tv American Politics CSPAN December 27, 2010 12:30am-2:00am EST
and at the same time, you know one must look at the last at doak china. china is a great friend of pakistan and yet china went to india and had a very pragmatic meeting with india because china wants honest neighbors to have a good relationship with all of its neighbors. you must ask yourself this question. india is a great country, there is no doubt about it. but india must learn that it must deal with its neighbors in that sense and that neighbor is not only pakistan, bangladesh, nepal, sri lanka and if you really look at it wired the neighbors -- for india, it is india's turn to come forward and do something if i may use the word to do more with its neighbor. it has to compromise a little
bit. it has an interest there is no doubt but look at the amount -- even trade, 70 million people in pakistan, 160 million in england , 30 million in nepal, 20 million in sri lanka, tremendous amount of prey can have it as a free trade area and that can only come about when it has a good relationship with its neighbors. now, you know, i go back to something about afghanistan. if you really want to be successful in afghanistan, go after the poppy cultivation. it is the poppy cultivation that fuels the war in afghanistan and let me explain to you how it fuels the war in afghanistan. >> to start with, is the farmers and they are taxed the taliban. the taliban says grow your poppy and you will pay this tax. the poppy moves into the -- most
are owned by members of the government. so, if you want to -- so by the by the taliban taxes them also and they get money from them also. so you have a relationship where the poppy cultivation is a source of income for the government people, for the taliban, whatever so you have got to go after the poppy cultivation. i was very surprised when i found there was really no concerted effort to go after the poppy cultivation and afghanistan. that is where you start. if there has to be -- it has to be towards good governance and that good governance will take some doing. but my own feeling is that, and i think we are heading towards the direction for some sort of
accommodation will calm in the future. in a year, two years i don't know but it will come about. but the real war i go back within pakistan. that is ground zero and that is where the thing is. ladies and gentlemen let me tell you very clearly that unless you address the core question that terrorism there and you have a counterterrorism force which can be created overnight,. in the 1980s and antenna card explicitly set up and that force did a tremendous job because they reduce poppy cultivation to almost nil and the drug craze was downgraded to 10 or 15%. it has its own personnel. that has its intelligence. overnight, it can be turned into a relationship with the culture
and terrorism. my good friend geoffrey styles gives me a lot of information about -- which is there and already has approval so you have got an entity in place. you have got the funds available and overnight you can have a counterterrorism force which will gain with the main problem. that is to eliminate al qaeda and unless you go and go into the heartland of pakistan, going to the infrastructure of al qaeda, all the logistics, the money laundering, the drug trade, the arms trade, the people who make passports, the people who make i.d. cards etc., the people who do the arms smuggling, you are not going to go anywhere. this problem will grow. thank you very much. >> thank yous ikram.
in view of the fact that we have such and it distinguished audience and people with expertise in the region i'm going to. my claim as the moderator to ask the first question so i'm going to open it up to the qwest -- audience. if you would like to ask a question please raise your hand and identify you and come to the item. please do remember to identify yourself for the audience. >> i am with "nation magazine." so, i am sorry. i am bob with the "nation magazine." it seems to me almost like pakistan saying it wants to find terrorists just like i was a -- oj saying he wants to find his wife's killer. maybe i'm missing something here, but a cousin of the unequal relationship between pakistan and india, it seems obvious to me that pakistan has
spent a quarter of a century building terrorist groups and still supports them across the board. so, i mean, let's call facts facts here and not talk about how pakistan needs to form a counterterrorism force. pakistan is in the terrorism business it seems to me. >> i think you are absolutely wrong. can you imagine my giving you -- to kill myself. what you are saying the isi is funding the terrorist to kill isi versus. the most people that have been attacked and pakistan today as far as personnel and families are concerned are the army and the isi so what you are saying is, and the isi officer 90% by the army so what you are saying is here's a group that says okay fine, here is the money. arm and train yourselves and come and kill me, right? that is nonsense. yes, i agree with you.
many years ago and there is no doubt about it, pakistan was not in the terrorism business but in the business of supporting the freedom fight within kashmir and there is ... it. summerlong defined that was wrong. but today for the last few years certainly that is not a correct thing and you cannot be a correct thing. how can you expect he army officers -- how many generals have been lost in pakistan? six brigadier generals. there is a tremendous price paid. how many families? how many people have been killed in their homes? so you think that is what the pakistan army is? they think that is ridiculous for you to say that pakistan is end -- there is nothing official about it. >> maybe i can add something.
some groups are partially controlled but not totally and there is a very very strange situation. that is the key point. the afghan taliban are not fighting the pakistani army. they are in pakistan especially in qatar and allude to stand. and that is also why there are drone attacks or even attacks on the ground in the frontier province.
it is a situation where most of the farc are in the tribal area. when the taliban, -- for the fighting in baluchistan and nobody can strike baluchistan because the pakistani army, there is a line here. you cannot strike qatar and you cannot strike the cities, so i think that is also part of the conversation. >> thank you. >> can i ask the panel is to address main issues in the obama administration and the threat outside of the taliban that is the haqqani network which of course has the sanctuary north of waziristan but if you could assess right now but he believed to be the strength of the haqqani network is racially and
light of the special operations raised not only in pakistan but on the afghan side where i sat does have much more access to go after them? thank you. >> first, in your question there is the idea that the haqqani network is a outside the talibak is wrong. so far, as far as i know, the haqqani network is inside the taliban. at least give me proof that they are not. did we see in the last 10 years clashes or just a clash actually between the people working for haqqani and people working for
omar? did we see official, i mean, kind of official communiqué from haqqani? i don't think so. underground, if you are looking at the taliban organization, you know that you have the provincial organization. there is never been a conflict. >> i just want to address the haqqani network and their operations. >> but it is very important to start with that because from that you know that they are part of the larger strategy and you cannot distinguish because where does it stop the haqqani network? the haqqani network implements part of the network and it made total sense so i would be very very careful about that. to answer exactly your question, first older east and they prefer to phrase it like that in you have seen the taliban
organization, specially because the tribes are not totally out of the picture. the afghan tribes talk with the taliban. they are being destroyed as political forces. the second is that the eastern taliban network are now very close to jalalabad and kabul. that is why i'm very pessimistic in this area. that is one part of the equation. the second part of the equation is that it seems that people close to haqqani and even the idea of a haqqani network that is totally closed is complicated. basically, targeting specific people in afghanistan often link to terrorist.
that is probably a little bit special in the general picture. and nothing indicates so far that there is any kind of pressure under this network from the pakistani army. of course there is a -- in waziristan but there are also technical problems. does not easy to invade and more importantly to stay in these areas and second, so far there is no clashes between the haqqani people and the pakistani army. so, what i'm seeing is that it is very dynamic. their make in progress and they are not under a strategic threat under pakistan's. >> i would just like to add to what gilles has said. both from swat and south waziristan and other elements that escaped from the pakistani
army's operations. that became a point of contention and i think sooner or later the pakistani army will have to go against the haqqani network and they very well recognize this. the question is very obvious that since they are not active against pakistan they will be starting a new -- because there are much better equipped than the other insurgents. number two, the pakistani army is really stretch now. they will need far more helicopters. fortunately it was a helicopter pilot and i've flown in that area. is a very difficult area and almost inaccessible. they can be ambush very quickly so what you really need is a lot of effort.
i think that is what is at the moment dissuading the pakistan army from finally moving toward the haqqani network but i think there is a growing recognition that at the end of the day ultimately they have got to get rid of terrorism within pakistan. the people that the haqqani network has to be addressed and the pakistani army will have to move against them. >> them. >> if i could add to that just having come back from pakistan and having finished a study of counterinsurgency in the nexus with counterterrorism, my own information indicates also that pakistan army still has unfinished business in the border region with the kunar province in afghanistan. they also have unfinished business in the border region between the agencies of thoughts the. where they thought they were fighting the final battle and they couldn't clear their whole
area. so there are sanctuaries in the valley which connects to afghanistan on the kunar side of the afghan border which they feel they need to clear before they can move additional troops to north waziristan. then there is the weather. winter is now setting in and it is going to be nearly impossible to fight in north waziristan because of the territory. you have favre be heard from the other panelists about the difficult terrain. currently the pakistan army has something like 35 to 37,000 troops inside north waziristan. they are basically trying to dominate the space but they are being attacked and they are being killed almost on a daily basis according to my reports by the people that escaped from south waziristan and that are being harbored by either the haqqani group directly or by their allies in north waziristan.
so there is a co-mingling that is now occurring and they think soon we will be able to say that there is no difference between the afghan, taliban and the local taliban in north waziristan. >> if i may just add one thing. that is the problem with the idea that you force the pakistani army to fight the afghani taliban. the problem is we are creating a common interest with the pakistani taliban, so-called taliban. and these people were not born to be together with, and interest. they are very different people but the more we are putting pressure, the more we are creating common interest. if you make a deal with the taliban you can secure the afghan side of the border basically. if you find the afghan taliban
and the pakistani taliban, the problem is it gets out of control because no foreign army is going to control--. >> thank you gilles. >> the barbara slavin. i want to ask a little bit more about the regional context. you have been so negative every time i hear you say it is getting worse and it will never get any better. i have heard recently samore optimistic discussions coming out of afghanistan for take it where he about trade routes. trade coming from central asia, going through iran, going through the indian courts, way to avoid pakistan province connected with pakistan. a very positive prognostication about mineral wealth and pipeline deals and so on. is the classy than a quarter
full in your view? is there nothing good that is going on? >> thank you for the question because it it is good to make two points. first leg -- is to be right or wrong and basically i used to be called pessimistic or whatever. was i right two or three years ago? it seems i was right. was i right in 2003 when i was writing about the taliban coming back to afghanistan? i was right so the problem was not that i was pessimistic. that is my first . the second is, and this is a key element, when i am pessimistic, it is about certain element of the afghan situation.
when you were basically pulling billions of dollars in afghanistan, of course you are creating an economy that is very dynamic. the real estate in kabul right now is undone, the prices have increased and then you have a very dynamic afghan society. the problem is that it is very fragile and it is artificial twister to extend because basically it is totally -- afghanistan is not at all a remote country. in two cases of course it is going to tip to the outside world. the afghan society is very dynamic dissent translate into
stability. that is the key point. on the contrary. the more you are creating interest to continue the war. the main source for the taliban, financial resources for the taliban, is the --. we are giving according to the places five, 10, sometimes 20% just to be able to work in the countryside right now. so it is unstable. we are putting far too much money in afghanistan and if he put in that amount of money you are creating -- the fight against corruption does make sense. when you are putting $1 million in one province because sometimes it is that amount of money, you cannot do something with the money. so of course you find -- with a suitcase with 40 or $50 billion
going to dubai because there is no way -- okay, it is is the culture and it is bad but also there is no way and most of the people would do the same thing. so those are my two points but thank you for the question. >> did you mean to say massoud's brother? barbara has a quick follow-up and then we will move to. >> just a quick follow-up and that is the nation-building efforts such as it is. again i accept a lot of the money is flushing over into corruption but can you give any evaluation of the efforts that have been made by the prt, by the 1000 civilians, u.s. civilians that are now apparently in afghanistan working on rule of law and all of these other social programs? is that also offered now? >> we don't know. we don't feel the impact.
i ask my students to work on that, just between us. nobody can find a good study explaining what is the impact of the provincial constitution. what is the problem with the afghan law? the afghan law, we are checking the inputs so the amount of money basically. we are checking the out put, is the building there? but never the outcome. so we don't know the impact in the political situation and is very interesting because i found actually planned study which is not very well done. basically we don't know the impact. when you have $1 billion in quick emergency aid, 1.2 actually, and 2008, so this cash
money. what is the impact on society in afghanistan? basically we do not know. you have hundreds or thousands of entities working in afghanistan. there is no mistake. there is no mistake. nobody knows exactly. the impact on the society, we can see this creating social tensions of course because some people are becoming -- in a few years so there is no market in the real sense of the term and it is creating tensions between groups, tribes, whatever. that is what we are seeing in kandahar very small group of people is taking 80% of the money. one of the key problems is that there is no reform of the
current inspections. there is no judge in kandahar. the situation is worse than three months ago and i don't see how you can just not put in any administration and think it is going to work. so that is a key point, is not working very well. >> thank you gilles. >> it would just like to add that some of the money has come back to pakistan. 60% of the transport is owned by afghans within pakistan actually. and you know that is a source. the problem is again, we really get nothing for the interest for the rules.
biggest beneficiary and we suffer also at the same time. >> stan kober with the cato institute. a few days ago there was a bombing in iran and a couple of days ago reports in the iranian press that president ahmadinejad called president zardari and basically said you take care of this problem or else. and that is what i want to ask. nobody is talking about the possibility of iranian forces going across the border. iranians have been complaining about this for some time. is their patience runs out and they decide to intervene how does that affect the situation in south asia? >> if you will allow me maybe i can begin to reply and i am sure
gilles and ikram will have if you also. as a historian i go back to 1972 he was discussing just this iran pakistan issue. ipod time there was an insurgency in baluchistan and the shah was basically saying if pakistan doesn't solve this problem, we will. at first he sent over 20 or 30 helicopters to help the pakistan army fight the insurgents but then he was losing patience and it is quite clear that iran has always been very concerned about what happens on the border with pakistan. as for the bombing that was recently reported, from all the public reporting it appears to have been a sectarian issue, because of the processions during the first 10 days particularly on the tenth day of -- so this may or may not
have been related to some of the other terrorist activities that i ran that have been based in pakistan. the biggest complaint in recent years was about jim dole and from all reports that have come out in the last year or so, thus pakistan's intelligence that helped iran capture the ahead. maybe there is a shift in the pakistani calculus and not allowing them to operate in that area and maybe there is a difference of opinion about that that is about all i can add to the discussion. >> just before i came we were discussing this issue about the two borders, the eastern side in the northwestern side.
pakistan is in a difficult position as far as that is concerned. certainly i think our people they did operate on the pakistani side and i think there was a bit of not official but unofficial ignoring them. but at the same time we must remember that pakistanis have very good relationship with the air of country, and south arabia etc. who are definitely not very friendly because of iranian intentions and israeli intentions. pakistan is in a difficult position. it is a serious position that we must address. we cannot afford to have iranian forces coming in because that is all the people need because with the army already stressed, think that would need a catastrophic situation for us. >> my assessment would be that
that -- what i mean is that anytime we have an event it is a bad event. i don't remember an event being positive. when you are trying to make -- is touring and it takes time. it is rational. doesn't make the news very much and when you bomb a car or whatever you are in the news or whatever. all the events are potentially dangerous and for example if there is a second mumbai attack, we don't know what would have happened. my second is that the situation is getting better in the sense that they have -- in iraq now thanks to the u.s. invasion and
they will have more next year and the year after. and they can, they can deal with turkey for the north, for the kurdish side. so undecided is better. in afghanistan, they think that the strategy is going to work for code that is the general opinion of of the russian diplomats. everybody thinks it is going to work so they just have to wait basically. that is why i don't think that iran will take any risk of a fight or any kind direct confrontation with pakistan. that is is not the right moment. it could give the united states to -- put more pressure. and away i am -- time is the key
element and their main problem. [inaudible] which have been active with the people and therefore afraid of the and the fact that they think that the united states has been financing the kurdish groups for the last few years. they are much more afraid of internal dissent than the more strategic picture. >> thank you gilles. >> mr. dorronsoro wants to clarify one thing. and understand your second goal of u.s. policy to have influence, long-term influence into central asia and iran from
afghanistan. i just wanted to clarify did you think that was a sustainable policy or not? is there anything which is consistent with u.s. interests there? >> for the first question, yeah i was probably not very clear. knowno, my idea was basically it is at some point you find something which is generally not very impressive but something is going to top. so, no it is not. the second question is i have a clear idea.
what i think we should do us much more difficult, vis-à-vis afghanistan. first, india should not help support and finance the groups, people who are trying to sell in washington the idea that they are going to contain the alabama alabama -- taliban if we give them arms and money. and i am not speaking theoretically. it is very practical. so, think it is a very bad idea because the idea that we could withdraw for example. that is what the ambassador was suggesting. when we withdraw from afghanistan and leave the taliban in control of the border it is just totally irrational.
are securities on the border so if you want to make a deal with the people on the border it is certainly -- where there is not as far as i know some kind of transnational threats you know so this policy is both dangerous because it could be the disintegration of. you will have this integration of pakistan. that is a given. so you are putting a system in place that is totally crazy. what they should not do is also try to be very visible. it should be low-profile. and the third thing is, because i mean it is putting pressure on afghanistan and the last point is that they should try to negotiate with their coalition
their security interests. that means we have -- afghanistan should not be a base for jihad this groups for the next 9/11 event or the next mumbai and that is a strong position in the negotiation. on that, we have all the same interests. and that would be part and that should be part of the negotiation with the taliban and pakistan. and it is not just a piece of paper. it is how do you do it? so is it possible for example -- it is doable and. [inaudible]
>> i think in short, there is a red flag for pakistan and afghanistan. i think their particular interest would be solved by the economic and let's have less conflict on on the border etc.. i think that would be -- the pakistani establishment is very suspicious of india and it intentions in afghanistan and they feel that you know everything is done with a purpose. so i think one major thing india can do this to say to pakistan we will help with political ambitions and secondly the as gilles said --. >> if if i could just add to that. i i think pakistan probably needs to also change its way of
looking at afghanistan and no longer see if solely through the prism of the pashtun. i think the the same mistake that goes back to the time of the soviet invasion and the fact that the contiguous area was pashtun made pakistan and allied inside of afghanistan and this constant harping on trying to have a rebalance government in kabul really is not one pakistan many friends inside of afghanistan. apart from alienating a very substantial proportion of the population, which constitutes the uzbek, the tajik and so on. i think that would help and clearly both india and pakistan do have a common aim in afghanistan which is stability because of afghanistan is stable then pakistan will be stable and if afghanistan and pakistan are stable you can start opening the borders between india and
pakistan and connect through afghanistan to tajikistan and provide the energy that india will need to sustain its nine and 10% annual growth rate or goes so there are many things that could drive working together in afghanistan rather than working against each other. >> and just come coming you are perfectly right and to the idea that pakistan is going to go -- controlled afghanistan, is not going to work. the day the taliban is back in afghanistan, they will take about of distance and look, the taliban were back in afghanistan.
basically they were very autonomous from pakistan and they did plenty of things that were absolutely against pakistani interests. so, it is very possible to find a deal with the border in the idea with neutrality in afghanistan. so because the taliban are part of a government they will obey pakistan i think is --. >> president obama is running out of time because next july 2011 he has to reassess its strategy. there are reports although denied, that there are plans for usaid to go into pakistan and do some operations against the afghan taliban. if america does that order of the dangers and benefits of that? >> first of all, the pakistani
army is not fighting the --. the haqqani network are operating, i agree with that but the taliban as a separate entity and i think you will want him to explain that. the second part of your question is definitely a disaster. if there are boots on the ground from the united states inside pakistan, i don't think any pakistan government or anybody in the -- will be able to sustain that without immediately reacting. the first thing they will do is stop all of the supply routes. i would say to start but that is the first thing they should do. the second thing of course and i strongly feel that there is an attack on pakistan, they will fight back on the issues but i think that would be a total
disaster. that would escalate the situation out-of-control. i think that should not even come -- and i saw that article which came out yesterday in "the new york times." i think basically i mean the little bit that i understand it is confined to the general mass of people and pakistan. [inaudible] and a i say to you that there are pakistani intelligence but the fact that american boots being on the ground, that would be a disaster. >> well, of course i mean it is
not even a rational. i mean it is very strange. i don't know who are the sources in "the new york times" very clearly but i hope it was just an overoptimistic article. the thing is that now we should reassess. the united states should reassess its policy towards pakistan in the sense that it is better to keep the connection between the afghan taliban and the pakistan army at this point because even if the pakistanis are trying to fight the afghan taliban they will not succeed very clearly and you will have a situation where it will be very difficult to find somebody to talk with. at this point i am more afraid of the lack of people to talk with more than the insurgency has such. for example if pakistan changes totally its policy, so -- 24
hours and they can do that of course. so there is no more taliban but you still have a very strong insurgency inside of afghanistan. plus you have afghan, taliban and pakistani taliban working totally together and both sides of the border. what is the worst? i am not sure it is the better situation and honestly i don't think it is a very important strategy being gained. >> let me add to that. i think there is an additional danger and gilles mentioned that in his opening remarks which is but very powerful budding relationship between the afghan taliban, the pakistani taliban and the punjabi military groups which are a far more serious threat regionally and globally now as all the current reports are indicating. they have links in india with bangladesh and with people in europe and north america. these groups are much more
dangerous and can certainly create a very serious problem in the heartland of pakistan where it will be near impossible for the pakistan military to be deployed in the punjab. they can also create a very serious situation with india. if another mumbai attack occurs i think prime minister singh will find it difficult to resist the clamor for some kind of action against pakistan so i would say that is the nightmare scenario. i think when one looks at afghanistan and the taliban situation, quite often military planners do what they do which is they look at the tactical issue. if only i could just go across and grabbed these guys to bring them back, but this is not a simple equation. is a multi-varied equation and you need to be able to look at
pakistan, india afghanistan iran, everyone all at the same time. i think that is something that needs cooler heads to prevail. a hope in in the isaf senior command in kabul and islamabad and in washington. >> thank you. could you comment a bit about the success or lack thereof of efforts to build up the afghan security forces and the police and are you confident that they can take a security lead started in july as the obama administration hopes? >> let me tell you first, i mentioned that the national army during the soviet time never fought the majority. the one national army deserted and block the taliban.
and the iran national army is not fighting the taliban. and look at the desertion rate. in the iran national security forces police almost 75% annually and then the iran national army 25%. look at the -- i would say it is a test of whether an army is engaged in battle are not. what is the characteristics of the army? at least i have tried to research them and have not been able to find it. more than 100 in the last 18 months in the iran national army. >> quickly, three points on the afghan mission. first it takes time to train officers and we don't have officers. i mean we have officers usually but we don't have a new
generation of officers so it is not going to be ready in 2014, that is for sure. the second problem we have is that the nctc questioned in the afghan army is becoming really bad in the sense that most of the people fighting in armand or whatever are non-pashtun. pashtun are not joining. there are a few exceptions. the -- try because they are doing that all of the time, 50, 60 years. but generally no. you have a situation where the guise of fighting are fighting the in the armand, they are -- and that is a huge problem. the rest of the problem is you can build an army without a
state basically. it is a bit risky i think. what we are doing now in afghanistan, there is no more -- in afghanistan to be clear. the state is losing ground all of the time. they have no control of the population. there is no control of the countryside and in the south we see that -- there is basically nothing. and there you want to build an army of 300,000 or more people but officers are human beings. they have a political affiliation. they need to fight for a state. they want to fight for something. and what you are seeing now is that more and more -- is acting as a kind of good federation and
the old tradition where he is paying networks of people in and the army is going this way because he wants to put demolish inside of the army and the private security inside the army. my feeling is that the army is not going to be a strong organizational institutiinstituti on with this kind of culture that you are part of an institution. and for the police i think the basic problem is that we are asking the police to do a counterinsurgency job and they cannot do it. but the basic premise is more that they are not equipped to fight the taliban. that is it. >> gilles mentioned this idea of little bit before and talked about this a little bit before but it was probably ambassador
rockwell who said there should be a de facto partition of taliban but that is the most realistic outcome and perhaps that would reduce the u.s. reliance on pakistan and all that entails. do you see any merits in this argument for de facto partition or do you is unrealistic way of thinking? >> i think it is unrealistic. i think afghanistan is a nation. i think my own feeling is that this even-handed policy, you know when the taliban had a few years of dead ruled they did reach out except for the punjab state did reach out. i think ultimately you have to come to a solution. you cannot -- and that will create more problems. then what is going to happen is that you have division and they were going to have trouble in
some attack inside -- pakistani border. you start one problem that create another problem and then once we have over to stand, they will search sing something and waziristan will start saying something. so what you do is you may start one problem but start many of the problems. >> i agree that -- there is a worse case scenario that we can develop into worlds. that as is things are not going well and for washington politico negotiate with the taliban. so one way to -- out is to quickly with plenty of money some militia in the north around kabul and you exit.
without an argument. that is not likely because -- it is a headache and almost impossible but let's follow this you would have a huge ethnic cleansing because don't forget millions of pashtun are vb and the north and there is an impression in the northwest and it could be much worse. if you have this kind of situation, you are destabilizing of course all of the. the other aspect is that just suggests speaking of attacks, it is putting the taliban in a very good situation because they can say okay we are fighting for the afghan nation and don't make the
mistake. maybe they have been -- but they love their country. and explaining that okay we are going to organize a partition of afghanistan, it is the perfect thing for the taliban. it is absolutely, i mean in and i do not suggest that ambassador black what is -- by the taliban but it is perfect. let's go on like that and the only representative of the afghan national would be the taliban. >> we at the question here and that i have four questions and we are going to end with ambassador pickering. may i suggest if we could move thickly through the questions? >> i am an american citizen who was born in india and i would like to address this comment and
question to our friend from pakistan. i don't know whether -- he is not obviously representing the pakistani government but i do want to defend you against that comments that came that pakistanis and in the business of terrorism. if pakistan has been thanks to the united united states, whichy got introduced to the cia during the soviet presidency in afghanistan so if pakistan had to enter the terrorism business thanks to cia, which was terrorism business and continues to be in state terrorism business even to this day. so you are no different. the question on this table should be what the united states should do in the near future, and to me it seems the united states should not have gone in in afghanistan. i was opposed to it when
mr. bush made that move. i thought that was a pretty dumb move and since then, after he has gotten us tangled into afghanistan and even our democratic resident mr. obama has gotten into it and it is a shame that he has. it is time for the united states to withdraw and let all the ethnic cleansing that should take place in afghanistan after u.s. moves as this gentleman has pointed out, let afghanistan achieved its equilibrium among its own different ethnic groups and hopefully, and hopefully pakistan and india will not interfere in that process. therefore, afghanistan will survive. ..
>> last night's news indicated the american military managed to obtain a treaty with the local afghan war lord, which they have initialed and signed. for $1 million they will not grow poppies. what do you think of this method of controlling drugs in afghanistan and eliminating it? it appears they are willing to do so. >> i think it's a start. because at least, you know, as long as the money doesn't get for the taliban. as long as the money doesn't go to the taliban. i think basically what i suggested we followed was
alternative crops which are brought up. which are brought over. so that the farmers knows whatever he's going to produce is going to be brought over. that would be a better way of going about it. at the same time, i think at least it's a start. at least you are not growing poppy and the poppy is not going to laboratories. one of the things that occurs to me, you know, all of these players which are there in kabul today, they all have houses and links in dubai. and they all want money in dubai. they don't want to stick around and wait for the taliban to take over the country. they are going to take off. not the same north lands that we knew in the massuod.
>> i don't know the deal. so i comment marginally. we put the taliban in a difficult place from our states -- i mean the individuals from businessmen in pakistan and the international works and international aid which is the main source of money. so opium is not that ridiculous. and if it's not a very expensive insurgency that people are fighting for resolution. and arms are everywhere. so that's the first thing. maybe it's going to work, maybe not. but it's not going to affect the
long term strategic perspective. the second is that we should be careful about local solution for drugs, you know. it never worked. it's structural. why? because you have a great project and i think the british were mentioning that sort of thing in the 1890s. you have a great project in one aspect. you are buying the drugs or doing whatever. so it's working. you have a great report. and at the same time, the people are moving. i mean just the opportunity of the respect. so local solution up, never, never worked in afghanistan. the example -- in north banshi.
you have that everywhere. member the family was trying to make a deal with the american ambassador in istanbul at that time just to buy a solution. so, no, it's not going to do anything. if it's a local man, going out to expand the poor. expect that is not going to change the system. >> you have a brief comment? >> i think it was a lot faster. i have to disagree about the local solution. i think in afghanistan, what you'd have to do, you'd have to have local solution into trying with each other. because it's such a diverse tribal society, you would have to have local solutions. i think that's a start. i think you'll have to try matters like that.
and if you look at it, there are local -- there are local local solutions in place or when it was massoud. that was how they managed to control the thing by having solutions. i think arguably, that's what they have tried if nothing else. >> okay. good question here. >> please wait for the microphone. >> i have a quick question for mr. sehgal and shuja. you both talked about india's. diplomacy on p5, but not pakistan. i was just curious as we look at 2011.
>> would you like to go first? >> i think basically, i'm one of those who admires what india has done. i think what one would like to do is indian, you know, take on the responsibility of the power in that area; right? and each out to his neighbors; right? and not repeat, you know, -- or belabor or beat box where this thing is at. i think pakistan definitely realized there is need to engage with india. i think pakistan is looking forward to that. i think every time something comes up, the leadership has taken on. i think perhaps india and diplomacy there has been lacking. india diplomacy has not shown the maturity. if you remember, i talked about
china. china has a lot of problems. you know, et cetera, et cetera, it is an active order problem. but yet it came. and obviously here's the stories about the united states, you know, propping up india for china. yet it moved to establish those economic links between the limited transfer. i think that is what we expect from india. if india engages with us. i want to feel that, you know, an agreement or it's not going to be possible in two or three lifetimes. but i think an arrangement is possible. you know, as opposed to an agreement. i think if we have been an arrangement, individuals heading in the direction, i think that goes along with what we said. >> i'll just respond by saying the answer is in economics. i think pakistan has a shrinking
economic buy and india has a growing economic buy. pakistan doesn't have an economic approach. there's a divide between the civilians and military. the best and only way that's currently available is trade with india. there's some resistance among the establishment which is the code word in pakistan for the military to this approach. but there is now growing support among civil society on both sides of the border. the question now is how quickly they can move on. 2010 was a year of missed opportunities. i think the fact this matter was left to the mandarins in the foreign office in both india and pakistan meant that it was going to die a slow death. there needs to be an effort at
the highest level. in pakistan's case, it means the military. very much so the way they have been in dialogue with the united states. once that starts happening, there have been responsibilities. >> once the last -- i think we are maybe running short of time. if i don't mind, i'll give you a couple of seconds for winding up. two more questions please. >> you mentioned three or four times negotiating the scenario. you mentioned a little bit more lipically than you you'ded, -- than you'd like, the taliban will be back in charge. what will help karzai and the others. you mentioned you got 37,000
troops in north war -- waziristan, what are you going to do about it? absolutely nothing. or make a deal, or drive them back into afghanistan? what are your choices? what direction do you go? >> okay. very quickly under the negotiation, i want to move the microphone towards you, thanks. >> i think two questions that shouldn't be exonerated. the political and social forces. if you just consider the political forces, you have the taliban and not much else. when i say social forces, it means so-called society, and the
shiite and such. also businessman or so. i mean kind of political deals. maybe a new constitution. but it should be between afghans with outer in the outside as it goes between. it's the 2001 process again. with the taliban. we should let them do most of the job. and behind when you have to push it forward, you went further to the negotiation at the end of the process. and there's the second that's quite different. the international security which where you work in india, you work the united states, and in the country, and everybody is in charge and it's clear they
should be also out of the process. where? we say we can spend the reason if they should be asked and clearly, the afghan government is not going to stop us. because it's a right, it's the united nations. and it's the corrective difference. and in this kind of agreement, you can say, okay, some troops could be in afghanistan on that spot of the negotiation. and also you have to go in details. is there a schedule? if there is, what are we going to do? you need a commission to do that, and so on and so on. so i think this is -- this kind of negotiation is unique. and so it's two different things. of course, it's impossible to to do just one. you have to do both.
you have to be distinguished. two different tables. same people are not invited in two different ones. >> i believe we should not have gone in 2003 and into waziristan without adequate forces. without adequate forces, we will come -- we don't have such agreements. we are responding to every attack. we have to have the adequate forces, and we have to have the adequate government. that includes a lot. because we have the mobility, we can deal with the problem. but you cannot have these treaties within the iran borders with people like this. this is absolutely asking for trouble. >> we could just extend to the
last question at the back because i don't want to disappoint the gentleman. >> media, has the media coverage about what has been happening economically in south asia been sufficient and mostly accurate. is there anything more any of you think should have been gotten more attention than it has particularly in the united states? >> let me see if i can respond quickly to that, trying to wrap it up too at same time. i think the media attention on india has been quite adequate and extremely well represented in the sense of recognizing the changes that have occurred on the landscape in india and globally. the attention on pakistan's economy has been much less than it should have been. and this, i think, has taken the emphasis away from the economy and it's affects on politics in pakistan to the military aspects of the relationship between the u.s. and pakistan, particularly
focused on the western bordered. i think that has created a kind of distortion. and when elections take place inside pakistan, people vote on economic issues. the way they vote on economic issues in the united states. and so, i think there is a risk if the media doesn't recognize the importance of economics in the region as much as they ought to. >> with that i'm wonder if you would like to sum up your view of 2011 in a sentence of two? what you expect? >> two sentences? >> yes. >> okay. so i think 2011 is -- i mean the center of 2011 would be in the key moment for the reassessment of the strategy in the afghanistan. if nothing is done at this point, 2011, if we wait, it will
be impossible if we wait because it will be underground. >> thank you. how do you see 2011? >> i think -- i think 2011 in the sense that i think if we are more responsible, mature policy from india and pakistan's engagement in india will help us becoming more and dealing with the iran situation. at the moment we seem to lock over our back. the second thing that we must -- and i think we are already on the way to having -- dealing with the insurgency to an extent. we still have something left. we need to have a force to deal with the problem in pakistan.
shuja talked about it. the terrorists and affiliates throughout the country scare me far more than the president. the pakistan army cannot leave it. it has to be a separate force dedicated. >> thank you. >> i think that's a good point to segue into my last comments. which is just today the gallop international released it's poll on what they call the global barometer on net hope. looking at our region, it's very interesting. they don't see pakistan very favorable this year. in 2011, 13% of pakistanis only see 2011 as a likely of the property -- prosperity. much larger, giving it a
in afghanistan, interestingly, it is 24%. in iraq, about 15%. in india, there's a net hope of 34%. in previous years, india scored lower than pakistan on these measures. even though the per capita of 30 is in the two countries, in india 3260 u.s. dollars, but when it comes to net hope, the gap is much bigger. 24% -21% in pakistan. not a great way to end at the discussion but i have to remind you, the secretary of to -- the secretary of state george shultz said that hope is not a policy.
we have to wait for the policy makers to come up with practical solutions to the problems. i think you all for thinking -- for coming. thank you all for joining us at home. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> monday is day one of the american university's annual campaign management institute, a training students to work on political campaigns. we will hear from political consultants and strategist from both parties. topics include the general political environment and the chicago mayor's raise. we will have live coverage starting and 9:00 a.m. ease band -- 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2. come january, they will be eight new members of the new look --
of the u.s. house from the state of florida. one of them is sande adams from the 24th district along the central lentic coast. a member of the state house, she is a former deputy county sheriff and air force veteran. she defeated democratic incumbent. 59%-40%. another new member from florida, david rivera, a republican who beat up four-term democratic incumbent. he is a native of brooklyn and will be representing the 25th congressional district, covering the far southwestern miami metro area and the florida keys. the new congress convenes on wednesday january 6 with live coverage on c-span. florida is one state that stands to gain two new congressional seats during the 2011 redistricting. population growth is measured by the 2010 census. it shows that most of the
state's that gained house seats a lean to the gop. texas will gain four new representatives while arizona, georgia, and nevada, south carolina, utah, and washington will gain one new seats each. six are considered political conservative. >> up closing speech has unnecessary aspect of this out to. and coming to an end, the predominant feeling is pride in the great privilege to be a part of this very unique body. >> search the farewell speeches and hear from retiring senators on the c-span video library with every c-span program since 1987. more than 160,000 hours, all on line, all three. it is washington your way.
from the washington journal, a look at the legal and congressional challenges of the new rule passed by the fcc on that neutrality. this is about 35 minutes. ngton journal" continues. host: it was last tuesday at the federal communications commission where there was a vote that took place on rules that dealt with the internet, to deal specifically with the topic called net neutrality. we're going to talk about that for our next 45 minutes. but in order to kind of set the stage on the debate, here's julia, the chairman, as he explains what these rules will accomplish. >> today we're adopting a set of high level rules of the road that strikes the right balance between these impertives. we're adopting a framework that will increase certainty for businesses, investors, entrepreneurs, in key respects the interests of edge
innovators, the entrepreneurs creating internet content services and application, their interests, the interests of broad band providers and of american consumers are aligned. innovation at the edge catalyzes consumer demand for broad band, consumer deband for private investment, faster networks sparks ever cooler invation at the edge. i believe our action today will foster an ongoing cycle of massive investment, innovation, an consumer demand both at the edge and in the core of broad band networks. our action will strengthen the internet job creation engine. our action wl advance our goals of having america's broadband networks be the freest and the fastest in the world. >> some of you may have understood that. and for those who don't, lynne,
who follows this, is along to answer questioning about that. first, let's start with the basics. net neutrality as a term i don't knowf many people would understand. what does it mean? guest: it means treating all of the information that you want to send and receive over the internet equally, so that the broad band provider is providing a service, like at&t, comcast or verizon doesn't decide that one service or another service, like skiping or getting overhe top video like hullu or net flicks might be treatd better or worse than another depending how it benefits one or the other. host: has there been incidents in the past where nsk was blocked by these providers? guest: the two main cases that the fcc tends to cite are quite a few years back. about 2005 flfs a small telephone company blocking voice tover internet protocol. and then much more recently, in
2008, comcast was intervening in -- they were blocking in the processing and sending of peer-to-peer file sharing. host: some may not understand that. guest: it means you can go out and take data files, video, clips, whatever, that are actually located around the internet. instead of going to some main provider, you would get it sitting on somebody else's computer and you would go to get it. content providers, especially with broad band service providers argued that an awful lot of that content was illegal, that it was copyright infringing material. though the person who brought this to the attention of the public was trying to share barber shop quart at the time files around the turn of the century that were clearly out of copyright protection.
so it affected people doing other things with it. host: how do people understand that? guest: most people would be out of their local telephone company or cable company that is providing them with internet access, the company that lets you get to the internet and then you go to web sites and various services. host: and if i'm one and i'm concerned about traffic traveling, what would cause me or what would i have to say that's a bit of concern, maybe i should keep that from happening? guest: there's a lot of different issues. a lot of time what there are concerns about is just congestion. just too much traffic. and that was in fact what comcat said was the problem. because there were so many people sharing information. if you were a bit torrent user you might not be a ware of the traffic you were creating because you had know idea it was happening. it was just sending out all
this traffic. so part of it is the congestion traffic yuge issue. part of it the fcc would argue is the competitive issue, particularly for a cable provider who is also your internet provider but also increasingly at&t, they want video, too, as a subscription service. there are services on the internet that compete with that, like net flicks, like huh will you that possibly people will do what they call cut the cord and no longer subscribe to a paid subscription based video service like comcast or others and instead just get all their video either for fre or for $12 a month. are host: so competition interests. guest: yes. host: so the chairman passes these rules. what does that mean for all the players involved and what was done at the fcc last week? guest: the fcc basically
divided providers into two galtgrizz fixed providers and local providers. fixed would be the ones that i was just talking about, mainly your at&t, comcast, verizon fios, as well as fixed wireless providers that it's not like your cell phone or your smart phone that you use anywhere. it basically is going to one point and that you used to service there. and the other are the providers, keeping your service over your smart phone or a little modem card that you stick into your computer or laptop if you have an i-pad that you're connecting to the internet through. host: so now that these new rules are in place, what does that mean? guest: so if all providers have to provide transparency now. they have to tell you what speed is providing, what that really means. not just up to something. but they have to give you some idea what that means. they have to tell you how they are managing their network.
if they are blocking some category of service or if the have a cap that they're not tting you have more than x meg at bs or giga bits a month they have to tell you this. there's also a rule for not blocking and degrading. that's where kind of the division comes in. r fixed providers they're not allowed to block or degrade web sites, contents, application services that are accessed over the internet. where as the mobble providers, because the fcc accepts their argument about their network being a little different, both because they don't have the capacity sometimes that the fixed providers have but also because it's harder for them to predict what the demand might be at a given time. people might show up for things unexpectedly. they can plan for sporting events to some degree. but if everybody is on their mobile phone, it's much harder to predict. so they're only required to not
block or degrade web sites or services that compete with their own voice and video services that they offer. so it's a little bit more focused in terms of the nonblocking. host: so now i cabinet say, if i'm a network provider, i'm observing this, i see someone wanting a net flicks video, i can't slow the tap sorks to speak, to get to the ondse other end. guest: exactly. host: if you have questions, she is the person to do that for us. if you want to ask questions, our numbers e on the bottom of your screen. you can e-mail or twitter if toupt give your input there. from last tuesday, how do the network providers or the operators generally respond? guest: they've actually been for the most part somewhat mute
in their criticism of it. a lot of them are saying we have to wait and see the precise language of the rules which were not available on tuesday. they didn't come out until late thursday and a lot of people were headed home at that time and didn't see them. so there's a certain amount of restraint in terms of their reaction. some of the stronger language actually come from support irs of net neutrality who feel that the rules were not strong enough, did not do enough to protect consumers and to protect what are called edge providers. those are the ones that write net fliction. google. anybody providing a service over the internet. host: your first call from kansas, republican line. john, go ahead. can are you there? caller: good morning. we have -- just a second. i had it muted and my button
didn't work. i think it's muted now. host: go ahead, sir. caller: good. well, let's see. now that the fcc is planning to take over the internet -- you know, the internet has worked very well for many, many years. not perfectly, but very, very well. now, let's take a look at how the government runs things into the ditch as our esteemed president likes to say. the post office, the postal service of america is run by the united states government. it pays absolutely no taxes, no property taxes, no sales taxes, no fees, and it's one of the $10 billion loss. then we've got on the other hand private enterprise, the ups and fed ex and others, and they're making money and they're paying taxes out the wa zoo. now that we've got the fcc running the internet, they're going to be able to gu