tv Army Modernization and Russian Military Strategy in Europe CSPAN July 31, 2017 5:45pm-6:48pm EDT
>> jeff moss, founder and creator of blackhat and defcaf talks about his back-to-back conferences for security researchers and how hacking works. >> you've got to remember now, it's pretty hostile everywhere. it used to be just hostile during defcon and blackhat. but now every airport seems to have a fake cell tower operating, fake wi-fi catchers. because if you're going to steal somebody's logons, why not at the business lounge at an international airport. that's where the high-value targets are. if you monitor your wi-fi signals when you're traveling, you'll see all these fake stations, amtrak station right there at d.c. has a fake cell tower outside of it a couple times. it's just, this is the way that it is. and if you're a criminal and you can build a become packpack to intercept information and leave the backpack plugged in somewhere, that's so much more low risk than trying to rob a bank. >> watch "the communicators"
tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span2. next, a look at military readiness and increasing terrorism threats, hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. they focused on chemical warfare and modernization of the army. the discussion is an hour. >> all right, thank you, everyone, for sticking around as we made our transition. as i mentioned, we're going to roll into the second half of the event, where we're going to focus on army modernization. and csis is today rolling out a report on army modernization called the army modernization imperative. a new big five for army modernization. and i want to begin by thanking the sponsors of that study, because without sponsors, we don't get to do studies. and this study was sponsored by a combination of support from general dynamics drs technologies, part of leonardo,
and all three, as well. so we want to thank them for their support. i'm going to briefly walk through the chief findings and recommendations of the report. it's about 80ish page, but it's a pretty quick read. there's a lot of pictures, so i urge you to go read the whole thing. i'm going to hit the highlights, and then we're going to bring up our distinguished panel to give us the real scoop on army modernization, and how we should think about it. and what we should do with it? and i want to start by saying, with this study, we've always -- every time we've talked to folks about it, we've had to start by saying, this is not a critique of army acquisition. this is a look at, if you start with a premise that the army needs to modernize, how does it develop a strategy for doing that, which it can clearly and forcefully communicate within the army, within the department of defense, and with the congress in order to get the resources to actually carry that out? so that's the focus of this study. it's less procedural and more of
a strategic overview. in terms of our findings, because we wanted to set the scene in doing this study, what is the state of army modernization today. skpe with came back with a finding that the army's experiencing a modernization triple whammy and i'll get into more detail by what i mean by that in a couple of minutes. the army modernization is below its historic level, both on average and during periods when the army is seeking to modernize, because the army, like most of the services go through phases of modernization that represent peaks and valleys, as is the case with the overall defense budget. there's little relief on the way, both in terms of the budget control act discussed both by senator cotton and the limits it puts on defense spending and army spending by implication. and in terms of the issues that the army's confronting, such as readiness, that the senator referred to. even if the army had a robust
budget for army modernization, the army has very limited options, as of today, because the technology effort has been more focused on the early stages and given the level of funding that was available, that's probably appropriate. but there hasn't been a lot of platform development or system development in the army budget in recent years, which we could then seek to modernize the army on a rapid basis. the army was through the drawdown period, sought to minimize harm. and i think they did a pretty good job on that. again, our study is not a critique of the tough decisions that were made after sequestration to rtrue to salvae some form of army modernization. but we believe it's clear that they don't leave the army in a position with a ready and obvious path forward. and so work needs to be done to duothat. and we've taken a crack at that. and lastly, one of our findings is that we think that there is not a consensus on priorities
for army modernization. and we'll talk a little bit about why that is the case. let me just talk about this idea of the triple >> has been picked up in some circles. what do we mean by that? this is not the first time, this draw down that happened because of the budget act and sequestration. it's not the first time the army's duran down its happened in the past. and there's definitely similarities but there's notable differences. the first leg of the triple whammy is that this draw down is larger than previous draw downs. if you look over on the right hand column under total army modernization, the draw down was 74%.
this is in contract obligation dollar terms. that exceeds relatively robustly previous draw downs. the second leg of the triple whammy though is where most of that extra draw down came from. if you look at the procurement problem on our chart, you're not seeing what i'm seeing on my paper, excuse me. there it is. okay, so that right-hand column has previous draw downs by ten to 15%. the source of most of that ex session draw down is really the rnd accounts. decline in procurement was consistent with previous draw downs. the decline on the rnd account was 52%. if you look at the first two draw downs you average them in the first draw downs in the accounts of 22%. the rnd has been preserved
during relatively draw downs. the reduction in rnd was the average of the previous two, that's more than twice of the average of the previous two draw downs. the last element of the triple whammy that's on the bottom part of this chart is the state that the army entered this draw down in. and previous draw downs most notable the draw down at the end of the cold war the army was in the process of completing a standard of modernization, the big 5, in the 1980s to which our report title refers was secure. was in the process of completing securism when the last draw down happened. when this draw down wen into effect, the army was coming off some regrettable program, future combat system, comanche, crew saider there's a list, i won't go through them all in detail.
you will not see a substantial build up of new systems in the army. that pre-seeded the culture draw down. you have a draw down larger than you have in the past and particularly your rnd accounts were drowned down much more substantially than previously. we then wanted to get a sense of where's army modernization today in context of broader modern modernization, so we wen back and looked back army modernization funding back to the end of world war ii, sortive in the modern area. we developed, the two dotted lines, the lower lines is the historic level of modernization across that post-world war ii period. the -- the army was seeking to replenish or regenerate its
technology. you had the higher level up and around $35 billion and historical average being here 5 $35 billion. and we see where we are today which is $5 billion below the historic modernization, $10 billion below the level during the periods where the modernization was progressing. that is suggesting if the army is seeking to modernize this technology today it's probe going to require additional funding to make that happen. i want to talk a bit about this issue of the priorities. in order to get funding for army modernization you got to be able to go to the congress and also to leadership of d od and say, this is why we need this funding. that means setting priorities about what it is that needs to be modernized. what we're just showing here is a list or some of the examples of modernization priorities that have been expressed in recent
documents or testimony by the army to congress. the gist of this is that every list is, there's some similarities across list but they're all different. they have take different, i guess starting points as to what they're talking about. aviation as a priority is an important area for prior toization but convey a lot about how you're going to pursue modernization in the aviation world. we think there's a lack of -- on priorities. allow me to talk about the gop. that was a big focus of the senator remarks and the eats today for russia challenge and the modernization. when we started this report it was prior to the election controversies and the attack on the election system. but pretty quickly when you look at questions of army
modernization you do find, i know the chief has testified that russia is a pacing threat. not necessarily because we expect to go to war with russia, and europe or elsewhere but russian systems are the core systems for most of the adversaries we can get into reform with. rapid advance of the recent technology of years they invested back when they invested heavily. when oil was high they've gone into systems that are not just russian systems but they proliferated to others as well, iran certainly in that group. and they have particularly gone after an a-2, ad concept. the technology the senator was focused on was a pig part of that. it's being keeping the u.s., its allies and systems away from the defended area that the russian defenses are defending. in the case of russia that's
russian territory. and it's sophisticated layer, redid you know dan approach, ar till retire, crews missiles, radars, tanks, it's a real sweet capability that they have been developing and deploying and sharing with others, that the u.s. army is likely to face if it gets drawn into high intensity conflict somewhere in the world. particularly, focus on non-capabilities like nonelectronic warfare and cyber, that they have been focused on more than the u.s. has as we have been involved in the coin channel in the middle east. so i move now to kind of our respondent's exhibits. a new big five for the 21 century. how do you express clear priorities that the army's going to meet the challenge that it has in the future and how do you invest and develop a monetary
program that is going to deliver on those priorities. one of the tricky, subtle arguments that we make on the report is that it's much better to talk about this in terms of capabilities and platforms. the previous big five was platforms. a couple of other black hawk, and the apa which he, so five platforms that were going to meet the threats of that day. in today's world i think you're better off talking about capabilities. the reason why is platforms take, depending on who you ask, ten to 10 years, maybe -- 10 or 20 years, maybe more to develop. going to congress in 2017 saying, we have an urgent problem, i want you to join me in a platform development that in 20 years will give us an answer. that's a tough case to make. if on the other hand, what you're asking for is we have significant deficit and electronic warfare and we have a
plan to increase our electronic warfare capabilities to meet that, you can show progress on that priority relatively quickly while also developing a long-term plan. and these are the five that recommended, i would say we had two workshops, we talked to a lot of experts, we sent these to the right five but the army will come up with its own and they're working hard on that. and this idea of thinking of capabilities in terms of platforms, we think it's very important enlisting the support that the army's going to need to do its modernization program. so, just wrapping up my piece here and we'll do the discussion. the -- has represented a clear focus strategy. make modernization a priority, that is on the chief's list of priorities but there is this competition with spending on personnel and readiness, and those are important as well. but the army has to really think
hard about how to make modernization, we believe a higher priority. focus on capabilities not platforms. making army acquisition more agile by focusing on revelation, as i mentioned improves capabilities rapidly as we move toward longer term. making room within your modernization program to address emerging opportunities and challenges. and then aligning human capital with this modernization strategy and some of our panelist have additional ideas of what you have to do to make this approach work. so without further adieu i'll call them up to the stage and we can hear from them.
>> thank you for joining us today i'll introduce the panel and we'll turn and get their thoughts. to my right is heidi chew, she is currently serving as chairman of the board of robo t north america. she previously worked at raytheon and before that ate hughes. and formally chairman of the air force scientific adviser board. to her right is colonel retired u.s. army dan roper. he's director at national security studies at the association of united states army. former manager director and author of global counter servantsy. and so his right is doug bush, a former colleague of mine. a former national security analyst at a usa and a former
army officer. so heidi i'll start with you, you can start us out. if you could give us some of your thoughts on the strategic approach that you think is most likely to be effective in this period. >> absolutely. i think you guys have did a great job in terms of covering the impact of b.c.a. in 2011. i do want to emphasize for a second on what you have said. when you look at the army total from f yrk-10-15. the army budget has increased on the top one. but the security funding are the a pot decreased by 33%. so army modernization can't happen when you're budget's being cut that significantly. i want to emphasize one other
thing. the annual c.r. creates even a bigger turmoil than people realize, because if you can't get the budget on october 1st, you're sitting there waiting. you can't spend, you can't start new program, you can't ramp up production, right. tremendous turmoil on programs, okay. and during the sequestration, plus the annual c.r., what the army had to do was stretch out programs, right, restructure them, reduce the procurement quantity buys down to the minimum sustainable rates without breaking annual tie year contracts and then start programs that was planned, orwee terminated. so there was significant turmoil within our -- basically across
every single one of our portfolios. so within the budgeting environment seconding what you said, i actually drew a pyramid, a pyramid chart where we divest all the equipment because we need to save on this cost. we have to reset the equipment so we're ready to fight. we'll modernize or existing platforms and we will chose carefully what new capability to develop to increase our mobility, lethality and survival ability. then we will invest in our s&p to enable the next generation capability. so that was our strategy in declining budget environment. looking ahead, it was a great dialogue this morning, i appreciate being here. i will give you my personal
perspective, based upon what i see as threats that the army will face, and what i deem the modernization effort has to focus on, okay. we will obviously see cyber attacks, disinformation on social media, that will never stop. we'll see jamming over jp s, our radar and our communications systems. we've seen that and it will continue. so, what are the monitorizations that are required? we need assured pn, position navigation time so we're no longer jammed. we need to operate beyond just e.w. e.w.'s absolutely critical but we need to be operating in the intersection of an integrated e.
wind-chill factor and i.o. because of the the agility of the threats. you don't have time to be pipe system anymore. and we need assured communications, okay. the other type, you guys have talked about this morning is the tremendous proliferation of weapon systems, okay. with increased sophistication, right. we see the r.p.g.s, we see much longer range missiles and brackets, crews missile, advance theater missile. we see an exponent shl growths, performance in surveillance systems. think about the next generation which will perform attack. okay. so what do we need to do, i will
expand on what you talk about missile integration deference. in my perspective we need a layered integrated active and passive iamd to enable missile defense/offense. okay. and it's layered in the sense that we have started this program, it's all the f-pick right, indirect field-sobriety capability, that is the base tests of rockets, missiles, uavs crews missiles. we need to continue that program, push that forward. the next layer of protection that we have is really plug and play. our existing pipe system into a -- which are legacy system -- into a common fire controlled network. so, the integrated battle command system is going to be
critical. ivc s you guys have heard of that, that's absolute critical. another leg under that umbrella that's absolutely critical is get a patriot a.e.s.s.a. which stands for active, electronically scan array. compared to what we have today, a es a is what we have today, and enable counter measures. so those are the stuff that we have in program -- either we have a program record today or we need to get going on. but we also need to add the beha passive capability. why i say that because active mean your radiating someone with jam you, passive mean you're not radiating.
so we need to sintegrate thosin to. give us a layered integrate capacity. then i will focus on, because of the proliferation of threats, we have to increase serve vooifr bl. so talent mont on what we need to focus on pushing forward is an integrated aircraft capability a s e, program. to enable us to wrap up the detect, identify and encountering of the threat. it needs to be integrated system because there's no single sensor of single counter measure that will counter all threats, okay. on the ground, this is why you see the focus shifting towards a active protection system for combat vehicles. but beyond just these two systems, we have to think about
how we need to see the target further and resolve it better. this is why we need the third generation for looking i.r. system. third generation flare. the other aspect that we need to focus on which is degrade a visual environment. we have to be able to enable operation in all environments, whether it's white out, black out, you name it, fog, smoke we've got to operate in that environment. okay. increasing lethality. okay, with longer range, jag ls, joint air to ground missiles. enabling our apa which he, be able to shoot. all the way up to longer range position fires. this is something our commander has asked for, for years now,
okay. and this is really the attack on replacement. and then increasing our mobility. it engine. to improve current engine programs. we currently have a 200 power chad horsepower engine. it will enable us to fly high and hot temperature, okay. the rest is a mobility program, we have program record, the j.m.t.v., the a.n.p.v., they will all increase the mobility and display our legacy systems. the one thing i did see people talking about, is improving our sense in war, especially in light of the fact we will see adversary that we use chemical
and biological weapons. so, therefore we should not put our soldier in harm's way, this is where robotics comes in. put sensors on robotics, let the roboti robotics roll ahead of you to be able to sense and more. so i wen through a lot, i don't want to hog all the time. i think the other thing you talk about in terms of lo gistics, this is where robotics can once again play a huge role in terms of reducing the lo gistics burden on our soldier today. i'll slow down and wrap up with other comments later. >> thank you. dan, you're next with the idea of modernization strategy. you've had a history of both
dealing with and -- on all of those. so i'll let you take your pick and give us your thoughts. >> i absolutely think -- small question too, thanks. this report does a good job of framing the context because the risk in developing a strategy is not understanding your operational environment, and what you've done is lay out, by assessing the j.o. tchl and strategic environment. the way we do modernization, where so critical gaps are and now you're proposing a kang in the ways where the ways is oppose to the big five, the abrams, strikers and so forth, the things that exist, and we're familiar with them now, your propose that we character rise is capability. and intellectually that makes sense. if we're too narrow when we start we'll miss the dynamics.
it's a little harder to get excited about a capability, even though it's essential you have to dig into it and understand the capability gap and say, i need to address electronic warfare or address missile defense. but underneath that there are systems that people sell, advocate, and attach their identity to that are very important. going back to the senator's comments this morning, and the report also brings it up, i don't think we have a problem with analytics. i don't think we have a problem with the science. we know as much as we can know and we have good plans to address some of those gaps. i think the biggest challenge is the communication on what needs to be done when -- and what resources do we need to expend on it and why do we -- how do we help the senators and
congressmen make the necessary trade offs with other very important things. i think the army's challenge is more diverse and complicated than saying, oh i need another aircraft carrier. not that that's a significant thing and we'd like to have more, but it's it treatmently seven l. the 101 level of the arlingtogu it's incredibly complex to articulate a story that encaps late everything you just said because there was a tour of force to everyone that feeds to be done. what happens the person receiving that, that's ultimately signing the check or getting a program going act upon that. so the more i look at strategy, the more i find it as, it's essential, about strategic communicating and got nothing to do with i.o. or public affairs.
it's communicating priorities, the people that have to act on it from the lowest to the highest level. the army does need to update its strategy. the one thing i'd say on that is shifting to the meeds. you recommend -- but the chief of staff in the army is recently testified and have said this many times, readiness is number one is going to stay there until we reach or interim readiness objectives which he expects to take about four years. that's based on the assumption that there's some level of coherent consistent funding, which is an assumption that fails every single year. so when you trade off readiness versus fore instructor, versus
modernization, this audience or community of interest just saying, let's try harder is not going to move the ball down the field, because there are other important tensions. so that doesn't offer an answer but maybe the strategic communication that's enabled by topping capabilities helps us -- topping capabilities also helps us bring in the joint discussion because we don't develop army capabilities for the army, we do ultimately provide it to the joint commander and the coalition commander and then thinking a little more imaginatively, was eluded to in some of the earlier comments, how are we enabling ally and partner capabilities. how can they close the gaps in areas whether legally or financially we can't do it. but industry can do that, industry gets the little ham strong and processes, maybe through f ms in some capacity.
we deliberatery close that gap so that's a little bit of way and means to kmod rating that report and hearing these comments. >> doug? >> sure-of, i don't have a lot add. one, i see it putting a restraining hand on the army in terms of a big push in modernization, is that the army's in a war now. a war in the greater middle east has a lot of soldier in it. and that's something that army leadership can't take their eye off, the potential for escalation there. they're also staring in the face a potential war in north korea. again, that's the kind of thing the chief has to balance out.
what's specific to modernization, i would just offer, one additional thing and that's the army is pulled in many directions of the diversity of its missions that it has under different plans. it has been hard for them to focus. in the army's defense, one reason it's been difficult to focus is because of the lack of political leadership, giving them priorities. so in the absence of that, from administrations that haven't paid a lot of attention to the army really, the army has to try to do everything and that's very difficult. makes it very difficult to do what you're talking about. so more political leadership across the board to tell the army what to focus on and where to take risk i think would be a big factor in helping the army achieve more coherence in its modernizations plans. the last thing i'd mention, andrew regarding to your report,
i think the capability areas are good ones. i'm sitting here looking at it though thinking of where the money would come from. the money's spoken from and it's not in those things, largely. so if you look at the palms, that eat up a lot of money, aviation platforms eat up a lot of money. they're going to simply have to move a lot of those things. it's something that require the chief, civilian leadership, secretary massty working with congress to achieve, it's doable. members across the board support the army broadly but the army has had a hard time when it come to specific programs as you've pointed out. >> the neaa has passed the house. it set out an approach to
funding in particular, the general and the army in particular well above the b.c.a. caps and yet those caps are still allow. so, is there an end game here? i admit my crystal ball doesn't show me one where we get to change in the caps. is it really lisk really? i think we can sit here and say if the army was told you need $10 billion to your modernization but you get no more for your top line, that has an undoable task for a reasonable person. therefore somewhere probably there needs to be some kind of uptick to get there. are we on a path towards increase? the house bills passes a lot of wages, which is encouraging, it's not clear to me if it gets it to the end. or when it's getting us to. >> be very kaufcareful, unlike
senator collin i am not elected. i think there are some resources for defense, but that doesn't answer anything that was mentioned by the senator at the table. i'm hopeful and i have been for seven years now that a new kind of -- a new version of what we've seen in the past where if we can't get rid of the budget control act we defer its effects, perhaps a little longer this time, two year deal. i believe a lot of republicans didn't want that. i think my boss ranking member smith and chairman thornberry had some thoughtful exchanges on the floor about that and that really lays out well attention. that's all to be determined the end game, this fall. we'll see. >> i'd like to ask the whole panel, and also feel free to
talk about funding if you'd like, talk about timing. one of key things that drove us to the conclusions that we reach was the fact that due to the some of challenges we discussed today. we think the army needs to do some modernization quickly to regain an advantage taz opinion eroding. and search in specific technology areas that's true in particular. so that was one of the thing that kind of enforcemented our approach of capabilities over new platforms because new platforms are hard thing to do quickly. i'd be interested in the panel's thoughts about time frame. leafing aside momentarily, although you can bring it in if you want, the question is is it realistic the army's going to get enough money to do something quickly on modernization. do you see the need for it and how do you pursue doing something quickly and you were king of the world and you have that choice? heidi you want to start? >> sure. this is a discussion i had with general milly before when i was
still in the pentagon. he asked me, why does acquisition take so long. i told him it's not that we don't know how to do things faster but all the statutes and regulations put shackles on you. you're asking to run an ultimate marathon, you sprinted but you have shackles on so you can't move fast. but here's several ways that can help us move faster, okay. our partner nations also have a defense budget and they develop capability that can compliment ours. we ought to be leverages our country's nation's capabilities and power, right. we have a tendency to design, develop, deliver everything ourselves, right. not invented here syndrome. so we could expedite things a
lot quicker doing that. the other thing is, instead of setting a golden bar for requirements, waiting for the requirements to be finalized, which takes forever right, and you can't get consensus on the requirements, one method of doing it is, this is a capability i would like to have, we're exploring it, industry tell me what is it that you have in this area, bring it, let us see what you have, let us test it out and use it. provide user feedback as to is this good enough for what i want to do or here are the knobs i want instead, okay. so, after you do that, then inform me what your requirements ought to be, right. but get the user's feedback into the requirements upfront, rather than lobbying over the requirement, you start from scratch and try to scratch a
head and how you need it. so i think that would be very available. the third thing that could help tremendously is, don't try to buy the same product for the entire army before you upgrade for the next file, right. look at global lauk, right. global hawk have multiple lots. each lot, from lot to lot was not identical. it improved every single lot. army should leverage same method dog. so what if the entire army doesn't have it, just an x number of agree gads have one, then you build a technology in certain -- lawsuot number two. so that's the way you with bring the hand of technology into a warfare far faster than the acquisition process, those are just the three ideas. >> there's a high sense of
urgency and maybe system of the things that -- some of the things that appear and could go better like the top chart of technology or statements that seem to not be in -- because i think the army fully recognizes its got some ground to make up, and it's not due to negligence of many different reasons and it gets minimum ld by high-profile systems that didn't make it. it's actively trying to do it and it's articulated in your document and others, things like the rapid capabilities office is a way to get at some things at a smaller thing. it's knot going to get us a new combat system any time soon but it's filling the gap that is fit into the capability umbrella than the single magic platform.
so it's having enough of that fenced so there's some freedom of intellectual maneuver and freedom of doing the prototypes, getting the people to use it and providing input now, and not seven years from now when it's tool to change it. and i think that commitment is there. it's -- again the army communicating internally into the community so it doesn't take all the regulations that are there, and in some cases making them -- making compliance even harder which doesn't do any -- which is not the intent of the legislation in the first place. so we got to do some internal learning to kind of greece the gears internal to the army, as well as ask for relief outside where it makes sebs. >> doug? >> i think congress has shown some willingness to support rapid experiment takes and prototypes theory when as a body
its convinced of urgency of a threat. there's a lot of lee way given when that urgency is created pretty well. and thauf done that already with regard to russia. so it can happen. one slight note of caution would be the army can get itself out of difficult situation if it resorts to an ineffort to speed up not doing competitions, at least of some kind at the right point and not doing enough testing. so, hopefully acquisition reform is not resolved on those two things, because the army could, despite best intentions, create a big failure. i think there is a willingness, especially with regard to russian threat these days for congress to support efforts to go faster, as long as it's done with some thought and they can make a sell. >> i want to open up to
questions from the audience. raise your hand and we'll have someone bring a microphone. we have sidney up front. >> hi, sidney freed burg breaking deference. referencing the chart of the army's top 25 to 30 priorities, and you mentioned this doug, the need to figure out its own course when there isn't a clear himself course. one of thing we struggle with, not to mention any one, what are we for fundamentally, what is your primary mission? we had a clear mig in the gap that drove the big five for example, we had a clear mission with counter surgtsy for a while. now we are looking russia, syria, afghanistan. to what degree is the army's problem, not merely articulating and prioritizing and communicating but actually
itself not being sure what it's for? not be clear on its mission therefore not being able to be clear on what it needs to prioritize? >> what i'd offer on that is many of you probably seen it, rosa book is a book out recently about how everything became war and the military became everything. and one underlying premises is, the distinction between what's more and what's not is more blurred than its ever been and the military is getting called in to fill thing that aren't what you'd call traditional core old school military missions. like invading -- and attack across france. it's not that simple to articulate it. and with people living on the ground, inevitably, if someone's got to go do something from the u.s. government, you know, a soldier has become the default
mechanism. doesn't mean for everything, obviously we need the tool integration of the whole interagency team and g.o. partners and allies and so forth. but, if there is a gap that the u.s. needs to fill, it generally winds up being some level of boods on the grown, military or civilian and we get pulled into things, and that leads away at the core things that the chief is trying to prepare for, such as a threat from a competitor. so, i think the leadership's attention, they know what they have to do, but their time and attention and engineer gets pulled to fill that gap that we don't have the political capacity and willingness to use that other tool that we have in the united states and the united
states government. >> i can just build or add on to that by saying, with the big five, the original big five there was a concept of operations that went along with that, it was air land battle. and that -- the two fit together right, and that was a big reenforcing function temporary what made a compelling case of the congress. so the question arise, as far as the big five or for anyone's new big five, what would the operational concept be? the one that has been much discussed referenced earlier i think by tom was multi demain battle concept. so far i like it, not sure i understand it yet. but what i have heard about it and read it with joint session discussions i feel -- what does it mean to you, does it seem like it is a compelling case r for -- that the army can build and construct a model program.
doug, you look like you want to say something so i'll turn to you. >> well it's an intellectually good effort by the army, the challenge it has when it meets contact with congress is it's not location specific. it's somewhere mirror fis where we have this battle against somebody somewhere. so, while it is a very important thing for the army to think through deeply, how to better integrate itself across itself, i think at this point it is not formed in a way that can make -- may turn the dial dramatically. however if you put it in a place, eastern europe, it gets a lot of attention. so i think one thing the army can build on is deputy -- the
secretary about work. a lot of that was about restoring conventional deterrence in a place that members care about. i think if the army can find a way to connect what it wants toto a political context the members care about, which is preserving peace in europe, in that case deterring russia better but being able to fight them for effectively if it comes to that, i think that's a big part of getting support for whatever they want to do. it's a thing that the army lacks because it's pulled in so many different directions and different places in the world where it has to be ready to fight but it will make a big difference here. >> right now i think the best advocate -- the army's best advocate for the army's multi demain battle -- that's the way he has to fight in his theater
with support of obviously the entire joint team. so it's providing a place -- and i'd agree, europe, doesn't fit into that dialogue or conversation that much. and if it's just the army talking about multi domain battle because it makes for sense to us and we're addressing some thing before, and if it's just a focused argument, it may provide better technical proficiency. but again, when it meets contact with people that have to actually support it, politically, financially and otherwise, that's the challenge i think we've got right now. when you kind of get into it, it makes sense. but there's no such thing of a 30 second commercial, it kind of conveys it to the senior leader who's busine
whose busy with 15 other important things. this initiative i got to jump behind it. >> other questions? sidney you get to go again. >> to pull the thread from the first half of today's event, missiles, i mean the chinese and the russians sitting aside the nine f treaty, and i'm generally confused by what a lot of these treaties do. but sitting aside those treaties, the russia certainly have a lot of land base missiles that are a major part of their fire power in lieu of having a lot of f-16s and 35s. does the army need to investigate in a missile core or a rocket artillery force of that
kind? and would it be helpful to have no i.n.f. treaty in order to do that? even so, been being confined at 499 kilometers because of the treaty. >> i think the army is starting to shift itself focus there, we have a rocket artillery core, we've them the units for a long type. i think some of what the chief has talked about in terms of testimony is -- fore structure and capability. in a european context the 499 is less limiting than it is in a pacific context. so it depends on the army again getting some guidance on where it focuses separate. the challenges i mentioned earlier that's going to compete with all the other modernization projects, dramatic change in the
army's top line. i think the army is putting a lot of emphasize there, there's a lot of potential under 499 to make the army what has much ber. so i think that's what the army's focused on right now, leaving the big political question to others. >> i want to add to that if i may. so when this discussion occurred i was still in the pentagon, and it comes down to every discussion -- every discussion comes down to well, how much money do i have to build the capability that i need. does it have to -- so literally came down to, is it just a replacement to give you better range or do you literally need more capability than just greater range? because you want to counter targets that may maneuver at end state. it is a totally different type
of missile than a dome missile that can flight ballistically to counter someone else. so a lot of the discussion was being debated, and a.o.a. was in process when you left, i don't know the end results of that analysis. it was purely driven by the budge decision unfortunately, goes back to what doug said, need more money if you want greater capability. >> what's interesting -- >> i do want to add one more thing. the pay trend baatal yant is really stressed out to the max. so we need more of that -- >> i think -- air and missile defense and rock artillery for
example, which would be long the lines of what you're representativing. we'll see. >> on the earlier point that you meed, what is the answer to your question on -- do we need more range or more capability, what the if the answer is yes? i'm thinking of what the knave was doing its a.o.a. for drones coming off the couriers was going to be a strike asset, an asset that provided fuel, and i think we have been in that exercise for at least five years now, figuring out. and the answer to all of them is probably yes. so, you talked earlier heidi about a process of doing requirements that will allow you to make progress without necessarily having, you know, the 20-year answer in hand when we start. and, do you see that -- is there an application of that same idea to this question about integrated fires as well?
or how would -- is there hope that we could do that? >> oh, boy, is there hope. i think what's tough for the army is because its portfolio is far broader than the navy and the air force, okay. we have two to three or more products. so you have demand on the modernization, everybody's portfolio is important. so, as a result, without increasing the top line enough, everything is driven by, do i have enough budget to do that. and then what happens is, you
just marchly upgrade systems. so the right lane is to counter these threats and see where the threats are evolving to. will the army get enough money to literally do this, i don't know. right. because if the focus is going to be already as a manpower, you're not going to have enough modernization budget. right? your top line can't accommodate it. i can always hope. >> it's a related problem that's been talked about a lot. it's the persistentsy and predictability and conflicts over years because these thing don't come over night. the program is like an undernourished person that's been that why for eight to ten years. and not because, you know benevolence or evil when hard decisions were made but it's been exacerbated by budget control act and ongoing
continuing resolutions. so if there was some mystical giant pot of money that became available, which isn't, but just a pot experiment that we had all the money to buy the stuff that we modernized in those strategies, it's going to take time to regain a viable modernization program that's adaptable to those changing threats. so it's -- it's going to take as long to get out of this as it took to get into it. and it's sort of like the plane has been coming down to the ground and now it's starting to turn around due to a hero of efforts and a number of places, but to get back up it's going to try as to the take as much effort as it will take to get down here. >> well, dan i think you're going to get the last word. i want to thank our audience for joining us it's a great discussion. i hope you all find and read the
report it's john line. for those here in person we have copies as well. and please join me in thanking our panel for a great discussion. [ applause ] president trump tweeted about the debate
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