tv U.S. Policy Toward North Korea CSPAN October 20, 2017 10:21am-11:55am EDT
your power back." she is interviewed by "washington post" columnist sally quin. watch on c-span2's book tv. next, career diplomats and asia experts discuss u.s. policy toward north korea. this comes to us from an event hosted by the carnegie endowment for international peace in washington, d.c. panelists discuss the role of regional countries, including south korea, japan, and china. this is 90 minutes. good afternoon. i am jim chauff, a senior fellow
at the carnegie endowment for international peace in our asia program. welcome to our event called weighing bad options. past diplomacy with north korea and alliance options today. the significant interest we see in today's event, of course, is attributable to the quality and reputation of our speakers and our panelists. it is also a topic that is foremost in the minds of policymakers in embassies in washington. what kinds of realistic diplomatic options do we have to prevent a nuclear catastrophe with north korea and how do we evaluate these options. today as japanese citizens unfortunately grow accustomed to missile warning sirens and text messages. it's worth remembering that a decade ago this month the second phase actions and the six-party talks were jointly decided for
implementing north korean denuclearization in exchange for diplomatic normalization and economic cooperation. this included dismantlement or disablement of north korean nuclear facilities, among other steps. a year later, however, the six-party talks had all but collapsed. this was the last major diplomatic initiative to address the so-called north korea problem. so today we're fortunate to hear from two former diplomats who were deeply involved in this past dialogue with north korea and who remain active scholars in the region. with our distinguished panelists we have an opportunity to reflect on events a decade ago and, more importantly, put them into present context, which involves new leaders, new technology and new balances of power in the region. if we tried to launch a diplomatic surge with north korea in the words of senator cardin on the floor the other
day, how might we go about it and what should we keep in mind? before i introduce our speakers i want to highlight our collaboration today with the u.s./japan research institute usji. usji essentially brought this opportunity to us so that we could become the co-organizer. for those of you who are not familiar with usji, it was established in washington as a non-profit organization in 2009 by japanese universities, currently nine preeminent japanese universities support it. the program includes research, partnering, networking and dissemination. i want to thank usji's president, dr. tanaka. thank you dr. tanaka of waseda university. i would like to thank the others
who helped put this together. featured speakers. chris hill and mitoji yabunaka. since 2010 mr. hill has been the dean of the school of international studies at the university of denver where he leverages the experience he gained as a career diplomat, four-time ambassador, including to our allied republic of korea. a member of u.s. negotiating team for the bosnia agreement. and america's enjoy to the six-party talks. ambassador hill, i give you the podium. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, jim. let me say what a pleasure it is to be here with these distinguished scholars and friends from japan. this is truly an impressive
group. and to be here at carnegie, which is always in the search for international peace, even when the subject includes north korea. what i thought i would do is maybe talk a little about where we've been, talk about where we are and where we might go. there is no question that the search for a peaceful outcome, denuclearized outcome is increasingly elusive. it was very kind of you to mention, jim, what we did ten years ago, but it now seems about a hundred years ago when you consider where we've come since then. indeed, i think there have been several efforts at diplomacy with north korea, and, like the proverbial sixth marriage, they are a triumph of hope over experience. there has also been a certain amount of cynicism that's crept
into this process, a sense that nothing can work and nothing will work. and worse yet, you see that, in the sort of tribal wars in washington, increasingly there are those who are loyal to a certain process that went on for a certain time, very much opposed to the next process that went on for a certain time, and before you know it people kind of line up behind the processes that they were involved in, and i think increasingly in this sort of tribal climate that we have in this country today, we have an increasingly difficult time, notwithstanding the efforts of carnegie and other distinguished institutions to try to bring us all together and figure out what we are going to do about this problem. because this problem is not going away, and as i will lay out in a minute, i think the problem is far worse than many people think it is and requires
a solution which will involve all of us to support. i would argue, strangely enough, when i was doing this some ten years ago, when i was engaged in this process, first i had the people from the penultimate process, the agreed framework, and i always made clear that i never said anything bad about the agreed framework. it had its problems. we had our problems. everyone has their problems. i thought it was useful to try to be positive about what they went through. and yet many people in the agreed framework certainly didn't want to support what we were doing because, after all, they had the same kinds of solutions in the agreed framework if anl theonly their framework had been allowed to go forward. so i had those skeptics, who had been involved with us before and felt that somehow we had ignored the lessons and ignored the progress made from that point, from that time. but i also had other detractors
who felt that any kind of negotiation with north korea was illusory, it could never work. the theory of the case was, in effect, to make sure it never worked, otherwise they would be proven wrong. well, i think for now they were certainly proven right, but i must tell you, when you are out negotiating and you have people back in -- back at the home front saying, you know, we'll never convince north korea to do away with its nuclear weapons, think about the message that that is giving to the north korean hard-liners, which is to say, if they can -- if they can convince some people in the states already that, you know, we're not going to give up our nuclear weapons, we just need to wait for the other americans to come to the understanding that we're not going to give up our nuclear weapons. so ironically the sort of tough line that i received often -- i won't call it as support but advice, i would say, from the home front, was sort of what
you're doing is not going to work because they're not going to give up their nuclear weapons and the north koreans said exactly, listen to your people, don't listen to us, listen to them. so i think we need to try to come together around some assumptions here. and i think we need to come around to the view that we really ought to try to pull together and see if we can disabuse north korea of its nuclear weapons. i think this issue is far more difficult and perhaps even more dangerous than many people think it is today. there is certainly the view out there today that, after all, this is a small country, country beset by problems, one of the weakest states in the world. it has a terrible economy. and they just want a few nuclear weapons to make them feel safe. and why can't we come up with some kind of system of containment?
why can't we simply contain this problem? if they just want a few nuclear weapons, why can't we find a way to make this problem so that it doesn't get worse but ultimately why can't we just live with this problem? there are those who say, you know, the poor little north korea. they just -- they have no natural friends. they have no prestige, if you look at the republic of korea, it's one of the top countries in the world. poor little north korea has nothing. and so, this is just an effort by north korea to get some attention and to get some notoriety and to be taken seriously because they have nuclear weapons. that's another argument which is to say let's contain it. let's figure out what we can do about it. i submit to you that this is a much more serious problem because what we are seeing in the last few weeks is clearly missiles that are no longer just test versions of missiles. they're not just trying to see whether these things will work
and then retinker them and try another in a month. it's pretty clear they have a production process with these missiles and it's pretty clear that they have mastered some things that many people, many experts, actually felt they would not achieve by this time. sold-fuel rocketry, for example. multi-stage rockets. it's pretty clear that they are making a lot of progress here. so we have to ask, is this all part of a little country that wants to be taken seriously, or is there a much more purposeful issue involved? and i would argue that, what they are doing, what they are really trying to achieve, is to somehow decouple the united states from the korean peninsula and perhaps more broadly from northeast asia. that sounds pretty fanciful. i mean, how can north korea succeed in decoupling the u.s. from say the republic of korea? we have stood shoulder to
shoulder with the south koreans since 1950. how could this be accomplished? if you think about what they're trying to doo. they put -- their troops are not in some territorial defense configuration. they're right up there along the dmz. they have a lot of asymmetrical programs, chemical weapons. biological weapons. they've got a lot of special -- special forces. so consider the following scenario. north korea invades south korea. it's happened before. the u.s. says, okay, we're in, we're in, we're going to come to the aid of our alliance partner, south korea. and then the north koreans say, not so fast, americans, because if you join this fight, we are going to hold one of your cities at risk. we are going to attack one of your civilian centers, to which the u.s. says, you do that and we'll come right after you. we will annihilate your country if you do that. and then the north koreans say,
well, game on. so then, at that point, the american president has to decide, probably the south koreans can handle this themselves. probably they don't need our help in terms of withstanding a north korean invasion. it's true north korea has a million people in its army but the south korean army is extremely robust. maybe they don't really need our help. maybe they can handle this. why would a u.s. president blink or why would a u.s. president hesitate in this case? because to join in the fight against the north koreans is to create the possibility, certainly greater than zero, the possibility and maybe probability that the north koreans would attack the u.s. again, pretty fanciful given the disparate in what we know to be the north korean capabilities and the r.o.k. capabilities. why would they ever attack north korea -- attack south korea.
but the north koreans also believe, and if you don't -- if you don't believe that, just ask one of them -- that somehow south korea is a creature and frankly a creation of the united states. if you can just get the u.s. off the peninsula, many north korea -- many south koreans would somehow welcome some kind of unification. again, pretty hard to take when you -- when you look at the objective circumstances, but looking at objective circumstances is not very north korean of you. north koreans often look at the circumstances they believe that, with a unified effort, and by the way, history is full of less powerful armies defeating more powerful armies because of this unity of spirit and effort. so, it is not to be ruled out. in fact, i think it is more likely than some of the other
explanations, that north korea believes they can -- they can, by pointing a nuclear weapon at the united states, they can put themselves in a position of making the u.s. blink. and i would argue, if the u.s. blinks with respect to its alliance commitments in the korean peninsula, the whole question of u.s. alliance commitments around the world would be up for grabs. so i say this, whether one agrees with it or not, you certainly have to put the probability as greater than zero. and so now the question is what are we going to do about it. well, i think there are several things we need to do about it. one of them is to reassure our allies, such as south korea and japan, that we're not going to blink, that we understand the importance of this. and that, by reassuring our allies we need to make available some of our best equipment, our best military technology, for dealing with the issues.
so i think t.h.a.a.d. is very important to -- as a system, as one of our most advanced systems, to be clear that we are prepared to deploy this with our allies in northeast asia. so i think assurance to them is very important. second issue, i think especially for their republics is our willingness to keep the door open to negotiation. after all, we negotiated before with north korea. we did not achieve what we wanted. and in fact, the process that jim referred to in 2007 was interrupted in 2008 by the fact that the north koreans did not give us adequate verification and we could not go forward with a process that did not have verification. people often say, well, was it that you didn't trust north korea? and i would argue trust had nothing to do with it. the problem was we couldn't verify anything we needed to
verify. but i think it's pretty clear that the south korean public and the japanese public had been concerned earlier by the fact that the u.s. was not negotiating with the north koreans. and if you look at some of the opinion surveys, especially in south korea and back in 2004. some 40%, 45% of south koreans were blaming the united states for north korea's nuclear program, blaming the united states. why? because the -- they saw the u.s. unwillingness to negotiate in the first bush term as being the reason north korea felt it had to have nuclear weapons. so i think keeping that door open to negotiations is absolutely critical. let me -- i will say a few more things about negotiations, but there is a third element that i think is also very critical. and that is working with china. now, we cannot work with china as some kind of contractor in this. we cannot work with china as something that we somehow
outsource the problem to the chinese. we need to have a serious sit-down, a serious discussion with the chinese about what our aspirations are and what their aspirations are. think back to the shanghai acards when president nixon arrived in shanghai and pulled this rabbit out of a hat. you have to remember, rabbits don't live in hats. so somebody spent time putting that rabbit down the hat. you recall that henry kissinger spent days and weeks on end working to lay the groundwork to essentially stuff the rabbit down the hat. so i think we need that kind of discussion. we don't need tweets in the dead of night. we don't need telephone calls that -- public telephone calls that i don't think really reach the level i am talking about. we need what is called in the bureaucracy a deep dive. we need a real effort to understand each other. the chinese might say to us, look, if north korea goes down, we end up with a situation where
it's your ally, who is a successor state, and they're right up on our border. and you will put troops on our border, you'll put listening posts on our border, and we can't accept that. well, maybe we can have a conversation about that. a conversation consistent with our alliance requirements with south korea. that is, we should not be talking about south korea without south korea. we need to keep our south korean allies in that process. but then the chinese might say, well, okay, we hear your assurances about troops, about listening posts, but what about just the perception that our public will have that you win and we lose. after all, this affects the internal politics of china. again, these things are serious issues. china is a big country. there is not a consensus on anything in china. people have a different point of view. and so we need to be able to work with the chinese and
understand them better. and this means kind of clearing the decks. this means all hands on deck, but it also means clearing the decks. we cannot address the hundred different items that we have on the agenda with china. we have to pick some priorities. i would submit that north korea is one of them. because i don't think any country can live with a nuclear -- with a country aiming nuclear weapons at it. and for the united states, this would be the first such country to do so in many decades. finally -- and this is, i think, a kind of gray area -- there is some space between peace and war. the idea that somehow we should have some overt or preemptive strike against north korea, one, we would not get all their nuclear materials, and, two, and most importantly, we would have to make sure the south koreans are comfortable with that, and for the south koreans to be comfortable with that, they would have to make sure that they feel they're willing to run
the risk of what 20 million south koreans within artillery range of north korea would need. so this is not an easy option, and in fact, i would put a preemptive strike kind of way out there as one of the most difficult options. but are there -- are there issues we can do between war and peace? are there things we can do, whether it's cyberattacks or some type of sabotage? are there some things we can do, if not to end their program but at least to slow it up and see whether, in slowing it up, we could allow the sanctions to have more bite in the country, whether in slowing it up we could look for more diplomatic opportunities? i think we -- we need to really look at that issue. but to do that, we're going to have to get deadly serious about it and serious now. ultimately, this problem will need a negotiation. ultimately, we are going to have to sit down. and i think we should be prepared to sit down with the
north koreans for some of the reasons i mentioned with the south korean public and the japanese public. but also, i think we need to be able to lay out to the north koreans directly the consequences of their continuing pursuit of these programs. no question they've been told this before, but as any advertiser knows, sometimes you have to say something 50 times before the person listening understands what it is you are talking about. so i don't think we should fear to negotiate. i don't think we should be afraid to engage our diplomacy. american diplomacy is not a kont dicti contradiction in terms. we are pretty good at it. it's time that, if we're going to pursue more diplomacy we need to get a few diplomats into the game here. with that, i think this -- the trump administration, which to a great extent has understood this problem as the most serious problem out there, but i think has not kind of cleared the decks and been prepared to deal
with it, because if the trump administration comes up against the election in 2020 with the prospect that north korea has nuclear weapons and are aiming them at the united states, i think that's going to be a hard one to lay at their predecessor. they'll certainly blame barack obama for a lot of things, and they'll probably try to blame barack obama for this thing, but frankly, i think it's time that we really got serious in terms of a strategy, with several parts to it, and each part of it moving together. so with those comments, thank you and i'll stand by for questions. [ applause ] thank you very much, ambassador hill. it's a sobering assessment but a very useful start to our discussion. i am glad you widened the aperture a little bit to include china into this. we'll get to some of that
dynamic in our group discussion immediately afterwards. but first, we have a chance -- emphasizing the role of diplomacy a long time and well accomplished diplomat, 40-year career in japan that he culminated in 2010. mitoji yabunaka from japan. during that time, his time at the foreign ministry, he served as director general of asian affairs. and was japan's chief representative to the six-party talks. later rising to be deputy minister of foreign affairs. the gacherapa and vice minister of foreign affairs. he is now in kyoto and it's my pleasure to invite mr. yabunaka here. >> thank you, jim. good afternoon, distinguished audiences.
i am so honored to be here to talk about north korea. coming from japan and living dangerously in japan, 6:00 in the morning, all tv stations are tuned into the announcement, north korea has just launched missiles. find out some places to hide. this is what is happening in japan. so you understand how serious it is or at least see from our eyes it is really a sort of serious situation we are now in. now, today's sort of programs. looking back and way forward. i was, as a -- as was introduced, the chief negotiators for six-party talks and also one of those -- the original founders of six-party talks. so when i heard from secretary tillerson that all sort of other engagement.
all talks, all negotiations from some 20 years are faded, i feel uncomfortable to hear that. i was one of those sort of people who worked very hard to do something about the north koreans' nuclear and missile threat. of course, judged by what is called result-oriented approach, yes, we all failed because we couldn't prevent north korea from dropping its own nuclear and missile technologies. so that's -- in that sense that -- that statement was right, but nonetheless, i feel that sort of uneasiness. now, looking back to the past. was it any chance in those sort of experiences or negotiations with north korea for denuclearization. was it really a sort of a case that they were all failures or was there any chance to achieve
that. we hear, i think there was a chance. that was 2005, of course. as you know, september 19th of 2005 there was a joint statement in that six-party talks. thanks to mr. hill. you were one of the most important persons at that time for that joint statement. we started working from 2003 onward. the truce at that time north korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons. of course, you can say, oh, you again were all deceived. they didn't mean that. just wordings. maybe. but i don't know about that. one year prior to that 2005 joint statement, i accompanied my prime minister who went to pyongyang for the second time. it was very lively discussions between him and kim jong il at
the time father of the current leader. in that discussions, very active discussions for 90 minutes kismi said, which is more advantageous to you, to have or not to have? and i am sure not to have is more advantageous to you because in that case we can help you. but if you go for the path of to have the nuclears you will be isolated. that was the kind of description by mr. koizmi. and mr. kim jong il responded. i know that a nuclear is a useless object. it is useless. bu because of america, the american hostile policy, i have to do that. i have to develop these nuclear weapons. that's the answer. and we said, of course, no, americans don't have that sort of hostile policy to you. those kinds of discussions took
deceived by the international community. that is what happened. then maybe he went for a nuke test in 2006. 2007 and 2009 already he mentioned about that. now what happened after that, things are getting worse. the new leader, as we know kim jong-un, he went after all kind of -- he was so so determined to go for nuclear, the launching of missiles, a number of nuke tests. and why was he doing that? certainly that you could ask the reason why he was so determined to do so. and not sure that we can answer in two ways. one is domestic and the other is external reasons. as i understand, domestic of course when he succeeded his
father, he wasn't quite sure. he was very young and inexperienced and there was also a coup attempt. also externally what happened to gaddafi in libya. i'm told that if you give up nuclear, then what happens to gaddafi. that is in his mind. he's now so much advanced and created situations so critical, the stage we are now in. what to do about that.
what we should do from now on is a very dire, very difficult task to do so. of course japan as abe prime minister said that we are enjoying alliance with the united states. certainly this alliance is so important with japan. as we wait for the future and all options are on the table, we're told. certainly when you talk about all options on the table, that includes several options naturally. one, option a might be the military solution. option b is sanction after sanction to the extent that kim jong-un finally will give up the nuclear sort of programs. and option c is of course negotiated settlement or resolutions. and you have to know already that the answer, military
options, military solutions is possible. and my answer is yes and no. yes, of course, united states, american mighty military strength, certainly you can destroy north korea. but of course that is accompanied by unpredictable consequences. we know that in 1994 you could have done it so much easier. today they have advanced so much of their nuclear arsenals and with sort of a preemptive strike, you couldn't annihilate and some sort of retaliations where striking back may be possible. so japan, we already under the sort of their missile reach and of course seoul, they don't need any nuclear missiles. so great sort of huge
consequences may be accompanied by that military solutions. that's the reason why that yes and no. it is of course least desirability solution. second option, sanction after sanction. we achieve the kind of our goal of denuclearization to the extent that i have to give up. i'm very encouraged in the most recent resolutions, that even security council resolutions. we have take en a number of actions and resolutions that 90% of the export or 30% of
petroleum import. that's a very important development. stage one is of course that vigorous implementation of that resolution is very important. but unfortunately, i doubt whether that's enough to the extent that kim jong-un now have suffered too much. so i have to forget -- i have to give up sort of nuclear aspirations. i don't think so with these current sanctions. you have to of course increase more pressures and adapt to that sanctions. and the very easy answer to that matter is how far. of course, a total ban, total sort of embargo of oil and total embargo of trade. if that will take place, certainly that will -- for that to happen, china must agree to that point, because after all
they are the supplier of oil and the largest trading partner with north korea. and we hear from chinese friends that if you go that far, if you go that far for that measures taken, then certainly all kind of developments, unpredictable developments within north korea, either implosion, explosions and all kind of the development may force many people to flee and refugee programs. or before that, kim jong-un would go for very much more riskier responses, attacking the neighboring countries. so that's the reason why we couldn't go that far. that is a kind of explanation as i understand it china has in his mind. when we talk to them, why don't you do more, that's what we've
been hearing. so number three or third option is negotiated settlement or solution. of course, this negotiation should be based on that second sort of option of sanction after sanction as much as possible. and then you have to open some sort of window for negotiations. that's, as i heard and as i hear talking about also some kind of negotiations, very important. and that matter i agree. i have some concern about that nonetheless. i hear a lot these days from american friends or american, quote, unquote, experts. now north korea has developed that much of nuclear arsenals. it is not realistic to talk about the entire denuclearization, entire nuclear
programs by north korea. that's not achievable. that's what i hear. so you have to manage the situations and you have to somehow accommodate some kind of nuclear arsenals that north korea may maintain. the reason why i say i have a concern about that is that might suffice american interests, because they haven't reached yet their missiles and they haven't developed yet to reach the mainland america, united states. but we already are being covered by the north korea missiles. so if you say that realistic approaches may be freeze, maybe some kind of the small reduct n reductions and we start giving all kind of economic cooperations to north korea, that doesn't work for us, because that sort of continuous
threat from north korea. that's very important point. and we have to make sure in that negotiated settlement or solution, the most important thing is we have to make objective aim very clear. that's denuclearization. we have to stick to that point. and in that sense i'm rather encouraged by trump administration. they say that will stick to the denuclearization as their major sort of goal and i hope that will be the case. and how to advance negotiations, that's also very important for us. north korea always say that we prefer and we are ready to talk to americans one to one. because after all, the reason why we are developing nuclear is because of american threat.
so when we talk about the nuclear, this is only with america. that's their position. in doing so they can elevate their status as sort of equal partner with the united states, the super mighty power. that's their way of thinking it. another concern for me is that president trump might be interested in having that sort of bilateral talks instead of all sort of six countries, six powers, six countries, very complicated sort of processes. why not go for one to one? the reason why i say that i am concerned is that 1994, for example, that's the u.s./north korea bilateral talks. and what happened is that japanese or south korean people waiting for -- they couldn't go into room, so waiting in the
corridor. and we are told when agreement is made. here the agreement. of course we are told it is for the peace and security of east asia. so you have to take it. and we did take it. but this time as i mentioned that of course i appreciate very much of japan/u.s. alliance. and yet as i say, the kind of source of political security problems may differ from the united states in terms of icbm. we have to be there. we have to state clearly our position very clearly. and six party talks, japan was of course one of those sort of key players. and for the first time that six party talks involved all relevant players in the region.
so that's a kind of sort of the venue we have to seek for that. and in doing so in particular, i once more personal sort of position. and that is why not for japan, why within the framework of talks, we called upon the new sort of initiative calling for emergency five countries, 40 ministers meeting. five countries, japan, united states, china, south korea and russia. it is worse sort of scenarios when those five countries are divided. that's something the north korea enjoys very much of their positions. we have to be united. and also that we have to use this special session and this is not business as usual time sort of things.
yes, we heard today that time is running out. it is that sort of sense of crisis, sense of urgency we should express our kind of new initiatives. wand in doing so in particular we have to ask china why you should do more. and the question about that, as i mentioned, going too far may distract all of situations in north korea. that i understand. but at the same time you have to ask yourself that if you do acquiesce north korea become kind of a de facto nuclear power, certainly that will be followed by, as we all know, that more than 6% of south koreans, they say that they have to develop their own nuclears. of course, japan, japan is probably committed to
non-nuclear policies. and yet we have to say to chinese friends that if you let north korea be a kind of a sort of de facto nuclear, certainly that will sort of open the vote for the nonproliferation system be collapsed. and you are responsible for those matters. that's a choice. that kind of serious talks on all kind of the security matters, peace matters should be done within those sort of five countries and then consolidating our positions and to face with north korea. that's how that i think if there's any hope. of course it is very difficult to pursue this route. i may sound like too much of a sort of dreamy type of things but if anything could succeed, that's sort of a new attempt,
new sense of emergency and new sense of crisis is very important. that's my personal thought. thank you very much. [ applause ]. >> thank you very much. so now i'd like to invite our panelists and speakers up here. we're going to have a short group discussion before we open it up to the audience. and the opening presentations by ambassador hill have begiven us some good building blocks to carry on this conversation. we've been joined now on the stage by professor nakatuji. he was dean of the graduate
school there. to my far left, your right, doug paul, our own vice president of studies and leader of the asia program at the carnegie endowment for national peace. he's served for president's reagan and george h.w. bush and later america's director of the american institute in taiwan. i want to begin with you a little bit. yabanaka has given his personal experience. i want to ask you about the diplomatic context in japan now, this dynamic of missiles flying over japan, of sirens going off. japan has long had a policy of mixing dialogue and pressure and
we've seen prime minister abe himself be a strong advocate of dialogue. he advocated discussions with the north koreans in 2014 just a couple years ago. in stockholm they signed an agreement to re-look at the abductee issue. every once in a while we hear rumors that prime minister abe is ready to yet off to pyongyang and have some kind of meeting. now we're hearing dialogue is a dead end and it's all about pressure at this point. i'm going to ask you to paint a picture of the context of the view from tokyo these days. >> i'm not quite sure whether i can directly answer your question, but of course putting emphasis on japanese perspective, i'd like to sort out the north korean issue by my own capacity. i'm a historian by training. so i'd like to provide some kind
of historical lessons for you to study. i'd touch upon the petroleum embargo. i would like to bring it back to 1941, maybe a few months prior to the pearl harbor attack. the united states imposed petroleum embargo against japan. and the prime minister along with other military leaders knew that within half a year or so japanese military will become inactive. so japan decided to start war with the united states. so in that short period, japanese decision may not be
called irrational. of course in the whole picture, it is pretty much irrational decision. i'm from kyoto. there is a moment you have to jump from the sun deck of the temple. i don't know how many of you have been there. the temple is built in a cliff area and there's a sun deck for visitors. and if you jump from the sun deck of the temple, of course it means death. i'm totally opposed how irrational he was. of course at that time i couldn't say this. i might have been executed by japanese military. what i'm telling is so petroleum
embargo is so critical decision. we have to be very careful about that. i'd rather appreciate restraining attitude of russia and china in this particular matter. and of course difference between japan and north korea today is japan was invading china and north korea is not invading anything. of course this is very serious matter. i totally agree to ambassador hill that this might induce nuclearization domino starting from south korea and japan. this is very serious matter. what i would like to say is that i'm not quite sure whether prime
minister abe understood or understands the gravity of this particular embargo question. lesson two, maybe i have to make it short. korean war started on june 25th, 1950. three days later, seoul fell down. so that's what i would like to emphasi emphasize, the problem of military option. this is no syrian missile shooting case at all. so i wonder to what extent president trump understand the geographical nearness of seoul to city of pearl. and number three, that is rather
about north korea -- previous presenters have mentioned that kim jong-un seems to be learning lessons, historical lessons from the case of saddam hussein or kwa daf gaddafi rather than vietnam. this is another case of learning history wrongly. thank you very much. >> thank you. doug, i'd like to invite you to comment on what you've heard so far today and in particular invite your thoughts about china's perspective on this. i thought ambassador hill's point about really trying to make china a partner in this process seems critical, but what are the prospects for that? >> i'm glad to audiocassettalk things.
the first point i'd like to make is the temple is temporarily closed right now so you can't get access to jump to your death from the deck. so we have a little bit of time. another lesson from history that occurred to me listening just this moment is something i don't think i heard mentioned in our presentations. and that is the stakes of the acquisition of nuclear capabilities or some definite military capability really changed in 2011 after our negotiations had come to a halt when gaddafi died in the desert, having surrendered his nuclear capabilities to the united states. you hear this lesson repeated again and again from north korean outlets, that if they disarm themselves, they make
themselves vulnerable to other kinds of economic sanctions, military moves, whatever, that would be to decapitate the regime. so for them, it's a fundamental element of survival that they develop the independennuclear w drive this forward. the second thing that seems to be dominating thinking is they are so close to having a capability. the testing has been more and more successful with the missiles and the nuclear weapons. and to give up at this point would not just be a failure at various measures of governance, but it would be a failure of an historic mission to get into talks with us that would be on the premise or maybe not a shared premise but certainly our premise would be ultimate denuclearization. so the fear factor and having it
almost in your hands factors really make this a tough one. then you go to the chinese question, which you've raised jim. what do the chinese see as motivating a real shift in their own position toward one of putting extreme pressure, whether it's petroleum cut off or other forms of pressure thus far we have not seen from china. and the ambivalence in beijing has become more and more clear. very credible scholars, people who are scholars whom we know retain influence in government circles are increasingly saying north korea is now fundamentally threatening chinese interests with its behavior. approximate thermo nuclear test to chinese borders could go wrong that could hurt chinese, pollute the atmosphere. i can think of many things that could go wrong. the war on the north korean or on the korean peninsula would
fundamentally endangerer chinese interests. and the refugee flows to protect the nuclear weapons from falling into the hand of reckless elements or being exported to terrorists, there's a cascade of reasons why china has been hesitant to go forward but also has been thinking it doesn't have a choice either. the latest chinese resolutions of the united nations security council certainly have gone farther than they have before. on those things where they have a say in writing the security council resolutions, they've come a long way. but it is absolutely written into chinese dna, communist chinese dna anyway, that you try to avoid legally binding yourself by sanctions. you give yourself maximum flexibility. we saw this in the iranian case where china had extensive
contracts for gas and oil exploration for providing iran with equipment and so on and so forth. the chinese just put the slowest guy in china working on each of them. we're seeing something of that now behind the scenes. the chinese are putting on these kind of informal pressures. we're not going to have the satisfaction of being able to point to them, but the chinese will have the satisfaction of saying we didn't do it but in fact they did it and if they want to take it off, they can do it without telling anybody. you can understand the chinese have a lot more maneuverability to employ. now, having introduced those factors, i'd add a third which is we are in the period leading up to the 19th party congress in china. every public signal from china over the past year has been
under the chinese umbrella term, maintain stability. we want to get smoothly through this 19th party congress and not have exogenous factors emerge. therefore when xi came to florida to meet with trump at mar-a-lago, he was very obliging. they held a number of major events in china trying do keep china as an international actor, responsible stake holder. china doing the right things, they're not looking to ruffle feathers externally or have that blowback internally. that does create an interesting question. what are they going to do after the 19th party congress? here it goes to a point that ambassador hill was making that you need a cadre of diplomats. not to pursue negotiations to me
i think would be irresponsible. to believe negotiations could arrive easily at a solution or that we can verify a solution easily if we get to one would also be irresponsible. but a lot of work between now and sometime after the 19th party congress needs to be done so we can get into position to put on the table, both privately and publicly, positions of the u.s. with respect to containment and deterrence of north korea. and there's a lot more military work to be done. and inducements, the carrots and the sticks need to be set out much more clearly. that's a job for diplomats -- again ambassador hill said you have to advertise something 50 times. you have to go and have that conversation over and over again, do the diplomatic spade work. george schultz referred to it as gardening. it's been an important watch word for me ever since.
that gardening needs to be done. that should be the near, the medium and -- the short and midterm set of objectives. the unga that's meeting this week is a fantastic opportunity to do that kind of work. i hope we'll see signs of it being done. i have a feeling we're going to see demands for short-term actions to remove north korea embassies or north korean workers and not much more. but we need a much more serious framework that has both the carrots and the sticks. that will give china a better set of choices to be a party to bringing this crisis to a core state in the aftermath of the party congress. >> thank you. the image i have in my head now is that part of my yard that i've just let go completely and never touched and the vines have grown all over the place. it seems like a scary place to begin gardening but i think you're right. a couple quick questions before we open it up to the floor. one is i can't help but listen to the conversations so far and
think that if we take a broad definition of diplomacy or diplomatic action, sanctions, negotiations, action at the u.n., relations with south korea, coordination with south korea, out reach to southeast asia and middle east nations to try to help put this whole right balance together of we're either trying to compel north korea to change its calculus and have no other choice but, or we're just trying to actually influence and change the calculus. and here ambassador hill's comment about if you just have north korea with a couple of nuclear weapons and that's all they want is to be left alone, perhaps that's manageable. but it's the aggressive use or aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons that is really the most dangerous. so i wanted to ask in general
what do you think is kind of a productive balance of all these different types of tools, diplomatic tools to try to affect north korean calculus. i'll just assume for the moment that compellance is secondary because it's harder than changing the calculus. right now the focus is sanctions. >> i know. but which of us? >> please. >> i think that in order to have a very productive negotiations in north korea, you have to make a position very clear and very persistent and very consistent sort of pressure is very important. as i recall in 2003 of course they said no way six party talks
doesn't work. so we don't go into that six parties talks. they kept saying that because they saw when united states and president bush attacked iraq at that time. and those are sort of compelling reasons why. now we have to go to the negotiating table. i think of reasons why at the time they agreed to six parties talks, meaning that you have to send a very coherent and strong message to north korea. sometimes these days they may be confused when they hear the fire and fury and -- so which way you have to listen to that matters. let's stay very consistent, persistent and strong. and of course you leave room for negotiations.
but nonetheless, key message is very strong message and leaving some sort of open space for negotiations. that's the only way they will come to the table. >> i think that's right. i mean, what you're trying to say to them -- in fact, what i said to them many times is we're not going to live with a nuclear north korea. i mean, we just cannot accept that and so we are going to -- and i was talking directly to the north koreans. i said we're not going to walk away from this. we're going to continue to come after you. i remember only half joking i said if you open a bank account on the moon, we'll go back to the moon and shut it down. and in short, trying to make the point that if you think your security is better with nuclear weapons, think again. and i think -- so i think sharpening the choices for them and making them understand that
this is not a cost free endeavor, they need to be clear that they are setting on a course. it's not just isolation. we always say we will isolate you. and they go, hey, we like that. that doesn't seem to be their worst nightmare. but that we will in effect go after you wherever we can and never give you a night's sleep. that's another message. so i think that has to be clear. i guess what i worry about is this idea that we can accept some element of nuclear north korea, i think is an extremely mixed message and extremely kind of dangerous message to suggest that somehow there's some level of nuclear north korea that we can accept. and in that regard i would call people's attention to some of the things that north korea has
said of late, including to japan, suggesting that geography notwithstanding they can somehow imagine a future without japan, namely sinking japanese islands now. i mean, this is sort of stuff that prize fighters say before a fight. but that's pretty serious words. that doesn't sound like someone saying we just need a couple of nuclear weapons to feel safe. that sounds like something a little more serious. i would simply caution people on the notion that somehow once they have a couple of nuclear weapons, this thing is all going to quiet down. i don't see the evidence to support that. for that reason, i think we need to be very clear about our concerns. >> that's a matter also of timing in terms of as long as the ultimate destination is denuclearization, presumably as long as we're reversing or
halting the momentum in the wrong direction that we're going in right now -- and i was enjoying reading your book "o "outpost," chris. i had not realized that you had raised the issue of an intersection back in 2007. and i gathered from the way you wrote wit the approvit with the president bush to offer that but the north koreans were not interested. >> it was interesting because the chinese were pushing that because they really felt the intersection worked very well after the shanghai accords and felt that that -- you know, in fact they kind of would often describe north korea as china several decades ago. i'm not sure if that's particularly accurate but they were talking about that. so they really pushed the idea of an intersection. so i kind of went back to washington. people looked at me like i was
some kind of crazy accommodat n accommodationist. i thought it would be a nice thing to offer and if we can show that position, it will show we're prepared to move ahead. finally i had to go right up to the president, okay, we can offer that. i offer it to north korea. they said, are you kidding? we have no interest in an intersection. one other message i gave to them pretty consistently, which was with denuclearization, everything is possible. they always wanted us to halt the exercises and i always said, look, my only regret about exercises is we didn't have them in the spring of 1950. i did tell them in the context of denuclearization i can image mutual pullbacks, mutual confidence building measures. in the context of denuclearization we can look at everything. but lacking denuclearization we
frankly can't look at much of anything. >> i want to give our audience a chance to ask a couple of questions to anyone on our panel. we have microphones that will come to you. if i call on you, please stand, let us know who you are, where you're from. if you have a specific question for one of our panelists, let us know. i'm going to begin right there, the gentleman there and then i'll work my way around here. >> thank you. question for ambassador hill. >> you are? >> joe bossco formerly with the defense department. north korea's motivation is either to use a nuclear shield for the purpose of depression against the south or to decouple the united states from the alliance system. you indicated this would be a
calami calamity. what would china's view of that outcome be? wouldn't that also serve china's interest and hasn't the north korean program been serving china's interests, making it pose as the responsible stake holder and good faith negotiator, meanwhile distracting the u.s. diplomatically and every other way. >> i think i will defer to my colleague doug paul on chinese interests. but i will say i don't think there's a consensus within china on this issue of north korea and i think the failure to develop a consensus, i think has been harmful really to china's role and maybe after this 19th party congress there will be more of a consensus, but i don't think there is a consensus. i would say there is a body of opinion, especially in china's security system. and if steve bannon thinks we
have a deep state, he ought to get a load of what goes on in china. among those 20 million policemen in china, i think there's a view that somehow u.s. troops on the korean peninsula are a bigger threat than north korean mischief. i think that exists. my sense is that i think it's less prevalent in think tanks and less prevalent frankly in more senior levels but i think it's very much there as a view. and i think, to your point, when china and russia joined with a freeze for freeze proposal, suggesting they freeze their tests, which i think freezing tests is not going to freeze that nuclear program. in return for our freezing exercises, if i were a north korean, i would have gladly accepted that.
so i think that does kind of represent what you're addressing. but i'll close by saying, you know, if we solve this thing and we turn around and say how do we solve it, i think it's very unlikely that we would have or will have solved it without cooperation with china. and to the extent that we can solve it, i think we will probably find that working with china, being focused, being relentless and not just episodic and not just with tweets, but a really serious effort with china was one of the main elements in our having solved it. so i just feel, you know, the u.s./china relationship is one i would call too big to fail. and i think we just have to keep at them and keep at them and see what we can get out of it. >> any additional thoughts on
the panel? >> you know, the most generous level of taking up from chris hill's comment on solving the problem, chinese generally don't see problems to be solved. they see problems to be dealt with, to be handled. they've got 14 untrusting neighbors on the land borders of china and they know they're not going to solve india or the others. they're just going to deal with what may come. they don't have the same impetus that americans have to jump in and try to solve things. secondly, you're right, there's a deeply held opinion that it's in china's interest to keep the u.s. bogged down on the korean peninsula, not able to expand its influence, tying down resources that cannot be focused on china. i think there's some erosion in this view. and partly the very important decision to put the theater high altitude area defense thad
system into south korea and i think china's counter productive posture on that, which was hostility toward south korean industry and people, fewer tourists, et cetera. they've actually turned this issue around in south korea, where the popular polls were showing real affection growing for china and declining for the u.s. that's now been really reversed by china's heavy handed approach. i think a lot of the people who i mentioned earlier, the commentators who have credibility are starting to say this is hurting our interest not just what i mentioned chinese potential radiation damage to the chinese or refugee flows but also reputational damage and the sense that china's aligning itself with the wrong end of history in north korea and not with south korea, which has a great future. the decision has not been made. i think before the 19th party congress, it would be a decision they don't want to make. but comparable to our continued american focus on the middle
east -- and we've got a lot of cabinet and senior people all focused on the middle east -- that suits china's long-term interests, keep us from focusing on china, focus on these other areas where china doesn't have a dog in the fight. >> i have a question here. microphone coming. >> pbs online news hour. given that these have been multilateral negotiations, how do you assess the role of south korea? you've dealt with liberal governments, conservative governments. now we have a liberal government that's having to act and talk like a conservative government. how does all this parse out? >> from my viewpoint, certainly that we used to have u.s./japan
sort of mechanism -- and to counter with what sort of occasions against north korea or even with china and russia. now of course as you say south korea's positions may differ frich from time to time from president to president. even today they're saying a bit different from japan or the united states. that's also asset. we can unite together. i'm hopeful for that matter because they have reason to say this and that sort of things and there are many generations the people in south korea who have different views, younger generations, older generations. as a whole, i'm confident that we can overcome any differences. also one more point is that
japan, south korea and china also we have a kind of mechanism. we have to use it. different views from south korea, i don't mind and we can kind of create a kind of unified position even within that sort of differences. that's my understanding. >> that's another key aspect of diplomacy is keeping the allies close together and the allied coordination. >> right. >> by the way, when we go from one administration to another, it's not exactly seamless either. i mean we've had our problems getting continuity. i think the south koreans have done okay in this. >> i would just add on this, i think there's a role in these progressive governments in south korea for the good cop and bad cop on relations with north korea. the u.s. can stand tough but the south koreans will have their interests and humanitarian
relief and various kinds of economic exchanges as long as they're firm with us on the security side, there ought to be room for them to explore what might be available through the various means they've had other decades, none of which has led us to nirvana but the ability to let off steam from time to time. having said that, i think this particular government came into office not equipped to do that because they have won the popular vote for presidency but they're far behind in the national assembly and their immediate priority is domestic and they're going to focus on getting the next elections in june to raise their level of support in theassembly. they tend to do whatever we ask them to do because they want to keep that from being a source of trouble. >> i guess many of you have heard idea of prime minister abe that he's about to implement
another general election, maybe taking advantage of a very extreme posture of kim jong-un. and we have discussed a decoupling possible of our alliance system. but it seems kim jong-un is connecting us and prime minister abe has been taking advantage of north korea issue to implement to realize his nationalistic policies last ten years or so. and this time around kim jong-un is doing too much so that we are having not perfect but still very important coalition among five other powers, including china i think. >> i think managing the alliance partners is perhaps an even greater task than managing the relationship with china. and so i think we need to be
careful especially how we manage south korea through internal transitions. i think doug is quite right. this is about internal politics in south korea. i would start by suggesting it's not very helpful to call the south koreans appeasers. >> i have a question here. gentleman on the end. >> south china morning post. from the u.s. side, white house or state department, we are hearing a lot about talking about sticks but carrots. instead the u.s. have decided that north korea needed to do more first as a precondition to going back to negotiation table. so i wonder if is it time for u.s. to make some offer to the north, some carrots and what
kind of carrots, what kind of offer. these days the administration could offer -- given that the united nations security council, has already a lot of sanctions on oil supply, or seafood or textile. is there enough room for u.s. to make such offer in order to get north korea back to negotiation table? thanks. >> first of all, north korea agreed to denuclearize. they didn't just agree to it to the united states. they agreed to it with all the five partners of the six parties. they agreed to complete denuclearization of their country. four years later, they said -- tried to say, nope, we no longer agree to it. so what the u.s. has asked for is that north korea to rejoin
the talks, they should rejoin the talks on the basis of what the talks are. the purpose of the talks is not to talk. it's to have the denuclearization that we politely said of the korean peninsula. so that is not a precondition. i mean, the alternative is to just have talks and no sense of what they think the purpose of the talks are. and sometimes we hear the north koreans say they would like to have talks on the base of one nuclear country to another. well, that doesn't really work for what we have in mind. so i don't call this a precondition. i just call this north korea's case of not acknowledging what it previously agreed. but let's say we have a situation where north korea does want to get back to talks on the basis of denuclearization but they don't want to say that. they don't want to simply reverse themselves and agree to
something they haven't agreed to in years. that's what talks about talks are about. you sit down and say okay, we're going to meet next tuesday. you will reaffirm your position. but by a date certain you will have an agreement on north korea rejoining the talks on the basis of the purpose of the talks. you can work this stuff out. but i want to emphasize north korea has shown zero interest in talks now. they have continued to say they will not have talks about nuclearization. in fact they even put it in their constitution they're a nuclear weapon state. this is a bit of a problem for us. i don't think we're to blame for the fact that they refuse to join disarmament talks. again, i -- look, i'm a career diplomat. i always support talks. but i think we need to be
realistic about the purpose of the talks and if it's something like, look, we'll denuclearize but we need some carrots, we need some indication that you're trying to do something positive rather than all negative. we don't want to say we're denuclearizing because of all the sanctions you've taken. again, we can work that out. but the problem is they have not started that conversation at all. >> of course this is not the time to show any type of carrots. as you know, the north korea go for nuke test and launching missiles and provocative actions after provocative actions and then showing the carrots. it's not the time to do so. show our seriousness and then finally they come to table. certainly many negotiations can take place. >> in this sense, i'm gathering, you know, when people say the time for talks are over, maybe that's for now and with north
korea. but clearly there's a lot among the five countries to work out together that would strengthen our engagement with the north, i believe. i have a woman here in the wi-- with her hand up. >> my question is sort of a followup of the previous question. i understand the questions of accepting nuclear -- however six party talks about tin years ago was about cvid and with completely irreversible denuclearization of north korea. that didn't work. meanwhile, north korea developed more advanced program. wouldn't it be more difficult to give up nuclear program when you have more advanced and more
powerful program? and i also understand that when we approach north korea, there should be a -- what is it? the unified voice. is it dialogue first or denuclearization first? which one is first? there are two very different way of bringing north korea to the table. >> this will be our final question, our final comment. >> go ahead. >> first of all, i don't think we have a chicken and egg problem of dialogue first or denuclearization. that's what talks about talks could deal with. but i think we need to be very clear. north korea decided not to give us any kind of verification regime in 2008. you know, they gave us a declaration which we felt was incomplete, but we accepted it. we're understanding we need the verification, which is some kind
of international standard and they refused to give us any verification. now, was this because they didn't want to deal with the bush administration anymore, wanted to deal with the obama administration? whatever. they did not give us any verification. in the meantime they continued to develop weapons, a very serious program that has continued. and then to make the argument, well, we continued to make nuclear weapons, now it's kind of hard to give them up since we worked so hard on this is kind of an argument i would have a little trouble with a 6-year-old making that argument, let alone a country. again, if they want to get out of the issue that they've put themselves into, there are plenty of challenges. they know our telephone number. and i want to emphasize something said earlier. the time when the u.s. alone deals with north korea, no one else has a role, that's over.
you know, japan needs to be there, equal party to the talks, south korea, you know, russia too. they have a border there. so i think it's very important that we all be there. so sometimes when you can't make any progress, you say well, gee, we have six party talks, maybe it should be seven parties or whatever. the issue is north korea has refused to engage in these sn negotiations and that is the problem we're facing. >> 2010 to today they have developed more. also in 2010 we didn't have this kind of sanctions. 90% of the trade cut, this kind of international sort of coordination has not taken place at that time. so one way or another, the two have to keep working on that matters. >> by the way, that was before gaddafi. so this whole argument that, gee, we looked at gaddafi and we
felt really bad about that, i don't think kind of holds up to the time sequence. >> gentleman, i want to joining. never a satisfying conclusion to these types of discussions. but i learned a lot from it, and i'm grateful for your participation. so please join me in thanking our panel. [ applause ] >> white house press secretary sarah sanders has scheduled a briefing today. she'll answer reporter questions
at 2:00 p.m. eastern and we'll have that for you live when it starts on c-span. >> also today, the heritage foundation hosts a panel discussion on recent supreme court rulings involving freedom of speech. we'll have live coverage at 5:00 p.m. eastern also on c-span. >> and later, remarks from janet yellb, the federal reserve chair, who met with president trump yesterday, will speak at a national economists club dinner. our live coverage begins at 7:15 p.m. eastern on c-span and a programming note, you can watch all of these events live online at c-span.org or listen on the free c-span radio app. >> this weekend on book tv, on c-span2, saturday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, former vice president al gore looks at the effects of climate change around the world with his book "an inconvenient sequel, truth to power." >> and we in our civilization, not me, but technologists and
engineers are learning how to manage atoms and molecules with the same precision they have demonstrated to manage bits of information, and it's changing things dramatically. c 02 emissions have stabilized for the last four years. starting a downward trend. and we are going to win this, but the remaining question is whether we will win it in time to reduce the risk to an acceptable level that we will cross some point of no return, and it's a dangerous race between hope and the catastrophic consequences that we're creating. >> then on sunday at 5:30 p.m. eastern, an author discussion on political diversity and free speech on college campuses. with professors sam abrams of sarah lawrence college, mark lilla of columbia university, april kelly wasner of elizabethtown college, and
nadine straussen, former president of the aclu. >> so i don't want to demonize and disparage these protesters i think the way too often happens. so what's positive about what they're doing? they're passionately committed to social justice and racial justice. so i want to thank them for that. but i would love to have the opportunity to persuade them that freedom of speech, especially for the thought that we hate, is their most essential ally. >> for more of this weekend's schedule, go to booktv.org. c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider.
now, a panel of palestinians talk about the future of their people in regards to potential one and two-state solutions. they also discuss the current debate around either the full recognition of a separate palestinian state or the integration of the palestinian people as full citizens of israel. following the discussion, panelists took questions from the audience. this was part of the american-arab anti-discrimination committee's annual conference in washington, d.c. it's an hour and 20 minutes. >> we're going to go ahead and start the convention off right now. first, on