tv Six Days of War June 1967 CSPAN June 3, 2017 4:00pm-5:11pm EDT
battle, which resulted in changes in leadership and a new balance of power. washingtoncorded in in 2003. it is about one hour, 10 minutes. carla: hello. i am one of the owners of politics and pros, and i want to welcome you here tonight, the day after "harry potter." [laughter] what a day. i want to do a few housekeeping issues for the beginning. one, if you want to ask a question you must make your way to the audience microphone. we will not recognize you standing at your seat, or sitting.
and after it is over, if you could help us get the chairs out of the way so people can have a book signed and talk with michael. fold of the chairs and put them against the pillar or a bookcase. thank you. very happy to have michael oren here. the, his book "six days of war: june 1967.", has been a huge seller here. and i think there are a lot of reasons for that. one, people really want to know why, in the predicament that we are today, it has been 35 years, but it has also been 90 years almost since the, since this, since the end of the first world war. 80 years.
the lines that were drawn at shadowme have cast a over the whole 20th century. the changes that took place in 1967 have certainly affected the whole second part of the century and we've felt the effects into our new century. michael oren is in a story and that served -- the story that served in the government of israel. he has tried to steer a middle ground and be utterly as truthful as he can be about the causes of the war. book is now available in paperback. and i noticed that the back of the paper book -- paperback says that he has a novelist command of narrative. encouraged bys
that or maybe he had already had in the work, but we now have a novel by him, which is terrific. it is really hard for most of you, as you know, to switch john has. -- switch genres. but this also switches time periods, and it takes place at the end of world war ii, a lot of it. and with an american battalion in belgium. so, we are selling both of the books today. and of course, we are having our members hail. -- sale. anyway, the book would be 25% off. we encourage you to stay, ask questions, buy books. and we look for to hearing from michael oren. [applause] michael: thank you. thank you for this impressive
turnout. i'm very flattered. i thought this was the "harry potter" sale. i thought about calling this "harry potter and the six-day war." [laughter] michael: i want to start off by describing a scenario in the middle east, i think it will sound familiar to just about everybody. it begins with a military dictator who is hated by much of the west, feared by other arab rulers. he is rumored to have stockpiled weapons of mass destruction, and has shown a willingness to use unconventional weapons, even against fellow arabs. he had an army of hundreds of thousands, and tens of thousands of tanks. and with this military force behind him, he defies u.n. resolutions, even ask u.n.
observers from the country, and challenges the western democracies of the world, only one accepts the challenge in war breaks out. and they charge across the desert, the once formidable forces of the arab dictator milk away and the war is quickly concluded. parts of the local population greet the troops, the advancing troops of the democracy as liberators, but in time it is clear that a growing number of that publish and views the new troops as occupiers. the occupation continues and it generates opposition internationally, even within that democracy itself. and increasing numbers of the population, influenced by extremism, by extreme nationalism, turn to terror. sound familiar? yes, you are supposed to not your heads -- nod your heads.
so familiar you cannot see the forest through the trees. period ofis is the the intervention of america in iraq. but it is precisely the sequence of events, the circumstances during the time 36 years ago this month in what we call today the june, or the six-day war of 1967. and you had an arab military leader, not saddam hussein. we had gamal abdul nasser, who is hated by the west and feared by other arab rulers. reportedwho was widely to have stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. he used poison gas for the first time against arabs, not israelis, arabs during the 1962 civil war. army, with soviets
applying tanks and guns. and with the force behind him he defied the u.s. and you and resolutions, he elected you and observers -- evicted u.n. observers from his territory. and israel launched a war against egypt in 1967 and the war was very swift. the egyptian army retreated and in short order israel had occupied the area of areas -- areas of gaza. and israeli soldiers were often greeted as liberators, believe it or not. but soon israel settled into an open ended occupation that was criticized abroad. even within that country. and the local population, which was greeted them as liberators, returned to extremism and palestinian nationalism toward a
terrorism. that is where we are today. of course, there are many to similarities, many differences between the recent intervention in iraq and the 1967 war with israel. but i firmly believed to understand the middle east today, to get a grasp of the situation, you need to go back to those six crucial days 36 years ago. every major milestone, every major event in israel arab relations, beginning with the war of attrition, the october war in 1963, the second intifada, the whole country versus surrounding the status of these territories seized by israel, question the future of the city of jerusalem, all of these major events and toestones can be traced back six short but intense days of fighting that begin on june 5, 1967. i do not think you can find
another example in modern history of an event that was so short in its time duration and is so circumscribed geographically, that has had such profound global ramifications. living with the impact of the six days to this very day. not just in the middle east, but here as well. it is safe to say that for ,ilitary and political leaders in the region and beyond, a six-day war has never really ended. for historians and scholars of the middle east, it is just beginning. the war is just beginning, thanks to the recently classification of top-secret documents in archives, in israel, in great britain, even in the former soviet union. a massive evidence, which combined with secondary sources with histories, provide us, provide historians with an
unprecedented detailed glimpse into the events surrounding the war of 1967 and into the decision-making process leading up to the events. they provide us with portraits of the individuals that made those decisions. we are talking about tiring -- towering people. i mentioned the master of egypt, but there was also lyndon jordan, king hussein of , impressive,an imposing people. together this sea of documents and secondary evidence paints a picture of an entire region cast into what i call a context of conflict. and it is the context of conflict occurring on every possible level that conflict can occur, on the international sphere, and the cold war between the u.s. and soviet union.
in the fatal rivalries between the arab rulers, the conservatives and radical leaders. andon the bilateral plane, in the israeli arab conflict. when you have this context of conflict, you do not need much. you need the slightest spark and you can ignite a regional war. this is precisely what happened leading up to the 1967 war, six months before the outbreak of of conflict, in november 1966 three israeli soldiers were patrolling the border between the west bank of jordan, and the three soldiers stepped on a mine planted by an organization under yasser arafat. they were killed by the mine. two days later, israel launched a retaliation, the largest since
the war of 1956. paratroopers, with tanks, crossing over the west bank border to strike at a stronghold in the west bank. but en route to destination something went awry in the plan. fromtalion of infantryman jordan, not supposed to be in the vicinity, crossed their path. shots were exchanged and 14 soldiers were laying dead. almost instantly, the jordan west bank population, they did not like king hussein and they rose up in revolt saying the king did not defend them from the israelis, that he was in league with the israelis, and that he must be violently overthrown. so his crown did not fit easily on his head. he was panic stricken. he quickly was looking for a way
to deflect the internal criticism the way, outside of jordan. so propaganda began to claim that king hussein's nemesis, gamal abdul nasser of egypt was responsible. he was the collaborating with the israelis and that he was hiding behind the skirt of you and peacekeeping forces placed in gaza in cyanide, to serve as a buffer between israel and the egyptians. now it was gamal abdul nasser's turn to be mortified, and he found a pretext to get rid of the u.n. force. that was furnished to him by the soviet union on may 12, 1967, when the soviets reported egyptians, falsely, that they had learned of a secret plan from israel to invade syria and conquer the capital. they quickly ascertained the report was false, but they saw
it as an opportunity. gamal abdul nasser used it as an opportunity to get rid of the u.s. forces in the area. he closed the streets of toronto -- tehran. he made defensive packs -- pacts with georgia and syria. 1967, it wasin only a matter of time, and they acted preemptively. ie entire sequence of events just outlined for you can be traced back to the event of november 11, 1966, when the three soldiers stepped on the mine. except we now know from the declassified documents that that raid, the event of the raid, should never have taken place. it was in fact easily preventable. the back to november 11, the
death of the three soldiers. the word of the event reaches king hussein. in his rhetoric, he was anti-israel, as any current generation -- as any arab leader of his generation was, but he did have open channels to the british and american embassies, he would meet with israeli emissaries abroad. in linking the same learned of the death of the three soldiers he sat down and he wrote a personal letter of condolence to the israeli prime minister. in the letter he said, i was in grief to hear about the death of the three soldiers, let's work together to combat the terrorist threat. and he passed the letter to the american embassy, which brought it to its contra part -- counterpart in tel aviv. to the ambassador of israel. now he was an unusual man. he was a big man.
a very big guy. a strange man. he lived with his bachelor sister. all of his life. but he was a beloved ambassador, he had been there for nine years, long time to the in office. and he knew the country well. he received the letter of condolence from king hussein in the afternoon of november 11. and had a past on the letter immediately to the israeli government, i think it is inconceivable that the government would have given a green light to the raid. it came with the matter of the state department, -- to have flaunted the appeal, it would've been a terrible flap for the united states. but the israeli government did not receive the letter on the afternoon of november 11. after november 11, it was a friday afternoon and the ambassador being experienced
knows what occurs on a friday afternoon in israel, it is the sabbath and everett encloses. -- everything closes. he thinks, this can wait until monday. onael launched the raid november 13, sunday. so you can say that the six-day war breaks out not because of israeli activism, that it breaks out because of the across the nation -- the procrastination of one man, and ambassador, an american ambassador. the same type of quirky turn of events precluded the egyptians from watching the same type of mass surprise attack against the israelis. that they eventually mounted against the egyptians on june 6. the plan for the egyptians,
code-named the dawn, called for a surprise aerial strike by the air force, to knock out all of israel's vital installations. the railroad, the port, oil refineries, the power grid, army bases, that paralyzed the country. and when it was left powerless, the ground forces, thousands of tanks would come across the border in breakthrough defenses and go north until they had linked up with the jordanian border and cut the country in half. it was the brainchild of the de facto chief of the egyptian army. man.e was also a colorful philandererfamous and substance abuser. given by egyptian standards he had raised the political
corruption to a new art level. disastrously in the 1956 war with israel, catastrophically in the egypt intervention. he was looking for a way to regain his reputation and he seized on this as providing that type of vehicle. and he proved that the operation could work. on may 18 and economic 4, 1967, he sent fighters over the israeli border to photograph the most sensitive strategic site, the nuclear reactor. the israeli army fired missiles at the airplanes and sent mirage is to intercept them. they got away. so he had proved israel was one honorable to surprise attack -- vulnerable to surprise attack. there is only one person in the egyptian leadership that had the power to stand up to him and say, operation dawn would not go
forward. and that individual was gamal abdul nasser. he did not want to start a war against israel. he wanted israel to start the war, so they could be blamed for starting another middle east war. and gamal abdul nasser believed his army could counterstrike and drive the israelis back. he could not stand up to amar. -- for one thing, he was afraid of him. it was a military dictatorship and the army was his power base. he was a powerful man. sser loved fear, na him. they were best friends. their kids married one another, they went on vacation together. so this strange company should of fear and affection prevented nasser from standing up and saying no, the operation will not go forward.
instead, it was scheduled to go forward and the day was set, fittingly for dawn on the morning of may 27. but it did not happen. as we know. it did not happen, we know from the documents, because the previous day on may 26, the former -- foreign minister of israel landed in washington dc and his goal was to ascertain for the american government, the government of president johnson, the position of the americans if there was an outbreak in the middle east. and when he even landed at the airport he was immediately handed an altra secret memo from the israeli government, and the memo told him that is really intelligence learned about an imminent egyptian attack on israel to go off in the next few hours.
that he should find out from the president what the united states would do about that. so presenting his intelligence to johnson officials at the white house that evening, first the secretary of state, later to the president. the americas replied by saying, our intelligence sources cannot confirm the israeli intelligence services. as far as we can see, we see no sign of an impending egyptian invasion of israel. so he left the white house despond and -- but when he left, johnson remained in the oval office with top advisers and being a shrewd statesman he scratched his head and said, what if their sources are better than our sources. what is the israelis are right? we better play it safe. he fired off a hotline message
to his counterpart in the kremlin, the premier alexei kosygin. he told him, we have learned from the israelis that your proxy in the middle east, the egyptians plan to launch a war. neither of us wanted this war that could escalate into global conflict, and we strongly urge you to reign in your allies. the impact of the message came a few hours later, 2:00 in the morning cairo time, when there was a knock on the door at nasser's villa. he opens the door and there is the soviet ambassador to egypt. and he reads him a personal cable from alexei kosygin, in which he says we have learned from the americans who have learned from the israelis, that you egyptians plan to start a middle east war. we do not want egypt to be blamed for starting a conflict.
if you fire the first shot, we will not be behind you. dumbfounded, how did the israelis even know about it? he convenes his general staff and says there has been a terrible leak, whatever you have planned, call it off. but the general was not to be quickly persuaded. he contacted the chief of the egyptian air force, and he said, how long will it take operation dawn to get off the ground? the chief of the air force said they were climbing into their cockpits and within 45 minutes they would be airborne. during the next three quarters of an hour, the future of the middle east hung in the balance. and he utilized those 45 minutes to consult with sources in the kremlin and they confirmed the substance of the message to
nasser, that the soviet would not defend them with the first reich. so he called back and told the pallets to climb down, operation dawn is canceled. now we know, have operation been implemented as planned, that there was little israel could have done to stop it. we know from the flights over the nuclear reactor, that the egyptian air force could have inflicted on israel extensive, but not existential damage. it did not happen. instead, eight days later the israeli air force mounted virtually a mirror image of operation dawn against the egyptians. it began with an aerial surprise attack that neutralize the air force on the ground, about 370 aircraft, followed by a ground thrust that broke through egyptian defenses.
but there was one essential difference between the israeli operation and the planned operation dawn of the egyptians. the israeli operation was seen as a surgical strike that was limited in its objective. its first goal, the neutralization of the air force. secondly, the elimination of the first of three egyptian defense lines. that is all. it did not call for the conquest of all of sinai. it did not call for israeli forces to seize the west bank, or as the israelis say, to liberate jerusalem. war,of those stages of the none of those were anticipated or forcing. -- forseen. so how that 48 hour surgical strike snowballed and escalated into a six-day war in which israel defeated at least three
arab armies and almost quadrupled its territory is an extraordinary story. remarkable story print i guess -- remarkable story. i guess you will just have to get the book. [laughter] michael: joking aside, in view of the violence occurring this evening, the terrorist attack before coming over here, in the west bank. the small attack in the west bank. let me tell you about one particular episode in the soccer and that is how the israelis came to capture the west bank, because again the documents provide us with unique insight and it changes the historical record significantly. to understand the episode, you have to go back to this relationship between israel and jordan in the 1960's. the israelis did not want a war with jordan. it was not that the jordanian border was the longest and most
vulnerable, or israel had hands full with nasser, it was the israeli leaders had lived through the 1948 war of independence and in that war, every time they went up against the jordanian army, they lost. they were afraid of the jordanians. they had a very professional army and israel wanted to avoid opening up a second front with them. on the morning of june 5, the airplanes coming for their target in the south, the government sent a message to jordan saying what is about to happen with israel is between us and egyptians. stay out of it and we will stay out of it with you as well. then orders came out along the eastern front with the jordan and in jerusalem not to open fire against the jordanians, even if they opened fire against israel, even if the king had to lob shells to prove he was a
good leader. the forces lobbed more than a few shells starting on june 5. the jordanian artillery opened fire with thousands of artillery shells into western jerusalem. 20 israelis were killed within one hour. buildings were destroyed. at the same time, jordanian planes began to hit the coastal cities. most disturbing for the government in israel, the long-range guns, they began to shell the outskirts of tel aviv. in spite of all of this provocation and aggression, the israeli orders held firm. they did not return fire. until 12:30 p.m. in the afternoon of june 5. something very strange happened at that time. the jordanian radio news announced jordanian soldiers were in the process of seizing
and capturing government house ridge on the southern approaches of the city of jerusalem. ok. now, i do not know how many of you have been to jerusalem. you have probably been there without knowing it if you have, it is the >> i actually live right behind it. area, itnot a scenic had been demilitarized by the u.n.. the area was so strategically sensitive. anyone who controlled that rich could dominate southern jerusalem. some say that he is really command maintained a secret listening post just off the ridge. when israel intelligence intercepted the jordanian news reports, the israeli army caught up his occupation point.
one hour later, at 1:30 in the afternoon, jordanian shoulders -- soldiers did attack government has rich. soldiers were in the process of attacking the enclave in the northern part of the city. the army called up the garrison and said if you see any jordanian soldiers -- they said he sectors quite. the army concluded that there was no coordination between the jordanian radio any jordanian army. it happens. what was really happening on the jordanian side. how to explain this most peak uriel -- peculiar behavior.
the last thing the same once was and what with the israelis. in the. war,ng up to the six-day king jordan faced a terrible dilemma. if nafta went to war against israel and he didn't join the arabs throughout the middle east would kill him. if nasa went to war against israel and jordan didn't join the effort and nasa won the war, if they proceeded in breaking the border, they would stop at the jordanian order. how do you get out of this terrible dilemma russian mark hussein thought he would them all.
arrived and took direct command of the jordanian army. all was fine and good until the morning of june 5. at 9:30 in the morning, an hour after the war started in the south, they received a cable from general honor. israelis that he is -- forces have been destroyed on a graph. an egyptian armored column is now making its way up the west bank from the south through bethlehem. it will soon enter southern jerusalem. they tell them to guard the eastern flank by taking government help edge. at the same time, he thinks that israel will try to reinforce these cities through mouth scope us. he also sent forces up to mouth scope us.
-- mount scope us. they knew there was no egyptian column. again, the israeli leaders remembered the 48 war and they remembered the terrible siege that he jordanian army had led on western jerusalem. there were 100,000 jews left without water or food. it was an enduring, for israeli leaders. that operation in 1948 began with the same two-pronged attack. government hill ridge in the south and mouth scope us in the north. -- mount scopus in the north. they destroyed the egyptian air force on the ground. they sent an armored column to
silence the gun to do mean -- guns of jenean. they were in complete retreat. after heavy, fighting, by the morning of june 7, they succeeded in surrounding the old city. with its holy sites, including the holiest site, the western wall. this was within several hundred yards. if any be ours all does i am, but get the pictures in the book, see pictures of paratroopers dancing. you would obviously conclude that the israeli government gave the green light. we know from the documents that this was not the case. on the morning of june 7, the israeli government stopped. whether or not to send israel
and soldiers. especially the religious ministers and the israeli government were led by alexei kosygin --moshe dayan. it was for christianity, the holiest site. christian countries would several -- several relationships with israel. we need that vatican. the decision ultimately fell to one man, it fell to the prime minister. i respect him as a man of great
wisdom and wit. he desperately wants to realize this millennial jewish vision of reuniting the jews ancient capital of jerusalem. at the same time, this was a seasoned statement. he knew the grave risk involved in doing that. now it is his turn to come up with a brilliant skin. at 9:30 in the morning, he now wrote a letter. in the letter he sent your majesty, if you will declare an unconditional cease-fire, if you will a bit the egyptian commanders from your country and read them control of your army and if you will agree to enter into a peace process with us, talks, the israeli army will not enter the city of jerusalem. this is the first jewish leader in 2000 years.
he's going to forfeit this opportunity. just on the possibility of getting a peace process. there was no response to this. 1130 in the morning, the order -- given, take power through they power through. the words that continue to reverberate in israel and the entire middle east, the temple mount is in our hands. going back to my earlier argument that you could posit that the six-day war breaks out because one letter did not reach , theestination on time operation dawned and did i get off the ground.
the israelis came to capture the west bank. the anecdote of the six-day war, i think it is very interesting. i enjoy telling them. what, beyond their anecdotal value, what can they teach us about the fundamental and enduring nature of middle eastern politics to mark how can they help us get a grip on the complex and dangerous situation of the middle east, today? when you have a context of conflict, a war that nobody wants, nobody foresees and anticipates, it can break out.
that's what happened in 1967. the war does not break out as a consequence of series of rational decisions. conclusion is very pertinent to today. the middle east remained deeply embedded in a context of conflict. volatiley ways more than it was in 1967. there is no cold war. there is no ipo division. who is president bush opposed to hotline? our conservative leaders no longer exist. the false run my through every arab state. even the lines in the arabic are very tough, they are no longer
easier -- easily drawn. for the most part, it is removed from population centers. there is very little civilian damage. it would not be thought out in the desert somewhere. warhead.an array of thought in our cities, in our streets, in our neighborhoods. and they get intimated that i'm not a scholar of this. >> i'm an israeli father. i'm also the father of two younger children who take a city
bus to and from school every day. it is the number 14 bus. it was several hours before i got in the plane. all of israel goes into this utter panic. everyone using their cell phones to make sure everyone is ok. the unpredictable, volatile , isre that affects my life not entertaining, it is not riveting, it is not engaging. we have colin powell trying to pursue that roadmap. very manyou will have questions about it. somee it leads us to destination.
if they just to a reconciliation and resolution of this conflict. people often tell me that you're so lucky. you never run out of subjects, you never run out of lord. when you -- when will you write about young part? -- yom kippur? my greatest aspiration is to write the definitive and wonderful history of the arab-israeli peace. thank you. [applause]
in your book and also in your writings, your recent writings, you made it clear that the dispute in the middle east is not an israeli-palestinian dispute, it is an israeli arab dispute. despite the six-day war, the arab countries still don't accept a jewish presence in the middle east. in light of that, how do you explain that the new york times, the washington post, the national, also it's a prospective moderates speak about the palestinian israeli dispute and say that they have accepted israel. is there something this ingenuous?
they first create a palestinian state. that middle eastern -- theyre difficult to are in palatable. beinghink they are disingenuous, they're trying to put the best face on a terrible situation. the wall street journal published an article of mine a week and a half ago. it called attention to an asymmetry which the bush administration has to be cognizant of. from 1967 to today, the israeli population has undergone a profound transformation in its
attitude toward the palestinian issue. a man significantly to the right and the camp david accords recognized that there is such a thing as a palestinian. the palestinian ask a has right. they had a right to self-determination. camp david says that he is not only recognizing the palestinians right, they're going to accommodate those. ago, thew weeks architect of the movement, saying the award. -- that is a transformation that
is substantive and strategic. on the palestinian side, there have also been changes. six years later, the palestinians, the plo, they formulated the phases program that called for the deliberation of any part of how stunned by any means. that liberated part of palestinian would break the rest of palestinian. these two plans, these two documents have never been disavowed by the palestinian leadership. even though there is a
do this, theo palestinians have never given up their demand for the return of palestinian refugees. that same demand -- until the palestinians rectify this, until they respond -- let me respond and rephrase this. i'm not a spokesman for the government. i figure i speak for a good body of israeli public opinion. when we recognize palestinian people have suffered injustices in the past and we would like to try to inaugurate those injustices, they have a historical tie to this land and they deserve to share it with
us. we are looking for the palestinians to reciprocate that position. only wayprocity is the for a durable peace in the middle east. any other arrangement won't work in the long run. he thought he could get away with it. it wasn't such an irrational position. it was a their bet on their part. they evicted the u.n. forces. the u.n. did nothing. there wasn't another power in the what to say anything.
johnson bailey condemned it. he moved his entire army. nobody did anything. the one ally that the israelis have, the french announced they were switching sides. if you put yourself in their shoes, this man is being deified. this is a very good bet. sign ofuld every backing down. they probably would have done the same thing. quirks i noticed difficult to take the politics out of it.
these were the apex is where the triangles met. that would be a road going east to west. a road going north, south, linking israel with iraq. that idea is still out there. even in the behind closed doors talks, they are talking about creating a road. we will enable some of this huge population to siphon off.
siphon off to gaza and link them in some way. when he accepted the roadmap and accepted that he would create a palestinian state with -- that was territorially contiguous, read the lines there. it will never be an absolute solution for gaza. certainly any peace plan if it will work has to address this very intractable problem. >> what struck me in your talk and in your book was well the importance in shaping the aspects of the book, of the war is clear, it strikes me that the war that exists now is so different from the wharton 67. what the 67 war unleashed was palestinian nationalism.
created aed and force. the fact is that you're not facing a few arab countries and ae hour later, you're facing popular situation. how muchhe question is the 67 war and what is the series of events you point out? how much can they teach us about what is going on russian mark i'm also an israeli citizen. what strikes me the most about working on those and working with palestinians on peace andects are the symmetries perception on the two sides. the degree to which palestinians believe that israel is out to
destroy them and the degree to which israel is believed that palestinians, the inside is about the destruction of israel. your --rested into interested in your response into the way in which the nature of the conflict has changed so fundamentally and last 35 years. the 67 war and with israeli guns that threaten our capitals. this requires a strategic depth that it never had. there are changes on the arab side. as you mentioned, it was the congealed, nationalist movement. this asemerges with
their head as a potent force in our politics. also, the feet of the arab armies in the war, the dramatic disappointment of the arabs and in vision spurs a flight search of an alternative ideology. let's look back and see what we have and what is authentic. from 67.ee this lady this place such a profound role in the middle east. general, the continuity that i see is that the two major issues that triggered the middle east, i'm not talking about water, not militarized zones, the two core issues are the
palestinian problem. what to do about the refugees. thanks on the other hand, the refusal of the arab population, not just arab leaders to accept a jewish state in their midst. i believe that tremendous made in has been recognizing this is not a tremendous problem. situationnessing a where there is widespread support for a palestinian state that is not -- does not yet exist. there is a lack of recognition for an israeli state that does exist. until we can get these two i think theive, conflict remains unchanged.
>> i question was related to a statement you made earlier about the population earlier. >> doubling of it. keeping demographics of today -- ind, in hindsight, made an error by keeping a large segment of them. a big point of controversy is the creation of a wall. i wrote an article against the wall. i expressed all sorts of reservations. we lived behind the wall.
book. >> i am questioning your impartiality. >> i question my impartiality. clearly, i have very strong and outspoken ideas about this, i'm a political commentator. when i approach a historical subject, i know that if i want to understand what happened, to see through other's eyes, to see through the soviet eyes, i have to do my own prejudices and obstacles to be overcome. i have to ask myself all the time, and my being objective here. am i being partial?
the most rewarding responses i've had on this book have come from it arab world. all of the arabic reviewers have set up front, who i am, what i am, what i have done. if you said this is the thing i -- if you asked me, this is the thing i am proudest about. >> you alluded to the idea of the wall. the issue of whether the palestinian leadership has enough power or influence to
really come to an agreement. let me extend that. you can if they did right now, what are your concerns about the likelihood that that would be a stable enough leadership? how much transient is that in terms of who is the leadership among the palestinians that they be able to maintain control? if there were an agreement that they could honor on the and. it is relative. >> i'm skeptical of polls. he later post show that commenced only 2% of popular support. it is not towering. that definitely create a discrepancy.
this is the only act in town right now. i will go back on the personal level. the older son of mine who is has been to three funerals of his friends in the past four months. as a father, i will do anything to get him out of that combat area. if they're willing to take over the city's and controlling, it is wonderful. from --e my elder son from this, i will endanger the kids on the number 14 bus. it sounds like it's obvious choice situation. i've -- what a terrible dilemma this is. i think i speak for a great majority of israelis were willing to take the risks. i would like to see the been over backwards
as much as they can. >> i would like to get back to demography. i did visit many west bank arabs. they were middle-class arabs. reasonably educated on the west bank. the last thing they want to have is to have people from gaza moving to the west bank. bethey consider them to egyptian palestinians. they speak a slightly different language. they are different cultural backgrounds. they are entirely different from the people of the west bank. my second point has to do with cultural matters. there is the position of women in our society. you see this by the fact that anyone was a about
martyr. he has 10 brothers and sisters. but, the future do you see for a palestinian state? >> is a multifaceted question. there is a difference between creating a state in creating a nation. one of them you alluded to, the lack of empathy -- empathy, it is clue, the gaza population is historically like this. there are sent there by muhammad ali.
>> aggregate, it is optical. as for women, i think this is a much broader question. it goes to the heart of the middle eastern malaise. i believe it is the question of women's rights and women's deaths in the middle east is the question. this is the question that encompasses all other questions. it is the court of a rather muslim culture. it has to be a re-formation. it has to undergo a reformation. keep in mind, the status of women and islamic societies -- society is a core concept. it has to undergo a reformation. is the creation of the courtyard. the west, with its mtv and its
nudity and lasciviousness on tv present a mortal threat to the civilization. oure think they will import mtv, our women selling automobiles, we are not. if we are going to meet the civilization in such a way that is not a lash but is a dialogue that can lead to some type of productive thing, we have to progress toward a change of women's status. it has to be with sensitivity to muslim sensibilities. it has to be done, on the other hand it has to be done right. [applause] >> no questions about the novel? >> thank you so much michael
websites. your logic american history tv all weekend every weekend on c-span3. all weekend long, american history tv is joining our comcast cable partners to showcase the history of eugene r. c-span.org/cities tour. >> we are overlooking the -- this is in honor of wayne morse. he was a law professor, a politician,