persistence they had. the determination. the board -- north vietnamese. the vietcong, i am talking about. >> in an effort to get inside the heads of the presidents. what was the options that were
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available to them. what was their information. i want to jump off on two things. we can never quite get a handle on it. that is one thing i want to explore a little bit, this notion of where the presidents ever really able to control the events or to the events control them? did they make proactive decisions or reactive decisions? you mentioned president diem. i think that's interesting. when you think of the national tragedy that we suffered with the killing of president kennedy he already had his eye on , certain things they were very important, civil rights and the tax bill. also managing events in vietnam. a coup that had happened.
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aware andstates was had approved of that. the question i would say to the group is can you put yourself inside president johnson's head and say how he was handling this information, what options were available? tom: my role during those years was primarily that of a notetaker. during the past six weeks with the help of a young georgia tech senior i have gone through several hundred of the notes that i took that were transcribed and sent to the obj -- lbj library. it is taken was 50 years for me to get all of them. many of them are accepted
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-- excerpted significantly. there have been deletions made by the cia and others. i am relying on my notes. this is only a small portion of the notes in answering this question. i don't want to count on my memory about vietnam. lbj was terribly conflicted. russell andor others who had advised him not to get into a ground war in asia. leave weny others who treatiesoutheast asia that we needed to respect. we had treaties that down this to come to the defense of the nations that were signatories to it. the leader of singapore said
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that he thought that all of southeast asia could fall if we did not protect south vietnam. you have heard much about the domino theory. it was the view of many people at that time. it was more than a theory. president johnson worried about china and russia intervening on the side of the north vietnamese. always. especially if we accidentally bombed russian or chinese ships in the hanoi or haiphong harbor. he often said it will be a young pilot from johnson city texas who will accidentally start world war iii. the experience of korea where the chinese came down en masse to support the north koreans was
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constantly with him. the worry that we might in a chinese airspace. it was there. lbj anguished about that war. every single day. that is not an overstatement. the daily body counts. the calls either to or from the situation room often match 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. to see if the carrier pilots had returned. a regular tuesday lunch meeting that almost always consisted of the secretary of defense secretary of state the cia director the national security advisor the press secretary and a notetaker. [laughter] specific bombing targets were reviewed with him.
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he did not want to bomb the dikes. he did not wish to bomb the cities. he did not wish to bomb the food sources. only military targets. deeply personal. he had two sons in law in combat zone areas. letters and tapes that were sent back to his daughters were at times confiscated by president johnson or one of us and he would listen to them piece of . in one occasion he said the best report he had in vietnam was chuck robb. finally, he said more than once i am dammed if i do and i am dammed if i don't.
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as he considered troop escalations, halts, bombing intensification. he wanted his commanders in the field especially general westmoreland to have the troops and the munitions that they needed until with 500,000 troops on the ground general westmoreland in 1968 asked for 200,000 more. at that point on the advice of a group of wise men he assembled and clark clifford he said he would not approve that request. issue out about what was his biggest single word in the war. it was that we might have another incident for the french were overrun by the north
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vietnamese. the loss of that base led to the french losing the war. khe sanh was in such grave danger in 1968 with divisions of north vietnamese troops assembled in the area. they developed a contingency plan for the tactical use of nuclear weapons. >> my understanding from some of the interviews, governor connally among them, suggested you win the war by winning it.
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if that required nuclear weapons then so be it. so there was a wide range of advice. >> i assure you from being in the room that president johnson never would have used nuclear weapons. he demanded a written letter from all members of the joint chiefs of staff, a formal written document which is here in this library from the joint chiefs of staff assuring him in writing that khe sanh would not be overrun. we had adequate forces to defend it. we had a new fragmentation weapon that was used to have much like the top -- type of weapon, the so-called barrel bomb. that was placed into the troops
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around caisson. >> when lyndon johnson took off the table the possibility of invading north vietnam he basically insured that united states could never definitively when the war. it had to keep fighting to avoid losing the war. johnson did this for very good reasons. he was in the senate in 1951 harry truman allowed the invasion of north korea that brought the chinese into the war. the 1960's china nuclear weapons. if the united states found itself directly up against china in the 1960's it could have been world war iii with nuclear weapons. he was not going to go there. >> we've talked about the possibility of escalation and a land war.
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i do wonder if we could come back to an earlier part of the administration, the momentous summer of 1964 were president johnson has not yet run for reelection. he is being very careful about how he is handling things. moving ahead with the tax bill and the civil rights act. he is being very careful about how he is handling things. he has already moved ahead with the tax bill and the civil rights act. it was a little bit trickier to manage. did that set the stage for something in terms of the way that we were explaining to the american people what was happening or not happening? what later became known as the credibility gap this erosion of america's belief that what they were hearing was accurate. the american people were not going to believe despite being
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told this was a military victory -- not a military victory for the north. it was very difficult to accept that. you are a president but not fully presint. still in president kennedy's shadow. in a sense of wanting to fulfill some of the legacies that he had set forth. he didn't want to run from any commitments that president kennedy had made. tom: i arrived in 1965. so all of my information is based on the records that are here and are at the pentagon. clearly the tonkin incidents played a significant role in the decision to dramatically increase and i think we will all
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go to our graves with different versions of that event. larry levinson was a highly trusted attorney, he reviewed that and worked for joe califano, to understand the decision-making process and the politics of the time. with senator goldwater taking such very strong military positions. as you know were answered by the little girl pulling the pedals from a flower as a nuclear mushroom cloud erupted in the background. you had this incredible group of people who were just felt we've
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been successful virtually every war. america's military power prior to that was just so awesome. it was unbelievable. we never released fully our capability in vietnam. the little statements the at johnson made about not sending american boys to fight a war that should be for by vietnamese boys. that was a significant part of the credit of the issue. >> lyndon johnson was a grudging cold warrior. he went into politics for domestic reasons. he wanted to build the great society. he couldn't afford to lose vietnam because he is a once he
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started losing vietnam he would lose congress. nor was he willing to go all out and put anything else aside and put the country on a war footing to say this is what we need do first. he had two very good reasons for not doing that. a concern that the war in vietnam would escalate into a war between the united states and soviet union and/or china. at no point did anybody in the white house think that vietnam was worth a war with the soviet union or china. the other thing, johnson and nixon understood that the american people were going to devote only so much in the way of resources and energy and time to vietnam. the basic problem was that was very difficult to make the case that vietnam was intrinsically important to american security. it had some importance but the importance lay in its relation
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to american credibility. if the united states had said we're going to defend south vietnam, then one of the germans germans going to think? what will the allies think? allies that are more important to the united states. johnson wasn't the one that made those promises. those promises were made by harry truman and dwight eisenhower and john kennedy. johnson was the inheritor of those promises. but because those promises have been made to think he could simply ignore them. it would've been politically impossible for johnson to say, this is a bad place for america to be involved in. pull the troops out. he could not have done that politically. >> that is the way that johnson saw it. that is the way that most of those that he trusted the most in the congress and around him in the cabinet felt.
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the shouts of hey hey lbj how many kids you kill today could be heard in the white house. i'm never forget driving out one evening as the protesters shouted at him. hey hey lbj how many kids did you kill today? he said i just wish that they knew that i want peace as much as they do.
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he wanted peace as much as anyone. i mean that. this was not a man who was a hawk or a dove. he was a person looking to do what was right. he continued to say it's not doing was right is knowing what it is knowinght, what is right. he was trying to navigate through these issues. using secret channels one of which was the philadelphia channel where this relatively young professor from harvard made contact with a group of french in paris to conduct back channel discussions with hanoi. lbj so wanted to get ho chi minh in a room and negotiate with him the same way he negotiated with everett dirksen and gerald
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ford. to achieve peace. he was accustomed to that hands-on negotiation process. each year, the will in america to stay the course continued to erode. the incredible will of the north was an unshakable will coming from hanoi despite the bombings despite the loss of life. the americans never lost a battle. not in tet. never did american forces lose a
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battle in that war. there were setbacks and there were huge casualties. [applause] to those of you who served and died, people like jan scruggs who served and were wounded. this nation owes you an incredible amount of debt and as you visit thailand and laos and singapore of the places today , there are many people who think that communism could've replaced the kind of democracy that flourishes there. i guess we will never know. alexander: your comment about the 1964 period and the gulf of tonkin.
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august 4 of 1964. when the two destroyers were presumably attacked. they said they were under attack. that happens to be the last day that i was there. i was commanding all the low and medium level reconnaissance forces. in southeast asia, including laos and thailand. that is the day i left. that was my final day there. we took off at 6:00 and flew back to okinawa, which was my home base. i had no idea what the president's thinking was at that time. fast forwarding to when i was
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there in washington in 1965 and 1966, when i knew tom, the best and the brightest were doing their damnedest, we felt we had no choice. by 1968, there were 543,000 people there. we were losing 300 soldiers a week. president nixon, and i have read some of the things he wrote during the campaign. he knew very well that i was going to be something huge. that he would have to deal with. although i will say he devoted the first couple of months of his presidency to visit europe and was europe centric in his thinking.
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only in march that he start the ed the highly secret bombing of cambodia. another country. and that was serious business. tom: we had gone in covertly earlier. alexander: but the bombing proceeded what we put our people there one year later. a number of people on the national security council staff quit. that was the reason for kent state. students all over with ere demonstrating. nixon quickly got into the vietnam problems that went with it. kent state was huge because for
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ur students were killed. that was may 4 of 1970. the secret bombing started in 1969 right after next and took -- nixon took office. i used to say we were paranoid about communism. ever since the cold war. today, we don't think very seriously about it at all. we did then, based on the theory that international communism
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insists on being universal. that is to say that we are for the overthrow of your country. that is the reason that we try to avoid if we can these little countries becoming communist. if your neighbor became communist the thought was that there was all the more chance that you would. i saw a letter, speech that john kennedy gave back when he was a senator long before he was president, in 1956. giving a speech to the friends of vietnam. something like that. the speech given by jfk to the american confederation of friends of vietnam. he was actually passionate about vietnam. and about president diem. this guy was a real soldier. he did a lot of good things. before we came along and started working with them.
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[laughter] he was the first president of vietnam. he believed in peace. he stood up to the communists. he didn't want any monkey business on his staff. he was very open about that. he was the first president of the republic of south vietnam from 1955. kennedy's speech talks about vietnam being the cornerstone of democracy in asia. and laos and thailand and cambodia and even japan and the philippines were really at risk if south vietnam didn't hold fast. he was all for it. tom: president nixon and president johnson were very much
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together on that. president nixon's positions in 1968 were far more aligned with johnson's than at times with the positions of vice president hubert humphrey. there are many examples of that and speeches that brought tension between humphrey and johnson. nixon took office, he continued to confer with president johnson. he had a jet star sent to bergstrom every friday with a packet of materials from kissinger and general haig, briefing papers for president johnson to read.
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henry kissinger stayed in touch johnson, just as president johnson conferred secretly with dwight eisenhower. there was a continuity there. you can argue it one way or the other. there was a continuity at that point in many ways about vietnam. we do not want to go with the massive b-52. those sanctuaries contained significant numbers of north vietnamese soldiers. it was reinforcements to attack americans. those two countries proclaimed to be neutral. they were not neutral and all. they were providing shelter for the north vietnamese.
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it was a very tough decision to escalate. i know many of the veterans out here think we should have gone absolutely to the mat but the china issue and many others, far more complicated. >> let's talk about 1968. ultimately a very dark, challenging year for the united states. we had assassinations at home. growing civil unrest. president johnson gave the in march of 1968.
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with president johnson having won a landslide in the mandate in 1964, what we saw in 1968 was whisker thin between richard nixon and hubert humphrey. there was a political impossibility of pulling out of that point. tom, you are talking about the continuity between johnson and nixon. tom: on vietnam. >> was there another way coming after that? was he obliged to stay the course? alexander: nixon laid out very clearly during his campaign in 1968 that he didn't want it to be, he wanted an honorable peace.
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he faced up to the fact that we're going to have to deal with the vietnamese and his idea then, he had it in 1968. he did put it to the test. it did seem to work. his vietnamization plan. we would gradually withdraw but only as our training of the vietnamese people and supplying them with arms and munitions and better weapons and that sort of thing.
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as we gave them better weapons, we would pull out. he did that june 8, 1969, he pulled out 25,000 was the initial thing. then in september 40,000. in december, another 45,000. so, he pulled out of a hundred 115,000 in that first year state in 1969. presumably the vietnamese were taking over more of thbattle. one thing we haven't mentioned everyone wonders why the french lost it in 1954. they were starting to fight these trench warfare battles in the jungle. so manynamese could put
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tons on an elephant's back and go through the jungle. the jungle was used to their advantage. you can fly over there and see. we continue to do that letter of kennedy's with a speech he gave in 1956 praising the country and commending south vietnam. he likens the u.s. forces to a volunteer fire department. when they come in and put out the fire and they are able to go to the next fire. they leave the people who are now homeless to clean up the mess and rebuild. we go on to another conflagration. tom: i think you and i are good enough friends that can hit you with a hardball. there was controversy about this one.
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in 1968, we were working to get the parties to the conference table in paris. r unexplained reasons, the south vietnamese pullback and showed reluctance. you were not there in 1968. tell us about that episode and what you know about it. we are still trying to sort it out. alexander: she was delivering a message for nixon. >> having access to free officials in south vietnam there is a real question as to whether
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or not there was interference by the nixon campaign in the peace process. if you take this off the table and nixon is elected you will get a better deal from president nixon. there were a lot of stories to that effect. when interview -- one interview was posted on the nixon presidential library website. you have any insight into that? alexander: i know she ended up not speaking to nixon. she was very upset with him. anna. >> something similar was alleged against the reagan campaign of 1980. that they had contacted tehran and said if you keep the hostages until after the election you will get a better deal from the new administration in the case of reagan is not clear whether this had any authorization.
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in the case of 1968, you didn't have to be a political genius if you were the leader south vietnam to think, we are going to get a new president anyway. there's no point in going out on the land for president was going to be leaving office. let's hold out and see what we get from the new president. i don't think it's that important. common sense would say don't give any concessions because you are going to deal with a new president and there might be a new ballgame. the transition from johnson to nixon. nixon was going to initiate the policy of detente. he was going to go to the approach the soviets and the chinese separately. the basic premise the truman and eisenhower had used to justify american intervention was that
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the communist movement in the world was essentially a monolith. therefore, a victory for any communist party in any part of the world was a victory for the soviet union itself. by the late 1960's, richard nixon was the first president to acknowledge and try to exploit the communist movement had come apart. there's no reason to think that a communist victory in vietnam would augment the strength of the soviet union. in fact there was probably a dust plenty of -- in fact, there was plenty of reason to think it might be just the opposite. but even these were aligned with the chinese that the russians. he was trying to split the communist countries and get them to withdraw their support for north vietnam. they were getting resupplied from the soviet union. if nixon could talk moscow and beijing into withdrawing their
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thenrt of north vietnam, the vietnam policy of the troops pulling out that was feasible. in fact he never did get the soviets and the chinese to go along with it. tom: one major elephant in this room. the role of the media. early on, if you were to sample the american press, which i've tried to do, there was enormous support from the publishers of america who were very pro-american intervention. many of the early correspondence were reporting a more favorable story about it. thanks to some extraordinary reporting, peter arnett is an example.
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prize-winning reporter for the associated press. incredible photographers that were there. those images -- the cover of life magazine. the impact of television. dan rather will be a part of this program. as you know. as those images continues to discontinued -- as those images continued to come across on the tvs and in the newspapers of america it had profound impact on the policymakers. profound impact on the people in the streets. i am glad that we have as much of the program that is to calm that will look at the impact of the media because it was extraordinary. >> that is a nice place to leave it. we could go on for another hour easily but we are at the end of
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our time. at the end of our time. thank you, gentlemen. thanks to the lbj library. please give a big hand to our guests. alexander butterfield, tom johnson and h.w. bill brands. thank you very much. thank you for joining us. thank you very much. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] >> this weekend, the c-span the historyexplores and literary culture of las vegas, nevada. we will visit the writers block, an independent bookstore in downtown las vegas.
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the las vegas literary scene and why he chose to open the only independent store in the city. >> having a good independent bookstore come others a lot of great big readers here and a population of excellent writers. had a little more literary vibrancy than people think. >> a couple weeks later, a phone call comes in to the pit at the siena -- hacienda. he wanted to know who the best criminal lawyer was in las vegas. -- "calld the phone oscar." >> we visit the center for gaming research at the university of nevada las vegas
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archives to see items in their collection related to the history of gambling in las vegas. and learn about how the industry evolved. >> gambling in las vegas goes back to the beginning. by theas was established union pacific railroad. they bought a ranch and decided they would lay a town out here. >> the atomic testing museum to learn about the nevada test site. there is a vacation -- a northwest ofocated las vegas for the testing of nuclear devices. clouds could be seen for 100 miles. >> they started to advertise in advance so that local people and could come to las vegas and plan on witnessing or
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observing a nuclear blast. c-span cities tour. working with our cable affiliates and visiting cities across the country. weekend, colonial williamsburg hosts a lecture by riques.en farms.ington has five it totaled over 5000 acres. nine miles of fence. you can imagine how full his days would be. he's almost running a hotel ,ecause everyone my friends visitors want to stop.
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they want to see him. an interesting note he wrote in -- if no one pops in for dinner, it will be the first time in 20 years that martha and i have gotten along. he owns 50,000 acres of land out west. he is dealing with the potomac canal company to connect the east to the west. lots in the capital city that will be named for him. >> watch the entire program sunday at 8:00 a.m. and midnight eastern here on american history tv. only on c-span3. >> citizens have got to feel
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that their vote matters, that their voice matters and whether centcannot spare a single to help a person running for office or whether they can write a big check, their concerns, their struggles will be listened to. and followed up on. tammy baldwin talks about her career in public service and wisconsin's political history. changeed shepherd the senators were not appointed by the legislature, but demanded elections. know if it was the first, but the idea that it was not going to be the party bosses who made the decision of who the nominees were in smoke-filled rooms but rather the
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people who were going to get a chance to vote in free and fair elections. night on c-span's q&a. >> next, author andrew gyory explores the origins of the chinese exclusion act. daylecture is part of a two symposium. on the history of immigration. this is about 50 minutes. >> thank you. before i go any further, i want to acknowledge the co-direct emeritus. he is here to give us a

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