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tv   Lectures in History  CSPAN  December 4, 2016 12:00pm-1:01pm EST

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at 11:00 eastern time we will be live to take your calls and ofets for the author pacific crucible. that is live next saturday here on american history tv. >> american history tv marking the 75th anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor, next we join c-span2. featuring author steve twomey, and craig nelson. >> ♪ december 7, 1941. a day of infamy.
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wereas japanese diplomats conferring with the secretary of state on piece measures, planes were swooping down on pearl harbor. u.s. filmses both and pictures taken by the enemy as they drop their load on civilian homes and schools. and a numberplanes of submarines took part in the attack. battles of, the arizona was destroyed and four others were damaged severely. three cruisers suffered damage. 200 planes were destroyed. pacificday morning, the fleet appeared to be completely immobilize, turning 3000 casualties to the catastrophe. >> it has been 75 years since over 2400 american sailors and soldiers were killed in the japanese attack on pearl harbor, december 7, 1941. starting now on book tv, a
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three-hour discussion of that day, what led up to it and its aftermath. we have three authors joining us. and craigsteve twomey nelson. each of you ask the question, why did japan attacked the u.s.? what was your conclusion? >> they really didn't know what they were doing. didn't have ahey coherent decision making process. nobody was responsible, they felt. and nobody was brave enough to step in and say, "this war is crazy so let's stop." felt thatople somebody else should be blamed for that kind of cowardice, especially the military men. there was no dictatorship but they felt that they had to keep
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, which is a const -- complicated system of passing off the risk of possibility to each other and backing off. >> steve what was your conclusion? >> my was the same. it was almost a leap into an abyss. an attack more of hope than actual strategic calculations. we need to remember that the attack on pearl harbor was only a small part of what japan was doing that day. all across the pacific. we knew what was likely to be happening elsewhere. they were moving forces towards singapore and the philippines and the dutch east indies. pearl harbor was an added element, primarily because they thought that the pacific fleet
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was the only thing in the pacific that could interfere with their plans elsewhere. but basically, the idea that they could win this war was on a very shaky foundation. >> craig nelson? >> i think the great example comes in the most written about in american history who you will see across all of 1941 claiming that we could not -- the japanese could not possibly attack america and win. there was no way. he is still vocal that the rest of the navy is fearful that assassins are going to assassinate him and he was assigned on a battleship to keep that from happening and at the same time he did that, he planned the attack on pearl harbor. he had threatened to quit the service twice to make that happen. he famously is called the reluctant admiral.
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attack wasay the reluctant. oahu, 8:00 a.m., what happened? >> one of the most thrilling parts was to hear the first americans who were attacked which was the japanese aircrews coming across three california servicemen, saying it was their last day after a year of the station -- inc. stationed in hawaii. this one final day they decided to use their pilot's license to and hyper codes, which are little tiny canvas airplanes. these are the first americans taken down by state-of-the-art japanese fighters. to think of being in one of those little tiny planes and
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meeting the japanese air force is just astonishing to me. >> at 8:00 a.m., as they flew over oahu into pearl harbor? >> 96 ships in the harbor many them, the average age at that time of the servicemen is 19. they have no idea what is about to happen. ine of my favorite quotes was " didn't think they were sore at us." the japanese have created technological advantage with state-of-the-art torpedoes. off and theyeak strike the target. they created state-of-the-art naval shells and those were the extraordinary explosions in the powder magazine.
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over thatem arriving famous north shore of oahu. it is famous for sportsmanship now. they say "i can't believe we are looking at a nation at peace." >> steve twomey? the subtitle of your book is the 12 days since the attack. what happened? >> the reason for selecting that timeframe is that the japanese attacks left on november 26, 1941 from its secret assembly plant at the far northern extremity of japan. it was going to take 12 days to get to hawaii. over 3000 miles. days, the united states was collecting clues of one kind or another that something big was about to
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happen. i mentioned that we knew that the japanese forces were moving towards the southwest pacific. his,ew that from conciliar and it was hard for japan to mask the movements of those particular forces. we never knew about the advancing fleet that was also a part of this military offensive. during those days, there was considerable evidence accumulating that something was about to happen. today,ght, 75 years ago september 4 is when -- december 4, is when washington earned destroying code machines. that is how we anticipated something was going to happen. along the way, decisions were made, in many cases incorrect
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ones and the result was the end of that. >> was the fact that it happened at pearl harbor a surprise? >> pearl harbor had long been discussed as a possible target, even before a declaration of war. up through 1941 the native -- the navy was discussing the possibility of surprise starting with frank knox writing to his counterpart at the war department in january that he was concerned about the japanese attacking pearl harbor prior to the declaration of any war. that seem kept coming up, most noticeably -- most notably in a 41 in whicharch of 19 an army general in a navy admiral theorized pretty much exactly what would happen, it was as if they had gotten to the
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future and seen what could happen. they foresaw an air attack on hawaii from a force that we never would have detected. a surprise attack on pearl harbor, in theory, was not a surprise. the reality was a surprise, however. >> what was japan like in 1941? what was going on? injapan was already at war 1941. japan had been engaged in a inld cup west that started 1937. trying to conquer china. but theyuered cities didn't quite get the whole country under control and they kept saying that they were leaping from victory to victory, which was true but they were not
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winning the war. wonder,ere starting to this war that was supposed to be over in one month, after four years it hasn't ended. what is going on. the most acute sign of this prolonged war that they didn't was going was their hunger. the rationing system had been put into effect in april of 1941. the main target was the rice, which has such a huge place in japanese diet. they don't have anything else. rice is the thing and as long as they have rice they are healthy. but they don't have this rice. anothere to do with kind and even then they have to dilute it with potato or something.
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in early 1941, by the fall of 1941, all the major metropolitan cities had to do this rationing system. it must have been scandalous to quite a worrying sign. we can't really question the authority because it is already in a semi-war economy and they .re not really an independent since 1931, since the manchurian incident, the major newspapers have been very friendly with the military and they had been their to boost reputations by launching this jingoistic campaign supporting the war effort. once you start that kind of self-censorship it is quite "from now on we
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are criticizing you. in 1937, that got escalated one notch, again and by 1941, there were more stipulations about every aspect of people's life, people must have felt quite they went into china in 1941. the de facto total when it came to it. they felt that japan -- they were told that japan was cornered into this impossible situation on economic flight. only because they wanted to survive well and because they wanted to believe that they were doing this for their asian neighbors as well, to decolonize
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them. sinceas part of the claim 1931. self-pity and emotion because of uncertainty but also wanting to get on with life each day. on and securing enough for the family. attack china in 1937? ms. hotta: because for a number of reasons. military bravado had something to do with it but there was a north, fear from the coming from the soviet union. the rewards of imperialism, because japan arrived too late. the powers had reaped benefits
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from imperialism in china and they were happy to keep it divided until they realized that, perhaps, this very westernized and very charming shanghai check might be the next leader of china so they decided to keep it unified. like.t japan didn't they were the ones that should be protecting chinese and, by extension, asian in trysts -- interests. they invoked a sense of moral doctrine. they felt that they had a special regional interest in that fear. >> craig nelson, how significant theit too when fdr moved naval base for the pacific to pearl harbor?
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did that threaten japan? mr. nelson: not really. fdr was convinced he could get them to calm down. america was very close to china at this time and we have a poll that americans were thinking chinese were natural allies against fascism much more than the british. but he was convinced that he had kimball.richardson and richardson lost his job. fdr was convinced that by keeping them it would make japan nervous and keep them from going plundering further in it did not work. one of the great conflicts that thate at this moment is the united states is looking at the japanese leaders as being like the nazis. a unified force of fascism united behind a common dictator and a common way of life. none of this was true.
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the japanese leadership changes hands 50 times. -- 15 times. the army was fighting with the navy, the army was fighting within itself. they just lurched from crisis to crisis. it was the most chaotic government one has ever seen. it is very difficult to prepare a defense strategy. >> steve to me, geopolitics had a big role. mr. twomey: you can't separate what was about to happen from what was happening in the atlantic. theact of a war in atlantic was paramount in ofsevelt's mind in terms using american resources to keep the british in the war against , and by the time of
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pearl harbor there was a shooting war in the atlantic ocean. american naval ships were escorting british convoys to britain. roosevelt had given orders to shoot on sight any german surface ship or submarine they encountered and that was happening. a couple of american destroyers had been sunk with loss of life prior to pearl harbor. his focus was the atlantic and as a result he was stripping ships from the pacific fleet in hawaii much to the objection of admiral kimball, commander in chief of the pacific fleet. the last thing roosevelt wanted was a war in the pacific, precisely because it would affect his ability to help the british. the british are getting sustained, in part, by the resources coming from the far east and any war was going to disrupt that chain of resources. plus, the american navy would
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ship ships back to the atlantic if there was a war there. roosevelt wrote to someone, i think it was the member of his cabinet, saying "i don't have enough ships to go around a war in both places." his preference was to keep it in the atlantic. regiontics was a major -- major reason. >> welcome to book tv on c-span2. this is where we have one author or one topic discussed for three hours, we hear phone calls and social media comments as well. this month is the 75th anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. here the phone numbers. east and8200 on the central time zones. a 201 if you live in the mountains and world war ii
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veterans, we would love to hear from you as well, or world war ii era folks who remember pearl harbor. 620,000 or so veterans are still surviving from world or to according to the v.a.. 202-748-8202. if you can't get through on the phone lines, you can join our facebook discussion at facebook.com/book tv or you can tweet us. @book tv is our twitter handle. let me tell you just a little bit about our three offers. hotta.egin with eri her book came out just a couple years ago and she has also taught at oxford university in the past. she was born in tokyo. , his go to steve twomey
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book is called countdown to pearl harbor, the 12 days to the attack. andon a pulitzer prize worked at the washington post for many years and has taught at new york university. .inally, craig nelson his most recent book was called "pearl harbor: from infamy to greatness." some of his other books include and author of the first heroes, the extraordinary story of the two little raid. hotta, who are some of the major players in japan leading up to pearl harbor? ms. hotta: it is ironic that you ask that question because i thought that all the japanese counterpart
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countries like germany, italy or u.k., they have famous figures and key statesman. the problem with japan was that we really didn't have effective leaders. they had a handful of who, by theleaders sheer force of their weak personalities, remained in power. and i think the utmost example is emperor here at -- emperor hito, who is basically outside of the decision-making process because he is not supposed to interfere with politics. he did feel like he had veto power but he was reluctant to use it according to his postwar confession. >> could he have stopped pearl harbor? i think so.
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many people would disagree but i think the fact that he felt he needed to explain why he didn't intervene and exercise veto power after, that is very telling. that he shouldt explain and he probably could have done so. his reasoning was that if he didn't go along with the decision of the military and , it will beernments up to him to pursue diplomacy and military. he would be undermining the military, he probably felt that there could be a diplomatic breakthrough within the tooframe which is really, optimistic in hindsight but he might have felt it. was, for minister three years, prime minister of
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japan leading up to the war. weak, another ineffective leader that managed to perpetuate power because of his indecisiveness. he was from the second noblest family in japan, almost like the second emperor. he was a prince. he felt that prime minister ship was beneath him and even if he made a mess of something, somebody else would cover for him. that was his attitude all the way through. a very, he allowed bombastic and rather maniacal foreign minister to reach an alliance with germany and italy in the fall of 1940. he didn't really pursue the
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opportunity to back out of that. barbarossation against the soviet union, the alliance should have no longer impress onat would the american mind that japan was serious about negotiation with washington. ok'edhe went ahead and the operation into china, which he had had at like cold bath or something like that -- i don't know the exact quote -- but he was waiting to hear from the japanese, replying to ,his proposal that he roosevelt, came up with which was really conciliatory. if japan decided to withdraw into china, its troops,
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roosevelt would make sure the chinese peninsula would be neutralized. it would have meant a whole different postwar history for that region as well. roosevelt wanted to make indochina the switzerland of southeast asia which would have tipped the balance. one thing roosevelt tried to do -- with the most recent indochinese occupation so that he would have a chance to save his face. conaway didn't pursue that. he again made this deal with the military, ok, "i will let you mobilize for the war and continue this rhetoric if you let me go talk to roosevelt in person and have a conference,
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possibly in hawaii. hawaii is coming back as a weak point of the peace conference location." roosevelt seemed quite keen to but you never know how truly engaged he was. roosevelt was not really a verse to this kind of theatrical thing where it great things got decided by great men, like churchill. >> craig nelson, you are nodding your head yes about roosevelt. this is the great moment in pearl harbor history, because the last civilian prime minister that we have was very sincere about setting this up. mr. nelson: he did all these manipulations within the japanese government to do it but eri, was you left out,
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how he liked to eat. the 51 andint out swirl it in the water and put it in his mouth. this is what a prince he was. sudden, he spent his first term being very pro-war and then he became prime minister again and he became anti-military. the roosevelt and ministration hawks saw that previous position and said that they can take it seriously. were dealing with is having a ship standing by to take him to alaska where he would meet with the president aboard a battleship, it was so close to happening. >> why did they pass? mr. nelson: i don't think they trusted the japanese at all. the secretary of state. his vote was the decisive vote.
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his ambassador in tokyo was pushing for this meeting very hard and he thought it was a sincere offer and he also thought there was nothing to lose. by agreeing to some sort of conference. know, almost to upfronts, one of those soviet american summits where everything is decided long before they get there, he wanted to know exactly what the outlines of the deal were, what it was going to be. when they couldn't get that he was determined not to have that meeting. >> to mark the 75th anniversary, c-span's american history tv is joining book tv for the first hour of this in-depth. american history tv is on c-span3 every weekend with our title films, tours of historic places, and much more. for viewers interested in american history and want to know more
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more about pearl harbor, you can watch next saturday, december 10, starting at 8:00 a.m. eastern time. the december 7 ceremonies will be from both the pearl harbor and world war ii memorial in washington, d.c., first-person accounts from veterans and civilians. -- live viewer collins .iewer call-ins that is next saturday. we are live here. we are glad our audience is with us as well. we will put the phone numbers on screen. let's take some calls from our viewers. let's go to roger in ohio. caller: i am glad you are talking about this. there is a story i heard in the 1960's. guyosedly it was told by a
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camp.s a pow in a the guy that did it was supposedly -- anyway, the japanese had invaded manchuria. the russians had troops on the manchurian border to protect them, or protect the country. what was supposed to happen according to the sky is that the japanese and the nazis were to be attacked at the same time, forcing russia into a two front war. mr. sien: you know what, all three of our authors write about that. craig nelson. mr. nelson: what was going on was when the soviets -- when the nancy's invaded the soviet union, the japanese were completely taken aback.
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they had a treaty with stalin. they had their treaty with germany. they were thinking they were on top of the work. they thought they would be their own united nations. they were completely taken aback. the negotiations over and over again, you see cordell hall referring to the japanese just like hiller turned on stalin, he is going to turn on you. mr. sien: the next call is from mike in kansas. go ahead. caller: howdy. mr. sien: go ahead. we are listening. and my correct that the japanese diplomatic codes were already broken at the time this war started so that the fdr administration knew what was going on, and the american aircraft carriers were sent away just before the attack occurred.
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the japanese were attacking military targets. that the admiral and his men were being betrayed i the fdr administration. -- by the fdr administration. the american response was to attack civilian targets, dropping napalm on cities like tokyo. what is your response what -- to that? mr. sien: we will start with steve twomey. mr. twomey: he raised several points. we did break japan's diplomatic code and had been reading the messages between tokyo and washington for about a year. at no time were there any indications in those messages that pearl harbor itself was a .arget for an attack there would be no reason for the foreign ministry to be telling its ambassadors in washington
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that the war was coming and where it would start, particularly given the confusion within the japanese government about who was doing what. the second point he raised was regarding aircraft carriers. this is often cited as evidence that somebody do something was coming. -- new something was coming. the two aircraft carriers based in pearl harbor were away on december 7. they had each been dispatched on specific missions. they were behaving like fedex, carrying airplanes to american outposts in the pacific. they were not told to get out of the harbor because anyone believed an attack was coming. it was coincidence. extremelyfact fortunate. the third aircraft carrier was on the west coast and had been there sometime. the idea that they were ordered
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out because someone new it was coming, i don't think it's credible. mr. sien: anything you would like to add? ms. hotta: i think the dimension of civilian bombing is important. it is unfortunate that civilians were bombed over and over in japan. you have to understand it in the context of the history of civilian bombings and how japan figured into that picture. shocked by world was the nancy bombings -- nazi bombings. japan bombed major cities in china during the china work. i am not excusing the civilian targets. it is part of the total war you ethoshat japan -- war
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that japan thought they were preparing for. within japansking what happens if tokyo gets bombed. that was in the front of their mind. mr. nelson: i would like to address this simply by saying that admiral kimmel received 56 pages of warnings about the japanese over the course of 1941 from washington. he received additional warnings from his own staff he also received warnings from british intelligence in the pacific, which he did not pass to washington. the conspiracy theory is that roosevelt withheld some other messages, and if only he had received those three or four other messages, you would have done something. his inattention and misbehavior can make it look like he is in the with the japanese, and it is
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completely implausible in every single way. he did not have a job much longer after december 7. i thought -- mr. nelson: i thought he was treated quite well. he demoted himself. then placed on the retired list. he kept his salary and pension and his title. he was not in charge of anyone. how could he have been after that that happened? i thought he was treated very well officially. oft happened was the courts public opinion accused them of being responsible. the japanese were responsible. that is why for 70 years we have been trying to restore their reputation. willy is calling in from georgia. good afternoon to you.
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we are listening. please go ahead. know -- weant to passed through pearl harbor. -- and here is the question i want. nagasaki from japan? mr. sien: what was it your role in world war ii? caller: i was in the u.s. navy. mr. sien: what was your job? caller: i was a machine gunner on the uss him and. -- hamlin. mr. sien: what years did you serve? the warfrom 1943 until was over. mr. sien: it was still a mess and 1943? caller: they still had twisted
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steel out of the water. they wanted to show us what had happened. we were young, and he was very emotional. he was telling us about those people, how commerce down here -- comrades down here. it shook me up. mr. sien: have you been back to visit in the 75 years? caller: i have not. i have not had the transportation to go either way. i saw the tv, the survivors they had. steel time, just twisted out of the water in pearl harbor. mr. sien: thank you for calling in. anybody want to respond? >> even today, it is a pretty moving place to go. you cannot not be moved by
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standing on the platform of the arizona memorial and gazing down at the arizona. i cannot imagine what it would have been like in 1943. it would have been more -- telling, i think. mr. sien: if you are a world war ii veteran, and you want to share your expenses, we want to hear from you. 748-8202. how long did the attack last? what was the damage? it is interesting to note that in military terms the attack was not catastrophic in retrospect. the japanese as we spoke about earlier did not find the american aircraft carriers in the harbor, which proved pivotal in the coming months of the war.
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they also did not attack the infrastructure of pearl harbor, the drydocks and tank farms, which were quite visible and without which the fleet not sail very long. hawaii does not have any natural resources that the navy needs. it does not have oil and coal. all of the oil that the fleet needed was sitting there. many of the ships that were damaged were actually repaired and found their way back into the war, perhaps most notably the battleship west virginia, one of the eight that was in the harbor wound up in tokyo bay the day of the surrender in 1945. it had been repaired and fought through all of the war. the battleship nevada, whose story is among the most heroic on december 7, actually was off the coast of normandy on june 6,
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1944. the invasion of france, providing bombardment cover for the invading troops. strictly in military terms, i don't think the attack was as great as perhaps our minds tell us psychologically. it was an overwhelming event in american history. mr. sien: what was the reaction in japan? i think one that surfaced over all was euphoria because they were fighting this war in china that had no end. now they attacked and western power successfully. they could justify the war they had been fighting in china as a war of liberation from the western powers, as well as to show that the ingrained sense of inferiority because of racism and imperialism, we tend to
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overlook that nowadays, i think it was really great, and i think the japanese in general are conditioned to think a lot about the color of their skin in those days. they cannot change it. what a shame. of themheir way straining to the world that they did matter, and they could be brilliant at something. of course, this may not really be an indication of what people felt inside. mothers had to send their kids to the battlefields. they might not come back. some people knew about the western powers and the industrial output that far outweigh japan. there were reasons to fear. something i use throughout the novel, and it is he waselling of what thinking about. he had this really cool mind and
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i to say that this was not going to last. they did not think they can win it. mr. sien: has your book been japanese -- translated into japanese? ms. hotta: i translated it myself. [laughter] i am glad i did it. quite a lot of things get lost in translation. .he nuances get missed one thing to make sure if you speak the language, if you have to do it yourself. mr. sien: it is for sale in japan. there is one other thing about the book you wanted to mention. majortta: if one a newspaper prize, which was humbling to me because i thought
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it was going to be very touchy, and think why are you writing about the war? i could not have been wrong. maybe the government did not like my interpretation, but there were enough readers who were receptive to my writing. mr. sien: you used a phrase in your book talking about the japanese character where one is the face, and one is the real meaning. ms. hotta: the face and the inner voice. it can be translated public face and in her voice. mr. sien: did that affect your research? ms. hotta: all the time. what is said or not set in the conference proceedings, you have to look between lines. it is often more significant what they are not saying. privatea sense that in records and conference proceedings between them, quite
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a lot of disparities. people are speaking on both ends of the mouth, and also triple talking and quadruple talking sometimes. you do not really know what their inner voice might be. you do just have to imagine yourself to be there looking at photographs helps a lot. trying to overcome this time difference. mr. sien: craig nelson, in your research were the japanese archives organized? bignelson: there are three ones. i got into two of them easily. the one in tokyo. we try to get into the naval school archives, and they would not let me in. every time we try to figure out why, they came up with a new reason. would call carolyn kennedy, the ambassador to japan, to get
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this resolved. i just wanted an answer. we don't have any english speakers, we are not open right translator.i had my mr. nelson says a japanese writer coming to america would never be treated this way, and you are not acting like a friend. i do want to follow up with one comment about the public and private face. a couple of months after pearl ministerhe prime called a conference. the emperor and roosevelt came too late, if you come earlier it would have changed everything. to stop thei tried war, there would have been a coup d'etat, and i would have been assassinated. so there we have those two. mr. sien: just want to show what
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picture from craig nelson's book. here is the assistant secretary of the navy, and roosevelt in 1914 -- franklin roosevelt in 1914 watching as the uss arizona is being late. mr. nelson: our life is being able to do research. finding this is like losing my mind. before914, two months ferdinand is assassinated. you see him at the height of his happiness in the federal government. he loves the navy. much.es the navy so he calls the navy us, and the army them. that great birth of love. i know some of your viewers are upset. it is in brooklyn.
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there we go. mr. sien: gary from california. thank you for holding. you are on book tv on c-span2. i have a question for your historians. theanybody confirm or deny actions of an assistant secretary of state named dean ashton in respect to circumventing the desires or hally of fdr and cordell concerning the fuel embargo that congress passed for japan? mr. sien: craig nelson, you are nodding your head. concerton: he acted in behind the backs of fdr. embargoed to do and that he would hold the reins of.
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he said he wanted to pull japan's strings, but he did not want the wrong war in the wrong ocean at the wrong time. while fdr was off the coast of newfoundland, these two guys in state and treasury used their abilities to shut down the japanese purchase and exerted a full embargo on japan. you are correct about that. mr. sien: steve twomey, what have u.s. japanese relations been like leading up to 1941? mr. twomey: the relationship had been pretty good through most of the years when both were emerging world powers. in fact, when franklin roosevelt on december 6 wrote his famous letter to the emperor seeking to find a way around this problem, i believe he referred to the long-standing relationship
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between the two countries. it was clear that these were the countries of strength and enable sense in the pacific -- in a naval sense in the pacific. countries ofi certainly think n navy had been preparing for years, as the japanese had, for the possibility of conflict over the control of the civic. -- pacific. most american navy wargames and the pacific was japan in theory. years drewy as the the prospect1, that japan was going to be the adversary was obvious, i think, to all. so that long-standing good afraid --ip gradually frayed. mr. sien: there seems to be a
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lot of intrigue going on in tokyo in the 1930's and 1940's. ms. hotta: i think society faced a similar problem because of what was economically going on around the world. looking back at this martial task, they were somehow spiritually and noble -- ennobled. i think that held sway after the military came up that they should be the one leading the societal reformation. and they were doing that in china. to blame all of the social ills in your society to foreign policies -- ours is not uncommon is not uncommon as we see. mr. sien: what does the phrase mean?tora, tora
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ms. hotta: it is tiger, tiger, tiger literally. i don't know why that was used to signal the success of the operations. -- ar as i know >> perhaps it is two syllables, meaning torpedoes attack. mr. sien: we want to talk about captain fu tschida. from talk to sarah hayward. i was listening to the program, and they were talking about regimes. 17 or 18 changeovers. i did not hear if that was china or japan. i wanted to clarify that. i wanted to know how i could
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find out about my cousin bill banks, who was in hawaii at the time of the attack. mr. sien: let's start with eri hotta. how many japanese governments were there, what was going on in a general sense? right before 1941. she was not sure if that change of governments was happening in china or japan. ms. hotta: japan. i was talking about japan. changing hands. -- the main character in all of it until october of 1941. tojo is asked to step in to reverse the momentum for war. palace'sthe imperial decision to get the hardliners at chance to reverse it, because i guess hawks can do a better hawks.taining the
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the prime minister stayed in power from the middle of -- the october.942 up until hissien: you say because of lack of leadership. craig nelson, if that uncle wanted to find her relative bill banks? there are two ways to look them up, one is through naval history and command, and the other is through archives.g ov. is service record through one of those. and you can also use google. that would be another way to go. mr. sien: we have awakened a sleeping giant and instilled in him a terrible resolve. admiral yamamoto
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supposedly said that. i don't know that it is an established fact that he actually said that. it is certainly reflected his sentiment that the united states would be an extremely formidable opponent. he had lived in this country as somend both times sort of military attache at different levels. he traveled around the country a lot. he spoke english. he even went to an iowa-northwestern football game. he had an appreciation, and he was a big fan of abraham lincoln, too. thead an appreciation for industrial power of the united limitless's seemingly natural resources. he understood that in any long war, the united states would be able to replace its losses much
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whichr than japan would, turned out to be the case. his boat was not the deciding vote on whether to go to war with the united states. think, toponding, i what he regarded as an inevitable decision. i cannot stop was going to happen, i'm going to make the best of it by launching this surprise attack on pearl harbor to eliminate the threat that existed in the pacific to his ships and to the other japanese offensives that were planned for that time. he was making the best of a bad situation. i think that quote, whether it was said or not, accurately reflects what he thought. mr. sien: would you consider him an anglophile? mr. nelson: i need to go back because i spent three days on
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that quote. this is a great example of internet history. you will find thousands of citations claiming he said this. when i did my citations, we have to look up and find where and when he said this. we cannot find it. three days later, we realized it was made up for the movie torah, tora, tora. the thing i love about admiral yamamoto that we have not talked about, at the momentous battle of -- he lost two fingers. his nickname was ¥80 because at cost ¥100. manic or one of the first of our interpretations of the military code was knowing where he was fine. the two men, americans who were
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supposed to take them up, have been battling the quote to this day. mr. sien: to mark the 75th anniversary of this attack, american history tv has joined us for this first hour of in-depth. they will be going away from us at this point. american history tv is on c-span3 every weekend with archival films, tours of historic places, lectures in college classrooms, and much more. for viewers interested in american history and to want to learn more about pearl harbor, join american history tv on c-span3 next saturday morning beginning at 8:00 a.m. eastern time. you will see the december 7 ceremonies from pearl harbor and washington. you will hear first-person accounts from veterans. you will see fdr's speech to congress requesting a declaration of war. on --ve viewer collins
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ins. >> almost 2400 americans were killed and almost 1200 wounded. the next day president roosevelt appeared before a joint session of congress to declare war on japan. this year marks the 75th anniversary of the pearl harbor and the u.s. entry into world war ii. up next, we hear from survivors who were stationed in honolulu in 1941. the national park service conducted the oral history. this is about an hour. >> we were in the hurricane for nine days, coming over from san diego. here you have a rather green crew. we got into honolulu, and some of us got liberty. we took a taxi into

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