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tv   Brookings Institute Forum Examines U.S. Global Image  CSPAN  June 30, 2017 2:11am-3:53am EDT

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haley on u.s. priorities. >> the brookings institution held a hearing on the global perceptions of the united states. they focused on after are a, europe, asia and the middle east. this event is just over an hour and a half. good morning, everyone. welcome to brookings. my name is tarun chab ara. i'm a visiting member here at brookings. i'm excited to welcome you on america's global image co-hosted by brookings and the pugh
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research center. this year marks the third year running that brookings and pugh are co-hosting a public vent to launch and discuss their important regular survey data about america's place in the world and other pressing global issues. mazz of you are already aware if you glanced at the newspaper or checked your social media account this morning, last night pugh released latest edition of the global attitude survey which has been conducted since 2002. with this year's survey covering 37 countries and 40,000 respondents. all conducted after the inauguration of president trump between february 16th and may 8th of this year. the white house is hosting the prime minister of india and hosting the prime minister of korea and a week ahead of president trump's travel to germany for this year's g-20 summit where he will -- which will feature 20 heads of state and government and numerous
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bilateral meetings including a possible meeting between president trump and president putin. so to share us with the highlights of this year's survey, we're privileged to have richard wich from the pugh research center. richard has been the author of numerous recent pugh survey reports and you likely read the analysis in a variety of newspapers and seen his commentary on television not just in the united states but also abroad. he previously worked at the research firm greenberg, quinnlyn & rosener. i'll welcome a panel from brookings whom i'll introduce when we're all seated. and we'll have a 45-minute discussion of whether and if so how these survey results matter. then we'll tournurn to a 25 min
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q&a here today. i want to thank the members for putting together this event and counter parts at pugh. with that, richard, please, take it away. >> all right. thank you, thank you very much for brookings for hosting this. thanks to all the panelists for being here and thanks to all of you for being here. really happen dwroi hay to haveo talk about our most recent survey that we conducted. and in particular, happy to have a chance to talk about this topic. we look at lots of different topics in our international survey work at pugh. fwh but there is the one we've dmoevent work on consistently over the years. how does the world see the united states? we've been doing that now for a dpek a decade and a half. we've seen lots of changes over that decade and a half. we certainly have a lot of changes this year.
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let me tell but pugh research center. we've been around two decades now. we're funding by the pugh charitable trust and also get funneleding from other foundations. we're nonprofit, nonpartisan, nonadvocacy. we tlik call ourselves a fact tank rather than a think tank because we put search emphasis on data and empirical research. you can see the topics that we tend to look at in our research. i'll put a flug our website. all our reports are. there things like op-eds and blog posts. we have cool features including one associated with this report that can you go in and play around with the data a little
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bit yourself. can you go to our web sites and download our data sets as well and use that in your own analysis. briefly on the methodology, it was conducted in 37 countries aren't world. i'll show you a map of those countries in just a moment. in some countries we do telephone interviews and most countries it's a face-to-face interview. you see the margin of error. that is typical for this survey work. i'll be happy to talk more about the methodology or answer questions about how we go about conducting this type of work around the world during q&a if you're interested. >> so these are the 37 countries that we're included in the survey. you know, each year there saulz countries we tlik include but were not able to for one reason or another. in general, i think we do a good job of including countries from
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regions around the world. so what do we find? let me start off by showing you some data on what i think are the two most fundamental measures in the survey. one is a question we've asked about variety of world leaders for years. how much confidence do you have in president trum tp to do the g thing in world affairs snt other question is a basic question we and others have asked. we call it u.s. favorability. very simply, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the united states? there is a big shift in how the world sees the u.s. president. so if you look at these 37 countries and go back to the last couple of years of the obama era, 64% said they had
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confidence in president obama. just 23% said they lacked confidence in him. just 22% across the 37 countries say they do have confidence in him. so a big shift in terms of how the world sees the u.s. president. that affects how the world sees the united states. so this is that question about whether they have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the u.s. back again the end of the obama era. 64% favorable, 26% unfavorable. as you can see, that favorable line has gone down. the unfavorable line has gone up. so a big change in terms of
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publics around the world see the u.s. president and a change in how they rate the united states as a country. now let's take a look at some specific countries. so in just about every country we survey, we see a significant gap in terms of ratings for obama during the end of his presidency and ratings for trump this year. and i can't fit all of them on to the slides. so this is just where we see a 50% gap or greater. so take sweden, for example, at the top up here. 93% in our survey there last year said they had confidence in president obama. just 10% say this about president trump. big gaps in other european countries. but also in south korea, canada, australia, often the biggest gaps are in some of america's
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closest allies. now there are two countries where we see president trump getting higher ratings than president obama. israel and russia. so slightly higher ratings for president trump and israel. significantly higher ratings for president trump in russia. this is data for four european countries we survey. as can you see, president bush starts off his term not especially popular in western europe. those numbers come down over time. he's unpopular. there's a lot of opposition.
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by the time he leaves office in 2008, the ratings are pretty low. president obama comes into office in 2009. he gets, you know, astronomical ratings in some countries. it is 90% positive, for example in, 2009 in germany and france. comes down a little bit over time. the nsa snow snoweden scandal had impact on views against president obama in germany and some other countries. but his ratings bounced back a little bit tend of his term. he leaves office popular and you can see what happens this year. you know, a very steep slope downward. and, you know, trump's rate thgz year and these four western european countries look a lot like what we saw in 2008 for president bush when he left office. knees are all median percentage as cross the 37 countries that
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we survey. so we asked about afrpg la america will and she's the only one of the four leaders we tested who gets on balance positive ratings. there is 31% saying they don't have confidence in her. she and putin both get negative ratings for the most part. but not as negative as what we see for president trump. so you know, she and putin, it's not positive but the negative ratings are not as high as we see globally at least for president trump. as you can see, you know, often we see variations among regions across the world. we also see variations within regions quite often. so you can see that in europe, places like poland, hungary and
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uk. germany, for example, 62% saying they have an unfavorable view of the u.s. if you look at asia, again, you get a lot of variation across countries. very high ratings in vietnam, philippines, south korea, australians you look down at the bottom of the screen if can you see it, essentially divided right now in terms of views of the u.s. of course, australia a long timal yi timal yi of the unit-- long tim long time al yi of the united states. negative ratings in the middle east. something we've seen consistently over time. of course, president obama came into office hoping to turn around america's image in the region, give a famous speech in cairo and june 2009 sort of to kick off the efforts. we didn't see a real sea change during the obama presidency in terms of views of the u.s. and
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certainly very negative in this year's survey specially in turkey and jordan. africa is a region we've seen a positive views towards the united states. that was true during the buescher are a when there was a rise in anti-americanism in many regions. he was pretty popular there. his policies were relatively popular there and the u.s. continued to get good rate tlgz. same is true or maybe even more so than the obama era. even though there are declines in africa and this survey on balance and the countries we sur vafd continue to seat u.s. in a positive light. latin america again some difference as cross the latin american nation that's we surveyed. mexico stands out in a place in this year's survey. has very negative ratings for the u.s. at least vis-a-vis what people used to say in our mexico surveys. and you see that a little bit on this map here.
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so red countries are where there's been a negative change. dark gray is where there's been essentially no change. and then blue are places where america's image has improved on this favorability measure. there are only two blue countries. one is vietnam. i believe the change in vietnam is from a78% favorable to 8 had 4%. so, you know, went from already very high to slightly higher. and, of course, the big change is in russia. i believe the numbers there, last time we surveyed in 2015 was 15% favorable. and then 41% this year. so you know, again, different places in this survey, russia is an outlier. the darkest red is mexico. that's the country where we see
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the biggest decline in u.s. favorability. it's gone from 66% favorable in 2015 to 30% this year. you want to see some of president trump's policies and character traits. when it comes to policy, we tested five. restricting people from certain majority muslim countries from entering the united states. they're talking about building the wall on the bored we are mexico. these are global immediatians across the country we surveyed. as can you seesh, the policies e all broadly unpopular across the surveys. iran nuclear deal, a little less uneven on balance.
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global public tell us they disapprove of this proposal. i believe the iranian pulling out of the iranian nuclear deal is popular in israel and jordan. on the whole, we see pretty widespread global opposition to the policy proposals that we tested on the survey. the positive and negative and whether people associate those with president trump. so we read them this list and some positive and some negative. as can you see, the negative characteristics, people tend to say, yes, i would describe donald trump in that way. in particular arrogant, majorities around the world also say they think trump is intoll ranlt and even dangerous.
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four in ten think of them as charismatic. there are views about trump around the world are the question of being a strong leader. you see majorities around the world saying i, yes, they associate the term strong leader with him. and that includes some places where other ratings for trump are pretty negative. take france, for example. 54% think of trump as a strong leader while just 14% say they have confidence in trump to do the right thing in world affairs. that's a characteristic that stands out as being positive even in places where overall attitudes towards trum. >> reporter: very negative. something we've done in the past in our surveys and did again this year is look at attitudes toward different aspects of what we might think of as american soft power. so again, you know, global media is on questions we think tap into the notion of soft power.
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the american people continue to score pretty well on our surveys. 58% across the country we survey think of the american people in a positive light. people tend to say they like american popular culture. 65% say i like american movies and music and television. the u.s. gets good ratings in terms of respecting the individual liberty of its citizens. that's a question we have seen downward trends on over the last few years in the wake of the nsa storey. but on balance, people still tend to think that u.s. government do z. respect personal freedoms. more mixed views when it comes to american ideas about democracy. en in you see the negative ratings on whether it's a good thing or bad thing that american customs and ideas are spreading to our country. this overall pattern is typical on what we've seen on the
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questions. the numbers have come down a bit in some countries. the overall pattern is consistently been true. if you look, for example teshgs american customs and ideas question in the popular culture question, it is sort of an interesting contrast. people, you know, they want their jay z and taylor swift and super hero movies. but they're also worried about american culture pushing out their own local cultures and traditions. and it's representative of this kind of push and pull that people feel about the united states. a final topic we want to look at is what people think about the near future of relations with the u.s. we ask people now the trump is president, do you think that relations between your country and the u.s. are going to get better, get worse, or stay the same? outside of after kashgs you don't see a lot of people saying things are going to get better. you see pretty significant numbers in many countries saying things are going to get worse.
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the prevailing view is things are going to stay about the same. i think it's an interesting finding given all the negativity we see towards president trump and towards his policies that none of less people don't necessarily think there's going to be some sort of radical sea change in terms of their country's relationship with the united states. and, you know, i think that finding illustrates a broader point that we see in these findings. and that is that, you know, even with this pretty negative picture of how the world currently sees the u.s., there are some bright spots. i think this is snag we've seen over the last decade and a half in our research. that, you know, even if that there is unpopular american president, u.s. foreign policies are pretty unpopular. there is still some strong suits
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in america's global image and some things that people value about the united states even if it's a time of great tensions with the american administration. and i'll stop there and i look forward to the panel discussion. thanks.
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thank you very much, richard. i'll briefly introduce the panel and then we'll get started. so to richard's left, you have shadi, a senior fellow in the project on u.s. relations with the islamic world. he is author of "islamic exceptionalism how the struggle with is slam reshaping the world." and just out jed a new piece on turkey's president published in the atlantic for which he is a contributing editor. i highly recommend that piece to all of you. prior to his tenure here, spent time at the brookings doja center. to his left, you have the
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inaugural robert baush senior fellow in center on united states in europe here at brookings. she is the author of numerous publication onz german, european, and transatlantic foreign security policy and strategy. most recently publishing work i recommend to all you have on the legacy of german chancellor helmut kohl and tomorrow she is testifying on european elections. if you'd tlik catch her. there previous slides, she's been a journalist and jurorist. she holds a doctorate in law. and just prior to joining brookings was a senior transatlantic fellow where she directed another influential survey. and finally to my right, is eli ratner, senior fellow in china studies at the council on foreign relations where he writes on u.s. china relations, regional security in east asia and u.s. national security policy. he published most recently in
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the current issue of foreign affairs, a terrific piece on china's maritime advance. and he was a colleague in the obama administration. he served from 2015 to 2017 as deputy national security adviser to vice president biden and in which capacity he focussed in particular on asian security affairs and he previously worked at the state department and senate foreign relations committee. so take us to the question of what these survey results matter and the parts of the world where you studied. so the drop in confidence from obama to trump is precipitous. i noticed in particular if you look at the top ten countries where that drop was in those precipitous nine of the ten countries are the treaty allies. we talk about the advantage of the united states and the world drawing from a coalition of allies and partnerships around the world. but i do think we should step back for a moment. i'd like to ask each of you in the regions where you focus,
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what difference do these results really matter from the per inspect iive of both u.s. interests and regional order? >> yeah, sure. so i focus on a region where favorability ratings towards the u.s. have been very low for a long time. and you see slight increases under obama when he was elected after the cairo speech. but after that, expectations were not met. we see a drop. and in some cases in several countries, favorability towards the u.s. was lower under obama than it was in bush's final year. which is an important point to em. that is sort of thoord process. how could that possibly be? but even in the case of say jordan, it's only a 1% increase. but u.s. favorability went up from 14% in 2015 to 15% under trump. so you negotiation pretty much
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the same. but it shows that at least in places where there is strong anti-american sentment that's been there for a long time, do people really care that fch trump was elected? they may not like him. but for them they're life long experience with the u.s. policy is a very negative one. and they're very skeptical that anyone can really change that. and i think the obama years really underscore that point because, again, i mean, the cairo speech was quite well received but then people didn't actually see significant changes in policy. also if you look at turkey, it was -- one of the years under bush there was 12% approval of the u.s. it drops down under obama to 10% in 2011. and jumps up and now is at 18%. so depending on what year you look at, again, you can -- under
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trump in 2017 is higher than some of the years of obama's tenure. so it's just important to keep in mind the middle east is sort of an outlier if you look at the rest of the results. but i think it sort of gets to a question that applies to a lot of the results in this survey is how much does any of this really matter? what does it mean to say that favorability ratings dropped tremendously or increase tremendously under a certain president? does it actually matter as much as we might think does it? and when you have a new president they can shoot up 60% or go down 60% as we have seen from the bush-obama transition but also the obama-trump transition. so the world never -- the world doesn't end with these changes in a sense. the last thing i'd say, is you know, i think can you also argue that even though i would argue
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this to be clear, that even if favorability ratings were quite high under obama in a place like europe and he will talk about this a little bit more, i think there is a legitimate debate to be had about whether obama's policies were better for europe. i mean how do we judge that? we can, you know, you can say that refugee crisis in syria because obama's in action there in part led to serious problems in europe. so there are different ways to look at. this i think what we're seeing now is a kind of natural experiment over the next four, possibly eight years where it's as if you're introducing most offensive problematic president to the world and then we can now see in real time how much that affects our relationships with other countries. does it lead to things that are very, very bad? i think that's the presumption that a lot of people on the left have that after four to eight
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years of donald trump, terrible things will be the result and we might never recover from it. i'm very skeptical of this narrative. but we will actually find out. four years from now, we can all sit down here or eight years, we'll see, and be able to say, hey, what is the relationship between people hating our president and the world falling apart? >> right. well, i'm here as the sort of proxy for germany and europe. as has already been made clear. and as he said, i once ran the survey myself a couple years which in general -- and i have tremendous respect for pugh and in particular i have tremendous budget envy. even retro active and capability envy and all sorts of envy.
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i send to take the surveys with a kilo of salt. i tend to think nothing really substitutes for examining actual policy. so let me try and say how i think this looks from europe. we have been america's allies. the germans since 1956. and we had some whips on it. the cold war which sovis often gotten but with bush and obama and in particular with the nsa spying allegations which didn't do the relationship much good. and, of course, there was a lot of criticism about obama's actions or inactions with regard to the middle east and there is a feeling, you know, that may have had some impact on the refugee -- the record refugee in flow that we experienced in 2015 and 2016.
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but that said, it's also resill yenlt relationship much it's one where policymakers know that even when there is huge turbulence at the official level policymakers send to move closer together. and to try and make sure will is no bleeding as it were from areas of agreement into areas where we have to cooperate. it's been a pretty damn resi resilient relationship overall. but i will say this is also kind of special. this particular administration holds challenges for europe of the kind that we haven't encountered before. and we haven't simply not encountered an american president who has refused in public to reiterate the commitment to the mutual defense
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clause in article five. i think that really shocked a lot of people. not just policymakers but lead aernz the european public. and that, of course, feeds into whatever anti-american, anti-western attitudes that there are. we can talk at length about the attitudes. they're a reflection of ourselves. our fears af complicated feature, lots of control. but the fact is that those are sometimes articulated in the form of our favorite others are relatives. and in that case for the europeans it's the americans. so this is not helping. do i think i can predict what is going to happen in four years? i haven't been tibl predict anything that has happened. so why should i be able to say what is going to happen now? >> i do want to ask you though, since you've been studying up on russian election interference, i was struck by the fact that
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respondents in seven nato allies and this included germany by ratio of 2-1 indicated that they have more confidence in president putin than president trump. what are we to make of that with respect to the u.s.-russia relations? >> i think that is less able confidence and more on putin. and i think if you look at other european opinion polls which i do a lot because that is a question of interest, you will see that distrust for america, sorry, for russia, has increased significantly. particularly with the annexation of crimea and conflict by ukraine and russia and also interfering in the u.s. public space. that -- that's the context that you have to keep in mind.
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and i think very few european polls other than those would are trying to take the authoritarian meanings and that does exist. that suggests that putin is in any way well received in europe by majorities. so i think that this is a reflection of people's unhappiness with mr. trump. i encourage you to take the findings of afrpg la america will with a grain of salt. >> we'll come back to that. eli, as richard indicated and some respects, the survey data has been s. a bit of a bright spot. not as much as africa i should sachlt i wish we had room for more chairs on the stage so we could talk about africa and latin america. but, you know, 76 -- sorry, i think somewhere in vietnam, philippines and republic of
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korea favorable views of the united states exceed 75%. so as you think about these results, one question i'd ask you to consider is the administration poised to take some of that positive sentiment towards the snuts. >> shurment i'll get to. that i think just to build on what's been said so far, to the question of do these views matter? i think it's important to ask that question because in asia as in elsewhere in the world obama very high favorability rating didn't translate into policy successes. so north korea's nuclear program was developing. china's maritime assertiveness was growing. we shouldn't assume that again there say one to one relationship between popularity and policy success. but i think it does matter in asia perhaps more than anywhere else for the following reasons which is that the united states is in emergent geopolitical competition with china and that
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is starting in the first instance over a competition over the future of the regional order in asia. and while these countries, you know, even allied countries are not going to make some funnel fundamental choice between united states and china, every day they are making choices it's too how they're going to approach trade issues and human rights issues and how they're going to approach security issues. and in every single country in asia, it's different from place to place. but publics in every country including american allies in south korea and australia and everywhere having very fierce debates about how they balance competing interests as it relates to china often the economic benefits of their relationship with china, with their historical cultural security and economic relationships with the united states. to the extent that these types of public opinion views are shifting and changing the public discourse in this country, it is important. it will effect the degree to which leaders are willing to stick their necks out and work with the united states or willing to push back in china.
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i think it does in asia's case, it really does matter. i think this survey had potentially even more good news than bad news as it relates to the region for some reasons you suggested. i think asia is a historical beneficialry of american leadership. it is certainly more complicated than the middle east. some of our allies in northeast asia and elsewhere have been less affect bhad happened in the middle east. i think some of president trump's more liberal social policies resonate less in northeast asia than they do in certainly in europe and in other progressive australia, other countries like that. so there does seem to be a well spring of good will there. very high favorability ratings. the highest of any region of confidence or approval in american democracy, american values. so i think to the extent that part of the theoryst obama administration's pivot to asia or rebalance ago tension and
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resources to asia was seeing asia as a future or a future of the united states to continue its now 70-year plus project to try to expand a liberal order in the world. i it this promise and the importance of doing that in asia is perhaps more than anywhere else in the world. i think that what we see in this data is that there is still opportunity there to work on some of that. i think the other at least from a perspective of nature of the u.s.-china competent tishgs a very negative views of ping were quite striking. i think there are a lot of chinese diplomats around the world that are hoping this survey doesn't make its way back to beijing because they're spending billions and billions and billions of dollars trying to improve through state run propaganda global views of ping and i think this survey tells you that it's not working. and so whereas yes, donald trump may be not particularly favorable, the fact that alternative of ping is not rating very high i think matters in terms of how we think about opportunities for the united states.
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so i think that is good news. the bad news, of course, is what lush lurks behind the figures. the question are about various policy issues. there is diversity in the region. what is worrying the south koreans is not worrying the indonesians and what is worrying the australians. but on balance, some of the things the trump administration has done withdrawing from the partnership raising concerns about the alliance commitment social security s and just more generally not putting forward a view of american leadership in the world does have the region worried. what i read from the data, is the trump administration poised to seize upon this? i think if they do want to lead in arab yashgs the opportunity is still. there the public support and politics do still support it. i think what we see in the data is real concern that united states isn't stepping up and in the absence of american
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leadership, even if they don't want to live in a china led world, they will do so. >> i want to come back to the resilience and data that he mentioned. but while we're on leaders, you mentioned president xi. >> you're not going to let go of this? >> no. i'm not going to let go. >> so angela merkel's ratings are double that of president trump. they're 50% higher than xichlt and putin. many are going to say xi as already the new leader of the free and maybe even the less than free world. so what does that mean for someone like her, a chancellor who as you have written depends on taen takes advantage of ambiguity and inhabits a leadership culture that is ambivalent about public i did ploem i
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president obama had approval ratings in germany that were basically 250%, you know, going up. i was at the speech that he gave in the berlin version of central park. and the summer of 2008 was 200,000 people when he was just a candidate. i think he still pretty much has rock star status. so that's a benchmark that no german politician is going to achieve that easily. the other thing, is of course, merkel is an odd candidate for the title of beacon of the free world because she herself has -- i think despite the fact she is like obama and she has become friends with him, one thing i
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think she always appeared very skeptical about is his silver tongue. at built to sort of, you know, spout forward endlessly in terms reminiscent of somebody standing at a historical foot rather than in a political world. her ability but also by inclination. and i emphasize that and with that to some degree because germans of our age and she's, you know, ten years older than i am, tend to be suspicious.
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this is not a title given us to by other people electronics a political fact. they have spent a great deal of time trying to live up to this recently. some you were remember the three famous speeches in munich. the defense minister said we have enunciating the spiderman doctrine, we have great power and therefore we must exercise greater responsibility. there is a great deal going on over ukraine and mid willing in europe. but there is also an understanding that in europe, you know, you can't do this on your own. so we need our neighbors, friends, allies to pick up some of this as well. europe is not the kind of
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political project that one large state can lead. that is not how it works. so those kind of stickers are not particularly helpful. richard, you noted there is this fairly large delta, i think it is 35 points between the median percentage of respondents that had no confidence in president trump and median unfavorable view of the united states. 74% to 39%. so is that delta sustainable? based on previous survey data, is that something that you expect to converge over time? what's your snens. >> obviously how the world feels about the u.s. president and u.s. foreign policies does have a big impact on how the world sees the u.s. it's complicated, too. there are lots of things that
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influence how people see america. there is signs in this data and our surveys we conducted over time that can highlight this resiliency in terms of america's image. despite all the negativity towards trump as i mentioned, you don't see huge majority saying they respect relations to necessarily get worse with the u.s. we ask about soft power and american people, et cetera. people tend to like a lot of things about the u.s. even though they're not happy with the administration. the obama era demonstrated this resiliency. you've had american anti-ism for a long time before bush. and it's bounced back. and we saw a lot of the numbers
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that had turned very anythingtive bounce back during our surveys in the obama presidency. so we have seen president dense for resiliency. i think there are signs of it even in the survey this year despite all the negativity we see at the same time. >> how are we to read the results that bilateral relations with the united states are going to change? do we read that in the sense they don't think the relationship should change despite the disregard for president trump or do we read it impeeshgly in the sense they don't it this ground rules shift because they have faith in u.s. institutions and perhaps their own? >> i think one thing here is that we have an unusual situation where the u.s. doesn't have a unitary foreign policy. it's never unitary. there are always divisions within the bureaucracy. but i think particularly under
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trump there are four simultaneous u.s. foreign policies. secretary mattis has his own foreign policy. mcmaster has a different one. the list goes on, right? i think we have to ask ourselves the question who speaks for the u.s.? tillerson and trump are sig die met rickly different things on the most destructive crisis we've seen in, you know, recent months certainly but perhaps even recent years, the gcc crisis. so i mean i prefer tillerson's foreign policy over trump's in this regard. so i think that makes it a little bit more challenging that this is such an unusual president at such an unusual time that it's very hard to
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compare it to what's come before. so that's i think one thing. but, you know, but then there is also this -- people don't necessarily -- there is a status quo bias. you think, hey, things are more likely to stay the same and i think if i'm responding to these kind of pulls, i would say i personally don't like trump at all. is it going to change the bilateral relationship with x, y, or z country? i can see why a lot of people would say probably not so much. >> is there bias in respect to europe? >> i think, you know, i actually take more hope from the fact that survey spont enrespondents distinction between the president himself and the country. that was also the case when i
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ran and people made the distinction between president bush and america and i think that's good. and that shows a certain great maturity. i think also from europe we come from a different place than many of the people who live in the middle east. relationships have survived a great deal already as i said. there is a sense that we are so deeply politically and economically intergrated with each other that it's actually, you know, despite a best efforts, it is quite difficult to completely rip apart this fabric. and so completely rip apart this fabric. so there's an assumption that the machine to some degree is going to chug on by himself regardless of what the gentleman on the deck is attempting to do. now, over time that could obviously change if the gentleman is on the deck for a long time. but for now there's a feeling, this relationship is just so much bigger than one single
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government, that we will weather this, too, this crucial task. >> yeah, i will just say i think that's right. and interestingly the countries with some of the largest figures of concerns there would be negative effects, japan, south korea, and australian more than 40% of repondants saying they think the relationship would be negative. but there are relationships operating on many different levels. i think we saw a real case of that if you recall early in the administration the president had a phone call with the australian prime minister that didn't go that well. it was reported out as a bad call. it was ended much more quickly than it was supposed to. the response was just a ground well support from civil society, congress. rubio put out statements, mccain. and it really activated alliance
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managers. and it was demonstration of how many people there are who think this relationship is reg really important and are going to fight for it, and multiimately won't allow donald trump to do something like that because of the long historic relationship. but i think this question about bilateral relationship is important. but to get back to my earlier comment, in asia in particular, you have a resurgeance about an uncommitted united states. and the concern that i have personally and the concern of people in the region are there things that are going to happy in the next couple of years that are going to put them on a path -- or a security order that's redefined through chinese revisionism. that means even when president x is elected in 20/20 and he or
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she goes out and says america is back, here we are, that the region e has been transformed the nature of bilateral relations isn't as important as thachange that's happened on a bilateral order. so i would suspect if you went into people who are really concerned about these issues and follow them closely in these regions what's concerning them is america's leadership in this role, economic leadership like transpacific partnerships. and these things come together in a negative way. >> people's attitudes towards the u.s. especially in my region, are very complex. and there's almost like this love-hate aspect to it. to even ask a sort of binary question, how do you feel about the u.s., good or bad?
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i mean i can imagine someone writing a long essay on that in like egypt or jordan, and it would be a very complex just because the history, there's so much there to unpack. one result i was remeended of, in 2005 in jordan confidence in george w. bush was 1% in jordan. i was actually living in jordan in 2005, and i think i knew the 1%. so i was like -- but these are people who would never say that to a pollster, but there was this sense that george w. bush is supporting the first arab spring which was happening 2004, 2005. more people were profesting. there was a sense of optism at least among aletes. but these were people also who historically were very suspicious of the u.s. so they
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were like, wait, is george w. bush apriechl uving this? but we know the history. so, again, there's almost an internal struggle as people try to make sense of what they feel about the u.s. >> i wanted to raise yesterday's supreme court decision to hear arguments regarding the immigration ban. this was covered in the survey. disproval on immigration restrictions was quite pronounced. 96% for jordan. so from your perspective, what would be the impact for the decision to allow the ban to stand pending full hearing later this year? >> well, i think it's pretty -- it is worth noting there is a very public leadership divide. many reported immigrants
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supported trump's ban, even countries that claimed to speak for saudi arabia. on a variety of complex reasons we don't have to get into right now, but i think that part of it is interesting. even though you have very strong public disproval of trump's muslim ban, that doesn't necessarily filter up to the government and that's because most of these countries are not democracies. so i think when we're looking at this question at large, how much the government is responsive to their people is pretty critical. because if you have strong levels of anti-americanism, naecherally for you're running a campaign, you're going to feed off that anti-american sentiment. so i think one thing we're going to see in the next foufr years, if they see that their people are pissed off at trump, we're
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going to try to use this to our advantage. >> this past weekend merkel's challenger, martin schultz went onto a full campaign mode, which essentially said forget 2%, we're never going to do that. so that would be playing on all the anti-american -- i thought he was going to be more responsible than that. but he's also 14 points behind merkel in the polls. so he clearly feels he has to do this. so there you go. these are memes or analysis people can pull up, and that will have an impact.
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on the other hand, i'm also seeing some of my social democrat friends on facebook agnizing over this saying oh, my god, now we're really going to hell in a hand basket. >> it's interesting to the fact it seems to be the case trump wasn't traveling to london because there was concern about protests there. and as compared to asia again, president trump is scheduled to go to the philippines, to vietnam later this year. he anticipated an invitation from president modi yesterday to go out to india. he'll likely go to japan and south korea as well. i don't think he'd face that kind of public opposition in those place. so it'd be interesting to see how it changes his world view and how this support affects him when he starts traveling the world. i think it will matter. >> in some ways insulting your friends is worse.
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>> richard, i want to ask you within political science now or even international relations there's kind of more study the role leaders play in international politics. and in that sense i wonder has pew consideredduing survey of elites, you've done some in the past? how do you think of this question? >> we have done some in the past. it's not easy to survey elites. we have done some of that. we did a little project where we surveyed some foekz within one of their kerchss. and you do see some gaps sometimes. i think issues like globalization, for example, trade, these kinds of issues can be seen very differently by elites and by average citizens
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across the globe. now that survey where we did survey transatlantic elites, did have some find gds where these transatlantic elites were very concerned about the trump administration, concerned about the jujectary of transatlantic relations. so i think on that we're seeing some correspondence between elites and average citizens. >> and eli, because the president will here on thursday, i wanted to ask you despite the relatively positive high approval rating of the united states and south korea, it was striking that 76% of south koreans consider president trump dangerous. this is also a country where we have nearly 30,000 u.s. troops. so what does this mean for president moon when he walks into the oval office on thursday in. >> yeah, that's striking. in all these regions there's just a lot of diversity in what
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their interests are. because what's driving that result is clearly the concern that president trump will be overly aggressive with north korea and start a conflict there. president moon has come into office in a much more consillatory position towards north korea than his predecessor who as about as hard is you're going to get and going against the pressure. so this is a good example of the tightrope walk leaders are going to have to do now when they come to meet president trump. because they're going to have not be seen as overly deferential, but at the same time you don't want to signal to president trump south korea isn't up for this alliance anymore. you could imagine if trump got the signal south korea wasn't any longer willing to work with the united states on the north
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korea issue, he'd question why do we have tens of thousands of troops there? why are we willing to let our country die for those -- so i do think, again, this is potential volativity that the domestic politics bring into this. but i also think it's a good example of a relationship that is very deep. there have been moon officials in washington coming through over the last couple of weeks meeting with people on the outside as well as doing a number of meetings to try to find a way to thread the needle through this. and modi just had a good visit. like when justin trudeau came to washington, he was a good example you couldn't have two more different leaders -- >> eli, how do you interpret
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modi tackling and bear hug? they were going to shake hands but then modi just jumps on him and gives him a pretty intense hug. >> and that was interesting. i wasn't sure if he was trying to signal something -- >> i don't know. he loves twitter, so maybe it was for social media. but it was a good example again, where in some ways there are some sharp differences between the united states and india. but they were able to come and say hey, we have some common ground here. i think both probably some of the folks in the white house and also people in the international community are learning over time how best to do these kinds of visits and how to president trump should stay away from things that could go sideways. >> one more question on u.s. china relations, there was news
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this morning the yoourchs is now poised to take a tougher line on china. if that is right, do you think the risk of u.s.-china confrontation is going to be seen with trepidation in these countries or will it be welcoming? >> it depends entirely on whether they do it well or not. a tough on trump policy that's leading on institutions, that takes on china like that will have the support of the region. but a tough on china policy that's purely america first, protectionist and takes unnecessary risks on military matters, that's really a different question entirely. and we'll see how they do it. >> and results coming out later this year on u.s.-china relationships. >> yeah, we'll have a views by the balance of power between of
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china ask around the world. we've framed a lot of our research on views of the u.s., not only how they see the yeast in and of itself but how they see the usga visa vi china. >> let's open it up in the back. >> i usually would like to ask the last question. but this day it's very important. the opening synopsis that the gentleman did, he asked how the world sees the u.s., how does the world see trump? we ask people can you clarify when you say how you see the world, are you referring to your survey results from those global and political classes of those countries? is that what you're talking about? and why won't you say the world
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when not the representative of the world? also you need to say this trump is undermining, sabotaging the ideological foundation of what these leaders experience have followed over the last 70 years. so you have to look at in those context, not doing this what i call it unnecessary -- >> let's take one more as well and we'll answer both together. also in the back on the far left. >> thank you all very much. i'm going to ask a question out of right field, left field, whichever field you choose to call it. how does the pew research look at it today? full bright program, universities bringing in a million students a year to the u.s. your comments please? >> sure, you know, in terms of
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who are these people we're talking to in these surveys it's not just elites or leaders in these countries. essentially it's a national sample of these populations. so in terms of demographic profile of the people in our sample it looks like the demographic profile of a people's population. but there are some where for one reason or another we can't get to for logistical or security reasons. so for the most part these are national samples. so it looks like what it looks like. in terms of gloepsacy, we don't get into policy recommendations with research centers. maybe the panel will have some thoughts about that. we certainly see there's an appetite for this type of information in the public diplomacy community. i think they're very interested
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in the data we collect include things like soft power, et cetera that they look to kind of leverage in their program. >> i think this question of diplomacy is hugely important in terms of the u.s.-china competition. the u.s. has not been thinking about a ideological contest for several decades now, and now we're facing one, a very active propaganda machine out of china, in your newspapers and whatnot. and what's interesting, that may have some effect because when publics are surveyed, they consistently overestimate their country's for instance economic dependence on china. many will say china is the most important country or china has the most important economy in
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the world. so constant overestimation of chinese influence. and i think that's a direct result of chinese propaganda. and united states is not really engaged in that space at all. so i think one of the tough policy questions i think will have to be much bigger than what we've done in the past. i think what u.s. policy makers have to think about -- and again traditionally more tougher in a trump context. buts i think how does the united states engage again is something that's coming back fast and furious from washington. >> but from your sper pective the focus on u.s. fluns and less on -- >> well, on the u.s. influence again. the same in australia, the united states is the largest
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foreign investor. i don't think the australians would think that. so, yes, not only providing them more information about the reality of china's economic footprint but also expressing the role of the united states. and we haven't done a great job of that in part because the u.s. government doesn't take credit for the u.s. economy in the way some other governments do. and i think we have to be a lot more vocal and affirmative in what we are providing these countries. >> right here. second row. >> thank you very much. so good news for donald trump and his voters. he's put america first, and people see him as a leader. so in the next two to three years shouldn't we expect to see more bullying of our supposed allies, more not shaking hands with people to make sure his
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voters understand that he's a strong leader not manipulated by these elites along the fringes and more powered to the wall, the ban and getting money out of germany? >> well, those are the two results that stood out to me as positive for trump. if he was reading the report, which he probably won't, but if he did, he might read like the page summery or whatever. if he read it, there's two positive things there. the fact that 55% see him as a strong leader despite not liking him otherwise, that seems positive. but also 39% think he's charactermatic. those are two interesting results. my sense is that there is a kind of school of thought that says, hey, we don't care what the
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publics in other countries think about us. we want to get results. and i think trump's perspective is taking a hard line and bullying, if you will, can produce better behavior on the part of allies but also on the part of adversaries. and i think one oexample of this, hithet thetically what if after four years, european nations more of them actually decided to meet the 2% gdp expectation for nato contributions? that's actually more plausible in the sense now than it would have been a few years ago in a kind of counter intuitive way. because people are afraid the u.s. is doing its own thing and won't be there to support them, they have to take responsibility for their own defense more. hypothetically that could be one scenario. so that would be -- i mean,
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sothets a different way of looking at foreign policy. who cares if people like us, if we're feared, and i think there's also the anti-obama aspect of this as well. there's a very strong perception that obama was a bit of a softy and that undermined the credibility of our commitments throughout the world. and that's actually i will confess an argument i've made in the past when it comes with the red line and syria. so i think it gets bigger debates of what leads to an effective u.s. foreign policy. >> i also want to ask and perhaps it's already happened on twitter, but there's a way the president and some in the white house could wear this a badge of honor. could that in a sense potentially free him up to do more business? >> at this point, a lot of people in europe will tell you we have been decreasing --
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increasing our defense budgets because of russia. we promise to achieve it by 2024, and the chancellor has several times including in this election year, we are going to do this until we reach the 2% in 2024. so to some degree there's a sense in burren okay, if wooepts he wants to take credit for that, fine. great, because we're going to do this anyway. the economic stuff is a little more difficult because that's where you are getting into the realm of, you know, you can have your opinion now but not the facts, not your own facts. yes germany has an account surplus, and that's a very large account surplus. and whether we need to have that
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and what we can do against it is actually a matter of great debate in europe and germany. but the trump administration also seemed to believe we can tell the european central bank what to do is how to set the value of the euro. that is unfortunately untrue. germany wishes it were. but the reality is that the german position has lost out. we were against quantitative easing that the u.s. central bank then instituted at the request of the obama administration. so honestly these -- i think at this point what the europeans and certainly what the germans are doing is a combination of hugging and dredging. there are points where that's just not possible, where we cannot go against the facts or where we also cannot go against our own national interest. where in asia should we be
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worried about it? >> the first thing i want to say about this is it's not as if the democratic party was completely inverse. yes, some of the issues on the board about the wall with mexico and refugees and whatnot, the immigrants was an important place. but on issues like trade, it's not clear where they are. in fact you see chuck shooumer according to "the washington post," accusing him of not being tough enough. so there's many debates to had of where the politics shakeout. where the democratic party lands on some of these issues may not be the internationalest, centrist republic foreign policy. you could end up on the left about trade protectionism and maybe not such a robust security policy. i think we couldened up there so
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the politics are more complicated. in terms of the issues over which this will be expressed, one will be -- i think there's an opportunity in asia as in europe for allies to step up and do more. because again the choice, if the united states is shrinking away, does that mean we have to accommodate china? there's also a choice of working together and trying to network more with allies. and we're starting to see more of that. so i think there's an opportunity here for countries like australia to more more with japan and singapore and india and others. whether they move porward with tpp in the absence of the united states i think would be an important sign of whether they're going to try to do some of this themselves or not. >> in the back. >> the report focuses on the idea that the u.s. could back off from the iran nuclear deal
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signed 2015. and it looks like many in the middle east, muslim majority countries, support this idea. siding more with israel than europe. so why you think it's so in the middle east, and if i may why is it that europeans oppose the idea of withdrawing from the deal? thank you very much. >> okay, well, i think that if you're talking about suni majority countries, there's -- so i think that's part of it. but iran policies at least from a suny arab perspective have been destabilizing in a number of different contexts. whether it's iran's support of
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l h hezbollah or lebanon. so i think this would be one area where you see some overlap of politics and trump's position. there's also one area where there's some overlap, and again that's one of the things that really stood out to me in reading the report. the highest support for building a border wall with mexico, trump's wall is actually among jordanians. 44% support a border wall. >> and you have an explanation for this? >> well, we can speckilate. i mean, i guess the one speculation would be that jordan has had a mas chb influx of refugees over the past 15 years,
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not just recently. so you've had palestinian refugees, iraqi ref jays, and now syrian refugees and it's really altered the demographic make-up of the country. so that would be my guess. >> so i was really interested that 63% of turkey opposed the border wall. >> yeah, so you would think that turkey would share jordan's perspective on this again because they had a big influx of syrian refugees. yet -- i don't know. one pus aeblt is there haven't been previous influxes. so this is the first time turkey has really had to deal with this. and turkey is much larger country. if you have hundreds of thousands of refugees coming in, everyone feels it some way. it affects the housing market, prices and so on. and just my experience being in turkey in recent years, you don't feel it as much. and also if you support erduwan,
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you still has support of a big percent of turks. he sort of promotes that as kind of this turkish exceptionalism, if you will. >> keep in mind, that europe was part of the iranian deal. it was co-negotiateiated by the brits, the turks, and the jrmens. so we're invested in this. at the same time we're not niavenn naive. i think if you talk to them, there is a great concern of iran's role in the region, iran's support of terrorist
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organizations. and of course very little trust in its willingness to actually stick to the deal. that said, the deal at least gives us a framework, a framework for talking to iran about this. so it's seen as an achievement that is definitely better than the alternatives. as we know that kind of thing hits europe a lot earlier than the consequences are felts in america. so i think that gives you an explanation for how europeans feel. >> in the back in the orange. >> hi, i'm anne walters with the german press agency. i wanted to look ahead to the g-20. and see how these panels will
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balance the issues and also how you think trump will be received given the major disagreements on change and climate change. >> in other words, as is often the case with something like this, the actual issues are hashed out on both sides. and i would expect in the white house there are enough people who think this needs to be the domain of professionals and who would be working with european capitals to do this. is it possible for there to be a repetition for something like the brussels speech? yes, you know, there's only so much performance that any of us i think including the white
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house staff have over the proclivities of the president. i think there's also conflicting views in the white house, in the cabinet of how to deal with these trade disagreements and how to talk to europeans about them. so i think to that degree there's a certain degree of difficulty. and i would expect the europeans to be kaechlting to make offers to washington, attempting to find a framework in which it is possible to settle these disagreements. but on some things like climate change, i think we're going to have to just agree to disagree. but it's in no one's interest for this to turn out on all out
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confrontation. >> and because there's this perception that trump is vindictive, if he doesn't get along with you personally, that leaders kind of want to go out of their way to make a deal, if you will, or to somehow make the relationship less tense. so you might recall there was this "the new york times" article on this nato summit where there was this realization you had to shorten your speeches, to keep it short and sweet like one minute to five minute comments so that trump could stay engaged. now, that might sound in some ways negative and make us feel embairsed as americans, but it's interesting despite the dislike
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of trump leaders do seem willing and interested to go the extra mile to wlee in trump's good favor. i don't know what to make of that yet and what that means in practice, but i think that's something to watch pretty closely. >> gentleman in the first row here. >> this question i have is on leadership in asia. when you start talking about international trade, tpp was meant to be a way for other countries to compete with china and how does the change as americans make decisions on what to do with north korea? >> trying to understand the connection with the north korean piece. >> we have our trade and now this escalation of what we're going to do with north korea and how that will impact our
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relationship with china and u.s. and therefore all asia. just your thoughts on leadership in asia and the role of north korea. >> i'll take the question on tpp. i would say the u.s. withdrawal from the transpacific partnership, again, as was indicated in survey results was devastating to the perception of the united states. and we'll see it in the survey i'm sure, there's a growing perception in asia that the future of the economic order will be china led. it will be china's rules, china's institutions, multilateral or informal that will be convening the region and determining its course, and transpacific partnership was the best mechanism to try to provide an alternative to that. ask the reason it matters in my view is i think there's some
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questions on how pronounced that would be. but because the lack of leadership on this issue, the lack of the united states convening together starts cascading into other sets of issues. so if a country -- let's say a country in southeast asia perceives the u.s. is withdrawing economically, that their economics future will lie with china. and if they defy china over a variety of issues, they'll face economic punishment for them. again, that's going to cascade into other issues. they may be less willing to criticize human rights with the united nations. so these things i think given the centrality of economics in asia, this really matters. and the tag line i keep saying is i'm going around town talking about these issues, is there's no amount of defense spending that can make up for this, no
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amount of ships the u.s. can build that will reverse these perceptions. it will be economics. and economics will start having an effect. so that particular finding, and i'll be excited to see how it's revealed. but i think it's going to be pretty stark. and the trump administration doesn't get in on the game whether it's reviving tpp or not, then u.s. leadership in the region will detearierate no matter what. >> we'll take two final questions together. the one on the side, the gentleman here i think the fourth row and right across as well. earlier trump express gratitude with the outcome of brexit. is his slow learning curve on international economics a concern in much of the rest of the world? >> and right across here as
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well. we'll take two and wrap up. >> freelance writer. i actually wanted to touch on a middle east question about how the u.s. has been able to spread democracy around the world historically -- we saw in libya, saw in iraq and syria that the invasion of iraq creating these power vacuums has been a probleminaproblem in the region. and do you think that u.s. foreign policy in terms of being the largest military power in the world and having such a huge influence in the region has maybe created -- has put maybe a terrorist target on our backs? i mean we've been seeing this in the u.s., we've seen this in
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europe in that regard. richard, i do want to talk about the pew research center poll. what kind of message can you send to congress about these results, and how can that maybe influence policy going forward? thank you. >> you want to start with the trade question? look, i think we addressed that earlier when i said politics very often a matter of interpretation, economics is not. you're dealing with actual facts. and you're dealing with pretty clear causal correlations. and it's without wanting to estate the field of economics here, but there is, i think, a real bemusement in european capitals not just at some of the
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economic theories and trade theories being compounded not by the president but by significant members of administration but even more and in a way that's even more concerning, the degree to which there seems to be a feeling in this administration that trade wars are a good thing and that trade relationships are something are something of necessity or from america's vantage point ought to be always calculated on the bilateral level. and therefore the question of res prustyty needs to be settled bileterally. where for european union where we as nation states have delegated to brussels and to european authorities, that's a legal and factual possibility. we can't do that. and all conversations that european leaders have had with the white house indicate that that fact, which has been a fact for more than 20 years, is just
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not accepted. and that makes that conversation a really difficult one to have. i think there's a tremendous amount of sense in europe these things are so important we cannot afford to let this relationship detearierate. but we can't blow up the european union just to make the white house trade negotiators happy. that's not going to happen. and we're currently seeing just with brexit how difficult it is for them to leave. the process itself is so difficult, so many laws and regulations bind us together. >> just very quickly, i think just to underscore something i said a little earlier, this issue is much bigger than trump now. and i think the question will be how is he activating american politics in a way where it's not necessarily about trump, the democrat's party is not showing
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bold leadership right now on free trade. so it's only going to get more difficult around these issues. and it's a big problem, this question of globalization and the future of work and what advance said societies are going to do about that. so trump matters, but he may -- whether he learns the importance about the european union or the transpacific partnership, it's not clear the political waters in the united states will bear even if he did change his mind. >> it's bother me a little bit in the kind of media discourse in the last few months where people are saying, well, trump is giving up on supporting democracy and embracing dictators like c.c. and other arab democrats. and it's almost like we've
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forgotten one crittism of obama was he was unusually bad on -- take for example, the fact that secretary carrie was profusely praising egyptian president c. c. two or three months after the worst massacre in modern egyptian history and crediting c.c. for presiding over a democratic -- can you imagine if trump did something like that? i think that our -- whether it's analysts or journalists, the sort of prevalent dislike of trump, i think, has made it more difficult for us to be objective about trump's foreign policy. but the bigger point is that we have a pretty bad record on supporting democracy in the
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middle east. that's not the province of one president or another. that's a decade long thing that's been pretty consistent. so i'd be pretty careful seeing trump in that regard. and just the last question of does intervening lead to more anti-american sentiment? yes, there is data and academic literature which suggests a kind of relationship, sure. but at the same time nonintervention also seems to have a relationship with the rise of extremism and terrorism. and i think syria is good example of that. that's where we said, hey, we're going to stay as far as away as possible from this. we're going to do a reverse iraq in syria. but what that led to in practice is that the rapid rise and emergence of the most successful andtremist group in recent decades, isis. >> what's the final word to you,
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and please feel free to give us a plug for the up coming survey results. >> with regard to economic policies, you know, our survey shows a lot of opposition to trump's proposals around the world. but also with the theme if you look across, we tested a lot of opposition to the idea of the u.s. withdrawing from commitments around the world or putting up barriers to the rest of the world in terms of restrictions of people entering the country from arab, muslim nations, putting up a wall with mexico, pulling out of trade agreements, it plays into how people view america's role in the world. and just to put in a plug for up coming research, as i said, we'll be looking at america's
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image visa vi china. we'll also look at globalization and democracy around the world. in some ways i think we'll have policies that speak to these big debates about the fate of the world order. and hopefully what's we can add to that debate is some data on how average citizens around the world think about these different components of that order. >> thank you very much. thank you all for coming. [ applause ]
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c-span's washington journal live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up friday morning review the week in washington including the latest senate republican health care reform efforts. and also discussing the rising tensions between the media and the trump white house. be sure to watch c-span's washington journal live at 7:00 a.m. eastern friday morning. join the discussion. on friday a discussion about the famine in south sedan, live from the center of strategic and international studies at 10:30 a.m. eastern on c-span 2, c-span.org and streaming on our free c-span radio app.
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on friday south creen president moon jae-in on relations with the u.s. he's speaking at the center for strategic and international studies. you can also follow along on c-span.org and on our free c-span radio app. this weekend c-span's city tour with the help our comcast partners takes tv to oregon. we'll visit powal city of books covering on entire city block. we'll learn about the history of one of the world's largest independent bookstore. >> when we first moved into this building we were 15,000 square feet of books. and now we're 75,000 square feet of retail of books. we here that quite often for
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authors this is a resource for them. >> and then senator state senator shares her personal journey as an african-american growing up in oregon with a book. >> knowing that we -- that i could be a part of the march and the demonstrations and the conversations that went on in our local community was very -- the word i would use now is empowering. that's what it was. and connecting to what was happening all those many, many miles away. on sunday at 2:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv we'll step inside the historic pittech mansion. >> he worked there for a number
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of years, pretty much proved himself invaluable. he was the one that actually kept it going. the owner was rather distracted to politics to the point he owed henry a lot of back wages. so in 1860 his employer zieed to give the paper to pettech. he was eventually able to build a house as grand as this one. >> watch saturday at noon eastern on c-span's book tv. working with our cable affiliates and visiting cities across the country. next former new york lieutenant governor betsy mccaughey discusses health care reform efforts.

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