tv U.S.- South Korea Relations and North Korea Nuclear Program CSPAN October 2, 2017 9:53pm-10:54pm EDT
statement. in the extreme. in fact, according to to a research it was the driving force on the right side of the political spectrum. >> sunday night, on q and a. new york times contributing writer talks about his feature story down the bright bart hole. >> i think it is really what gets to the disparity between the way i always heard people talk about and continue to hear people talk about bright bart has a hysterical, shoutty machine for creating offense. much more sort of antidime, reality of the news organization. as it functions on a day-to-day basis. sunday night at 8 eastern on c-span q and a. >> next to look at u.s. south korea relations and the potential threat of north korea's nuclear program. a panel debated how the global community should approach north
korea. hosted by the center for strategic and ente strategic and international studies. >> the north korean nuclear crisis. for this panel, we could not have put together a more impressive panel. a wealth of knowledge and experience on the panel. academic and policy. it's an honor to have this discussion with you guys. i think it's not an examination race to say, if anyone has been following north korea for a while. there's always been crisis of some sort between the u.s. and north korea, south korea. we've had various crisis here and there, i feel like, at least
for me the current state seems different. with north korea, two icbm tests in july, the six nuclear tests that followed. and north korea has been close to completing the nuclear program, catering to their capable where they can attack the united states and it wasn't in the sense that it's not acceptable. it's a sense of urgency, that something new and different, whatever that is needs to be done about that. and, of course, we have president trump, who has increased the rhetoric against north korea, i'm sure everyone has seen his speech at the united nations, calling kim jong-un rocket man and threatening to destroy north korea, and, of course, kim jong-un following up with a personal statement, personally,
i have not seen such a personal statement, first person with his name. just everything becomes so personal, and the north korean foreign minister following up with a threat to do another nuclear test, this time over the pacific ocean. even today earlier with more threat to even possibly shut down one of our bombers, i think in the middle of all this, i don't think it's a majority, but to be very candid, there are voices out there who are advocating a preempting military action. or more accurate, military action. this is the state of the current state of play here. and to help us sort of go through these issues, we have these panelists, and none of these, no one here needs full introduction, you all have their
bios in the program, i'll do a brief introduction so we can get on with the discussion. this brief introduction, we have professor young. professor kim is a member of the policy advisory committee. and sitting next to professor kim is ambassador lippor. widely popular u.s. ambassador to south korea. i think one of the many reasonables he's so popular. he embraces all things korean, even his love for korean food, learning the language, and giving his children korean names, et cetera. sitting next to him is ambassador galucci, a distinguished would h professor at georgetown university. serving various government
positions. including special envoy for the state department. also, chief u.s. negotiator in the early 1990s next to me i have the vice president of research, a premiere independent think tank he also served as a senior adviser during the kim jong-il administration. tremendous experience and knowledge in the panel. we're fortunate. how this is going to work, i'm going to ask each panelist to give brief opening remarks. we'll use that as a spring board for further discussion. i'll open it up for questions from the audience. let me ask all of you two basic questions.
we're talking about alliance. first on the alliance. given the current state of tension, and given that president un is -- does this new tension mean that u.s./south korea alliance is getting stronger as we talked about earlier? and what are some of the challenges and opportunities for both administrations in terms of north korean policy. and if the koreans can talk about the administration, the americans can talk about the trump administration secondly, i think a big mac row question on north korea. particularly, given the two icbm tests in july and where they're headed. are we reaching or have we already reached a critical
threshold that requires a different type of response? whatever that is. what would that be, so if you could comment on what you think should be the path forward. in terms of practical, practically speaking, where do we go from here, where we are today. >> would you like to start? >> me? okay. thank you for having me here. i was higher three weeks ago, i don't know what i can add at the moment, about the second question. i'm a little concerned about the peaceful resolution -- of course, we are trying to have diplomatic resolution by enforcing sanctions and the military exercise, those things have not prevented north korea from doing the things we don't want them to do. north korea is determined to have the completion of the
nuclear program. why we are bringing these efforts to the table, maybe we have to think about how to live with a nuclear north korea if that's the case, we have to think about how we're going to upgrade our posture in a more comprehensive way. we're talking about the missile defense, is it good enough to defend south korea. one battery, how many batteries do we need? we have to think about a totally different war. not just externally, but internally. one of the factors which contribute to the legitimacy of kim jong-un, he's heir of the family. he's legitimizing his rule as the north korean leader, it's
almost impossible for him to give up nuclear weapons. i'm a little pessimistic about the project. at the end of the day, maybe north korea can gradually give it up, he will take a long time. that's my first response about whether this is between president un and president trump of course maybe we can say united states tilting more toward the military options. after seeing a series of provocation of north korea. they've become much more tilting toward more pressure. he's talking about pressures and sanctions, and it's clear it's not the right time to talk about north korea. we have north korea's response.
he has no intention to approach north korea independently from the other side. because actually, he's not seeking autonomous approach in handling north korean problem, despite a proposal, a two proposal, actually, one is nuclear options, the other is a humanitarian dialogue, at the moment, he has not stated any strong desire to follow the proposal he made on july 17th. on the other, koreans have become much more concerned about the possibility of military options. regardless if you are conservative oar progressive. still actually, we should not drop any kinds of military options. in korea, you see all the
options they're talking good preemptive strike or decapitation. below that level, we have various options, we have not built any kinds of options. it will neutralize the military utility of wmd. to a certain degree, that's why there's a constant demonstration of force by the united states. sometimes jointly. we have to think about, what kinds of day tant measures are necessary to enhance our position. there's a way to deliver assurances to the public. and clear message to north korea. >> thank you. >> thank you. i'm frankly confused by the current situation.
because the way i look at it, and i'm confused, i was talking to a colleague a little bit about ago. i was trying to capture what it is that -- what is this current situation similar to in all of our experience. in that what i'd liken it to is when you watch the television, and you hear, you see a picture of somebody living in a beach house in florida or houston or some place, and the national weather center is telling you there's this category 23 hurricane about to come up and everybody should leave, and they're drinking martinis and hanging out. nobody's going anywhere. and you say, well, what? there are people evacuating, but they're staying put, it's okay. so that's -- and you wonder, well, what are they thinking, i've never lived in a beach house, so i don't know, but i do
have the feeling now -- and sumi you said today, many of you must have heard your young hosts say that he took -- or his government took the words of the president of the united states as a declaration of war. when is the last time you heard a country's foreign minister say that your president had declared war on his country? and if you didn't get the significance of that, he then went on to say that that would mean that even over international waters, we might shoot down american aircraft, which he knows and you all should know, we have flown for the first time in a couple decades, north -- you know, this is a bomber, b 1 with fighter escort, north of the 38th parallel, and let's have another martini. i mean, there's no -- i have not heard the words -- some people in this audience will recall
them from 1994 when we got a blistering cable in from -- it's known in the state department as the luck laney cable. that was general luck and ambassador laney. sent in a cable essentially asking whether we in washington were nuts? with what we were doing and planning to do in june of 1994, and we hadn't started neo operations. that's to get dependence in all hours and out of korea. that's a couple hundred thousand people out of seoul. we weren't behaving consistent with the level of threat we were beginning to define in washington. this is going on now for some months, and people have said extraordinary things. they're not random people, we're talking about the president of the united states. the leader of the dprk.
and yet we're leaving everybody in place. and i think we are -- so my contribution here, i think we are within hours of a military exchange. within hours, i may have misunderstood, and it wouldn't be the first time, if there's a splashdown of irbm's around guam, if there's a test of an icbm at range instead of altitude. if there is even a brushback of u.s. military aircraft of some kind, i think it's quite plausible that the secretary of defense wasn't kidding when he said certain things happen, it will be game on. and tag will certainly appreciate what that phrase means, and certainly everybody else should too.
what i'm expecting, in other words -- and i want to say, i will not be surprised if the hurricane doesn't hook right and miss us entirely, if we get hit by this hurricane, i don't think anybody should get up in the morning and say, how could that have happened. now, i don't want to completely ignore your question. but -- so what does this mean for the alliance? i noticed that president moon said something like -- and somebody here, maybe you all can correct me, something like, the united states has assured him that we will not act in it a kinetic way. no, he didn't say that. but in a kinetic way, without first getting approval from seoul. certainly consulting, the consulting is a soft word. but approval is another word.
there might not be time. what i'm saying is that i think -- to go through a crisis like this and have nothing happen, i think is terrific for the alliance i think to go through a crisis like this and have it tested where we strike, and our allies is the most probable to suffer is most probable. provocation happened from the north. and nothing happened on our side. that would also stress the alliance. and i want to say finally that i hope we can avoid saying that kind of thins that have been said i think most sharply by a guy who used to work in the white house by the name of bannon, who said, there is no military option.
ladies and gentlemen, there are many military options, there is just no free military option. there's no military option which is without risk. if someone is without military options, i would argue it is the dprk not the usa. we have a lot of thijs we can do. we cannot assure they will not produce very negative consequences. and that had test the alliance. >> thank you for sufficiently scaring us. hopefully you have something more uplifting to say? >> i have a little more of a glass half full assessment, i would say this. as tom and sandy know well, when you're the ambassador, you're charged with maintaining the bilateral relationship, and what
ends up happening is that you manage -- what you try to do is manage through the disagreements, because you're never going to disagree or never going to agree on anything, you're two sovereign countries, two different peoples all of that, you try to accentuate the positives, you're trying to take stock of where the alliance is, what i would say is, on north korea policy, a couple points. what's interesting is that north korea policy has dominated the alliance, right? i would say toward the end of the obama administration, we were obviously very focused on the north korea threat. rightly so, and i think president obama would tell you upon leaving office, it was the number one -- or right there with isis, he had held that view for some time, i think the question is, we were looking at that, but obviously looking at all the other facets of the bilateral relationship. one of which flaired up in the news a week ago.
which the trade relationship. the economic relationship. what i would say is on the north korea situation, what it has done, it has drowned out a lot of the other elements. in terms of bandwidth, and i always say that the scarcest commodity in washington is the time attention and energy of senior policy makers, and it's rightly fixated on the north korea threat. probably at the expense of some other facets that are important and really critical to the livelihood, peace and prosperity . so i think that's one point that you do see this interesting and again i agree with you. you see this real focus on north korea. rightly so. remember you just there are only so many hours in the day to work on the issues. the second is taking a part north korea to unpack north korea. i don't see a lot of daylight in north korea policy. and president trump administration. at least right now.
three, four months ago there might have been potential. i would say they're on the same page in terms of pressure and negotiate. in terms of what i would say in the defense sphere in terms of communication through military channels. through capability upgrade. you don't see major issues there. and what i would say is they're being fairly creative in terms of military thinking, posture, planning. you don't see a lot of rifts at least out wardly so. what i would say there is general alignment. and i think the question is couple of things. one, how is this going to hold up over time. two, i think the u.s. does need some of the people in place to help manage these alliances.
you can only manage these at the top for so long before you start to see cracks or dropped balls. this is not a situation for dropped balls. and three what i would say finally, there is i would say a general agreement on the assessment. which i think is important. which is i think they think kim jong un is not his father. it's a different situation. the situation is very dangerous and more more dangerous than it was five to ten years ago. finally let me say in terms of the other facets of the alliance. because we would talk about other elements. that would include the economic relationship. working for five and a half years or at least on and off as a private citizen. the jury is still out. we have to see where we are in the other elements. those are important elements going forward. rightly so north korea has been
in focus and in sharp focus because it is a serious and dangerous problem. >> hello everyone. you already notice i'm kind of the new face here. and at least the famous and least known person here. i was a member of the foreign policy team in 2012. election campaign. and of course it was we failed. and 2016 i rejoined. and concerted him. regarding foreign policy. that's why i'm invited here. social security the second time. i have to go back tomorrow because i'm teaching tomorrow. i don't have any position right now. i'm fear in a way to criticize.
i'm freer to criticize. and i want to state freer to do that. to give a constructive criticism. it might sound different from my opinion. from other people. so i'll give three points. and maybe i could go over little bit longer. bear with me. i think we all might have to confess we reached the point that nowhere north korea is the nuclear state. we cannot accept it as a state of policy. and kim jong-un is different from his predecessors.
it's about gaining nuclear capability. it is a little exaggerating things, but it's not a total empty post. and he is in on his pace. and it doesn't want to have dialogue now and it's not going to rush for dialogue until completion of nuclear development. and north korea may not be solvable at this moment. and for the time being. but at the same time, we all know we cannot accept this situation. and accept that north korea is a nuclear state. as a state of policy. and what do we have now? everybody says, especially leaderships talking about all options on the table and military options. to me, it's unthinkable.
and majority at this moment many people share the opinion that increase the pressure over north korea. and increase the capability, deterrence capability until what? until north korea is giving up or collapsing. or coming to the table with that. i don't think it's possible in the near future. and having said that, right now, everybody knows candle light demonstrations. he's sandwiched by conservative ends, he's a supporter. i'm kind of in between progressive because i can now fully criticize him right now, but progressives are really frustrated.
they expected him to be different. from the predecessors. and many people agree he has navigate a very narrow path. there's so many obstacles. and challenges and pressure from washington. and domestic politics. and although moon has not done much on ebb gaugement issue, yet, but still the widespread concern if not suspicions on his weak point. he even trump said his appeasement. the deployment become a litmus paper from both directions. from u.s. and from progressive in south korea. he's being sandwiched by these two. i'm really worried he's a losing
support base of progressives. and domestic audience becoming much more important in both countries. that's the issue here too. and although trump has pledged a top priority and outline has been provided through interviews and speeches and tweets. policy seems to me as influx. it's strategic patience or confusions. and why trump wants to differentiate himself in the name of maximum pressure and engagement, his policy has emphasized pressure with a little clarity on what conditions for engagement. my last point.
no question about it. trump continues to give mixed messages. he thinks by doing so creates additional leverage. maybe he's right. but too risky for south koreans. e he has to decide to solve the problem or to use the problem to accomplish other goal containing china or domestic purpose. because i think cannot have both. because china's help is critical. both as washington should continue to try to work with north korea because there can be no serious progress without china's cooperations. understanding china's interests
as leverage of gaining trust can be the best way to draw chinese commitment to solve the problem. i'm going to finish my comment by quoting jeffrey bather's recent report. the attitude of the public debate in the u.s. over north korea problem that obsesses over the threat to the u.s. mainland why ignoring the clear and present danger to allies on the doorstep has revived lock debates in the region about u.s. reliability in the face of china. >> thank you. so i have so many questions, but i'll just ask few and open up to the audience. just the follow up on your statement on how do we need to consider leading with nuclear
north korea. there's a debate here. i have a couple questions. first question has to do with containment. because we don't want to go there. we don't want to publicly extend the nuclear power and all that. i get that. but after all the diplomatic, if it doesn't work. and north korea. economic long distances. the big question is were containment in terms of traditional nuclear deterrence like it worked with soviet union and russia over 50 years have worked. i think there's a debate ultimately whether containment can work with north korea and given how little we know about kim jong-un's intentions, what his thinking is, how sure are we that how confident can we be to work with north korea.
and this second question is on china because we brought it up a little bit but haven't talked about it. in terms of dealing with north korea. china announced saturday it would halt exports of some petroleum products to north korea and stop um porting textiles and this is after and obviously this bares watching because we watch for a long time. and we have been disappointed over and over. long history of backsliding. the spotlight fades. so what is your assessment. is it tactical? is it hedging tactics they have always done? or is there something more fundamental going on that you're seeing? and one question for you. when you say he's losing progressive votes, i'm not quite
sure what are progressive expecting from president moon. he has reached out to north korea many times asking for dialogue and engagement. north koreas that are not accepting it. they are saying no, we're not going to deal with south korea. what is president moon supposed to do about that? >> containment, we have to think of the different posture is actually now why some people argue the nuclear weapons. upgrading the systems they have now so these options should be seriously considered by u.s.
as long as they keep developing the, cbm and provoking the situation. actually we have just started the real sanctions. by having 2375 but we have not gone to the level to be on that case. we can think about it. i saw maybe the people who suffered from that kind of comprehensive sanction. so we have been followed very now we are shifting toward sanctions. it's very critical. you remember. how north korea reacted. finally a second. how we can dry up. information influx sags in north korea.
that actually leads change. now people are popular what they call market of the economy. we have to think about how we can utilize or use the market of north korea. and the other i like to implement it. but that must be guaranteed. we cannot be sure about it. we can think about the views of international monetary mechanism. so those are things i can think of. a different way to approach the nuclear and missile program. china? >> >> first, my glass is half empty.
i think that we go to the point that you made, one can look negatively if you live in south korea at the united states' on the idea that we will be become vulnerable to the thort korea. current fixation with missiles made with nuclear weapons. a situation which the south koreans and japanese have been living with for quite some time. that would be a negative interpretation. i live here and have great affection for my country so i don't take it that way. a manifestation of a structural problem. problem, which we have long recognized with extended deterrence.
we had that problem as the europeans came to understand one of the problems that we have done with the nato guarantee. when the soviet union has extraordinary nuclear capability. could we still be trusted. would we trade one of our cities for their city. that question could be asked of us now. i think there are two things. one is, does our extended deterrence lose any credibility once we become vulnerable? no. we're still credible. i have a short answer for that, no. but the question stands. the second thing is what do americans particularly want or ask of their government with respect to the north korea capability to take one of those boosted or truly thermonuclear weapon asks put on an american city.
do they expect our government to stop the north koreas from this, as you said correctly, not a preemptive strike, but a a preventive strike to stop that capability. knowing that it not only would be catastrophe plausibly if not inevitably for south korea, but a second korean war. or do we instead of going that way and risking that, we risk the vulnerability of uncertainty of deterrence of the leader of north korea. so this -- i like this a as question for the american people. and fort for the president. i know what my answer is. i don't know what the american people's answer is. the third point is china. american presidents always discover china.
when they try to deal with north korea. and i'm prepared to believe that the chinese have figured out what e we want them to do. we don't nooen need to send envoys to explain that to them. however i would like an envoy to go and be as clear as possible about american thinking and behavior. and tolerance. expectations for my restraint under certain circumstances. that's what i'm all about now. not getting the chinese to act responsible in northeast asia. blah blah blah. we have been been there done that. and finally, sanctions. i i recognize there are different kinds of sanctions that we have a model in the iranian case ask sanctions played in our model a a key role and i'm prepared to believe that's true, but i'm noot prepared to believe we should fall in love with sanctions. i think sanctions can increase pressure and that may be good or bad depending on what we want to achieve.
it is not going to stop their programs. i don't believe this is even remotely possible. that it would cause sufficient pain that they may decide that if they could have that pressure released by negotiation they will have a fake one or a real one. they may get them to the table. if that's your objective, okay. you can have another objective, which is getting them to their knees, that's not going to. happen. we shouldn't make believe it will. >> let me take a stap at a couple of these. i would say on tactical nuclear weapons, i'm not a fan. i don't think it's necessary. i'm with bob on the deterrence issue. i think the american commitment is strong and real having worked at the highest levels of the pentagon.
we take these extremely seriously and put resources against them and we practice and are prepared tr them. they're real commitments. so i think that's the first one. the second pointed i would say, a lot of the arguments when you hear them about reintroduction on the peninsula tend to be around a trip wire. if we have tactical nuclear weapons there, there's a trip wire and the u.s. will be less able to be coupled in the event of some sort of threatening with nuclear weapons from north korea. the trip wire is there. it's 30,000 troops and all the american citizens. it's the treaty commitments. there's deep and abiding commitment there. so i would say finally undermine your moral authority. you're trying to get rid of nuclear weapons in one part of the peninsula, i think it undermines your credibility.
we are dependent upon the international community. i would say just on the american involvement, look i think if there's a silver lining here it shows that this crisis shows how deep committed the united states is. this is the highest levels of this government. very committed. i would say it was a bipartisan basis back through the obama and bush administrations. very sign yor senior level attention. and i would argue clinton as well. the point is i was at a lunch today and off the record so i'm not going to cite it, but a well known hand was citing polling data that's publicly available that shows americans continue to believe asia is the most important part of the world.
shouldn't defend if there's an attack against them. so not just the government at high levels but the american people are deeply engaged with this issue as well. >> questions just short absentees for the rep. like a conservative some kind of heading ground on nationalist sentiment because of the crisis. by north korea. president's moon so it's not the solution for the crisis. you have to understand, first, it's the outcome of candle light demonstration.
and the big problem is campaign promise is the different approach toward north korea. even don't consider them. as pronorth. they understand the grave situation. they understand why inclined to the hard line policy. the mixed messages from trump. they understand. i understand actually moon is trying to get assurance from the u.s. and make them understand. and moon might be the second coming. he tried to clarify and make him understand and get the assurance it avoid political sabotage.
and too much work. they know this is not the time for engagement, but at least they want moon to show some kind of positioning. and get the vision and persuade u.s. they were so happy that they are we are kind of leading role. we are entitled to have a leading role. over time it's not true. there's the point. and the mixed messages from the specifically three things. apaidment issues. and grams comments.
actually after having the un security counsel resolution. they used to comply. they returned to the old way of doing business. so i don't think china has made a specific decision. the preservation of the regime is most important national security interests. so i don't think they will push to the limit because they are afraid of the collapse of the regime. of instability of north korea. of course right now. china is complying with the resolution, by i don't know how long they can enforce and they can't enter the next level of sanctions. so i'm cautious about the chinese corporation enforcing the sanctions. but actually, the problem in
having china's cooperation is how farther willing to go. hour u.s. is going to use its power or influence over china. to do what it is supposed to do. >> well, right now, it looks like they are fully going to have a secondary sanction. u.s. government is committed to that. but since we're running out of time, i want to take some questions from the audience. and i'll just take a group. if you could identify yourself. any questions from the audience? there's a lady. yeah. >> my name is abigail dau sob. i'm a first year student at georgetown university. i have a question r for the ambassador lippert. ambassador as well as anyone else who would like to offer thoughts.
do you think there would ever be a a point in the future at which it would be reasonable and realistic to consider placing tactical nuclear weapons in south korea? and if so, what would that point be? thank you. >> there's a question here. >> good afternoon. i'm a research intern and thank you very much for the speech. i really enjoyed and learned a lot from you guys. i have a question that what are the other options rather than more the more advancive weapons or impression on the china with the north korea, what are the options left for south korea and republic of south korea and u.s. to deal? what initiative we can take for today? >> why you ask such a hard question.
>> i think we're all dumbfounded by all the questions and inability to answer. one thing we haven't talked about is generational. and i know it was rather intriguing that president moon had had said his dream was to take his elderly mother back to north korea to his home. he would prefer to live there as well. i don't know how long ago he wrote that. but you have that on the one hand. is that the progressive or we have not heard the word renunification once. and secondly, how many of the south korean young people feel anything other than just the security, military threat and are they just in their own other world. thirdly, how many people in north korea would be just
devastated if kim were to depart. is it kim jong un were no longer part of government. how many people would be devastated? >> i think we just have one more. and then we'll let the panelists answer. >> i have a question. my question is everybody agrees that china has a kilo when it comes to dealing with those issues. but it seems like everybody kind of read it's very important. but what if they turn out to be unsuccessful. does the united states go forward to impose secondary on china? >> so we have a first question on tactical nuclear weapons. maybe not now.
but maybe your question is at what point if maybe north korea has this capability to attack, at some point is that acceptable or not. the e second question is what other options are there when it comes to north korea. third question, last if sanctions fail, what is next? similar questions. i think you can choose whatever you want to answer. >> >> maybe i'll lump the first and the third together because they are both directed a the me. in a situation like this, i don't think you want to take options off the table. this is a dangerous, delicate and complex situation. you don't want to start ruling things in or out forever and ever or saying that you'll never do something. i think that's the first point. on tactical nuclear weapons, i would still say the bar is high.
extremely high for reintroduction, proliferation concerns, proximity concerns, your moral e e situation concerns. so i wouldn't hazard a guess because i can't predict the future, but i would say it's a high threshold. and you have seen ib creasing proximity to engage in secondary sanctions as well. that's something that both administrations, obama and trump, have been exercising judiciously because the issue at hand is if you do too much, one, you actually release all your leverage, and what you're trying to do is speed up the chinese clock. so you sort of implement the sanctions and that's all you have. but the second is that you risk turning the chinese the other way. as everybody here has said today, the chinese are a necessary part of this e equation. so i'll stop there.
>> it's a hard question you raised. i think from my personal experience with president moon, he's more like resembles more he's such a pragmatist to me. he's very progressive in certain areas. especially north korea. but after he became the president, i think he became more. so you don't have to worry about much about his ideological coverage. he's really pragmatist. the biggest difference here is. korea is the one who suffers the most. but has at least resource and leverage to solve the problems. so korea to be in the driver
seat, we need help from china and the u.s. both both countries have the leverage. so here's my ideas. get the leverage from the two countries and for the past 25 years, we never, many people said you adjust all the options. but we never used this pressure and engagement at the same time. so at this moment, it's not like saying that. we need some kind of relation between the three trilateral cooperation. not among u.s., japan and korea. but among korea, u.s., china. so u.s. and china is maximizing pressure. and they outsourcing to south korea.
i think that's the one inside moon i don't know. that's why progressive are arguing and asking moon to have a position rather than zigzagging to people. and about young generation, they worry about but many americans are surprised how calm korea and south korea is against this situation. maybe one reason is because it's been awhile. and north korea is always like that. we are really worried because of unpredictability from president trump. and nuclear bomb. so young generations prefer peace rather than unification. i don't think they care about unification at this point.
and moon cares about the peace, rather than unification. maybe outside they will be sad, but inside they will work ob it. any concluding thoughts? we're running out of time. >> >> i hope president moon stays with the current cause by enforcing the sanction. and upgrading by spending more money on defense. e he promised to spend dl 2.9% of gdp ob defense. so the sooner the better. he is going to actually preserve combine defense posture and combine forces command. so i hope he will maintain the current cause as we can. china actually i don't know is a possible to have a corporation. you say china's role is the responsibility.
china actually has led the situation. if they helped us and corrected, ten years ago, it could be better at the moment. helped us problem right now, china sees the nuclear program as a u.s./china rival. as long as they have that kind of mentality, it's almost impossible to have chinese cooperation. at the moment, china's cooperated. as i said, how far and how long? >> and you have the last word. and i'm sure he will have something to say. which is good. >> i would like to end on the proposal of a two-step program to solve north korean problems. >> okay. >> that's supposed to be funny. step one would be the judicious
application of duct tape in two capitals. step two would be an agreement to have fairly senior representatives of both governments meet without preconditions to have talks about having talks. thank you. >> great. with that, i think we'll conclude this panel. please thank them with a round of applause [ applause ] . >> thank you very much. we'd like to thank our panel of distinguished experts and everyone for coming today. hope to see you at css sometime in the future. thank you.
former chair and ceo of equifax, richard smith, testifies this woeek about the company's massive data breach. tuesday before the house energy and commerce committee. live coverage starts at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 3. also on tuesday, james mattis and joiseph dunford will testif on military strategy in south asia. live coverage of that starting at 1:00 p.m. eastern. al those hearings on c-span 3, online at c-span.org or on the
free c-span radio app. i always wanted to be a missionary doctor. i used to listen to the mission stories in church. and they frequently featured missionary doctors, people who at great personal expense would go. and it seemed like the most noble thing a person could do. and i harbored that dream from the time i was 8 years old until i was 13, at which time, having grown-up in dire poverty, i decided i'd rather be rich. so at that point, missionary doctor was out. and i decided i wanted to be a si psychiatrist. >> for the past 30 years, the video labor rath video library is your source. whether it happened 30 years ago