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tv   Washington Journal  CSPAN  November 7, 2016 10:04am-10:47am EST

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influence your public and tell the story. have you seen good strategies? what do you think a good strategy is? >> i love the message you have in your report. in discussions of everything from terrorism to cyber security, we're constantly using the two ds, defense and deterrence. keep the bad guys out and/or scare the bad guys away. and in terrorism in cyber security and in this information warfare side, that is a losing game. as you put it, it's never going to give you 100% security because, one, there's actors that aren't deterrable. other actors already on the inside, so you can do whatever you want on the immigration on the wall side but inside, same thing in cyber security. instead, the magic word should be resilience.
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how do i power through the attack? how do i, to go back to use the taylor swift reference, shake it off. how do i remember quickly when i've been knocked down. it's the same thing when you're thinking about information warfare. the best way to respond is to be resilient. the best way to keep from being manipulated is to know that someone is trying to manipulate you. and again, shrug it off, power through it, push out alternative messages that are just as adept, bury the lie in a sea of truths. that -- the challenge, and i think your next panel is going to get to this, it's the same thing again in all of these spaces, cyber security,
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terrorism, information warfare side is, is our current political system and media one that incentivizes resilience or rewards hysteria? is it one where the gate keeper, so to speak, whether it's a gate keeper who is an editor on a cable tv show, a gate keeper in terms of a media company, social media company, a gate keeper in terms of a politician, are they incentivized to ramp up the anger, ramp up the fear factor, ramp up the uncertainty, or are they incentivized to say we will power through this. is it worse where they are existing in two different worlds? it's hard to be resilient if you and i have a different set of facts that happened.
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that's one of the major challenges of our democracy right now is how does it become more resilient to these forces? >> that's great. it's a terrific opening conversation for us to bring up the next panel. tell us before you go, then please peter will stick around for the q&a, you have a book you're working on? >> there is a next project that will try to pull back and look at this, not individual examples, but figure out what's going on overall in terms of politics. >> we look forward to that book. can't wait. get busy. if i could invite the panel to come up right now. i will interest deuce them to you. this is a very distinguished panel. we want to make sure we get them correct. we have katie wheelbarger. previously miss wheelbarger served as deputy staff director -- i'm going to call you katie. on intelligence during the chairman of mike rogers.
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katie was council advisor to dick cheney and chernoff in the department of homeland security. graduate of ucla and harvard law school. next to her we have jewell why it kayyem who is expert on homeland defense and national security having served as state official in massachusetts and department of homeland security. she is today an entrepreneur running her own company giving strategic advice and risk management planning, kayyem solutions. she is an analyst on cnn. she is a podcaster and author of new book called "security mom, an unclassified guide to protecting our homeland and your
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home" which came out in april 2016. immediately to my left is mayor buddy dyer. he served as orlando's mayor since 2003. he's a really important leader for central florida. if you think about orlando, orlando is not your average city of its size. it is one of the most visited cities in the world, certainly in this country. something like 49 million visitors a year? >> 66. >> i'm off by a lot. 66 million visitors a year for a city that's i think 250,000 in the city proper and 1.4 million in the area. when you're mayor of that city, you have a really interesting set of challenges. i have a list of his accomplishments. he opened three community venues, the amway center, dr. phillips center of performing arts, camping world stadium, number two nationally best place to buy real estate. number three in job growth. my favorite, number four in the happiest place to work.
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he served in the florida senate as senate leader. he is a very experienced politician. he's been mayor since 2003. if i remember right, in 2004 he started his tenure off with three hurricanes and a tropical storm all in a row? >> right. >> he got trial by fire. i was intrigued to see you have degree of civil engineering from brown university and jd in florida in some other florida city, and started out as environmental engineer. which is a topic near and dear to my heart. delighted you could join us today. katie, i would like to start with you. the question i have for you, you look at threat. tell us about the threat, is terrorism something americans
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still need to worry about, and specifically at home? is this a threat that's growing, that's getting worse? give us a sense. >> appreciate you having me here today. i think peter explained it in your discussion with him, gave a back drop of what we worry a lot on capitol hill. the morphing and changing behavior of the terrorist organizations, the stent to which they are harnesses new media and new communication techniques to really bring new members into their fold and also inspire others around the world, even if they are not directly members. i will say though in some ways, looking at the threat now and par mistaking in the public dialogue, the post isil era, there is a silver lining to it is that i believe people are paying attention to it as they deserve to pay attention to it. those of us that were advocating to continue to worry about the
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terrorist threats the metastasizing threat around the world as different branches of al qaeda were opening and we were continuing to take in different military actions in more and more countries, there was a sense in america it was not something we wanted to think about any more or something we thought we had solved. we could deal with it overseas by military action. we had defended ourselves and made ourselves so secure in our homeland defense it wasn't as much of a problem here. i think the event, not only the rise of isil but attacks in europe and america the last couple of years have actually brought the attention it deserves. the numbers we cite are a little sometimes don't necessarily reflect the true stent of the threat. you're unlikely statistically to be a victim of terrorism, but in ways the number of terrorist attacks we have not had is somewhat a sign of the success of our post 9/11 counterterrorism efforts.
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we've been lucky sometimes. i think the numbers are not what we should be looking at, but look at the fact there are growing organizations metastasizing organizations that right now continue to have people that are completely absorbed every day in doing external plotting against the united states. i just came back from afghanistan. i was there two days ago. met with general nicholson. he likes to remind visitors that 20 of 90 designated terrorist organizations operate within the afpak area. many attempting to attack the u.s. personnel in ose countries. jalalabad continues to be a hotbed. these are issues we are still confronting. the organizations are resilient. they are emboldened. i think they can absorb a lot of our military efforts. the coalition against isil is
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doing great things. some of us on capitol hill wish they could go a little bit faster. the slower the military efforts overseas take, the easier it is for the organizations to absorb the effort and to adapt to them. these are adaptable organizations. i'll end with one thought which is i'm heartened to see the report because we do spend so much time when looking at the threat focused on how is the enemy using social media for their advantage? i think it's really important for us to get a better sense of how we can better use it to avoid the fear and the terror the terrorists actually want us to endure. >> one more question for katie. which is, so what do you think, if you had to characterize the view from congress and how congress is looking at terrorism
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and specifically at counterterrorism and the united states, how would you describe the level of interest of what members of congress want right now? >> i think, obviously, they want us to be secure. if i was being perfectly honest, the perspective i have is schizophrenic. right after an attack or a thwarted attack, the talk for the first few weeks after it is how can we harden our defenses, how can the fbi let this happen? what could we be collecting more of? how could we not have known what that person was thinking. that's something else i want to foot stomp what you said earlier. we can't expect ourselves to be perfect. especially in defense. we are an open, civil society. i believe we need to do everything we can overseas to stop the organization from existing to avoid them inspiring others to do acts in the united states. we can't expect a level of perfection from our intelligence and defense agencies that they can't read people's minds. in some ways, you would be expecting them if you prior
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that. schizophrenic in the sense immediately after attack or a thwarted attack, they want to know what happened and how we could stop it. there might be civil liberties issues that come up later. why are these agencies doing x, y and z or correcting that information? they are trying to find the balance that the american constituency is trying to find and get back to something peter said is sometimes we can find ourselves in the media loop of we get more attention if we're hysterical, whichever direction it goes. whether it's the hypersecurity side. we see that a lot on capitol hill. the little bit of the loud voices get the attention. most folks up there are strong on security and balanced in how to achieve it.
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we do see the same things they're trying to address in your report. we see on capitol hill. >> take that view, juliette. you have a really interesting perspective on this. not just because you're you. a federal official, a cia official, and then at the time that the boston marathon bombing happened, you were a cnn analyst and fresh off government service, i believe. not only that, it was your town, a mile from your house. so all of a sudden you're living a terrorist attack as a journalist, a public official, a parent, a resident, a victim, it was your city, you were right there. can you give us your perspective, your multilayered perspective? >> i write about it in the book. thank you all for coming and thank you. it's an honor to meet you. and katie was my husband's student. i'm sure she did well. he did good in one regard. the boston marathon bombing both
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because i think it set the stage for what worked and didn't work for what happened in orlando, but my various roles. my life i had one career with many jobs. in federal government as state homeland security advisor i was in charge of the planning for the boston marathon many years before the attacks. it was very intimate with a lot of the preparedness and planning that had gone on. as some people in the audience know, the brothers went to my kids' school. >> the anchors were saying newtown. >> and trying to give a sense of what was going. so part of what i viewed my role was describe how the apparatus works. why does it look like the cops are just standing there and what are they doing? also was interesting use of social media both good and bad. cnn had a major reporting error wednesday when they announced an arrest and there wasn't. thursday night when for the first time the fbi and those who work with the fbi know how
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historic this was, crowd source and identification. there are millions of cameras at the finish line. the irony was given all those cameras, there was not good positioning of public cameras to figure out who they are, of public safety cameras. so you saw the good and bad of this crowd sourcing, social media. it confirmed what i had been thinking about since i left dhs. we can tend to try to rationalize away the threat of terrorism particular in the homeland by saying the statistics are so low, whatever. what i remind people as a mother of three, yeah, you can say that, but if my kid is that 0.001%, your statistics be damned, right? we have to accept as public officials the intimacy that people feel and fear that they feel. that does get to what i thought was so interesting about the report, if i could xent on a few
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things. homeland security, we actually don't talk about the department as being homeland security. any more than would you say the department of education is education policy. we really talk in terms of the homeland security enterprise. we also talk another pivot essentially after 2005 hurricane katrina, the department of homeland security came out in 2001 and the terror attacks in 2005 is what i call a course correction after hurricane katrina which we also talk about all hazards. those two things combined really do try to invest the communities with a sense of trying to minimize all risks to the community. so you are training your public officials for all sorts of hazards. you try to maximize all national defenses, not just federal because the department is very small. people from fema, there are less than 3,000 people that work at fema.fema. the muscle of public safety is on the state and local level. you also try to maintain our openness as a society. those shifts really do complement what's going on in social media. i want to just talk about after the boom side of this and something to think about in response to the report. it is true that i think that social media has the capacity to engage communities after any disasters, but we could talk about terrorism specifically. in my field in 2001, we had a tendency to talk about to the public in a way that either made them tune out or freak out. we probably still do that.
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oh, god, the world is going to hell in a hand basket, i can't pay attention. or i can't go outside my house. my kids have to wear helmets in the basement. that's how we talk to people. trying to use social media to engage people to actually do something rather than read about it, be scared about it or whatever. so that's write think social media has this power to engage people in what we call the enterprise, which is the public, state and local first responders. ngos, the churches and faith based community, and certainly the network. so one thing that is worth noting is the stent to which we've become reliant on social media. i sort of put crowd sourcing and shared economy, i put those all together. using the web or whatever to you try to maximize all national
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the muscle of public safety is on the state and local level. you also try to maintain our openness as a society. those shifts really do complement what's going on in social media. i want to just talk about after the boom side of this and something to think about in response to the report. it is true that i think that social media has the capacity to engage communities after any disasters, but we could talk about terrorism specifically. in my field in 2001, we had a tendency to talk about to the public in a way that either made them tune out or freak out. we probably still do that. oh, god, the world is going to hell in a hand basket, i can't pay attention. or i can't go outside my house. my kids have to wear helmets in the basement. that's how we talk to people. trying to use social media to engage people to actually do something rather than read about it, be scared about it or whatever. so that's write think social media has this power to engage people in what we call the
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enterprise, which is the public, state and local first responders. ngos, the churches and faith based community, and certainly the network. so one thing that is worth noting is the stent to which we've become reliant on social media. i sort of put crowd sourcing and shared economy, i put those all together. using the web or whatever to engage people who aren't physically in the same room. a lot of you are familiar with facebook sort of disaster ping. if something happens in paris, i advise airbnb, and to give them full credit, airbnb after orlando but certainly after paris and in the buildup to the
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hurricane, airbnb renters -- they are not called renters. i just exposed the fact i don't use them. but airbnb people who put up their homes, we notify them and say there are going to be people who may need homes. they're an incredible community. that is something you can do whether it's a hurricane or terrorist attack. you can engage and use the platform. uber. a lot of you noticed uber is helping out with flu shots because public health is part of homeland security in the sense you want a strong resilient nation. uber is starting to do a lot with trying to get people to get their flu shots. there are creative ways in which we can use people's enthusiasm, but also the way people communicate now, which is no longer i pick up a phone and call you. we follow the same people so we may get to know each other. those are optimistic and hopeful ways begin, as we all agree, you're not going to get the vulnerabilities to zero, not in this nation. >> that is a terrific overview. i have other questions i want to
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ask you. i'll put you on notice to think about it. one of the things that happened in the way that disasters and attacks are being communicated right now is it's immediate and the echo is profound. again, sometimes how that story gets told and spread, it's not always right information and it's not always helpful information. one of the things that's been an ongoing concern and we'll talk about in a second, mayor, is communities that get targeted for secondary violence. in particular arab americans or muslim americans. i managed to pose it to you, but your family is originally from lebanon. that's the other layer of juliette kayyem, you've got the official, journalist, the parent but also arab american. i wonder especially right now because political rhetoric is
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part of this picture, too. how do you feel about that and do people look to you, as i am right now, to be an expert on that as well? how do you think that community reacts relative to any other community in what's happening the way the commission is moving. >> do you want me to answer that now or go to the mayor? >> think about it. >> that's what i thought. >> especially because the mayor did think about it. we looked at the case study, we spoke to you and a number of other people, reporters, your police wouldn't talk to us. but we did a lot of research about them and all of the police reports during the shooting. we spoke to people on your staff. people who live in orlando about what happened and how they felt about it.
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we're down there looking around. we came away with the conclusion that orlando was pretty resilient in how it dealt with the aftermath of this attack. and what we heard and you don't have to agree with this, but what we heard from a lot of people in the city was they saw you as the hero of this story. and that they looked to you to tell them how to feel and you did. what i think would be great, rather than me walking through the case study is have you talk about that day and tell us the chain of events, and when you made decisions about specifically about how to communicate with people and what to communicate. just starting with how did you first find out that this had happened? >> i'll tell 2000 things just to start out with. >> it's your show now. >> to set the stage a little bit. everybody knows orlando, right? there's not everybody i don't think in the whole world that
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doesn't know orlando what they know is disney is there and universal is there and 66 million visitors came to orlando last year not 49, which is the most visited place at least in america, not the world. everybody knows orlando, but they don't know orlando and its residents. you saw orlando and its residents during the course of pulse and the aftermath of pulse. we're a very young city. we're a very open city. you don't have to be third generation to do whatever you want to do there. people come from opportunity, but we embrace diversity, quality, fairness. we are a multicultural city. that's who we were on that day. it wasn't something we needed to form and tell people it's who we were so we had that advantage going in that day. the second thing is, after 9/11 and then the three hurricanes that you referenced, and we had a work place shooting in
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downtown that had one fatality and three injured. we do a lot of emergency training. a lot of it is weather related, as you might speculate. but we also do a lot of active shooter training. we do it not just as the city of orlando, but on a regional basis. all our law enforcement people know each other. when they showed up that night, it's not like they're meeting each other for the first time. they're all together. they know how they talk, they know how they act. they know what to expect, and then interestingly, we had been following the national trends like everybody else and we usually do hurricanes, we do active shooter, but we actually did a table top on civil disobedience after first and baltimore. a wild scenario was an african-american being shot by a
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police officer in one of our troubled neighborhoods with the naacp convention convened in town, and a rapper that was going to perform that night. that was an interesting scenario to deal with. but through that, we understood how important communication was all throughout this, and we actually now had esf function that was simply social media. we actually had that esf. right. i usually don't bust into acronyms. >> all my life in the pentagon so i'm going to call you out on acronyms. >> we had plans on how to communicate, for instance in a civil disobedience, it would be police twitter, during a hurricane would be our twitter.
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>> roles and missions were defined. >> right. you can never anticipate. we never anticipated what was going to occur, and it would be hard to ever imagine that that could occur. so the first shots were fired at 2:02, 2:03, somewhere in that range. i got a call at home. i was asleep about 3:00 in the morning. the call was mayor, this is deputy chief enzoato, there has been a shooting at the pulse night club. there's an active shooter, multiple casualties and it's now a hostage situation. the command center will be set up at certain locations, which you saw at some point. my first thought, i'm a dad. i immediately the next thing i did was call my 26-year-old son trey to see where he was. i don't know that he's ever been to pulse or whether he frequents there or not, but i wanted to
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make sure. it makes your job a little bit easier to do what you need to do if you know your family members are all safe. my wife is in bed. turns out he was in bed, as well. my next call was to my deputy chief who heather fagan who is our communications guru or queen. >> everyone said tell heather we talked to you and we were helpful. heather has a lot of sway over these situations. >> my police liaison was on the way to pick me up. we agreed we would pick heather up second to have an extra five minutes to do her hair or brush her teeth. >> probably the last time she did for three days. >> right. we went down to the command center and got to the command center, and it's a big giant rv trailer type of thing with basically two rooms, a command room then one that has a lot of technical equipment that's being manned by the others. we come in and it's the chief, two or three deputy chiefs, fbi,
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fdle and three sheriffs from orange or surrounding counties we had discussed on the way there, what's my role? we've done all these types of scenarios and everything. never envisioned being in the middle of the night in that type of situation. heather and i determined i needed to stay out of the way of the law enforcement. and let them do their jobs because they are trained to do that. number two, we needed to make sure that i supported and did not undermine the chief's authority, even though i'm his boss, and make sure everybody saw that i understood the chief was going to make the final call on any decisions that were made. and the fbi and fdle and sheriffs were acting in that same fashion, which i took as very professional. third was to gather as much possible information as we could because we knew we were going to have to communicate in some fashion at some point. >> you told me that that was really important to you that you
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wanted to be able to communicate as much information as you possibly could as early as you possibly could. why did you think that was important? >> even back to charlie, if you don't provide as much information in a concise, accurate way, somebody else is going to fill in those gaps and probably not with accurate information. the more information we could get out in an accurate manner and not a manner people stopped listening, but they want that information, i think it helps you serve the purpose that you're going to serve. so when we got there, the chief updated us on what had occurred. i could go through that or move on to communication. >> at what point were you ready -- not until about 7:30 in the morning you had your press conference? >> i'll shorten the five-hour time period to a three-hour time period. the opd and s.w.a.t. team had
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the shooter confined to a bathroom. all of the living victims were evacuated. they evacuated a couple dressing rooms that had not gotten out early on. so really early on, everybody that was in the main part were on the way to the hospital. by 4:30, everybody else except those that were in the two bathrooms where the shooter was. >> you know some of these people were sending texts and phone calls and videos. what we found was, and i'm wondering if you can confirm this, it was mostly point to point. they were calling or sending video to family members or to first responders. they were not broadcasting. they were sending it to someone. >> no. they were not broadcasting. they were either texting or in some cases calling family members who were then calling 911.
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or directly to 911 in some cases. some of those calls have been released. they gave us the depiction. that's how we found people in the dressing rooms and were able to get them out. we knew roughly how many were in one bathroom and where the shooter was, which bathroom and how many people were roughly in there. what happened though from those, you also got inaccurate information. the shooter was in contact with 911 and hostage negotiators and indicated he had explosive vests and was going to detonate those and he had explosives in his vehicle that was parked outside. that was confirmed by some of the people in the bathroom. they must have heard him tell that to hostage negotiators and they confirmed it. we had to verify that was the case and he gave an indication
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he was getting ready to act. the chief made a determination at that point it was time to breach the building. s.w.a.t. had gotten into place. placed explosives. there was a hallway between the two bathrooms. they were hoping to break into the bathroom where the shooter was not to get them out. they put explosive charges and it did not breakthrough the wall we had a piece of equipment called a bearcat which was then employed. just as an aside, i took a lot of heat when we bought that because we were having discussions about the militarization of police forces. >> a little satisfaction. >> i was very happy we had that bearcat. we evacuated about 15 people out of the bathroom that did not have the shooter. and we had thrown diversionary explosive devices in there so he was probably a little disoriented. he came out of his bathroom and engaged s.w.a.t. and shot one of our guys. fortunately in his kevlar helmet.
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our guys returned fire and killed him. that was 5:15. >> all throughout this, the shooter -- you never named him. you never said his name and you just don't consider him a relevant person. >> once he was dead, i didn't need to think about him, i didn't need to act upon him. that was somebody else's job. that was the fbi's job. certainly everybody else could comment about who he was or why he did it. i'm not sure we know exactly why he did it. there is speculation about that. the instant he was dead, the fbi said, we're in charge, terrorist event. it went from opd being in charge to the fbi being in charge. we needed to follow their direction. there was an active investigation. but they had then determined it was a lone shooter at that point. we had that knowledge.
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they had a lot of information already about who he was. >> all throughout the attack he was using facebook and he was posting to facebook and googling himself and seeing if he was trending. facebook was taking them down. i don't know how fast, but they were taking his posts down. they didn't necessarily get wide play, but he was all throughout the attack broadcasting and trying to shape his own story. >> we didn't know that at the time. fbi assumes control of the investigation. we start the discussion about how we inform the public. we actually had a -- >> about 5:30, 6:00 in the morning? >> we actually had a little discussion about whether the fbi or police were going to lead out. we pushed back and said no. i have to lead out because i'm the person that they know. ron hopper is the best fbi agent i know.
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when he goes out there, that's going to scare people. nobody is going to know who he is, whether to trust him or not. if opd leads out, that sends a whole different tone than if your elected mayor comes out we got them to agree with that. we were fortunate in that regard. the fbi's federal spokes people weren't there yet till the next day. we might not have been able to convince them, but we were able to convince the local agent in charge that's the way it ought to be. >> note to any fbi headquarters officials listening, it's really good to have your local official who is known by the community in charge of setting the tone in the communications. >> we were able to, i don't want to say dictate, but lead throughout the course of the first day in setting the tone. heather and i had a substantial discussion about what do we want
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to do when we go out to that first press conference? we delayed a couple of hours until 7:15, 7:30 in that range because there was still the possibility there were explosives in either the building or the vehicle. >> right. i remember you telling me you thought this was going to end with an explosion, a suicide. >> i did think that. we believed he had those explosive vests. i was prepared for the building blowing up with everybody in it. fortunately that was not the outcome. we still thought there might be explosives in the vehicle. we did not think we would instill confidence in the public if we came out and had a press conference and his car blew up in the background while we were having the press conference. so we delayed having the press conference what we wanted to do was convey accurate information. we wanted to, and we talked specifically about this. we wanted to calm everybody down and instill confidence that we had this. that we're in control and let everybody know we were safe. those were the words and types
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of things we crafted. i also, from the very start -- i guess this might have been intuitive. i don't know why we said this exactly. we came out and what became our guiding principle was, we're not going to be defined by the hate-filled act of a demented killer. we are going to be defined by our response which will be love, compassion and unity. that rallied, i think, our community behind us. >> then there was another press conference. a few hours later. you added some players to the stage for that one. directly germane to what you just said. tell bus that. you were thinking about potential for secondary violence. >> while we didn't mention the killer nor know for sure what his rationale was, we did know who he was and his religious or ethnic background. >> you knew what he said. he pledged allegiance to isis. he was vague on the details. he had used arabic phrases.
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you knew that from the very beginning. >> we certainly have seen in the past there can be hostility towards muslims or arab americans in a circumstance like that. we wanted to do everything we could to defuse that. i had an imam who i know and trust and i knew what he would say come to the very second press conference we had. he set the right tone saying this is not what the religion is all about. we do not support anything like that. that message was out there straight away. >> you didn't have to guess on who you could call on.
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these were relationships you had. >> i do have the benefit of having represented orlando in the senate ten years and as mayor for roughly 14 years. i'd been everywhere. if this would have happened in hispanic community, let's say the african-american community would have been the same in terms of having the connections. we work really hard at doing that, which is another part of the making sure we don't have the civil unrest that some other cities experienced. making everybody feel like they have a seat at the table, then knowing people. >> you thought about all this and you called on the community to be part of the response, and you gave them a role. and then there were open mikes. talk about the danger of an open mike. >> were you there the first day? the way we have this set up -- usually you have your press area more controls than we did. once all the main press got set up, we did.
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but the press area got set up on a side road. it wasn't really monitored that well. we came out, did our first press conference. then we went back into the command center to figure out what we were going to do, second press conference, get more news. every politician in central florida that can reach the area had reached the area. it was open mike. people were taking to the microphone. most of all of them didn't actually have any information other than what had been shared by cnn or the news stations which may or may not have been accurate at that point as well we were -- one of the more difficult things is trying to follow the fbi's suggestions. they were generally more than suggestions on what information we could convey. they knew who the shooter was, they did not want us to verify who he was. and just before we are going out, cnn and msnbc and everybody else is doing a profile on the guy. we're going out and they are
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asking, do you know who the shooter is? no. we don't know. we have not verified who the shooter is. that's after the first press conference. the hardest part of anything i did that whole time after the first or end of the first press conference, one of the reporters asked the chief in q&a, we understand there are 20 dead, is that right? the chief either said yes there are 20 dead or at least 20 dead. i'm not sure. we already knew there were a lot more than that just from the observations of the police officers that had been inside. we turned to walk away and i said, gee, we've got to get an accurate count next time we come out here. we have to be able to tell them exactly what has happened. heather was talking towards us with this, i don't know how to describe the expression to let us know there were 50 people deceased, not 20. so the second press conference i


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