tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN August 29, 2016 3:00pm-5:01pm EDT
emerging story that's unfolding about adolf hitler in germany and the persecution that jews are experiencing. and refugees are carefully and closely connected to narratives about jewish people. and so, if you do a keyword search, you'll find that consistently emerging. this is the boat, the "ss st. louis," that carried over 900 jewish refugees that managed to get out of europe in 1939 and were sailing for a safe harbor in the new world. they came initially to new york, were turned away from new york, and then tried to find a harbor in havana, in cuba, and ultimately were denied there. they came back to new york again, hoping once again for a kind of political maneuver to allow them to come in. prior to this, fdr had been seeking to get more jewish refugees to come to the united states by filling up the german quota that was in the national
origins act. and a good many jewish refugees do come into the united states through that as germans, not as jews. unfortunately, this exceeded the quota. these good folks exceeded the quota. and fdr at this point decided not, or did not imagine that as the president, he could find a way of bringing them into the nation. here are some images of these folks. lots of women and children. they had means. they were better off than many refugees who could not get out. one of my teachers in graduate school managed to get out a few weeks before this from vienna and sailed into the united states and had to lie about her identity. her name was gerta lerner, founder of women's history at the university of wisconsin, an amazing story that she really had to sort of ironically lied
to authorities to get in, said that she was already married, that she was an unaccompanied woman. never would have gotten in. they would have thought that she was a white slave, and she knew that. so, but she managed to get in. these good folks did not, and the united states turned them away. they sailed back to europe in 1939 as war was breaking out. and of the 940 or so on board, well over half met their death in death camps. and the story of this at the time would become a kind of wound to the united states. this was perceived at the moment as a calamity, as a mistake by many. and yet, there was a tremendous amount of resistance to accepting jewish people into the united states, something that often gets forgotten after the holocaust. and the story of the holocaust as it unfolded over time will be
one that will shape u.s. refugee policy in some really important ways. for now, what i'd like you to do is just highlight that fdr at the time may have felt ambivalent about this but saw himself as bound by the law of the national origins act and did not take any execute action that he might have. and we'll come back to what role the president or the congress or judicial actors had in shaping refugee policy. so, as american soldiers uncovered the atrocities of the holocaust in april 1945, they are key actors in shaping the knowledge of refugees and are actually important sort of public opinion shapers. it is u.s. members of the 5th infantry who come to this sort of kingpin of germany's work
camps, where most people worked, and then they worked nearly to death and then sent them off to auschwitz and other places to be executed. and they find thousands of bodies that have just recently perished. and the stories that u.s. troops tell are really powerful. it affected u.s. soldiers and shaped their perspectives. and that sort of slowly percolated back and shape a desire to make the united states a nation that would, could have prevented these wrongs from occurring. that said -- and here's the difficult part of the story -- most americans, a good number of them remained deeply anti-semitic well after the post war period, well into the post war period, into the '40s, into the '50s. so that there is a kind of resistance to learning a different lesson from the holocau holocaust. it doesn't change hearts and minds right away. and we'll come back to that.
so, i would say that some of these case studies pivot the nation's interests against that of humanity. there's clearly a sense that there was a mistake made, humanity here, and jewish people lost. but the national interest was seen to be more important in 1939, and that persistence is really quite powerful through the immediate postwar period. let me turn to the late 1940s. as the cold war is beginning to shape up between the united states and the soviet union, as conflicts are emerging, as the extraordinary challenge of reconstructing europe -- and there are millions of refugees in europe. several million germans have been displaced as well as other peoples, and so the refugee crisis in europe is profound in a way that we need to remember. and there is an anxiety that western europe will become communist as by the mid to late
1940s, an the united states is actively pursuing ways of preventing an expansion of the soviet union's bloc, if you will, in eastern europe into the western areas. and so, it's in that context in which refugees become extremely important. they are viewed as potential vectors of communism, also as agents who would be unstable in europe. and so, it's in this context in 1948 that truman pushes for a displaced persons act. dp, displaced persons. not refugees exactly, but that's what he calls them. and they are offered visas to the united states, some 200,000 people. and it is initially sort of put forward by a group of more liberal inclusionists that our reading describes, but they are afforded in some profound ways by the actors who administer
this program. so one of the interesting themes that's emerging in u.s. refugee policy history is who is the state? who is actually implementing the law, not simply what the law is on the face of it, but who gets to decide how people come in. and this is an interesting story in 1948. so, it's designed really to aid victims of nazism and fascism. that's the stated purpose of the displaced persons act, one would think jewish people of those who survived. and yet of the 200,000, only about 20%, or 40,000 people, who are admitted are jewish, which is a fairly small percentage. and quite extraordinary are the number of people who are actually ex-nazis who come into the country under the displaced persons act. not only ex-nazis, nazi sympathizers coming along next to those same jewish victims of the world war ii.
and this outrages some of the efficacy advocates in the nalts. how did that occur? well, it occurred in part because of foreign policy considerations here, nation versus humanity. some of the people administering the law saw in these ex-nazis potential assets for u.s. foreign policy. and the author bon tempo describes this. he writes, "this was not coincidental. the admission of nazis, ex-nazis or the fault of lax screening procedures but rather the work of american intelligence agencies who looked to turn them into agents fit for work behind the emerging iron curtain." oso, the interests of fighting a cold war meant there was a approach with ex-nazis. they can speak the native language. they would be useful in fighting communism. so, this may seem like a corruption of the true humanitarian intent behind the refugee, this refugee act, of
what displaced persons, who they were. but keep in mind, it's the foreign policy context. this act was passed as part of the u.s. marshall plan, seeking to rebuild europe from war and also to prevent the expansion of communism. and without that framing, the act wouldn't have occurred in the first place. another reason that there was vo few jewish people who got in or fewer than we might have expected was because of who was implementing the law. and i'll bring in an important character, senator pat mccarron, who is one of the ardent restrictionists in u.s. political history, and he played a key role in shaping the displaced persons act. he was in dialogue with a lot of people who believed that this potential inclusion of refugees would be a way of getting around the national origins act and
were skeptical of the fact that it could in effect bust or open up the united states to lots of people from southern and eastern europe who had been excluded. here senator william revercum, democrat of west virginia in 1948 -- we could solve this whole displaced persons problem. he stated, "all right, if we could simply work out a way and a bill that would keep out those jews." swear to god. this is the desire to maintain a refugee policy that excludes jews that excludes eastern and southern europeans was at the forefront of public discussion. so, pat mccarron, he uses the displaced persons law to create a very elaborate set of screening procedures. among them asking your political history, you know, who do you support, what work have you done, what work could you do for the united states intelligence agencies. and they're actually looking to recruit people in the process. and a good number of germans and
ex-nazis come in, in large measure because of the influence of the restrictionists. so, the idea that the u.s. nation would be a refugee nation is not really gaining a lot of traction at this point. it is still -- refugees are deemed to be of strategic value, of foreign policy considerations, but not necessarily ones that would open the borders. we can see the restrictionist energy really clearly in the mccarron/walter act. i mentioned it in the last lecture, but i'll briefly touch on it. this was passed at the peak of the cold war. mccarron believed in the anxiety of the communist expansion was generating, believed that we had to recommend stronger, less porous border and if they were
taking loyalty oaths, so should refugees and immigrants and how does that apply to the quota of the 1920s? mccarron/walter reiterates it, supports it, bolsters it, makes it much harder, in fact, for southern and eastern europeans, or jews, wherever they're coming from, to come into the united states. and it ended the prohibition on asian immigration but only gave a very nominal number to chinese or japanese immigrants. so it says afterwards, now 100 can come in. so they get up to the minimal level of let's say greeks and others. so there is some modest, i suppose, changes, but they're really in effect reiterating what was existing law. and more importantly, there were -- it expanded the power of the state to deport immigrants, refugees, especially as
communists or their sympathizers. and this was applied to retroactively. so, after mccarron/walter is passed, mexican and mexican americans are deported at much more efficient and large numbers. this is part of the authority that leads to what's called "operation wet back" on the u.s./mexican border, in which authorities would come in and round up people as potentially security threats. it expands in person policy terms the significance of immigrants. every immigrant is a potential security threat. they all need to take loyalty oaths. and it is the state that largely decides, restrictionists who are administering this law. so, up to 1952, the notion that u.s. foreign policy would be liberalizing refugee law is far-fetched. it's quite the opposite. the anxieties on the border about so-called aliens is really driving a more restrictionist policy in u.s. immigration.
so that begins to change in a really striking way. and this is in some ways where the story gets perhaps surprising or unpredictable. it begins with harry truman and also dwight d. eisenhower, both republicans and democrats see in anti-communism there is an opportunity to actually expand refugees and their significance in the u.s.'s effort to fight a global war against communism. so truman himself critiques mccarron/walter. he vietoes the act and then is overridden by the authorities in 1952 at the end of his second term. but he goes down fighting, truman does. he writes, "the idea behind this discriminatory policy was to put above thee that americans with english or irish names make better american citizens than those with italian, greek or
polish names. nationalistic thinking was unworthy of our traditions and ideals, like the great political doctrine of the declaration of independence that all men are created equal. the humanitarian creed inscribed beneath our statue of liberty, our belief in the brotherhood of man." he gives a kind of pluralistic understanding of the nation and used that to fight the restrictionist law, but that argument didn't do inch 1952. it persuaded too few people. what changes, what empowers truman and what empowers other presidents is the argument about refugees being extraordinarily useful to fighting a cold war, that they are, in fact, in the nation's interests. and you can see this in the ways in which they redefine refugees as fundamentally not just political refugees but as anti-communists who are our allies, who are kind of prototypical americans as they
fight communist oppression abroad and that we have an obligation to let them in because they're anti-communist. and one can see the kind of transformation of american identity along next to what a refugee is. the two are co-defining each other. so, truman does this in part in the refugee relief program. he proposes this in 1952. it doesn't become law until 1953. let's in some 200,000 people. and it's still sort of a political football over who will control it and how it will be administer administered. it seeks to bring in those sort of, in effect, prototypical americans who are fighting against america's enemies and mostly brings in people from east germany, from the eastern european countries that are now under soviet domination. interesting here, emanuel sellers, author of the law,
describes the refugees that he saw coming out of east germany as, "they would make great citizens if we let them into our country because they understand the meaning of liberty, they understand how they have been downtrodden, how liberty has been denied to them. i find them to be only too happy to come here to america, and they appreciate freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion." interesting of him to be saying that in 1953, the very moment when mccarthy is compromising freedom of expression and freedom of the press. so there's a kind of interesting story in which people were fighting about the stakes of american democracy and americanism are using refugees to do that, to do that battle. so what then happens, it is put in. it's a modest proposal. it doesn't really take off. it is kind of bottled up by restrictionists under mccarron. and then a new foreign policy erupts -- opportunity, i should
say, and that's in 1956 with the revolution in hungary that briefly topples the undemocratic soviet puppet state, and there is a sort of democratic socialist state that comes to power very briefly before soviet tanks come in and dramatically crush this domestic story. and this is a picture of budape budapest, dead people and soviet tanks in the background. and it produces, not surprisingly, an extraordinary number of refugees who pour across the hungarian border into austria. in december of 1956 there are about 130,000 who are in austria. there is an echo here in the present. there are at least that many muslim refugees coming north into austria and they're being bottlenecked in the contemporary moment. today europe is awash in
refugees. the same story is going on in 1956 here. the u.s. response is quite, quite different. so, what happens in december '56? none other than richard nixon, vice president, an ardent restrictionist, goes and visits austria and inspects the camps and comes home deeply moved about the absolute necessity of bringing in many more hungarians into the united states. and here's how this story gets also in some ways interesting again. how does he do that? well, the refugee relief program is cumbersome. it takes a long time to get people processed and they need a more quick, more useful instrument for foreign policy. so what do they do? they use a littl little-known, called a codocile, a little known bureaucratic rule in the mccarron/walter act which allows the attorney general to bring someone into the country as a parolee, in effect to recognize
that they're breaking the law and to parole them. and they're a parolee and they come in and they can stay in the united states without legal standing, but nonetheless, legally. that is to say, their citizenship status is not decided yet, but they're proubrt in and they're going to be safe. and this is the power that richard nixon as vice president and then dwight d. eisenhower uses to bring in most of the hungarian refugees. it's quite apart in any congressional authorization and debate. many come in the spring of '57. 32,000 of them are parolees. the significance of this is quite dramatic and will in effect benefit every single president for the next half century that seek to use refugees to, in effect, as instruments of u.s. foreign policy and to change the relationship between actors.
put this into contemporary perspective. the complaints about president obama using executive authority, usurping his constitutional role is an old complaint that congress has made about political leaders. in fact, it goes right back to the heart of this policy. this refugee policy is largely enacted by the executive branch at the expense of congress, and it's a good instrument. it allows them to respond quickly to the hungarian crisis here, immigrants crossing into austria. that is the border right behind you, that machine gun post. many of them are orphans like these three kids. my babysitter was a hungarian refugee when i was -- she came over in 1956 and was a wonderful musician, and we loved her dearly. but anyhow, so, it gets closer to some of the personal story in our family.
so, there is an effort by the state, by the state department after hungary, these refugees come in. they recognize that there is sort of political unpopularity. they seek to justify it, and the state department's interesting, the executive branch as well create a public relations campaign. they seek to persuade america that these refugees are, in fact, pro to americans, that their anti-communism makes them good americans. and they hire an ad firm that goes around and talks about hungarians as this sort of seek to approve and burnish their ethnicity on one hand, but really play up their credentials as ardent anti-communists who risk their lives against a communist regime, and therefore are ipso facto americans in the formation, in the making. here is what one ad executive for the state department said to "life" magazine -- "you should be helping the american people
realize that hungary has a rich and cultural heritage and past and that these refugees are not dopes coming from a cultural vacuum just because they don't know much english." then he encourages them to show them as what? not only good anti-communists, but as good american consumers. and there is this really interesting spread in "life" magazine as well as in "look" magazine that shows hungarian immigrants quickly adapting and loving america in abundance. here's one phrase from the article. "seven days after arriving in the united states, this weary refugee family was transformed into four ecstatic minnesotans." i love that. well, they still don't speak english, but they seem to like their kitchen and their sink and what have you. and there's this fusing of american identity, consumer culture, stuff that we had talked about in the past, with also this political understanding of anti-communism that's really at the heart of the story. so, this is a pattern that's emerging. refugees are understood as in
effect proto typically american and it's expanding numbers dramatically. this is the same story, then, moving forward in the cuban revolution that occurs in 1959. once again, a revolution involving, well, in this case fidel castro, who is initially not anti-american, but over the course of the revolution does become an ardent critic of the united states and embraces soviet aid and is deemed a communist. and those who are being persecuted by castro and his regime are anti-communists and are welcomed into the united states as these prototypical americans. this occurs not without controversy, but the cuban story exemplifies this kind of liberalizing story within u.s. refugee policy. if the united states is this extraordinarily generous nation of refugees, it's because of its anti-communist campaigns, it's because of the cold war. this is no accident. it's really the reason the
united states opens its doors. over the course of the 1960s, 500,000 cuban refugees arrive, basically to set foot on florida or on american soil makes them a refugee who has got protected legal status and a path to citizenship. unlike any other group in the western hemisphere. and the reason is because castro was in power. so it's an explicit part of u.s. foreign policy. the cubans are important for a couple of reasons, cuban refugees, because refugee policy is largely a kind of version of an exceptional cuban policy. so refugee resettlement programs are put into place to help cubans that then become used for all refugees. they involve finding them jobs, housing, creating a bureaucracy to help aid in their resettlement. in 1966, the cuban status adjustment act is passed, which
has a remarkable political story. it normalizes, it gives citizenship to cuban refugees. it also allows them to become dual citizens, which is -- there is no dual citizens in the united states in 1966. the first ones are cubans. and why is that? because they're passionate cold warriors. they're fighting castro, and if they want to go back and fight castro, we want to support them. they should not give up their cuban citizenship. they can become americans, but we want them to become able, to in effect, achieve that foreign policy objective, which was to overthrow castro. and in effect, this kind of exception for cuban refugees becomes then a kind of law for a larger community of americans after 1967 because, actually, there's a supreme court case that says, well, in fact, u.s. citizens can become dual citizens in 1967, largely in the wake of the cuban story. so cuban exceptionalism, it's an interesting story. it is only understandable as a
product of u.s. foreign policy objectives. it is extraordinarily generous to cubans. and is leading to changes in the status of refugees across the spectrum as well. there are -- so, all these examples i'm giving you, just real quickly, there is a clear theme, which is that the united states is fighting a cold war with refugees, and its generosity towards refugees is because of those foreign policy objectives. and that is largely unchallenged. it does not lead to that sort of convergence of foreign policy and domestic definitions. it does not change u.s. immigration law dramatically. the 1965 immigration reform act does very little for refugees. it doesn't make them central to the story. one might expect that it would have, that you would have had a
lot of refugees being brought in because it is a cold war piece of legislation. but in effect, they don't need to because the law is aimed at helping those countries that have been fighting the cold war. it's no accident that the main beneficiaries of the reform act in 1965 are southern and eastern europeans. and why? greece, hungary, those same nations that have been fighting the cold war are the beneficiaries of that reform which repeals those national origins quotas. okay, summarizing a lot. any questions at this moment before we look at this key turn to human rights? yeah. >> after the hungarian revolution. >> yeah. >> because nixon actually went to the refugee camps and had that experience, were his intentions coming from that humanitarian place and did he use the discourse of the cold war to kind of move american public opinion because he knew
that would be most effective or were his intentions very much focused in the foreign policy interests? >> that's a great question. i don't have a good answer. i don't know his intentions. but if you do look later in nixon's career, i don't think -- nixon was an extraordinarily pragmatic politician. and what is clear is that in 1956, he saw the political opportunity and he seized it, which was we can expand the power of the executive branch through refugees. and it's his insight that if we use this little-known, little provision here, parolee immigrants to refugees, we can get more in. that was good for foreign policy interests, which is what he was engaged with, and it also expanded the power of the president. and in that sense, that's very consistent with the later nixon who was the so-called imperial president. so, whether it was genuine
humanitarian interests, probably not, but what's interesting is that the anti-communism was not framed as a humanitarian story. it was to some degree, but mostly, they were pro to americans. we have an obligation to accept them because they're americans, not because we are humanitari s humanitarians. that is in some ways a troubling takeaway. we live in the context today where, again, humanitarian understandings of the refugee define those political interests in one way that's not actually the way people understood it for much of the cold war. they were not incompatible, but that was not the framing. the main framing was that they were pro to american. does that answer the question? any other questions? yeah. >> this isn't refugee policy, but when did the influx of east and south asians primarily start beginning after the 1965 immigration act? because i know that really
affe affected more people coming in. >> i'm about to turn to that very question and the unintended consequences of the '65 law have a lot to do with refugee law as well as the ways that the family reunification, which was at the heart of the '65 reform. one reason that -- the quick answer is how did the '65 law, which in some ways supported the admission of people who were already here, because family reunification would do that. it's kind of like a version of the national origins act. how did it bring in so many asian immigrants? it did, because when you brought in lots of refugees from vietnam, from laos, from cambodia, what do they start to do? they start to send for their family. and so, when you bring in lots of refugees, you actually expand the family reunification story, and that twining of immigration policy with refugee policy is one of the main generators of the transformation in expansion
of asian immigrant post-'65. yeah? >> at this point, china's a communist country, so it would seem like we're fighting -- if the 1965 law was because of like cold war policies that they wouldn't want specifically like china's communists to come in. >> that's a great question, why not more chinese refugees before the '70s when they do come? like why not more chinese refugees at the moment that china becomes communist in 1950? there are very few chinese refugees who come in. what do you think? thoughts. yeah. >> i believe the chinese government simply didn't let them out or, like, had very strong restrictions on like the mobility of their people. >> there is that. where would they have fled to? so, and the hungarians are flying into austria, into a u.s. ally. it's easier to get them out.
that's part of the story, but there are u.s. allies in asia, and there are many refugees who do flee. they go to taiwan, but why not more taiwanese, chinese that come from taiwan into the united states? the answer i already alluded to it. you want to guess? >> i think maybe historically anti-asian sentiment? >> absolutely. anti-asian sentiment has not gone away in 1952 or 1960, so the mccarron/walter act has restrict national quotas still, and refugees are a way around it. they're not counted as that, but it's largely in the foreign policy latitude. the united states before getting involved militarily, it wants to avoid a military conflict, by and large, with china in the '50s, and so that it's not seeking -- when you accept a country's refugees, you're actually, it's almost like a statement -- it's a foreign policy statement. and so, it will become important
later. and i guess maybe one sees the wake of the vietnam story, one can see there are many chinese refugees who come out of that context as well. so it's a good question. i don't have a -- that would be a great research paper. i know it's too late to come up with new topics, but anyway, i like it. maura? >> was there a screening for refugees coming from communist countries to make sure that they were anti-communist and would fight communism? or was it assumed that because they were trying to flee, they were inherently anti-communist. >> so there was a screening procedure in all of these programs. and one of the interesting ironies is that many people fleeing the hungarian revolution were, in fact, communists. it's a different kind of communist. they had supported a different kind of democratic socialism that had overthrown the communist government, and there were screening procedures. one famous guy who found out is a guy named samuel gombos. he's a 37-year-old.
he's mentioned in the book. he's a pro-elite. he had worked with the hungarian secret police and had been a main agent of the communist regime in repressing and suppressing the democratic revolt in hungary. and he comes out as a refugee, but he's turned in by his fellow refugees who say that's the guy who put my parents in jail. so, the screening procedures seeks to capture those people, but it's not necessarily that effective. so you're right. i mean, the fact that you're accepting people from communist nations, but the presumption more often than not, the benefit of the doubt is you're fleeing communists -- this is true for the cubans as well, you're fleeing castro. ipso factor, you're anti-communist, even if you're not, and you're going to be pro-american. >> i don't really think that there's an answer to this, but this reminds me of current debates about refugees from the middle east. and it's interesting that when people were fleeing communism, it was almost assumed that they could be an ally in fighting
communism, the people who were fleeing, and they would be anti-communist, and therefore, it's a tool to undermine communism by taking them, whereas modern debates about accepting refugees from the middle east frames the refugee more as an agent of what they're fleeing and a threat because they come from that, rather than an agent who could help to fight whatever regime they're fleeing. >> that's a really good observation, because in fact, what you see -- the only thing that's really changed radically -- two things have changed, and i'm jumping ahead in the lecture, which is fine. there are two things that have changed in refugee discussions. first is that the definition of refugee shifts to this humanitarian vision, which is the 1980 refugee act, and seeks to have a more -- a less foreign policy-driven understanding of what and who a refugee is. but even as that is enacted and as cold war liberalism itself
has kind of dismantled, those who support refugee admissions no longer make arguments about the national interests. it's the restrictionists who are making the arguments about national interests today. they are not new. they've been making that argument since 1939. it's the same damn argument. refugees are threatening our country. they are threats to our national security. keep them out. what is not happening is the argument you're making, which i think i'm hearing, which is basically that, actually, we have a national interest in accepting more syrian and iraqi refugees. if we're going to fight isis, we should do that. we have a national interest, why? because they can speak arabic. that would be kind of important. they have an investment in fighting isis because they're refugees of isis, let's say. that argument is -- you see it occasionally. you don't see it very often and you don't see it as a policy. and so, the numbers -- so, that's a good question. why is that the case? why do you think that's not the case? haley?
[ inaudible ] >> but do you think that the fear of like a national security danger was still present the way it is today at that time? it was just kind of like overpowered by the belief that like these anti-communist refugees would be more helpful, like the chances that you would have more helpful refugees than potential security threats were just overpowered the fear, or was that fear not there the same way that it is today? >> so, i think the fear -- the fear of communism was profound. i mean, the united states -- the only way to understand cold war liberalism was that it was motivated by a profound existential anxiety about communism, both abroad and at home. and so, what's kind of remarkable is that refugees actually didn't threaten that anxiety. they were seen as allies, as assets in redressing those anxieties. if we get the good hungarians,
if we get the good greeks who are victims of the civil war there, if we get the good cubans, if you will, good meaning they're patriotic americans already in formation, then they'll be allies in fighting this war. what the cold war was about was a way of redefining understanding american rights very much as anti-communist. that was sort of the central glue to the whole rights discussion, which brings us back to the discussion we had last class about civil rights, too. without that, civil rights it gave an opportunity for civil rights activists. i guess the question is why not in the present? yeah. >> they wouldn't actually be like the good cubans, the good hungarians. i think there is a fear now that there will be bad refugees posing as good refugees as like their ticket in, you know? so, is that fear that you would actually get some bad refugees in that pool not there or was it just overpowered? >> there was definitely that fear and restrictions were
arguing and they would find individual refugees who were actually, you know, bad actors or bad apples, and they would bring it up and try to reduce the number of refugees. i suppose what's really different about the war on terror is that the consequences of one bad refugee who's fully armed and detonates himself or herself is quite different from one person who would be ideologically a communist in the old -- like what was the threat of an individual communist in, i don't know, durham, north carolina, in 1955? probably not much. well, actually, we know, the communists in durham, north carolina, in the 1940s and early '50s, who were they? you know? >> the union workers. >> yeah, the union workers who were saying let's dismantle jim crow segregation. those were dangerous people, really dangerous. that's why they were repressed so hard. yeah, so, that's interesting to make those connections. i think the similarities and
differences are really quite striking. we're not going to have time to get through everything. i'm going to keep going and we're going to continue this lecture. i want to make sure we get to the end, and so what we don't get through right now is fine. we have time in this lecture to keep moving forward. i would say just one of the most interesting moments to focus in on. as in the wake of the vietnam war and the loss, the united states lost there, the influx and the importation of lots of vietname vietnamese, laosan and cambodian refugees has a different logic. they're americans because they are anti-communist, yes, that's true, but they're not serving the same geopolitical, strategic interests, if you will, because we've already lost the war. and so, in some ways, the rationale for accepting lots of them is to fight the communist power over there or to have a cohort of people who could infiltrate the communist regime that you're fighting is kind of
obsolete because we basically are losing the war. and that's going on at the same time that this emerging language about human rights is gaining traction, largely in reaction to the immoralities of the vietnam war itself, the fact that this was a war against citizens very often. it was deemed, understood to be a very unfair, inhumane war, so that produces a different kind of language that justifies the significance of vietnamese refugees in very different terms. here the argument is less that they're useful in fighting a cold war, and it's more of what you initially suggested, diane. we have an obligation because we lost the war to aid our allies. and so, the stakes are still a cold war set of foreign policy stakes, but we're going to protect our own. we have allies in other places of the world like iran or other countries where revolution is about to explode. and if we abandon our allies in vietnam, we're basically cutting loose our allies elsewhere. so that's the argument that's used to bring in hundreds of thousands of vietnamese. we have to protect those who are u.s. allies in that fight.
but it changes, it begins to change how we imagine, americans imagine the significance and the foreign policy stakes of refugees. the 1980 refugee act seeks to kind of bring forward -- i'm skipping ahead kind of quickly here, but that's what i'll fill in. it smencements that image i described to you in the first set of slides of u.s. refugees as human rights survivors, and there's a new litmus test, in effect, passed by a woman named liz holtzman, who stipulates -- and this is in the reading -- that in effect, if you're going to be a refugee, not only do you have to be pro-american and perhaps anti-communist, but you should also renounce any former political persecution. you should renounce torture. you should renounce having persecuted anybody or violated any of their essential human rights. so the nation is reimagined in the late '70s as a human rights
nation under jimmy carter, under several other actors. and that's really what you see enacted in the 1980 law. and that changes profound, but once it sees it sort of playing out in the dramatic fashion in the summer of 1980 right after the law has been passed with more hungarian refugees coming, here's the reaction that is being generated to vietnamese refugees. the growing hostility toward refugees in the 1970s is racialized because they're coming from asia, so that anti-asian sentiment has not gone away. sorry. all righty, next, okay. so, this is what happens in this room. i cannot advance the slide. that's okay. so, in the summer of 1980, you have a kind of dramatic pairing of two refugee crises at the same time, involving haitians and also cubans, both coming to the same shore in florida.
and here are, these are refugees from vietnam and laos who are waiting to be brought to the united states. this is a boat of cubans coming out of cuban in 1979 and 1980, the marilitos so-called boat lift. what's interesting is castro is exploiting the opportunity to get rid of those jailed. he has an opportunity to get rid of people he cannot take care of to push the humanitarianism of the united states. and these cubans are in the exceptional strategy instant citizens. here's castro saying, we don't want them, we don't need them. here are haitians coming in. god, look at that boat. that's just -- that image is striking! these are haitians setting out for the coast of florida. just look at that image. man! that is courage.
they have a different kind of reception when they get to the united states. many of them are basically rounded up. the first immigration detention centers are largely created in florida to house haitian, prospective refugees and to process them, to decide whether they should be allowed into the country. so, the human rights regime that -- human rights language that converges after the '80 refugee act has sought to change how u.s. refugee law is administered. it doesn't -- it shouldn't matter if you're fleeing a u.s. ally or a u.s. enemy. your refugee status should be universal. in practice, that was not the case. and this is put to the test at this moment in time. haitians had a much harder time getting into the country as citizens. they had been denied citizenship or refugee status throughout the 1970s where cubans had been let in. and the differences are about race. they're also about the cold war. these haitians had the
misfortune of fleeing a u.s. ally, a u.s. dictator, and that meant that they were not good anti-communists. if anything, they were critics of u.s. foreign policy as they were understood. now, the u.s. refugees act seeks to change that. it doesn't change it overnight. and in fact, you have a persistence of cold war policy playing itself out in the 1980s after this act is made law. one of the best examples are refugees of the el salvador civil war. and they're fleeing -- many of these refugees are fleeing u.s.-back u.s.-backed, right-wing actors and come to the united states and are not allowed to become refugees. so they seek instead to be under asylum law to become refugees after the the fact, but they have a very hard time. most of them are denied admission or denied refugee or asylum status.
let me give you in the five minutes we have left, i want to give you a story of one of those good people, because i think it illustrates the ongoing and the endu enduring tension in u.s. refugee law between refugee status as a humanitarian law, the u.s. refugee act 1980, and national foreign policy interests. so, this is the story of a fellow named miguel. his real name i've changed. he is a dear friend of mine. he is, i would argue, the best citizen in north carolina. i've never met any citizen better than him. and by that, i'll describe. he fled el salvador in 1983. he was forced to fight at the age of 12 for the marxist guerrillas. his parents were killed. he came into the united states at the age of 14, made his way to north carolina. he worked all kinds of jobs.
he describes his first weeks in america as the most sort of beautiful days of his life because he could sleep without bombs blowing up, waking him at night. he was a refugee of a horrific civil war, by any definition he would have been, should be a refugee. he applied, finally, when he came to north carolina under asylum law for refugee status. his case was pending for 17 years. what happened? after 17 years, the ruling finally came down. the civil war is over. you no longer have an asylum claim. you're going to be deported. in the meantime, he had been a legal resident as an asylum-seeker.
welcome back. i want to mention as we stand on the floor with ten minutes to go here, there's 500 million to sell on the bell. that could have taken some of the levity out of this market. we're still up 103 points on the dow though. we're here on the floor with david pearl, executive vice president and co-chief investment officer of epoc investment partners. welcome back. what are you watching in this market? >> well, we're seeing the market react as good and continuing to be good. the market is going up on equities. bonds a little more indifferent to whether rates are going up or not. if you think about the long-term equities grow the economy, and they also pass through inflation. so if rates go up, equities where you want to be, not bonds. equities really are beginning to take leadership and you know, for the last few years. there has been a real movement to buy dividend yield stocks, defensive stocks, where the
economy has been so-so and fears around the world. three corrections over the last 12 months. defensive stocks got very expensive. the market is 17 times earnings. consumer staples are at 23, but there is a huge picking stop in economic technology stocks, industrials, and consumer discretionary which should do better given the economy. >> and banks leading the charge today. that might be part of it. i want to dye into apple. i noticed that you're an owner of that. couple. bits of news today. they set the date for an event, could be the new iphone, we don't know. the tax issue in europe, does it change your position on the stock? >> no, it's clear the irish government did a reasonable deal with apple. they're going to help defend this with apple. in any case, they are the most cash-rich company in the world. they can afford to pay a few million dollars.
>> thanks very much. thanks for your questions. >> american history tv airs on c-span 3 every weekend through events, interviews, and visits through historic locations. this month the tv is in prime time to introduce you to programs you could see every weekend on c-span 3. features include lectures in history, visits to college classrooms across the country. to hear lectures by top history professors. american artifacts looks at the treasures at u.s. historic sites, museums, and archives.
real america, revealing reels. the civil war, where you hear about the people who shaped the civil war and reconstruction, and the president siz focuses on u.s. presidents and first ladys. to learn about their politics, policies, and legacies. all this month in prime time and every weekend, on american history tv. on c-span 3. all this week in american history tv prime time will feature programs from lectures and history series. in which we take you into college classrooms across the country. each night leads off with a debut of a new class, and tonight, it's the cold war. we begin at 8:00 eastern. 9:15, human radiation experiments. and then at 10:30 eastern, it's a lecture on the origins of the cold war. before taking it's summer break, the senate voted for a second time to block funding to combat and prevent the zika
virus. >> just last may, when our democratic colleagues asked us to act and act with urgency, but today, they turned down the very money that they argued for last may. and they decided to gamble with the lives of children like this. instead of protecting them. as i said, they ignored their own calls to get this done quickly. and they've refused for the pass urgent measures to protect our country from a public health crisis. so as i said when i started, mr. president, this was a test today to see whether our democratic colleagues cared more about babies like this or special interest groups and they failed the test. it's simple as that. >> under the bill we got back and that republics on the senate
approved what happened on the house, planned parenthood, an organization where hundreds and hundreds of thousands of women go for their care, now do you think they're going to have a little rush of business now? because women in america today want to make sure that they have the ability to not get pregnant. why? because of mosquitos ravage pregnant women. under the logic of my friends, republican leader, they don't need to go to planned parenthood, they can go to their doctor someplace in las vegas or chicago or lexington, kentucky. they can go to an emergency room, and say i'm sorry, i didn't get birth control, can you help me? that is what emergency rooms are for. no, that's what planned parenthood is for. vast majority of women who need
help, that's where they go, planned parenthood. and under the legislation we got back from the house, now there's no money to be provided for that. >> this thursday, a preview of four major issues congress will debate when they return from recess. zika funding, defense policy, gun violence, and the impeachment of irs commissioner john. feature key florida debate and update with washington examiner senior congressional correspondent susan. that's thursday, at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. c-span, created by america's cable television companies and brought to you by cable or satellite provider. so we're going to talk about the radiation experiments. and by the radiation experiments, i mean experiments that were done in and around the second world war and during the
cold war. a fairly heterogeneous set of experiments, more heterogeneous than we've talked about, done by lots of different people by lots of different people. they're studying the interaction of human beings and radioactivity. very curious phenomenon of radioactivity that came -- i guess to it's biggest fruition with the explosion over hershey ma and subsequently nagasaki in august of 1945. now before we can talk about the experiments in order to make sense of them, we need to talk a little bit about the context in which they were done. what we're going to talk about is first of all, the war itself, second world war. we're going to talk about how it was a science-based war. we're going to talk about the development of big science. big science, lots of people, lots of investigators. lots of money. complicated system. and we're going to talk about
the cold war, and ideas about national defense and national security and how that played into the radiation experiments. like all medical history, in order to understand what happened, we need to understand the context in which it happened. now, there was medical research and physical science research going on in the interwar period. we're going to talk first about the physical signs for search and then about the medical research. there were some small, poorly funded, poorly organized research going on, and the example i'm going to use is the story about some military research designed to figure out where an airplane is. now the first world warsaw a little bit of air power, but airplanes were getting faster, they were getting bigger, they could show up over your head. you wouldn't know they were coming. and so one of the biggest
military problems was how to detect airplanes before they got there. and in the 1930s, the staff member at the naval research laboratory noticed that if you sent radio waves out, they would bounce back from planes. and furthermore, if you looked at how long it took them to bounce back from the plane, you could figure out about how far away they were. in other words, he used radio to detect and range airplanes, and that's how we came up with the acronym, radar. radio detection and ranging. now the discovery of radar was very uncoordinated. people didn't talk to each other. it was done in a naval research laboratory and the only way that the army even found out that it existed is that somebody from the army happened to go and visit the naval research
laboratory. they didn't reach out to civilians who had expertises in how to design a radar apparatus, they didn't have much funding. and this was fairly typical of the ad hoc manner of research in the interwar period. the second world war of course starts in 1939. starts in europe, united states doesn't enter until 1941. from the outset, people knew that the second world war was going to be a science-based war. that science was likely to determine who won and who lost. and one of the questions that arose is then how do you organize? the pursuit of science in wartime. now we've talked about this before with the question of how to organize the medical core. and a lot of the same issues apply. the medical core, you'll remember, at the height of the second world war, the number of people in the medical core was bigger than the entire army had
been in 1939. so if all of the sudden you're expanding the size, how do you organize it? you've got to put some people in charge, you've got to figure out how you're going to decide who's in charge and what the different units look like, and then once you've made that decision, that decision is very likely to persist well after the war is gone. so you create structures that then continue. well, the same thing happened for the organization of science, not surprisingly. a lot of it had to do with this guy here. bush's grandfather has been a whaling captain. he was one of the early pioneers of concepts that we now call computing. he made a mechanical version of now what we have as an electronic computer. he was the dean at mit, and he became head of the office of scientific research and development, osrd. the new york times said this made him the sign czar.
he knew that access to the president was going to give him a lot of power in organizing scientific research. and he used that to get the medical research under his umbrella as well. roosevelt was about to shell out the medical research included into a different unit, when he went to roosevelt and he said, you know the people that you want to give that responsibility to are under criminal indictment right now. that was literally true, but it had to do with anti-trust violations in washington, d.c. didn't matter. roosevelt said i'm not givening this to people who are criminals and it went instead under bush. now what bush organized was a civilian organization, it was charged with coordinating the research. primarily funded by the military. and what they learned how to do there was to operate big scientific research. used to be people had pretty simple research labs. you wanted to do research, you
had a lab, you hired some people, you did research. now suddenly you had people all over the country. you had people here, you have people there, needed a lot of money. needed people who could organize the contracts who could do the financing, who could obtain the resources, it was starting to become the kind of big science that has now become the norm since then. and again, the changes that were made lasted well after the war was over. so let's get back to our example of radar, what happens with radar? by 1940 it's obvious that radar works, but it could be a lot better. you need to be better at discriminating the difference between airplanes and birds, you need to be better at picking up low flying or fast-moving airplanes. and so the government decided to fund a research laboratory, and again they confronted the question of where do we put this lab? we've talked earlier about the tension with government-funded research. on the one hand, you have people
who say it ought to go equally to all the states. on the other hand if you're for wars, it turns out that people in some states don't have much in the way of research infrastructure. and people in other states do. and so, the lab that was going to study radar was set up at the massachusetts institute of steknology. they called it the rad lab. r.a.d., rad lab. it was trying to confuse people into thinking they were studying radiation physics who didn't seem like a big topic for investigation. well, radar turned out to be terribly important and i'll give you a couple of different examples. you've heard of the battle of britain, hitler wanted to invade britain, operation sea lion in 1940 was supposed to have
smashed britain's air force. germany had a lot more attack planes than britain had defense planes, but by using radar, they were able to see the planes coming, use their fighters effectively and as you know, germany in fact never did invade england. much to the surprise of people at the time. the other place where it was more important had to do with submarines. the german boats were wreaking havoc on american convoys supplying britain, later on supplying the war effort. they emitted confusing sonar signals and it was hard to find them. it turns out that the subs needed to surface to take in fresh air and when they surfaced, airplanes with radar could see them. up to five miles away. how effective? consider this. in january and february of 1942, without using radar allies forced put is in 8,000 hours of
patrol in the atlantic and managed to find only four submarines to attack over a two-month period. the very first night a plane went out with radar installed, they found four submarines and they sunk one of them. so it's that kind of effectiveness of radar that made it's importance grow over the course of the war, it showed that organized research could make a difference. and it has been said possibly accurately the atom bomb ended the war, but radar won it. a few more examples of the kind of big physical signs for search, this is the slide that shows the monthly losses and german submarines. and you can see 1941 and 1942, there wasn't a lot that we bring in radar and all the sudden it goes up. these are examples can of early
computers, in this case, computers who are doing computation. eventually we then moved to electronic computers. another innovation was operations research. which meant using statistics and geometry to figure out the best way to find a submarine in the ocean. or the best way to organize your bomber squad so it would be unlikely to get shot down. this requires social engineering as well. vanderbush wanted the secretary of the navy, chief of naval operations was so tough so that he was to shave every morning with a blow torch. and he wasn't all that will interested in civilians ideas about how it ought to be best how to run his navy. however, the success of the operation together with the promise that first of all the navy would be in charge of everything and second of all, the oerngss research scientists wouldn't take credit for anything. managed to convince him to use
operations research and the radar and it got results. other kinds of results, u.s. merchant vessels that used to take 35 weeks to be built were being built in 50 days. in 1939, the u.s. army had 800 planes by the end of the war in 1944, the airport just down the road, they were making almost 5500 each year. proximity fuse that enabled it munitions to explode when they got close to their target without actually having to hit it changed the entire strategy of warfare. so all of these research ideas for mathematics and the physical sciences convinced people that scientific research was something worth funding and worth doing and it would make a difference in the war effort.
the problem with mustard gas is that it's specific. you have to do the experiments on human beings. you can't do them on anybody else. so lots of experiments were done using mustard gas. there were so-called man-break experiments which were designed to see how long it would take a man to break. people were put into a chamber, it was introduced and they weren't let out until they became unconscious. even though they might try very hard to get out. these were so-called volunteers. how voluntary were the
volunteers? one person who was there said quote, occasionally there have been individuals or groups who did not cooperate fully. a short talk and if necessary, a slight verbal dressing down has always proved successful. and there's not a single instance in which somebody refused to volunteer. which makes me wonder if they were really volunteering. some of the people used were prisoners, the idea there being that you owed something to the war effort if you weren't going overseas to fight, you needed to do something at home. it was an early cancer and there were experiments done at yale which showed something in treating cancer with nitrogen mustard, some, the patients died but they got better for a while, however these were secret results and they couldn't be published.
what about epidemic diseases? always a problem in wartime. gonorrh gonorrhea. this is a federal prison in indiana where experiments were done on gonorrhea. in 1941, there wasn't enough penicillin in the united states to treat even one patient. 1942, there was enough to treat one. the organization headed by bush not only clinical trials, but also the production of penicillin. protocols show that it was incredibly effective for treating ve nernl disease like syphilis and gonorrhea. and by the end of the war, there was enough for civilians and ally us. there was also interesting using it to see if you could prevent people who had been exposed to gonorrhea from getting
gonorrhea. and this touches on the complexity of the ethical issues weir going to get to with the radiation experiments. the experiments were proposed here at the federal prison in indiana. they were proposing to give them gonorrhea and see if penicillin could use it. they knew this would be sensitive. so pot memo, which was part of the office of scientific research and development and richard said when any risks are involved, volunteers only should be utilized as subjects and these only after the risks have been fully explained and after signed statements have been obtained which shall prove that the volunteer offered his services with full knowledge. now, this is a pretty clear indication of what you need to do to do experiments on people that might hurt them. it might have had wider applicability, had it not been a secret memo.
so it's unclear who actually read it. any any event the experiments were stopped after a very short time because it turned out it was more difficult than you might think to give people gonorrhea. they were not stopped totally and in another series of experiments that we touched on in another class, some of the same people involved in the united states went down to guatemala and continued these experiments after the war. that's another story. malaria. tremendous problem. in sicily, north africa, pacific theater, and you heard from ashley about some of the efforts to eradicate malaria during the war and afterwards. people thought it was the biggest medical problem of the war. it was harder to treat during the war because the drug that was most effective for treating malaria came from plants that were primarily in areas occupied by our enemies. that was another anti-ma larl
drug, these men did not take it. experiments were done using prisoners, we'll come back to prisoners later on in the lecture. one famous subject for the mat lair ya experiment was nathan leopold who kidnapped somebody and became the very famous cause celebre. this image was on the war in illinois. and this led to issues in the trials because of condition sent. as important that has medical research was, doctors were not the star scientists. the people that really were the most important for the research in the second world war came from not medicine, but physics. this is a statue at the university of chicago but henry moore entitled nuclear energy.
dan says a wonderful book called the physicists that talks about the physics during and after the war. in the 1930s scientists trying to understand pure science were trying to understand the nature of the atom and probably the most exciting scientific news in 1939 was the fishening of the uranium knnuclease and that happened in germany. and it's the question then arose if the energy can be derived, can you make a bomb? nobody was sure. you needed to separate isotopes to get uranium. if you see red copenhagen. it's a great play. it sets up this question of the
early years and whether or not you could make a bomb. it revolves around what you know is a true interaction probably the most brilliant of the 20th century. and i'm including einstein in that generalization. and bore who rk woed out the theory of the atom. and we know he went back to germany and we know that shortly afterwards, germany gave up it's attempts to make a nuclear bomb. figured that the problems in making a bomb were so great that we wouldn't be able to make a bomb. and one of the great historical questions about this episode which again is very nicely set
up in the play is -- i mean, it's applied what happened. that did he make a math error or did he question whether or not it would be a good idea? and a really horrible thing to speculate on is suppose germany had been able to make a nuclear bomb. i mean, they were dropping bombs on central london as the war wound down, i don't think there's any doubt that if they had an atomic bomb, they would have if they could, but they didn't. making the bomb was hard. required technical and social innovations. you had to separate the isotopes, you had to figure out if a chain reaction could be controlled. you needed to have large production plants to make large quantities of material. you had to get scientists and people in the military working together, which wasn't that
easy. some of the work was done in existing yumpts like the university of chicago, some of it was done in facilities specifically built for the government. like a plutonium works on the columbia river in washington state near hanford, washington, in a site which we will return. let's turn now to events at the university of chicago, not very far from where we're sitting right here. let's turn to stag field. university of chicago played there. anybody know who the first person to win the heisman trophy was and where he went to school? obviously the answer is the university of chicago. he won the heisman trophy, university of chicago was a founding member of the big ten football conference. they eventually -- here we see
some action taking place out on stag field. the university of chicago is an interesting institution. i had the opportunity to spend some time there. the stadium fell into disrepair and here you see a chart which shows the joseph library which know stands so imagine this, if you can, they tore down their football stadium to build a library. true story, they did. they also left the big ten in 1946 and it left room for another member to join the big ten to make up the full compliment of ten michigan state university was admitted to the big ten. university of chicago left, michigan state came in they had a president who famously was known to observe that when i feel like exercising, i lie down until the feeling goes away. they were not big into the
intercollegiate sports scene. however, in 1942, they still were in the big ten and stag field still existed. it had stash courts under the stadium. and it was on those squash courts that an event transpired that truly changed the course of history. december 2, 1942. they had all kinds of up there there were no photographers present. we don't have any photographs. very famous physicists was there to see if they could have a self-sustained nuclear reaction. there were rods that were soaking up all the neutrons they gradually pulled off the rods
the clicks increased said to sound like cricket chirping. and finally the pile went critical. you could have a self-sustaining nuclear reaction. the code that was sent back to headquarters was the italian navigator has landed in the new world. so under this the stands of the field at the university of chicago found out that we've actually had the capacity to build, in theory, a nuclear bomb. in order to build the bomb we needed to get really, really smart people and it had to be done in secret. because we didn't know that germany was not going to be able to make a bomb. so here in new mexico and altitude of 7500 feet north of albuquerque was gathered perhaps
the greatest collection the world has ever seen. sometimes eight will be sitting around dining together in the dining room. it's incredibly isolated they clicked on hot plates because the wood stoves didn't work well. they took the physicists from all over the country, they were part of a system that cost eventually about $2 billion. they worked in complete secrecy to develop a nuclear weapon. so develop what they thought was would be a nuclear weapon. they weren't sure. and finally on july 16, 1945, at ground zero shown here. in new mexico, the first nuclear bomb exploded. question, what do we do now?
this is a subject that's been debated a lot more now, i think, than it was then. president truman was president. and he'd seen what happens when it happened in world war i. he wanted unconditional surrender from japan. the emperor wasn't negotiating. the u.s. military was working it's way across the pacific ocean in some pretty brutal, brutal battles. four weeks 30,000 u.s. casualties. 12 weeks. 50,000 u.s. casualties, 90,000 japanese troops. # 00,000 civilians. we thought this was going to be a rehearsal. if we invaded, that's what it was going to be like. we also weren't sure if the bomb would work consistently, it went off once, you could spend a whole course talking about the development on a bomb.
there were a lot of things that might not work. germany decided it wasn't going to work. so we weren't sure if we tried it again if it was going to work or not. in any event, the decision was made and on august 6, 1945, they dropped an atomic bomb on hiroshima. there were 350 people alive in hiroshima on the 5th of august, 140,000 of them were dead the next day. this is a picture of hiroshima after the bomb blasted.
on august 9, we dropped another atomic bomb. before the bomb and picture of the bomb shows nagasaki after the bomb. and the war came to an end. and it was so politically charged and so politically sensitive that they eventually threw their hands up and said they wanted to have a discussion of what was going on. they wanted to put things in context, but whatever they tried ran into protests and disruptions and objections and
they eventually said they can't do it. seen they simply showed the plane with a very simple factual plaque in the discussion. 50th anniversaries are usually the toughest. 25th anniversaries, everybody still agrees with the original intents, 100th anniversaries, nobody's left, so there's nobody there who can complain who says i was there. 50th anniversaries are hard. the statue was put up on the 20th anniversary of the nuclear reaction. i used to walk past this on my way to school every day it's more or less on the spot where this reaction took place. so what we have in a sense here is the triumph of big science. we spent $2 billion and we had an atomic bomb. what should we do now? the war's over. what are we going to do about long-term control? after all the bomb is based on the laws of nature which are
available to terve. united states proposeled a comprehensive evaluation on site inspections to survey control all uranium deposits then we would relinquish our arsenal and sign desk information. the soviet union proposed a ban on the use of acomic weapons. and make everything public before they agreed to comply. the u.s. said the soviets were being unreasonable, nothing happened and the cold war started. some of them started in the second world war, most of them in the cold war. kbhafs the cold war all about? europe was divided. no don't forget that the united states and soviet union were allies. we were partners in the second world war. we were on the same side.
no longer. took over china, we had only a handful of warheads and only a few long range missiles and of course to no one's surprise in 1949, the soviet union obtained an atomic weapon. wet got bombing in 1952, the sooef yets got a bomb until 1953. we race to develop more and more efficient ways of ramming down destruction on each other. this is a titan two missile. this is the culmination that came a little bit later. in missile, which you can see is no longer functional, there is a girter covering jot ut let. this is still the only one that still exists. this is outside of tucson, arizona. this missile carried 600 times the destructive power of the bomb that landed over hiroshima. 600 times.
there were three cities, wichita, little rock, and tucson. each one of them had 18 different sites. they had keys, each had to turn simultaneously. b-52s went overhead. the idea here was mutually assured destruction. the idea here was we've got overwhelming nuclear power and if you attack us, we'll attack you. two corp. yans in a bottle. if one stings the other, they both die. that's why immaterialed you to watch dr. stagelove. on the one hand, it's a comedic farce, it's black comedy.
it's one of stanley's strangest movies ever. but it really gives you a sense of what the cold war was like. it's not a coincidence that if you notice at the very beginning of the movie there is a disclaimer that says, this is fictional and the u.s. military says there's no way this could actually happen. but the notion of b-52 bombers being poised to take off and overfire russia and deliver unbelievable destruction was real. i don't think there was a doomsday machine, but it was a doomsday scenario. i personally grew up in columbus, mississippi, which is the home of a strategic air command base. and i was there when the base was closed during the cuban missile crisis as is depicted in dr. strangelove. they closed the base. and that's real. and people said at the end of the runway, ready to jump into
b-52 and go nuke, everything. there's no fighting in the war room, gentlemen. what'd you think of strangelove, did you like it? glad you watched it? it was a great -- this is of course major t.j. king kong. this was the role originally offered to john wayne, but he turned it down. this affected the way people lived and again, the experiments in a second, how do we live. this is survival under atomic attack. if you happen to be bombed, don't rush right outside and don't take chances. this is a real illustration. the nuclear weapon is coming and you don't have anywhere to go, jump into a trench and cover yourself up with drying laund rethat'll protect you from the heat. so people live with the notion
of what do we do if there's a nuclear attack. fallout shelters. shown here. and reflected in dr. strangelove. the idea there is the people will go under and survive forever. people had shelters and they kept them stopped and ethical discussions. i remember in high school, what do you do if you've only got enough food and water for one family and another family wants to come and jump into your fallout shelter? if nuclear war comes and you manage too get into your fallout shelter, what do you think you're coming out to when you finally come out? the korean war. there were over fights, this was a cold war, but it was a very hot war in many very real senses. we competed on many grounds.
when sputnik went up on october 1987, it was a huge deal. the soviet union was supposed to get backwards state. they were supposed to be much better than them. all the sudden they launched a satellite and every 90 minutes, it was coming around the globe and another satellite. and this one had a dog in it. and they sent it back showing that the dog was still alive. and so we decided we're going to launch a satellite too and on december 6, we launched a satellite and only it didn't work. so we're in this conflict with the soviet union it's not entirely clear that we're winning finally the last part of the cold war, just mentioned is of course the cuban missile crisis which comes along in 1962. as you may recall united states saw evidence of the soviet union putting missiles in cuba just south of us. we said bring them out. we put a blockade around cuba an we danced around the question of
nuclear war for some time until eventually a deal was struck. and we did not have a nuclear war. so and i want to talk about some of these specific experiments that went on once off sense of what life was like. about the cold war of what life was like on the cold war. what it was like. okay. we're going to talk about experiments, some of the things we're going to talk about are informed or not. were people told what the experiments were all about or not? we're going to talk about experiments done on patients, on children, on the general population. we are not going to touch on soldiers being used for radiation experiments. that's a fascinating topic, we don't have time for that. it's a whole other topic. and we're going to talk about both the actual risk as we now
understand it and what people understood then about the risk. but our story, we have to go back to los alamos, up in the mountains. people weren't sure they could get enough uranium 235 and a guy named glenn who was a native of michigan helping to derive a new element called plutonium. it was named after the a present pluto. now it should have been plutium if you think about it. that's why we call it that. he went on to get the noble prize and chemistry as well as being chancellor at berkly. he was very active in arms control later in life. now what were the health esksings of this plutonium thing? it didn't seem to penetrate the skin, but what about if you ingested. what if it was swallowed? we knew that was not good for you because in the interwar
period, there were women who were painting luminous styles on watches. if you had a glow in the dark watch, it had radium and these women were paid to paint the dials on the watch and they had very fine grain brushes and put the bush in the mouth to get the tip just exactly right and paint and swallow the radium and they would get a bunch of not so good diseases. we knew it was dangerous. so. 1944, room d 119, a 23-year-old chemist by the name of don mastic is a promising young grachblgt berkeley was working with plutonium. like so many things, it started
with a mistake. pretty serious mistake. he got it in his mouth. he could days the acidic taste and he tried to spit out everything he could. they called for help and he swished his mouth out every 15 minutes, did it 12 times. they pumped his stomach, they tried to extract out as much as possible. this is valuable stuff. this is all the plutonium in the world. we're trying to build an atomic bomb and the stuff we could extract from his stomach may be what we need for the bomb. he didn't seem to have any horrible ill-effects accept for many, many weeks thereafter, if he walks into a room and blew across the room, the radiation counters would go nuts. go off the scale. what we knew that he wasn't going to be the first person to ingest plutonium. and we didn't know what it did. we didn't know what the health effects were. so we started to do a series of
experiments. not at los alamos where there wasn't very much in the way of medical facilities. but at oak ridge, at rochester, at the university of chicago, and at others. first was at oakridge, it was a 53-year-old african american man. cement worker named eastbound david. he was in a car accident. he was injected with 4.7 micrograms of plutonium. he wasn't told that he was being injected. remember the very word plutonium was top secret. the fact that it existed was top secret. but we wanted to see what would happen and how it would be excreted. experiments went on to the university of chicago, first person was a 68-year-old man with a advanced cancer of the mouth and lung and next was a 55-year-old woman with breast
cancer. so here they were trying it would appear to pick patients who were likely to die. the third was the young man with hopkins. hodgkin's. the last two got 95 micrograms. remember the first got 4.7 microgams, the last two got 95, that's a whole lot more. and we learned that the excretion was different. that the fe call excretion rate was lower in humans than it was in animals. sop that was useful information in trying to predict what would happen to plutonium. again, it's unclear if the people who we injected with this plutonium were even told what they were being injected with. similar kinds of things happened at other institutions as well. the massachusetts general hospital took patients with brain cancer. replaced them with brain cancer, they were injected to see where the uranium would go in the body. one of them didn't have brain
cancer. they thought he did. he actually had some bleeding into his brain. so, all of these experiments were done without getting consent without informing patients. inned or that we could continue to build bombs and take care of the people who were helping to build these bombs. the last set of experiments -- i'll go into nor detail happened in cincinnati. between 1960 and 1972. so called total body radiation. whole body radiation. they were done in other places as well in the anderson, in houston, baylor, memorial, sloan, kettering and new york. the theory was if you have cancer, we knew the radiation could be used to treat cancer. maybe radiating were whole body would help slow the cancer.
actually we had good evidence at this point that it didn't work for the cancer. but the department of defense was very interested in the effects of total body radiation. because if there's a nuclear war, and people get e radiated, are they going to be able to function? will a pilot whose flying a plane be able to land the plane? will they be able to fight if -- would they be able to work? ironically the people that wanted to do this experiment on were precisely the people who were least likely to derhode island any benefit from it. we knew that certain kinds of cancer were sensitive to radiation. so radiating those patients might expect to help them. but then the side effects of the radiation will be the side effects of the cancer and the department fsz defense
particularly interested in the effects of radiation on people with cancer, they wanted to know what the effects of radiation were on a healthy 23-year-old pilot. and that could be best studied by radiating people whose cancers were not going to respond. to the radiation. most of the patients who were radiated were poor. most of the patients who were radiated were african american. all of them had cancer. some of them weren't all that sick. some of them were still ambulatory. some were still going to work. and the radiation had some pretty serious effects. out of the 90 people who were radiated, 12i6 them were dead within a month. and here's what's -- many things that were bothersome about this. we know that when you irradiate
people, they have side effects. you get nauseated, very nauseated. but the department of defense didn't want the patients to be given medicines to reduce the nausea because they wanted to know what the effects would be. without the medicines to reduce the nausea. as a matter of fact, they didn't want the patients to be informed that the nausea might be a side effect because that might influence them to get nauseated. these patients were not even given the basic medicines given to other people at the time. to help prevent the side effects of the radiation. these experiments, ended in 1972. 197 # 2 is the day you'll remember of course that's when the experiments became public. it's when a lot of things happened. move on to the second to experiments, radiation experiments on children. any questions about these raid yay experiments?
yes. [ inaudible ] >> was it before informed conse consent? that's actually -- that's a very good question. and it raises all sorts of issues. not to the play word games, but the question is what is meant by informed consent? and the notion the informed con accident as we now understand it hadn't really been fully articulated. although there's the core case of 1914 of seanburg versus new york hospital, the parkt has the right to decide what happens to her or his own body. the memo that i showed you earlier for the e gonorrhea experiment suggested that in 1942, the head of the committee on medical research thought that something like informed consent was absolutely essential. clearly that was not being followed here. we'll talk about sources in a
little bit, but, one of the questions is how do you know if somebody had inform the consent? we have in some of the physicians claim they got informed consent, but there's not documentary evidence of it. there was a lawsuit, by the way, and as a result of this plaque now sits in the hospital in cincinnati. other questions. all right. the walter e.fernan school in boston. research funded by the national institutes of health, the atomic energy commission and quaker oats. this was an experiment on breakfast food. which children were given breakfast food with radioactive iron and calcium to see how that food would be absorbed. the rational for this was the
quaker wanted to get a leg up on cream of wheat. they wanted to be able to show that their cereals were better absorbed and better spread throughout the body. not making this up. how do they get them to do this? here's an excerpt from a letter. letter to patients, 1953. we have done some examinations in connection with the nutritional department to the massachusetts institute of technology with the purpose of helping to improve the nutrition of our children. i want to point out that just like we sfau you remember in some of the letters in the experiments asking the known come in for a spinal funkture in which you had up at the top of the letter, the names of institutions like the institute, or the alabama state board of health. here, massachusetts institute of technology, a very well respected, highly regarded boston institution. the blood samples are taken
after one test reel which consists of a special breakfast containing a certain a. calcium. and if you sign up for this, you get to be a member of the science club. and if you're a member of the science club, you get additional prif religious. you -- privileges. you get to cup of milk, beach, outside dinners. nothing in here that says we're going to give you radioactive tracers. all right. this raises all sorts of questions similar to the ones we talked about with the willow brother experiments. the willer brook experiments by the way, i think i might not have mentioned, were also funded in part by the military. the armed forces were interested in the vaccine and that's why they funded some of those experiments. this raises questions. and first of all, can children give informed consent? are parents being coerced? if your child -- this was not a
great institution by the way. this was not a place you really wanted to be. did parents really feel like they had any sort of choice? a quart of milk a day, but if you don't have it, is this too much coercion? it turns out when you look at this critically, the levels of radiation they got probably didn't hurt them very much or at all. but nonetheless, this raises questions about whether it is appropriate to do experiments on institutionalized children without informing either them or their parents. any questions about the experiments? okay. let's move to oregon. so this is the cold war and we're interradiation and people,
the idea of nuclear power is very big. and the hope is that we will soon have nuclear power on airplanes. quite seriously being discussed. and people -- pilots flying have nuclear powered airplanes quite seriously being discussed. pilots who are flying nuclear powered airplanes will be exposed to a lot of radiation. who else, space flight. people who go up in space. nasa is interested in this. people who work with nuclear power. if there is a nuclear attack, people will be exposed to radiation. what are they worried about? when they talk to potential crew members on nuclear planes they were especially concerned about damage to what was euphemistically in the kinder gentler years referred to as the family jewels. testicles contain rapidly dividing cells.
thus, if there's radiation exposure, those are cells that you would expect to be more likely to be hit by the radiation. this could produce chromosomal damage and potentially problems for your progeny down the road. testicles also have the advantage in that they can more easily than some bodily organs can be irradiated without having to irradiate the entire body. so in the oregon state, in the washington state prisons, between 1963 and 1973, there were a series of radiation experiments done to determine the effect of irradiation on testicles. why prisoners? these were healthy men who weren't going anywhere for a while.
also a way for them to pay back to society for what they've done. the experiments in oregon were overseen by extremely prominent endocrinologist. a machine was made to irradiate the testicles. men were asked to lie on their stomach, testicles were placed in warm water so they would hang down and then they would be irradiated. this will be followed by biopsies and then a vasectomy. if it caused any damage, they didn't want the men having any children. the recruitment was purely by word of mouth suggesting that
they knew that the atomic energy commission who was sponsoring this research saw it as sensitive and didn't want it to be too public. there was a loose and informal psychiatric examination and consultation with the chaplain. the chaplain was required to certify that the men in question were not roman catholic because if they were roman catholic they were not to have a vasectomy. there was no benefit to these men in terms of their health. they did get money. they were paid 25 cents a day. they got $25 for a testicular biopsy. whether for $200 would you have a testicular biopsy or vasectomy and if i'm reading your facial
expressions correctly, i'm guessing the answer for you is no. so these were another set of radiation experiments that went on in the prisons. they were stopped in 1970 because of changing environment. the administrators were concerned that prisoners could not fully consent. that's a valid concern. similar experiments were done in the washington state penitentiary. it's interesting to think for a moment about the use of prisoners in human experimentation in general. the concerns about experimenting on prisoners in the 1940s and 50s were not the same as the ones we might have today. the main concern was that they wouldn't be adequately punished. if you were in a medical experiment you get special privileges. you get to go to the hospital. you will get better food. if you're in prison, you're
supposed to be punished for your crimes. it was affirmed in the journal of the american medical association as being a legitimate way of doing experiments. by 1972 90% came from phase 1 drug trials. you have a new drug and you want to try it out and see what happens in gradually increasing doses, not as a treatment for disease, but to look for toxic effects. the experiments on prisoners were seen as being a privilege, perhaps not surprisingly tended to be more white than african american prisoners. we were in the united states way out of touch with the rest of the world, almost the entire rest of the world, experimentation of prisoners was seen as not ethical and not appropriate. the nuremberg code says you can't coerce people into doing experiments. the idea was if you're in prison you can't make a free choice about what you're doing. eventually prison experiments in the united states became nonexistent. they came up in the hearings about the tuskegee experiments that kennedy had only for one day. prisoner experiments, any questions? this is hanford, washington. it's a lovely town on the columbia river. it's remote and in 1942 it was the site for a plutonium
factory. for many years it was the place where plutonium was made. it was picked for a couple of reasons. one, ready access to fresh water for cooling from the columbia river. second reason is that it was out of the way. if you're making plutonium, when plutonium is top secret, you want to be secret. here is a billboard. don't talk. silence means security. another sign loose talk to chain reaction from espionage. this is how they advertise it. atomic frontier day, new light on the old frontier. you're called that soviet union exploded its first bomb in 1945. how did we know what they are
doing? we know because radiation put in the atmosphere spreads all over the world and we can pick it up here. how do we interpret that? that's hard. we wanted to figure out what radiation is like when it was put in the atmosphere. how did you it come down? where did it come down? how could you detect it? what better way to find out what that was like than to release radiation from a plant, like hanford. these are the so-called green run experiments because the fuel that was used was young, or green. so they started releasing
radioactivity into the atmosphere, so they could study how and when and where it came down. because this is top secret, they are not bothering to tell the people if the area that oh, by the way we'll be putting a lot of radiation into the atmosphere. there were problems. the weather wasn't what they expected or desired. they got more exposure at local sites. we now know that drinking milk from cows that graze on contaminated pastures is the main source of exposure for children. if you release the radiation, it lands on the fields, the cows eat the grass, children drink the milk. they did so with considerable secrecy. they pretended to be animal husbandry specialists from the department of agriculture to check it.
if you're a spy, you think about taking on a false persona. this is in your backyard in the united states. you've got somebody working for the atomic energy commission claims to be an animal husbandry expert who wants to check your cows. it's unclear how much damage was actually done. how many people were actually injured. it's also clear that there was probably more radiation released from the normal operations of the plants from 1944 to 1947 they released radiation by here is a cartoon showing hanford in the 19 40s and '50s, see people surrounded by fumes, kind of skeletal, i don't know if you can read on the back, it says, yes, sir, it is reassuring to know if we were in any kind of danger here, our government would let us know right away. so you lose enormous trust when
you start dumping radiation out into the field. you're also now using the entire population as your experiment subjects. this was done not only in hanford, in a handful of other places. there were nuclear explosions released to the atmosphere that impacted holy sites for the pueblo indians who live in close relationship to the land. this was done in the southwest. there was some concern and some observations that the spanish and native-americans tended to be more often down stream in the releases than the others. before i transition to how we know about this and how these experiments