tv The Presidency Harry S. Truman Russia the Cold War CSPAN August 19, 2018 8:00pm-9:50pm EDT
symposium focuses on russia and the cold war. anelists talk about the 33rd president's relationship with british prime minister winston in chill, the u.s. position berlin and the origins of nato a ch mr. truman considered signature accomplishment. the harry s. truman little white harry s. truman foundation both in key west, florida, co-hosted the event. first of two parts. it's about two hours. well, thank you, and thank you all for being with us this morning. thank you for inviting me. it's my second trip to the it's veryte house and good to be back here in key west. my presentation today is ntitled the iron curtain speech, the sinews of peace and prose.wer of in the spirit of looking at original documents, randy, we're
to look at the near final draft of the iron curtain speech. his is the draft of the iron curtain speech that is in the national of the churchill museum, his train raid washington, d.c. to missouri. he is making final edits and to the great speech. we have this in our collection we had it on view in an exhibition called the power of prose. gives us an that and chance to see churchill's mind, great master of rhetoric and the great visionary when, about by thoughts of the cold war looking at the primary source document. before we do that, i thought it to set the ropriate stage. before we talk about the cold
to start probably good with the ending of the last war, world war ii before it. winston churchill led the allies to victory together with the russians, the he big three, the alliance and a terrific [pa] -- v.e. try in may 1945 on day giving the sign v saying the triumphantyours, the end of it world war ii in europe victory lapl took a on that occasion. many americans forget that thereafter there was a general election in britain and arguably, the most visible and popular figure who won thehe world war lost an election. before that, he attended the
otsdam conference outside of berlin with harry truman, the truman andthat harry winston churchill met with here is the photograph stoic. three looking very it's a chilly photograph, a precursor to the cold war. the conference erupted when the announced sults were and churchill's party loses the another becomes prime minister. f course, the conference resumes and the new number three potsdam.ig three at the loss of that general election for winston churchill a blow.e he really didn't think he would lose the election. he was nervous at the end, but did, in fact, lose and this is the prime minister who had long years to the war effort in world war ii, led
his troops rallied to victory and lost the election. his wife clementine said, winston, i think it's a blessing disguise. he replied, well then it's very disguised. [laughter] >> churchill moped about a little bit. painting holiday in italy to refresh his batteries and egan to receive invitations to speak about woorld affairs from people all over the world including this invitation in the form of a typewritten letter, ne page from the president of westminster college, frank mcclure. he was a westminster alumnus, 1918 who rose up to the president and invited winston in the l to participate college's green foundation lecture, the john finley green lecture.on it was a bold move to be sure to prime minister to the middle of america in fulton,
i think to speak and that this letter would have been given to a secretary politely come, i can't possibly tell them thank you, save for perhaps the most famous post-script in history and that post-script here you can read in truman's hand, this is a wonderful school in my home come, i will introduce you. regards, harry truman. post-script caught his attention. he knew if he was on the staple with the president of the united in the he would be back game. he accepted, the formal courtesy ould to reply to the president of westminster college, i would be glad to come. do that, he n't wrote directly to the president of the united states who in turn let the college know he is coming. this is the letter from the archives from harry truman to mcclure saying get ready, winston s when
churchill will descend upon fullton. a smart hurchill is man, he comes to this location, south florida, in january 1946. passage on the queen tozabeth, the great cunarder new york and makes his way down to miami beach where he relaxes, paints, he was an avid painter. here is a painting he did of beach, the venetian causeway. of colonel the home frank clark and treated royally to refresh,sunshine relax and rejuvenate very much here in key an did west. churchill writes to frank finally from miami beach in january, so we're about a move out from the speech, the march 5.s this is the last part of january and he says, mr. mcclure, i'm coming.forward to i don't really know what i'm a ng to say, but it will be
speech of considerable importance. and it will be about world i'm going to discuss it with the president, thank you for the apples, they were see in the you can letter. churchill was very kind. then the speech happens. i have never met mr. church until the berlin in, mr. e, mr. stall churchill and myself. i became very fond of both of them. men and they are leaders in this world today when leadership. it's a pleasure to me to churchill.mr. he is one of the great men of the age. a great englishman. [applause] great englishman, but
he is half american. [applause] >> mr. church hill and i believe in freedom of speech. i understand that mr. churchill talk on the sinews of peace. he was have something constructive to say to the world in that speech. he came here to deliver it and it's one of the of my lifetime to be ble to present to you that great world citizen, winston churchill. [applause] kept his y truman promise and he accompanied via train fromll washington to jefferson city, then by motorcade to fulton. played s a lot of poker on that train, i know for sure. prowess man showed his in that arena. they arrived in westminster 5 to a packed h auditorium, the largest space on
campus, the the -- for this address. churchill by this time has decided that his lectured will sinews of peace, even though up to two weeks before, he said i think it's going to be something like world peace. that's how it's published in the rogram, but at a final rhetorical moment of inspiration, he changes his title to sinews of peace. and now as i mentioned, i would like to look at the original document. it is. his secretary, the presentation she gave to colonel clark, churchill's host in miami beach. document that a churchill was working on in the embassy in washington the night got on the train. as you can see, this is his presentation format. he loved to read from texts in
poetry, one ofe, reasons he is such a great orator. speeches.ing on the this speech is the carbon caller: . ou can imagine churchill reading the typewritten originals and the second taking shorthand making last speech.additions to the here is one of the first things churchill in the cold war. remember, he is a private citizen now, not prime minister, say almost e to anything. that gives him power. in fact, he wants his audience to know that. let me make it clear that i statements of l kind. i only speak for myself. there is nothing here but what you see. >> of course, the backdrop is is what they see. they see the former prime minister of great britain on
stage. him is the to president of the united states, harry truman. it certainly is a world platform you see is something of great significance. speech, he outlines the united states and british that even in ays peace time, we must continue the anglo american relationship. he outlines his strategic he puts it. this page in the speech is very interesting. t's the only original typewritten speech, it's not a with notes on it. this is the thesis of the iron outlining the strategic objective, too many notes at the last minute that retype it in total. that's why there are slightly type fonts. he talks about war and tyranny, he two marauders and the destruction of war. he outlines and gives a history
aftermath, ii, the the lingering impacts in his great rhetorical style. methods for t achieving peace through the speech, heions in his outlines that's the way to go moving forward. he talks about the anglo-american alliance and also the need for that alliance and air force.e an armed it's very clear that churchill says nato must have an air force we can combine and share military resources to protect freedoms and securities in the world. about this l talks was a concept he originally thought of after world war i, it materialized the way he had hoped. this was a chance to do it again says that nuclear weapons, now in the hands of the allies, canada, britain, and the united states ought to remain in nato.hands, not he is very clear that the english-speaking peoples as he
alled them should be the custodians of the new nuclear arsenal, not nato. nato, ays air force for ut not nuclear capability orca passt capacity. he says that nuclear weapons should not under any fall into the hands of fashionists or communists. first page, he has mentioned communism. he is setting the same time. we can to whatever keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the communists. means russia and the soviet union. merits of out the anglo-american values and says through the magna carta, the trial by jury, the english common-law, they find our most famous expression in the declaration of independence. last es here at the minute, he puts the american
declaration of independence. his audience here in fulton. the , he is buttering up audience with talk, very flourishing talk about freedom, and justice which found a welcome remarks in the audience. ahead here to where he begins to say that risk of nuclear war without what he calls the relationship. the term special relationship, the relationship between britain and the united states was coined iron curtain speech in fulton. he says without that special these two p, without super powers, churchill surely even t of great britain, in its weakened position post-ward war 2 of being a super they had the nuclear arsenal, without the special relationship, there risk that the nuclear arsenal would fall into the
communist hands. here is where he begins to in the cross sia hairs. soviet and ows the the communist international to do in on intends to future, the limits if any their expansive and proslytizing tendencies. >> nobody knows what russia is doing. churchill has a good idea. goes on to say, some the tudes to stalin and russian people but also some warnings. here is the famous phrase that he, for which the speech is commonly known. defended across the continent, behind that line, the
central and s of eastern europe, warsaw, berlin, prague, vienna, budapest, belgrade, bucharest, all of hese famous cities and the in lations around them lie the soviet sphere. and all are subject in one form another, not only the soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from moscow. one change, the last-minute change to this part of the speech is the short-hand, it originally said the lie inion surrounds them the soviet sphere and churchill mustnalizes this in what i call the soviet sphere. taking this upon himself.
influence again is unchecked following the u.k. american s and withdrawals, stalin didn't take his troops back when the allies that was the iron here is when he appeals to the united states in ctly warning that previous conflicts, they sent if there wasas and not an important alliance, that would surely happen again. >> in our own lifetime we have against united states arguments which it is impossible, it is impossible not comprehend. -- to e have seen them
victory, but only after devastation have kurd. > interesting note about that passage in the speech. ou hear churchill stumble across the words. he had a ferocious memory. he had them mostly committed to memory. with such a last-minute change the night before, he is almost as if -- this is not what i originally wrote. he is stumbling through those there on page 37. churchill where begins to really build to the great climax of the speech. says the situation will not solve itself. > and the longer this is delayed, the more general it will be and the greater our become. will from what i have seen of our russian friends and allies the war, i am convinced that there is nothing they
strength, and as there is nothing for which they than weakness,ct weakness.y military >> this thought was one that was dapted by the truman administration a year later. uses his y, churchill celebrity and his vision and 1930's that during the before the outbreak of world war world of the the nazi menace. >> i cried aloud to my fellow world, butand to the no one paid any attention. 1933 or even r germany might have been saved from the awful fate that we may taken her and the all been spared from
mankind. hitler had on the timely reaction that desolated such great areas of the globes. it could have been prevented in my belief without the firing of a single shot. >> so he is reminding that in the 1930's, it could have been if they only listened to my observations and here he s making observations again warning that the soviets are the next threat to world peace. and now is the time. achieved by nly be this year,t in 1946, 1946, by reaching a good understanding on all points with russia under the general authority of the united nations organization. and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many the world ars by instrument supported by the whole strength of the
all sh-speaking world and its connections. solution which i to you in y offer this address which i have given sinews of peace. >> note that the night before he train, last minute, he puts that section into the speech, so much as he finally titling it in the last moment. and it's that sinews of peace, the strength, muscles, things together, things sinews are things that bring anglo together, the american relationship, the special relationship is what churchill is striving. that is the way to defeat tyranny and communism. outlineuped in the iron curtain speech. hat is what churchill in his rousing finish says together, the two nations, britain and the
can solidify and strengthen their existing of ance to meet the threats the cold war ahead. we had adapt faithfully strength, -- of men, if all british moral and material orces and convictions are joined with your own in of ciation, the high roads the future will be clear. not only for us, but for all. for our time, but for a century to come. [applause] > and so that's how winston
churchill ends his iron curtain speech. reaction was mixed. there was still some looming concerns that the soviets were allies. even truman distanced himself, stage, lapping on the the newsreel, he said i didn't copy of the speech beforehand. i didn't know he was going to say all that. later, truman and the rest of the world have fallen in to follow some of the outlined provision for the pecial relationship, but strengthen nato and a policy of eterrence which outlined the policies of the cold war in the remainder of the 20th century. ways that in some the cold war began in earnest in a gymnasium at westminster in fulton, missouri, on march 5 with the president of and the formeres prime minister of great britain, were honorary
degree recipients that day, westminster's most proud alumni, i might add. it did set into motion a number things in this country and throughout the world that still have rippling effects today. thank you for allowing me to iron e archeology of the curtain speech and share it with you today. take questions i think after the panel. once again, thank you. [applause] >> that was outstanding, thank you, tim. i think we're all reminded just churchill's to words, that must be a thrill to give a talk like that. you just get to play churchill's speech which, i mean, to be reminded there was a gentleman history of such a public service, he was an accomplished writer, he had books, had he won
pulitzer prize book yet, the ower of or tray which i myself had, none of you would be sleeping right now. hat i find really interesting that was the relationship of those two men which is fascinating to me. f.d.r. of course were great friends. f.d.r. dies and truman who was they meet for r, the first time at potsdam and the fascinating thing to me when they first met is right on that same day, almost t the exact same moment, because of the time difference, they're meeting for the first ime at potsdam and the trinity shot is going off in new mexico. that would say a lot of the ortents of what would happen because of that relationship. outstanding talk, thank you very much. i think we are going to do the so we are up r, now. who is next? rob, would you like to -- randy next? introduced him,
i'm proud to introduce randy, please. [applause] randy: thank you very much. i'm an dy sole, trumanst at the harry s. library in missouri, a long way away from here. y topic is the berlin airlift but it is more specifically harry truman and the berlin airlift. truman lot more about than i do about the airlift. they obviously are connected. as you may know, this will mark the 70th anniversary of the beginning of berlin airlift in 1948. it was quite likely the greatest achievement in the history of military aviation with the land
into berlin, es the divided city of berlin russians, some tons of coals and supplies were carried and flown united lin most by the states air force with help from america's british and french allies. persons lost their lives in the course of that operation. streetsday, many of the in berlin are named after the died on behalf of the citizens of berlin. the airlift was truly the work german ands of people, civilians as well as military officers, crewmen and pilots, supply people. carry it oution to even de by a single man, in his lifetime, president harry
celebrated and criticized for his ability to withoutficult decisions delay and apparently without a second thought. his secretary of state wrote that truman was "that most without enfeebling of emotions, regret." proud of his was reputation for decisiveness and regarded a capacity for prompt crucial making as a facet of leadership. and i rote in retirement quote, the most dangerous course a president can follow in a to defer risis is making decisions until they are him and thereupon become inevitable decisions. hand and n get out of take control of the president and he is compelled to overcome should have ich he prevented. when a president finds himself in that position, he is no leader, but an improviser who is driven to
ex-pedience." the bull in a china shop as far relations.tional truman telling off poor molotov in the oval office and cold edly starting the war. truman dropping atomic bombs on shimma and knack sake without losing a night's sleep. forces to military declaration of war. truman responded and i quote, "tell the son of a bitch he'll have to shoot his way in." this blunt form of statecraft may appeal to many of us, but to seem st of us, it may belligerenteckless, and even potentially dangerous.
of truman as age knee jerk bottom down hell the world ho treated of his daughter's thoughtful man was orshipped by the men in his he kept it inally, check. more importantly, he did not relish interpersonal conflict. hisn example, early in presidency he wanted to replace francis biddle as attorney general. even though he was president, he did not want to confront him face-to-face. he had a member of his staff call him and ask him to resign. insulted and insisted on a personal meeting with the president. invited francis biddle to
the white house and apologized for the way he handled the whole thing. at his request, the attorney general agreed to resign. at the end, and he touched the president's shoulder. "you see, it's not so hard." but it was always hard for truman to fire people. he would face discomfort getting rid of subordinates like the defense secretary johnson. 1990 -- 1949,e superficially, they are in reputation as a tough and defiant decision-making to -- decision-maker. when the russians cut off access berlin,n comments -- this leaves little room for doubt. he met with robert lovett, the
secretary of the army. in one diary -- when a specific question was discussed as to what our future policy in germany was to be, namely were we to stay in berlin or not, the president interrupted to say there was no discussion on that point. we were going to stay, period. reiteratedartment determined steps should be taken by the u.s. to stay in berlin. that same day, secretary of set ageorge marshall telegram to the u.s. and busy in london summarizing u.s. policy as determined by the president. the first point -- we stay in berlin. truman ordered the air force to begin carrying supplies to west berlin. the airlift was underway, but only providing a portion of the city's daily needs when the
president met with marshall on july 14, 1948. forestall, lovett, royal, and the under secretary of the army. first, the words in truman's diary bristle on the page, but conclude with right amusement and self-pity. marshall andith jim forestall on the russian situation -- marshall thinks the facts in the situation we are faced. i made the decision 10 days ago to stay in berlin. and he underlined to those three words. jim wants to hedge. he always does. he is constantly sending me out withmos which i return directions on the facts. we will stay in berlin, come what may. i have to listen to a rehash of what i know already and reiterate mice day in berlin --
my stay in berlin decision. i do not pass the buck or alibi out of any decision i make your it on that sorry note he turns to discuss something else that happened that day, the funeral of general john pershing. "when to pershing's funeral at the marble amphitheater in arlington. the hottest damn place. this is the 10th time i planned to attend the general's funeral. it came off this time." now he starts to feel sorry for himself. beth and margaret went to bed at 6:30 p.m. god's time. i was sorry to see them go. i came back to the great white jail -- that would be the white house -- read some papers and wrote this. it is hot and humid and lonely. why does anyone want to be the
head of a state? dammed if i know -- damned if know. iwill pass the buck, nor do alibi out of any decision i have to make. pride, but also his resentment toward advisors ao were suggesting perhaps more cautious approach to the berlin crisis. note to the variations of that -- "we stay in appear no fewer than six times in the documents i have cited. he said that he made the decision 10 days ago, when in fact he stated this basic rentable as far back as june 28 -- basic principle as far back as june 28, at the beginning of the crisis. it appears truman was making his position on berlin as clear as possible in private meetings,
secret cables, and in his diary, but what was he saying about the berlin blockade in public? the answer, absolutely nothing. or almost nothing. on a july news conference, the president was asked what he thought about the berlin blockade. " i have no comment," he replied. he did not refer reporters to a statement by the u.s. secretary day,ate the previous reaffirming the u.s. commitment to stay in berlin. on july 15, truman went to the democratic national convention in philadelphia, and delivered a fiery speech accepting the nomination for president. dramaticed to be a occasion for denunciation of the russians. did not even mention the berlin crisis in his speech. on july 22, it was time for another news conference.
the first question -- mr. berlin -- mr. president, what you make of the situation in berlin? response, "no comment." he was asked if he would discuss the berlin crisis in his upcoming speech to congress. "i will not," he said, and again repeated "i will not." for duringarkable the first three months of the berlin crisis, late june to late september, while the air support was increasing in intensity, negotiations between russia and the western allies dragged on. never mentioned berlin in public statements. when repeatedly asked about the crisis, he responded by referring reporters to statements made by his secretary of state. that does not sound like give 'em hell harry.
his public reticence in the face of what he must have regarded as 's violation of american rights in germany is not in keeping with his popular image. it may be consistent with an interpretation of his actions offered by some historians. according to this view, when truman said, we stay in berlin, he did not really mean it. he was playing for time. keep in mind, we know his military advisers warned him the allies could not hope to supply airin by error alone, -- by alone, at least not during the winter months that loomed ahead. there was an alternative, as you may know, by the tenant general lucius clay. lieutenant general lucius clay. in armed convoy. even clay admitted the use of an armed convoy raised the risk of war, and truman rejected that option the time being.
so, the airlift was seen, at least initially, as at best a temporary solution. knew heiled, truman would be faced with a terrible choice. abandon berlin or run the risk of war by resorting to more aggressive military action. the airlift, according to this view, allowed truman to postpone making a decision he did not want to make. lucky.man was the spectacular success of the berlin airlift, the success of pilots meant that he never had to make that decision. against all expectations, the western allies were able to fly in enough supplies to sustain the effort in west berlin even during the winter of 1948-49. recognizing the failure of the gambit, the russians called off the blockade in may of 1949 to
build up supplies in the city -- in may of 1945. to build up supplies in the city, the americans continue to supply until may 30 of 1949. truman was still waiting his options. even while saying we stay in berlin, he was holding in his mind the position of abandoning berlin ifosition in it forced to abandon it. but why did he keep reaffirming to one adviser after another his determination to stay in berlin yet the whited he repeat and underlined the same words in his hesonal diary, -- why did repeat and underlined those same words in his personal diary? it has been suggested by some historians that truman was kidding himself. according to this interpretation, his private bluster about staying in berlin
was in marked contrast to his public stance on the subject. traced thiss have obsession to the conditions of truman's early life and the circumstances under which he became president. young harry truman was something sy, by his own whossion, a scholarly boy took piano lessons. a need for his father's approval may have led to a need to appear tough masculine. in 1945, this little man from missouri, who had never even attended college, was called upon to succeed a legendary political leader during a crisis . at according to this view, he tried to conceal his feelings of inadequacy. from others, and perhaps from himself as well, by projecting
an image of toughness and challenge withry a show of bellicose defiance. been described as "a man who compensated for his insecurities with calculated displays of decisiveness." more to the point, daniel harrington has suggested that "truman believed that presidents must events, and his deep psychological need to see himself as a decisive leader talked him to exaggerate the firmness of his berlin policy, then and later." this psychological interpretation of harry truman as a little boy whistling past the graveyard of his own insecurities may be satisfying to some of us who disagree with decisions he made as president, but we must face the fact that truman probably would have made the same decisions even if he had been perfectly secure in his
masculinity and free of self-doubt, if there was ever a president entirely free of self-doubt. for political leader, what is the real distinction between being tough and pretending to be tough? recallbe worthwhile to the words of kurt vonnegut. for 10 to be, so we must be very careful about what we pretend to be -- what we pretend to be, so we must be very careful about what we pretend to be." leaving aside posthumous psychoanalysis from moment, the fact is truman repeatedly said the u.s. would stay in berlin a matter what. the evidence that he really didn't mean it is, frankly, pretty flimsy. leahy, theliam military chief of staff, remembers truman telling him on june 29, a few days after the blockade began, that the u.s. would stay in berlin "as long as on july 19, the
secretary of defense recorded in his diary a statement to the effect that truman would stay in berlin and till all diplomatic means had been exhausted in order to come to some kind of accommodation to avoid war. a little more ambiguous. but these are recollections or interpretations by others of our truman said or meant during the first weeks of the crisis. they were obliged to point out to the president the limitation of american resources in europe and the hazards involved in any allied response to the russian blockade. that leahy,o note though he was greatly liked by truman, was the same man who predicted a few years earlier it would never go off. never had the same amount of confidence in him after that. the stall is a different story. is a different
story. truman was beginning to lose confidence in the man he selected as secretary of defense in 1947. he saw him as a increasingly unconfident. he resigned and subsequently committed suicide, but truman did not know the extent of his problems in 1948. but he was beginning to lose confidence in him. there is ice may not have meant that much to truman anyway. -- their advice may not have meant that much to truman anyway. truman did not want to go to war with russia over berlin. wouldid not mean he abandon the city without further military action, including possibly the use of armed convoys to resupply the city. it seems to me the following
scenario is more plausible. truman's immediate reaction to the blockade is the position in west berlin would have to be maintained at all costs. this was reinforced by the events that occurred over the next five weeks. the meeting of the national security comes along july to any second, 19 48, general clay told abandonment ofhe berlin would have a disastrous impact on american plans for germany and therefore the economic reconstruction of western europe. clay went on to say "if we move out of berlin, we have lost everything we are fighting for." "the president stated that this was also his opinion." truman did not want a war for berlin, but he a good reason to believe the russians did not want a war either. he received a secret memo from the director of intelligence reporting on a recent meeting between a group of russian officials headed by a russian
martial and a group of industrialists. how the cia got this information, i have no idea. the germans warned the russians that the blockade would have a devastating effect on sugar refining, fishing, and other industries. sokolong to the memo, vsky expressed consternation, thatg been led to believe the used could be independent of the west. the steel mills could not undulate out supplies to the west. the russians appeared greatly shocked, and one general declared, if we had known this, we would not have gone so far. one of the russians in the memo is quoted as aiding flatly that a war with the western allies would be impossible because of economic conditions and bad harvest prospect. general clay agreed with this assessment. he told truman that he did not
think the russians were planning for war, noting there had been no troop movements are other signs to indicate they were preparing for war. ,n the event of hostilities clay told the president the russians have about 360,000 ground and air personnel in germany compared to an ally .orce of 210,000 obviously a disadvantage from the allegory of you, but not an overwhelming one. and the allies, specifically the united states, possess the weapon the russians did not have. truman understood, as kennedy did during the cuban missile crisis, under tents nsecumstances -- te circumstances, an action could lead to war even if neither side wanted it. clay'sused him to reject proposal. europe.eployed b-29s to
they were well known as the airplanes that dropped atomic bombs on hiroshima and nagasaki. they were not equipped with atomic weapons, but those know what the russians to know this. he was determined to stay in berlin, as truman said repeatedly. he did not flail at the russians with rhetoric, however tempting it may have been to do so. surely he was not reticent because he was holding out the possibility of abandoning the city. rather i think he was hoping negotiations would go forward. he believed the russians were bluffing, using the currency in sectors of western religion as an excuse to force the western allies out of the city without -- westernnflict berlin as an excuse to force the
western allies out of the city without an armed conflict. he had made his decision about berlin. he also wanted to avoid war, and he had good reason to think it could be avoided. ultimately, the success of the airlift enable the president to achieve both of his agenda gives -- objectives. in all likelihood, truman's actions during the blockade would have been the same if his father had been an interior decorator instead of england trader. we will never know what would've happened if the airlift had failed to supply west berlin, anymore than we would know what kind of emails truman would or whether tweets between truman and stallman -- and stalin would have made things worse. it was a different time.
truman, in his response to be tolin blockade was seeking employ all measures short of war -- not in impulsive, reckless manner, but at the same time, not wavering from his commitment to maintain the allied position in berlin. his desire to contribute to it ofieved a successful outcome the berlin crisis 1.0, i guess we would call it today. thank you. [applause] >> outstanding.
thank you. i will say from my own research, it is such a fascinating thing to look back and will us, at the time all of this is happening, the cia is a brand-new organization and all these brilliant people in washington are creating think pieces and singing them to the president. i have some of them with me today. they are interesting. i will make this brief because i know we have to move on, but just how close, what did they think what was going to happen was something you just addressed. in 19 for you, this is what the cia said. evidencenderance of derived from the logic of the situation supports the conclusion that the ussr will not resort to direct military action during 1948. if you turn the page, however, you will read what the cia thought of the soviet military, exactly how strong it was, and how bad it would be if things
went the wrong direction. we talked about james forestall. where of the interesting things -- i would say the most interesting thing i pulled from his diary just in my own head situation and the thinking if things go wrong -- we had the bomb and the soviets didn't. but if we had a war, even our possession of the atomic bomb could not stop the soviet military from conducting operations against us. that is how bad things could have gotten. did not go that way. let me see who we have next. pardon me for a second. i'm sorry. leffler? ladies and gentlemen, melvin
leffler of the university of virginia. [applause] it is a pleasure to be here again. the comments i have today about truman and the united date and -- uniteds of nato states in the origins of nato follow-up on my remarks in a originsddress about the of the cold war. once again, i am going to focus on the origins of nato, the united states, and the origins sort of a big theme i want to argue, a big theme i nato, ofmphasize -- sourse, was one of truman' major accomplishments. one of his greatest achievements nato. the point i want to stress is he
entered the alliance. treatyed the atlantic reluctantly under relentless pressure from the british and the french. let me create the context for this. was not eager to incur strategic amendments in europe. truman was imbibed with the basic american tradition. what was the basic american tradition? no entangling. had warnederson against entanglements. of course, the united states had been an associated power during
world war i -- and associated -- offense inally britain during world war i. and fans in the united states had been part of the great alliance that had triumph over nazis in world war ii. at the end of the war, most americans, including president truman wanted to be free of obligations. when he went to the pot stem -- potsdam conference in summer of 1945, when he first met churchill, the talk we heard about a few minutes ago, read diaries -- you suspicious, not only of stalin, but also churchill. foreigners.ike he wanted to promote american interest, and he said that again and again and again.
whenas indicated, churchill gave that remarkable address at westminster college in february 1946, president truman was unhappy about the invitation to join an alliance with great britain. he always suspected the british, whether it be churchill or bevan , were trying to trick the united states into doing something that might not comport with basic american interests. wanted to be free of engagements and obligations and in that respect he represented the will of most americans. this was extenuating in the fall of 1946. electoral victory
and gaining control of the house of representatives and the united states senate. the republicans definitely did not want commitments in europe. not embrace any degree of the american alliance. one of the important things the truman administration had done in early 1946 was to extend, the u.s. government extend a major loan to great britain. that was one thing that was really important to a nation facing a financial crisis. truman did embrace the loan. he supported the loan. it engendered tremendous amounts of republican criticism, and truman took this electoral victory for what it was, and it
commitment by the american people and the republicans to focus on what we will now -- what we would now call "america first." but as i claimed in my early 1947,ght, in truman became aware of the huge transformation of conditions going on in the world. he understood the need to shore american presence in the eastern mediterranean. when the british announced they were pulling out of the eastern mediterranean, and would not support greece or the turks, both of whom were under pressure, truman understood the insening economic situation western europe and early 19th the seven, and of course, he announced the truman doctrine in march 1947, and he followed this
up in june of 1947 by supporting marshall's famous commencement address to help expedite for the united states to provide huge loans to europe, to expedite the economic recovery of western europe, and undercut the support that local communist parties in france and italy and greece had the idea of the european recovery program was to promote the reconstruction of europe, and thereby undercut the support parties hadommunist been able to garner in 1945 and , whered early 1947 often, they were either the leading political party in
france and italy, or the second political party in france and italy. in perfectly free elections. the european recovery program was designed to revive the economies of western europe and undercut support for local communist parties. but the european recovery focusedalso was significantly on the recovery of the western zones in germany, the zones not under soviet control. the french had a little zone, the british had a major zone in the industrial heartland of germany, and the americans had an important zone. the idea of european recovery program was to transform america's policy towards the western zones of germany to
begin to increase the level of industrial production in western germany, to turn over the management of the vital coal mines in western germany in the ruhr part of germany to german management in order to capitalize recovery so that western germany's recovery would help bring about and affection away to the rest of europe. this was a key component of the european recovery program. of the marshall plan. we often forget how important the western zones of germany were to the revival of western europe. thatin mind, however, these initiatives, these initiatives toward western
anxietyengendered throughout europe, not only in the soviet union, not only in poland, but also these initiatives triggered enormous holland,n france, in and great britain. 1947 wasin europe in traumatized by the war that had just ended. and everyone in europe feared overevival of german power the long-term. everyone was aware, right, within their lifetimes, everyone in 1917 and 1918, ,ermany had been defeated
supposedly disarmed, and within a generation, germany not only had taken hitler control and within 22 years or so, germany dominated the entirety of the european , occupied all of western europe and very large parts of eastern europe and soviet russia. that was the memory of all policymakers in europe and all people in europe in 1947. worryre was tremendous about the implications of the marshall plan. europe,le in western the marshall plan and the initiatives towards western germany also conjured up the oflity of the possibility
soviet countermeasures, countermeasures like the blockade of berlin that we just heard about, countermeasures that could actually lead to a series of initiatives back and forth, that could culminate in war. people were worried about the possibility of war with russia in the short run, and the long-term danger of the revival of german power. nobody was more worried about this than the british foreign minister, ernest bevin. bevin was worried about it because he believed that the revival of germany, or the western parts of germany, commitments byty the united states in order to ensure both the british and the
ofnch against the revival german power. but most of all, he was in constant conversation with the french in paris, and the french made clear to the british foreign minister that they would not go along with the initiatives in western germany without additional strategic anditments by great britain by the united states. and french cooperation in the european recovery program was vital to its success, not only in terms of france, but in terms of the fact that the french controlled a small sector inside the western parts of germany, and you needed french cooperation and collaboration in
,rder to agree to the revival or to the uplifting of the level of industrial production in western germany, which was under control of the allied openers, the french -- governors, the french, the british and the americans. you needed french cooperation. you needed french cooperation in order to bring about currency reform in western germany. you needed to have french cooperation if you wanted to return the coal mines to german management, and the french guaranteesditional of their security. the french worried about 2 things. the french worried about the revival of german power long-term, and they were also extremely worried that these initiatives in western germany
could provoke soviet countermeasures that would lead to war. bevin, the british foreign minister, in order to reassure the french, initially proposed what was called the western european union to the french. indeed, that was signed in early 1948. as the initiatives began to take place to revise western policy towards the western zones in negotiated with the french, the dutch, an agreement that called for british commitments, mutual commitments to defend britain, france, the netherlands, they'll jump and luxembourg. that was the western european union. the french demanded this, but they demanded more. the french demanded that the united states commitment --
commit itself to the defense of western europe. bevin agreed with this. his idea was to bring in the united states, to bring in canada, and also to bring in the british dominions. exercised a tremendous amount of pressure on the truman administration to sign commitments and a treaty to of these the defense western european nations, all of whom would be collaborating in the marshall plan, in the european recovery program. administration, and truman himself, in early 1948, was ambivalent about going along with this. thoughambivalent, even many of his key advisers were
telling him, you need to do this . if the recovery program is going to be successful, if you are going to get the french to agree to this, you must make commitments are you truman himself, as i just said, was uncertain whether this was the right policy. and he was increasingly uncertain during the summer of 1948, when the berlin blockade was underway. he was uncertain because he also knew there was a forthcoming election, and he didn't know if he could get republican support. , thely, behind-the-scenes very, very influential under a secretary of state, robert lovett, was meeting all the time with the republican leader in the senate, arthur vandenberg, to try to get vandenberg's cooperation and collaboration on
a bipartisan policy that would support american commitments in western europe. the late spring and summer of 1948, decided to support what was called the vandenberg resolution, that america'side commitment. eventually, the united states would sign such a treaty, but truman was hopeful to get through the election of 1948 before this happened, because he knew this would be an incredibly controversial commitment, even though vandenberg, the republican leader in the senate, supported it. the other major republican running forwas president, was robert taft, who was not supportive of an american commitment to europe.
itself, the blockade that we just heard about, and truman's commitment to stay in thatn, and the tensions this aroused during the summer of 1948, and the possibility that conflict might arise, impelled truman and his advisers to say yes, we really need to make this commitment. we need to make this commitment .o the french and the europeans if our recovery program is ultimately going to be successful. we need to reassure the french that we will defend them if war breaks out, and the possibility of war, lb at unlikely, judged -- albeit unlikely, was more and more of a possibility. the french kept saying these
initiatives that you and the british are supporting might lead to war. what is going to happen if there is war? yes, the united states will win in the long run, no doubt about it in 1948. but in the short run, what would happen? soviet armies would conquer all of western europe in the short run before ultimately, the soviet union would be defeated. the french said, we need assurance that you will defend us should these initiatives breakout. and the french said, we want assurance that if war does not breakout, and german power revives in the long run, that you will come to our defense if we again have to deal with the specter of german domination of europe. and those are the factors that led truman, after the election of 1948, to move decisively
ahead with the signing of the north atlantic treaty. the north atlantic treaty had two purposes. we often think of it mostly as a deterrent against the soviet union. but when you look at the negotiations that were underway all through 1948, you see that a was toreoccupation reassure western europeans, and the british, about the revival of german power. that was deemed indispensable in order to expedite the recovery of all of western europe, which is what the british and the americans wanted. sameurse, in 1948, at the time, people were uncertain about what would be the long-term consequences about the revival of german power.
and a north atlantic treaty was aimed at reassuring europeans about the revival of german power. at the same time, the north atlantic treaty had provisions that provided for the time, they that over newly emerging west german state to joinould be able nato. when nato was formed, germany was not part of it. western germany was not part of it. thatmericans hoped eventually, western parts of become, and what would west germany, would not only be integrated into the marshall plan and the european recovery program, but that western germany eventually would become part of the north atlantic treaty organization, part of the nato alliance.
the intent of this was to both use german power to defend against the possibility of a soviet attack in the future, but the other part of nato was to integrate and co-opt german power for the western alliance. let me add a coda to this. at the end of the cold war, in 1988 and 1989, this whole issue reemerged.ny it reemerged after the fall of the berlin wall. after the fall of the berlin wall, it became clear that eastern germany and western germany would be integrated into one nation. , there was still
enormous concern and apprehension about the revival of german power. margaret thatcher was stridently opposed to the unification of germany in 1989. she still feared, she still had the memories of world war ii on her mind, as did many brits. what was so interesting was that in 1989, one of the selling , both of george h.w. bush to mikael gorbachev and margaret existed, was that nato precisely to integrate and co-opt german power. the indispensable requirement for the united states in late
1989 and early 1990 in the negotiations with gorbachev over the unification of germany was , a unifiedy must germany must be inside the nato. in 1989 andsh 1990's all that -- saw that position -- sold that position to gorbachev and the british by germany, integrated atlanticinside the alliance, inside nato, as well as inside the western european union, a united germany integrated would have its power co-opted and controlled so that
germany's neighbors in europe could be reassured that germany, again, would not be the same type of threat as it had been in 2 world wars. the importance of nato was that the possibility of a soviet attack, and it reassured europeans about the revival of german power. however grudgingly truman initially was about it, he embraced nato and it became one of the signal -- the signature achievements of the truman administration. thank you. [applause] >> we are going to do some questions, i think. outstanding. thank you very much.
how arewe are going to, we doing on time? we are good? i have a question for each that might get the conversation started. then we encourage you to come up with questions. maybe we can go in reverse order. i think particularly the young people in the room might be fascinated, someone who has written so much about the cold war, how strong the communist party was within the united states in the early days. can you speak to that? >> the communist party at this time in the mid to late 1940's totallyst nonexistent, impotent. the short answer to your question -- >> can we address the 1948 campaign of henry wallace? >> well, i mean, i, are you suggesting henry wallace was a communist? >> i am suggesting people have
made the argument that the communist party was stronger than people today think. so much so that they might have a >> there were plenty but, they didn't garner all that much support, and certainly, wallace appealed to the progressive wing of the democratic party, and definitely, wallace appealed to people, for example, in the south, who supported what we would say is the beginning of the civil rights movement and racial integration. as a result of that, wallace was often charged with being a communist, garnering the support of communists who wanted racial integration. that was the way the segregationists targeted and tarnished the champions of
racial integration in 1940 eight and 1949. but to answer your question directly and succinctly, the nomunist party had significant power whatsoever in the united states in the late 1940's. >> excellent. had this wonderful experience in the truman library where an a packagebrought out of cigarettes that belonged to joseph stalin. the cigarettes were strange. they looked different than american cigarettes and they had soviet writing on them. i think this is a way to get into how extraordinary the archives are there. might i ask what some of the more surprising things we might find there, even if they are not on display? >> well, the portrait of harry s truman on the head of a pin is hard to exceed that.
the obvious question is, why would anybody want to execute a portrait of truman on the head of a pin? but somebody did and we have it. stalin'soned cigarettes, which i think were liberated by somebody at the conference, so when he wasn't looking, perhaps he was still sullen over the outcome over the british election and couldn't understand how the british new would win the election before it happened. in all the elections he was in, he won easily. he was frustrated when churchill didn't come back and he lost an election. how could you not have known that? lot,y, i think we have a you mentioned the cigarettes. pilots amelia earhart's license. not sure why, but we have that. we have all kinds of gifts given to president truman as head of
state, and as a private citizen. portrait asthe pin an extreme example of artworks in honor of president truman. question more briefly, mr. and mrs. truman never threw anything away. when we got access to the papers after margaret truman daniel died, and the papers were donated to the library, we found checks dating back to the 1920's and 1930's, all their utility bills, all the stuff you put in your shoebox at home and throw away eventually, they never threw anything away. we are glad they didn't. we have marvelously minute documentation of the personal and private lives of mr. and mrs. truman.
, they weret colorful a couple people who didn't spend a lot of money. one thing we found out was mr. truman had more money than we basically hed, wasn't totally poor. they never spent any money. so they saved up all the allowance they had from their white house years. they were able to save a lot of presidential salary, which was a lot of money. they were in good shape by the 1950's. they weren't ready for the poor house, although they didn't have any income until the presidential pension at was passed. there are a great variety of papers that still come to light occasionally, photographs, things that were in somebody's attic and we had never seen before. we are finding things all of the time. we have a remarkable collection. >> it is remarkable, the work that the archivists do.
when i am painting a portrait of harry truman, when he comes president, i can did in the archives and know how much money was in his bank account because all of that exists. i can see his checkbook from august 8, 1945, as we are repairing to baum nagasaki. b nagasaki.g to bom checks forrite groceries. he is sitting at his desk, and we have the checks with his signature. it is extraordinary. the work they do has to do with the important documents that tell the story of our nation's history in a real way. the fact that they exist is a privilege and says a lot of out our way of life and transparency in government. that work is important and i thank you. mr. riley? thank you for an excellent talk. personally,, for me
i feel like i can't underestimate the degree to which the ability of churchill and truman to get along humanally, and find a connection with each other, how important that was to the history of the world at the time, because coming out of world war ii, the interest of the united kingdom and the united states suddenly, after this great alliance, were not the same. i think it was the ability of these two people to find a personal connection that really helped us in the future. do you agree? can you talk about that relationship and the narrative of it as it evolved? an from a churchilli perspective, from 1940-1945 -- >> i'm sorry, can you hear? >> i will move forward. from 1940-19 45 and 1946, for churchill, the warriors, it was a great transformation of his
country. britain was a power and 1940, stood alone in the war. by the end of the war, britain was a distant third partner in the big three. the americans were truly the most powerful country. wooed roosevelt to enter the war and support the by the time truman comes into the picture, isrchill is not wooing, he begging for support. he needs american financial support, american military support. the iron curtain speech, in the he isin some ways, saying, britain has this wonderful past. we can still help but i know you are the power. looking to really lift himself up by being
associated with the americans, whereas earlier, it was bringing twitter leading power. it was an interesting powershift for churchill. the fact that he and truman got long very -- got along very well, there was nothing like a get to conference to know each other, and the train journey before the iron curtain speech, they talked about a variety of things. they played poker. there was a great luncheon. than 24 hours in fulton, but they certainly got along very well, and even though to the speechion was guarded after the iron curtain speech, throughout the rest of their lives, even when truman was out of office, truman had great respect for what happened in fulton. lots of things in the archives are about that. after churchill died, truman wrote glowingly of his
relationship with churchill. that special relationship between two men, not just two countries, that was established in 1940 five and 1946 lingered and was important. >> i would question the whole idea of a special relationship churchill.man and there has been a vast amount of scholarship on the roosevelt-churchill relationshif scholarship on the relationship, which in some ways was a special relationship, but there is a huge amount of incredibly persuasive scholarship to support exactly what we just heard. churchill wanted a special relationship, roosevelt always was dubious and skeptical about it. the anglo-american special relationship, as the british love to call it, as churchill
loved the color, was fraught with elements of competition, as well as elements of cooperation. mean, i have946, i looked through these diaries and the idea that truman had this chillal religious with chur is implausible. he said, phooey the british are coming in here, and there is mr. churchill this and stalin that -- there is no sense that truman has any special feeling toward hischill, or toward successor. and then there is actually virtually, as far as i know, no them.pondence between in september, october, december,
1945, then suddenly this proposal comes up, the possibility of churchill coming to full, which truman definitely embraces. he was consulted before hand, i think he even saw a draft of the speech before hand. and was happy about the fact that churchill raised the specter of an iron curtain and highlighted the possibility of a soviet threat to all of europe. truman embraced that, but he didn't like the idea of a special anglo-american alliance at all. and i think in the months after again iion speech, once do not think there is any real correspondence between truman and churchill. later on there is this glorification come absolutely what you said is right, but it is sort of the revival of this -- in people's memory -- it was
not at all salient at the time. ther was noe special relationship in 1945, 46 and 47. >> i will agree. there is a wonderful letter that human rights, where he says he is having more trouble with churchill than with stalin. and again, i think that the relationship was so much more important on the other side of the pond in the think is what you are saying. >> churchill needed truman a lot more than truman needed churchill. the appeared presence -- the mere presence and the rhetoric that churchill could bring to an occasion, the attention he could bring was something that was extraordinary. >> absolute. >> i encourage questions from the floor. i think we have a microphone over there, and one over there. good morning.
--question is for mr. self. south. hello. >> technical difficulties >. >> it is working now. >> i want to thank you and the other panelists for your presentation. my name is danny fernandez and i join you today as a masters in literature student. i noted you compared truman's berlin airlift to that of the cuban missile crisis. are they to moment similar? theidering the lectures, threat of war with russia was always on the tail end of every initiative and consideration of all the leaders, but here the cuban missile crisis was one instance of near nuclear war caused by a moment of aggression by the united states, and not a bluff of b-52s carrying rations, than bombs of total in our
nation. cuba and west germany were distinct, the former went through a communist revolution and the latter, a democratic reconstruction. again, heidi you believe these moments -- how do you believe these modes can be similar, when the cia supported a military force to take on castro's regime? >> i do not think they are similar in every respect, but in trumanse that candy and -- and that kennedy and a truman had a certain basic objectives. in these crises. onman's was insistence maintaining the american position in west berlin, the allied position in west berlin. he was convinced that to give that up would be devastating. his basick that
position, regarding cuba was he wanted the russian missiles out. kennedy in 1962, or truman in 1948, wanted war. i think they both wanted to avoid it. werehey took actions that restrained. instead of launching an armed convoy across and into germany to resupply west berlin by force, truman opted for the airlift. doing what aead of lot of his advisor suggested, military advisers especially, was the bomb cuba and blow them missile sites before they became operational, he listened to the advice of his brother and others whose adjusted that a blockade, excuse me, a quarantine of cuba would be a less risky alternative.
there was more riding on the missile crisis. i think you alluded to the fact that by 1962 the stakes were much higher for the world as a whole, because the two powers, both of which possessed nuclear weapons, and it would've resulted in a terrible loss of life if something had happened. which i think neither side wanted. but that is the extent of the comparison. i think obviously there are vast differences between the situation in germany and the situation in cuba. >> thank you very much. randy: you are welcome. >> sir? >> yes, my name is tim and i have from key west. several years ago, we organized something about what truman did during 1940, including the berlin airlift, and we had the privilege of bringing in to talk
colonel halverson, who i know you are familiar with. what he did, he was a young pilot during the airlift and without asking permission he came up with the idea of dropping candy for the children of berlin. and over the course of the -- and ultimately they said, go ahead. they dropped 22,000 tons of candy for the children of berlin, and american students with the help -- they would wrap it in handkerchiefs and use it as parachutes. and when he would go over to berlin to drop the candy, he would wiggle the wings of the airplane, and when i was trying to promote attendance at the vfw here i asked whether anybody was -- and there was a gentleman he raised his hand and said he was in berlin during the time of the airlift as a young child. and i said, what is your name?
he said, my name is dennis and i was amazed. i said kumar you frank howl ey's son? sure enough, he was. frank, working under general clay, he was the head of the allied forces in berlin itself. and he did a remarkable, remarkable job. in keyere his son lives west. >> i would say, one thing about the berlin airlift that has not been stated today, and it is very significant, although we do not have to focus on it, was that the soviet union and stalin made no effort to interfere with the airlift. and that was critical to its success. if the soviets had interfered with the airlift, it almost definitely would've led to a
major war. but the soviets did not. and i think that relates to the basic insight you are talking about, that harry truman had. even more than his most important defense and military advisers, harry truman had the intuition that the soviets would back down. most intelligence analysts in the summer of 1948, and i have reviewed almost all of these intelligence assessments, actually said that the soviets are not likely to go to war. but james forrestal, the secretary of defense, was a little unsure about that. so was marshall, the secretary of state. but most analysts, and general clay himself, said i am so sure the soviets will not go to war i am willing to sit on the airfield in germany in order to demonstrate that. but the key point was that
truman really felt that we should stay in berlin. i agree totally, we will stay in berlin. and he understood that the soviets understood that the united states had overwhelming power and would not challenge that power, which is they did not challenge. they allow the airlift to go on. >> that is true, they did not interfere with the airlift to the extent of actually shooting down airplanes. they tried in various ways to intimidate the pilots by flying close to them, some stunts, but it never went beyond that. the other thing all mention is mr. halverson has visited the truman library, the candy bomber, and he is a very nice man. he is the kind of man who came up with the idea on his own, as he was thinking of the children in a terribly depressed country,
a war-torn country, and how to make it easier for them. and when he was there one person on our staff then and now, after his talk, came up and thanked him. he is a german, a native of germany, and he said he wanted to thank mr. halverson for what he had done for the german people. that was applied not merely to the candy, but to the other goods they brought over at great risk. >> questions? sir, please. is this one working? >> yes. >> i am rocky gaston. i am a retired u.s. air force flight officer. i cannot believe how small this world is. i graduated from new york university. i belonged to a fraternity
there, my brother was dennis howley. and his older brother, peter. both were in the air force with me, together. and i met general -- the general, he was an alumni of the fraternity and he came to visit us. had a charisma you cannot believe. this is one thing about traveling around the world, the coincidences you come across. and that is touching. i still correspond and him close with dee today, in california, and of course dennis lives here. that was -- one of the things you brought up was about the communism after the communism rise, after world war ii. significant, but it was a rise that was probably -- the communist party with the
strongest in the unites states -- no? in the 1930's, it was popular. >> no comparison between the support for the communist party in the united states in the 1930's, with support for it in the late 1940's. >> one of the things you did bring up, wallace was colorful. i can remember him. wasn't there a man named norman thomas? he was the head of the communist -- the actual communist party. >> the socialist party. >> was it? >> it was. >> he ran four times. asked if he was going to run again. he said no, everything has a ready been instituted from my already beenhas
instituted from my platform. you brought up yesterday that the rise of communism at that time -- >> it was a very different situation in france and in italy and greece, where the communist party was extremely influential. >> greece was common is for several years, for about three years? actuallyafter the war, the commonest were never in control. the conservatives were. but a civil war broke out and it went on for about 14 years. >> yeah. i mean, it was more serious than i think you give us the impression of. i thought we were in control of that war for a while. but anyway, the fact that the socialist party. i always thought it was the communist party. but i thought it was interesting that norman was asked why he would it run for a fifth term,
and he said everything has been instituted from my platform. [laughter] anyway, that was -- >> on the subject of the communist united states, we have in our archives a host of letters that came in after the iron curtain speech. people saying, congratulations and so forth. there is one folder in one of our boxes labeled crackpot letters. [laughter] there is a file letter from one of the communist organizations in san francisco, saying how dare you bring winston churchill to do this. and we have one letter in the archives. >> i will say that i researched the dewey papers and there was a folder there also called crackpot letters. >> mr. truman wrote the file on those letters when he wanted them to go to that, then not file, and -- nut file, and he
would pass them along. sometimes they are strange comments, sometimes things out of the ordinary. >> i think we are out of time. we will ask one more question. it is easy to build symbolism into this poker game. who won the game? >> that is a really good question. at first, churchill took a bath. he loved to gamble. he did not know poker very well. truman like to gamble and he knew poker very well. churchill suffered. there was one point when he left the car into truman said to his associates, go easy on the old man. and churchill had a little recovery toward the end, and i think he came back a little bit, but that was in large part because of his special relationship in poker with harry truman. >> thank you. [applause]
[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] announcer: from george washington to george w. bush, every sunday at 8:00 p.m. we feature the presidency, our series exploring the presidents, their politics, policies and legacies. you are watching american history tv, all weekend, every weekend, on c-span3. night, thomas hazel it talks about his book "the political spectrum, let's modulus liberation of wireless technology from herbert hoover to the smartphone." >> we've only scratched the surface in terms of how much spectrum we have put out. the great majority of the airwaves that are highly valuable frick and medication are still squandered. they are allocated to things that were set aside 50 or 60 years ago. the technologies are gone, the applications are mute, but we
are blocking the amazing stuff. so we need to come up with better mechanisms. a lot of my book is devoted to those things that regulators can unleash even more and come in without the micromanagement of a federal commission commission. announcer: watch the communicators, monday at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. anduncer: in 1975, bill hillary clinton were married inside of their home in fayetteville, arkansas. next, we visit the site in the ozarks to learn how the house kick started the political career of the 42nd president. angie: welcome to fayetteville, arkansas we're at the clinton . house museum near the edge of the campus. this house was built in 1931 by a local man. his