tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN August 29, 2016 9:00am-11:01am EDT
captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2008 captioning performed by vitac that was the sort of essential glue to the whole rights discussion which brings us back to the discussion we had last class of civil rights, too. it gave an opportunity to civil rights activists. i question the question is why not in the present. >> well -- >> yeah? well no. sorry. >> they wouldn't be like the good cubans, the good hungarians. i think there's a fear now there will be bad refugees posing as good refugees. >> right. >> as like their ticket in so is that fear that you would
actually get bad refugees in that pool not there or overpowered? >> there was that fear and restrictionists would argue and find individual refugees who were actually, you know, bad actors or bad apples and they would bring it up and try to reduce the number of refugees. i suppose what's really different about the war on terror is that the consequences of one bad refugee who's fully armed and detonates herself or himself is quite different than one person ideologically a communist in the whole, like -- what was the threat of an individual communist in, i don't know, durham, north carolina, in 1955? probably not much. well, actually, no. in the 1940s and early '50s who were they? >> they were the union workers. >> the union workers saying let's dismantle jim crowe seg
reinauguration. dangerous people. that's why they were repressed so hard. i think the similarities and differences are quite striking. i'm going to keep going and we are going to continue this lecture. i want to make sure we get to the end and so what we don't get through right now is fine. we have time in this lecture to keep moving forward. i would say just one of the most interesting moments to focus in on as in the wake of the vietnam war and the loss the united states lost there, the influx and the importation of lots of vietnamese refugees has a different logic. they don't -- they're americans because they're anti-communists, yes, that's true but they're not serving the same geopolitical strategic interests if you will because we have already lost the war and so some way the rational of accepting lots of them to fight the communist power over
there or a cohort of people to infiltrate the communist regime you're fighting is kind of obsolete because we have basically are losing the war. and that's going on at the time that this emerging language about human rights is gaining traction largely in reaction to the immoralities of the vietnam war itself, the fact it's a war against citizens. very deemed it was understood to be a very unfair, inhumane war so that produces a different kind of language that justifies the significance of refugees in very different terms. here it's less that they're useful of fighting a cold war and more what you suggested, diane. we have an obligation because we lost the war to aid our allies. and so the stakes are still cold war set of foreign policy stakes but we are going to protect our own. we have allies in other places of the world like iran or other countries revolution about to explode and if we abandon our allies in vietnam we are
basically cutting loose our allies elsewhere. that's the argument used to bring in hundreds of thousands of vietnamese. we have to protect those that u.s. allies in that fight. but it changes, begins to change how we imagine americans imagine the significance and the foreign policy stakes of refugees. the 1980 refugee act seeks to kind of bring forward -- i'm skipping ahead kind of quickly here. i'll fill in. cements the image i described to you in the first set of slides of u.s. refugees as human rights survivors and there's a new litmus test in effect passed by a woman of liz holtszman if you're a refugee not only pro-american and anti-communist but renounce any form of political persecution. you should renounce torture, having persecuted anybody or e
violated any of their essential human rights. so the nation is reimagined in the 1970s as a human rights nation under jimmy carter, under several otherthat's really what enacted in the 1980 law and that change is to found but sees it playing out in the summer of 1980 right after the law is passed with more hungarian refugees coming. her's the reaction to vietnamese refugees. the growing hostility toward refugees in the 1970s is rationalized coming from asia and anti-asian sentiment has not gone away. sorry. ready. next. okay. so it's -- this is what happens in this room. i cannot advance the slide. that's okay. so in the summer of 1980 you have a kind of dramatic pairing of two refugee crisis at the
same time involving haitians and also involving cubans. both coming to the same shore in florida and here are -- these are from refugees from vietnam and laos who are waiting to be brought to the united states. this is a boat of cubans coming out of cuba in 1979 and 1980. the marititos so-called boat lift. castro is exploiting the opportunity to get rid of -- empties the jails and gets rid of people he doesn't want to take care of to seek the humanitarian of the united states and these cubans are in the exceptional strategy instant citizens. here's cass to saying we don't want them, we don't need them. here are haitians coming in. look at that boat. these are haitians setting out for the coast of florida. just look at that image.
man. that is courage. they have a different kind of reception when they get to the united states. many of them are basically rounded up. the first immigration detention centers are largely created in florida to house haitian prospective refugees and to process them, just to decide whether they should be allowed into the country. so the human rights regime that we -- that human rights language that emerges after the '80 refugee act has sought to change how u.s. refugee law is administered. it shouldn't matter fleeing a u.s. ally or a u.s. enemy. you're a refugee status should be universal. in practice, that was not the case and this is put to the test at this moment in time. haitians had a much harder time getting into the country as citizens. they were denied throughout the 1970s and cubans were let in and
the differences are about race and the cold war. these haitians had the misfortune of fleeing a u.s. ally, a u.s. dictator and they were not good anti-communists. if anything, they were critics of u.s. foreign policy as they were understood. now, the u.s. refugee act seeks to change that, doesn't change it overnight. in fact, you have a persistence of cold war policy playing its out in the 1980s after this act is made law. one of the best examples are refugees of the el salvador civil war. and they were fleeing, many of these refugees are fleeinging u.s.-backed right wing actors and come to the united states and are not allowed to become refugees. so they seek to be under asylum law to become refugees after the fact.
but they have a very hard time. most of them are denied admission or denied refugee or asylum status. let me give you -- in the five minutes we have left, i want to give you a story of one of those good people because i think it illustrates the ongoing and the enduring tension in u.s. refugee law between refugee status as a humanitarian law, the u.s. refugee act of 1980, and national foreign policy interests. so, this is a story of a fellow named miguel. his real name i changed. he is a dear friend of mine. he is, i would argue, the best citizen in north carolina. i've never met any citizen better than him. by that, i'll describe. he fled el salvador in 1983. he was forced to fight at the age of 12 for the marxist
guerrillas. his parents were killed. he came into the united states at the age of 14. made his way to north carolina. he worked all kinds of jobs. he describes his first weeks in america as the most sort of beautiful days of his life because he could sleep without bombs blowing up and waking him at night. he was a refugee of a horrific civil war. by any definition. he would have been -- should be a refugee. he applied, finally, when he came to north carolina for -- under asylum law for refugee status. his case was pending for 17 years. what happened? after 17 years, the ruling finally came down. the civil war is over. you no longer have an asylum claim. you're going to be deported.
in the meantime, he had been a legal resident as an asylum seeker. miguel, however, at this very moment in time had been doing other things. among them, deciding that democracy really was a beautiful thing and he had decided to register voters. i think i may have mentioned him. than any other. there was a voter registration contest in 2008. he won. he registered more than 2,000 voters in durham county. he was extraordinary. no one could say to this guy. he was pervasive. his personal story, smile, whatever. he registered all kinds of people. communists. anarchists. he registered like i did a member of the klan. what the heck? why not? you want to be a klansman, fine. you can vote. you want to register that as your party, you can do that. he then met a candidate named
barack obama for having won the contest to register more people. not democrats alone. but this ruling came down shortshort ly thereafter. he was put in deportation. he had to fight it and he became as a result of this a ferocious critic of the united states. also interesting. to me as a kind of citizen, he recognizes that perhaps the best measure of citizenship is to be a critic. and on his car is a picture of barack obama and he hollowed out the face of obama and left it on there because he was so pissed off because president obama he argued deported more immigrants than any president in u.s. country. with some factual accuracy there. a sense of betrayal. but as a citizen, as someone who understood what democracy is,
why descecember dissent matters passionately loves this country -- to me he is -- i don't agree with him. he is the perfect american if there is such a thing. he is the perfect citizen. we understands the stakes of democracy, what makes it work, how he has an investment in every one of you speaking and having a vote. and he is still in legal limbo. he is not a u.s. citizen. and that's why his name is miguel for the purposes of this discussion. he is likely to get a path to citizenship after all. but it's costing a lot of money. that's neither here nor there. i think the story is illustrative of the stakes. he is both a person who -- refugees understand this. in many respects they understand america and what makes america if you will the nation of refugees better than many americans do. and has an idealism about this
place that would be refreshing if people listened to it. so, the story of u.s. refugee policy is complicated. we'll come back to it. it links nation and humane interests at every turn. whether we listen to advocates like miguel is another story. but if we did, i think the discussion would change radically. so thanks very much. we'll have more debate about this relationship between humanitarian nationalism as we move forward. thanks very much. thanks for your questions. the u.s. defense budget, when's the effect of spending limits put in place of sequestration? what's in store for the next president and congress? what are the u.s. military priorities overseas? that's hosted by the brookings institution. we have it live at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span.
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experiments and by the radiation experiments i mean radiation experiments done in and around the second world war and the cold war. a set of heat ro genius experiments. but all unified by the fact they're studying the interaction of human beings and radioactivi radioactivity. very curious phenomenon of radioactivity that came -- i guess, to its biggest fruition with the explosion over hiroshima and then nag khaki in all of 1945. before we can talk about the experiments to make sense of them we need to talk about the context in which they were done. what we're going to talk about is the war itself, second world war. we'll talk about it's a science-based war. we're going to talk about the development of big science, big
science. lots of people. lots of investigators. lots of money. complicated system. and we're going to talk about the cold war and ideas about national defense and national security and how that played into the radiation experiments. like all medical history, in order to understand what happened we need to understand the context in which it happened. now, there was medical research and physical science research going on in the interwar period. we'll talk first about the physical science research and then about the medical research. there was some small poorly funded, poorly organized research going on. and the example i'm going to use is the story about some military research designed to figure out where an airplane is. now, the first world warsaw a little bit of air power but airplanes were getting faster,
they were getting bigger. they could show up over your head. you wouldn't know they were coming. and so one of the biggest military problems was how to detect airplanes before they got there. and in the 1930s, the staff member at the naval research laboratory noticed that if you sent radio waves out, they would bounce back from planes. further more, if you looked at how long it took them to bounce back from the plane you couldn't figure out about how far away they were. in other words, he used to radio to detect and range airplanes and that's how he came up with the acronym radar. radio detection and ranging. r-a-d-a-r. now the discovery of radar was very uncoordinated. people didn't talk to each other. it was done in a naval research laboratory and the only way that
the army even found out that it existed is that somebody from the army happened to go and visit the naval research laboratory. they didn't reach out to civilians who had expertise in how to design a radar apparatus. they didn't have much funding. this was fairly typical of the ad hoc manner of research in the interwar period. the second world war, of course, starts in 1939. starts in europe. the united states doesn't enter until 1941. from the outset, people knew that the second world war was going to be a science-based war. that science was likely to determine who won and who lost. and one of the questions that arose is then how do you organize the pursuit of science in wartime? now, we have talked about this before with the question of how to organize the medical corps. and a lot of the same issues
apply. the medical corps, you'll remember, at the height of the second world war, the number of people in the medical corps bigger than the entire army had been in 1939. so if all of a sudden you're expanding the size, how do you organize it? you've got to put some people in charge, figure out how to decide who's in charge and what the different units look like. and then, once you have made that decision, that decision is very likely to persist well after the war is gone so you create structures that then continue. well, the same thing happened for the organization of science. not surprisingly. a lot of it had to do with this guy here. this is van der veer bush. bush's grandfather was a whaling captain. he was one of the early pioneers of concept that is we now call compu computing. he made a mechanical version of what we have as an electronic computer. he was the dean at mit. and he became head of the office of scientific research and
development. osrd. "the new york times" said that this made him the science czar. he knew that access to the president was going do give him a lot of power in organizing scientific research and he used that to get the medical research under his belt, as well. roosevelt was about to shell it out and put it in a different unit. he went to roosevelt and said the people you want to give that responsibility to are under criminal indictment right now. well, that was literally true. but the criminal indictment had to do with anti-trust violations and nascent hmos in washington, d.c. didn't matter. roosevelt said i won't give it to people that are criminals and went instead under bush. now, what bush organized was a civilian organization charged with coordinating the research. primarily funded by the military. and what they learned how to do
there was to operate big scientific research. used to be people had pretty simple research labs. you wanted to do research, you had a lab. you hired some people. you did research. now suddenly you had people all over the country. you had people here, you had people there. needed a lot of money. needed people who could organize the contracts, who could do the financing, who could obtain the resources. it was starting to become the big science that's the norm since then. and again, the changes that were made lasted well after the war was over. so let's get back to our example of radar. what happens with radar. well, by 1940, it is obvious that radar worked but it could be a lot better. you need to be better at discriminating the difference between airplanes and birds. you need to be better at picking up low flying or fast-moving airplanes. and so, the government decided to fund a research laboratory and again they confronted the
question of where do we put this lab? we talked earlier of the tension of government-funded research. on the one hand, you have got people who say it ought to go equally to all the states. why should one state get more money than another state? on the other hand, if you're in the middle of a war or if a war is eminent as it was in 1940, it turns out that people in some states don't have much in the way of research infrastructure. and people in other states do. and so, the lab that was going to study radar was set up at the massachusetts institute of technology. now, they called it the rad lab. r-a-d. rad lab. that was actually an attempt to be deceitful trying to confuse people to think they were studying radiation physics and in 1940 didn't seem like a big topic for investigation. well, radar turned out to be terribly important, at least a couple of different examples. you've heard of the battle of
britain. hitler wanted to invade britain. operation sea lion in 1940 to smash britain's air force. germany had a lot more attack planes than britain had defense planes but using radar they were able to see the planes coming, use the fighters effectively and as you know, germany never did, in fact, success in invading england much to the surprise of many people at the time. the other place where it was perhaps even more important had to do with submarines. the german u-boats were wreaking havoc on american convoys. they emitted confusing sonar signals. it was hard to find them but it turns out they needed to surface to take in fresh air and recharge batteries and when they resurfaced, airplanes with radar could see them up to five miles away. how effective? consider this. in january and february of 1942,
without using radar, allied forces put in 8,000 hours of patrol in the atlantic and managed to only one 4 submarines to attack. over a two-month period. the very first night a plane went out with radar installed, they found four submarines and they sunk one of them. so it's that kind of effectiveness of radar that made its importance grow over the course of the war. it showed that organized research could make a difference. and it has been said possibly accurately that the atom bomb ended the war. but radar won it. a few more examples of the kinds of big, physical science research. this is the slide that shows the monthly losses of german submarines and you can see between 1941 and 1942 there's not a lot. then they bring in radar and all
of a sudden it goes up. these are examples of early computers. in this case, computers means people who are doing computation. eventually we then move to electronic computers. another innovation was operations research. which meant using statistics and geometry to figure out the best way to find a submarine in the ocean. or the best way to organize your bomber squad so it would be unlikely to get shot down. this required some social engineering, as well. bush wanted the approach the secretary of the navy. the chief of naval operations was so tough that he was said to, quote, shave every morning with a blow torch. he wasn't really all that interested of civilian ideas about how to run his navy. however, the success of the operation together with the promise that first of all the navy would be in charge of
everything and second of all the operations research scientists wouldn't take credit for anything managed to convince him and the radar and it got results. other kinds of results, u.s. merchant vessels that used to take 35 weeks to be built were being built in 50 days. in 1939, the u.s. army air corps had 800 planes. by the end of the war, in 1944, just down the road they were making almost 5,500 each year. proximity fuse that enabled munitions to explode when they got close to their target without actually having to hit it changed the entire strategy of warfare. so all of these research ideas from mathematics and the physical sciences convinced people that scientific research was something worth funding and
worth doing and that it would make a difference in the war effort. so let's switch now to biological research that went on during the war. that's physical science research. poison gas. mustard gas. one of the most dreaded weapons of the first world war. concerns that it was going to be used widely in the second world war. the problem with mustard gas is that it's species specific. in order to test gas masks, to test protective clothing, you have to do the experiments on human beings. you can't do them on anybody else. so lots of experiments were done used musard gas. they were man break experiments to see how long before it takes a man to break. people were put in a chamber. the mustard gas produced and they weren't let out unless they
collapsed and unconscious even though they try very hard to get out. they were so-called volunteers. how voluntary were the volunteers? one person who was there said, quote, occasionally there have been individuals or groups who did not cooperate fully. a short explanatory talk and if necessary, a slight verbal dressing down is successful and not a single instance of which someone refused to voluntary. which makes me wonder if they were really volunteering. the idea there being that you owed something to the war effort if you weren't going overseas to fight, you needed to do something at home. now, mustard gas has many of yo know it's an early cancer chemotherapeutic agent and experiments at yale showed some efficacy treating cancer. the patients died but they were
better for a while, however secret results and they couldn't be published. what about epidemic diseases? always a problem in wartime. gonorrhea. this is the federal prison in indiana where experiments were done on gonorrhea. penicillin discovered in 1930s. it was not widely produced. in 1941, there wasn't enough penicillin in the united states to treat even one patient. in 1942, there was enough to treat one. osrd, the organization headed by bush organized not only clinical trials but only the production of penicillin. controlled protocols showed that it was incredibly effective for treating syphilis and gonorrhea. by the end of the war there was enough for army, civilians and some allies.
there was also interest in using it to see if you could prevent people who had been exposed to gonorrhea from getting gonorrhea. this touches on the complexity of the ethical issues to get to with the radiation experiments. the experiments were proposed here at the federal prison in terre haute, indiana. they were proposing to give these men gonorrhea and then see if penicillin is used to treat it. but they knew it was likely to be sensitive. so in a mem ro from the head of the research, ann richards said when any risks are involved, volunteers only should be utilized as subjects and these only after the risks have been fully explained and after signed samt statements have been obtained which shall prove that the volunteer offered his services with full knowledge. now, this is a pretty clear indication of what you need to
do to do experiments on people that may harm them. it might have had wider applicability if it was not a secret memo. the experiments at terre haute were stopped after a short time because it turned out it was more difficult than you might think to give people gonorrhea. they were not stopped totally and in another series of experiments we touched on in another class some of the same people involved in the united states went down to guatemala and continued these experiments after the war. but that's another story. malaria. tremendous problem. in sicily, north africa, the pacific theater and you heard of ashley about some of the efforts to e raid kate malaria. some people thought it was the biggest medical problem of the war. it was harder to treat in the war because quinine, most effective for malaria, came from
plants primarily in areas occupied by our enemies. atabrine was another. you can see these men did not take the atabrine. experiments were done using prisoners. we'll come back to prisoners later on in the lecture. one famous subject for the malaria experiments was nathan leopold who had kidnapped somebody at the university of chicago and leopold and low was a famous cause celebre. this image on the malaria in the illinois and led to issues in the nurmburg trials and a question of whether prisoners can give informed consent. but important as the medical research were, doctors were not the star scientists. the people that really were the most important for the research in the second world war came from not medicine was physics.
this is a statue at the university of chicago by henry moore entitled "nuclear energy." dan kevlitz has a wonderful book called "physicists." in the 1930s, scientists trying to understand pure science or trying to understand the nature of the atom and probably the most exciting scientific news in 1939 was the fusioning of the uranium nucleus and that happened in germany. it's the question then arose, if there's energy can be derived from splitting the atom, can you make a bomb? nobody was quite sure. it might be possible. you needed to be able to separate isotopes. need to get uranium-235 from the abundant uranium 238. there's a wonderful play called
copenhagen. any of you seen or red copenhagen in it's a great play. it sets up this question of the early years of the war and whether or not you could make a bomb. it revolves around what we know was a true interaction between hizenburg, probably the most brilliant physicist of the 20th century and i'm including einstein if that generalization and niles bore who worked out the theory of the atom. it took place in copenhagen, this meeting. hizenberg came and visiting board. we know what happened in that meeting. we know they had a split. they used to be very close. and we know that hizenberg went back to germany and we know that shortly afterwards germany gave up its attempts to make a nuclear bomb. figured that the problems in making a bomb were so great that
we wouldn't be able to make a bomb. and one of the great historical questions about this episode, which is, again, very nicely set up in the play, is -- i mean, speculate why. what happened. that hizenberg made a math error or did he question whether or not it's a good idea? really horrible thing to speculate on suppose germany had been able to make a nuclear bomb. i mean, they were dropping bombs on central london as the war wound down. i don't think there's any doubt if they had an atomic bomb they would have dropped an atomic bomb if they could on central london but they didn't. making the bomb was hard. required technical and social innovations. you had to separate the isotopes. you had to figure out if a chain reaction could be controlled. you needed to have large production plants to make large quantities of material.
you had to get scientists and people in the military working together which wasn't that easy. some of the work was done at existing universities like the university of chicago. some of it was done in facilities specifically built for the government like a lieu tone yum works on the columbia river in washington state near hanford, washington. it's a site to which we'll return. so let's turn now to events at the university of chicago, not very far from where we're sitting right here. let's turn to stagg field. this is stagg field in 1927. university of chicago played there. anybody know who the first person to win the heisman trophy was? and where he went to school? obviously the answer is the university of chicago. jay berwanger won the heisman
trophy at illinois university. a founding member of the big ten football conference. they eventually -- here we see some action takes place out on stagg field. the university of chicago's an interesting institution. i had the opportunity to spend sometime there. the stadium fell into disrepair and here you see a chart which shows the joseph reaganstein library which stands so -- imagine this if you can. they tore down their football stadium to build a library. true story. they actually did. they also left the big ten in 1946. and it left room for another member to join the big ten to make up the full compliment of ten. of course in 1949, michigan state university was admitted to the big ten. so the university of chicago left. michigan state came in. they had a president who famously was known to observe that whether i feel like
exercising i lie down until the feeling goes away. so they were not big into the intercollegiate sports scene. however, in 1942, they still were in the big ten and stagg field still existed. it had squash courts. under the stadium. and it was on those squash courts that an event transpired that truly changed the course of history. december 2nd, 1942. they had all kinds of bricks laid up there. in the squash courts. this is an artist depiction of the event. there were no photographers present. we don't have any photographs. fairmy, very famous physicist was there to see if they could have a self-sustained nuclear reaction.
there were cadmium rods that were soaking up. the clicks of the neutron counters increased. said to sound like crickets chirping. and finally, the power went critical showing that, in fact, you could have a self-sustaining nuclear reaction. the code word sent back to headquarters, the italian navigator has landed in the new world. so under this -- under the stands of stagg field at the university of chicago, found out that we actually had the capacity to build in theory a nuclear bomb. the story then shifts. in order to build this bomb, we needed to get some really, really smart people and it had to be done in secret. because we didn't know that germany was not going to be able to make a bomb or japan. and so, here in los alamos, new
mexico, in an altitude of 7,500 feet north of albuquerque was gathered perhaps the greatest collection of nuclear physicists the world has ever seen. sometimes as many as eight nobel laureates will be sitting around dining together in the dining room. it's incredibly isolated. they cooked on hot plates because the wood stoves didn't work so well. they took these physicists from the radar research, they took them from all over the country, they were part of a system that cost eventually about $2 billion. they worked in complete secrecy to develop a nuclear weapon, to develop what they thought would be a nuclear weapon. they weren't sure. finally on july 16th, 1945, at ground zero shown here in new mexico, the first nuclear bomb exploded.
question, what do we do now? this is a subject that's been debated a lot more now i think than it was then. president truman was president and he'd seen what happens when it happened in world war i. he wanted unconditional surrender from japan. the emperor wasn't much in the mood to negotiate. meanwhile, the u.s. military was working its way across the pacific ocean. in some pretty brutal, brutal battles. iwo jima. four weeks, 30,000 u.s. casualties. okinawa, 12 weeks. 50,000 u.s. casualties. 90,000 japanese troops. 100,000 civilians. we thought this was going to be a rehearsal for invading japan. if we invaded japan, that's what it was going to be like.
we also weren't sure if the bomb would work consistently. it went off once. you could spend a course on the development of the atomic bomb. a lot of things might not work. germany decided it wouldn't work. we weren't sure if we tried it again if it was going to work again. in any event, the decision was made and on august the 6th, 1945, the anola gay dropped an atomic bomb on hiroshima. there were 350,000 people alive in hiroshima on the 5th of august. 140,000 of them were dead the next day. war's hell. this is a picture of hiroshima after the bomb blast. i have a colleague who grew up in tokyo shortly after the war. he was born shortly after the war and lived on the fourth floor of an apartment building
and he said you could see for miles. just to give you a sense of how much was wiped out. i mean, if you have been to tokyo, you know that the city is quite densely built now but after the war, he said he could see for miles. on august 9th, we dropped another atomic bomb on nagasaki. picture on top shows nagasaki before the bomb. the picture on the bottom shows nagasaki after the bomb. and the war came to an end. on the 50th anniversary of the bombing of hiroshima, the smithsonian institution attempted to do a display in which they would show the anola gay, the airplane from which the bomb was dropped. and it was so politically charged and so politically sensitive that they eventually threw their hands up and said -- they wanted to have an interpretive exhibit, they wanted to have a discussion of
what was going on, they wanted to put things in context. but whatever they tried ran into protests and disruptions and objections. they eventually said, we just can't do it and so they simply showed the plane with a factual plaque and no other discussion. 50th anniversaries are usually the toughest. 25th anniversaries, everybody still agrees with the original intent. 100th anniversary is nobody's left so there's nobody there who can complain who says i was there. 50th anniversaries are hard. the statue by the way was put up on the 25th anniversary of the first self sustaining nuclear reaction. i used to walk past this on my way to school every day. it's more or less on the spot where this reaction took place. so, what we have in a sense here is the triumph of big science. we spent $2 billion and we had an atomic bomb. what should we do now? the war is over.
what are we going to do about long-term control? after all, the bomb is based on the laws of natural which are available to everybody. the united states proposed a comprehensive evaluation on site inspections to survey and control all yue wran yum deposits and relinquish our arsenal and scientific information. the soviet union proposed an immediate ban on the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. the united states said the soviets were asking the united states to give up their monopoly and make everything public before they agreed to comply. the u.s. said the soviets were being unreasonable. nothing happened and the cold war started. the cold war is where a lot of the radiation experiments took place. some of them started in the second world war. most of them in the cold war. what was the cold war all about? europe was divided. now, don't forget that the
united states and the soviet union were allies. we were partners in the second world war. we were on the same side. no longer. tongue took over china. we had only a handle of warheads and only a few long-range missiles. of course, to no one's surprise in 1949, the soviet union obtained an atomic weapon. we got a hydrogen bomb in 1952. the soviets got a hydrogen bomb in 1953. we raced to develop more and more efficient ways of raining down destruction on each other. this is a titan-2 missile. this is the cull by nation that came along a little later. this missile which you can see is no longer functional, there's a girder covering the outlet, this is the only one that still exists. this is outside of tucson, arizona. this missile carried 600 times
the destructive power of the bomb that landed on hiroshima. 600 times. there were three cities, wichita, little rock and tucson, each one of them had 18 different sites. people who ran this missile were sitting underground. they didn't know where the missile was targeting. they had keys. they each had to turn the key simultaneously for the missile to be fired. b-52s went overhead. the idea here was mutually assured destruction. the idea here is we've got overwhelming nuclear power and if you attack us, we'll attack you. kind of like as somebody said, two scorpions in a bottle. each knowing if one stings the other, they both die. and that's why i wanted you to watch dr. strangelove because
"dr. strangelove" on the one hand it's a farce, black comedy, i one of stanley kubrick's greatest ever. he had but it really gives you a sense of what the cold war was like. it's not a coincidence that if you notice at the very beginning of the movie, there is a disclaimer that says this is fictional and the u.s. military says there is no way this could actually happen. but the notion of b-52 bombers being poised to take off and overfly russia and deliver unbelievable destruction was real. i don't think there really was a doom's day machine, but it was a doom's day scenario. i personally grew up in columbus, mississippi, which is the home of a strategic air command base. and i was there when the base
was closed during the cuban missile crisis, as is depicted in "dr. strange love." they closed the base. and that's real. and people sat at the end of a runway ready to jump no a b-52 and go nuke everything. this is the war room, one of my favorite lines is "there's no fighting in the war room, gentlemen." what did you guys think of "strange love?" did you like it? glad you watched it? it's great. this is, of course, major tj king kong riding the bomb down. this is a role originally offered to john wayne, but he turned it down. well, this affected the way people lived. and, again, we're going to get to the experiments in a second. you got to understand, how do we live? this is a manual for survival under atomic attack. if you happened to be bombed, don't rush right outside. don't take chances. this is a real -- illustration. if you're -- if the nuclear weapon is coming and you don't have anywhere to go, jump into a trench and cover yourself up
with drying laundry. that will protect you from the heat. so people lived with this notion of what do we do if there is a nuclear attack? fallout shelters. shown here. and reflected in dr. strange love, of course, the idea there is people will go underground and survive forever. people had fallout shelters and they kept them stopped. and we had ethical discussions. i remember in high school, what do you do if you have only got enough food and water for one family and another family wants to come and jump into your fallout shelter? i think a more realistic question is, if a nuclear war really comes and you manage to get into your fallout shelter, just what do you think you're coming out to when you finally come out? the korean war. there were -- this was a cold war, but it was a very hot war in many very real sense. senses.
we competed on many grounds. when sputnik went up in october 1957, it was a huge deal. the soviet union was supposed to be a backward state, we were supposed to be much better than them, and all of a sudden they launched a satellite. and every 90 minutes, that satellite was coming around the globe. and the next thing, they announced another satellite. and this one had a dog in it. and they sent back telemetry showing that the dog was still alive. and so we decided we're going to launch a satellite too. and on december the 6th, we tried to launch a satellite from cape canaveral, only it didn't work. so we're in this conflict with the soviet union. it's not entirely clear that we're winning. finally, the last part of the cold war ethos i want to mention is the cuban missile crisis which comes along in 1962. as you may recall, the united states saw evidence of the soviet union putting missiles in cuba, just south of us.
we said bring them out. we put a blockade around cuba. and we danced around the question of nuclear war for some time until eventually a deal was struck and we did not have a nuclear war. so i don't want to talk about specific experiments that went on once you have a sense of what life was like. but let me just pause. any questions thus far about the cold war, what life was like during the cold war? what the ethos was like? okay. we're going to talk about experiments. some of the things we're going to talk about are informed or not. were people told what the experiments were all about or not? we're going to talk about experiments done on patients. on children. on the general population. we are not going to touch on soldiers being used for radiation experiments. that's a fascinating topic. it's just -- we don't have time
for that. it's a whole other topic. and we're going to talk about both the actual risk as we now understand it and what people understood then about the risk. but our story, we have to go back to los alamos. up in the mountains. people weren't sure they could get enough uranium 235, and so a guy named glen seborg, who is a native of michigan helped to derive a new element called plutonium. plutonium was named after the planet pluto. now, it should have been plutium, if you think about it but he just liked the way plutonium sounded better. so that's why we call it plutonium. seborg went on to get the noble prize and chancellor at berkeley, very active in arms control later in his life. of now, what were the health effects of this plutonium thing? it didn't seem to penetrate the
skin. but what about if you ingested it? what if the radioactive material was swallowed? we knew that was not good for you, because in the interwar period, there were women who were painting luminous dials on watches. if you have a glow in the dark watch in those days, it had radium on it, and so these women were paid to paint the dials on the watch. and they had very fine-grain brushes, and they would put the brush in their mouth to get the tip just exactly right and then they would paint the wash and swallow the radium and get a bunch of not so good diseases. so we knew that ingesting plutonium was probably dangerous. we knew what the characteristics were of radium but not of plutonium. so in 1944, in room d-119, a 23-year-old chemist by the name of don mastic, promising young graduate of berkeley, was working in los alamos with plutonium.
like so many things in medicine, this started with a mistake. potentially pretty serious mistake. he got it in his mouth. he could taste the acidic taste of the plutonium. he tried to spit out everything he could. they called for help, and he swished his mouth out every 15 minutes. did it 12 times. they pumped his stomach, they tried to extract out as much as possible. this is very valuable stuff. this is all the plutonium in the world. we're trying to build an atomic bomb and the stuff we could extract from his stomach may be what we need for the bomb. he didn't seem to have any horrible ill effects, except for many weeks thereafter, if he walked into a room and just blew across the room, the radiation counters would go nuts, go off the scale. but we knew that he wasn't going to be the first person to invest plutonium. and we didn't know what it did. we didn't know what the health
effects were. so we started to do a series of experiments. not at los alamos where there really wasn't very much in the way of medical facilities. but at oak ridge, at rochester, at the university of chicago. and at others. first patient was at oak ridge. 53-year-old african-american man was a cement worker named ebb cade. he was in a car accident. he was injected with 4.7 micrograms of plutonium. he wasn't told that he was being injected. he wasn't told what it was. the remember, the very word plutonium was top secret. the fact that it existed was top secret. but we wanted to see what would happen and how it would be excreted. experiments went on to the university of chicago. first person was a 68-year-old man with an advanced cancer of
the mouth and lung and the next was a 55-year-old woman with breast cancer. so here they were trying, it would appear, to pick patients who were likely to die. the third was a young man with hodgkin's. the last two got 95 micrograms. remember, the first guy got 4.7 micrograms. the last two got 95 micrograms. that's a whole lot more. and we learned that the excretion rate was different. that the fecal excretion rate was lower in humans than it was in animals. so that was useful information in trying to predict what would happen to people who ingested plutonium. again, it's unclear if the people who we injected with this plutonium were even told what they were being injected with. similar kinds of things happened at other institutions, as well. the massachusetts general hospital took patients with
brain cancer. 11 patients with brain cancer, termnally ill, injected with uranium. one didn't actually have brain cancer. they thought he did. he actually had some bleeding into his brain. so all these experiments were done without getting consent, without informing patients in order that we could continue to build bombs and take care of the people who were helping to build these bombs. the last set of experiments -- i'll go into a little more detail, happened in cincinnati. between 1960 and 1972. so-called total body irradiation. or whole body irradiation. they were done in other places, as well, houston, baylor, memorial, sloan-kettering in new york. the theory was, if you had con cancer, we knew that radiation could be used to treat cancer,
maybe irradiating your whole body, total body irradiation, would help slow the cancer. actually, we had some pretty good evidence at this point that it didn't work. for the cancer. but the department of defense was very interested in the effects of total body irradiation. because if there is a nuclear war, and people get irradiated, are they going to be able to function? will a pilot who is flying a plane be able to land the plane? will they be able to fight if there's -- will they be able to work? ironically, the people they wanted to do this experiment on were precisely the people who were least likely to derive any benefit from it. we knew that certain kinds of cancer were sensitive to radiation. so irradiating those patients might expect to help them.
but then the side effects of the radiation would be the side effects of the cancer and the department of defense wasn't particularly interested in the effects of radiation on people with metastatic cancer. they wanted to know what the effects of cancer were on a healthy 23-year-old pilot. and that could be best studied by irradiating people whose cancers were not going to respond to the radiation. most of the patients who were irradiated were poor. most of the patients who were irradiated were african-american. all of them had cancer. some of them weren't all that sick. some of them were still ambulatory. some of them were still going to work. and the radiation had some pretty serious effects. out of the 90 people who were irradiated, 21 of them were dead within a month.
and here's what's -- the -- there are many things that are bothersome about this. we know when you irradiate people, you get side effects. you get nauseated. you get very nauseated. but the department of defense didn't want the patients to be given medicines to reduce the nausea, because they wanted to know what the effects would be without the medicines to reduce the nausea. as a matter of fact, they didn't even want the patients to be informed that nausea might be a side effect, because that might influence them to get nauseated. so these patients were not even given the basic medicines that were given to other people at the time. to help prevent the side effects of the irradiation. these experiments -- let's say ended in 1972. 1972 is the date you'll remember. of course, that's when the tuskegee experiments became public.
that's when a lot of things happened. we'll move on in a second to radiation experiments on children. any questions about these radiation experiments? yes. >> was this before informed consent? >> the question is, was this before informed consent. >> that's a very good question. and it raises all sorts of issues. not to play word games, but the question is what is meant by informed consent. and the notion of informed consent as we now understand it hadn't really been fully articulated, although there is the court case of 1914 of schaumburg versus new york hospital, established a patient has the right to decide what happens to his or her own body.
the memo that i showed you earlier for the terre haute gonorrhea experiment suggested in 1942, the head of the committee on medical research thought that something very much like informed consent was absolutely essential. clearly, that was not being followed here. we'll talk about sources in a little bit. but one of the questions is how do you know if somebody had informed consent? what we have in some of the physicians claimed they got informed consent. but there's not documentary evidence of it. there was a lawsuit, by the way, and as a result of this, a plaque now sits in the hospital in cincinnati. other questions. all right. the walter e. ferdinand school in boston. research funded by the national institutes of health, the atomic energy commission and quaker oats. this was an experiment on breakfast food. in which children were given
breakfast food with radioactive iron and calcium to see how that food would be absorbed. the rationale for this was that quaker wanted to get a leg up on cream of wheat. they wanted to be able to show that their cereals were better absorbed and better spread throughout the body. i'm not making this up. how do they get them to do this? here's an excerpt from a letter. letter to parents, 1953. we have done some examinations in connection with the nutritional department of the massachusetts institute of technology. with the purpose of helping to improve the nutrition of our children. i want to point out that just like we saw if you'll remember in some of the letters in the tuskegee experiments, asking the men to come in for a spinal puncture, which you had up at the top of the letter the names of institutions like the tuskegee institute or the alabama state board of health. here, massachusetts institute of technology, a very
well-respected, highly regarded boston institution. the blood samples are taken after one test meal, which consists of a special breakfast containing a certain amount of calcium. and if you sign up for this, you get to be a member of a science club. and if you're a member of the science club, you get additional privileges. you get a quart of milk daily. you get to go to a baseball game and to the beach and to some outside dinners. nothing in here that says we're going to give you radioactive tracers. all right. this raises all sorts of questions similar to the ones we talked about with the willow brook experiments. the willow brook experiments, by the way, i think i might not have mentioned, were also funded in part by the military, the armed forces were interested in a vaccine. and that's why they funded some of those experiments. this raises questions. first of all, can children give informed consent?
are parents being coerced? if your child -- this was not a great institution, by the way. this was not a place you really wanted to be. did parents really feel like they had any sort of choice? a quarter of milk a day may not seem like a big deal but if you don't have it, is this too much coercion. it turns out that when you look at this critically the levels of radiation that they got probably didn't hurt them very much or at all. nonetheless this raises questions about whether it is appropriate to do experiments on institutionalized children without informing either them for their parents. any questions about the fernal experiments? okay.
let's move to oregon. so this is the cold war and we're into radiation. the idea of nuclear power is very big. the hope is that we will soon have nuclear powered airplanes quite seriously being discussed. pilots who are flying nuclear powered airplanes will be exposed to a lot of radiation. who else, space flight. people who go up in space. nasa is interested in this. people who work with nuclear power. if there is a nuclear attack, people will be exposed to radiation. what are they worried about? when they talk to potential crew members on nuclear planes they were especially concerned about damage to what was euphemistically in the kinder gentler years referred to as the family jewels. testicles contain rapidly dividing cells.
thus, if there's radiation exposure, those are cells that you would expect to be more likely to be hit by the radiation. this could produce chromosomal damage and potentially problems for your progeny down the road. testicles also have the advantage in that they can more easily than some bodily organs can be irradiated without having to irradiate the entire body. so in the oregon state, in the washington state prisons, between 1963 and 1973, there were a series of radiation experiments done to determine the effect of irradiation on testicles. why prisoners? these were healthy men who weren't going anywhere for a while. also a way for them to pay back to society for what they've done. the experiments in oregon were
overseen by extremely prominent endocrinologist. a machine was made to irradiate the testicles. men were asked to lie on their stomach, testicles were placed in warm water so they would hang down and then they would be irradiated. this will be followed by biopsies and then a vasectomy. if it caused any damage, they didn't want the men having any children. the recruitment was purely by word of mouth suggesting that they knew that the atomic energy commission who was sponsoring this research saw it as sensitive and didn't want it to be too public. there was a loose and informal psychiatric examination and consultation with the chaplain. the chaplain was required to certify that the men in question were not roman catholic because if they were roman catholic they were not to have a vasectomy. there was no benefit to these
men in terms of their health. they did get money. they were paid 25 cents a day. they got $25 for a testicular biopsy. whether for $200 would you have a testicular biopsy or vasectomy and if i'm reading your facial expressions correctly, i'm guessing the answer for you is no. so these were another set of radiation experiments that went on in the prisons. they were stopped in 1970 because of changing environment. the administrators were concerned that prisoners could not fully consent. that's a valid concern. similar experiments were done in the washington state penitentiary. it's interesting to think for a moment about the use of
prisoners in human experimentation in general. the concerns about experimenting on prisoners in the 1940s and 50s were not the same as the ones we might have today. the main concern was that they wouldn't be adequately punished. if you were in a medical experiment you get special privileges. you get to go to the hospital. you will get better food. if you're in prison, you're supposed to be punished for your crimes. it was affirmed in the journal of the american medical association as being a legitimate way of doing experiments. by 1972 90% came from phase 1 drug trials. you have a new drug and you want to try it out and see what happens in gradually increasing doses, not as a treatment for disease, but to look for toxic effects. the experiments on prisoners were seen as being a privilege, perhaps not surprisingly tended to be more white than african
american prisoners. we were in the united states way out of touch with the rest of the world, almost the entire rest of the world, experimentation of prisoners was seen as not ethical and not appropriate. the nuremberg code says you can't coerce people into doing experiments. the idea was if you're in prison you can't make a free choice about what you're doing. eventually prison experiments in the united states became nonexistent. they came up in the hearings about the tuskegee experiments that kennedy had only for one day. prisoner experiments, any questions? this is hanford, washington. it's a lovely town on the columbia river.
it's remote and in 1942 it was the site for a plutonium factory. for many years it was the place where plutonium was made. it was picked for a couple of reasons. one, ready access to fresh water for cooling from the columbia river. second reason is that it was out of the way. if you're making plutonium, when plutonium is top secret, you want to be secret. here is a billboard. don't talk. silence means security. another sign loose talk to chain reaction from espionage. this is how they advertise it. atomic frontier day, new light on the old frontier. you're called that soviet union exploded its first bomb in 1945.
how did we know what they are doing? we know because radiation put in the atmosphere spreads all over the world and we can pick it up here. how do we interpret that? that's hard. we wanted to figure out what radiation is like when it was put in the atmosphere. how did you it come down? where did it come down? how could you detect it? what better way to find out what that was like than to release radiation from a plant, like hanford. these are the so-called green run experiments because the fuel that was used was young, or green. so they started releasing radioactivity into the atmosphere, so they could study how and win awhehen and where i down.
because this is top secret, they are not bothering to tell the people if the area that oh, by the way we'll be putting a lot of radiation into the atmosphere. there were problems. the weather wasn't what they expected or desired. they got more exposure at local sites. we now know that drinking milk from cows that graze on contaminated pastures is the main source of exposure for children. if you release the radiation, it lands on the fields, the cows eat the grass, children drink the milk. they did so with considerable secrecy. they pretended to be animal husbandry specialists from the department of agriculture to check it. if you're a spy, you think about taking on a false persona. this is in your backyard in the united states. you've got somebody working for the atomic energy commission claims to be an animal husbandry expert who wants to check your cows.
it's unclear how much damage was actually done. how many people were actually injured. it's also clear that there was probably more radiation released from the normal operations of the plants from 1944 to 1947 they released radiation by here is a cartoon showing hanford in the 19 40s and '50s, see people surrounded by fumes, kind of skeletal, i don't know if you can read on the back, it says, yes, sir, it is reassuring to know if we were in any kind of danger here, our government would let us know right away. so you lose enormous trust when you start dumping radiation out into the field. you're also now using the entire population as your experiment subjects. this was done not only in hanford, in a handful of other places.
there were nuclear explosions released to the atmosphere that impacted holy sites for the pueblo indians who live in close relationship to the land. this was done in the southwest. there was some concern and some observations that the spanish and native-americans tended to be more often down stream in the releases than the others. before i transition to how we know about this and how these experiments came to life, how questions about the experiments? how many of you knew about these experiments before this class? word of mouth or reading about them. word of mouth. >> in another history class. >> okay. >> how do we know about this. >> if they were top secret and they were top secret.
there were early reports and rumors that some americans had been injected with plutonium. a congressional report in 1986 was called america's nuclear guinea pigs. written in bland congressional language. a journalist wrote about the story and got names and faces. i mentioned a few people here. she wrote some incredible stories and has a wonderful book out called the plutonium files. but really we started to find out a lot more about these with the book that came out of a commission. this was the rather thick book.
this is from the advisory committee on human relations experiments, it was created in january of 1994. president bill clinton ordered all federal agencies and a ton of tough was declassified. and one of the things that happened as a result of this book and this commission was that the declassified documents are now publicly available. lots of people have gone to them and written about them. now, the commission that he formed was made up of historians, philosophers, lawyers, radiologists, physicists, even a private citizen. they were deluged with inquiries of people who wondered if something had happened to them or to their loved ones, and one of the staff members here who is taping this shared with me that his father was actually at hanford in this period.
people wondered what was going on. they held lots of hearings. there were lots of groups of people who felt aggrieved. veterans, convicts, mothers. people in the wrong place at the wrong time. they grapple with the tension of how do you make judgments, how do you differentiate between wrongness of actions and blameworthiness of actions. it's one thing to say it is wrong. it is another thing to say who is to blame. they were asked to decide who should receive monetary damages. who deserves money for this that who was wronged enough that the government ought to pay. they came up with a fairly short list, and they were criticized for that. the report was released and president clinton apologized on october the 3rd, 1995. on the evening news that night,
i don't think it was even mentioned because also on october 3rd, 1995, the jury came down with the verdict in the o.j. simpson trial. so it's an example of bad timing to release a report. now this is a wonderful book. really a tremendous job of historical and policymaking research. you may have noticed that some of what i'm telling you has not been as crystal clear as it might be, and that is because the nature of historical research that many of the records of what happened are incomplete. we just don't know. some are contradictory. some things we don't have protocols for. you asked about informed consent. we don't know. maybe because it was being done in war time. maybe because it was top secret
maybe because nobody bothered to write it down. maybe because what we're doing here is a little dicey and maybe we don't want to keep records and maybe we need to lose these records. we don't know. i think the committee did as good a job as they possibly could of finding out as much as they possibly could about this. a fundamental question they grappled with is how do we make retrospective judgments. how do we assess what people did in the past from our own perspective? a lot of the concepts of informed consent were not fully articulated until well after this time, so not really fair to go back and say, well, they didn't do things the way they would have done. the committee did come up with a method of making retrospective.
that i think makes a lot of sense. first of all, they said there are certain basic ethical princip principles that stand the test of time and place. they then of course pointed out that all of those ethical principles have exceptions. then they said there are certain policies of government departments or agencies, you ought to follow the policies of wherever you're working. the problem here is that if the policies are secret, how do you know about them? finally, they said there are the rules of professional ethics that people need to pay attention to. they did conclude and i agree that it's not okay to just use people because they are dying. some of the rationale for some of the plutonium experiments and radiation experiments and other injections was that these people
are dying and we might as well get some information from them. being ill and hospitalized did not justify that. you still have to respect them as people. so what are key lessons from the radiation experiments. i've only scratched the surface. i hope you will go and read more about them, in arlene wilson's book, jonathan moreno has a wonderful book on the history of the experiments, these human irradiation experiment books, a lot more detail. one of the lessons is the medicine and the quest for knowledge has to be looked at it the in a specific political, economic, social context. it can't be understood if you take it out of the context. these radiations experiments started in the context of a world war and ended in the context of a cold war which
turned quite hot on occasion, which was characterized by secrecy, which was characterized by fear that these weapons could be used against us. nonetheless some of the features that came out of these experiments continue to this day. large scale research, big research, for the idea that if you want to do a big project, that you can get government funding to do huge big protocols. even smaller protocols have to do with the era that this is coming out of. people got used to the idea that they ought to be funded it do research and many institutions are built on this notion that people doing science, people doing physics, people doing medicine should get funding, should get the funding they need to do the research. one of the casualties of these
experiments is trust. even if nobody got hurt, there aren't very many people who think for example that it's a good idea to give children radioactive oatmeal without telling everybody or to release radiation from a plutonium plant to see what happens. even if at the end of the day, nobody got hurt. i think it impedes. the kind of trust that helps to bind society together in the best possible examples. what i tried to do was give you sebs of the radiation experiments, and what happened. we got just a few minutes. let me see if there are any questions or comments. okay. well, thank you all for your attention and we'll see you on
monday at the medical science building two. the instructions are going to be sent in a message with details. thank you very much. [ applause ] later today, how to combat terrorism from the military, diplomatic, governmental and academic perspective. and let's take a look at future terrorist challenges and offer recommendations to improve preparedness. we have it live at 12:00 eastern, here on c-span3. the c-span radio app makes it easy to continue to follow the 2016 election wherever you are. it is free to downloot from the apple app store or google play. get audio coverage and up to the minute schedule information for c-span radio and c-span television, plus podcast times for our popular public affairs, book and history programs. stay up to date on all the election coverage.
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presidential and vice presidential debates on c-span. listen live on the free c-span radio app or watch anytime on demand at c-span.org. next on lectures in history, college of the ozarks professor david dalton teaches an american history survey course on colinization. in this lecture, he discusses the origins of the cold war following the end of world war ii. this is about an hour and 15 minutes. each week american history tv sits in on a lecture with one of the country's college professors. you can watch the classes here every saturday at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern and sundays at 11:00 a.m. eastern. college of the ozarks professor david dalton teaches an american history survey course that covers colinization to the present. in this lecture, he discusses the origins of the cold war following the end of world war ii. college of the ozarks is located in point lookout, missouri.
this is about an hour and 15 minutes. >> good afternoon, folks. a quick question. all right, where did i stop last time? we dropped two atomic bombs on japan, correct? august 6th, august 9th. all right, today what we're going to do is to talk about the post-war world. roughly defined 1945 to 1960, we're going to try to get through the 50s today if we can. focus today is primarily on what's known as the cold war. that's sort of an odd term. cold war. but of chronologically we're talking about roughly 1945 up through about 1989 or so. when were you guys born? >> '92. >> you have no concept of the cold war. but this is a term that's
applied to post world war ii period to talk about the conflicts between the united states and the soviet union. we are going to emerge from world war ii as the two great global superpowers and this post-war world is literally a struggle between the u.s. and the ussr for global supremacy. it is a cold war simply because we, the united states, could not come into direct military conflict with the soviet union. we're going to be battling them all around the world for global supremacy. but never directly. this is -- this is the most important foreign policy issue of the last half of the 20th century, the cold war. it encompasses what's going on in europe after world war ii. it encompasses the fall of china, the communism, korea, vietnam, all kinds of topics that we'll talk about over the next couple of weeks.
so, it not only has a foreign component. we're also going to talk today what's going on, the effects of the cold war here at home. and we'll talk about presidential elections. about a domestic issue known as the red scare, sort of the second red scare. and how the united states is sort of going to be gripped with suspicions and paranoia about all things communist. so a lot of ground to cover today in terms of foreign policy and domestic policy. all right, so we're going to start with the origins of the cold war. where do we start? well, let's go back really to 1941. last class period when we discussed the war itself, one of the mistakes that i mentioned that hitler made was when he invaded russia in the summer of 1941. he tried to have sort of a second kind of blitzkrieg to get in, get out and knock the russia, the soviet union out of this war. it didn't happen. an early winter, he gets bogged
down and then eventually in december of '41, the russian red army gets up and begins to counterattack. hitler gets bogged down in the soviet union. one of the things about the invasion led me to this interesting quote. take a look at this for a second and without the author, tell me who you think. this can be attributed to. >> churchill. >> winston churchill. prime minister of great britain. interesting quote. we're going to have strange bedfellows here in world war ii. winston churchill, prime minister of great britain, franklin roosevelt, president of the united states and our ally in our war against hitler is going to be joseph stalin. interesting quote. if hitler invaded hell, i'd at least make a favorable reference to the devil in the house of commons. war makes strange bedfellows. and in this case, we have the united states, great britain, long ties, long sympathies,
long-time connection history and culture, and yet we also now have the soviet union as our ally to defeat the common foe of adolph hitler. so the leader of the soviet union, joseph stalin. what do we know about stalin early in the war? not much. what we know now is an awful lot. the greatest murderer of the 20th century. imprisoned more of his people into camps, murdered more of his own people than hitler killed jews. he is a ruthless brutal, paranoid dictator for the soviet union. now, when i say paranoid, i mean sort of schizophrenic kind of paranoid. he is paranoid about the safety and security of his country. two times now they've been invaded from the west by germany, world war i and world war ii. there's no natural boundary that
separates, there's no division on his western front that would be an obstacle that would prevent other nations from invading. and so twice now, his country has been invaded and his people have suffered the consequences. he's very paranoid about the safety and security of his western front. he's also paranoid again about his own position of power. we have on the one hand democracy, capitalism, free enterprise in the west and we have this sort of totalitarian dictatorship in the east. he's very paranoid about the attempts to solidify his power or attempts that he would be thrown out of power. one of the things that he is going to make or make known early in the war is that he has some demands. one obviously is going to be a western front. hitler's army is bogged down in russia. the russian people are suffering. the russian red army is suffering the consequences of this. he wants or really is going to
demand that the allies, meaning primarily great britain and the united states will open up a second front in europe to help his army in the east. that would draw some of hitler's forces from the eastern front and allow his army to gain some momentum. try to drive them out of their country. he wants a western front. another demand that he has, or a consequence of this first demand is that when we actually do attack in europe, it's not actually in europe. that's not until 1944. american forces first go into battle in north africa. he doesn't like that at all. he wants a western european front. in his paranoid ways, he is thinking that we do this intentionally. we don't attack in western europe to help him in the east. we actually are attacking in north africa, which is very little of concern or help to him. he thinks we're doing this almost intentionally so that the nazi forces in russia could
continue to wear down the russian forces in the east. he's -- that's not the case. we talked about this last time. where we're trying to stretch hitler's forces thin. we're trying to make him stretch his resources until something snaps, fighting a three-front war instead of a two-front war. but in stalin's mind, our third front in north africa was intentional to punish his people. we don't like communists so this is a way that we are trying to destroy them. and the other thing that he's going to make known to the west to churchill, to roosevelt, is that he wants protection. when this war is over and we are victorious, meaning we meaning the allies are victorious, he wants a buffer zone of protection. but he wasn't very specific. that is, he wants to be able to protect his country from any further invasions.
does he want 50 miles? does he want 500 miles? does he want part of a country, all of a country, more than one country? he's not very specific on what he wants in terms of this buffer zone of protection. he'll get specific later. but the here early in the war, we're sort of uneasy allies to defeat common foe in hitler. we know a little bit about stalin. we know some of his demands, some of his philosophies. but we'll learn much more about him as time goes on. so what's roosevelt's response? president roosevelt guiding us through the great depression, now into war. roosevelt believes that the best way to the win this war senior -- is to cooperate with stalin. if there is one term that i could give you that is synonymous with roosevelt's foreign policy in dealing with the soviet union, it is simply cooperation. don't antagonize stalin. yeah, our systems may be
different. democracy, capitalism on the one hand, communism, socialism on the other. we may be very different in terms of our political and economic systems and institutions. but we have to cooperate with each other to defeat adolph hitler. and that is going to be the driving force in roosevelt's foreign policy in dealing with stalin. we're going to go along, get along as far as we can and as far as that will take us. well, the first time that roosevelt, churchill and stalin meet is in 1943 in tehran. they've communicated with each other with telegrams and the like, but never face to face. they probably already developed some predisposed notions of what the other guy is, what he looks like, what he likes to do, that sort of thing. but the first face to face meeting of the "big three" stalin, roosevelt, churchill, is in 1943 in tehran.
they are going to be talking about several items. foremost on their list is, the progress of the war and by 1943, the war's going well. if you'll remember from last time by 1943, we have already driven the german forces out of north africa, an invasion of sicily and an invasion of italy by now. the russian red army is beginning to push the nazis out of their country. we are also in the planning stages of operation overlord, d-day. all of this is happening by the time these guys meet in 1943. and so it's a pretty friendly meeting. it's a cordial meeting. they're getting to know each other. they're exchanging, you know, pleasantries, telling jokes. it's sort of a very cordial atmosphere. roosevelt even commented that you know, this guy stalin, he's not so bad after all. thinking that i can cooperate with him.
we'll be able to get along. and so the progress of the war really dictates that this is a fairly pleasant meeting. they're also going to be planning for the post-war world when this war is over, we need to be able to cooperate with each other to figure out what peace will look like. one of the things that comes out of tehran is stalin is just insisting this operation overlord, this invasion of normandy, this western front that i've been asking for, it's going to happen, right? yes, we're in the final stages of this planning. it is going to happen. in exchange for that, stalin informs roosevelt that once hitler is defeated, once hitler is defeated, his nation will declare war on japan. that hadn't happened yet. we're fighting japan in the pacific. soviet union has not declared war on japan. here in tehran, stalin tells
roosevelt, you guys go ahead with the d-day. we defeat hitler and with three months, within three months of hitler's defeat, the soviet union will declare war on japan. and help you, the americans, defeat this nation. so it's a very friendly kind of cordial meeting. the next time they get together, it's a little bit different. in february of 1945, the big three meet for a second time. it's known as the yalta conference. this is on the black sea. this time, things have changed because if you'll remember everywhere last class period, by the early part of 1945, the red army is driving deep into germany by now. they've already pushed the nazis out of their country all the way
through poland and into germany and they are knocking on the door of berlin. the western allies, the americans, the british, well, we got slowed down a little bit along that way. what was that? >> battle of the bulge. >> battle bulge. that's going to slow us down in our race to get to berlin. they get there first. we talked about that last time. so what i'm getting at is, when these guys meet again at yalta, the situation favors the soviet union. they are closer to berlin. they are going to get there first and so stalin uses that as a little bit of leverage. he's no longer sort of going to cooperate with the americans and the british. he's going to start making demands. this is what i want in the post-war world. he begins to get more specific with his demands. one of which is poland. his buffer zone of protection is not 50 miles. he wants all of poland. i want a few other eastern european countries. not all of them, he said. i will allow for free elections
to be held in some of them. but he is starting to define what he wants in terms of spheres of influence. there's no negotiation on this. here's the big three again. and if you notice anything different about it, it's franklin roosevelt. this is the impact of war. as well as his health. he doesn't look well. some historians have said roosevelt really wasn't well at yalta, he wasn't at his best. but roosevelt's going to agree to some of stalin's demands, poland, for example. part of it is simply he's maintaining that philosophy of wanting to try to cooperate with this guy. i'm not going to antagonize you.
i want to cooperate with you. part of it might be he wasn't -- in fact, some historians claim part of the reason, you know, roosevelt gave in a little bit at yalta was he's simply not at his best. the fact is, he's not. six weeks later, a little over six weeks later, roosevelt is dead. we talked about this on tuesday. cerebral hemorrhage, april of '45. roosevelt is dead. the president who carried us through the depression, the new deal on the road to war and now almost, almost all the way through the war is gone. that brings a change. missouri's own harry truman now becomes president of the united states. very interesting circumstances, obviously. we are just about to wrap up the war in europe. we are i land hopping our way into japan.
i mean, it looks promising and yet, there are all kinds of pot holes along the way. we still have to finish the defeat of germany. we still have to finish off japan. how we do that, when we do that, and what are the consequences of what we're doing, that's the rest of the story. truman is going to meet with stalin and churchill in potsdam, germany, after hitler is defeated. i mean, it's a new big three now with harry truman being the president now instead of roosevelt. truman's attitude is going to be very different from that of roosevelt. and some indication of that change of u.s. policy comes right away.
remember i mentioned to you that even vice president harry truman had not been kept informed of the manhattan -- one of them is there are probably a few things you need to know, one of them is we have been working on a bomb. you know what, it is the biggest, baddest bomb around. here in potsdam, truman gets the word that it works. we have successfully detonated an atomic bomb. it works. and so he goes over to stalin and says to him, yeah, hitler's been defeated. we want to cooperate with you, but i need to let you in on a little secret. the secret is, we're going to end this war with japan because we have an atomic weapon, the likes of which, again, the world has never seen. that was supposed to be news to stalin.
it wasn't. he already knew. really ironic, our own vice president harry truman was sort of kept in the dark about the yet, stalin already knew. we already have soviet spies in the united states who had passed information along to stalin that we were working on it, we were close to it. he already knew we were very close having a successful nuclear weapon. well, what truman is going to do then is to give the japanese an opportunity to surrender. when they don't, we talked about this, we drop two. first on hiroshima august 6th when there was still no surrender, we dropped the second on nagasaki on august 9th and then eventually, the japanese surrender.
i mentioned to you the last time, the primary reason why truman dropped it, to save american lives. the estimates of americans -- what was the casualty if we were going to invade mainland japan, as high as perhaps a million american casualties. exactly. that was the primary reason why truman drops the bomb. today i will give you a secondary reason. it's possible that harry truman also decided to drop the bomb not just to save american lives but to signal a shift in foreign policy, to send joseph stalin a completely different message about the role of the united states and its relationship with the soviet union. we're going to drop this bomb to send you a signal that there's a new sheriff in town. roosevelt is dead and cooperation is dead. harry truman will have a completely different foreign policy objective. he's going to rely on this guy. this is george kinnen, our
so-called expert on all things soviet, all things stalin. george kennan probably knew more about the history of soviet union, its current status, than anybody else. he came to truman with a couple of themes, if you will. he said first, there can never be permanent or lasting peace. between the united states and the soviet union. we are simply two different countries. so don't even try. roosevelt tried to cooperate with them, and he's saying we're simply too different. the second thing that he told truman is that joseph stalin is
determined to undermine and overthrow free and democratic countries around the world. if you thought hitler was determined to take over the world, joseph stalin probably is. he will use every opportunity he can to spread communist around the world. therefore, what truman was hearing was a change in foreign policy. kennan is going to recommend that the united states not cooperate with the soviet union anymore but we need to contain the soviet union. this is a dramatic shift in u.s. foreign policy. containment. if stalin is trying to infiltrate this area or this country, we must be there, stop them, thwart them, hold them back, contain their expansion. this is what kennan is advising. and so the days of cooperation are gone. the days of containment are here. this is going to mean that the
united states is going to have a dramatic shift in foreign policy that largely lasts up to this day, where we are going to become sort of the big brother to the world. we are going to be involved in other countries around the world. the days of isolationism are gone now. how does containment play itself out? well, 1947 is a big year for the cold war. harry truman is now going to start to describe for the american people and for the world what containment actually means. there is trouble in greece and turkey. after world war ii, both greece and turkey are struggling financially, politically. there is rebellions. there is insurrections in these two countries. truman is going to develop what is known as the truman doctrine in which the united states is going to send over $400 million
in economic assistance to greece and turkey. now, brief explanation. this is exactly what kennan was talking about. there is insurrection and people rioting in the street. there is a problem. is it possible that the soviet union is infiltrated in greece and turkey trying to overthrow countries in the mediterranean? this is exactly what we have been warned about. stalin is not just content with controlling eastern europe, now he's spreading his influence down into the mediterranean. now, that's not the case. we know that today. but in 1947, it fit perfectly with our suspicions of stalin and the soviet union. so we're going to get involved. we're going to send $400 million worth of aid to prop them up to defend themselves against this insurgency. second element of containment, the marshall plan, named after george marshall. $13 billion in economic
assistance to rebuild western europe. world war ii has devastated france, belgium. the netherlands, britain. they are in a weakened state. as long as they are in weakened state, they are susceptible to influence, foreign influence, communist influence. when people are at the bottom rung, they are willing to listen to anyone who offers them a different message of hope or whatever. the best way to hold back communist expansion is to with a healthy rebuilt europe, $13 billion to rebuild western europe, to hold back the soviet expansion. congress passes the national security act in 1947. this is an amazing piece of legislation and has lots of facets to it and creates a
national security agency. we're going to revamp our military, coordinate our various branches of the military. but what i want to talk about specifically today is it created the cia. what does that stand for? >> central intelligence agency. >> if josef stalin is bent upon undermining free and democratic countries around the world, we ought to know that. how are we going to know that unless we have people in countries already the world? we will send out folks who are going out to gather intelligence. i'm not talking about james bond. we are going to be sending out individuals working for the government, eyes and ears. what's going on in this country? are they susceptible to influence? of course, if we think that the soviet union will undermine and overthrow free and democratic countries, maybe those guys might have the opportunity to undermine a weak and vacillating communist state as well.
so we're not only going to go out there and gather intelligence, we might spark a little rebellion on our own behalf if we see stalin sort of asleep at the wheel. and then finally, in 1947, we sign the rio pact. it sounds like a song, but it's a military alliance between most of the countries of central and south america and the united states. it's a defensive alliance. where an attack upon one is an attack upon all. of course, big brother, the united states, will come to their aid and rescue. we have always been the protector of the western hemisphere, from the days back in the monroe doctrine, the 1800s. now we codified that and say we will militarily come to the aid and assistance of countries in central and south america. this is a lot of stuff in just one year. this is containment. stop for a second and put yourself in joseph stalin's
shoes. the united states has gotten involved in greece and turkey. the mediterranean. the united states has gotten involved in rebuilding western europe. the united states is sending out guys all around the world, and now we have signed on to a military alliance in central and south america. if you are joseph stalin, who is the great threat to the peace safety, and security of the world? who is trying to take over the world? >> us. >> yes, the united states. if you paranoid and suspicious, it's the united states. so if you are joseph stalin, you have to respond. the cold war is like a tennis match. it goes from one court to the other. we do something, the soviet union does something. we respond, they respond. here is stalin's response.
he is going to tighten up control over countries in eastern europe. hungary and czechoslovakia i mentioned here specifically because those were two countries that were supposed to have free elections after world war ii is over. well, the free elections go out the window by 1948. the communists have a purge of leadership and the two countries will be puppet regimes of the soviet union and then berlin. it gets complicated now. just keep in mind that during world war ii at the very end you've got the russian, the soviet army is driving deep into germany. they're going to get to berlin before we do. they're going to occupy much of eastern germany with their army, with their forces. berlin is a very important city