tv Churchill Roosevelt Company CSPAN July 15, 2017 12:00pm-1:01pm EDT
is more of civil disobedience. women are not supposed to jive -- to drive, we show that we are capable of driving along life and being in the driver seat of our own destiny. >> sunday night at 8 p.m. eastern on q&a. up next on the presidency, discussesewis lehrman fdr and churchill and how they won world war ii. he spoke at the new york historical society where he is also a member of the board of press -- the board of trustees. this is just under one hour. thrilled to welcome lewis
lehrman back to our stage. -- a member of our board of trustees since 2003, lewis lehrman was instrumental in our 2008 exhibition on alexander hamilton, the man who made modern america. his vision of our institution as the destination for american history has guided us over the past 14 years with the most recent fruits of his initiative and extraordinary exhibition focused on dolly madison and the women of the early american republic. together with another, lewis lehrman established a collection of original historic manuscripts and documents here at york historical society. his institute for american history has developed a highly acclaimed national program for teaching american history in high schools and colleges throughout the united states. lewis lehrman also created the lincoln prize and the center for
the study of slavery, resistance, and abolition at yale university which awards the frederick douglass prize for the best work of the year on slavery, resistance, and abolition. for all of this tremendous work in american history, lewis lehrman was presented with the national humanities medal at the white house in 2005. lewis lehrman is the author of several books, including his latest "churchill, roosevelt & company: studies in character and statecraft." in a complementary review this past march, the wall street journal noted " the book is packed with fascinating detail and illuminates not only the past, but challenges of the present day. the subtitle, studies in character and statecraft, he makes it clear that in geopolitics, the two go
together." before i welcome him to the stage, i will ask everyone to check their cell phones and anything else that makes a noise, turn them on. now it is my great pleasure to welcome mr. lewis lehrman. [applause] lewis: madam chairman, thank you so much for the introduction. even after marriage in courtship for 53 years, one needs reinforcement. louise is here. distinguished trustees, members, and guests, we are gathered in this hall tonight to contemplate
the most colossal war of human history. and to focus especially upon the anglo american alliance in world war ii. at the onset of war anglo phobia was commonplace among civilian and military leaders in washington. more than one century of anglo american opposition had led to mutual distrust. not to mention, the revolutionary separation from the mother country and the humiliating war of 1812. bad blood had followed the disappointments of world war one. not least, britain's failure to repay its war debts to america. in britain, condescension toward its former colonials still prevailed among the british elites.
depression at home and revolution abroad, appeasement and isolationism preoccupied both countries. now some american politicians believed that sophisticated british leaders such as winston churchill, might be a slippery fleece america in order to keep the british empire in tact. one british officer would write, some americans are curiously liable to suspect that they are going to be outsmarted by the subtle british because we british sometimes do such stupid things that the americans cannot take them at face value. but suspect them of being part of some dark design. churchill himself never doubted
that the full support of the united states was necessary to defeat hitler's bid for mastery of the european continent. after a desperate courtship of fdr by the prime minister in 1940 and 1941, president roosevelt would still not consent to marriage in the war against nazi germany. the cautious fdr would wait until pearl harbor in december 1941. whereupon a shotgun wedding would be declared, nearly 18 months after the fall of france. during those fateful months, fdr had escalated u.s. cooperation with churchill -- and none too soon. by the time of pearl harbor, german troops had arrived at the gates of moscow. let us pause for a moment to
consider the provenance of these two titans of the anglo-american alliance. educated by tutors at home, fdr as a very young man followed the path of the rich and the wellborn. churchill at seven years of age was sent off to a harsh boarding school. then after his years there, he would struggle to pass the examination to enter the royal military academy. at sandhurst. roosevelt would go to harvard. there he had some success, but he was mortified to be rejected by the socially prestigious club to which his father had belonged. young winston upon graduation from sandhurst would see the world as a junior army officer
in the cavalry, and at the same time as a highly paid war correspondent, a most irregular role for a british army officer. eight years older than fdr, churchill would become world-famous by the time roosevelt entered harvard. as a british army officer, churchill proved intrepid in battle. in cuba, india, the sudan, and south africa, he would attain the world-renowned he craved as a vehicle to enter parliament. at that time the future prime minister thought himself unique. i think it is fair to say that he always thought himself unique. but at that time he would , confide to a lady friend, "we are all worms, but i do believe
that i am a glow worm." now fdr would marry his cousin, eleanor, in 1905 in the wedding presided over by her uncle, the then president of the united states. theodore roosevelt. churchill would propose later. before and during world war i would serve in the cabinet as first lord of the admiralty. roosevelt himself would never serve in the armed forces, but he would follow the example of his famous cousin teddy as assistant secretary of the navy in world war i under woodrow wilson. in may 1940 when winston
churchill became prime minister, great britain would undergo one of the greatest crises of her long national history. a mortal threat to the very survival of the nation itself. indeed, at the end of 1940, britain was insolvent. isolated by the fall of france, the u.k. fought the massive german armed forces alone. to prevail, the prime minister knew he needed an american alliance. as he said, "i will drag america in." but in fact it would be japan and germany on december seventh 1941 who would drag america into world war two. some distrust between america and britain never dissipated
during world war ii, the gossip to the contrary notwithstanding. the president and his secretary of state presented churchill's -- resented churchill's determination to maintain a british empire and its imperial trading preferences. the prime minister would but defiantly respond, "i have not become the kings prime minister to preside over the dissolution of the british empire." working under the prime minister and the president were many levels of military and civilian leaders, some of whom did embrace the spirit necessary for victory. but on neither side of the atlantic was team spirit pervasive. for example, secretary of state, the secretary of the treasury,
henry morgan fall and their , deputies among others shed their angle phobia reluctantly. -- there anglo phobia reluctantly. the chief of naval operations would never stop pulling the lions tail. u.s. army chief of staff george marshall, the supreme commander in europe dwight eisenhower would make the alliance effective. among important civilian officials in the alliance to who aimed at teamwork were a few officials. the gifted hopkins would become the defective national security counselor. an unlikely achievement for a former social worker from a small town in iowa. above all, hopkins would gain the trust of the prime minister.
even that of the standoffish members. on his second trip to london in july 1941, harry hopkins would take a navy seaplane across the arctic to moscow where he met with joseph stalin. for three days he reported that stalin welcomed him with a few blunt russian words, "it was like talking to a perfectly coordinated machine." joseph stalin knew exactly what he wanted, he knew what russia needed, and he assumed that you knew too. stalin made the case to hopkins
that russia would survive, an argument that would lead to the allies giving aid to russia. now historians tend to emphasize that churchill, roosevelt, and company won the war in the west and the pacific -- all true. but lessig knowledged is the , fact that it was a soviet army that destroyed the bulk of the german armed forces in the east. 80%, four out of every five german soldiers killed in battle died fighting the russians on the eastern front. now let us consider the character and the personality of the commanders in chief of the anglo-american alliance.
churchill and roosevelt themselves were patricians of great talent and ambition. inspired by their elite families and their famous forebears. roosevelt, a democrat, would prove a much better grassroots politician, having the political skill to build a loyal organization in the republican hudson valley. fdr would enter new york politics when the progressive republican theodore roosevelt was the most famous american in the world. politics was different for roosevelt. and for churchill. churchill's heart beat to the rhythm of debate in parliament. not to the noise of grassroots politics. after his heroic struggle to
overcome polio and paralysis, fdr would become the people's politician. much more attuned than churchill to public opinion. but even in early 1941, after three presidential victories, , fdr did not preside over decisive congressional majority, not least because of the isolationism in both the democrat and republican parties. churchill on the other hand governed a large majority coalition throughout the war. fdr would have to fight two campaigns for the presidency during the war, 1940 and 1944. the prime minister would face no parliamentary general election until july 1945 at the end of the war.
whereupon he was dismissed from office by the british voters, one of the great ironies of the war. churchill's character was more straightforward than that of roosevelt. fdr was practiced at deception, as he himself readily acknowledged. he told the secretary of the treasury, "i am a juggler and i never let my left hand know what my right hand does." the secretary of the interior "you won't even talk frankly with people who are loyal to you, the loyalty of whom you are only convinced." roosevelt's devoted speechwriter robert sherwood wrote, "if
either the president or the prime minister could be called a student of machiavelli, it was surely franklin roosevelt." however, the emotional prime minister was a complex mixture of actor and warrior. he could alternate quickly between charm and curmudgeon. churchill's true feelings tended to show through. he rarely bothered to hide them. he did not hold back tears, even sobbing in public. the guarded fdr was much more circumspect, more tightly wound. more intense. churchill would not rest while prosecuting the war. nor could he relax as fdr did with his stamp collection and his naval encyclopedias. the prime minister was all in for war, all the time.
general hastings, military aides, liaisons would joke about the prime minister. i quote him. " churchill is the great military genius of history, he can use one division on three fronts at the same time. " still on strategy churchill almost always consulted his war cabinet. during the war, fdr paid little attention to his cabinet. his attitude toward the state department bordering on contact. -- on contempt. for example the secretary of state was not in washington when the president would soon depart the summit conference with the prime minister in 1941.
roosevelt invited the number two man at state. like fdr, wells was a harvard educated member of the eastern establishment. fdr himself was far more comfortable with wells than with paul, the former tennessee senator. eleanor roosevelt with observed, "franklin is not at ease with people not of his own class." at this summit near newfoundland, roosevelt and churchill decided to send a small delegation to moscow to decide what military resources should be shipped to russia. to go to russia fdr would choose , the man who had been managing the american side of langley's,
in britain another man. harriman was the not so rare american in london who embraced the charms of the prime minister's daughter-in-law. edward r. murrow was another. no more locker room talk tonight. going with harriman to russia was controversial. lord beaverbrook. a canadian who had served with churchill in world war i cap. indeed, the self-confident prime minister would choose beaverbrook for his first cabinet in 1940 over the doubts and hesitations of king george the sixth. the stubborn beaverbrook could and did stand up to the prime minister, but he would later complain that eating, drinking,
and arguing with the prime minister, "nearly killed me, almost made me a drunkard." not every man could drink 20,000 bottles of champagne in a single lifetime. fdr was like churchill, a man of intuition and impulse. his inner life was opaque, even to those who knew him best. robert sherwood, the same loyal speechwriter wrote "i tried continually to study fdr. to try to look beyond his charming and amusing and warmly affection into his heavily for -- forest did interior.
fdr's own daughter would say "no one truly new fdr," even members of his own family. but in decision-making, fdr would choose wisely his leaders from the armed forces. men such as general marshall and general eisenhower. so to, his senior admirals. king, stark. fdr would often this missed -- detail with a cavalier wave of the hand. fdr was the supreme improviser. he also wrote, " fdr's favorite technique was to keep grants of authority incomplete, jurisdictions uncertain,
charters overlapping. the result of this competitive theory of administration was often confusion and exasperation on the operating level." to his diary, the secretary of war confided that fdr, " was the poorest administrator i have ever worked under with respect to the orderly procedure and routine of his performance. ." in addition to joseph kennedy, lord beaverbrook, and a few others, i do focus not only on other major civilian and military leaders, but on dozens of key figures not so well-known. among a few of these leaders i should like to name them, the super spies. william donovan and william
stevenson. general burns and also john maynard and harry dexter white. ganthal's chief deputy. it was harry dexter white that was totally in charge of the bretton woods conference in 1944 which established the postwar international monetary and financial system. but i shall tell you only a little more about these fascinating characters, maybe you will then want to buy the book. [laughter] alone among the big three, churchill, roosevelt, and stalin -- the prime minister would make the great travel to keep the
allies together. always trying to reduce misunderstandings by speaking directly with his american and russian allies. the prime minister's travel astonished his colleagues. the tireless churchill would meet roosevelt 11 times during the war. always in north america, except at casablanca, cairo, tehran, in yalta. -- and yalta. the prime minister's courageous and constant travel by air and ship into the war zone, general douglas macarthur would write, "foreign and hostile lands may be the duty of young pilots, but for a statesman burdened by the world's care, it is an act of inspiring gallantry and valor. of the victoria cross, macarthur
would say no one of those who wears it deserves to where it more than churchill, when speaking of the british medal of honor. it is true that by early 1941 before pearl harbor, key american cabinet members did favor u.s. entry into the war against hitler's, including the navy secretary and the secretary of war. they were ahead of the president, and ahead of public opinion. fdr was the consummate master of both of those, but there were distractions which made him very cautious, despite his landslide victory in november 1940, the president would always remember his campaign pledge to american mothers not to send their sons to war again. nevertheless, roosevelt truly
raised the temperature of american belligerence in 1940 and 1941 with fdr's approval and began actively planning for war, even in late 1940. one year before pearl harbor. it was then that the admiral produced the famous dog memo on general war strategy on a global basis. which led to the war planning conference of early 1941 in washington. there the conference would confirm a germany first strategy in the event of war. this was almost one year before the japanese attack at pearl harbor. so with the benefit of hindsight, a great advantage for historians, we are now able to see that the first week of
december 1941 was an early turning point of world war ii. it was at the beginning of december 1941 that the german invasion forces were turned back at the gates of moscow by a russian counterattack in temperatures that reached 20 to 30 degrees below zero. moreover on december 7 as we well know, 1941, the japanese attacked pearl harbor, uniting the former isolationist america behind a congressional declaration of war. prime minister churchill, as he wrote in his memoirs, would go to bed and sleep the sleep of the saved. however, it must be said that all the members of the grand alliance, britain, russia, and the united states had been
unready for world war ii despite transparent warnings and obvious the british and the french, at war since september of 1939, had been caught i'm ready for the overwhelming german blitzkrieg of may 1940. many authentic warnings, stalin had been caught unprepared for the german invasion of june 1941, not least because russia had been germany's former ally in a cynical, fascist, communist partnership created in the hitler-stalin pact of august 1939. even the u.s. government was not fully prepared or war with japan, a war that fdr did expect. things would change in the
balance wheel of the alliance as the years went by. it was in late 1943 that the churchill-roosevelt honeymoon would deteriorate along with the help of oatman. -- health of both men. there were sincere policy differences as well, confirming the rule that statecraft and nations have no permanent friends, only vital interests. the clash of strong personalities could also divide the anglo-american leaders long before victory was assured. for example, army chief of staff general marshall never really forgave churchill for convincing roosevelt during the summer of 1942 to delay marshall's thoughtful but premature strategic plan for a cross channel invasion of europe. this he proposed for the autumn
of 1942, even though america had entered the war only in december of 1941. instead, the prime minister persuaded fdr to invade north africa, namely the amphibious operation torch, of which eisenhower would become the supreme commander. this assignment being the general's launching pad to the supreme commander ultimately of overlord on d-day. this remarkable cross channel invasion of normandy finally got underway on june 6, 1944. two years after marshall had made plans for it. along the road to allied victory, there are plenty of grievous misjudgments. for example in the 1930's, as an early advocate of british air force expansion, churchill would
declare, "an aeroplane cannot sink a battleship because the armor is too thick." and in 1938, "the air menace against properly armed and protected ships of war will not be of decisive character." tell that to the japanese navy in 1942. devastating japanese aircraft carrier attacks on the british navy and its empire in the pacific woodshop churchill to the quick. in the spring of 1941, stalin refused to believe sources that a german invasion of russia was imminent. despite the obvious fact that hitler had mobilized 3 million german soldiers near the border for the invasion.
-- foolhartyparty myopia would cause disaster and death to strike millions of the russian people gratuitously. here is the best one of all. u.s. federal william leahy, the indispensable chief of staff to fdr, as well as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff would say, "the atomic bomb will never go off, and i speak as an expert on explosives." the ironies of the war. in the end, the character and the statecraft of the supreme allied commander of the d-day invasion, general eisenhower, cannot be underestimated. he proved that an american general could management only
proud american officers, but also british commanders. his diplomacy, his modesty, his low-key ability to inspire, his sheer likability overcame what might've been insurmountable allied challenges. admirale lord, british andrew cunningham wrote, "from the very beginning eisenhower said anglo american unity and friendship as a primary purpose. the staffs work closely integrated. it was not long before the british and americans ceased to look at each other like warring tomcats and came to discover that nationals of both countries had brains, ideas, and drive." thus it is fitting that we now listen to general eisenhower's mary fallin -- very own major
tribute to the anglo-american victory given that the hall in london on june 12, 1945. i quote the general, "no one could alone have brought about this result. had i possessed the military skill of the marlborough, the wisdom of solomon, the understanding of lincoln, i would been helpless without the loyalty, the vision, the generosity of thousands of british and americans. some of them were my companions in the high command. many were enlisted men and icers carrying the fears brunt of the battle in the field. many others were back to the united states and here in great britain in london.
us wasr, in back of always a great national war leaders. in their civil and military staffs that supported us through every trial, every test the whole was one great team." thank you very much. [applause] >> the first question is why did the british populace turn against churchill after the war? clement attlee won the election
by an 8% popular majority margin. it was a decisive defeat of churchill. -- the british voter in 1945 begins really in the 1930's in the early 1940's. the british people had been impoverished by world war i and the depression of the 1930's. as a result, socialism had become a powerful force in britain. indeed, communism was a strong force in britain. there is a great deal of sympathy for the soviets. and churchill and roosevelt were very much aware of this in britain at the time.
the soviet union is thought to be in some places, not least the universities, to be the wave of the future. so that in britain, under lord beverage a plan was concocted by , the labour party for what they called a new jerusalem. this new jerusalem was to provide every british family a proper home, proper food, proper health, proper security. and of course, a worthy job. , this program was something that churchill himself could not endorse. in fact, he hated communism from its very inception. he so opposed the bolshevik revolution that after world war i he would supervise british attempting toia
turn back the bolsheviks. churchill, though he was not a conservative in the classical sense of it, he would not accepo turn back the bolsheviks. the so-called socializing of england. indeed during the campaign he , referred to the possibility that the socialist united kingdom under clement attlee would have a gestapo-like effect. that word alone probably lost in a large percentage of the margin of victory. so that we have a british electorate divided on the one hand between the hope for the future called the new jerusalem -- a form of socialism, and churchill himself who resisted. even the soldiers voted against churchill. britain was ready for a completely new social regime. i might add, this persisted
until margaret thatcher. domestically, why was the socialistic instruction of roosevelt's new deal ever allowed to happen with his republican constituents in the hudson valley? and were there reverberations into the 1950's? i have to say i must answer that in another book. but it is is a very good question. [laughter] maybe a quick way to answer it this is say that i was born and raised in central pennsylvania,
rock rib republican territory. my daddy and my grandpa were lincoln republicans to the core. they both voted for roosevelt. would you describe the relationship between churchill and joseph kennedy? you must buy my book. [laughter] fdr and kennedy? this is a great question. joseph kennedy, we probably know, was very ambitious politically. he even contemplated running for the presidency of the united states but decided to wait for jack and joe. he was the leading democrat politician in massachusetts. he aspired to high office,
especially secretary of the treasury. roosevelt was reluctant to appoint him. eventually in 1938, after being head of the sec, he accepted appointment and wanted it as ambassador to the court of st. james in england. there joseph kennedy ruined the reputation he had been building all of his life in business. he continually in public used the word, this is after 1940 -- 1939-1940, that britain was finished. it was not that he was sympathetic to hitler, he just believed that hitler was going to prevail and dominate the continent. that was the policy he wanted to pursue.
he wanted somehow an accommodation with with hitler on the continent. of course churchill would have , none of this. therefore, his relationship with churchill was never hostile in the active political sense. because churchill himself was a diplomat, even though joe kennedy was not. however, it was a relationship which existed at sword's point. similarly with fdr. fdr knew how ambitious joseph kennedy was. he tended to condescend toward joseph kennedy. kennedy never really liked roosevelt. and roosevelt never really liked kennedy. however, politicians and politics make strange bedfellows. kennedy was very important in
the election of roosevelt. he had lots of money to invest and lots of constituents which would support him. so that in sum, one has to say that his relationship with churchill was very strange, to , to the pointed of breaking at times. his relationship with fdr was strained to the breaking point as well. to read the story in my book about how roosevelt got rid of kennedy shows how deft a politician roosevelt was. kennedy was out of the court of st. james by the beginning of 1941. and roosevelt was happy to be rid of him.
here is another book-length question. [laughter] what can our current leaders learn from the examples of fdr and churchill? in the case of fdr, certainly personal courage. his triumph over polio was astonishing. his war leadership in the major decisions is an example that you don't have to be full-time on the job to make important strategic decisions which work out. in the case of churchill, there is no more heroic example of a war of national survival being presided over by a prime minister who would never give in. one of his great speeches was never give in.
this is a complicated question. but i think one should hear it. do you think churchill and roosevelt should be held accountable for their knowledge of concentration camps and rampant jewish oppression and their failure to do anything about it? so permit me to contest the , implication of the question. they did not do nothing about it. most of you may remember from your history books and high school or college before him recover act -- the acts of 1924 which limited immigration very strictly in all of america, and especially in the countries of western europe and eastern europe.
roosevelt decided to combine the quotas which were spelled out in the act for austria and germany and permit only jewish refugees to take those places. that was a small fraction of the jews in germany, not to mention eastern europe, but he did what the law permitted him to do. there is of course the question about the ship st. louis which was turned back with jewish refugees. that is a very sad tale and is hard to explain that, other than to say that there was in the state department an assistant secretary of state, it is transparently the case by the name of rick and bridge long it , -- breckinridge long it is a
, matter of fact that he was not sympathetic to the jewish refugee problem even though there was a limited amount that franklin roosevelt was able to do. in the case of churchill, i would have to call churchill the philosimite. he always endorsed the declaration which the british foreign minister had espoused for a jewish homeland in palestine. churchill was always in the right place for the right time for the jewish homeland. in world war ii, it was claimed that there was an appeal to bomb the rail lines into auschwitz. i think that may be an application of this question.
question.tion of this there was a sincere and serious debate over whether or not the rail lines into auschwitz could be accurately bombed. first of all the bombs being , dropped by airplanes over germany were quite inaccurate. just to give you an example, 47% of the pilots who flew british and american air force missions over germany did not return. very often killed by bombs going off in their own aircraft. that is the way young joe kennedy, the son of the ambassador died. so that they refer to it more as aerial bombing. as the war went on, the bombing got more accurate. but the aerial bombing was just opening up the bottom of the airplane and jumping the bombs -- dropping the bombs out on cities and incinerating whole
cities like dresden so the argument that we could have successfully -- or the anglo american alliance could have successfully bombed the rail lines into auschwitz is a debatable question at best. i conclude for this good question that churchill and roosevelt themselves should not be held responsible. it was manifestly the work of hitler, the nazi party, and their allies in eastern europe. i deal with this one in my book , too. forgive me. why did marshall and eisenhower -- see a cross channel
invasion was militarily possible? it was primarily general marshall whose plan it was. eisenhower was his director of plans. he did what marshall told him to do. it is true that eisenhower had a very positive attitude towards the plan. i mean this was his very own plan that he delivered to general marshall. there was a confidence in the american military. you won't forget that in world war i, the arrival of one million american troops in the spring and fall of 1917 in europe turned the balance of the war. the americans, although suffering major casualties, acquitted themselves brilliantly, and it was armistice in november 1918. not a little bit the result of
the american intervention. the american army was very confident that they could bring together the same kind of intervention force and cross the channel. it was churchill who believe that yes, it was possible, but that it was premature. churchill's strategy was collect all the american soldiers in great britain, primarily in northern england to train them , for two years and then to attempt to cross channel invasion, not to mention that in 1942 we didn't even have a landing craft. churchill and general sir alan brooke pointed that out. we didn't have the landing craft to land the troops on the normandy beaches arrive or in france they decided to land them. it was one of those aggressive inspirations of general marshall
to get american troops into action in france. you will remember that general marshall was the adjutant for general pershing in the american expeditionary force in 1917. so he had memories, and he wanted to acquitted the american army as quickly as possible. it was churchill and sir alan supportand then fdr in of churchill and general alan brooke who decided to delay the cross channel invasion. indeed the preparations for june 6, 1944 went on daily. of course it was a success, but there is no guarantee of success. anyone who read the story of the weather and the crossing on june 6, which was very doubtful knows how likely failure could have resulted.
do i believe that stalin out-negotiated fdr at yalta? i have a full chapter in my book on yalta. [laughter] i think it is fair to say that stalin did get the best deal at yalta. did he out negotiate roosevelt? at that time, roosevelt had two objections. to form the united nations itself to fulfill woodrow , wilson's league of nations. the second was to get russia into the war against japan.
remember, war in europe was over may 8-10. the war in japan was not over until we dropped the atomic bomb. i know that date because it is my birthday, august 15, 1945. so that roosevelt did not know that they were going to drop the atomic bomb. he might have if he lived, might have given the order. he did not know then. getting russia into the war was important to him in order to save as a many american lives as -- for the necessary japanese invasion as possible. with the benefit of hindsight, we can all say that stalin got the best deal at yalta, but it doesn't take into account all the considerations which president roosevelt had in mind at yalta at that time. i think dale gregory -- there
are a couple of other wonderful questions here. you will forgive me for not answering. i thank you very much. [applause] >> this weekend on american history tv on c-span3, tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on lectures in history, appalachian state university professor jedkin browning discusses mcclellan's failed attempt to take the confederate capital in richmond. >> they have not done an awful lot of research develop this peninsula looks like and what marching along the peninsula would look like. but he is dead set on making sure he's not concede anything to lincoln that he basically puts his army on the peninsula in the spring of 1862. it will be perhaps the worst possible place to launch his campaign. p.m. on the 6:30
320th anniversary of the salem witch trials, margo burns talks about the primary sources for the trials compiled in the book "records of the salem witch hunt." >> that is what we know so much about salem village, so much about the pleas of innocence. single parish took it all down. the reason arthur miller coached from him is because it reads like a play. he says this, she says that. the girls were flailing around. all these descriptions come from daniel paris, because he was constituting it from the shorthand. >> at 8:00 p.m. eastern on the presidency, former boston globe journals, spooky on the book "the road to camelot: inside jfk's five-year campaign." >> i was in junior in college in 1960, and it was the first time i ever heard the word charisma. he had charisma.
richard nixon did not have charisma, lbj did not have charisma, by jack kennedy had charisma. i think they could've had chari. i think that could have possibly tipped the balance in some people's minds. >> for our complete american history tv schedule, go to www.c-span.org. >> the shot heard round the world happened right here at the northbridge. we are in concord, massachusetts to learn more about the battle that started the american revolution. >> by the bridge, here the embattled farmers stood and fired the shot heard round the world. nu