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tv   The Civil War  CSPAN  October 1, 2016 1:45pm-3:01pm EDT

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terms of total tragedies. the battle turned an assault by confederate troops by general james long street, which drove troops from the field. next, historian james ogden argues there is a difference between the formation long street had planned for the assault and how confederate troops lined up out of necessity during the heat of the action. the top was part of a symposium hosted by the emerging civil war blog, focusing on great attacks of the civil war. it is about an hour and 10 minutes. >> at this time, it is my pleasure to introduce jim. i'm not sure you will even remember this story, but i first met him years ago when i was attending a civil war journalism university ofthe tennessee. fantastic event. jim was one of the organizers at that event. he very patiently asked
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questions from a young journalist -- or answered questions from a young journalism professor, and he was easily one of the most patient -- answerers is have ever met in my years. his graciousness made a profound impact on me as i was getting started, so i owe a great deal of personal gratitude and debt to jim. i'm extremely excited to have him come up here. jim actually spent some time live in the caretakers cottage once upon a time. he had many stations during his tenure with the parks service. time without.some
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he has spent many years tutoring and mentoring generations of civil war buffs. very few of us in the field know anyone who has made a greater impact in the real van jim ogden during-- than jim ogden his tenure at the park service.
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mr. ogden: thank you, chris, and i think i'm going to have to start off i getting out of your site for a minute. the owner of the computer is here, so that will save me having to learn another one thank you for the introduction, and ask, everybody, involved with emerging civil war and having me up to speak. i'm glad to do it. thank you all for coming out and participating in this symposium. with thet these issues war. i hope that most of you all have had a chance to visit
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chickamauga at chattanooga national park at one time or another. there certainly is a lot to see re, and if you have not visited in recent years, thanks to the assistance of several , somevation organizations additional areas of the then preserved. not all of that ground is yet open, and some of it that has been preserved in the last 15 or 20 years has only limited access you have your hiking boots on and the right time of the year, there are more parts of the battlefield in the chattanooga area that you can get on now and consider the where theythe ground actually occurred. if you have spent much time at
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youchickamauga battlefield, certainly no part of the story and kind of the deciding moment in the battle. notice i did not use the term be -- the and" may ," and maybe later on i will define what i mean. you may be familiar with this first quote i will start with. "our lines emerged into the border of long, open fields, over which the enemy were retreating under the cover of several batteries, which were arranged on the crest of a ridge running up to the corner of a stubble yield and of one battery on our level front, posted in the elevation of our wheels. scene now presented was
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unspeakably grand. the resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out of the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the glitter of dash ofhe onward artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the host of our army, the smoke, the noise of firearms, of whistling balls and great shot, and a bursting shell made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur. here generals hood gave me the last order i received from him on the field -- go ahead and keep ahead of everything. how this order was obeyed will be best determined by those who investigate all the details of his battle." that comes from the brigadier general commanding the led inonal division that the in what is long street's
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.rand charge at chickamauga it is, as i said, the deciding moment, really, in determining the outcome of the battle, creating chickamauga as a tactical victory for can veterans. more to thata lot story, and that is what i want to spend a few minutes on tonight. many james long street fans out there who want to have longstreetstreet -- looking into the future and seeing what will happen in the next few hours or minutes. if we were on the battlefield standing at the win of the breakthrough, i might even motioned towards a large pinetree on the east side of the lafayette road and say james longstreet fans would like to have old peeking around the edge of that pinetree to see thomas woods division moving out of the
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battle line. --y of us will be familiar many of us will be familiar with 'sat formation for longstreet attack. one of the maps out of date powell -- dave powell's a very useful, very helpful "maps of chickamauga". look, youome out to should have a copy of that with you, but on that app there is, of course, this formation right hood passhe center, formation on september 20, those troops stacked in that column inmation that dave talked the new york -- that dave talked
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about a minute ago. you have this night, need formation depicted just minutes before he will send the other troops forward. that was not at all what he had originally intended or even what thatally wound up with on morning of september 20. of course, the decision had been made in early september as a william stark rosenkranz's approach to chattanooga, that importing a way to the industrial heartland and braxton bragg' cries for reinforcement as a result of the approach, confederate authorities in richmond made the decision to not only reinforce bragg toss army with large numbers of troops from mississippi and also from east tennessee, but eventually to
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send two divisions of the first core of the army of northern virginia under james longstreet to virginia, and of course, we could have another symposiums time in the future to talk about the important rail moves of the , and this one that is commonly used to illustrate the use of that new transportation medium in the war. longstreet's command wound its milethe circuitous 970 route through the eastern carolinas that into georgia, to atlanta and northward to join , arriving in almost dribs and drabs beginning on september 15 as a result of the distance, the number of rail lines that were necessary to make that move and the deteriorating condition of the
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confederate rail system. longstreet himself and part of his staff did not arrive in the area of bragg's army until about 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of september 19. they will arrive at catoosa platform, a stop on that railroad just a little bit south although technically just east of georgia, a platform that had been developed by the railroad as a place for those visiting the mineral springs to get off of the western atlantic railroad and take-home carriages to those mineral springs. those mineral springs were -- the resort facilities at those minerals rings -- springs had
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served as confederate hospitals in 1862 and into the summer of 1863. that is where braxton bragg was -- the very detailed braxton bragg and his ill wife had so their bones in those mineral springs in july and august of 1863. that is where braxton bragg was on the day that the bombardment of chattanooga began to announce the approach. longstreet will this embark -- disembark in the area of catoosa platform because the destruction of bridges on the western atlantic railroad as rag's army had retreated out of chattanooga 11, thember 9, 10, and bedford forrest cavalry
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screening that withdrawal in the area had earned a number of bridges on the western atlantic railroad. as a result, the railroad did not operate the aunt catoosa platform, and there is good evidence that no train could actually reach the platform it self -- itself. longstreet himself and none of his staff will indicate exactly how they got their horses off the train with the train carrying those horses arrived a little later on, but john bell hood, who had arrived the day before said that to get his horse off of the train, they had to jump the horse off of the boxcar that it was in. the reason that they were not unloading right of the platform itself and also why longstreet and his staff had to
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wait almost two hours for the train carrying their horses was that to accommodate the number of troops that were being moved, the railroad was being operated .n section this was actually a common form of railroad operation at that time, given the limited power of the locomotives, only a certain number of cars they could pull, particularly if the cars were loaded, so they had an elaborate system of the and able to operate one locomotive, a string of cars, another locomotive, a string of cars, and they could do this 2, 3, 4 trains that's, a series of flags indicating if there were following trains or not. apparently on the ride up from atlanta, one of the trains in further back than the one longstreet himself was on will break down, his having
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to wait the additional two hours for the arrival of their horses, , asonce the trains arrived one of the staff officers will say, the rickety train pulled up , they willand bangs he andir horses, and another staff officer will set out for the battlefield. the sound of battle roaring off in the distance. braxton bragg is often criticized for not having anyone at catoosa platform to meet james longstreet, and while he certainly could have been a better commander, i will defend him here. it was not bragg's
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responsibility to have somebody at the railroad to meet james longstreet. since 3:00 a.m. on the morning of september 17, another of longstreet's staff officers has headquarters.s or someone he arranged not at the railroad to meet longstreet? and the party will set out toward the sound of battle. they will work their way using the sound of battle as a guide. at one point in the move, they almost captured after dark when they nearly ride into union picket line along chickamauga creek at some point. the exact route longstreet
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traveled toward the battlefield is not known, but in his memoir, he notes that as they move toward the sound of battle, wounded soldiers were coming into the road that they were on from the right, which would suggest he is moving more southwestward from the area of ringgold, having passed through taylor's ridge after leaving .atoosa platform but after nearly writing into sharplines and making a right about, they will gallop away from the hasty and surprised fire of the union .ickets they will, as they approach the battlefield itself, encounter lieutenant general lee and i
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leonidasleonardo's -- polk. polk, at the moment longstreet him,is party encounters was headed back to his own headquarters near alexander's bridge. longstreet and his party will not reach bragg's headquarters until near 11:00 at night. it may, however, have actually been later. it may have been around midnight before longstreet found bragg's at or nears located bedford's ford. they found braxton bragg asleep , and after he is will joinlongstreet
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bragg, and there will be a betweenconversation bragg and longstreet. longstreet will briefly relate that meeting. the artillery consisted of majors williams, robertson, and leiden together with some other batteries attached to brigades. this brief description by longstreet indicates the reorganization of bragg's army that bragg had instituted on the evening of the 19th. in fact, organization number 11 in the 14-daytime that is going .o end with september 20
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how would you like to work with an organization that reorganizes almost daily? sure, atou have, i'm some point in your careers. bragg toss reorganization of the army into the left and right wing was something that he had begun even by late morning when he had assigned on the 19th to take command of troops on the right. longstreet will go on and say the commanding general gave him and that showing roads and streams between lookout mountain and the chickamauga river, and a general description of the position. that longstreet refers to is probably a portion of the principal map that was in braxton bragg's headquarters at .he time this is plate 48 in the official records at less, and, yes, i
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know on this screen it is not toss of a to see all of the .etails of the map a scale of two miles to the it is not-- but likely that longstreet received a copy of this entire map. more probably, he received a portion of it. he says he was given a map showing roads and streams between lookout mountain, here on the western or left edge of the map, and chickamauga river , andeek, which is here more probably, something just like this. in the lafayette require his papers at the southern historical collection at university of north carolina chapel hill, there are a series
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of essentially these little off ofaps or snippets this for very similar confederate maps, and that is probably what longstreet was given. the confederate army has a very difficult time reproducing maps of any size. you can find in a number of surviving collections almost like the old aaa trip maps or are good forhey that route you are traveling on, but if you turn left or right you wille route, probably not know where you're going. longstreet will get just a very small snippet probably of this map. togstreet will then begin
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receive his order. i was informed that troops will be engaged in severe skirmishing while endeavoring to get in line for battle. not sure of almost all of the then divisions of the army of tennessee that had been engaged in the fighting on september 19 would say that it had been .erely skirmishing it had been a pretty costly fight, but that statement probably says something about the awareness that braxton bragg had of the condition of his army and the state of the army and long-held belief of how the battle would the unfolding, and now only here on the night of the 19th does he really begin to change that idea.
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longstreet will go on and say, "and informed me battle was ordered for daylight the next morning, the action to be brought on on our right and be taken up successively to the left, the general movement to be a wheel upon my extreme left as a pivot." is referring to is what bragg had ordered bragg had essentially wanted all 10 of the then available divisions within his army overnight on the night of the 19th in the early morning hours of the 20th to get online side by side one another from north to south, all 10 divisions, and at the first bit of daylight, the northernmost division, the right division in leonidas , was to jumpwing off and quickly thereafter in echelon by division from north to south, as each division saw
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the one to its right move forward, the next division was to its self step off and move forward. get was an effort to coordination, synchronization, cooperation, something that bragg had had a difficult time achieving over the last couple of days. learned that night that the battle was expected to daylightthe right at the next morning and be taken up successively by division and essentially, if things went correctly, driving the union line back, it would essentially be a large left 's leftith longstreet division as a pivot.
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the conversation lasted for .bout an hour there are a lot of things we do not know about that meeting, one of which is if braxton bragg communicated to longstreet that earlier in the evening, bragg himself had talked with one of longstreet's subordinates and relayed to him at least the general outline of the planned for september 20. into play because there is some evidence that have relayed some of this idea down the chain of his command even before longstreet had arrived.
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also inside was it longstreet's staff officer latrobe joined longstreet at that point or not until the next morning and also the he got one company of louisiana cavalry that will be assigned to him, and also, when the soldier of the first confederate infantry, tom brotherton, son of the brotherton family, whose farm will be a principal landmark for longstreet actions on september joinedn tom brotherton longstreet to serve as a local guide. it's all -- it's possible he was already playing that role for on september 19
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and even 18. a number of soldiers from the local area had been detailed a couple of days before bragg had executed the plan, so it is possible tom brotherton was serving in this capacity with and becomeshood onociated with longstreet the 20th. after this brief conference, return to sleep and longstreet and his small staff will also lay down to get some rest. sorrell says, "we all took to the leafy ground under the tall oaks and hickories for some sleep against the work before us ."
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anyention here of sending messages out to the five or six divisions that he is to command the next morning, to make preparations for the beginning soone attack in his sector after daylight if his plan goes off as he desires, but after the long train ride, you can needinly see perhaps the for longstreet and his staff to .et some rest the next morning, longstreet at dawn there were some indications that might have been a little bit before dawn, but the next morning, longstreet will ride to the front from the
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fog that is rising that morning of the five,ommand soon to be six, divisions that are present, 17 brigades. only five of those eventual are coming from virginia as reinforcements. the other 12 brigades are regular parts of bragg's army or reinforcements that have been sent from mississippi or east tennessee. when longstreet rides into the sector of his now left wing of the army of tennessee, he will a situation very different than that nice, neat, orderly the earlier map. he will say that the line was arranged from right to left as
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follows -- stuart's, johnson's divisions, hood's division of which only three wickets were up, was somewhat in the rear of johnson's. there also was some fighting that continued until just after dark. most of the confederate units that had been engaged in late afternoon or evening would pull .ack the fight in their sector ended,
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typically with darkness, putting an end to the fighting. one of the divisions which had marched onto the battlefield the afternoon of the 19, and is left briefly engaged in some of the fighting in the vineyard farm area, had actually after dark pulled back to the east several hundred yards, perhaps in a column of battalion formation similar to what david described earlier as the column of the gave formation in one of his examples. what he finds that morning at dawn wilma says it ate amount of work. divisions had both
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spent time during the night building some field fortifications, fearful that the federals were going to attack them. almost literally a jumble in some areas of the battlefields with lines of battle of different brigades and the regiments within them at right angles. as i said early on the evening hood hadth, john bell paid a visit to bragg's headquarters and had received from bragg at least a general idea of what bragg expected on .eptember 20 there is some possibility that hood had sent out some orders to
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at least the two divisions he had commanded on september 19, his own that day, and on the provisionalnson's division. some of those troops report moving right at daylight on the morning of september 20. and before longstreet himself had done anything to make movement within those formations. this is particularly the case own division. his three brigades, robinson's texas brigade, the georgia brigade, and the alabama regained, which had been under sheffield and will soon be under
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-- robinson had spent the night in the area where they had been engaged in new the farm on the afternoon of september 19, and so there was at least the necessity of getting those brigades back with the alabama brigade, so it is possible that either hood or law longhem in motion before exert anyan to influence on the scene. when he found hood's division under law in a position behind alexander peter stewart's division, longstreet about daylight road to alexander peter issue his orders, and there process learn that
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were no confederate troops to than 800right for more yards, half a mile or so longstreetnd learning this, wishing to both close on the left of leonidas polk's right wing and also divisiono get hood's orderedront line stuart's division to shift to the right. this little graphic, what thestreet found, description of stuart, johnson, heineman, and preston in the front with hood or law's --ision in the second line
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when longstreet found this situation, what he will then attempt to achieve is this formation, where he wants to shift stuart's division to the right to get good's division or law's on the front line with the intention that when the brigades arrived, that they will join division towards the center. longstreet would keep -- basically would have a formation of four divisions across the front and keep preston's division in reserve with kershaw joining law. longstreet ordered each division was to form with two brigades up and one back.
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they talked about the concept of incorporated, the idea of troops in the second line, giving the commander some versatility and flexibility to shift troops left or right to conduct forward passage of lines or relief as needed. longstreet wanted to have this formation of two brigades up and one back, and that is what he begins to communicate to his new on the morning of the 20th. stuart's division will indeed shift to the right. they will move northward along the crest of a low rise of ground along which they are located, but they will only move because0 yards
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overnight, about 1200 yards north of where stewart started out, someone else began to rise ofhat same low ground, and that was troops of the army of the cumberland. stuart was only able to shift about 400 yards to the north or and will, by necessity, rightly have to bend his brigade or william bates' brigade back at a little bit of a right angle to guard against the union troops on the same low rise of ground a little bit further to the north. when stewart's division shifted to the right, johnson did essentially what he had been told the evening before, and that was maintained his connection with the troops on his right. seeing stuart shift to the
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right, johnson shifted to the space everll, and no open in the front line for law's division as longstreet had desired. heineman's division, which had fallen back overnight will move forward and form on johnson's left, so in the end, with the , whatl of kershaw longstreet wound up with, what he had to accept was not the ,ormation that he desired having the divisions online two gates up and one brigade back, but instead, a formation essentially of three divisions across the front, two others stacked behind that center division with one division held in reserve. in fact, there is evidence that neither longstreet or hood ever
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realized that law's division had not gotten on the front line. in fact, by the time they will actually move forward with the assault, it is possible that longstreet was not even aware of this actual formation. , grand columnt that appeared on that earlier map and which is so recognized by longstreet's action at all whatga was not at he had intended. it was essentially the circumstances encountered there in the woods on that foggy morning of sunday center for 20 -- september 20. these three divisions, eight brigades in five lines and what becomes longstreet's grand called, a it is
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little closer up here, i know at the size of this graphic, not everybody can read all of the formations, but johnson's twosion is formed with regains on the front line, and part of his third brigade with the rest of that third brigade in a second line, and then is formed in two twos, one brigade up and brigades back, and that's thater situation longstreet may not have been aware of, the inability to get on the front lines if law is not able to shift and get the formation longstreet desired. maps have to show this in some form for understanding, but you have the
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, and they will become the fifth line of the assault column, but they are arriving.lly not until 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the 20th two they , and theyeir orders are literally just marching into when longstreet will send this formation forward. as longstreet made these shifts ,n the formation that morning in his effort to get law's division on the front line and also to reduce the space between ,streetht and polk's left will actually shift troops over in front of some of leonidas .s troops
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you literally wind up with the circumstance of these two wings 's army overlapping one another. when the attacks finally did begin, not at day dawn as bragg had hoped and desired, but because of those communications problems which so badly plagued brad's army, not until after 's30, the attack of hill troops that they briefly talked about and use that formation of ,ill's two divisions breckenridge's and claybrook cost troops begin their attack, claver -- claiborne's centerleft longstreet's right,
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and you get an overlap of commands. longstreet will work on getting the formation as he desired, but before he had solved that, the fighting on the right will fighting on the right will begin. longstreet will say it's soon as he heard the fighting, he sent a messenger to braxton bragg suggesting he order his divisions to move forward to the attack since time had been lost that morning. but, before the messenger returned, [video clip] [video clip] longstreet returned -- learned bragg frustrated braxton had thrown his hands up with the command of situation. last, struggled over the
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nearly 10 days to get his orders carried out, and now yet another day not be getting the way that bragg desired, braxton bragg, about the time launched is the salt, turned to one of his officers major howard lee and ordered lee to write down the line and order everything the -- division commander into action immediately. this directive by bragg to lee which lee will begin to carry out, shows braxton bragg just giving up on his command structure. lee will begin writing out, and he will reach alexander peter extorts division. store, being a regular part of bragg's army, here is this directive from want of rags
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trusted staff officers -- one of bragg's trusted staff officers, he jumps off into this direction from braxton bragg. longstreet's nice and orderly across the front, will be disrupted when stewart's division attacks on the directive from lee. hearing that lee will sport -- disrupt his formation, longstreet will issue an order for a forward movement. this directive will put hoods column and heineman's division in motion. this will be the deciding attack of the battle. [video clip]
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-- motion. this will be the deciding attack of the battle. a little after 11:00, the first line of johnson's division and the first line of feynman's division -- china's division was sent off. they are skirmishers, which had been pushed back by a very aggressive union skirmish line. so aggressive that some confederate commanders said that just before the order to advance, to repulse this union attack, some -- several of the artillery battles along that front confederate lined head open fired.
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now the order to advance is given, and mcnair's, part of bragg's and other gates will all step off. after they hit the grass about 200 yards, the second line moves forward. they mention the relative spacing in a column formation. you had to have the proper distance between the lines to facilitate the movement to the left or right of the troops. that formation that long street had while raining the assault was formed with only 50 or 75 yards between the lines. it now has two uncoil as it moves forward in the assault so that there would be enough room for those troops, and the second, third, fourth line to maneuver as needed. after that second line began to
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move, the third line did not move until another 200 yards, then the fourth line in the fifth line. some ways it was like a spring, slowly uncompressing as the line moved slower. of course -- as the line moved forward. this was successful, at least in helping to decide the battle of chickamauga, when johnson's troops go forward what do they find. they happen to strike the second error -- center of the unit online -- line, there was a gap that rosencrantz believed existed in his line.
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as johnson's men came out of the woods on the east side of the road and entered the field on the farm, they found no federal force. some of the federal skirmishers were still there, some of them from illinois under their command will take shelter among the buildings of the farm in an effort to resist the confederate advance. from there, many of them will be captured, much to the delight of some of the tennesseans of johnson's division. the last couple of weeks before the battle of chickamauga there is a new man elected to the grade of second lieutenant.
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they had not yet had an opportunity to acquire the proper symbols of authority for a second you -- second lieutenant. as they capture men of the hundred illinois around the buildings of the brothers farmstead, there are a number of officers from the 100 illinois. what are those captains and lieutenants wearing question mark the proper symbols of authority. just moments later fulton's man continued westward, recently minted second lieutenants from tennessee are wearing the proper symbols of authority in the form some booty from the battlefield. the dashing forward, we have this first slide, several artillery batteries, blowing a hole in the union line. but there was no need for them because johnson's troops will pour rector line -- pour through the line. in more than an hours time, the aeros on this map show -- the arrows on the map show the southern half of the union line
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on the battlefield will crumble under the weight of the assault, as these union troops leave this assault, they will turn northward towards chattanooga, some of them rallying to make a stand on a series of wooded hills part of the easternmost portion of the missionary ridge complex, sod grass hill and horse shoe ridge. longstreet had ridden forward between the fourth and fifth line, as it turned out the assault, column. as a charge into the fields, the commander -- it turned out that three divisions john l lloyd --hood, will be wounded.
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he lost his right leg at chickamauga. thanks to the work of stephen hood, relocating and another branch of the family, a lot more of the details of his wounding are known. the path of the will through his right femur and necessitate the amputation of the leg on just a couple of inches of the hip.
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with his wounding, the command of his formation willie sensually come to him end -- will, to an end. there is a date of rank check on the battlefield with the bullets flying. in the end, it doesn't really matter, as the command structure will disintegrate. longstreet was trying to keep track of the nature of the formation. he had followed the column forward and to the right, as he rode along trying to judge the action, he realized it was now near noon. it is also what time of day. it is time for lunch. he ordered his lunch brought forward, while he scouted just a
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little bit, and then shortly thereafter, probably after 1:00, longstreet and his staff and simon and his staff sat down to a lunch. probably not at the farm as was marked by the -- more probably on the brotherton farm. they sit down and enjoy bacon and sweet potatoes. during which one of the staff officers manning will be wounded when he was struck by a small fragment of shell. he had the natural right reaction of the human. he gasped. it is noted that he cannot read and they proceed to get a knife to pry the chunk of potato out of his windpipe.
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manning is carried on to the rear to be killed for, long street will also have an order issued and distribute some of the captured artillery pieces. it is an illustration at this moment he is not exercising direct control of the situation on the battlefield, with hood wounded and carried to the rear. this meeting with braxton bragg, where brad wanted longstreet to send his troops to his sector will largely take longstreet out of control of the situation through the afternoon. that's how you wind up with the theory of piecemeal assaults, as many as 25 individual brigades do the assault. longstreet attack on september 20 will result in the collapse of the union line, largely because the situation, the condition of the union line as
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they found it at that particular moment, it will survive the tactical battle of chickamauga, but it was not quite the grant assault that james longstreet is credited for. it comes more of the circumstances that he their in the valley of west chickamauga creek on the morning of step to improve 20th 1863. -- on the morning of september 20, 1863.
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[applause] >> it seems like from what you describe, longstreet, did he use these tactics? >> column formations are included in scott tactics. the default in scott tactics is all battalions and all units on line. column formations are in scarves -- scott's tactics. if you look at formations on other battles deal and other assault does have some depth to his formation.
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two brigades up, to brigades that or multiple lines of troops. that is what he is doing here. as i said, there is some evidence that he was not aware of the fact that the depth of his formation wound up with those five lines at chickamauga. he was intending of having to brigades up and to back. divisions were to be formed to brigades up and one back. if there were more than three brigades in a division, they were to be formed with half the brigade in the frontline and half second line. all the divisions at three brigades except one division,
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which had to brigades. why he would say that knowing that all of them were three brigade formations -- he did want the depth so you have the versatility and lacks ability to react to the situation. if you look at some of his other assaults on battlefield, if you look at another assault that he was supposed to be responsible for, there was a lot more depth desired by that commander to the four masked and then what was achieved. >> i heard that longstreet.
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longstreetayed getting out of virginia, or he didn't have all of his troops or horses on the battlefield. if they had been there earlier? >> that is difficult to judge. the potential difficulty of shifting any sizable body of troops any distance. several times during the war, the resistant on the idea of sending troops from his army to anywhere else, saying that by the time they get there the situation will be changed and
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there will be more and greater value, to try to change the course of the war. if the decision had been made a few days earlier, how might that have influenced him? that is difficult to say. the arrival of reinforcements is what will embolden braxton bragg to take the offensive anyway. he postpones his defense at chickamauga by one day when latrobe arrives and gave bragg a little bit of an idea what the troops were under. it is difficult to judge the decision, if it had been made a day or week early what the union army was doing. >> it seems like most of these men in the attacks -- hard to understand why there was an established command -- and this
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is war. >> they don't yet have the established practice of a chain of command. again, longstreet command 17 brigades. only five of them are his own brigades. the other 12 were regular parts of racks tennessee or reinforcements from mississippi andes tennis the -- and east tennessee. they tried to pull together and organized here it that first map, all the way back at the
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beginning of the powerpoint, suggest to us a nice, neat, orderly formation. but it was anything but that. herschel's and humphreys ruggeri are over the line -- are over the line. as they were deployed, there was fire coming through the woods towards them. it is a very last-minute situation, with hood as the as corps commander. there are some of those normal people just aren't present. >> on the 20th longstreet says the whole thing doesn't move
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until 9:00. >> the attack does not begin until 9:30 and it starts on the right. longstreet will not send his troops forward until about 11:00. it did not start on time. it did not start on time because communications, message delivery problems overnight and in the early morning hours, from bragg and others, we could do a whole symposium on just one win -- what went wrong, staff officers who cannot find the people that they are sent out to deliver the message to. guides who were supposed to meet
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maintaining where you turn off the road to go to pull headquarters, messengers who return who delivered a message and don't tell anyone. i have only begun to enter into the situations that did not happen. the man who was supposed to open the attack at a dawn, whose division is supposed to be the first attack, slept. guess what polk did not tell him he was he was expected to do the next day at day dawn. there are communications problems. earlier they made remarks about coordination issues. when you have command dissension the first thing that goes is
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communication. which then means you are not going to achieve coordination, synchronous -- synchronization. i appreciate you having me in your symposium. [applause] >> barring any complications, i will be around for the rest of the weekend. if you have additional questions i will be happy to talk to you. >> thank you very much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit] >> tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern, westfield state university criminal justice professor george michael describes the relationship between the extreme right subculture and current politics. first, trumpat
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said he did not know enough about you to reject the support, but a couple of days later he disavowed any support from duke and the party. be that as it may, it is not stopped the media from caricaturing trump as racist and a bigot. >> sunday at 10:00 a.m. -- the republican bus presidential debate between ben quayle and -- dan quayle and lloyd bentsen. lloyd bentsen: we would be pushing hard to recapture foreign markets, and i think we can do it with a dukakis-bentsen administration. ben quayle: to tell farmers not to grow corn, not to grow soybeans -- that is the kind of policy you will get under a dukakis administration. thet 8:00 p.m. eastern on presidency -- >> henry kissinger wanted to make sure no agency had entree
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to president-elect nixon. he and kissinger wanted to control the intelligence flow and did not want the agency trying to sell itself as the premier actor in the intelligence community. >> with the release of 2500 daily briefs of richard nixon and gerald ford, historians at the museum discuss the changes presidents have made to the daily brief. for our complete american history tv schedule, go to >> leading up to tuesday's debate between senator tim kaine and governor mike pence, we look at past vice presidential debates, starting with the 1984 debate between george h.w. bush and geraldine ferraro. geraldine ferraro: you can walk around saying things are great -- that is what we are going to be hearing. i expect they expect the american people to hear that.
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i will become a one-woman truth squad. bush: they delivered what they called malaise -- interest rates off the charts. they delivered take-home pay is -- checks that were shaking, and we delivered optimism. 1988 debate with the ben quayle and lloyd bentsen. have -- benn: i quayle: i have far more experience than many others that sought the office of vice president. i have as much experience in the congress as jack kennedy did when he sought the presidency. bentsen: i served with jack kennedy. i knew jack kennedy. jack kennedy was a friend of mine. senator, you are no jack kennedy. [applause] between008 debate
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governor joe biden and alaska sarah palin. >> i think we need to band together and say never again. mr. biden: the middle class needs tax relief -- any help now. the focus will change with barack obama. and anytime ont, and listen at 8:00 p.m. eastern on the c-span radio ap. p>> the cia recently released 2500 pages of deviously classified material -- previously classified material. the documents were the president's daily brief on national security threats and issues, seen only by the president and selected officials. of -- thend, the rest richard nixon presidential library and museum holds a discussion about the changes president's have made to the daily brief. here is a preview.
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>> now, the circulation for the document itself is entirely up to the president. in a case of johnson, he had it delivered to 10 people by the time he left office. nixon cut that way back to six, and gradually expanded to nine. sometimes, it is gone to as many as two and a half dozen individuals outside of the immediate circle, and in other close it has been very held, again, up to the president. the key point here from the relationship perspective is that under nixon, it lost its stand-alone quality. it was no longer the thing that went to the president each morning, albeit by delivery from the cia, and with a discussion between the president and the national security advisor, or just the president reading it himself. the way kissinger ran the intelligence process is he would take the document, let it sit, four, effectively, 12 hours, constantly updating it with situation room material and
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other traffic, and prepare a national security memo that he, kissinger, to do the president for a one-on-one briefing. cia is out of the picture, and none of those individual items in the presidential security memo was tagged specifically to the pdb. we are largely red out of the process, document terribly. we are also out of the process in feedback because there is no back-and-forth between the white house and the cia. aids, of kissinger's andrew marshall said, you and your -- the president's workstyle do not lend themselves to feedback, meaning you like to go in the oval office, slammed the door shut, then spring it on the policy committee. cia is not involved you are taking it as it comes, and going from there. so, as a result, the pdb is growing ever more useless overtime in the nixon
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administration. >> watch the entire program sunday at 8:00 p.m. or midnight eastern. american history tv, only on c-span3. tv,ext on american history rush loving jr. talks about the rise and fall of the railroad industry. he is the offer of -- author of "the well-dressed hobo: the many wondrous adventures of a man who loves trains." he is the former editor of "fortune," and former business editor of the richmond times dispatch. he shares anecdotes from his experience covering american railroads since the 1960's. this is just under an hour. mr. rush loving jr.: thank you. it is a pleasure. i am not here to about the candidacy of gary joh


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