tv U.S. House of Representatives CSPAN January 31, 2011 5:00pm-8:00pm EST
than it is about the contribution that one can make. and it's just an interesting transition. and frankly, it's -- you know, somebody asked me an interesting question. he said, "is this book kind of a -- give you closure to your presidency?" and that's a fascinating question and to a certain extent, i think it does. i hadn't thought of it that way. but sitting there and writing this thing for 18 months or however long it took, 20 months, was not only fulfilling but to a certain extent it did end closure to the presidency. this is a -- this book is an opportunity for me to lay out what i saw, what i heard on important issues and put it in a way that i hope the average reader can understand it and that the future historian will find it useful. and maybe that is a period to the presidency. although you'd never stop
>> for a dvd copy of this program, call1-877-662-7726. for free transcripts or to give as your comments about this program, visit us at q-and-a .org. >> coming up at 8 eastern tonight, journalists marvin kalb takes to an inside look at the new york times. we will bring you live coverage starting at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> tonight on "the communicators," we will talk about the state permits role in freedom of expression matters
across the globe. the federal trade commission's very first team in technologist on his role at the ftc on privacy matters. tonight on c-span2. texas c-span networks provide coverage of politics, public affairs, and non-fiction books and american history. it is all available to you on television, radio, on line, and on social media networking sites. byner content anytime 3 c-span is video library. we take c-span on the road with our digital bus local content vehicle. washington your way, the c-span networks. now available in more than 100 million homes. created by cable, provided as a public service. >> state department spokesman p.j. crowley confirmed that former u.s. ambassador to egypt is in cairo with -- for meetings with government officials to repeat the obama
administration's recent call for political and economic reforms amid large anti-government protests. the state department briefing is just under an hour. >> before beginning, i am delighted to welcome back to the state department -- let me start the briefing first and we will do this official. good afternoon and welcome to the department of state. the one person i want to have stand-up and take about, we have been fortunate at the state department, a person who is familiar to you, he has been running in the press operations for the last number of years has returned to the mother ship, as he called it. he will be interacting with many of you, particularly those who wish to speak in the language of spanish.
so we are very happy to have mike here as our principal deputy. secretary clinton will host an informal dinner this evening for visiting nato secretary general, secretary of defense gates, an assistant secretary for european and eurasian affairs. it is an opportunity for secretaries clinton and gates to compare notes with the secretary-general on the outcome of last november's net of summit in lisbon and review potential issues for discussion for the next nato summit in 2012, which the united states has offered to host. all this week we are hosting the 2011 local chiefs of mission conference here at the department. it is a historic gathering never
rides an opportunity for our ambassadors to be the outcomes of the quadrennial diplomacy and development review and discuss strategies for implementation of this and other key initiatives in the context of current and future budget realities. for those of you who have read it from cover to cover, i am sure everybody in this room has done so. it talks about the changing role and the changing demand of our ambassadors, as the war becomes more complicated. our operations across government become more integrated. our ambassadors or running a government operation and working through the implications of that. at the same time want to hear from ambassadors. there are field generals out there at poster around the world, what they see in terms of the challenges that the
department faces going forward. there will be breakout sessions where we will be listening to the ambassadors as they help us understand the challenges of preventing conflict, in reforming security and justice around the world, encountering violent extremism, building private-public partnerships, supporting commercial and economic diplomacy, enhancing regional engagement, strengthening planning and budgeting, advancing human rights and democracy, and promoting sustainable development. during the course of the week, the secretary will have some significant reactions of ambassadors on wednesday and thursday. from chairman mike mullen later in the week.
that will go through our anticipated budget for2 retary f the u.s. delegation to the african union summit. the delegation included the special envoy for sued on an assistant secretary of african affairs, johnny carson. in addition to meeting with heads of the delegation, the deputy secretary met with african union commission chair person. a major outcome of the sum included reaffirmation of recognition of the winner of last year's presidential election. i think we just put out a statement that the united states, responding to the brutal post-election crackdown by the government of belarus has taken action.
the u.s. is revoking the general license that are authorized u.s. persons to do business with two belo russian -- belaursian cos. we'll continue to adjust their policies. these measures are not cleared -- not aimed at the people of belarus. we will continue to coordinate closely with the european union which is announcing its own sanctions today. regarding egypt, let me bring you up-to-date on the flow of american citizens out of cairo. we do have a couple of airplanes that are very close to taking off. when they do in the next few minutes, we will have had nine
flights leave cairo today, taking more than 1200 american citizens out to three destinations. one is -- cyprus, athens, greece, an easton will, turkey. -- istanbul, turkey. one flight made two round trips and we were able to put a small number of american citizens on a canadian flight leaving cairo today. we are very grateful for the support of the government of canada. we also were able to put some u.s. citizens on a military flight that happen to be in the area and we were able to divert it to take out some american citizens as well.
in terms of tomorrow, we anticipate at least the same level of effort, another six flights planned. tomorrow we expect to begin to add other destinations. we might have to flights tomorrow going through frankfurt, but as we also have begun to do surveys around country, as soon as we cannot we will have flights going to ask one and luxor in the next day or two as we have identified pockets of american citizens in those locations as well. as i have some other american citizen information, but i can come back to that. >> he said the military flight
had been diverted. my understanding is that it is actually bringing in security augmentation. >> it was a target of opportunity. >> but it was not a diverted like. >> fair enough. -- not a diverted flights. >> as we are working through this authorized departure, we are sending more than 40 additional consulate officers to cairo and our other safe havens to assist u.s. citizens and of men and our forces in cairo, as well as being able to handle the additional burden at posts for which they are receiving american citizens from egypt. one of our limitations at the present time is the curfew between 3:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.
it has limited the ability of americans to float to the airports. the airport is open 24/7, so as people get to the airport, that are being put on the next available flight out. we are rare successful today. my understanding is we have roughly 50 american citizens at the airport now that were probably on the flights today or will be put on the first light tomorrow. as we reach a a.m. tomorrow, we anticipate there will be an additional flow of american citizens to the airport. roughly 2600 people have contacted us by a variety of means and registered with us that they wish to leave the country. obviously today we have put a pretty big dent that you did in
that number, and it will fluctuate from day to day as american citizens make their own decisions about whether to stay in egypt or to leave. just a reminder, american citizens who have the ability to get out through traditional means are doing so at the same time. there are still commercial flights coming in and out of cairo. they are operating on a slightly reduced schedule, but people have other commercial options besides these like that we have set up. we do ask american citizens and their immediate family members to verify if they have valid travel documents before proceeding to the airport. if a u.s. citizen lacks of valid u.s. passport, they can go to the embassy. family members can consult with the proper officials are designated safe haven destinations to make sure they
have the required into documents. we are making every effort to expedite evacuation's of u.s. citizens. u.s. citizens should come to the airport prepared to wait, because for the 50 that we estimate here, that will be at the airport for several hours before we will be able to move them out. the internet situation is still down in egypt, but we do note that people do have access to land lines and some cellphone coverage. more detailed information is always available on travel.state.gov. >> the 2600 people is you mentioned, this represents the ones who want to leave of all
the americans, or are there americans you have not been in touch with yet? >> these numbers are going to be on a roller coaster for several days. there are roughly 50,000 americans who have registered, who have been registered in the system with the embassy in cairo. we expect there are probably a larger number of americans who are physically in the country at the present time. not all of them will want to leave. many of them will want to stay. this will be a dynamic process where as a contact us, as they verify that they have travel documents and want to leave, some will contact us and register online, some will call us, and some will probably to show up at the airport.
>> are you doing contingency planning about other ways to get people out? are there listings drawn up the boats and planes that could be brought into this operation if it does need to be expanded? >> we have established a fairly good flow. if we have six charters plus available aircraft that might arrive in cairo that puts us in good stead, we will do this for a number of days. obviously it is an uncertain situation on the ground. we have no information that suggests that american citizens have been targets. no american citizen has been killed or injured. we can carried out in an orderly way as we go through. >> is the u.s. plan to send someone to cairo to meet or speak with president hosni mubarak? can you confirm this?
>> the former ambassador to egypt travels frequently to cairo, and given his expertise, we have asked him to add his perspective to our analysis of current developments. he has traveled to cairo and is on the ground now. we look forward to hearing his news when he returns. >> does he have a message for the president? >> he has the ability to talk to leaders in egypt. we have sent a very clear message publicly and privately, so this is not about a lack of communication. >> can you give us a sense of who he is meeting with? is he meeting with any other political official? >> i do not know his particular
schedule. he arrived today, and i cannot tell you who he has met with at this point. >> he said today that the change must happen at the top and that we also need to see action. are you defending mubarak? >> asking if we want to see a process unfold, the secretary talked about this yesterday during her sunday show appearance. president reinforces, in late friday after talking to president mubarak. he pledged to undertake political and economic reforms. as we have said ever since, we want to see concrete actions that shows that the government is responding to the aspirations of the egyptian people. we will be looking for concrete
action, a process that leads egypt to more inclusive environment and of free, fair, and credible election later on this year. >> these are decisions to be made inside of egypt. >> can you elaborate on the concrete steps that you want to see undertaken in egypt? >> the process has to be inclusive. it has to open next states for political and economic reform to happen. has to be inclusive and bring it into the national dialogue. those who want to have an opportunity to shake egypt's future. as to specific steps, it is not for us to impose our vision on
egypt, but one thing we will be looking at as egypt goes through this is revocation of the emergency law. [unintelligible] >> he is a private citizen. he is a retired diplomat and former ambassador to egypt. he knows some of the key players within the egyptian government. we thought it was useful, both for him to have the opportunity and to interact with egyptian society, and we will look forward to hearing his perspective on what is
happening. >> did you ask him to go to egypt? did the administration asked him to go to egypt to try to find out what is going on? >> i cannot tell you whether he was planning to go and then we took advantage of his opportunity or if we ask him to go. >> you said there is communication between you and the egyptians. what exactly can mr. wisner bring to the table? you say you have made clear to the authorities that you want an orderly transition. is that mean there are some things that are better said in private, face-to-face, and this is what mr. wisner will be doing? >> we have said lots of things publicly and privately.
our messages both public and private have been very consistent. this is an opportunity, both for ambassador wisner, who has a history with some of these key figures, to meet with them and reinforce what the president's and secretary said at the same time. he has the opportunity to gain perspective on what they are thinking and what their ideas are in terms of the process. >> or other channels within the government that are communicating directly with president mubarak and whether there are channels to communicate with any opposition interest? >> we have talked to mr. hull are a guide in the past and that dialogue will certainly continue elbaradai.boren di
we will continue to touch base with all of these elements that we hope would be a part of this broad national dialogue. >> can you be more specific? it does not say who you spoke to and when. >> to answer a specific question, i don't believe we have had any contact with mr. elbaradei in recent days. we do assistant outreach and we will continue to do that. >> your message from the podium to him as the lead opposition figure in egypt is what? >> he is one of many different
voices that should be heard during these negotiations with the government. >> your counterpart at the white house, mr. gibbs, said that they expect it to be included in the next government. -- the muslim brotherhood might be included in the next government. >> what is important here is not any particular group. it is the process that allows the egyptian government, the egyptian people to have their aspirations heard, and how the government response to these aspirations. we have not had any contact with the muslim brotherhood recently. i think robert gibbs laid out that from our standpoint, any group that wants to play a role
in egypt future has to be committed to non-violence and willing to be a participant in and respect the democratic process. >> there is some suggestion that aid to egypt might be reviewed, but secretary lynn and others indicated this was not really an issue. is it being reviewed, what might trigger a review, and if not, why would the u.s. not use it as immediate leverage? >> what robert gibbs said on friday was that as the bends go forward, we will review our assistance, based on the unfolding events. yesterday the secretary said that at the present time, we have no immediate plans to cut off aid. >> so the message to the military is as long as you don't shoot down your citizens, we
will not stop the aid? >> there are stipulations in terms of behavior of recipients of our systems, and obviously if aid is used in a way that is contrary to our larger policies and ideas, we will make adjustments as we need to. >> the feeling on the streets in cairo that the u.s. administration is hedging its bets, speaking very softly, the message that the people of cairo call for the departure of president mubarak. >> it is not for us to choose. a path that leadss to credible, free, and fair elections.
these are decisions to be made within egypt by the egyptian people and the players within the system. it is not for the united states to a a point in the individual who wants to play a role in this process. we wanted to open up real political space for egyptians to make these decisions. >> they are asking for president mubarak to go. >> there is kind of a contradiction. it is not for us to make these choices. it is for us to encourage egypt to open up space for true economic and political reform to occur. we won a process that leads to real change. that said, how egypt evolves, down what path and to what end,
research shows us that the egyptian people have the right to make, and we want to see a process where the government comes together with other elements of egyptian society and responds to the aspirations of the people of egypt and demonstrates to the people to continue to want to have their voices heard in the streets of egypt, that they have a role to play. >> can you talk about the hot withholding of aid? with elections that lack credibility, fairness, and freedom, would that from this review? >> your asking me to speculate. we continue to provide assistance to egypt, and based on what we see today, we don't envision taking any immediate action. as robert gibbs emphasized on
friday, as events unfold, we will continue to review our aid in light of what happened. >> if there is violence on the streets there, does that controvert review of u.s. aid? >> a do not have a crystal ball in terms of determining exactly what is going to happen. as we have emphasized, people have a right to protest peacefully. we do not want to see any of this devolved into violence. we want to see all sides, the government, the military, the people, but show restraint. that is that is what is important to
allow all egyptian society to begin. we certainly continue to emphasize that people of egypt have a right to peacefully protest and the government needs to respond to their voices and to their aspirations. >> you know any thought of that aid is used by the egyptian government to fund -- apart from the military -- does any of that money go to the the ministry of interior? >> i do not had a letdown of specific assistance and where it goes. clearly we do provide assistance to egypt. some of that assistance is in the form of security assistance. and we make no apologies for that. but at this point, what happens
within egypt and to the extent that what happens in each is tied to any assistance that we have provided, we will make adjustments if we need to based on how events unfold. >> are you not concerned that some of the assistance was used by the egyptian government to actually -- [unintelligible] >> our assistance to egypt is longstanding. it is based on the work we have done together, and our relationship has been a stabilizing one. certainly the relationship between the united states and other support from others has stabilized across the region. egypt has been a strong pursuer of the pursuit of middle -- a piece in the middle east. beneficial reasons for the aid that we have provided egypt up to this point.
as we have said. as events unfold in the tube, we will continue to evaluate our assistance. >> that is not my question. are you concerned that some of that money was used in the killing of over 150 egyptians? >> i will simply say that we continue to watch the events unfold. we will make adjustments as necessary. >> since we have been out here elbaradei came out on state television. he is saying that they will have elections in the coming week. are you encouraged about that? >> i will defer comment. we would get something else to you once we understand the full context of what he has said. >> following up on that
question, a procedure that you want them to follow. t you want them -- do you won a transition government question are >> again, how this process unfolds is up to egypt. we want to see meaningful negotiations across a cross- section of egyptian society, including opposition groups. it should focus on the elements of a transition to a government the reflects the aspirations of the egyptian people. these elements would include free and fair elections, the presidency and the parliament, constitutional changes to have a more open and inclusive democratic process. that is what we recommend and what we encourage egypt to pursue. how that happens in particular are decisions that the government together with civil society will make in the coming days.
>> do you want to be consulted before the system is reconstituted secretary clinton talked to the foreign minister on multiple occasions. the president talked to president mubarak. there is of particular sickens -- there is a particular sequence of will lead to the white house. we have been in touch with a broad cross-section of the egyptian government over several days. our private message is a public message. the government has to respond to the aspirations of the egyptian people. this will take some time to undertake. we do encourage egypt to take aggressive steps as soon as possible. >> did u.s. officials push for
different names or more inclusive process in this cabinet has been appointed? >> these are decisions made within the egyptian government. but we think that there needs to be this broad national dialogue and that is what we continue to encourage. >> the damage did egyptian antiquities, and are there any u.s. mechanisms to find out about that? >> we will find out. i now that we have not had an opportunity to discuss that with the government of egypt. obviously we are concerned when such historical artifacts are damaged. i saw a report released nothing was stolen. that is encouraging. and we're encouraged by the
response of the projection people. -- the egyptian people. in the context of museums of neighborhoods, they have taken responsibility on the run, so we are encouraged by the report that does exist between the big six and people in the egyptian military. -- the egyptian people and the egyptian military. we want to see the luting and dealt with. we want to see all sides continue to show restraint. but in terms of getting down into the specifics on that, i don't think we have. >> the president said that israel has announced the egyptian army will move for the first time since 1979, 800 soldiers into the sinai. what is behind this movement? >> are we aware of it? yes. as to the details of that, i'll defer to both the egyptian and
israeli governments. [inaudible] >> to restart peace talks between israelis and palestinians? >> it has not changed our perspective of what needs to be done. we continue to have contacts with officials across the region. but obviously this is going to distract people for a period of time. >> what phone calls specifically made or received today? >> in terms of the secretary today, she has participated in a lengthy conference call this morning. i am not aware that she has had any calls with outside leaders today.
>> going back to the numbers you mentioned, they were in nine flights out today. one of them was a canadian military flight? >> a canadian flag, i do not know whether the military civilian. >> and it was not diverted from there. >> it was there on the ground, but since u.s. officials and civilian were taken up this morning. >> you know what it was airforce? >> i do not know. >> the consular officers, are they going to cairo or athens? >> all the bay -- all the above. we have three safe haven destinations. which shows those locations because they have the ability to handle an influx of people. we're sending consular officers there is well as the cairo.
>> so they have been deployed all four locations. >> there could be other destinations as well. >> on that 2600 contacted, how many of those our embassy non- essential personnel? >> my assumption is that we handle our own non-essential staff and family members outside of the 2600. that 2600 are private american citizens that wish to leave. >> how many embassy personnel have been moved out already? >> i do not have the number. on the flights going on today, there have been a mix of in the sea and private citizens, something correlating to about half the plane in each category. we have several hundred family
members and non-essential personnel that we will move out as we can. if we have moved out of hundred citizens, perhaps somewhere about half might be in that. i will try to get you the other number of how many of our own community we have moved. >> had dissented in extra marines? -- have you sent an extra marines? >> we have augmented our external defense with diplomatic security and additions to the marine security guards. >> can you say how many? >> we are not. a talk about that. we have augmented both the number of marines and the number of diplomatic security officers. >> these routes have not expressed any anti-american
sentiment. >> as i have been monitoring the conversations on line, including responses to twitter, right now the focus is the egyptian people on their own government and what they want their government to do. we do not see anything that has been directed specifically american citizens. >> after 10 asia and egypt, who will be next? -- tunisia and egypt, who will be next? >> go back to what the secretary said at the doha around. the status quo is unsustainable. there has to be reform across the region. it is not necessary about tenace said tuni -- about tunisia or
other countries. how in the open of greater political and economic opportunities for their people? each country faces similar demographic challenges. a very significant percentage of population in the middle east and north africa is young. a high percentage of them are getting good educations and looking for jobs and cannot find any. it is vitally important that countries understand the right lessons here and take aggressive steps to promote greater opportunity and to open up political areas so that their people have a vested interest in the future. >> the expect other things to happen in other countries in the middle east was a margin -- in
the middle east? . >> the secretary mentioned that she is family friends with mubarak and family. she had extended an invitation to visit any time. is that invitation still valid she does that -- if he decides to come here with family? [laughter] >> i will defer to my counterpart in cairo. mubarak i mubarak its focus -- i think mubarak is focused on the current situation. we encourage him to begin a process of real negotiation with elements of egyptian civil society and move forward to give the egyptian people a greater opportunity and demonstrate
concrete steps that respond to the aspirations of the egyptian people. >> on sunday, some were critical of the message from president clinton. -- secretary clinton. did you still have confidence in mubarak possibility to implement the part magic -- diplomatic reforms? >> the government needs to lead a process of national dialogue, and the government needs to open up this process for participation by broad elements of egyptian society. how that happens, who is involved in the process -- these are decisions to be made inside egypt. >> new subject. p.j..
>> 1, 2, 3, ago. >> it has been so that secretary clinton and someone would exchange instruments on february 5 on the margins of the munich security conference. are you saying anything publicly about that? secondly, as the fall of a couple of days ago about the situation in kazakhstan, i think they're talking about early elections now as opposed to the referendum. any comment on that. >> we are aware that the government of kazakhstan has decided not to pursue the national referendum. we think that is the right decision for kazakhstan. now that president medvedev has
lined -- signs the law of ratification, we're working with the russian federation to exchange instruments. i think will have more to say about that. >> i was talking about the early election in kazakhstan. >> as to when elections are scheduled, those are decisions made by kazakhstan. last week, when foreign minister -- when the foreign minister was here, he was still talking about a national referendum which would actually canceled elections in 2013 and 2017. it appeared to us that kazakhstan has decided not to pursue a national referendum and we think that is the right decision. >> hold on. new topic.
>> this relates to the university in the bay area accused of fraud. it would find that there was any more information on that what the indian embassy. did come up in the talks last week? the second part of that, there was a very strong reaction in india to the success and that the students involved are accused should be wearing radio tags on their ankles. could you comment on that? >> i have a link the answer here. i can read it in the record or we can do it quickly afterwards. the short answer is that tri valley university, we take these allegations of immigration abuse fraud very seriously. these allegations are an
excellent example of the damaging effects of these of fraud. -- visa fraud. reestablished a help line for the students affected by the closure of these universities in california. those involved in this investigation had been issued ankle monitors. this is widespread across the united states and standard procedure for a variety of investigations. it does not imply guilt or suspicion of criminal activity. we are following this case closely. we are in regular communication with officials of the government of india. dhs and ice are leading the investigation and that is all i can say at this point. i do not know. >> the american arrested for
killing pakistan is, at least one pakistan me official was calling him an american functionary. what is his job? why was he carrying a gun percent mark -- a gun? >> we're talking about a u.s. diplomat. we have called for his immediate release. he is a member of the embassy technical administrative staff. is therefore entitled to full criminal community. he cannot be lawfully arrested or detained in accordance with the geneva conventions. he acted in self-defense when confronted by two armed men on motorcycles. he had every reason to believe the men mentum of the hon. they had robbed money at gunpoint from a pakistani citizen in the same area. >> did embassy's staff carry weapon? >> yes, but the way he was
detained, he identified himself to police as a diplomat and has been requesting geneva convention relations. >> you looked at the picture of his visa, it is not an official visa -- i know -- it is not a diplomatic visa. >> this is a matter that we are still discussing with the government of pakistan. >> at you confirm his name yet? >> i am not at liberty to talk about any of that. he remains in custody. >> pakistan has doubled its nuclear arsenal, and it is costing 100. what you say about increasing this arsenal? are you concerned about safety and security?
>> first of all, these are estimates attributed to a non- governmental organization. we do not comment on nuclear issues, particularly the size of pakistan's nuclear arsenal. >> do you have your own estimate you do not believe the nongovernment? >> we believe in the bayou of the fissile material cut off material -- and we are encouraging pakistan to engage constructively on efforts to preclude this. >> the u.s. is running out patients, they said, with regard to pursuing [unintelligible] what is the next seven? >> it is something we continue
to have ongoing discussions with the government of pakistan. we stress the importance of the fmct globally and also that pakistan should be supportive. >> i will defer to sarah. >> do you think she should return or to margin now will defer to sarah. >> have you seen his interview? he committed himself to gradual reform. do you have faith in his commitment to a gradual reform was marked with uc something else happened in egypt? -- to gradual reform? or would you see something else happened in egypt? >> there is a need for reform.
i think in the context of egypt, it is one thing to say you're going to reform, another thing to actually take real steps and enact real genuine reform. the people of the region are looking at what happened in tunisia and what has happened in egypt. they have aspirations, they have talents, they have capabilities. the region as a whole when you look at the political, social, economic well-being of this people, it has underperformed. it is vital to the future of the middle east and the future of the states of north africa. >> parliament started after 20 years. do you have any comments on this development? >> the november 7 parliamentary elections were neither free nor
fair. i -- unsurprisingly, it was a parliament devoted to the pro- junta element. we are not surprised by this. as we have long said, we want to see political prisoners released. we want to see and inclusive, open political process. we were disappointed last week at the burmese supreme court which had the opportunity to authorize the recognition of the national league of democracy as well as other democratic parties. this would have been a good step to enter in a genuine, inclusive dialogue. but as we've seen in burma, it was another lost opportunity. >> any comments on north korea?
any food aid. >> we remain concerned about the well-being of the north korean people. our policy regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance is based on three factors. the level of need of a given country, competing needs and other countries, and our ability to ensure that aid is reliably reaching the people in need. these are standards that we have traditionally applied to north korea. we have provided mercury of with the -- north korea with assistance in the past. we have no plans for contributions at this time. one of the sticking points in past discussions with north korea have always been confidence in the ability to be sure that humanitarian assistance is provided and gets to the intended to -- those in
need instead of siphoned off for those who are favored by the government. [inaudible] >> we talk to north korea on a regular basis. i will not get into what we talk about. >> on pakistan, a white kenyan not specify where the the diplomat -- white kenyan not specify whether the diplomat was or was not authorized to have a gun? -- why can you not specify whether the diplomat was or was not authorized to to carry a gun? and if international law provides for embassy officials to carry guns outside of the embassies, outside national territories in the foreign country? >> there are people, based on
your particular job, authorized to carry weapons. they could be authorized to carry weapons inside or outside the compound. that is all i can say at this point. i am making a general. maine. i will not comment -- this is a matter still being investigated. >> are you referring to u.s. law? >> the conduct of individuals who work in embassies around the world. there are specific individuals and specific jobs authorized to carry weapons in the context of their duties. this is something that we worked out with the government in question. i will not comment on this particular individual. >> is confusing for people.
is he directly employed by the state department? what is the technical status meeting with mark >> i can repeat what is here. i'm not going to extended. thank you. >> the washington post reports that pakistan has doubled its nuclear stockpile over the past several years. this afternoon, the u.s. institute of peace hosted a discussion on pakistan's future. it included former u.s. ambassador to pakistan as well as southeast asia as scholars. the event was held at the u.s. institute of peace in washington, d.c. this portion is about an hour and half.
>> thank you for coming. this event is being hosted by the brookings institution and the united states institute of peace. the extreme interest in the subject and the timeliness and criticality of the discussion comes out of the overwhelming response we got when we announced this event. i think it is unprecedented. i am serb we're in for an exciting and stimulating discussion this afternoon. pakistan remains in the limelight and has been for much of the last decade. the fact that pakistan stability is the same -- it is cliche by now. i think there's no denying the fact that whatever direction
pakistan takes has implications not only for the region for definitely u.s. policy g enough as well. what is interesting and what has us thinking about hosting this event if that if you think about it, there is not much about the future of pakistan that is being discussed. at least not the medium and long-term future. much of what preoccupies us is the here and now, the daily developments, pickup of newspaper and seeing if pakistan is there or not. that is not unimportant but it takes away from this idea of going to the future and seeing just what opportunities pakistan has and what it needs to avoid. for better and more in foreign policy making, both in the u.s. and pakistan itself. today much of the focus is microscopic. the sober and bombing sense that we need to get pakistan to
deliver on the security front. what this does is in some ways keep us from discussing the complexities and nuances of this country. that's what you need to study if you want to see where pakistan is headed in the medium and long term. as i said, knowledge on the factors that would drive pakistan in one direction versus the other are required for more informed policy making. today's event builds on this idea, and it grows out of a recently concluded prodded by the brookings institution, and he led this project on the future pakistan. with a collection of scholarly essays and i believe you have a handout with a brief rundown on the project. they look to this idea of where
pockets and is headed and what kind of evidence -- pakistan is headed and what we need to look for the future. it was funded by the u.s. aid grants program which helps conduct research and problematic activities on pac stand. -- pakistan when to we had the funding for the project, stephen non i talked about the subject and we thought that there was a need to initiate a systematic research-driven debates on the future of pakistan. that is what has brought us here today. we're going to cover three aspects through the afternoon. the first panel will look at the variable factors which will be key in determining what direction pakistan takes. the second one, panelists will talk about various potential future is of pakistan, and the third one will hone in on the
policy implications for the u.s. and for pakistan sell. we're very fortunate to have an imminent and the sting was set of speakers here today. pakistan as well as american, both to deal with pakistan in various capacities as well as academic experts who study this country for years. there's a copy of the agenda and the bios outside, but we will have three panels. each will run for a total of 75 pence. the speakers will speak for 10 minutes each, and that should leave is a good half an hour or more for a question and answer after every panel. this is a delivered to us because we want to make this as interactive as possible. finally, before i invite steve to come and talk briefly about
this project, but may also take this opportunity to thank our team which is work to make this event possible. i for one naturally have very little clue of what was happening. i'm standing here taking the credit. other staff at brooking, the public affairs team of brooking, our evidence detail, as well as the people making sure that the event is going right on the web. many more are not visible but did work to make this happen over the past few weeks. once again, thanks for joining us and we look forward to interesting afternoon. steve. >> thank you. this project had its origins in a year or two after i finished
my book on the idea of pakistan. i watched developments in pakistan carefully. i wanted to see whether the predictions were coming and what pat pakistan was taking. as the years went by, i realize that many of the warning lights that i had pointed out were burned out. under the musharraf years, things had gone from bad to work. i thought i would try of methodology which was not another book, but was a tripartite methodology. this consists of three things. first is a review of past predictions about the future pakistan. that is contained as an appendix in my own paper. in the back of my own paper, were looking at different predictions by individuals and others. the second was my own paper
available outside, about a 70 page essay about the future pakistan. and the third was the papers. it was a marvelous setting for an interesting and painful discussion. as it into from the participants, those people who are academics, practitioners, think tankers, young, old, and individuals to study different aspects of pakistan. i set the agenda for the meeting whereas each of them to write a sort paper, no more than 10 of 15 pages, looking ahead. i wanted them first to write about the factors and burbles that they thought would shape the future, and by future amid the next five or seven years, medium-term. secondly i wanted them to allen as best they could what does futures would look like. most likely, least likely, and i thought that in my own paper.
-- and i followed that in my own paper. we're neither optimistic pessimist. we try to analyze the events as we see them. i was asked to do a summary and said we do not need one. i cannot speak on behalf of the paper writers. i can only speak on behalf of myself. but this is a country where there is a lot of pessimism -- and i used to use the phrase, i quoted george shultz what were foreign policy planning, hope is not a policy. a pakistani diplomat said, this bear is not a policy, either. somewhere between -- dispair is not a policy, either. we would have sought not only some of the papers but have some
new people to talk about how they see the future of pakistan. the missed out there and turn this meeting back over to -- it is my task to remind everybody, as you leave this meeting, please turn on your cellphones. moeed. >> they are supposed to be off right now. let me introduce mr. chamberlain -- mr. chamberlain, which will look at the bridge into a chair the first panel. embassador chamberlain, the president of the middle east interview, she has served as u.s. ambassador at various places, including pakistan in
2002-2002, which is all of you know was really in the hot seat. she also served on the boards of several groups, including the american academy for diplomacy, the global heritage foundation, the search for common ground, among others. we have meeting biographies outside. we will keep the introduction very short period >> i would like to say that it is my great pleasure to in turn introduced three very distinguished young people of extraordinary insights into pakistan, who will talk about the factors that will determine and shape pakistan's future. ilam., ambassador bill myla he has long and distinguished career in the state department. he preceded me as ambassador to pakistan in less than 2001.
vilas remain very tight end -- bill has remained very active and is currently a scholar at the woodrow wilson center. joshua wife is a research fellow at the institute for global engagement. he often speaks and writes on islamic politics and the political stability in places like pakistan. he makes frequent trips back to pakistan for brown proofing. another is a scholar at the woodrow wilson center. she is a journalist for pakistan's leading english- language paper. she often writes for other papers like the globe and express. she is a graduate of mit and harvard, and she writes on the sensitive social issues in pakistan that thing get some people in trouble -- human
rights, honor killings, the gang wars, in the government's ineffective prosecution of rape cases. it is not a surprise that her courage and her reporting has won her a number of awards including the enesco award for gender in journalism in 2005, and the human rights in journalism in 2006. bill, over to you. 10 minutes. >> thank you for the young in your introduction. [laughter] that was unexpected. very gratefully received. the second thing i want to point out to those of you and to the audience in general is that the last time i discussed this issue of the future pakistan in a group like this was in palacios
-- bellagio. the setting is somewhat different. every time you looked up, you got a postcard view outside your window. here, not much. my job is to talk about -- i understand -- external variables. they call them factors, i like to call them variables. and their likely impact. i ask myself, likely impact on wife? on pakistan, yes, in a general sense, but i think we have to think about their impact on certain of the other factors that have to do with the future pakistan. so i picked out of the list i have in my paper -- let's say -- four. one, my favorite bugaboo, which is what i call india-century city. -- century city.
-- centricity, then the focus on the pakistan the army, and something that has become -- the islamists narrative and in particular seeping into the course of pakistan is decided. and last, not necessarily least, the economy, which is going to be very important in the short run. i have to move fast. i will start with the comity.ionall that will put pressure on pakistan over the next few years. food and energy prices are rising and will probably
continue to rise. this puts inflationary pressures in did the economy, no matter how you look at it, whether the food prices go up because they are passed through or because the government subsidizes them and prints money which also creates inflation. this would be a more short-term factor but i think the economy, and i hope chaucer will say something on the internal side, is one of the most important things we will be looking at and worrying about in the next few months. the rest of my external factors are basically countries. china -- china is a spoiler. it isn't easy fall back for pakistan whenever they hear something they do not like from someone else. china gives a lot of trade and aid. china probably sees pakistan as a way to keep pressure on india,
which is its great rival in asia. in that looks to me as if china is is -- would be working against the normalization of relations with india but the pakistans. it is not a great fan of democratization, either. china also is providing of very large part of the foreign investment pakistan receiving these days. that is that going to be important to pakistan. china does not appear to be able to change its ways. but if they saw something pakistan doing which really threatened its interest, it would. but i do not see a great deal of chance of that. india is the major paradox. it seems to sit on the side and waits and be content to wait for something to happen in pakistan, particularly for pakistan to
fall apart. i think it is very ambivalent on normalization with pakistan. i wonder whether this is a conscious strategy or whether this is just an inability of a fractious democracy to make up its mind. but i think india is one of the two major sources, if there is one, of what i would call a black swan event. some sort of war or other dustup that causes great turmoil in pakistan and perhaps accelerates the process of this deterioration, if it is going to deteriorate. afghanistan -- afghanistan is to my mind an important cog, and i say this in my paper, because the outcome of what i think to be an inevitable political solution there is key to what happens in pakistan.
if the strength in the army, could strengthen the india centricity, and then a long shot, actually give india and pakistan a chance to work together. >> you are ok. >> thank you. and learn how making the long before they actually get around to normalizing regularly. finally, the united states. probably the in other states is an external factor, the most benign of the external factors. nonetheless, and none has a very neutral meaning. have a know that we great amount of influence our leverage these days. our assistance would be of great help in this time of need. pakistan is becoming more aid- dependent all the time, i think.
we have finally awoke conceived strategy -- a well conceived strategy of moving forward with our relationship and knowing it believes it. certainly not in pakistan, and i am not sure that too many people in washington believe it yet. in fact, i believe that part of our problem with pakistan is that there is a an enormous on -- there is an enormous division between the administration as to what the policy should be. we keep talking out of both sides of our mouth with regard to a afghanistan. you notice the president talked about july 11, 200011 as the beginning of the drawdown in pakistan. they tried to move that to 2014, but that does not seem to have penetrated. it would be very unlikely that
the pakistan is do not believe we're going to cut and run again. this is the second source -- excuse me -- of blacks one possibility, some sort of real thing that happens in the united states that would create a public clamor for some stronger action against pakistan right now. i think i probably used up my time. >> thank you very much. if i guess the other speakers to speak from the podium for our cameras in the back. >> thank you. good to be here today. i was given the unenviable task of having to talk about domestic factors that will impact pakistan's future and about 10 minutes. the only thing i can promise you is that this will be thoroughly and satisfying. i wanted to touch on a couple.
a one of the talks -- to oroughly-- the unsatisfiying. the economy, if you will know that it is criminal. the good news is that pakistan is not on the brink of a crisis. we can all smile about that. it might be the only happy things we hear about this afternoon. the bad news is that pakistan is close to a fiscal crisis. you only have to read the headlines in pakistan to know that when pakistan is facing a fiscal crunch, it is very clear what sort of things they cut. they cut development, they cut flood relief, they cut cash transfers to the poor, that education, they cut a lot of the things that would be important for any of the mildly rosy too happy long-term future is that
we will be talking about here today. so over the tort term, this looks like questions of pakistan implementing a sales tax or other tax regime, it is pakistan. to increase the number of people that pay taxes from about 3 million out of 135 million, to a more respectable number. all those are short-term questions they will be explored over the next couple months. but in the long term, there are few things to consider. the first is that as long as the united states and pakistan on relatively good footing, it is likely that pakistan will keep fighting no way to clear the very minimum are necessary to keep the international institutions engage with pakistan. they showed a remarkable ability to negotiate from a position of weakness, to tell the analysis and the international community
that times are-red, and that pakistan does under it will hurt everybody. -- that times are desperate and that it pakistan goes under, it will hurt everybody. in this five-seven year time frame that we're looking at, can pakistan address the structural problems in this economy? a lot of them are so enter a plea of iraq -- related to the political economy of pakistan. since the beginning of 1947, of very prominent role in parliament and for did every attempt to implement the tax. industrialists have tried to roll back energy subsidies of any time. you have a military that assesses its budget independently and lets the other branches of government fight for the strap -- scraps. particularly in fiscal crisis, all the political incentives
become a perverse. if you look at the 10 points for the economic agenda, the first one is to roll back this terrible cut in energy subsidies. the fourth one is to control inflation. as if these things are totally difference and there is no recommendation that pakistan has been monetizing its fiscal episodes. i think we're left with the question -- what will happen to this political stasis in the economic sector or to mark there is voluminous literature on how economic reform happens. one school says if you have to hit a crisis for real economic reform to happen. and that is the most likely way. it would be interesting to see the some of pakistan's most deep pocketed allies, the united states, saudi arabia, and china had been increasingly wary of supporting pakistan financially. that might lead one to think
that there's a likelihood that some kind of crisis could be a catalyst. on the other hand, a fiscal crisis is in my view a muchness -- much less likely crisis to rein in and outside pressures. the international community is likely to good effect is down and say come and live 12 to for ways of putting your house in order. there is another argument which says that economic reform can best be carried out in an environment of distraction. there is an argument that has been made -- we can debated -- india's reforms in the 1990's, and that india was able to implement reforms in the 1990's rather than the 1980's because of the emphasis on conflict. a country that is distracted face a much easier for rockers are a small lead to move economic reform forward.
that intersects with the political issues. we see in this respect, there's very likely a trade-off around the world between a more democratic and open process of economic reform that is less effective, and a more technocratic process which has all the problems of being closed but can be more effective in the short term of doing painful things like implementation of austerity measures. it is not satisfying, but i put that on the discussion. the second issue i want to talk about and put on the table is the role of political islam. there are couple frames of reference in talking about political the slump in pakistan that are particularly unhelpful. the first is the perennial question, will the islamists take over the state? it is unhelpful, because first of all, political islamic
parties do not do well at the polls. they get most 50% of the vote. second, they do not have very much capacity -- that most 15% of the vote. one episode was saddened, call and only once in awhile hopeful to see the islamic parties to education and water delivery in all the things the government has to do. third, even when people talk about hypothetical cases of taliban 60 miles from islamabad and advancing on the capital, one is as the serious question, what on earth are they going to do when they get there? this is a real question in a state with a large army that has proved to be quite resilience. what is the taliban going to do when they walk down the central
streets of islam a bun? that has not been talked through and has led to a lot of speculation. it is really not very helpful. the fourth, the military sees political parties and islamic militant artists as some sort of force multiplier but only to point. we see that the military recognizes that these groups are useful in a limited way. a much more interesting question has to do with state incentives for supporting islamic politics or for supporting islamic militancy. even my fears to the nationalistic pakistani france will unmet that the government has a long and laborious history of doing this. this depends on what bill was talking about with the threat
perception in the region. there is also a level of momentum that comes with supporting these kind of militant groups. all of this is this a religious radicalism is not completely organic to pakistan or the pakistani society. it has been supported and cultivated, and there have been some great ways that on the demand side of the militancy, the government perspective and agenda has quite significant role in shaping people's preferences and their views. i will end with one other question that i think is particularly not helpful in talking about the future of political islam. moderate islam triumphing over radical islam. this is another question that maybe has some very large scale relevance on some level,.
but particularly in the wake of the assassination and other events, these categories have been rendered obsolete. there is this feud that as the liberals or holding down the fort against the radicals, and it is true that a lot of them are more liberal on a number of social and cultural issues, but it is also true that another party was inspired by radicals. it does not take much to look beneath the surface at the ideology behind this and realize, gosh, they're liberal on a whole number of issues but they respect a profit. there were others celebrating the killing of the governor. these should not have been tremendously surprising. we set up categories of moderates and radicals.
we have seen those categories been inadequate. they comport very well with a notion of liberalism. at the end of the day, there are issues at which they do things that shocked us as being illiberal. the question is not art the moderates going to be liberal, but the question, what is the discourse and what is the government response to those groups across the board engage in vigilante islamism? that is, it is legitimate to do with the state will not do. i would suggest as we look in the future, this is a much more interesting question because it cuts across the divide between
mainstream and islamist parties. you will find those in the most liberal parties in islam debating these questions. finally, it cuts across the class lines and the regional lines as well. i will wrap up with that, and getting our questions right, when we look at this long, the future of islam is important, and perhaps a single question that puts us how political islam is like to be used and expressed and how resilient the state will be in the eyes of the public. >> thank you, josh. ok, thank you for having me here. i will talk a little bit about
social factors that will enter into pakistan's future. i will start with a democratic time bomb. the population is growing at 82% rate, according to the u. n.'s projections. this is a very young population. two-thirds of all but passed on -- pakistainis are under the age of 50. to ensure that the 90 million pakistanis find employment in the next decade, the gdp needs to be at 9%. in other words, over the next two decades it seems unlikely pakistan will be able to put most of its young population to
work. over 1 million jobs will need to be created each year. this population boom will translate into intense resource scarcity. by 2025, pakistan will be a very scarce country. drinking water. irrigation practices continue to be wasteful and remains to be seen how the recovery from the floods will proceed. the situation has become dire after the army has taken control of the water shortages as a control. the water scarcity will translate into much more heightened food insecurity. we have 77 million going hungry. it has been documented that
chronically unemployed will become a prime target for extremist recruitment. they use the rhetoric of social injustice. we have already seen this occur in 2009. what i am trying to get at is these developments -- this could lead to a sharp rise of extremism. depending on whether or not strong action is taking and reforms are implemented, this could be facilitated or offset by rapid urbanization. 50% of, 50's and 10's --
all pakistanis will live in cities. rapid urbanization brings its own implications. we can talk about those in the q&a session. to shift toward the comments about political islam, i feel that -- i agree with him that extremists will not come into party -- into power in the times is soon. i believe we will see an overall shift in the pakistani ideology, and i believe this
will take the shape of heightened popularization of what is considered extremist rhetoric. a variety of factors will contribute to the spirit the first is a simple probability, militant organizations othat provide the marketplace of theological options -- up ideological options. a young person chronically unemployed and food into juror who is vulnerable to radicalization will find groups that have a similar ideological position can offer some new wants that is appealing. with 20 million internet subscribers, the ability to attract these different groups
is increasing and multiplying. there is also the fact that we will get in the course of this afternoon this it education in pakistan, and people in this room know that pakistan has a schizophrenic school system -- public, private, religious -- and these produce students with different world views. worth noting is that each of these currently has a curriculum that promotes islam, islamic values, society, and pushing for this idea as pakistan under threat, instead of using islam being the solution of many of the country's problem. the one thing that the products of these three very different school systems haven't of
common is the heightened religious dawson the and the sense of being persecuted and one that can be exploited by organizations by this public narrative and conversations in the public realm. finally, pakistan's paralyzed media. we've gone from having television channels, and since -- these channels have been increasingly willing and opened the broadcast the use of the leaders of extremist organizations. there has been mention of the aftermath of an assassination, and many are beginning to blame the media for promoting some of the support for the assassin.
clerics who had supported these actions were getting lots of air time. you also see the media in an effort to boost ratings, spreading conspiracy theories. i can imagine some of the scenarios that build on the black forms of any conflict with the united states or india, we can expect the media to disseminate violent rhetoric. point, it will be debated about the government will have a chance, given that the army does not have the government in waiting, and nobody wants to take the job right now. we are moving toward a situation where we will have a more
decentralized government thanks to the passage of the 18th amendment. i expect we will see a rise in religious parties. there has already been a call yesterday for more provinces to be created. we will see an increase in coalition politics. these will be more competitive, and because of this increase, i expect to see the consolidation of all trends of dynastic politics and the continuing culture of political patronage. i believe that without -- as people struggle more to stay in power longer, there will be a lack of long-term strategizing, a willingness to implement reforms and some of the policies required to address developmental issues and problems. i will wrap up there and i look
forward to the discussion. >> thank you. and thank you to build and josh. a very comprehensive discussion. my job was to be the mop up person at the end and touch on some of the issues not addressed, but i think we did a very good job in a touching most of the important issues. i might just add, one that was not mentioned, and that was sex -- a nod from the audience -- in terms of numbers, but the demographics in terms of the youth, would like to emphasize. you see different statistics. 60% under 30, half of them man, many of them young man, teenagers, young adults.
i talk about sex i am talking about for months. all that testosterone it makes for a population that is restive, and i am not picking on pakistan. those of you in the audience who are in my generation of the baby boomers remember that the 1960's and the 1970's -- we were a pretty obstreperous group ourselves. our icons -- bob kennedy, john kennedy, john lennon -- sds, cities burned in united states -- it was a violent. , and we cannot discount the nature of the population leads for a very active population, and that is a fact or a variable, one must consider this in pakistan's future.
the second point that i thought of this btu was very well covered, and that is the political islam. i couched it differently. in terms of the civil war, over foul use, the values of the idea of pakistan, as steve wrote in his book, the vision of pakistan as a secular, democratic nation, rolled under a constitution or laws had their roots in the british system is now being challenged, and several of the speakers mentioned the assassination of -- this revealed the conflict of values in pakistan, the conflict of whether it is a government responsibility to provide for its poor, whether it is the security agency's responsibility
to provide for security for all not for minorities, which is the ugly truth we saw with the assassination. and the economic issues that we discussed. pointing out that as the economic issues get worse, it is the poor, the investments in population that get shortchanged. and this addresses, i would call, a civil war value in pakistan, and that certainly will be an important element that will shape its future. my final point before we open up for discussion, and i do not think this was emphasized enough, and that is the demonization of the united states. we see ourselves as a very good friend of pakistan. yet you have a government we are
close to, an army that we are close to, in terms of institutions, but as as a science class as a society, is at war with the united states. it is eroding the common ground we would like to put our feet. it makes it difficult for our humanitarian workers to distribute this, now we have it, the developmental assistance passed by congress. makes dangerous for american diplomats in cities. you have had this tragic event in lahore, and makes it difficult for us to resolve a diplomatic problems. 40,000 people in the streets of lahore burning effigies. this is not got to be a variable in what kind of pakistan emerges and what relationship we are able to have.
i do not believe that anybody in the pakistan government or the united states government wants anything less than very good relations. we are fighting some very powerful forces there that i think it is time we talk about little -- a little more openly, where our diplomatic relations are going in the future. i hope we can do that very openly and candidly this afternoon. what i would like to suggest as we take questions is that -- we have cameras and we have microphones, so pleased with until you are given a microphone before you begin your question, and if she could identify yourself, it would be helpful to all of us. sari, the microphones are up here. if you could just line up behind the microphones on both sides of the room, and that will make it easier for me in selecting who gets to speak first. trudy -- story -- chirs.
-- chris. >> i have a couple of comments. i have concerns with the characterization of poverty, lack of education, as driving this militancy. the interesting thing is there is no evidence for that. my colleagues have done a lot of polling, and they find it is the wealthier and better educated people that are most attracted to al qaeda, and that makes sense because they are the ones that are most familiar with it. the problem with characterizing these factors has contributed to militancy is there's no evidence for it, and it may provoke us as the government goes down pathways that are not terribly useful. going back to the remarks,
josh's point, that we have categories that are utterly useless, i was there during the assassination, and and scholars are enraged about it not being consistent with the koran. the absolute best majority of this country have no ability to have a comprehension. so the united states pursuing this anti-secularization campaign, maybe somebody else needs it. pakistan wants to be an islamist states, they -- issue will be so bad that even that they oppose the law because it is inconsistent with the koran, are afraid to say yet to focus in the environment. i put that out there. we might want to reconsider what is driving this.
>> thank you, chris. i would welcome other comments that would react to crist's comments. >> my name is arnold, and i opened the first associated press bureau in pakistan in 1969, and have been following pakistan affairs since. i have come back from china at the end of the 2009 and have been in washington since then, and there's one group, one interest group that i find ignored or hardly ever mentioned, that i would like to read something to you and appreciate if you think it has any validity. what i am talking about is bureaucracy in pakistan. the statement i would like to show you, would like to read to you, to determine if it has validity, is the pure trustee of pakistan is self-serving,
dedicated to its survival, and consideration, using a net civilian and government and the hubris of the military to make itself supreme. does that have any validity? that is my question. >> anybody on the panel like to address that? >> let me start by addressing your comment which is to clarify where i am coming from, because i agree with you. i am trying to point out that there is an increasing willingness among the extreme groups, not only to bring religious rhetoric to the table, but to come at it from the social justice ankle. looking forward, assuming other factors, like josh mention, that the government supports these
groups, they support them freely, they become more organized, this would be a factor. i think that trajectory happens, the membership of the extremist organization will look like is a different thing. what i think is looking at it from the outside there is a right-ward matt, which does not mean that everybody is becoming a militant. it means there is this increased concern with islam, i agree with you that this conversation must be had religious terms, and one of the least productive things is to talk about -- i do not think they exist, and the u.s. in particular has to reconsider -- and the question is coming up increasingly that, are we ready to do with pakistan that is not that pakistan of the
1970's, that is a much more religious pakistan? that is the new pakistan that everyone is in beijing with. that is what i was trying to get at, that there are nuances that are much more in the middle. just to clarify my comments. >> i think chris raised a terrific point. we think of the public schools in pakistan as being secular, because that is our american model, but anybody who goes to school in pakistan anywhere will study islamiat, and i think the point well that if p pakistanis what a society with young people where they think about what issues are in accordance with the koran, neat experience with it. our efforts to promote things
that are secular are translated in pakistan as -- translates as god blless. i am absolutely delighted, had never received a question about the rear christie. the practice is a self-serving institution. all brokers these are, by definition. it has done a good job of surviving, and ask any pakistani they think of the bureaucracy, and they will have stories of corrupt bureaucrats and incredibly competent, and present officers. i have met the full spectrum, and you look at the issue of the economy, these days the technical your cats and the financial ministry, many of them are doing their darndest to getting government to realize the problem, the problem the country faces, and fiscal
solutions available, and so at times bureaucrats do tremendously effective work and at times they have been a part of the problem. that is not different from anywhere else. in terms of their impact on the future, i am not sure that it would be a decisive factor. in many ways pakistan has many of the british ways of operating the practice, and in some cases we have seen under national disasters the bureaucracy has done a pretty decent job. >> trudy ruben. josh, you spoke about the real question about what is the government response to engage in vigilante islamism, trying to create a new contract. my question is, given what we have said about the increase religiosity and angry with theosophy and given what we saw
in the aftermath of the assassination, where d.c. in the groups, whether it is governmental, whether it is non-governmental, whether it is high up in the military or anywhere else in society, that is willing to take on the issue of vigilante islamism, if we mean the murder of shiites, christians, the assassination of people who speak out, or even the question of a mumbai, which the general claimed he did not know about and claims quite vociferously. do not know if it is true, but perhaps he did not and others did. who in pakistan society is willing to take on any of that from the domestic, even to the
international, at this point in time? if i could add to that question, a similar question that came from the -- vigilante islam. they asked how does this play into the narrative of the -- and what is the source of power? >> those are great questions, and you are right to observe that. there are not many people who will speak out in public against these kind of vigilante activities, but there are some. there are some members of political parties who will say regardless of what you think, these are things that one can add due by 1's own hand. lot of these debates are not happening in the public space. they're happening within political parties, within the military and in other places, and i have talked to quite a few
members of the islamist political parties who are having these debates within their parties and have over the last several years, having debates over the red mosque, what is happening with the governor. we think he committed blasphemy, but whose job is it to rectify that? people taking this into their own hands are free of the fall up the text of society or a political environment where people take these things into their own hands? they are afraid of this because there are other television-like groups will consider them to the political sellouts. this is not served into the public debate. it does to some extent. some political partners will come out and say we have to draw a line here. within political parties there
is often a robust debate about not ultimate objective, but about the method by which this should be carried out. i have had senior clerics say to me, if somebody steals, his hand should be cut off, but in fact i cannot just go cut off his hand. the government has to cut off his hand. the person who says i cannot cut off his hand has a more moderate position. i will say that this is an important dividing line between those who say the government has a role and a necessary role and those who takes a -- position, and that is an important debate to watch. >> if this debate is in turmoil within the parties, you're talking about government. is there than no instrument of
power, meaning government or military, that has power to do something that is willing to take this on. and if it is a private debate, too fearful to come out in the open, is there any mechanism to fight back against vigilante islamists who >> it can come out. the question was, is there any institution that has the strength to take this on, and there will. it is a matter of political leadership. the military are members of the political parties, and regardless of what you think of state dick hughes, we >> i think that the military is a strong institution. i would be interested in your view on this. i do not think it is a hopeless case. it comes down to political leadership.
it is understandable why these issues do not come into public discourse. people are afraid of what will happen if this happens openly. once in awhile, on the tv, you see some pretty intense debates about blasphemy and how the government should respond to the television. -- to the taliban. >> i would just add two things. you can see this in the media, particularly after the assassination. a religious cleric is now in exile in fear of his life. he appears on many pakistan television channels. the fact is, his voice is on air and everyone heard that some of the story. there is a big movement for
better media regulation for more balanced debate. the other thing i think that is interesting is civil society organizations are becoming more saudi -- more savvy. they realize they have a steep learning curve. what they are doing is appealing to the independent groups. they file motions in court and asked the justice to take more action. i agree with you. i think that they're getting a better understanding of the bureaucracy. understanding of the bureaucracy of the system and pressurize it which they're learning to that in coming years we may see a few you know where the government is forced to take action according to the law.
>> can i say something? >> sure. >> thank you. >> this question, strikes me, i've raised this before, is really sort of a general question of somehow the formation of a counternarrative to what i would call the islamist narrative. which would be, i think -- should be in the hands of the government. whichever government is in power. and supported by the military. and there's where i think, in you know, this should work its way through the schools and so forth. there's where i don't think i see much signs of progress in pakistan. and i don't know exactly -- i mean, i thought the aftermath of the taseer thing, assassination, actually made me less confident that that's ever going to happen. as to the bureaucracy, i think the bureaucracy has changed some since the old days. i mean, it was much more sort of
hand in glove with the military rulers of the time, as i recall. i wasn't there. but that's my reading of history. it's not -- i don't think that's so much the case anymore. however, and i agree with josh, particularly in some of the key ministries there are some really good technical economists, technical people who know what should be done. it's the political will to do it that is not there. >> thank you very much. our broadcast, as i said i come from peshawar, and so many questions in my mind, but due to time restrictions, i understand i have to ask questions. my question is, in terms of what the islamists might be receiving
in any parliamentary election just 10 to 15 person. -- in pakistan would be the extremists have hijacked the moderate pakistanis? and then as a follow-up, nobody a single politician would vote on the condemned cadre and the media? and secondly -- that's my question then, do you think that they have hijacked? the second question is, if i have a letter the pakistani media role in all thifrs it has really become a pressure group. there some rating in the hands of righteous people and this not i am saying but the pakistani ruling coalition party member said yesterday. and so how do you see the role of media in all this, and
probably i think also that the point in discussion was missing that islamists don't operate in isolation and they're not some organic creatures. who is supporting them. but my question in specific is how does pakistan relationship change it or not? just the one institution there capable of keeping the country holding it together or breaking it. thank you very much. >> i'll take the question about the media. i touched on that. i certainly think that they are playing a big role in sort of heightening the sense of political instability and crisis. i have already talked a bit about how they are increasing more just for the drama value of it than for any sort of sinister reason to sort of give undue amount of air time to extremist view points. i think that they have learned a bit of a lesson from the
killing. there was a sudden need for self-correction. you saw a lot of channels issue retractions, clarify, do shows that were much more calm, more panelists for discussion, had both sides of the story represented. so i do think that this -- there's much learning to be done there. and i do think, again, this is a situation where the government does need to fix the ordinance -- the law bordering on censorship. they need to come up with better media leg lags and enforce it. right now there is no regulation -- regulatory policy. again, that becomes an issue of political will. but i do, the other trend that i have been researching and it's small right now, but it's one to watch, the recent femme on none is that some islamists, religious parties and extremist organizations have been reaching out and trying to connect with journalists and sort of, you know, in the effort of saying get up, get up point of view on air, trying to get to know them
better and exchanging sort of sympathies in the media groups with access to breaking news and things like that, this was very small at the moment but i'm interested to see where that goes. >> i'm steve cohen, part of this project. want to return to a country that arnold asked about the bureaucracy. one of the things i learned in writing, and doing this project and writing about it in my paper, and i think it's important to follow and first make categories, pakistan is both an idea. it's an idea of pakistan. it's also a state. and i think one of the trend lines we've seen of the state of pakistan with one exception has been a decline of the state, the bureaucracy, the administrative structure and so forth. that's not true of the army in a sense. the army has grown to the point where it dominates the rest of the pakistani state. but we learned from many examples around the world that
countries or states can't operate on the basis of a powerful army. whenever i go to pakistan, i say, your country, your estate, hopping on one strong leg which is the army. and there's strategic dilemma of the military leadership is to build up that civilian way, the chinese official said we would characterize it as pakistan having one leg like an elephant and the other like a chop stick. that's maybe an exaggeration but i think the point is clear the army can't do everything in pakistan. in fact it can barely do the things it's supposed to do, let alone build a state. and the interaction of the state, the state of pakistan which is in decline. with the idea of pkz, competing ideas of pakistan i think is at the heart of the pakistani. if you read my -- i think the issue, as arnold says states and bureaucracies are important. i started to figure out there are 18 or 19 different variables or factors. and i'm not sure how to rank
them in terms of importance. i think different variables, religion, ethnicity, state, the army and so flort be important at different times. applies to exteshal factors such as india or iran. or china. so i think that it's a difficult country to understand, because it's complicated. and i think it's an important country to understand as huma said, in a few years from now we're going to have 30 million pakistanis with maybe 300 declared weapons. 300 million pakistanis with 300 million with 30 -- with maybe 300 nuclear weapons. one nuclear weapon per 100 million. something like that. so i don't think we've ever faced a country like this. a country this large, this feeble in terms of its development of indicators with such, such enormous power. >> well, i was hoping to find what i'm thinking of, in my mind, was whether the bureaucracy is an obstacle or an
agent to change in pakistan. my own feeling is it's possible, but -- >> i think the answer to that is yes. >> i sort of like to know where there are agents for change. >> young pakistani historian that looks at the trend line of the pakistani civil bureaucracy. and it looks like that. so in a sense the army has to be think about rebuilding a civil bureaucracy that functions. >> let me ask a question from the overflow room. this one is from ambassador milam. what do you think can be done to engage china more, and to help foster stability in the region and in pakistan, versus playing a spoiler role. >> well we've got so many problems with china i'm not quite sure where pakistan comes in. for us here at the table, or for you in the room, i suppose it
would come from very high on the list. but, for the rest of the government of our country, it may come further down, with economic problems being very high on the list, as well as strategic problems in the western pacific. so, i don't know. i think, i hope, in fact, that when we have visits or meetings between the president of china, and the president of the united states, that pakistan comes up, and that we express our worries about the chinese role there, and how they might improve it. but, other than that, i'm frankly unaware of where -- of whether we bother to discuss pakistan in these meetings or not. even below the presidential level. i assume we do. but other than talking to the
chinese, and of course we've got such a wish list that the chinese are probably able to pick and choose with ease, i don't know quite what we do. >> i have covered in the balacan region and my question is two pronged. we have been discussing extremism in pakistan recently. but i will take you back to the swat issue. we see that in swat, 3 million people, the areas, and just to get support to the army and the government to pressure in those areas. and we -- support behind the army. and was successful.
conducted successful and today we see that it is almost free. number two is in this society there are people who took up arms to fight those militants which ought to include. and those have gone answered. number two part is my during the crisis from 2006 to 2010, we have been having every crisis, as you mentioned, but then we see we, we have in this crisis, we came on strongly, and we have an independent tradition. we have now a media, civil society, and then a parliament which is making more laws these days. and politicians which like
having sense. so what do we see, is this -- there is all everything pessimistic or is there still some hope? thank you. >> i would just start by saying that, i think that there are a number of lessons one could draw from what happened in suwat but one of them is a story of the resilience of the state. that the military does have red lines that it doesn't want to have crossed within its own borders. i don't think we know exactly what those red lines are or why they were triggered in that case. was the military increasingly embarrassed by all of the international exposure of what was happening. were they concerned about certain lines of communication being compromised. did they have a more systemic worry about their borderlands slipping out of their control. it's really hard to know. but nonetheless, they did show a concern, and have -- and understock some pretty serious
operations. and i think that that's -- that's worth noting. and there are also some other positive trends. we haven't talked about the judiciary here very much. we mentioned it briefly. this will be a fascinating thing to watch over the coming years because the judiciary is seemingly a little bit more assertive, and many people would say well that's wonderful. that's an unmitigated good. and it is good to see, in a country in which the judiciary has been the hand maiden of military power for a very long time to see some action in this regard. but it's also true that in pakistan, the supreme court has moto powers which mean means they don't have to wait for cases to move up the appellate docket they can essentially pull cases out of thin air and decide that they want various and sundry people to appear before them and explain themselves on various and sundry issues. this can be also a very good thing for public accountability. it can be a little bit strange
sometimes to have the supreme court setting the agenda and holding people accountable and bringing up its own pet issues. there are some who worry that they will even take this a little bit too far. that's an institution to watch over the coming years as it sort of grows into its own skin in a new way and tests the boundaries of this kind of assertiveness. >> first of all, i welcome the focus on the future of pakistan. i think it's such an important issue to look forward beyond the immediate, beyond the sort of three month or six month or one year window and have a bit of a think about pakistan more generally. my question really is about the data which we face some of our pessimism or qualified optimism of pakistan in future. we talked a bit about the state and the role of state institutions and a little bit about pakistani society. but i wondered if the panel would like to comment on two very important elements, i think
in thinking about future of pakistan, one is how much will patronage networks like the brotherhood networks, like some of the political patronage networks within political parties help manage the kind of manage the kind of demographic change that were mentioned earlier. the second question is about pakistan's middle class. wendy, i know this is something you in particular are focused on. the lower middle class in pakistan is going to be a very important variable in the future of pakistan. how much do we really know about that group of people. how much do we know about small businessmen or students? and if we don't know it, what should we be finding out? >> i can just start on the first question. i actually think that we're going to see this extensive culture of political patronage. in my mind it will be further
consolidated in coming years, assuming that civilian governance is allowed to stay on track. and as we see sort of more ethnic bodies come to the floor as the decentralization takes effect i think in order to stay relevant there will be a desire to sort of keep situations happy. and we'll see more of that intensify rather than change. i think it will be playing a fairly big role. >> do you have anything to add to that? >> it's a great question, it's a hard question. i think we don't know very much. i think we have a general sense that the lower middle class will often vote a little bit right of center just historically and
that we see the quote -- developmental class in a number of places in the muslim world. i really think you've hit on something important, is that we don't really know what the trend toward urbanization is going to mean politically, and how it's going to be playing out in the coming years. one can extrapolate from current trends and say, many of the urban traders vote somewhat wright of center and they have more of an islamic nationalist discourse and world view. i'd be worried having the linear extrapolation from that. the political landscape may become a little more complicated over time. >> excuse me, let me ask a question from the other room. the question really is, does the -- to what extent does
nationalism trump the religious ideology? and the questioner points out that pakistanis are quite exercised about drone strikes even those in the u.s., protesting in the u.s. and u.k., but do not internationalize their radicalism. for example, very few pakistanis web to the iraq in the early days of that war. >> i think they're increasingly asking youngsters to say things like, are you muslim first or pakistani first? and answers to that are fairly chaotic. in some cases islam wins out, in some cases pakistan does. i think that increasingly, however, the pride in being a pakistani comes from being a muslim, and they have become n
conflated. there's a great sense of this notion of external persecution of islam and pakistan comes from being from the country that has the muslim bomb. >> i would just add to alex's question, i think it's important for us to remember that islamist parties and patronage oriented parties are not mutually exclusive. you can have patronage oriented countries that are very islamist, you can have patronage other yinted parties that have an ethnonationalist party. >> another question?
>> i was going to stress the more than of patronage. perhaps i'll save my question -- >> no, no, ask it now. >> we're talking about bureaucracy, a judicious yarry, we're talking about structures. but the process in my experience underlining all of those is a patronage based system. and the real incentives for choice and action regardless of the institution or structure in which you are operating is often primarily patronage or your relation 1ship to other people a kinship basis. very few of us seem to perceive that or its impact on the way people react to proposals or make decisions. it's more of a comment. >> yeah, it's very interesting. >> would you like to respond? >> i agree with the speaker. i mean, i think that patronage
system is so embedded in the culture, that it can -- it will perhaps transform in its form in a sense that there were other new urban institutions, urban parties will become still, will remain still patronage institutions. i don't see that as a big change. and i think that's another reason why i think we won't see much difference, despite the urbanization in the way people react. >> this has been hinted at some of the comments from the panel members. one event which is likely to have an effect for the next
decade is the census. the last one was done in '98. one of the reasons we don't have an accurate idea, some site 21 as the median age, others site 18 as the median age. if and when the census does take place. it will put pakistan on the map as a largely urban country. when the results of that census are implemented by redrawing the political constituencies, it's going to shift the political balance from the countryside to the city. and then you juxtapose on that the work that chris and i have done and published recently on changing recruitment packages. this is going to be a major factor in how people think.
and it may actually affect some of the dependencies on the rural port on the landlords. by shifting and changing the political landscape. to give you one example. in karachi alone, they only have two representatives in the provincial assembly. out of a population of 18 million after the census, they're likely to have much more representati representation. that's certainly going to affect the future of pakistan and pakistani politics. i'm wondering if someone wants to comment on this democratic shift leading to a political shift. >> i think you put it quite well. i actually have a counter question for you. i agree, you see sort of the
tension in parties. they realize the census is going to change things. i think that contributes to some of the instability we keep seeing. i think ten or 11 million people in a decade -- they have absolutely no sense of what this will look like. but my counter question to you in some ways, you mentioned the military and the recruitment for the pakistan army. what effect will that have as we see a pakistan army taking better educated populations, leaving the bureaucracy more sort of debilitated, is that something we're thinking about? >> the army's always taken pretty well educated people into its ranks. the effect that it's most likely to have is that when it recruits
primarily from the cities and if we go back to some of the earlier work that barbara and others have done on the inn innerci innercities, then you have a much more conservative group coming into the army, which means that they now represent the population of pakistan much more accurately than they did before, when they were tilted toward certain limited number of districts. so that obviously will have an effect. we don't know if that is going to be just a conservative effect like the rest of the country or whether there will be elements of radicalism creeping in if the economy tanks and if the society falls apart and other factors start intruding. those are the questions we have to keep an eye on. >> i think this is our last question. >> i'm harlan allman. i was such surprised nobody mend
tunisia and egypt. could you rectify that, please? >> since i was the one that started off on external factors, i will rectify it by saying i thought this morning as i was riding in on the subway, perhaps that ought to be a part of what i ended with. we don't -- i can't think of exactly whether there will be an effect from the tunisia and egypt or not. if there will be an economic effect if egypt as it looks like, at least it might, if problems in egypt drive oil prices again, which they looked like they might do. but whether i am less -- frankly i'm skeptical at the popular uprisings we have seen, spontaneously at least in tunisia, and seemingly in egypt
are transferable to pakistan. i could be wrong. but who usually gets control of the streets in pakistan? it's not necessarily the spontaneous development of just people on the streets. but it's usually organized. and organized by parties or some -- in many cases islamist groups. i don't know. i really don't know the answer. >> but it is a good question. >> very quickly. >> you know a lot, you could answer it yourself. >> very quickly, josh. >> it seems to me that such a public grassroots response requi requires a clear focal point. in many ways it seemed that the waning days of musharif's rule were seeing more of that
activity. there was widespread frustration not with the army as an institution or state. but with one person who had crossed -- in people's minds, boundaries of what was acceptable for his office. today i don't think that's the case in pakistan, even though zudari is not beloved as a leader. the groups that have been most adaptive at organizing mass protests are religious parties. they're pretty good at it, they have youth wings and student wings they can mobilize. even they have shown limited ability to organize very widespread grassroots movements of that kind. >> well, thank you all very much. and i'd like to remind you that we have a short break here, and that we will resume the second panel promptly at 2:15. thank you.
merkle spoke at the world economic forum. she said she stands behind the strength of the euro, but warns that more regulation and transparency is required to rebuild the european economy. this is half an hour. >> ladies and gentleman, i very gladly accepted your invitation to come to gatos -- davos. this year, the theme -- i think that it describes a reality.
i think that you need to look at neiman brothers and the aftermath of that to understand what was at stake. there is close integration and i think we learned that something like that should never happen again. for the past two years or so, it has been very comforting because politicians have demonstrated that they are capable of acting in the international community has proved that it can't actually work against the crisis. we have had the first meeting of the 20 in washington. we have made quite considerable
strides in regulation. the shares of politicians show themselves capable of action. a positive lesson that we have learned is that the one thing that we were able to prevent is the collapse of the global economy as we know it. have we learned the lessons of this crisis and? then we prevent this from happening? we already have the necessary mechanisms in place an order to insure a sustainable growth globally and for the duration. i would say that we have laid down the groundwork for this, but we have to save that we are not there yet-we have to say that we are not there yet. -- we have to say that we are not there yet. the crisis is not something that
dominates the headlines every day. we run the risk that among members of the g 20, there is less of a sense of urgency. that is exactly the danger that we need to work against. we have an enormous job to be done. those answers are not yet -- of those questions are not yet answered. the main question is, can we prevent such a crisis from happening again and can we ensure sustainable growth for the world as we know which-as we know it? -- as we know it? we need to regulate more. every financial player has to be made to supervise. we have not really a
coordinated a national response to the question. what happens is a big important institution. how can we avoid the taxpayers footing the bill? how can we prevent that from happening again? what is more important is what we have actually done in order to ensure lasting and sustainable growth? this is of prime importance. this marks the transition from crisis mode to a phase where the world has to learn to work together better and more durable lead. not only in a crisis, but always. the french president outlined here that he has put this in the right point. we agree on a framework for growth. a framework for sustainable,
strong and equitable growth we have to look at this. it will enable us for this policy. i think that we have to understand that exchange rates need to reflect the fundamental data of individual countries so that they depend on the economic situation of a given country. the currency system has to be so robust that it can prevent financial excesses. we also have to see to it that and balances -- thatinbalances around a world are allowed to work themselves out. again, it will be our task to
try to put our competitiveness on a more equitable basis. germany bloodily accepted the challenge to discuss this with mexico to look at the future of a global currency system. i think that we have to say that this is a task that we will not be able to solve overnight. but, we germans are gladly -- will gladly shoulder the burden. the most worrying point after the crisis is that there are certain indications for a more protectionist policy. free trade will give a boost to global growth and is also the fairest and most equitable form. the conclusion is of much more importance. i will have an opportunity to
debate this with david cameron and with turkey and india and we will have initiated a policy to the other on the basis of a report drawn up by others. it will allow us to finally reach that goal. we are meters away from the finishing line, but if we are not reaching this finishing line, and i am saying this loud and clear, decades will go by without -- this is important for robust growth all over the world. each one of us needs to do his or her bit, but i think it will be worth our while and this goes for each and every country in the world. third, we need to concentrate on commodity speculation.
we need to concentrate on the volatility of commodity prices which is not only dangerous for those that actually sell them, it is dangerous for those who buy them. it is important to set up a more transparent system when we look at the exploitation of commodities and there has to be fair access to commodities. there are a number of places where this is debated. it is a very pertinent case in point. we need to concentrate on this. growth needs to become predictable and sustainable and needs to be shaped in an equitable way. these are the most important points on an agenda of growth. currency, trade and commodities, these are issues that need to be debated globally. then, each and every region has to look at its own home work and
has to live up to its responsibility. that brings me to my point on europe. in the crisis, europe acted in a coordinated fashion and show its resolve to tackle the crisis and on -- head on. it demanded quite a lot of nerve. we obviously have to contend with the consequences because we now have a very clear crisis of indebtedness and let me tell you very clearly, there is no crisis of the euro as such. one could have predicted this crisis. but we have to overcome it. two years ago, germany was in the crisis and decided to incorporate a debt break.
no matter what political parties will be at the helm of our country, we have to ensure that stability and sound public finances on the order of the day. for germany, it is very important because next year we will see a very important demographic change. we have an aging society that will be very much mired in the number of older people. the fact that we said that we need to pursue this course, we have been told that you need to contribute to growth. after the enormous slowdown that we had, last year we had 3.6% growth all of a sudden. in the beginning, they said
there would be a new deck of cards on the table. a china will be the big winners emerging from this crisis, but we, with our export opportunities are given a chance to contribute. consumer confidence has returned to germany and we have a very strong boost that was given to domestic consumption. that is an example of savings. it does not need to be a contradiction in terms. consumer confidence is a very important thing that allows you to stimulate growth so, we can say that budgetary consolidation remains of prime importance to us. europe has a problem with high indebtedness. let me say this very clearly.
the euro is our currency and is much more than just a currency. it is the embodiment of europe. i quite often say that if the euro fails, europe fails. europe, today, it is a continent of 500 million and is unfair competition with others. it allows us to pull-to pool -- our resources. we have to show solidarity. we show solidarity by setting up funds and guarantees and standing up for companies -- countries that have difficulties. after all, this is the result of
speculation. these speculators have also got a roof in reality. this is why we have to do away with the root causes of the speculation. these very high debts will actually be reduced. that confidence is not there. it is so important for me and has always been, that solidarity is important. solidarity needs to go hand-in- hand with sound public finances and better competitiveness for the whole of europe. i am saying this on behalf of the whole of the european union. it may change the way that we think.
indebtedness is the biggest danger for prosperity on the continent. this is why we have to work against that. but we also have to have to work towards competitiveness. it is linked to charting a new course the european union is joined as a common currency. this means that we need to now to something that we have not done to a sufficient extent when the your was introduced, mainly working together in a more coordinated fashion. this will not happen overnight. some will be done very quickly and some will take a longer period of time, but we will do this in close concert with france. we want to put out a marker for reducing our debts and also for boosting competitiveness and
work together more closely to coordinate more closely publicly -- closely public and -- closely politically. the social security system is completely [unintelligible] the demographic situation should be, in some way, have some kind of relationship with each other. i think that what also has to be done is that we need to free up the possibility for investments. red tape has to be cut. we need to create competitive jobs. the reality of the day is that we are not in europe as yet competitive, at least not in all the different areas. we have not secured our
competitiveness for the future. i am confident that we are able to do this. but we must not rest on our laurels. we need to give a boost to the investments that governments take out as compared to consumption and we have to show those that are keeping a close eye on europe and that we are actually using the best of morals and not average. we do not want to be only similar with each other in europe, but it may lead us down a slippery slope. in the yardstick for europe must be global competitiveness and this must be the yardstick for all of our future policies and all of our future political coordination. we are committed to this goal and we shall pursue it.
we are enhancing the stability and growth. we know that we need to regain confidence. italy's all of you that have kept a close eye on europe, will tell what we have done for the past few months. we have to prove that we abide by the rules. we have allowed it to be oriented more on macroeconomic standards. we need to do our homework. solidarity and competitiveness should be two sides of the same coin. that is why it was so important to me to underline that whoever gets solidarity also needs to receive the solidarity. people need to do their own homework at home.
this is our task, and we, as europeans, will give our competition what we can put on the table. now, let us reflect. in the crisis, when we initiated a fiscal stimulus package, we have the impression that we were actually stiffened by the economic crisis. we should now take a break and reflect for who we are doing this. we ought to concentrate on shaping our policies in such a way that it is in the interest of our people.
so, we know, this is not possible without getting closer to each other. i told you this two years ago. we also need global responsibility. we have to accept that. we have to allow others to tell us where we are wrong. shared norms are really what is absolutely essential in order to enable less to meet the challenges of this new reality to the benefit of the people for whom we are responsible. thank you, very much.
madam chancellor -- >> madam chancellor, many thanks for that visionary outlining of our way forward. you said at the outset that the currency really establishes individual country's competitiveness within your. there are many different levels of competitiveness. how do you see a dollars from the perspective of the road? you think it is overvalued or undervalued. i do not want to interfere with the evaluation of that. that is done with market forces. i feel that there is no
harmonious space for these evaluations. that is why i say that we need to steer a very clear course. in the currency union, you do not have the possibility of valuing your currency. it is important not to say that there is no reason to it as to have a more consistent and more coherent economic policy. if we were to drift further apart, the rope and the way it stands and is about it with it would be a theoretical kind of thing and it would not be competitive. if we look at the present situation and not look at a more
competitive country that is setting the pace, we would allow europe to slip and that, i think, is really the center of a fairly lively debate. we need to remain competitive. >> madam chancellor, when we speak about europe, questions of arise.ty a rise -- pric the postwar generation, my generation, has a clear idea of what europe has to be. no more war. perhaps the other prospective was the social market economy. listening to you, i could almost say that your vision is a market
community with a human face. >> that is basically what the social market economy is all about. in this crisis, we have seen that this interaction of both sides of industry or well accepted and helpless. i think that this particular issue -- the origin of europe clearly that this was a continent that, over centuries, nations fought a bitter wars against each other and that this should be a thing of the past and that peace should remain. if i looked around these days, there are many areas where we
would be very pleased if they had that. what is important is that it is not as if in the present situation this were replaced by something, but it is complemented by something else. in the world today, our ideas of shared values, we wish to bring these forward. that is something that we can only do if people stand together. we would lose everything if we put a question mark over these matters of peace and a peaceful coexistence. you would be very surprised how quickly this would give rise to the old cliche prejudices.
this should not result in a situation where we fall back into a pattern of the past. we need to absolutely prevent that. >> one final question. you have spoken today. over the last two years, industries have made very tough decisions. how do you see the partnership with business and the economy in achieving the goals that have to be achieved? what would you say to the people in the room? >> my which would be that where regulation is necessary, it is not fought against. people will think of very inventive ideas.
everyone who is interested in long-term prosperity and long term success should rally around this point. if we want to forge a growth policy, we should not only try to avoid regulation, we should try to set growth on a continued basis. secondly, i would hope that those that work in the real economy also try to bring their interests more to the front. interests more to the front. without having stability,