tv Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702 Renewal CSPAN October 13, 2017 8:33am-10:56am EDT
it's because of the data generated under this statutory authority we have been able in the after math to take data to use the information that we generate under 702 to go back to them and say we have proof that the individual that executed this has ties to isis. there are additional people involved. here is who they are. they are trying to mask the identity. here is their strategy because they want to use them again in the future. they want to use them in the
future to carry out attacks. it is in one particular country. the insight generated has enabled us to achieve insight from a cyber security perspective. we would not be able to generate some of the insights we would not have the same level of incite with cyber action around the world directed against our neighbors as well as directed against the u.s. structure. i hope one of the take aways when we talk about why this is so valuable it's you get a sense of how unique this is, the fact that it generates incites that have direct actionable impact. we are taking people off the battlefield. we are helping our partners take
people off the battlefield in terms of arresting those terrorists and those who would do harm. we are able to stop nations from moving to other parties, able to generate huge incites in terms of cyber security. i try to highlight to people this is why 702 is so valuable. it is this deep unique information we can't get via other means and it's the volume of this information and global applicability that makes it such a powerful tool for us. that's why we feel so strongly. hey, we believe it is in our nation's best interest to continue with the statutory authority that we think it is in our nation's best interest. we would also argue if you look over our track record i don't pretend for one minute we are perfect. i'm proud to call myself the
director and be a team of incredibly motivated people that work diligently to defend this nation and also safeguard the privacy and rights of its citizens. if you had the chance to sit down and talk to some of those men and women it is amazing the self-discipline, the focus on mission and ensuring the security of our security. we have to do both. ask them, can you help me understand your training? can you help me understand the controls? who can access this data? why should i feel comfortable
this data is not not being misused, that in some way you're using this to undermine the privacy and rights of our citizens. that is a diagnose log we welcome. with that i apologize. >> no. that's a great response. if i read sort of the trending out there in terms of criticisms to the program it's not so much at the front end of how you described as being used for disruptive purposes in attacks overseas and that sort of thing, but the incidental or inadd v ver -- inadvertent on by first baselining what it means to collect on u.s. persons inadd ver tently because of the
community because of the 702 program. that would be helpful. >> we are going to run into u.s. persons. that's the nature of the global telecommunications backbone. we all use our personal hand held devices. we knowledge that they say if you encounter what are you doing to make sure it isn't used inappropriately. the first thing is the law does not allow broad unfiltered collections. it first tries to by saying you can only collect overseas.
the second vehicle is that the law is very explicit. the law is very specific. it defines a set of circumstances. the law does not allow us to just indiscriminately collect anything we want. the law specifies you can only collect overseas against nonu.s. persons for three very specific stated purposes.
the law is very specific. so there is a series of protections built in. it is designed to stop the intelligence community from collecting any where it wants against any individual or u.s. person, can't do that. it is designed to stop us from collecting anything overseas. >> the word selector is used. what does that mean, a selector in the context of these three legal constraints on the collection. it is provided by u.s. service providers, we collect based on a specific set of criteria. you'll hear the term selector from us. what is a selector? it can be an e-mail address.
it can be a name. those are the most common. another protection, we have to be able to show that those selectors, those search criteria, they must be outside the united states, not be a u.s. person and be associated with one of these three specific categories for every single search criteria we select. another protection we put in place, no one single individual is authorized to make a collection request. we actually, first our analysts have to prove it is a non-u.s. person and it is for one of the three stated purposes then we have that request reviewed by two other senior analysts so that there's three individuals internally who look before it even goes to outside to actually
be met. if i could, let me finish the idea of some of the protections that are in place. it has the most checks and balances of any legal authority that nsa uses to execute its missions. some of the other kinds of oversights and checks and balances that are in place. the office of director of national intelligence has to put in writing, so how are you going to use this? what are the controls you will put in place to ensure that you're collecting in accordance with the law, how are you protecting the data that you then collect, talk to me about what training you're doing for your people and what oversights that you have in control to ensure the law -- we have to put
that in writing to the court every year. in addition to that once the court is comfortable it then allows the u.s. government to issue a series of directives that go to the providers that say so you will provide the u.s. government the following information for the following purposes using the following criteria. it gives the companies the legal basis upon which to comply. in addition to all of that we have oversight by both dni and the attorney generals team. we are spot checked every 60 days. every collection request we make is independently reviewed by the department of justice team. we have to inform our congressional oversight. we were reviewed by the privacy
and civil liberties oversight board. came back and said you are fully statutory compliant. we are impressed with the control mechanisms you have put in place. in addition to those things i have talked about we use our inspector general. we use our office internally. so one of the take aways that i hope is very structured, multiple checks and balances and multiple organizations in checking what's going on. it's not just us acting as our own policeman so to speak. it is external organizations in addition of what we do. in addition we have a series of protections in place. once we get that information who has access to it, how is it queried, how is it used or published in the form of reports. all of those controls are in
place. it doesn't matter how junior you are, anyone one of our employee to include me that has access to data must take an annual written test. there is a training program and you to take a to certify you understand legal frame work and the processes we have put in place. i take my responsibility as do the men and women of nsa. we want our citizens to feel comfortable that there seems to be a measure of oversight. there seems to be a measure of control. there is a regime in place to make sure this is not unilaterally used as a vehicle to generate information that
might in anyway abuse the privacy or rights of our citizens. on top of all of that there is a statutory requirement for us when we find problems or errors we must report them. that is in addition to all of the independent reviews. so for example we had publicly knowledged that we had stopped about collection, why? as we were walk through this process one of the technical solutions we had put in place was not working with enough ak cure si. we went to the court and said hey look, the technical solution is not working fully as compliant as we designed it to be. we want to court to be aware of that. we physically notified them. we have to notify the court in writing. after review i sat down and said
i'm not comfortable. i don't think that -- we will stop this and we'll recommend to the attorney general that we stop this collection because i don't want to do it even though i knowledge in stopping it we are going to lose intelligence value. there is an operational implication here that such is the importance to us of our ability to show to the outside world that we not only are fully compliant with the law but we understand its intent. it is to ensure the privacy and rights are not violated. therefore because we had concerns we stopped. it's not the way we were. don't get me wrong, our mission is to use this in a legal way to generate incites as to what
those that would do harm to our nation, what they are doing out there. i don't pretend for one minute that's what it is all about. it is also ensuring it we are doing it in an appropriate way. >> not to belabor the issue but and then proceed to write, talk accordingly. i want to come back to the u.s. person collection then with all of those layers of oversight that nsa is under inside the organization as well as under the surveillance act court. let's come back to the u.s. person piece of it. what happens when either there's a presumed u.s. person that's been collected on and what's the oversight? this is the more the half of the
equation. you have the data. what happens with that presume or known u.s. person data that you have? >> we have come in contact with the u.s. person and the data we collected you do a couple of things. first we ask ourselves is there a threat to life here? is there something that suggests this american person is under threat or harm? you might say what does that mean? it gets the things like hostage situations. we'll look to say is there something i need to suggest that there's threat to life here? the second thing we'll ask is have we stumbled into anything that is potentially criminal.
if the answer is no no threat to this u.s. person's life. we believe there is no personal intelligence value. we get rid of it. it doesn't meet the lawful intent of the law. we purge the data if the answer is no. if the answer is yes then we will retain the data and put additional protections in place. so if there's foreign intelligence value. it is that we will share with our customers.
>> it's not just an american citizen, it's anyone lawfully in this nation. it's a u.s. incorporated company. it's an association of individuals that are associated with the united states. there's a whole set of categories. it's much broader than all you guys care about is u.s. citizens. we put this in place. we hide the identity. we are not compromising. in some instances where for example the u.s. person is a
widely known public figure and it becomes very obvious who we are talking about because part of that is if you're in a very visible position it's a little different. so we'll do that. then we have a series of processes that are in place. some of you have heard this, the idea of unmasking. what is this unmasking thing? it is associated with our reporting, not with collection authority. it enables us to access information over seas against nonu.s. persons for three specific purposes. masking and unmasks are processes we put in place that it doesn't matter what the statutory authority is. did i get this -- we have a series of law that is authorize what we do. just as we mask to protect the
identity we also have what we call an unmasking person. we are an authorized individual, can request in writing the identify of the u.s. person for several purposes. number one it has to be something associated with the execution of professional tun duties. i see it refer to u.s. person one, u.s. person two, u.s. person three. it would be neat to know who these three individuals are. you can't do that. it's not enough. our process is it has to be on the basis of your job. you need this information because of the execution of your official duties. secondly, the next criteria to put in place is in your written requests you must also show us that you need this to understand this report. it's not just because it's interesting. it's not just because you have a valid need to know but without this you can't understand the report. what are some examples where
we'll unmask? companies, cyber security. we'll report that u.s. company one was hacked by the following country. here is how they got in. here is what they are doing. part of our responsibility is the duty to warn. how do you warn u.s. company one if you don't even know who u.s. company one is? one of the reasons we do unmasking is for example we can take protective action to ensure this information is provided to appropriate individuals. we keep a written record of every one of these requests. they are done in writing. they require the individual making the request by name. that's something that's changed over time as we continue to try to ask ourselves how do we keep improving? one is the request has to come from an individual, not an rg anization. it can't be the ci wants to know or nsa wants to know. it has got to be or national
security adviser wants to know. it has got to be a specific named individual. we want a record of everything and we have to understand why. we have been able to reproduce and provide that information to our legal oversight when they ask, hey, walk us through this process. here is how it is done. here are the rules that are in place. here is the written documentation. we can show you what's provided. the last thing with respect to this is when we unmask an identity we don't unmask it to every person who got that report. finally, when we do unmask it and we reveal the identity we also remind that individual you a legal responsibility to ensure this is appropriately protected the same way the original report was. just because we are revealing this name to you because of the
valid execution of your duties and you need this to help understand the intelligence value and to potentially take action as a result, we are al also -- we also remind them you can then sha re that informatio with anyone else. they remain in place. you cannot share this with others that we haven't approved. and that process to me is all separate from leaking, which is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. >> regardless. >> right. that is a crime. that is different from whistle blowing. whistle blowing is legally defined. there's a series of specific purposes and protections.
>> well, i hope that in the debate that's ensuing there is this distinction made of masking and unmasking. there is talk out there that combines the two things. i think it's erroneous. >> and it's very valid conversation. >> absolutely. in closing, you talked about the upstream collection and where the technology was and with this ever changing world in the area of technology and how it's moving at warped speed can you project into the future where this is all going from a technological standpoint and how does section 702 fit into that
as technology evolves. it was very dated and had to be renewed to meet the needs and requirements of the modern age i might even say from the 1970s, how do you see that? we'll close with that question. >> it's interesting. the current legal structure was amended over time because of technology. in 1978 when it is first passed the technology is largely copper based phone, one of the primary communication needs. >> with a really long cord in the kitchen. >> and we put a legal regime in pla place. now we are in the world of the
worldwide web, mobile communications. the technology has changed. the target environment has changed significantly. the current act created almost fen years ago to try to come to grip ws that. how do we try to adjust the changes in some of the target behaviors? we are in a terrorist fight on a global scale. so how do i see this evolving over time? i don't have a krigscrystal bal. the point i make to them is i don't know what the future necessarily looks like. the commitment i make is as we
see changes in technology, as we see changes in target behavior, as we see the relevance of 702 changing over time i will provide that feed back to our oversight so they are aware of it and we will work to ask what are the changes that we need to make over time? i'm the first to admit, over the 30 plus years that the rehas been in place it has been involved in the authorities that have been granted have changed over time. i expect that that will be the case in the future, given the nature of the global telecommunications environment. >> thank you for being with us today. educating the american people is critical as it goes in on this by the end of the calendar year.
thank you for the service that you provide and the men and women of nsa in terms of this program and keeping americans and our friends and allies safe because of how this is used as he mentioned in terms of his own engagements overseas as well. from the bottom of our hearts thank you for being with us today and giving us this opportunity to have this conversation with you. [ inaudible ].
so about a half an hour break. we'll return with live coverage at that time. while we wait for this discussion to resume we'll take you back to earlier today and let you hear some of the original comments. >> david, thank you. friday the 13th is not a happy day for washington fans. i think probably the audience is a lot of people didn't want to get out of bed this morning. what is kind of unusual here and a little bit threatening for someone to come and speak before you is not only did david grow up in the chicago area, chicago
married a chicago girl and we are trying to play down our excitement this morning, particularly since we are sitting in front of a crowd of fans. we fully understand that. just remember this, we have been suffering 108 years. so we know a little bit of your pain. i do want to say that i felt like i was in a win-win situation last night because spending all of these years in washington you have to be a nats fan. i thought i can make the switch
over for the rest of the series. it was a game that is going to kind of go down in history as one of the craziest games i have ever seen. i have an easy job this morning. 702 which is identified as really the holy grail which gives us access into the thinking, the minds and the actions of adversaries, not u.s. citizens, but foreign
adversaries it has become a tool by which we can determine and gain information about threats to the united states, about threats to our troops and weapons of mass destruction it is things that threaten the american people. the reauthorization of this authority is extraordinarily critical as we move towards the end of this session. we are fully aware of the fact that there are those who think that this is an overstep, that it invades their privacy, that it might not square up to the fourth amendment of the constitution, but we have taken
such extraordinary steps to ensure that we respect and that we honor and that we do everything we can to provide americans their constitutional rights, their rights of privacy and at the same time have in place something that is not designed inny way and has multiple protection to prevent us from competing in that privacy but is a critical element to keep americans safe she going he is going to explai you what it does do and what it doesn't do. he'll talk to you about how the intelligence community values
and respects the rights of americans in their constitutional rights and their privacy the incidents we have unclassified of letting the american people know the value of this particular authority that we have. it not only effects those of us in the united states try to go keep our families safe and try to go keep our country from harm but it also effects our foreign partners. as i travel throughout europe, the middle east, virtually without exception my counter
parts and intelligence agencies have said thank you for providing us the information that allowed us to stop the plot to intercept the plot to keep our people safe. several have said not only hundreds but perhaps thousands of our citizens have survived potential attack on their lives because of the information that you have derived from 702 and provided to us our allies. and those that are peace keeping countries that are at the targets of those that want to target them. so it has value beyond our
shores. as all of you know this collection is not against americans. it is against the law. we also know that there is some misunderstandings out there, some misperceptions of what the law does and doesn't do, what our procedures do and don't do. there is mischaracterization. some of it is a misunderstanding. others we hold to a whole different thought about keeping americans safe and about the breaches that they perceive. you need to know that the error rate on this, unintended error
rate forgot to be signed. it was delivered a day late, unintended errors throughout this program and we keep track of every one of these. we release all of this information to the public, to the oversight committees i can't find another one each year that comes in unintended. throughout the life of this authority that we have we have not found one intentional breach, one intentional misuse of this authority. that is a record that i think speak to the care in which we
impose. saying don't take the head of nsa's word for it. come out to the agency, walk down, don't sit through a power point. go down and talk to the young men and women, exceptional people that are working in this agency and talk to them. how do you do this? what about this? what about that? we have brought member that is have done a total 180 based on some of the narratives that are being spun out there by those that want to take away this authority is totally
contradicted by the facts. and look and be with the people that are exercising authorities we are up against those who frankly just have a total mistrust in government. they simply refuse to thing that government has any interest in keeping or keeping their privacy their privacy. i think i now want to maybe close with this.
admiral former in the public hearing before the senate collect committee on the intelligence. trying to determine who the bad guys are and how we can prevent them from connecting with either onnertives here or operatives from overseas. i ask the question, i said general alexander, i said if these authorities are removed, if they are not reauthorized, if they are compromised to the point where it compromises our ability to determine who is trying to do bad stuff on us, what is the ultimate result? in three words he said the ultimate result is americans
will die. that is a stark reality which we are looking at. the last thing we cannot do is compromise this program to the point where we get -- where we are back before 9/11. we learned a lot of lessons from 9/11. the bipartisan gave us recommendation on what we need to do to prevent that day from ever happening again. we know that's a tall challenge. unless we commit ourselves to do everything we legally can, supported by the courts, supported by every court decision that has been raised. supported by evidence of care and trust and doing it the right way, supported by all of the information we provide to the american people in terms of what we are doing, we have to succeed this year. it is the agencies, all 17 of
us, number one priority. it is absolutely essential if we'll deal with the world as it is and that world as it is is looking to provide great harm to the american people. let me introduce admiral rogers. he can bring evidence as to why this program is so critical, admiral. [ applause ] >> dan coats speaking earlier. the forum taking a scheduled break right now. coming up in about 15 minutes from now we'll hear from fbi director christopher ray. he'll focus on how to preserve
national security. that is in 15 minutes here on c-span3. right now remarks from mike rogers. he spoke about where surveillance fits into the counter terrorism efforts. >> so this same statutory authority allowed us to take him off the battlefield. the number two individual in isis we have been looking for him between 2014 and 2016. this was one hardened smart adversary. he knew that the techniques collectively, he moved without a regular signature. he was very intelligent who was constantly adapting how he commute and where he moved. because of 702 authority we were able to gain incite to an individual associated to him. that allowed us to track him and
we put him under surveillance. we attempted to capture him but he decide today try to escape and died in a fire. after an extended period of a multi-million dollars bounty on his head it is only because of incite that we are able to ultimately find him. if you look at attacks in europe we have been able to take data proceeded to us to use the information we generate to go back to them and say we have proof that the individual has ties to isis. there is additional people involved in this effort, here is
who they. they are trying to mask the identity of a couple of people in here. they want to use them again in the future. they want to use them in the future to carry out attacks. that was one particular scenario. the incite has enabled us to achieve from a sinner security it is with regards to the russian activity. we would without this authority not have the same level of incite with respect to cyber actions adds well as against the -- as well as against the u.s. structure. i hope when we talk to people about why is this so valuable you get a sense of how unique
this is. the fact that it generates incites that are direct actionable impact. we are taking off the battlefield. we are helping our per nrts take off. we are able to help nations. we are able to provide huge incites. i say this is why 702 is so valuable. it is a huge unique information and it's the volume of this information and its global applicability. we believe it is in our nation's best interest to continue with the statutory authority that we think is in our nation's best
interest. we would also, i don't pretend we are perfect. i am proud to be part of a team safeguard the privacy and the rights of its citizens. if you had the chance to sit down and talk to some of those men and women, it's amazing to me the self-discipline, the focus on both mission and ensuring the security of our citizens. it's not one or the other to them. it's, sir, we've got to do both. as you heard from the dni, it's one of the reasons we routinely offer and many members have taken us up on the offer, please come out to ft. meade. don't talk to me, sit down and watch the men and women who are actually doing this work. ask them, well, how do you gain access to this information? what kind of information is it? can you walk me through what are the protections you have put in place? can you help me understand your training. can you help me understand the
controls? hey, who can access this data? how do you use this data? why should i feel comfortable that this data is not, not being misused. that in some way you are using this to attempt to undermine the rights of our privacy and our citizens'. that's a dialogue we welcome. with that, apologize, david. >> no. that's a great response to a follow-on question that i had. if i read sort of the trending out there in terms of criticisms to the program, it's not so much at the front end of what you described as disruptive being used for disruptive purposes in attacks overseas and that sort of thing. but the incidental or inadvertent collection on u.s. persons. i think it would be useful if you could walk us through in terms of the oversight on that particular issue by first baselining what does it mean to
collect on u.s. persons inadvertently and incidentally, because of the communications that are captured throughout the 702 program. >> right. >> that would be helpful. >> so we acknowledge in the course of executing 702 we are going to run into u.s. persons. we acknowledge that. that is the nature of the global telecommunications backbone. it's the way this global system that we take for granted that we all use with our personal hand-held devices, with our own -- at home, with your -- if you are a landline user, via other communications, we acknowledge that. one of the things we have try tod build in -- tried to build into this is a series of protections to say, if you do encounter u.s. persons, what are you doing to make sure the information is not used inappropriately. the first thing we do is very up-front. the law does not allow broad, unfiltered connection -- collection, excuse me. the law is very specific.
it first tries to protect u.s. persons by saying you can only collect overseas. you can only collect overseas outside the united states. the second vehicle in the law that's designed to protect u.s. persons is that the law is very explicit. you cannot knowingly target u.s. persons via this authority. that is illegal. you can't use this authority to knowingly target u.s. persons. so that's the second protection that's in place. it's very explicit to us. the third protection that's in place within the law itself is the fact that the law -- this part of it is actually classified, but the law is very specific. it defines a specific set of purposes that we can collect against. so what does that mean? the law does not -- does not -- allow us to just indiscriminately overseas against non-u.s. persons collect anything we want. the law specifies you can only collect overseas against
non-u.s. persons for three very specific stated purposes, and i am not -- it's classified so i am not going to go into the specifics but the law is very specific. so there is a series of protections built into the legal framework itself that's designed to stop the intelligence community from being able to collect anywhere it wants. can't collect in the united states, against any individual, u.s. person, can't do that, and it's designed to stop us from just indiscriminately collecting anything overseas. >> let me ask you on that. just so -- for the audience. >> sure. >> the word "selector" is used. what does that mean? a selector in the context of these three legal constraints on the collection. >> so that's one of the additional protections that's put in place. we collect, by querying this data provided under legal authority, by u.s. service providers, we collect, based on a specific set of criterion.
in slang you'll often hear the term "selector" from us. what is a selector? it can be an e-mail address. it can be a name. those are the most common. another protection that's in place. we have to be able to show that those selectors, those search criteria, they must -- we have to show, be outside the united states, not be a u.s. person and be associated with one of these three specific categories. for every single search criterion we select we have to meet that criterion. another protection. no one single individual at nsa is authorized to make a collection request. we actually first -- our analysts have to prove it's an overseas target, it's a non-u.s. person and it's for one of the three stated purposes. then we have that request independently reviewed by two other senior analysts so that there are three individuals
internally within nsa who look at a query before it even goes to outside nsa to actually be met. if i could, let me just finish the idea of some of the protections that are in place. because i would tell you, 702 has the most oversight and the most checks and balances of any statutory legal authority that nsa uses to execute its missions. some of the other kinds of oversights and checks and balances that are in place. every year the u.s. government, through the department of justice and the office of the director of national tl intelligence, has to put in writing to the fisa court -- so, how are you going to use this law for the next year, what are the controls that you are going to put in place to ensure that you're collecting in accordance with the law, that you mthen -- we call it minimization procedures. how are you protecting the data you collect. talk about what training you're
doing four your people and what oversights and controls do you have in place to ensure the law is being fully complied with. we have to put that in writing to the fisa court every year. in addition to that, once the court is comfortable, it then allows the u.s. government to issue a series of directives, and the directives are very specific, that go to the providers that say, so you will provide the u.s. government the following information for the following purpgoses using the following criterion. that gives the companies the legal basis upon which to comply with the government's request for information. in addition to all that, we have oversight by both the dni and the tleattorney general's team. we are spot-checked every 60 days. every collection request we make is independently reviewed by the dni team and the department of justice team. we have to inform our congressional oversight about what we're doing.
we are reviewed by the pcl oversight board, reviewed the program in 2014, came back and said you are fully statutorily compliant and we're sprimpresse with the control mechanisms you've put in place. in addition to those things. we use our inspector general, our office of compliance internally to do other checks independently. one of the takeaways, i hope, it's very structured, multiple investigations and agencies. it's not just us acting as our own policemen, so to speak, it's external organizations in addition to what we do. in addition we have a series of protections in place, and so once we get this information, who has access to it, how is it queried, how is it used or published in the form of
reports. all of those additional controls are in place. for example, it doesn't matter how junior you are. from the junior-most employee to a four-star admiral. any one of our employees, to include me who has access to 702-generated data, for example, must take an annual written test. i take that annual written test. there is a training program, and then you have to take a written test to certify that you understand the legal framework and the processes that we have put in place. and every single individual in our organization has access to that data is required to do that. as i said, i take that test and i study for it just like everybody else. because i take my responsibility, as do the men and women of nsa -- there is a reason why we do this. we want our citizens to feel comfortable that, boy, there really seems to be a measure of oversight, there seems to be a measure of control. there is a regime in place to make sure that this is just not
unilaterally or indiscriminately used as a vehicle to generate information that might in any way abuse the privacy or rights of our citizens. and then, on top of all that, there is a statutory requirement for us when we find problems or errors, we must report them. that's in addition to all the independent reviews. there is a requirement for us to make sure we report. so, for example, we have publicly acknowledged that we have stopped doing what we call upstream about collection. why? because, as we were walking through this process as we do every year, one of the technical solutions that we had put in place was not working with enough accuracy. we went to the court and said, hey, look, the technical solution we put in place is not working fully as compliant as we designed it to be. we want the court to be aware of that. we physically notified them.
we have to notify the court in writing. and then, after a review, i sat down with a team and said, look, i am just not comfortable. i don't think that the technical solution -- i don't have enough confidence in it, so we're going to stop this. rather, we're going to recommend to the dni and the attorney general that we stop this collection because i don't want to do it, even though i acknowledge, in stopping it we acknowledged we are going to lose intelligence value. there is an operational implication here. but such is the importance to us of our ability to show to the outside world that we not only are fully compliant with the law but we understand its intent. and among its intent is to ensure the privacy and the rights of our citizens are not violated. and therefore, because we had concerns, we stopped. so i try to highlight that to people as, we're just not this indiscriminate, uncaring, it's just about grabbing all the information we can. that's not the way we work. don't get me wrong. our mission is to use this
statutory authority in a legal way to generate insight as to what adversaries, opponents -- >> we'll leave this here and return to live coverage now with fbi director christopher wray. pleasure to introduce to the audience both here in this room and obviously to the world out there the -- i think i can say new director still, and get away with that, chris wray, of the fbi. director wray comes from new york city, graduated from yale university in '89. makes me feel old. earned his law degree from yale law school in '92. he then clerked for judge michael lutig of the u.s. court of appeals for the fourth district. in 1993 began working in private practice in atlanta.
he began his department of justice career in 1997 in georgia where he prosecuted a series of cases on public corruption, gun trafficking and financial fraud. in 2001 he joined the office of the deputy attorney general where he served as associate deputy attorney general and then principal associate deputy attorney general with oversight responsibilities spanning the department. it's a rich curriculum vita, making him very appropriate for the job that he holds now at the fbi. without further ado. i'll let you make your remarks, and then we'll do some questions and answers. welcome. >> thank you. thank you very much. appreciate it. [ applause ] >> thanks, david. thanks to the heritage foundation for putting on this whole program so that we can have a better and more informed discussion about fisa section
702 which i think is southerrel needed. i am very happy to be here this morning and extremely fired up to be back in public service at the fbi. as david says, i think i still qualify as new. i still feel new. and i have spent the first two months trying to get up to speed on a lot of things, including section 702 and the reauthorization effort. i have also seen the enormous strides that the bureau has made in transforming our work in the new reality -- i still think of it as new, post 9/11. following the 9/11 attacks, the bureau and its partners in the intelligence community and elsewhere systematically worked to tear down walls that had prohibited or dangerously inhibited critical sharing of intelligence across our programs. i know that because i was there. i was there in the days before 9/11. i was in fbi headquarters on the days of the attack themselves.
and i was there for the four years afterwards. and the fact that we have not suffered another 9/11 scale attack is not just luck. it is the product of an enormous amount of very, very hard work and diligence by thousands of professionals. most importantly, it's a product of teamwork and information sharing and dot connecting by those professionals in the post 9/11, post wall world. with dot-connecting made possible, especially by tools like section 702. unfortunately, some of the potential amendments that we have heard about as part of this reauthorization discussion strike me eerily similar to essentially rebuilding walls like we had before 9/11. it's like watching well-intentioned people start positioning bricks back in the
walls again. perhaps growing complacent from the fact that we haven't had another attack. so what i would like to try to do in my brief remarks today and then obviously would like to have a discussion, is to talk first about the current threat landscape, which has evolved and changed since 9/11. second, the value of section 702 in helping us to stay ahead of those threats. and third, some clarification about what the 702 program is and what 702 program is not. and last, i want to talk about some of the potential real-world practical impact of some of the proposed changes in the 702 program. so let me start with the current threat landscape. when i left public service in 2005, we were still very much focused on the 9/11-style attacks, the kind of terrorist threat posed by al qaeda and groups like that.
that threat remains. but since coming back, i have learned very quickly how much the threats have changed and diversified. we now face a serious and constantly evolving threat landscape where travel and technology have blurred the lines between foreign and domestic threats. we still have enemies who are plotting the kind of elaborate, mass casualty attacks that we suffered on 9/11. that's not all. new technologies now allow isis and others to recruit, radicalize and direct people worldwide much more easily and more remotely than ever before, including right here in the u.s. home-grown violent extremists or lone actors who self-radicalize at home with little warning are also continuing to be a major concern. we worry that terrorists and others will be using, as we have
seen in europe, crude but agile methods of attack, from vehicles to drones, attacks that can be planned much more leanly and with fewer participants and executed in a matter of days or even hours instead of weeks or months. overall what that means is we now have a greater volume of arguably more compact threats and much less time to detect and disrupt any one of those potential attacks. a much shorter flash to bang, as the professionals would describe it. so that's a very thumbnail description of the threat landscape. that volume of threats, combined with fewer dots within each one of those threats to connect, and much shorter and tighter time windows in which to detect them and connect them puts a huge, huge and obvious premium on agility. it's one of the things that i
have also learned since coming back, the tremendous value of the 702 program for just that purpose, that is, that agility. as most of you know, after the 9/11 attacks our government worked very hard to figure out why we had failed before 9/11 to connect the dots. that's a phrase that should be familiar to everyone in the audience. as the 9/11 commission found, a major problem was our inability to take seemingly disparate pieces of information held by different parts of our government or even sometimes within the same agency and to integrate those different pieces into a coherent picture. since then, through a lot of hard work and a hlot of motivation by a lot of professionals we have succeeded in changing that dynamic. 702 gives us the lawful ability to connect those dots between foreign threats and homeland
targets. using information that is already within fbi holdings. i want to make sure people understand that. when you hear about the fbi conducting queries, what they're doing is doing database checks against databases of information the fbi already has, has already lawfully obtained. so query, database check, lawfully obtained information we already have. that's what we're talking about. that information, in our databases, gives us the agility we need to stay ahead of those threats. there has been some discussion about limiting the fbi's ability to access that database, accessing its 702 collection, which would, i am telling you now, would create a serious risk to the american public. every day the bureau, across the country and indeed across the world, receives tips and leads from lots and lots of different sources, from the public, from
other agencies, from state and local law enforcement, from our international partners. the tips and the leads are flooding in hourly. that's the good news. the american people rightly expect that we're going to take every one of those tips and leads seriously and figure out whether that nugget, that fragment of information represents something innocuous or whether that's the key flag of the next attack. to do that, to separate the wheat and the chaff, to figure out which ones are innocuous and which are the indications of something really serious at that early stage, with that sohort time window i was describing, we've got to be able to connect the dots from the different pieces we are getting and figure out whether that nugget fits in with something else we have elsewhere that causes that aha moment that's so important. and the queries of the fbi
databases, including the 702 database, is the first step in connecting those dots. those queries help us better understand the information, again, that we have already lawfully collected from a variety of sources. through section 702 and a lot of other means, by allowing us to cross-reference the information. that's what helps us prioritize and work the threats. rather than just randomly working one-off cases. and the only way we can do that is by being able to search our data when we get a tip or a lead. so, for that reason, at that early and critical stage, section 702 is one of the most important tools that we have. let me be clear. obstacles to conducting those database queries will put the american public at greater risk. obstacles to allowing us to conducting the queries will put the american public at greater risk. they're going to do that because it will either delay us when time is of the essence in
conducting those queries or, worse, in a lot of instances, prevent us from being able to look at all. that's going to blind us to information that is already lawfully in our possession. so let me talk a little bit about what 702 is and what it is not. there is a lot of misconceptions out there, and i am hoping that our discussion afterwards will help us go into a little bit more detail about some of these. let me briefly make a few basic points. first, what section 702 is. section 702 is a law that has been passed not once but twice by congress with strong bipartisan support. first in 2008 and then reauthorized in 2012. section 702 is constitutional, lawful, consistent with the
fourth amendment. every court has found that. and a lot of those court holdings, as well as the privacy and civil liberties oversight board have specifically concluded that those queries i was just describing, the fbi's queries, that practice itself, is consistent, both with fisa and with the constitution. so what that means is all this debate about potentially tinkering with 702, it's not the constitution that's requiring that. that's not driven by the constitution. the courts have uniformly held that both the program and the way it's being executed are constitutional. so a straight reauthorization of 702 would be fully consistent with the constitution, including the fourth amendment. so bipartisan support, fully constitutional. what else is 702? section 702 is, as i have
described, an essential foreign intelligence collection program for the entire intelligence community, including the fbi. but it's -- it is a target authority. by that i mean that the collection is only focused on specific selectors, like a particular e-mail address. and then one last point about what section 702 is. it is subject to rigorous oversight. oversight by not just one, not just two, but all three branches of government. i will tell you, from a practical perspective, that oversight is demanding. it can be pains-taking. it is certainly resource intensive. but we want to make sure that the program is working the way it should be. so we take that oversight seriously, and we respect that and embrace that. but that brings me to what section 702 is not. it is not bulk collection of
anybody, not even foreign persons. we in the u.s. government can't cast a broad net to collect information indiscriminately. and section 702 does not provide for that. it does not permit targeting surveillance on u.s. persons anywhere in the world. whether they're here or abroad. and it doesn't even allow targeting of just any foreigner abroad, even with foreigners there will have to be a reasonable expectation that the target will receive or communicate specific types of foreign intelligence information. now, the nsa -- and you have heard from admiral rogers already as the lead agency for the targeting part. one thing you might find reassuring is that the fbi only receives collection for a very small percentage of what the nsa does. so it's about 4.3% of the targets that are under nsa collection. but that 4.3% is
unbelievableably valuable and important to our mission. let me be clear here. when we run our queries that i have been describing we are running those against just a fraction of nsa collection, and the nsa collection itself is not bulk collection. and we can get nsa collection only for targets that are relevant to ongoing, full national security investigations. let me close by making clear that this is not an abstract or theoretical debate that we are having about this tool. this has real-world consequences. just to give one example. a tip under 702 from the nsa that was crucial in helping the fbi stop an attack on the new york city subway system. in 2009. just sort of stop and process what a successful attack on the new york subway system would
look like, feel like, sound like. 702 helped us prevent that. take a different kind of example. 702 helped us reveal the terrorist propaganda of an isis member, a guy named sean parson and identified additional members of his network. he was using social media to radicalize and recruit actors for isis. part of his network was encouraging followers online to carry out attacks in western europe and right here in the homeland, in the u.s. he was even posting the names and addresses of american service members. i just want to quote from his postings in case anybody misunderstands the seriousness of this. i am quoting from him. kill them in their own lands. behead them in their own homes. stab them to death as they walk their streets thinking they are safe. these are real-world
consequences. those are american service men and service women he is talking about there. section 702 helped us break that network, identify the people he was in contact with. so, given these kinds of potential consequences i am, as you might imagine, very concerned about some of the kinds of proposals being discussed in this reauthorization debate. any material change to the fbi's use of section 702 would severely inhibit our ability to keep the american people safe. i think back to the time that i was in government before on 9/11, right before 9/11, right after 9/11. i think about how hard dedicated men and women throughout the intelligence community worked to try to ter doar down the walls are connected us to prevent those attacks. as i said at the beginning,
listening to this debate right now, watching some of the potential ideas that are being floated, strikes me as eerily similar to people, well intentioned, starting to put bricks back into a wall. normally, the idea of imposing more restrictions on our ability at the fbi to do our jobs would be based on some kind of constitutional challenge. that's not the case here. as i said at the beginning, every court to consider this program has upheld its constitutionality. it's not because of the constitution. well, why else might somebody want to impose restrictions? well, maybe in the past there have been times when government has abused its power. so maybe that's a reason to have restrictions. but there has been no evidence of any kind of abuse of power under section 702, despite all the oversight i mentioned before with three branches of government and quite a few years of experience now.
so, the proposed changes to section 702 that you are hearing about are not based on a need to somehow make this statute constitutional, either as written or as applied. as i have noted, it already is. these are policy changes. policy changes based on personal views that people have, again, well intentioned views, and i respect that, on privacy. but as you can tell, my views are different. i think our responsibility, our role, my duty, the duty that people at the fbi and in the intelligence community, is that we owe it to the american people to use the full extent of our authorities that are consistent with the fourth amendment and that we be shouldn't be creating gaps and limitations in those authorities simply for policy reasons. one of the experiences i had in my prior time in government was meeting with the family members of the victims of 9/11.
and i am not going to look the families of future victims in the eye and tell them that there were things -- there was more that we could have done that was fully constitutional, fully within our licenegal authoritiet that we simply chose not to. i think americans rightly expect us to use all of the available information that we have and all of the tools and that he have that are consistent with the constitution to combat the threats that we face as a country. the fbi has made enormous strides since 9/11 to make sure that it's doing just that. so i urge -- i implore congress to reauthorize section 702 in its current form so that we can keep using one of the most valuable tools that we have in our tool box to keep america safe. thank you for having me here today. [ applause ] >> thank you for being here. thank you for your opening
remarks. ten weeks on the job. you have referred to the changes from the period of the first half of the decade. what's the biggest change that you have seen at the bureau? just in a general sense from having been in government, out of government, and now back in ten weeks in your current position? >> well, i think two of the biggest changes that are particularly relevant to this discussion, but they also happen to be two of the biggest things i have noticed, even independently, are in the roles of intelligence, the integration of intelligence and partnerships. so what i mean by that is, the fbi, in the '90s and before and into the beginning of the 2000s was still primarily viewed as a law enforcement agency. the fbi now, in 2017, the integration it has of intelligence into everything it does. its role as a full-blown,
respected member of the intelligence community, is like night and day to what it was during that period. i think that's in no small part due to the elimination of the wall between law enforcement and intelligence because it allows folks to understand how the intelligence is being used, what intelligence would be most useful. it's that merging of the two concepts that has made the fbi, i think, so much more effective as an intelligence agency and not just as a law enforcement agency. second, i said partnerships. i have noticed that, while partnerships were always important to the fbi, the degree of collaboration and teamwork between the fbi and the cia and the nsa but also state and local law enforcement, our foreign partners, especially the five is as they call them, has been a dramatic improvement since during the early 2000s. and i think that's, again, a reflection of the fact that, a,
the threats that we face are so cross-border but also the fac that -- fact that we're able to communicate, compare notes and exchange information and connect those dots. and so, i think the two things that i have noticed the most is progress, ironically -- i would have said that even if we weren't having a discussion. it ties well into 702 and its importance. >> you mentioned foreign partners. how does the bureau manage the sharing of information derived from 702 with foreign partners and, at the same time, protect, for example, the sources associated with where that's derived from to enhance, again, not only our protection but the protection of our friends and allies? so more on the partnership side since you raised that as one of the big changes, but it isas it applies to 702. >> certainly we exchange information related to section
702, although a lot of it comes from some of our other intelligence community partners and their interaction with our foreign partners. but even the sean parson case i mentioned, for example, you know, a key part of that was being able to exchange information with foreign partners so that there were subjects of interest in that investigation, foreign subjects of interest as well, who were being picked up in other countries and intercepted through that collaboration. >> and in the question of reauthorization, i think one of the issues that's going to loom large is this whole notion of 702 collection used for investigations of criminals outside of the national security realm. how do you respond to that in terms of both the oversight and the functional role that you have of ensuring that 702 is applied appropriately and in accordance to the law that admiral rogers so eloquently
laid out in terms of the checks and beealances to it. this is more on the criminal investigatory side than the intelligence collection for national security. >> well, i think there has been a little bit of myth development in that space. when we talk about sort of the criminal side, i think it's important to distinguish between the tip and lead scenario that i am describing, which is where section 702 is so important. and the prosecution end of it, where the information of any sort is being used. section 702 has not been used for any traditional criminal case as evidence, you know, in a trial or anything like that, ever, except in about ten terrorism prosecutions. so the notion that there are criminal agents using section
702 to make sort of garden-variety criminal cases, that's just myth. it is not happening. >> why has that myth evolved in the public square that somehow a law enforcement agency that also has an intelligence function, as does the bureau and, as you appropriately say, with the post 9/11 environment, having that intelligence function, how did that myth come about and how do we sort of beat it back from the public square? >> well, i think -- i am reluctant to try to get as to how people who are just confused get confused. my goal is to try to get them straight. at the access -- i said there were two phases. at the tip and lead phase it's important to think about how information comes in. you know. person x, you know, a private security guard or a police
officer, sees somebody at 3:00 in the morning taking all kinds of pictures of the key bridge. from all kinds of weird angles. that person who is taking those pictures hasn't committed a crime. the guard who sees it doesn't know what the person is up to. it just seems weird to him. we want that guard, we want that person, to call in and say, i saw this, thought it was odd. could be nothing, could be something. well, we're getting tips like that by the thousands. how do we know that that one is something that really matters? when the agent gets that tip, he runs a query in our databases. it's not just the section 702 collection. it's all 120 databases that the fbi has all in one place. one piece of which is the 702 collection. >> 4.2 -- >> 4.3% of what we get is in that pool. so the agent runs a query.
he is just trying to figure out what do i have here. if he gets a hit that finds out that the person -- let's say the guard gave a license plate. you run the license plate and you trace it to a person. so now you're running that person's name through the database. if you find out that that person has been communicating with a known isis recruiter, which is the kind of information that we have in our 4.3% of the 702 database. okay, now you have got somebody who is filming the key bridge who is in regular contact with a known isis recruiter. still may not mean that it's an attack, but now we know, whoa, don't let that go slip to the someday pile. we need to deal with that now and take a harder look at it and figure out how real is this. take another example. somebody at a, you know, some kind of supply store, hardware store, sees somebody buying some
odd accumulation of some product that could be used in an explosive device or could be used for something else. he thinks the person seems kind of squirrely so he calls in a tip. we don't know what we have. we don't know whether the person is an american or foreigner. we don't know whether the person is buying fertilizer or some gigantic lawn he has or whether he's going to build it into a device. even if he is going to build it into a device, we don't know if it's because he is mad at his employer or his ex or is in coordination with some kind of cell. at that initial access phase, the sifting of all these leads, that's when we need to be able to connect the dots. and that's where 702 is so important. we need the person to know what's the significance of the tip i have. what other dots does this fit with. and as i said before, unlike in the sort of more traditional al
qaeda scenario, we have fewer dots to connect. so these are fewer -- these are in many cases we are talking about home-grown violent extremists or isis recruits who are in contact with fewer people, so there are fewer dots that way, over a shorter period of time, so there are fewer dots that way, over simpler attacks but still very, very deadly to innocent people, so fewer dots that way. so each dot becomes that much more important to be able to connect. and the idea of just blinding the agent by putting some restriction on his ability to see information that, again, and i can't underscore this enough, that we already constitutionally have sitting in our own databases, the irony of it is tragic to me. >> mm-hmm. how often, if you could characterize in an unclassified setting, does the fbi come across criminal -- traditional criminal activity as a result of
those searches. and then walk us through the process of what you do with that. if you identify -- go back to the individual taking photos of the key bridge. and it turns out it's not a terrorist attack but he is planning to spray paint it, maybe, or do something that mars the property, and it's a crime but maybe not a terrorist act. what do you do with that information in terms of that 4.3% holdings as it applies to 702 where a crime is identified? i am not sure if my question is clear. >> right. i think there is some blur in there. so there is the information over here that the agent is seeing realtime in the u.s. that's the tip or the lead. and then there is the information in the database. and it's the connecting that's important. let me talk about what's in the database first and what isn't. what's in the database, that 4.3% is not evidence of garden-variety criminal conduct. the only stuff that's in that is
information about foreigners, reasonably believed to be overseas, for foreign intelligence purposes. so that's foreign intelligence information that's in there. it's not evidence of -- i don't know -- pick an example, you know, child porn or, you know, something else. could be very serious, but that's not what's in there. so, the agent over here, if he is a national security investigator, is connecting national -- something that he thinks of as national security information with foreign intelligence information. the criminal agent who is not doing anything related to national security, he is not looking to try to find some national security hook for his case. he is just trying to make sure -- let's say he has a cigarette smuggling case. one of the things we know is that terrorist groups have used things like cigarette smuggling to finance their activities. there are cases the department of justice have brought over the years on that very thing.
cigarette smuggling is a crime. if it turns out cigarette smuggling that's designed to support hezbollah, that's different and needs to be viewed differently. we won't know that if we build a wall between the agent and the information sitting right over here in the fbi database. >> there has been discussion about adding an additional dimension in legislation about warrant and probable cause of going further. can you describe for the audience what are we talking about in terms of warrantless and warrants when it applies to u.s. persons. so now we are in the u.s. persons end of the spectrum as it applies to 702. >> well, a number of things. first let me start with whenever i hear the word "warrant," i think fourth amendment. i am going to say this over and over and over again. every court to look at section 702 and the way it's been used, including the fbi's queries, has
found it fully consistent with the fourth amendment. and that makes sense. if you think about it. because what the agent is querying is not some new search. he is querying information the fbi has already lawfully obtained. the second thing i would say to me, when i hear warrant, probable cause, especially if you're talking about a warrant to be able to look at information that's already in our own databases that we lawfully and constitutionally obtained, that's those bricks in a wall. when people now sit back and say 3,000 people died on 9/11. how could the u.s. government let this happen. one of the answers is well, they had this wall. people say, how could there be this wall? folks, right now that's what we're watching. this is what building a wall feels like. well intentioned people when there is no constitutional justification for it and no abuse to be remedied, think,
well, what if we just put this one more restriction here, one more hoop there, one more restriction here, one more hoop there. that's what building a wall feels like. building a wall between the agents and what's in the fbi's own database. think about some of the hypotheticals and real-world examples i gave today. the guy who sees the person taking pictures of the key bridge. he doesn't have -- he is not going to be able to get a warrant based on that to search what's in the database. think about the person at the store with what could be a precursor. they're not going to get a warrant. think about an example, you know, one of the -- maybe near and dear to a lot of our hearts. high school student calls in. says my ex boyfriend has been making all kinds of ominous comments about his admiration for various mass casualty attacks. and let's say he lists everything from, you know, the awful shootings in connecticut
all the way to, like, the orlando nightclub bombing. all she knows is that he is saying how much he admires those people, and he has got -- let's say he has got a twitter handle that says like i am the angel of death or something. horrible, scary, worrisome, not probable cause. no warrant. so that agent who gets that tip, he is out of luck. he can't look if he doesn't have that -- if there is going to be a warrant requirement he can't run that search. now, maybe he could investigate. maybe he could get lucky. maybe, maybe. maybe over a period of time he would hit pay dirt. i don't think we should be relying on maybes. and especially when there is nothing in the constitution that would require it and there is no abuse by anybody in law enforcement intelligence community under this program that would justify it. it's just choice. just personal, self-imposed choice. when i say "self-imposed choice"
another version of that is self-inflicted wound. like i said, i have enormous respect for the people who have raised some of these possibilities like a warrant requirement. i know they mean well, i just don't think they understand the consequences of what they are asking for. tips when they come in, some people will say, oh, well, you could do it -- maybe you would have an exception for national security, but not if it's a pure criminal matter. think about some of the examples we have talked about. when tips come in, they don't come in with a nice bow on the top that says "national security," "criminal." they're not labeled that way. it's not all the round pegs go in the round holes and the square pegs go in the square holes. the pegs are coming in oblong. we have to figure out whether they're round or square, and that's what 702 enables us to do. so any restriction on our ability to access the information that's already constitutionally collected in our databases, i just think is
a -- a really tragic and needless restriction. and i just -- i -- i beg the country not to go there again. i think we will regret it, i just am hoping that it doesn't take another attack for people to realize that. >> and certainly in the kind of uncertain world that we live in, that's a distinct possibility of what our adversaries would wish to do to us. how is the decision on the 4.3 of the 702 data decided? why isn't it not 10% or why isn't it 2%? what, if you can elaborate on why is that so precise in terms of what's held, that moves to the bureau and not retained by nsa, let's say? >> well, the nsa still has it, right. so the way to think of that is the nsa has done all of this collection, and again, i want to stress, the nsa's collection is not bulk collection on anybody.
>> exactly. >> not even foreigners. so they've got their collection. we -- we're nominating certain e-mail addresses to be included as part of their -- what they collect. because we only ask for that information when it is related to what is our highest level of predication for a -- for a foreign intelligence or national security investigation, that just has a -- i think, a narrowing effect on what it is we would be asking for. so it's not that there is some magic percentage that we're seeking. it's just, i think, our own focus is what leads to it being a very small percentage because we ask sparingly, surgically and with emphasis on the proper focus. but -- you might say, well, gee, 4.3%, chris, that doesn't sound like much, so why is it so important. well, an easy way to answer that
is, think about how much havoc 19 people caused on 9/11. think about how much havoc one person caused in las vegas. so you don't need very many people for it to be incredibly valuable. and i can assure you that 4.3% is very valuable to all of the victims that could have been -- >> right. >> -- from that collection. >> thank you for elaborating on that. a question from the audience is, can you describe how the fbi uses 702 to fight cyber crime, which, of course, is a growing threat in its own right, as you look across the spectrum of cybersecurity. >> well, i mean, cyber, of course, now spans across everything from what a the lolo people think of as traditional hacking to cyber, ransom ware and various other kinds of activity and it's used from
everybody to nation-states, non-state actors, cyber terrorism. much like in the terrorism context, we are sending, as taskings, certain specific e-mail addresses that we think may be tied to cyber activity that is related to a national security investigation, and then that may lead to, again, just like in the terrorism arena, we are getting tips, by the thousands, and we need to be able to figure out which ones need to be prioritized. it's a similar concept to what i was describing in the terrorism context. >> i think your explanation about information sharing. admiral rogers talked about the russian cyber issue and the report from late last year that the community issued and how important 702 in its generic form, obviously you could not give us details on that. but that information sharing that crosses the boundaries of foreign and domestic, i am sure, is of tremendous value, isn't
it, in terms of seeing what nsa is focused on, well, you are addressing that as well. >> absolutely. that's true in a lot of different ways. just to pick an easy one to describe. lots of people are quite rightly focused on efforts by nation-states to meddle with our election systems. well, nation-states are doing the same thing with other countries' election systems. the fbi doesn't investigate interference with, you know, the german election system. but if there is information that we're obtaining about what's happening there, that tells us a lot about trade craft, methodology and so forth. i was on the phone just before i came over here with one of my foreign counterparts in europe. so that sort of comparing of notes is absolutely essential across all the different topics we talked about, whether it's counter-terrorism, counter espionage, cyber, frankly even
outside the national security context, we are an inter-connected world in a way that i think is more and more true every day. >> another question from the audience. can you tell us about the minimization process and how 702 information on americans minimizes and what does it look like in terms of the fbi in terms of getting access to it? >> minimization is jargon, it's term of art. minimization procedures are procedures that the fbi -- in this case we're talking about with the fbi. >> right. >> that we have approved by the court that allow us to -- require us to restrict how we use information about u.s. persons in the take that we get of the intelligence information. and there is a whole -- i can't describe all of them here because it's about 40 pages, but
i think the main takeaway for the audience is that these are protections for u.s. persons, approved by a court. if you think about all of this discussion that we had a minute ago about a warrant requirement, should there be a warrant requirement, well, what is a warrant requirement? a warrant requirement is a protection for a u.s. person approved by a court. the minimization procedure. we have those. they're 40 pages. they're very detailed and affect things like how long -- if a u.s. person is incidentally collected, it affects, you know, whether that information is redacted. you know, masked in the information. it affects whether or not -- how long the information is retained. it affects whether or not you asked earlier about could it be used in a criminal case. it affects whether or not it can be used in the case. all those protections are being fronted and reviewed by another branch of government, a court, a
judge, a federal judge, with life tenure, doesn't answer to me, doesn't answer to anybody in the executive branch. reviewing that with the information you get from the judicial review. that's why the minimization procedures are important. we put a lot of effort into crafting those, making sure that they're going to pass muster with the court and then adhering to them. >> and then the training that goes with it for -- >> right. extensive training. >> -- that goes with that. >> absolutely. >> i have a question that starts with, i am interested in the process. nsa discovers intelligence via section 702 and then fbi is made aware of this. there is a national security investigation. what happens, then, when nsa has made that discovery and then turns to the fbi? is that a phone call? is the data immediately passed? how does the process work by way of that information sharing?
what's the interaction? how close are the communications between the two agencies before and during an ongoing investigation? 702 related. >> well, i mean, i think the -- probably the short answer is all of the above. in terms of interaction between the fbi and the nsa. it depends on the particular circumstances. there could be phone calls, there could be e-mails. there could be other kinds of communication between the two agencies, if i understand the question correctly. i think that's -- >> would the bureau, in this case, and now i am adding to the audience question, place additional requirements on nsa for additional collection if it now moves into an investigation stage? in terms of additional data, in terms of looking for 702? in other words, there might be new selectors because the investigation is clearly,
hopefully, identifying additional dots as you have described them. so does then the bureau go -- reach back to nsa and say, here are some additional leads that we have, can you collect on that? >> well, yes and no. i mean, no in the sense that, remember that the bureau is only nominating selectors that, by that -- which sounds like a legalistic term, but essentially making requests of the nsa in the context of national security -- very specific kinds of national security situations. so, i don't want anybody to get confused into thinking that the fbi, in an effort to build a criminal -- some kind of non-national security case, is enlisting the help of the nsa to build that case. that does not happen. >> that's a very important point. >> that does not happen. what does happen is people in the fbi identify maybe a new e-mail address. they started to pick up on
somebody who is linked up to isis in some way and they thought it was these three e-mail addresses and how they get a fourth or fifth e-mail address related to it. they might supply that information and say can e-mail addresses. and now they get a fourth or a fifth e-mail address that's related. they might supply that information and say can you collect on that e-mail address as well. >> is there anything you see in your tenure so far that 702 does no provi not provide that you wish it did? this is thinking more proactively. the last question i asked admiral rogers was it took from 1978 to get to 2008 and then 2012. as we've seen technology change, obviously the copper wire of 1978 has largely gone by the wayside unless we double pay for our hand set as well as our land
line. how do you sort of see the future by way of where this is going, which may be another way of asking the question of what you wish it had or we need to be ready to see that it should have in terms of this legal authorization that we're not thinking about perhaps in the way that the world is going? >> well, i think my very high level answer to that question is we need to be trying to anticipate enough to be able to evaluate the way technology is changing in terms of how people communicate. if you think about the ways people communicate now and how different they are from the ways people communicated ten years ago, it's not hard to at least imagine and understand it's going to be different again ten years from now. the collection aspect of 702 is
really admiral roger's bailiwick and i'm enormously appreciative and admiring of his work. if he's already got a lead on that, i would defer to his expertise on that one. we're doing our webest to figur out how we can be more effective in using 702. folks, for god's sake, please let's not take a step backwards, which is what some of these amendments will do. >> we can only hope that for the sake of the nation that we don't go backwards having lived with the 9/11 convention and the terrorism act of 2004 and how vital and critical it was to move and hopefully stay ahead of our adversaries rather than go
backwards. i can tell you we're in a much better place today by way of the two communities coming closer together with proper oversight, with new concern to privacy and civil little bits. liberties. thank you very very much for coming today and helping inform the public on this vital issue that has just a few weeks away from coming to ahead. >> thank you to you and to heritage for hosting this event. it's an incredibly important topic that as you can tell from the discussions you've already had today, doesn't lend itself well to sound bites and one-sentence descriptions. there's a lot of confusion throughout, so having a thoughtful adult discussion is exactly what i think the country
needs. thank you for hosting it. >> thank you. [ applause ] . the family research council have gathered here in washington, d.c. for the 12th annual values voter summit. alabama senate candidate roy moore and steve scalise will speak to the conference. it's set to start at 2:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. on news makers utah congressman rob bishop, chairman of the resource committee sponsored
legislation to create national monuments. also puerto rico, wildfires in the west and the republican agenda in congress. sunday at 10:00 a.m. and again at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. everything was devastating for him at the end. he was really in some ways isolated and alone. >> sunday night author and professor at amhearst college.