tv Discussion Focuses on U.S.- Japan Military Collaboration CSPAN January 7, 2017 3:44am-4:18am EST
entering the pacific from the west. sunday afternoon on 2:00 p.m. on c-span 3. working with the affiliate and visiting cities across the country. >> flex a discussion about military cooperation between us and japan and shared interest. the hudson institute hosted the panel, technology and japan cybersecurity defenses. my opening remarks i mentioned third strategy and mentioned also my old firm conviction that over set strategy will provided important building blocks and connecti connective tissue for future
u.s./japan cooperation. let's find out more from two insiders who understand and many case have formulate that third off set strategy in its many facet and imply cases. it's my pleasure to introduce our panel who will be andrew who distinguished senior fellow sister for strategic budge tear assessment which he found in 1995. he assumed position after serving for 21 years as president of this premier washington think tank. >> the service was pro he had seeded by 21 years of president -- 21 career in the u.s. army. it's served in the department of defense office of assessment on
the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. currentsly served as chairman of the chief of naval operations executive panel and advisory counsel of business executives for national security. >> our other panelist doctor snider, colleague and president of the international planning services incorporated in washington based international trade advisory firm. doctor snider was under secretary of state for security voiceameri of 1980s. pry to being dominated and he served adviser to the u.s. government in several capacity almost endless capacity as
understand of military and scientific affairs is i think unparallel in this town. and in think tank world. he served as chairman of the president's general advise kple committee and served on defense science board since 2001. gentlema gentlemen my question to you is, how did this third off set strategy come to be formulated how do we see it shaping up as something that will end up being more than just simple another empty slogan or catch phrase that circulates for a number of years and becomes a solid and grounded concrete new way of
thinking how to fight in the sixth generation? >> we have both views on this, but i thing the third off saturday retains that name or some other is reflects the way in way the u.s. adapts to the technology that it needs for national defense to the threats opposed. u.s. is historically had a strong predisposition to using technology to solve problems whether it was in civil society or with defense we have always had a labor shortage in the u.s. we have always preferred using technology as a way of mitigating these kind of shortfalls. and of course the modern shift of this concept is rooted in the
soviet american riffvalry in th immediate aftermath of the world war ii left union with the manpower presence in the central and eastern europe that officered them powerful advantage in connecting military operation because they could be concentrated by the introduction of short rage nuclear system in the 50s and 60s and were able to force the sovietess lon forces to disperse and diminish for 3
days. it didn't seem very credible. and that evolved into the need to deal with the ultimate problem which was the russian selkd and third generation capabilities. andrew marshal was very effective in the decisive technologies that made it possible to without firing a shot the soviet forces by convergence with precision navigation and guidance with per sis tant surveillance. it enabled the u.s. and nato forces to completely expose the second and third. it contributed to the ability of
president reagan and president bush to wind up to cold war without the kind of warfare. we are in a new environment where the defense science board has done several studies where technology of modern warfare is more or less universally -- and it suggests that china is perhaps the most powerful exponent of the use of this universally available technology for military purposes. other countries are doing the same thing, perhaps on a different scale including iran and north korea and russia adopting its own tactics and
operations so the need is to find a way to defeat these technologies alodge the lines that he mentioned. it reflects an effort to do so. >> well, let me give you sort of my twist on the issue. first, i think the third offset strategy he says a nice turn but at the core of what we are talking about is strategy. we all know the basic definition, how to achieve the ends that you seek.
if you dig a little deeper it is against your adversary. at the same time recognizing those advantages that you have that are becoming what was called in the early days of the cold war, wasting assets, those advantages that are wasting away. your adversary is trying to make your advantages wasting assets and develop new advantages of their own. there is a constant competition that goes on. we had this enormous advantage of world war ii. we had a nuclear monopoly. it became a wasting asset when the russians tested their nuclear weapon in august of 1949. we with were confronted with a strategic choice of what to do
about it. the choice is do we build up our conventional forces in nato in 1952 there was a commitment to build up a force of 90 divisions. it sounds fantastic these days. president eisenhower after elected said this is going to be a long-term competition. we don't know when this competition with the russians is going to end. he made a strategic choice. he said in a long-term competition an important source of advantage for us will be the industrial base and the economic base of the countries of the free world. that's how we'll prevail in this long-term competition. he said what we are going to do is ride this nuclear advantage we have as long as we can to allow the europeans to rebuild their economies and rebuild their technological bases.
in fact that strategy worked in the sense that it succeeded in rebuilding economies, rebuilding technical bases until about the 1970s when not only did the russians as dr. snyder said, had a manpower advantage in europe but it also caught up to us in terms of nuclear capability. those of us remember what we are going to do. there were a number of people in the pentagon that looked for another offset and another source of advantage. they found it in basically a technology. they found it in information technology. the united states and the rest of the advanced industrial economies were shifting to an
industrial hardware economy. this was something soviet russia didn't seem to be able to do. i was buying, you know, sony television sets and pocket calculators. i wasn't buying any made in soviet russia and neither were you. people like william perry saw the potential there. we used it in terms of sdi to laid the ground work. we used it in sub marine, in precision navigation and timing. we used it in developing stealth technology. there were a lot of ways we could leverage this advantage and this advantage paved the way for what some people call the
revolution in military affairs in the '90s. this advantage is now becoming what they have said, china's development of these capabilities of chinese characteristics, if you will. if that's the case now our dominan dominance. where do we go next? i would argue that i don't think the answer is found in the 1950s or the 1970s. i think it was found in the 1920s and the 1930s.
as dr. sniyder said, it is becoming more capital intensive. if you look they are technology driven or technology is a key component. in the 1920s and 30s you have the commercial sector really driving a lot of what was going on. the automotive industry, the aviation industry, radio. the military takes some of this and adapts it. so it becomes radio for the military and becomes radar, for example. the question is what differentiated the militaries that got it right in that period for those that got it wrong? technology is widely available. as dr. snyder said, it is widely available today. where is big data? where is robotics? it's occurring in the commercial
sector. just as in the 1920s and '30s there were three keys in terms of who wins and who looses. the first one was identifying what are you trying to do, what is your purpose. so different objectives. number one was identifying what you're trying to do. i would say today what we are trying to do in terms of u.s. japan alliance is, you know, deter china from acting.
if you don't know what you're going to do it's very hard to leverage technology in a way that makes it most effective. so for example the german military lev leragesleverages. the american and japanese navies take some of that same technology and build their fast carrier, aviation and so on because they have a different objective and they are operating in a different domain. and so number one is what are you trying to do, second is figuring out how you will employ this to maximum effectiveness. again, you see a great example the americans use is the french army and german army. both have tanks. both have radios. both have aircraft. they figure out how to put them
together in the best way possible. and the third is time, who can do it faster? who figures out the new way of war first? whoever figuring it out first has an advantage. it is why the british doesn't perform well and the japanese and american navies perform at a very high level. the third is time. it is very much a time-based competition. you know, as our old soviet rivals would say there is a reality here. it is not dependent on the pentagon slogan it is what we experienced in the past. for me whether the name changes or not the challenge for us is going to remain and whether or
not we succeed will depend on these three factors. thank you. >> these are very important remarks especially the part about strategy and the vital dimension that imposes. i'm trying to figure out the best way to use our access to these technologies. one of the other dimensions i think are very important is a recognition that advance technology and such that we have been discussing and technologies being introduced, their importance is particularly profound with respect to the creation of new concepts of operation. we discussed, for example, the application of unmanned under water vehicles and the possibility of the it becomes
much more transparent. it would create a requirement for much levels concepts than we have here become accustomed. for this we need a very creative defense establishment especially the core that are able to adapt quickly to these operations. i think that is something that some times has given too little attention with a preoccupation with the technology. many different ways in which the technologies can be applied. it is only through the shaping of concepts of operation that are related to supporting a constructive strategy that the technology really makes a difference. i think this is something that we'll need to take advantage of.
the nature of the technologies that are on offer are moving much more rapidly than the experience we have had even in the 20s and 30s and all of the technology was moving rapidly. a number of the enabling technology for these military capabilities are advancing at ex exponential rates. if you think of taking a step of one meter each and do that for 32 times you have gone 32 meters but if technology is advancing and 32 incrimentes you're up to a billion. it has the property that it can
flexib flexible with having companies fail and cannot often be done with the same organization. a lot of things need to be -- it is an opportunity created by new technologies. >> i would add to that, again, using history as an example, everyone in the 20s and 30s knew that aviation was a new and important thing. the question is how new and how important? there was a great struggle in our navy i'm more familiar with. to help the battle line get into
position. things are very useful and hoping you get in position. so ybut at some point they realized you can use these planes for raids on airfields. of course we all remember that. in fact our own navy was very much involved in developing those capabilities. there was a transition point and the navies said look, these all help our battleships, our battle fleet. if aircraft can carry a very heavy payload they could sink these ships. it's not a matter of positi
positioning. it lead to the end of the battleship and rise of the aircraft carrier and sur marine. if you look at things today, i have had senior naval officers say to me, is the follow onto the virginia class a much improved version of what we have sore it something very different? is the next sub marine more like what we think of an aircraft carrier today, one that doesn't do the attacking itself, one that launches the way it launches unmanned under water vehicles? just when did the transition occur with aircraft in the '20s and '30s?
they have diffusing of unmanned under water systems technology and if you think about minds becoming smarter, smarter, smarter they start to look alike. so as doctor snyder said so many technologies moving forward at such a rate of speed it requires very serious sustained intellectual but how can you leverage it? what is the ultimate political purpose for this mill theitary capability? >> we will want to move smartly onto our panel at 10:30 but we do have some questions, including mine, which i will pose first. as moderator i claim that pr
privilege. as both of you know there is a feeling that the third offset strategy sits on relation with how they think about forces. our president-elect has made it his motto and he has clearly been thinking about this along the lines of building and increasing our spending and production levels in terms of conventional weaponry. if you were advising president-elect trump to existing conventional forces what would you say to him? i'll put this to both of you. >> i think the third offset technologies that we have been discussing like unmanned
vehicles, artificial intelligence and so forth can extend the life of existing systems, fourth generation aircrafts if accompanied by swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, that are able to operate autonomously can extend the life of these platforms so that the evolution of military capabilities and the application of military power and support of a particular strategy can survive with a mix of existing systems evolved using this third offset technology as we introduce new capabilities that are built around an entirely new concept of operation using technologies that are becoming available that can be applied for military
applications. >> i would i guess would be that we have built a military that is very advanced, but is used to operating in an environment that is passing what the military calls a permissive environment. nobody really goes after our muscle. nobody really goes after our nervous system. we get to have that as sort of out out of out of bounds. that would be my first point. my second point would be i think china in anyway you want to calculate it is the most dangerous. we have talked about rebalancing to the western pacific. that is really a hollow phrase. what are we trying to do?
whatever we are trying to do -- and i assume it's maintain the balance of power, how are we trying to do it. can we defend the first island change? at the core is japan and philippines. do we intend to do it with forward defense with reenforcements? with expedition nar forces? do we intend to fight the way we did in world war ii? we lose it but we take it back at some point. i don't think our allies would be too happy to hear that. some talk about an offshore strategy, which essentially is block aid. i think i risks giving it up to get it back. depending upon what kind of military postures you want to pursue you get different answers about the kind of military that
you need to have. we haven't done the hard, up-front thinking that we need to do. we have been sort of going on what the pentagon goes on momentum. i think if we took a good, hard look along the lines i think we could get significantly different answers. >> and there is one down here in the front. if you could give us your name and also affiliation that would be great. >> yes. just last week i was sitting at the u.s. council and we were talking about the expo then shl changes and what implications it had for the work force. what thoughts have you all given to whether it be the industrial work force that's having to make these things or the military work force in terms of being able to stay abreast of it?
>> the military establishment has a pretty good track record of training people at all levels to keep up with changes in technology. the civil sector has done less well and about programs and other kind of training. we probably need to do something differently than we have done in the past in order to keep up with it. the changes is much more rapid, but i believe also the ability to train people is much improved if we take advantage of it. >> i would just say from a strate
strategy point of view that our chinese friends have not the americans cannot fight a long war. we will win a long war. even though it is what they would prefer to do. on the other hand we spent a lot of time and effort making sure that the soviets knew we could fight and prevail. we have given up on that. a big part of what we ignored is things like strategic stockpiles, whether our industrial based can surge production. you can't surge production of a ford class carrier. you can of other things p in
order to convince the chinese that no matter how they are thinking about it aggression are not in their interest. >> thank you very much for giving us some ideas about not only where this comes from and where it is going. appreciate it very much. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> okay. it has gone through certain shall we say evolutions, our panelists who will be here to speak on the issue of beyond