tv Discussion Focuses on the Future of North Korea CSPAN June 9, 2017 4:15pm-5:48pm EDT
at 12:2:00, jeffrey stone with x and the constitution." then trey rade wlchlt his book, "democrazy: a true story of wierd policy, money, madness and finger food." and thomas ricks with his book, churchill and orwell, the fight for freedom. watch our coverage of the 33rd annual chicago tribune lit fest at 11:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2's book tv. dl was a discussion hosted on north korea's future, political, and economic prospect following a series of global shifts including donald trump winning the presidency and the 2017 election of moon j.in as the
south korean president. the panelists including korean and american scholars who talked about the challenges north korea posed to the u.s. and asian allies. afterwards they took questions from the audience. this is about 90 minutes. >> okay, thank you very much, everybody, for coming to this event at iiss discussion for north korea, boom or bust. normally we have a 30% drapout rate for those that signal tendance. today we had a 30% increase. that's a tribute to our speakers. but also to the issue at hand which is certainly one of the top security issues facing the united states and the world and particularly the region. so this event is part of the iiss america's dialogue series where now the third such event
we seek to address, shed light on the issues that come up at the dialogue which will be held this weekend in singapore for the 16th year. the dialogue is a gathering of defense ministers around the region and many of their counter parts in other countries. there is one asian defense minister that will not be there, that is the north korean. i tried many times to get the north koreans to come to our dialogue and it's been one of the failures every time i have my annual review. i get that checked off as area to improve on. we have victor cha, a senior adviser and the holder of the korea chair at csis.
that's another think tank in town. he is also director of asian studies. he served as directsor of asian affairs on the white house at the national security council. he is long time iiss member and contributor. su mi terry is the managing director for korea. from 2009 to 2010, she was the dmu ti national intelligence officer for east asia at the national intelligence council. earlier, she worked as a senior analyst at the korean affairs at the cia. i met her three years ago at a conference in philadelphia where i was very impressed with her presentation. ever since, i wanted her to join us at iiss.
thank you for coming at this time. our next guest served in several advisory positions in the korean government including the presidential committee for unification, preparation, the minister of foreign affairs and the ministry of unification. we met for the first time eight years ago in hanoi and our paths have crossed several times since then. finally, is michael elleman, iiss senior fellow fort miff defense based here in washington. before i hired mike in 2009, he spent five years at bu zell and hamilton where he supported the implementation of cooperative threat reduction programs in the former soviet union. previous to that, he spent 1 months at the united nations as a missile expert for weapons inspections missions in iraq. he writes and speaks extensively about north korea missile development. the fully event will run for an
hour and a half following remarks by each of the panelists. we'll have a discussion portion and i'll turn it over to questions for you. this event is on the record. it's being broadcast by c-span 1 and c-span radio. additionally, a video will be posted on the iiss website. because of the c-span broadcast, we have extra lights here which adds to the heat in the room. and unfortunately, today, the air conditioning chose to go out for the entire building. and the room is packed with people. so i'm going to encourage everyone to feel free to take off one layer of clothing. i encourage the panelists to do that, as well. we'll all been miked up in our suit. so we're not going to be able to be have that luxury. if you see us sweating it's not just because we're worried about
north korea. so victor, let's start off with some thoughts from you, please. >> thank you. thank you, mark. it's a pleasure to be here in this toasty room with all of you this morning. mark neglected to mention how we first met. you probably don't remember how we first met. >> i remember. >> you do remember. >> i was doing my ph.d. dissertation and i was doing my field research as a full bright scholar in japan and korea. and looking for people to interview for my thesis, and you know, when you're a p.h.d. students just roaming the streets of tokyo and seoul trying to get a government official to talk to you, you're grateful and remember the ones who actually said yes. mark was one of the two people at the u.s. embassy who said yes at the time. the other was bill mckinney. he was the defense attache at the time. i'm always grateful for that. thank you, mark.
in terms of north korea, great title boom or bust. the -- if any of you have even been mildly paying attention to the news, you have noticed an uptick in coverage of north korea largely because of the missile testing activity they have been undertaking. some of you may look at this and think, well, you know, we've seen the north koreans do this before. this is just cyclical coverage of every time they decide to test another missile or do another nuclear test. but i would put to you that there was a qualitative difference today in terms of what is happening versus what has happened in the past. if we start with some of the basic metrics, between 1994 and 2000 and the end of 2007, so for about 17 years, almost 1 years, north korea did 17 ballistic missile tests and one nuclear
test between 1994 and 2000, december of 2007. since january of 2008 till today, they have done i think the number is if we count this past weekend, 73 or 74 ballistic miff tests and four nuclear tests. so there has been a -- there has been a sea change in the amount of testing that they have been doing. in the past, there was a theory bandied about in the pos community in washington, d.c. and in academic halls around universities that one of the purposes of north korea's testing was that it was essentially a desire to have negotiations with the outside
world and in particular the united states. north korea is a poor small isolated country. it has the largest country on the world on its border. it's got russia on its border across the sea. sea of japan, east sea, whichever you prefer is japan, the united states military is in the south. and directly across the border in south korea is a very successful korea, not a very unsuccessful korea. for all these reasons, the north korean regime did these tests as essentially a way to try to draw the outside world into negotiations to get them credibility, to get them
legitimacy because it was the only currency they had. they had no other currency with which to trade with the outside world. i think it's pretty safe to say that they're not that many -- there may be a few still but there are not that many in policy community that still believe that is the purpose of this testing. the pace of testing clearly suggests that this is a military testing program. it is not simply a cry for help or a provocation disguised as an olive branch. this is a military testing program. so what is the purpose of this program? well, clearly one purpose is survival, right? every regime seeks survival. and dictatorships in particular are quite often very much focused on their survival. but i would put to you that a regime that over the past 25 years has devoted a disproportionate amount of its national resources to a wmd program is doing this not simply for reasons of survival. north korea is demonstrating and actively trying to test the capability that can reach the united states about a nuclear tipped icbm. we can certainly talk about and i'm sure michael can talk about some of the obstacles that still remain from them from doing
that. that's clearly the objective of all of this testing. the purpose of being able to reach the united states with an icbm, the west coast of the united states and to be able to threaten all of japan and south korea, the military objective of all this is in my view, they want to try to undercut the credibility of u.s. extended deterrence guarantees to south korea. in their own minds in their own minds, i'm not saying u.s. but in north korean minds they believe that if they can threaten the united states if they can threaten los angeles or san francisco with a nuclear attack, it will create hesitation on the part of the united states if they were called on defending south korea. they can threaten all u.s. installations and cities in
japan, including tokyo, they will create in their own minds some hesitation on the part of japan to allow the united states to flow forces through japanese logistics nodes in defense of the korean peninsula. you have to remember that in north korea had, the world for north korea is very small. it's about survival, of course. but north koreans don't really care about climate change. they don't really care about global governance. they don't really care about responsible overseas development, assistance policies in africa. right? they don't really care about fragile and conflict afflicted states. they don't really care. the only thing they care about is their survival and dominance of the korean peninsula. those are the only two things that they care about. so while this idea, this theory i'm putting forward may seem farfetched to some of you, if
you look at it from a north korean mind-set, this is all that matters because once they can create some sense of hesitation or doubt that the united states or japan would be there in the case i've conflict, then they will feel they have affected the strategic balance on the peninsula. 25 years ago, the north korean regime realized they were never going to be able to match south korea dollar for dollar, right? company for company. tank for tank. soldier for soldier. so they chose an asymmetric strategy focused on nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and cyber as a way to try to matches a symmetrically try to match what is happening on the other side of the peninsula. that is essentially the strategy that they've been following. in terms of, i don't know, mark, how long do you want me to speak
for? >> should be no more than ten. you're getting toward the conclusion i think. >> okay. i think let me make some comments about the new government in south korea. as you know, new government was elected in south korea what was it, last week, a couple of weeks ago. and i think there was a lot of noise in the press about how you know, this is the first progressive government in south korea in a decade. that they're going to take a very different view of policy towards north korea and create a rift in the alliance between the united states and south korea. i think what we've seen thus far actually has shown the opposite. which is that president moon appears to have taken a pretty measured position when it comes to engagement with north korea reinvigorating the so-called sunshine policy. of course, the north koreans
have helped in creating this measured response because they've already done two miff tests since the new south korean president was elected. and i think from a u.s. perspective, in principle, i think the united states doesn't have a problem with engagement with north korea. but it has to be done at the right time. it has to be coordinated and done at the right time. which is what the south koreans want, as well. the south koreans don't want to throw money down a black hole if they're going to invest in engagement, they want it to be effective. it's not going to be effective if it's not coordinated with the united states and other members who are involved in trying to denuclearize north korea. thus far, i think the media speculation was a little bit speculative. of course, they have to sell newspapers so that's a better story when you say the u.s. and south korea are going in
opposite directions but thus far, i think if you just look at president moon's statements they seem to have been quite measured reflecting realities on the ground rather than some you know ideologically blue sky view of what engagement can do with a regime that as i said since january of 2009 has -- january of 2008 has clearly been on a testing warpath. so why don't i stop there. >> thanks very much, victor, for laying out the situation and some views about the new south korean government which dr. hwang is also going to comment on. sue, you've been looking at the north korean case for quite a number of years. tell us some of your insights please. >> so when i used to work at the cia, i spend about a decade looking at north korean internal situation. i'll tell you most definitively
the hard part to get a clear understanding on is leadership dynamics, region intentions what the leaders are going to do. this is something that's really hard to get clarity on. very, very difficult. but as victor said, eventually we've got a handle on the kim jong-un leadership, the decision making. and what victor referred to we got a handle on this brinkmanship, tactics policy we called it a pattern, a cycle. provoke, pyongyang's playbook. we had cute names for it which was basically north korea would do something provocative and you know, there's an international condemnation. they would up the ante and pivot to some sort of peace offensive and off-ramp which would lead to dialogue and negotiation and some sort of concessions made by washington or seoul to north korea. this is not as noted exactly the
pattern under the kim jong leadership. he's not following this exact pattern. he seems to be bent on really perfecting and completing the nuclear program. he staked his entire legitimacy on perfecting this nuclear arsenal that his father and grandfather have power pursued and millions of lives and a cost of billions of dollars. he's bent on completing it because he sees achieving this capability to be able to hit the united states, washington, d.c. or new york with nuclear-tipped icbm as final deterrent, final guarantee. so what really concerns me is we didn't get to talk a lot about policy but maybe we'll get to that is that and weather you're for maximum pressure or engagement and i happen to be for pressure. i happen to be -- that's my
preference in terms of match mum amount of sanctions additional sanctions. you know, you're going after the secondary sanctions if necessary and other measures to try to get the regime to change its calculus, but what really concerns me since we're going to be frank here is that i have -- none of these measures were will likely achieve might not achieve the desire we want to achieve, the goal we want to achieve which is to get north korea to give up newark year weapons, give up its nuclear arsenal. what will we do? we sooner or later i think sooner rather than later, we will probably get there and north korea will achieve that capability. then the two -- i have many concerns obviously once north korea achieves that capability.
but the two main concerns that i have are first and i think victor has also referred to this many times is miscalculation. really will go up by the kim regime once he believes he has this capability that you can hold u.s. cities as hostage basically hold it as hostage. that his decision making or mind-set could be he thinks now he has this ability to deter us which then will lead to it could be more conventional acts of coercion, that will lead to unintended escalation that will lead to more obviously a problem. so that's one concern i have. second concern and i know a lot of the folks share this concern is that nuclear deterrence has worked thus far. it worked with north korea deterrence worked. deterrence and containment policy worked but again i'm not as confident on this leadership that nuclear deterrence and continued policy will
necessarily work with kim jong-un. i have less confidence that it would work. people like jeffrey lewis wrote a very scary foreign policy piece how north korea might even be developing offensive nuclear doctrine. i'm not sure if i would go as far as that, but there is an argument that people are making that you know, that there is a possibility that kim jong u.n. could do that, could use even nuclear weapons in an effort to really recoil u.s. and south korea in case he think to stop us from invading or going after north korea because when he saw cases like iraq and libya with saddam hussein and gadhafi, obviously conventional forces did not work. we cannot rule out that possibility. obviously that is a very scary scenario.
>> it's been six minutes, wow. so the trump administration apparently told the south korean delegation there's a four point strategy, one not recognizes north korea as a nuclear state, two imposing all available sanctions not seeking regime change and four ultimately resolving the issue with dialogue. this sounds goods but i do think that we have to be somewhat realistic. we have to be prepared for this scenario that none of these measures are going to work and what is our long-term policy and goal? i don't know if we have that. and i know some people are always talking about unification and so on. we say regime change is off the table because it's not fashionable to say that. but where is our end state? because if you if this is credible, it's not going to change, you're not going to go anywhere with this particular
regime. i mean, this is something we do have to think about. just two points since i'm out of time i want to talk about. on the elites. the sanctions mentioned all this. it's not only north korea. it does help in terms of undermining the current regime. if you are seeking for sort of your you're hoping to create instability or regime change scenario in north korea, sanctions trying to really -- because you're taking money away for kim jong un's ability to underwrite the lifestyle of the elites. i do think this information penetration campaign that we often talk about is very important but i just want to make this final point that it shouldn't only be targeted towards the public. the populace of getting
information into north korea. we should definitely try to again target the elites because we're trying to get two messages across to the elites which is that this current course of trying to attain nuclear weapons is not going to guarantee your survival and livelihood. secondly, if you are able to get out of north korea that there will be maybe some sort of amnesty or some sort of lifestyle that could be guaranteed. fundamentally, because it's the elite support that's keeping the region going. >> you ended on a very good place. that reminds me of what my friend talks about. it would be great if we can get him to washington, too. so professor hwang, from south korea not representing south korea, or course. >> thank you for having me here. i'm jihwan hwang, research scholar at the catholic university. so i think the -- i was wondering why the mark decide on the tight of this seminar, the north korea boom or bust. i'm sure that it's now boom because there are so many people here. so you are very interested in the north korean issues. he actually asking me to talk
about the south korean perspective on the north korean nuclear issues, but unfortunately, i'm not a government official. but anyway, i know a lot of people inside of korean government. i have many friends inside the new south korean government. moon jae-in. so i think i think very well about the new south korean government and new york policy. basically, i think that i believe that as most of us do that moon jae-in the government north korea policy is you know somewhat different from the those of the previous back and park you know hey because the moon jae-in government, basically emphasize the importance or inter-korean
relation including the economic comp ration and also the social and the cultural exchanges between the two koreas. so i think the moon government will start with the north korean policy. the cultural or the social approach rather than the political or the military one. but seems to me that however, i think that it's very difficult to say the new government moon jay government, the real north korea policy would be the completely and fundamentally different from the previous government. i would say the three different variables are to explain the north korea policy, the first one is south korea domestic politics and the second one is action reaction dynamics on the korean peninsula and the third one is the alliance of politics of course, the alliance between the u.s. and south korea. the first regarding the korean domestic policy, you know
because we have now the new, the progressive, the president in south korea it's natural to expect the new south korea policy by the south korean government. so moon's policy will definitely reflect the former or kim day young and -- which is widely only known as the sunshine policy. so many people predict that the president moon's policy would be the moon shine policy maybe. maybe. but so in this sense, recently the south korean government especially the ministry of unification approved the south korea's south korea's ngos. the humanitarian aid to north
korea maybe two days ago. the new foreign minister maybe you know her, who used to work for the u.n. and maybe the u.n. secretary-general was told that it is necessary to continue the humanitarian aid towards north korea in any case and she also said that this is u.n.'s basic principle. so maybe most of you know the professor moon at the university. now he's your president noon moon jae-in's special security adviser, he's you know, the strong support of sunshine policy. he has a book on sunshine policy published in 2013. and the title is the sunshine policy in defense of engage. as a path to peace in korea. and also, the professor who now
the president of nash security and also the professor at the university, he was here in the washington, d.c. to explain moon jae-in the government, the north korea policy on foreign policy. maybe several months ago. he's also a strong supporter of the sunshine policy on the korean peninsula. so director nominee. he has also had been deeply involved in the interkorean negotiation and relation during the government. so all of them believe that
sanctions are not enough to change the north korea's course of action. and they want to pursue new north korea policy that would change the real nature of the north korean society. maybe in a longer time perspective. it is somewhat difficult to pursue, you know, the conduct a fundamentally different north korea policy even during the government. the first reason is that the action-reaction dynamics and interkorean relations. so south korea -- north korea policy is influenced by north korea's external behavior as well as south korea's domestic politics. so because, you know, north korea has conducted five nuclear tests for last ten years and maybe hundreds of missile test. so it is not difficult to
initiate completely. the policy except the humanitarian agency. so if north korea -- we reciprocate serious bodily injury korea's conciliatory policy, then there will be less room so new policy even for the government. so in this sense, north korea's external behavior is really important. but it is less likely to stop the provocative actions. now most the south korean people feel very threatened by north core ease's provications. so most korean people support the international sanction on north korea and believe that china has not fully cooperating in the implementing the sanctions. maybe near china-north korea
borderline. so if north korea continues provocative behavior, behavior the south korean's public opinion, you know, less likely to support the new engage ment. so the alliance politics hit twenty u.s. and south korea. the government understand the importance of the korea-u.s. alliance in dealing with the north korean nuclear crisis. so president moon spoke -- do i have maybe one, two minutes? okay. the president moon also spoke several times about the importance of korea-u.s. alliance and also talked about the need to strengthen, keep strengthening the alliance. but what south korean people are concerned now is about the uncertainty and the
unpredictability on the north korean nuclear issue and also the trump administration's policy towards north korea. americans are concerned about the new south korean government and its north korea poll sichlt the south koreans are concerned about the trump administration's foreign policy and north korea policy. and the former bush and obama administrations policy towards north korea. trump administration and north korea policy appears even to me, you know, very uncertain and unpredictability which makes south korean people really concerned about the possibility of trump's korea passing actually. so when president trump says north korea has shown great dissprekt for their neighbor china and china is trying hard and the south korean people don't understand what he really
means. he also talked about, said that north korea is maybe more important than a trade deal with china. does he mean that? the south korean people do not understand what he really means. so this is why the south korean people are concerned about the possibility of u.s.-china, maybe u.s.-china agreement on the korea issue and that will represent south korea's security interests. i believe u.s. and north korea will play -- still believe that they play a critical role in resolving the north korean issue. it is still very necessary to resolve the uncertainty and unpredictability. it's really important to cooperate and coordinate very closely between this u.s. and
south korea, two countries. let me stop here. >> okay, thanks very much. some very interesting observations there. we want to get into about this concern. n. south korea over over statements. mike, i put you last because i knew that you would enlighten us even mor about the north korean missile capabilities and ideas on dealing with it. >> thank you, mark. as my co-panelist discussed earlier missiles play kind of a paramount role in north korea's state craft and its means to ensure its survival. it's probably the preferred means for delivering a nuclear weapon. missiles are also have a conventional capability and in principle they could arm the missiles with chemical or biological weapons, though i would argument that artillery is
more effective in dlooifr tlg agent and they can range seoul quite easily that way. i wouldn't expect them to use missiles to deliver wmd other than nuclear. now, in the headlines over the last three, four years or since kim jong un has certainly come to power, we've seen north korea conduct a large number of missile tests. i think it's somewhere in the neighborhood of 75 to 78. it depend on how you count them, you know, and some of the news reports are a little bit ambiguous but nevertheless there are reasons north korea would want to test its missiles. primarily at least under the kim jong un regime, we see them trying to develop new systems. you can't develop a new missile without testing it and testing it extensively. it typically takes two to five years to develop a new system
that -- that includes the flight trial portion of the development phase. you could certainly shorten that period and i wouldn't be surprised if north korea tries to shorten it to a year or two or three, but there are inherent risks to doing so. i'll attempt to address some of those risks in a bit. flight tests also provide north korea a means to train its launch crews for maintaining operational readiness. you can use them to kind of survey your stockpile to make sure that as they age, they still perform to specifications. this is actually an important rule of flight testing in the u.s. and russian programs or soviet programs in the past. missile tests can also be performed to deter rivals to achieve some political or diplomat messaging, coercion,
intimidation, as victor said, creating leverage for negotiations. we've seen them do this in the past and when we look back at the kim il sung and the kim jong un regimes, we see that the missile testing was done it seems primarily for political object -- to can reach political objectives as opposed to some technical imperatives such as developing new systems. now, it's interesting if we again exam history. i think previous speakers have talked about this but under the kimm kim young sung they tested missiles. kim jung il those came in bunches. with the exception of one test, they either occurred in 2006 or
2009. as i mentioned, obviously, the 2006 tests, i think they launched seven missiles in the course of a few hours and thoerp trying to achieve clearly a political message and it wasn't done for any penl purposes. -- technical purposes. when kim jong un came to power, things changed dramatically. they're now averaging about 15 to 13 tests per year. this is indicative of missile development programs. in fact, north korea is pursuing the development of more than one system. the they lose track of them because they seem to introduce something new each day. i want to talk a little bit about their kpap blilts, where they are and then project some timelines and maybe at the end offer some not policy prescriptions but some ideas and limitations we have in trying to
halt philadelphia development. the scud missiles were launched during the kim il sung jet stream. there was virtually no flight testing. indicative of having received the technology from a foreign source, in this case it was very likely russia and to be more specific, the mackay design bureau and elements ie 2567d to mackayev. what we've seen north korea do is leverage that existing scud technology. you'll recall that last year, they tested what is called the scud er for extended range. this is a scud that was modified. they've changed the materials of construction to lighten it. and increase in diameter from .8 meters to one meter. and this allows it to travel
about 1,000 kilometers. it is an old soviet design. it's a little unclear where north korea developed this themselves or whether this was imported during the 1990s with all the other technologies they received. why the scud er? a thousand kilometer missile, essentially matches that -- the performance of a no dawn. it seems -- and the way they tested it where they took what we call very steep or lofted trojectories, it was aimed at messaging to south korea that we can over fly your thad missile defense battery, we have options to counter your missile defense capabilities. more recently and in fact they unveiled it during the military parade on april 15th and they apparently tested over the weekend. it's a scud with appears to be a scud c with a new re-entry vehicle, one that can maneuver.
this could serve two purposes. map nooufrg when it's in the -- ma moving when it's in the air would compromise. but you can also achieve much bigger accuracy and make conventional weaponry more militarily effective. now, north korea's been quite ingenious in leveraging the scud technology to create a satellite launcher commonly called unha. ity think it goes by other names. it's like most development programs, it failed its first three or four launch attempts. it succeeded in the last two in placing something into orbit but the object placed into orbit apparently never really worked, so they have a ways to go. the concern with this satellite launcher is that it could be used as a steppingstone to creating an icbm. i'll talk about that in a moment. over the course of the last two years, weave seen several
surprising developments and the one that surprised me the most was the emergence of this solid -- two-staining solid propellant missile called the pukutsan 1. it's launched from a submarine which provides additional retaliatory camability, if you will, but all the missiles that the north koreans had relied on in the past have been liquid fuel. this is a solid fuel system. it appears at least from what i've been able to gather, these are developed indigenously. this is the first, again. this missile can cover 1200 kilometers, so the submarine can patrol relative distance from north korea -- or from the korean peninsula. i would argue that just a few tests doesn't mean they have the capability right now. they have a single submarine. they're going to have to develop
at least three. an old saying in the navy is if you have one ship, you have none. you have to have at a minimum three submarines, probably six to maintain a reliable retaliatory capacity. they also have to do a number of other things like develop concepts of operations, where are they going to pa control the subs, how are they going to protect them. command is key. they're going to have to develop that capacity if they want to be close. i don't see that emerging quickly. real quick. pukutsan 2 is a land based version on a track vehicle. the more interesting developments from a long-range missile capability is the musadan. it's failed six or seven times in its first eight launches. must be of possibilities for why
that is. more recently they tested the hasan 12. this was two weeks ago. it is an intermediate range missile. the source -- the engine that's been used for this is a mystery this is a true steppingstone towards an icbm. real quickly, three ways to get to an icbm, the quickest would be to convert the unha launcher. this would be an immobile system vulnerable to prelaunch. it would still take some modifications and flight tests as a missile. it could be ready for emergency use 2018, 2019, but i think it would just be an interim step. they could rely on musadan or this hs 12 technology to create an intermediate range missile.
they would have to prove out the missile first before they would want to step up. we've seen them take short cuts in the past. they could achieve a road mobile system based on these technologies sometime 2020, 2021. the more dntd prospect is the use of solid fuel we've seen in the missiles. i would be shocked if a missile would be operationally viable by 20 the 25. it's more likely 2030. policy options are very limited. i would just sum what i have here. we can talk about it a little until the question and answer. we treat all missile tests the same and i think that's wrong. when they test the scud, we should probably ignore it for -- well, practical purposes. the test of this intermediate range system was a big deal. yet our response to it has been
the same as it is for every other missile. i would like to see more thought going into how to respond to individual tests and the development of this intermediate range system is a lot more consequential than even the flight test of the unha. i'll stop there. i'm sorry for going over time, as usual. >> you have a lot to cover. the more systems they develop, the more time we need to give you. there's a lot on the table here. there's a lot of policy options to discuss. we can discuss a lot about capabilities. we can discuss intentions, which i thought it was fascinating when you were talking about how it was difficult to get a track on its and then you got it and then they changed the intention. so we're going into a q and a session here for about 30 minutes. make your question quick and witty if you can but solid is
more important than witty. here in the third row i'm going to call in two people at once. we're going to take two at a time. the blue shirt and greg in the white shirt. blue shirt first. take the mike, speak into the mike. [inaudible]. affiliated free agent. perhaps professor would like to respond to this question but any of the panel members are welcome to. i'm wondering what the prospects are for the new regime in south korea to take such measures as reopening the kay song industrial complex or family reunions or humanitarian aid, such measures or any other reaching out. >> ok. hold that question and we'll get back to you. we'll let greg pose the question and hopefully we won't have the same -- no. we are getting the same feedback.
>> greg tillman -- association. on the basis of some of the comments you made about your concerns about everyone's behavior. could you elaborate on the scenario you hear? i'm having trouble imagining that kim jong un could think that he could use any significant use of military force against south korea which would involve tens of thousands of american servicemen without thinking that the united states would attack north korea in response in a brutal fashion and resulted in his demise. >> ok. good question, greg. let's go to professor hwang to discuss family reunions and the like. >> ok. thank you for your great question. so said that right now it is very difficult to reopen the
industrial park because right now i think that the government will focus upon the nirkt starting the -- maybe the social culture exchange first and then economic cooperation and then maybe political and military issues, so family reunion definitely, i think that the government will start. maybe you know foreseeable future. maybe this year or next year. maybe the humanitarian, they already talk about the humanitarian aid. but these complexes are difficult because they may involve international sanction, also. so rather than getting industrial park, i think that the mountain region is the candidate for the next -- you know, the policy after the
humanitarian aid and the family reunion. so the first of the social culture exchange. second, economic cooperation, maybe the third and fourth is the political and military. >> let me ask you the following question here. some of -- this -- various forms of interaction with north korea that are being talked about seem to be in direct contradiction to the u.s. policy of isolation, isolation politically, economically, kasong industrial zone might be in violation of the security council resolution sanction. so i'm wondering, is there a recognition in south korea that such knish tiffs are going to run smack up against u.s. policy and maybe victor if you want to weigh in on this. how is this going to be seen in washingt
washington. >> as i said, this they also think much about the u.s.-korea relation. concerned about whether it will, you know, the -- complicate the international sanction on north korea. no? >> well, i think the tip of the spear of any engaging policy by the south korean government is going to start with food and fertilizer. that usually happens at a certain time of the year. we may be past that point now in terms of -- food is -- you can give all your fertilizer, maybe not so much. >> i think kaesong is -- if they
reopened it it would defy sanctions. the that may be off the table for a while. so we collect a lot of data of provocations and behavior and for what it's worth we predicted accurately that north korea would do kinetic provocations, bracketing the south korean elections. no one cares later that you got it right before but i'm just telling you got it right. >> parallel. >> parallel, yeah. our data doesn't really suggest there are driving forces for more north korean provocations coming up over the summer. actually, what usually happens is north korea enters a peace period which starts about june 25th, the anniversary of the crane war going to about august 15th, which is liberation day in
south korea. it sort of stops around august 159 because they have to get ready to get angry at the u. u.s.-r.o.k. drills. there could be a period in the summer where there might be an opportunity for social and cultural things, but i think it gets -- and i think it gets harder when you start talking about big projects like kaesong or the mountain projects. i think it becomes harder. i was in dwoth the lost time the progressives in south korea were -- sue was in power at the same time but i think even those people who are the strongest advocates of engagement understand that 2007 is a different north korea than the north korea we're dealing with today. it was a different leadership and their behavior is very different. there's a common misperception
out there that you know, if we just talk to the north koreans, maybe they'll calm down. what has become very clear under kim jong un, under under the current leadership is they have no interest in talking to anybody. if you look at their behavior since january of 2008, there has been absolutely no interest in talking to the united states, to japan, to south korea, to china, to russia. again, we collect data on china, dprk high-level interaction as. and this particular period that we're in now in terms of the average annual frequency of high-level interactions tw between china and -- is the lowest ever. and we know this because there's been no summit between kim jong un and xi jinping. the reason for the low-level interaction is not because the chinese are pissed off at the north koreans. i mean therapistsed off at the
north koreans. the reason is the north koreans don't want to talk to the chinese. the chinese, i think, had been trying very hard to talk to the north koreans and it's the north koreans that have been denying all contact. so i think while there are many from the previous progressive government that will be or are in the new government, i think there are new realities on the ground and i think they also understand that it's a different north korea than it was in 2004, five, six, seven. >> thanks very much victor. >> i want to repeat greg's question because apparently the mike wasn't working. his question was why would north korea think that the united states would not get involved in a conflict, given the trip wire function of u.s. forces in south korea who would be involved immediately in any attack on south korea? >> let me address the south korea part. i think there are degrees of
engagement. the k aesong is -- you can't guarantee where the money's going from there. my suggestion for the administration when he comes next month for the summit with mr. trump is sort of not try to address these -- any of the thorny issues, we're asking for clarification. when you say we should pay a billion, so on, so focus on trying to establish the poor connection. obviously, for mr. trump, that personal connection is important, as we've seen with prime minister abe and xi jinping. but when the australian prime minister tried to seek clarification, that didn't go well, so that would be the thing. i hope that victor is right, that the administration does not -- that after the initial talk they're not trying to open -- reopen kaesong because that would be at odds. to your question, i don't think
it's a likely scenario that kim jong un is trying to attack united states nuclear or south korea. it's just that there could be -- there were many times when you have a conventional acts, right. they were seeking of -- in 2010. that could always escalate when you think you have this ultimate deputy ternt camability. and i think as a last resort, if he miscalculated things that we are about to attack and you never know. officially when the trump administration he did rhetoric earlier on. remember the media, there was hysteria when they said we've send to the sea and so on. if there's any kind of miscalculation that kim jong un think we're about to do something, i think then that would trigger for him because he doesn't want saddam hussein fate, they don't want the gadhafi fate.
the they'll strike first if there's a wrar at all. not that there's anything we should be worried about. >> ok. thanks very much. that was a good -- we got ten people here. let's go to other third row, the young lady and up in the front here. we'll take these two questions. what -- just speak loudly and then i'm going to repeat the question. >> ok. my name is angela and i'm from the university of southern california. you mentioned that north korea hopes to undermine relations with skraerk and the united states and japan in hopes of dominating the crane peninsula. up wanted to ask how north korea views china and if there's any role survegs-china can play? >> the question was basically to victor, how to view the china factor in this north korean desire for dom understandings in
this -- in the korean peninsula. >> so i -- there are two responses -- >> wait. i'm sorry. we're going to take two swuns. >> sure. >> bob peters national defense university. my question is, as the rocks pursue kill change and kmpr came blilts particularly as they build up their cruise missile capabilities, do they know they need an indij jus overhead isr capability and a lot of it? which is dicey, so do they understand that those kind of intel requirements? >> ok. so bob peters asked the question with some acronyms that i didn't fully all get but the basic point does south korea understand that as it develops its kill chain missile defense systems they're going to need air breathing intelligence requirements that they don't now
have. that's probably a question for professor hwang. let's go to victor to answer the first question on china. >> so o the china dprk relationship is quite bad right now. it is after normalization of relations between china and south korea in 1992, no northern leader -- well, there was only one but no north korean leader went to china for a decade because they were so upset with it all. you sort of reemergence, renaissance, if you want, relationship in 2008, 2009 largely because the chinese signed a bunch of extractive industry contracts with north korea and they're taking a lot of minerals out of north korea now. they actually both hate each other. the north koreans feel like the chinese treat them like a poor prov inches, which they do, and
the chinese feel like north korea -- every time north korea does something bad china's ghamts dragged through the mud so they don't like it either. it's a mutual hostage situation. they're stuck with each other. i think north korea alleges that greatly to their advantage. they know that china will never allow north korea to collapse. they know that, and so they are willing to push the envelope as far as they can and that creates problems for the united states, because united states has a policy right now that's aimed at treating china as part of the solution, which is that if 85% of north korea's external trade is with china, we can go after slave labor exports and all these other things but if 85% of their trade is with china, china is marts of the solution in terms of putting that trade down, putting pressure on north korea. but the problem is, you know,
china is never going to put a truly pressing amount of economic squeeze on north korea because for fear that they would collapse the regime. the chinese ambassador himself had a op ed in usa today two weeks ago where he essentially said that china's willing to puts some pressure on but is afraid if it puts too much pressure on it will collapse the regime. that is music to north korea's ears. that's kinds of the box we're caught in right now. >> thanks victor. i like the mutual hostage message. somebody might wouldn't to tweet that. >> i'm not really fam with those acronyms like mark is, but i'm not an expert on the defense policy. but from the national defense university there is one guy there from the inss named --
>> spell that for me. >> yeah. but as far as i understand that, you know, government's policy is not clear yet actually so there is more room for the u.s. and south korea to coordinate on that issue, but mostly, the crane people including me are not really sure about the south korea aamd and -- capabilities but we are also concerned about how we code with the united states on these issues because it's natural south korea government try to develop its own camability for that issue. but the second -- the -- government is strongly stresses on the importance of the diplomatic terms in understanding security rather than military terms as opposed to the former park houston n
nay -- military sectors so -- >> i'm going to follow up on your question. in terms of technical capabilities. you mentioned that one person of launching the scud was to send a signal that thad won't be able to deal with such a high trajectory. do you have anything to say to bob on the other point but on this point, too. does that now become irrelevant? >> no. what -- i mean, i should explain it more fully, but there are targets that lie south of the thad battery that may be vulnerable if you can overfly the reach of the thad interceptors. you know, the maximum -- or the ceiling of engagement for thad
battery's i've heard 150 kilometers. it probably lies in between 150 and 250. but certainly to attack busan it would be vulnerable to trojectories of scud cr but not necessarily scud b or scud c. i agree with your premise that airborne sir is essential for kill chain. for those who are not aware kill chain is the republic of korea's strategy for defeating, you know, the ballistic missile forces of north korea, you know, prelaunch, you know, preassembly. it goes from, you know, birth till it lands somewhere. >> birth to death. >> yeah, birth to death. we have the experience from the gulf war in 1991 where we have
relative to today our airborne reconnaissance and intelligence gathering capabilities were very poor and we were unable to interdict scud -- iraq's scud launchers during that war, even though we had air superiority in everything. in north korea the job's a little bit easier, because most of the launchers can't stray too far from the roads. there's a limited number of paved and resurfaced roads in north korea, so with extend extensive use of uavs, maybe a few manned aircraft, overhead satellites, you i think have a pretty good chance of doing interdiction or at least disrupting operations on the ground for the north koreans and that will be essential, but the two elements that are required are the isr and communications is not a simple thing. it's what distinguishes american
missile defense from others. >> and isr -- i know this but everybody doesn't know it. >> sure. >> what does it mean again? >> intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. i guess it's a catch-all phrase for knowing what's happening on the ground. >> ok. i'm going to take the last two in the back there. the gentleman in there and then stanley. just speak loudly so i can hear. >> brian collins from the ohio state university and my question is for dr. terry. completely agree with your analysis that kim jong un is likely undeterrable in his goal to get nuclear capability -- deliverable came blilts and you say that you believe our best policy is go all out as far as we can with sanctions, tighten the screws. my question, though, two parts
to the question. part a, if he really is undeterrable -- i think you're right -- what then do we achieve in sanctions? is it possibly regime change or is it that we do our darnest, our best to erode north korean capability? part two is, what risks do we run if he really is undeterrable and sanctions won't do the job, do we end up looking like a paper tiger? the other risk potentially is that we're really destabilizing the situation or are we destabilizing the situation? >> ok. i'll repeat that. >> no affiliation. it's for sue and it's on regime change. i'm not sure if i heard you cell or sbrepted you cell. it's a important point. >> yeah. >> but the policy may fail as
well as our allies' policies fail and chinese. deterens may not work. we're in a horrible situation in terms of threat to our security. don't we have to think about regime change? i want to know if i intercepted you right because i don't want to put those words in your mouth. second, if you do think that, do you believe that any country, u.s., rok or even china has the capacity to affect regime change? do we have a candidate? do you know what you'd get? normally when you get a regime change, you hope for a replacement. >> that was great. i don't know if you coordinated those questions but -- so brian from ohio state university, these questions are both to sue terry. you said kim jong un is likely undeterrable in his quest to get nuclear capability, but you said that the best policy is sanctions. that's not quite what you said but did he understood you right,
what are the sanctions -- what is the purpose then? is it for regime change? and what are the risks in this? do we look like a paper tiger if it fails? stanley also asked the question about regime change, stanley roth. do we have the ability to pursue regime change? do you believe any of the country's united states, russia, have a capability, do we have somebody waiting in the closet, so to speak? >> so given that we can do nothing with all these provocations, there's other rogue regime is watching us. that's the only pure active thing we've got. people who are proponent of sanctions will argue that strong sanctions haven't been in place since february, march last year. it's not right because you've heard this -- there's so many other countries that we sanction more heavily than north korea. so we -- sanctions have not had
real chance to succeed, particularly enforcement of sanctions have not been working. this is why we're trying to press china to do -- to enforce sanctions. failing that, you'll hear about the secondary sanctions against chinese entities and banks doing business with north korea. proponents of sanctions would say let's give it a chance because it's the only option we've got in terms of trying to pressure the north korean regime. there's no other option, so that's the only -- given the limitsed options, that's the only thing we could possibly try. my point is after we try -- lisa say we try to enforce sanctions and do secondary sanctions and none of this work. what are we going to do? and is it going to potentially destabilize and if it does potentially destabilize the regime, is this the worst possible thing? i know this sounds really -- it's not a popular thing to hear, but i -- you know, i -- my personal view is that the north korean state has to disappear.
there's 25 million people who are -- we're not even talking about human rights. we vice president brought it up once this whole conversation, but the ultimate solution to the north korea -- to the crane problem is for north korean state to disappear and we have unification. so as far as this effect, that doesn't concern me. that creates a lot of other problems and we need to be prepared for that but that's a whole separate conversations. in terms of reaching change, i don't necessarily think or am optimistic about this occurring. he just got rid of his half brother using wmd at the international airport. even before the regime change occurred, the measures we're talking about, whether sanctions or information campaign to get into -- to get information into north korea, all these other measures are having that -- it's contributing to that.
and i'm just thinking that we need to be clear whether we want that as a goal or not. i'm not sure if our government has it as a goal, unification, regime -- it's something to think about is what i'm saying. it's something we need to be really face the hard truth and have it as a goal or not. but this is something we need to discuss. >> thanks very much, sue. ok. couple more -- i'm going to go to lady, the second row from the back an then mike, three rose ahead of her. >> diane pearlman school of complicate analysis and resolution at george mother nature. there's a body of literature from the 80s that's not very well known now and i know you worked with robert jervis and we talked about this before. i think it's problematic to say there are no other options and we have to only do pressure. there's a fair amount of evidence that coercive techs can have the opposite effect.
there's a study of 100 sanctions and they worked 14 times and failed 86 times. so it's likely to produce the opposite effect and sometimes like jervis and others talk about when you create dynamics that trigger off a spiral theory and escalation and that we need to do more tension reduction and people afraid and people rather die physically -- >> we're not accepting all this. so scoot up here. >> talk about some of that literature and other -- >> three rose ahead? >> yeah. mike. lchl the flip side so chafs said before. there was an article in the op ed in the outlook section of the washington post about three weeks ago by a person who was advertised to have been chinese investment boonker, but it could have been henry kiss jer in
disguise, suggesting that the deal we need to make is no regime change and a freeze on the nuclear program, which gets you away from the gadhafi problem. is there any future in that? because so far, from everything i've heard today, it's been an inadvertent advertisement for a strategic patience, which some people intercept as not doing much of anything. so is even this avenue a possibility? >> ok. thanks, mike. the first question was posed by diane perlman from george mason university who mentioned the literature in the 19ing 80s, which reached the conclusion that course of techniques can have the opposite impact and that 14 of 100 sanctions actually worked, meaning 86% did not work. then mike asked the question about basically the freeze.
one variation of a freeze option, a freezing on the nuclear program in exchange for clarity about no regime change, all of which sounds a bit like strategic patience policy which has been disavowed. so i guess victor of sue. >> she asked for victor. i'd like to faye a few words after victor. >> so it's a debate, right. i think it's a debate. there are people who say, you know, in terms of sanctions, you know, sanctions don't work until they do. right. i mean, look at any sanctions case and people will say they don't work they don't work they don't work and all of a sudden the target state does what you want and they're like oh, it worked. then they have some alternative explanations. so the thing to remember b about sanctions is they don't work until they do. the other thing is there is i
think in the minds of many in the policy community as a result of the obama administration's policy, there is in the minds of in the model of iran and the view that well, sanctions appear to have worked, whether you agree with it or not, there's a view out there that thinks sanctions and the heavy sanctions committed multi-lateral sanctions workeding to bring iran to the table. maybe something like that can happen with north korea. this coincided with a number of studies that were done by think tanks here in washington as well as in south korea that put on paper-to-paper compared the sco scope and breadth of the debate. there's the other side which was referred to which is this is 14s out of a hundred cases they've worked. in addition to that, we've got -- we'll soon have two aircraft carriers off the coast
of the korean peninsula. all right. we're in a sanctioning mode. north korea is on the missile testing war path. we have exercises coming up in august, no dialogue taking place. historians will talk about how this was a-foot war, right. there's two debates here and there's no right or wrong but that's what we're in the middle of right now. >> you want to add to this? >> yeah. just quickly, on the sanctions, even if you're for engagement and negotiation, sanctions we think that's leverage. once you have heavy sanctions b you have something to give away. why would north korea ever give up anything. iran it took three years. in terms of the freeze question, i think we might -- this is so unpalatable but we might have to get to those two options, just deterrence and not trying to talk to north korea as we live with nuclear russia, north korea china we live with nuclear
korea. this is what we might end up with. but both have a lot of problems, even freezing has a lot of problems, even the i.c. we don't know what all the things are. some are over but there are a lot of covert in these facilities with weapons. how are we going to trust anything they say we're going to do? we have 20 years working with them. we have many, many deals with north korea. so you know, there's some the -- there's lot of consistence with both options. >> we need to go another hour. let's take three 20-second questions. right here. third row. yes, you right here, go ahead. phrase your question. go ahead. >> i'm a student. so my question is is there a way to take the strategic importance of north korea like away from china so it's devalued in the eyes of china so an agreement
could come forth between the u.s., china, and the republic of korea? >> ok. good question. right in back. we're going to go liktity split. >> the question i have, with regards to a possible regime change or fill yur or collapse of the regime. do we have or should we be putting in plans or thinking about how to secure the nuclear program elements that are there, loose materials, missiles themselves command and control? >> ok and last question. yes. gentleman in the second row. ok. he's offering you. ing. >> so my question -- i'm sorry. i'm from usc -- regards their ability to use chemical and biological weapons. up wanted to know to what extent they've worked to develop those two types of weapons and with which countries they might work with in the future to develop
those k5i7 blilts because they can't do it on their own. >> one question is is there any way to take away the strategic leverage that north korea provides to china, to take that out of the equation. the second question was if there is regime change, if the regime collapses, plans for securing the nuclear program and lastly a question about chemical weapons capability with whom might north korea working in the future and how is that program going? so anybody want to address any one of those questions? they're not exactly in each persons' specialty but mike why don't you start? as you're summing up your 30-second pitch. >> on securing the nuclear weapons and other wmd missile technology in north korea, yes, there are elements within the department of defense that look at this very seriously.
whether we have the capability or not is a matter of argument. i've long thargd you need a group of experts in various fields, but the key is to wrap up the people, document the program, and then go after the assets. it's kind of the opposite of what we did with the iraq survey group. but that is being worked and i have a fair degree of confidence that we would succeed in securing at least the nuclear materials. on cwbw, north korea's a very opaque target. we have dochbltd know exactly what's going on. the presumption is they have the capacity to develop at least the keps. i would argue that chemical weapons are -- they're not an effective battle field weapon if your opponent is mobile and can be protected. and i would assume that the rok rs tos and the u.s. forces there
would have that capacity. against civil -- cities and such, it could be rather disastrous, and because seoul's within artillery range, you could deliver a lot of agent over a wide area to saturate and kill large numbers of people. that's what would be a major concern. who's helping them? i think they have the capacity themselves to do these things. they may rely on certain chemicals that probably come over the border with china, because it's -- to even say it's leaky would be, i think, a generous description. it's as porous as a screen door, so i don't have a lot of confidence that it could be stopped. >> ok. >> at this point. >> we're going to go down the row here. professor hwang. >> i want to respond to the student question on the north korea and china.
north korea not only strategy asset for china but also the strategy of them now and also china is assets for north korea, the burden for the north korea. so they need each other. that's why, you know, china, you know, does not seem to us china does not cooperate enough, you know, in the implementing the u.n. sanctions, because the chinese prefer the status quo of north korea to regiment collapse because it will destabilize the northeastern, you know, asia. and north korea also, you know, has some reservation about china, because china is not fully cooperating with north korea, either, but still those are some policy limitations, so
they are moving, you know, between these two, and so maybe they try to maximize their own strategy benefit, soing right now it's difficult to distinguish completely from -- the chinese benefit from the north korean one. >> thanks. sue. >> in terms of chemical weapons or biological weapons they do -- north korea definitely have the row best chemical and biological weapons. there's not enough attention paid toilet. i think we need to in addition to nuclear missile program. they cooperate with nations like syria. the second question. that is our number one concern. if there's going to be instability in north korea. the problem is while there are plans to try to secure things, there are a lot of problems to get a lot of them oout north of pyongyang, the road conditions, trying to reach those plays to
secure it. if we don't go through the united nations riot, which could take months, could be very protracted, the problem is is the u.s. going to run up over north korea in case of unstablt and how does china perceive that? there are some challenges in trying to secure all the wmd in terms of stablt. china has no war, no nukes in that oord. i think it's difficult to get china to change this when it comes to north korea other than when there's actual threat of war, maybe a threat of instability. with you it will be very hard and it will be a chenl for all of us to get china to change its thinking to think that its interests would be better without aiding north korea. >> three quick points. the first is chinese policy makers, experts, they know all the arguments why they should
drop north korea. they know them all. that's my answer to your question. second, on -- actually, mike had a question earlier about what if we just contain this problem and, you know, mutual deterrence contain it. the only thing there is the horizontal proliferation problem. north korea is a serial proliferator. they have missiles. they tried to sell to iraq under saddam hussein except saddam hussein wanted to pay on credit. he didn't want to pay on cash. it's a whole list, right. and so they have sold every system they've ever developed. in a containment scenario i would be very worried about horizontal proliferation. the last thing on going after nukes in a -- i hate to throw data at you, but we did a study
where we actually surveyed experts, u.s. experts about this, and asked them what was the number one issue in a unification scenario in terms of the cross between priority and how much we knew, right. so the big blind spots are where you have high priority and we have no knowledge. those are the big blind spots. what we actually found surveying american experts was the number one issue was actually not wmd. the number one issue was domestic stabilization in north korea. not because we don't care about the nuclear issue but i think relative to domestic stabilization we feel like we know more about the wmd situation than we know about domestic stabilization in the north. it was an interesting finding based on this data we did surveying 1200 u.s. experts and government officials. >> well, thanks very much. this has been fantastic, if i may say so. very good presentations, very good questions, good answers. this has been the most overflow crowd we've had here.
it's been the most heated discussion we've had here and please join me in thanking the panelists and come again. [ applause ] >> this weekend, book tv is live from the 33rd annual chicago tribune printers row lit fest in chicago. it starts at 11:00 a.m. eastern. at noon 2016 national book aw5rd winner and his book "stamps from the beginning" the definitive history of racist ideas in america. followed at 1:00 by michael eric dyson with his book "tears we cannot stop" a sermon to white america. and at 4:00, sidney blumenthal,
the political life of abram lincoln. our coverage continues on sunday with heather anne thompson and her book "blood in the water" the at ka up rising of 1971 and its legacy. at 2:00, sex and the constitution. sex, religion, and law from america's origins to the 21st century. dhen at 3:00, dray radle with democrazy. at 4:00 churchill & orwell, the fight for freedom. watch our coverage of the 33rd annual lit fest on c-span 2's book tv. st free state foundation held its annual telecommunication policy conference in washington,
d.c. at the national press club. speakers included form oer white house counsel c bodien gray and howard shalansky. they took part in a discussion on telecommunications regulations and expected fcc changes under the new chair. this portion is just over an hour. >> ok. well, everyone is so quiet that i think we should get started. that was really good. i'm randy