tv Washington This Week CSPAN August 17, 2013 3:00pm-6:31pm EDT
the other parts. the operations and investments. what do we do there? in operations, have to take the i cannot short nuclear deterrence we cannot be unready as a nuclear force. the presidential airplane needs to keep flying and so forth. there are certain things you take off of the table. the bill gets squeezed into the rest. what happens as a result is the cuts end up not spread out all over the entire defense budget but bulged into a few areas. the two areas that are most painful are training, readiness, and our civilian people getting furloughed, a terrible thing to do to them. let me take the first one.
training and readiness. let's take an air base. at an airbase, the air bases are open. they have guards at the gate. they have people in the tower. they have people in the fire truck. the lights are on. we're spending the money for all that. where can you stop spending money quickly? painting the buildings. mow the lawn less often. that kind of thing. importantly, you stop training. when you stop training, you have stopped readiness. we are protecting those in as we know are going to afghanistan and would be in a fight tonight on the korean peninsula if god forbid we ever had a wart on the korean peninsula. we're trying to protect the units most likely to find themselves in combat.
for the others, we cannot afford to train them. that is risky because if something happens, those units will not be fully ready. then we get to the civilian personnel part of a week ago, furloughs began for many of our civilians. we're far from washington, but our civilians live all over the country. they are not people that work at desks in washington. they're mostly people that fix airplanes and ships and do other essentials things. these folks have had their pay frozen for three years. they have had a hiring freeze. now we're taking 1/5 of their paycheck in the last quarter of the year. it is causing many to have to change their family plans and not do things they had hoped to do for the kids. it is a miserable way to treat people. i talk to audiences of civilians. i say, i do not know why you put up with us. except i do know. they are there for the mission. they care about defending the country.
otherwise, they would tell us to go to hell and leave. but they care and are dedicated. they do not deserve this kind of treatment. these are the things that happen as a result of cuts that are very steep and fast. if we had more time to take cuts like the cuts we've already taken, we approach it strategically. we say what things do we not need any more? we can phase this out. what kinds of capabilities do not need any more? we get rid of the old and start buying the new, like cyber. that is the sensible way to do things. the sequester thing in the short term frustrates us. >> if you have said six months ago a betting person would not think this would happen, if you were to put money on the table
now, excluding that fifth of your salary, you probably have to bet that the sequester will get extended. >> i am afraid you are right. >> this has become the new normal for you. how does that change the nature of the plan? >> you are right. we're taking very seriously the prospect that this craziness is going to continue into the next year. that is the path of least resistance for the political system. if a big deal cannot be put together by the congress that can be approved by both houses that the president can sign, then we will drift into next year with some continuation of what we have had this year. our responsibility is to be prepared for that eventuality as we try to be prepared for others. looking forward, you asked if this could go on. we started about four months ago, an effort to be prepared for exactly that. the president's budget has
further cuts for us to meet the objective of deficit reduction. but they phase in gradually. from a management point of view, that is the sensible way to do things. i can shed people over time, i just cannot do it in one year. that we can handle. i do not know that the president's budget will be approved. it is july. you do not see a lot of forward motion. we're looking at the possibility this does become the new normal and our budget stays low. we are preparing for that. we're going to do our level best to make this strategic transition which is the paramount thing. get rid of the things we do not need.
get new things. treat our people as decently as we can. recognizing we will have to shed people. >> i did not make it in until late last night. i hear from the discussion yesterday, one reason you might not do a no-fly zone around syria is because you could not afford it under these circumstances. >> we would need supplemental funding, which is normal for a new contingency. this is a concept where you add money to the defense department when you have a new need, which is a sensible thing to do. there is no reason for us to have that money if we are not going to be using the units. the example i give people is hurricanes. we have a bad hurricane about once every three years.
you could give us the money to be ready for hurricanes every year, but then we would waste it two out of three. what is sensible is you do not give us the money all the time and you give us extra money when something extra needs to be done. that is the concept we have applied to the wars in iraq and afghanistan, to readiness in the persian gulf, operations in the horn of africa, and so forth. it makes perfect sense when you have new, temporary things that cost money. >> let me ask you to briefly put on your political science hat. something has changed in the political culture. in the post-9/11 years, the
hawks in congress always outvoted the budget cutters in congress. when i was the white house correspondent for the "times," you would frequently hear president bush say, i will give my generals whatever they say they need. one might argue that is not necessarily a position the commander in chief should take, but you heard the line very often. now in his own party and to some degree in your party, what you are hearing is budget cuts in first and defense second. is this just a function of how many years have gone since 9/11? what has changed in this debate? >> a couple of things. it is very noticeable. there was always a solid center of the opinion that supported defense that you could count on.
much less so now. >> in both parties. >> there are a few reasons for that. one is the one you mentioned, which is we have a competing priority, which is fiscal discipline for the country. unfortunately, the part of government spending that has been most politically easy to get to has been discretionary spending. of course, there are revenues and entitlements also. those are three parts of the federal budget. much harder from a political point of view to get to the second two. a lot of the cutting has fallen on discretionary expenditures that pay for defense, homeland security, and all of the other agencies of the federal government. that is one thing.
the other thing is time has passed since 9/11. people are tired of the two wars. they are tired of afghanistan and iraq. you do not see afghanistan in the headlines as it used to be. >> and when you do, it is usually about the pace at which we are leaving. >> exactly. then there is the last thing that is particularly true for the counter-terrorism effort. in a funny way, the better we are, the less people will notice what we are doing. every time i get dispirited by the fact people do not seem to pay enough attention and care enough about defense and international security, i console myself with the thought that if we're doing our job well, people get up in the morning and go to work and take their kids to school.
they live their lives and dream their dreams without having to worry about physical security. what a gift that is. look around the world. a lot of people do not have that. security is like oxygen. if you have it, you do not think about it. if you do not have it, it is all you can think about. we would like to be in the former circumstance. that is kind of a paradox. it is very important in the counter-terrorism effort, of which we are a part. obviously the theme of this meeting. it is an important mission of the defense department. it is the balance of getting enough public support to do what needs to be done but not scaring people. the president said something riveting to me in a speech he gave on counter-terrorism a few months ago. he said we now at this point, after a decade of fighting and learning what we have learned, we can proceed not on the basis
of fear but hard-earned wisdom. and we do, we have hard-earned wisdom. we have gotten better. that is the foundation on which we build now. >> you briefly mentioned mr. snowden before. after wikileaks, i was involved in some of "the times" coverage. we were asking a lot of people the question, how can you download 250,000 documents from the state department? my recollection is your old boss, bob gates, asked that question publicly and privately vividly. then mr. snowden comes along. it was not 250,000 documents, but it was documents at a higher level of sensitivity. tell us what you think happened,
why it was able to happen. since you mentioned before the importance of defending your own networks. tell us how you are changing or plan to change your practices going forward. maybe make an assessment of how much damage was done. >> we are assessing the damage. i will tell you the damage is substantial. there is a criminal investigation involved. i cannot talk about that. the issue gets back to what i said about job one needing to be defending our own networks. this is a failure to defend our own network. this is not an outsider hacking in. it was an insider. everybody who has networks knows the insider threat is an enormous one. this failure originated from two practices that we need to reverse. the first is in an effort for
those in the intelligence community to be able to share information with one another, there was an enormous amount of information concentrated in one place. that is a mistake. we normally compartmentalize information for a good reason so one person cannot compromise a lot. loading everything onto a server by people each cleared in their own department creates a security risk of decompartmentalization. that is thing one, and thing two it is something we cannot do because it creates too much information in one place. the second thing is you have an individual that was given substantial authority to access
that information and move that information. that should not be the case are either. we are acting to reverse both of those things. it is clear those are the to the root causes of this. what do you have to do about it? you have to compartmentalize more rigidly. you have to have a system like what we have for handling nuclear weapons. we have no load zones, the two- man rule. you will see a red line and if you cross the can get shot. there are areas where you are not to be. the proximity to nuclear weapons is too sensitive and momentous a thing to be allowed for individuals. there is always some aberrant individual somewhere and you
have to recognize that fact. when it comes to nuclear weapons, we watch people's behavior in a special way. we do not let people all by themselves do anything. nobody ever touches a nuclear weapon by himself or herself. there are always two people rated in the same specialty so everybody can see and understand what is being done to the weapon. it has been that way for decades. here we had a case where a single person at one installation in the intelligence community could have access to and move that much information. both of those pieces are a mistake and have to be corrected. >> you mentioned nuclear weapons. your old specialty before you had to go into the world of budget cutting. in the berlin speech, president obama announced about a month ago the next big step he envisioned, which was bringing
the american arsenal down to just above 1000 nuclear weapons. but he added to that that it could only be done in concert with the russians and getting similar cuts. almost the next day, we heard president putin reject this approach. from your study of this, what would be the risk of doing this unilaterally? if you are not going to get russian agreement to this, would the united states be significantly less safe with merely 1000 weapons against the current russian arsenal? how do you deal with the russian concern of the hour non-nuclear weapons would increase in precision?
>> a good question. several things. you are right. the president did say we are prepared to make further reductions below the new level in our nuclear arsenal, but he had the intention of seeking them in parallel or in tandem with russia. you are right. putin said what he said, namely that the russians have some concerns that would need to be addressed in the course of the negotiation. i will get back to what they are. i think the fundamental point is we are not going to attack ourselves with our own nuclear weapons. the value of reducing them -- what we're after is protection. if there is value in reductions, the goal was to get russian reductions. the goal, more widely, iran,
north korea, stop proliferation, get people to control materials more closely -- that is what we want. because those weapons and materials might be used against us. if our own reductions and being prepared for our own reductions can be a catalyst for nuclear security more broadly, that is a good thing. that is what the president wants. you miss the opportunity if you just do it to yourself. we will not attack ourselves. >> will it save you considerably to decommission another 1/3 of the nuclear force? >> we may be surprised to learn nuclear-weapons do not cost that much. our annual spending for nuclear delivery systems is about $12 billion a year and coming down.
another $4 billion for the command and control system that goes with the nuclear weapons, the radar, the warning, the special communications to make sure the president can retaliate under any circumstances, especially if we are attacked first, and all of that. that takes you up to about $16 billion. it is not a big swinger of the budget. you do not save a lot of money by having arms control. the reason you do it is because these are the most awesome and terrible intentions of humankind. i am a physicist, as you mentioned. physicists always felt there was some responsibility that went with having created this technology. they are part of our arsenal
that deserves our most careful thought and treatment and responsibility, but they are not the answer to our budget problem. they are not that expensive. >> one more question and then we will go to the audience. at the beginning, we talked about afghanistan. you said you have to stay focused on it because we are still there. we know there is increasing debate in the administration about what some call the zero option. at the end of 2014, could you pull out everyone? there are down sides. one reason for keeping forces there is not only to be a tripwire in afghanistan but to have forces in place in case pakistan went bad. tell us where this debate stands. is the zero option a real option in your mind? is it more of a negotiating position? we did it in iraq.
could you imagine a situation where we do it in afghanistan? >> let me answer your question by backing up for a moment on afghanistan. it is something people have forgotten about. not being critical. the plan laid out in chicago a year and a half or so ago was that we were going to wind down our presence in afghanistan. that is the coalition would. as the afghan force got stronger. the idea being that as we went down, they would come up in such a way that the sum of our power and afghan power would be greater than the enemy's power.
that is the path we are on. we are winding down at the same time that the afghan forces are winding up. the afghan forces are upwards of 300,000 now and are not just vanilla infantrymen. they are beginning to get more and more capability over time. essentially all of the missions in afghanistan are led by afghans. that's the whole objective, that we wind down and afghanistan eventually becomes capable all by itself of defending itself. that can't happen for some time, which is the reason to do it gradually. the question you are raising is a good one. the president hasn't made a decision about how exactly to wind down and where to. part of the reason is, that depends on what afghanistan does. it needs to build up its forces so it can compensate, number one.
and number two, if we are going to have forces there, we have to have an agreement that covers them. so-called bilateral security agreement, which has not been completed yet, and which we have to have in order to stay. there are a lot of different variables. my own view, and i've been at this for four and a half years, and i've been involved in every little detail there, is to say that from the purely military point of view, having the capability to maintain the afghan state and a level of peace, that is within reach. that's a hard-earned thing. many americans died, wounded. i think it is in reach, but
depends on some other things. it depends on afghanistan, pakistan. there are other variables here. from a purely military point of view, it is within reach. i don't say that lightly because i have spent a fair amount of time there, working on the problems and issues. you have to, because your heart has to be in it, because our people were there. >> you think that we could, if we couldn't get that bilateral agreement, we might be able to live with the zero option? >> we have said that we need the bilateral security agreement. not having the biological security agreement and having a joint plan between the afghan
government and the coalition, is that a good thing? no, it will disrupt the ability to achieve this result within reach. that is not entirely within the president's purview. we need afghanistan as a partner. we need our coalition partners. then there is the whole issue of pakistan. >> let's go out to the audience, and ask you to ask your questions. we will start with jane. there is a microphone coming to you, jane. >> ash, thank you for sharing your enormous talent with our country. first, a correction to david. mark wells, chief of staff of the air force, did not say last night that we could not do the mission if asked. he said, with less resources, he would have to figure out how to get it done with less, but he would get it done.
ash, congress is incapable of doing big things these days. but it can do small things. why isn't it at least a reasonably easy to ask congress to give you the authority to apportion the cuts where you need to apportion them? if sequester continues forever, which it may, if you had that authority -- mark welsh said it you could live with that, and build a smaller dod, but you could build it intelligently. if you agree with that, why isn't a huge effort being made by the administration to build a coalition in congress to change the sequester just in that way? >> it's a good question. by the way, it's nice to see you here. this is somebody who knows all about this stuff here. great to see you, jane.
with respect to the question of flexibility, what we really need is time. that's what we really need. i will give you an example of why. i talked about people. over time, we can reduce the force. but we can't do it quickly. it's not feasible for us to do it. if you take a service member and involuntarily separate him or her, they go through a process that takes time and money. they're entitled to things in the course of that and so forth, so you can't just snap your fingers and reduce the size of the course.
we really need the time to do this strategically and intelligently. having yet another year next year, like this year, where you suddenly have to take a large amount of money out leads to the kind of twisted results that you see associated with sequester in the first year. what we really need is time. if there were a budget deal of the kind that the president has laid out, which is cuts, but they phase in overtime -- i realize nobody has agreed to the president's plan. i'm just saying, something like that that comes in overtime. that's the flexibility we need to do this strategically and intelligently. if we are hit again in 2014 -- i can tell you, we are getting ready for it -- we will be prepared. but it's not what you ought to expect.
it's not a good way to spend the taxpayers' money. it's too many perverse consequences of doing things this way. >> a hand right there. >> thank you very much. >> i'm sorry -- i want to add one other thing to what jane said. what we have to do, jane, in a year of execution to get money out when it is an unplanned cut is you have to go where the money is. i have to go where the money is. in that sense, flexibility to move money does not help me that much because i have to go where the money is. i cannot go to the war in afghanistan because i can't have
people over there and stop sending them fuel and food. i cannot cut the nuclear deterrent. i cannot cut the president's airplane. i have to go where the money is. that is what is perverse about it. and that is true whether i have to move things around or not. we really need is time to do things strategically. >> steve shapiro from new york, representing business executives for national security. if one moves one's strategic forces to a theater or increases capital production with respect to those forces, typically one's adversaries are aware of that. what is the advantage to publicly announcing a shift or pivot to the asian theater when so far the only visible results have been jitters in europe and the mideast and bellicose
response in asia? why not just do it, and keep quiet about it? >> okay. you have two parts of that. one is talking and not doing. the other is, there is no value in talking. we are doing. we are moving equipment, forces. we are moving money around in our investments to invest in things that are especially useful for that theater. there will be more u.s. forces in the asia-pacific theater for years to come than there have been in years. why? because they have been in iraq and afghanistan. there is more happening there. why are we there in the first place? the asia-pacific theater is one
in which -- that has enjoyed peace and stability basically for decades now. it has done that, even as the world's wounds of world war ii never healed. there is no nato in asia. there is no structure there. the critical factor that has kept peace and stability in east asia for decades has been the american military presence there. that is what allowed first japan to rise and prosper. and then south korea. and then southeast asia. today, china and india. and that is fine. that has been welcomed by the united states. it is economically welcomed by the united states, but it has a critical ingredient.
that peace and stability has been our pivotal military presence in the region and our alliances that anchor that. that is a good thing, and we want to keep that going. it is about that role that we play in east asia, where animosities run deep, people argue over rocks in the ocean, where the wounds of world war ii and the earlier part of the last century have never healed. we would like to continue to play our stabilizing role there. that is not aimed at anyone. it is not picking a fight with anyone. it is not a concept of deterrence or anything like that. it is to continue to play that stabilizing role. we have not been able to play that to the extent we had in previous decades over the last decade, because we have been so involved in iraq and afghanistan. we want to get back to that role.
it's important for people to understand why we're doing it -- what we're doing. it is important that we keep our alliances strong, and that we are not trying to militarize any situation there. we would like what has happened in decades past to keep going. democracy and prosperity has been spreading. a huge amount of economic and political development, without any conflict at all. it might very well have been accompanied by conflict if it were not for the american role. that is why we're doing it, and that is why we're saying what we are doing so that nobody gets the wrong idea, but they do get the right idea of why we're doing it. >> we have a couple of minutes left, and we cannot go over our time.
we will take to questions. we will take the two questions, and then you can pick which one you answer. >> kim dozier, ap. you mentioned the cyber offense and defense teams are almost ready to go. weeks or months before they are operational? and you mentioned two things you want to see changed to keep more snowden leaks from happening in the future. how fast can you bring that about? >> one question over there. >> maurice sonnenburg. first of all, ash, thank you for leaving the wars in academia and coming back to the government. i would like you to talk about adversaries, meaning china and the others, in terms of their expenditures and what it means in terms of the advantages they will accrue in the future.
for example, you mentioned nuclear at one point. our arsenal is 50% may be obsolete. talk about that. >> two good questions. first of all, soon and now. soon for the cyber force. the germs of these have existed in the services anyway. we are trying to reach out and get people who already have that skill set and bring them together. >> and they report straight up to general alexander? >> correct. the second part is, when are we taking countermeasures in terms of snowden? now. maurice knows a lot about this. he's done a lot of work on
behalf of intelligence of the united states, which is much appreciated. maurice, you are right. the international perception of sequester and our budget drama, i worry about a great deal. this is something that makes us look like we are enfeebling ourselves. it disheartens our partners and friends and allies. it could embolden those who would commit aggression. >> who do you have in mind? >> the usual suspects. [laughter] it is important that we put it in context. this is an unfortunate thing we're doing to ourselves. on the other hand, we are trying
to do our best to through. if we have a little time, or after we have had a little time to adjust, we will be fine. this is not a cataclysm for american defense. this is not a wholesale retreat from our alliances and military capabilities. nobody should get that impression. it's not a good way to run things. it's not a good way to spend the taxpayers' money. we will get through this, and we will keep our eye on what our priorities are. we will eventually make it through this strategic transition which we have to make. it will be slower, less graceful. we will do it anyway. nobody should have thought about that. both things are true. it's a bad thing to be doing to ourselves. foreign counterparts have said, what is going on? it is hard to explain. it is important that we remain very strong indeed.
as we turn the investments we have been making in iraq and afghanistan to other things, they will see them showing up in the cyber area, electronic work area, and many other areas they will see in areas they will not see. it is important that message gets across. >> ash, thank you very much, thank you, mike. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] hill, eric leahy wants to hold more hearings on nsa surveillance programs. authority inlegal surveilling americans and
foreigners living in the united states. tonight, we will have more on u.s. intelligence and threats around the world with officials from the national counterterrorism center at 8:35 p.m. eastern here on c-span. "wash yournext journal," we will discuss the political unrest in egypt and and bordering country. we will talk with jon alterman. and then stephen ellis talks about the national flood insurance program and how a new law is causing rates to rise. after that, social media and how it might be used to help predict the outcome of u.s. house elections. we will talk with indiana university professor rojas.bio that will be live on "washington journal." >> standing inside hardscrabble, which is a two-story log cabin
in 1856. her memoirs letters know that she does not like it one bit. she founded crude and homely. true to her nature, she will make the best of it. as a young married woman, she would want to be mistress of her own home. she just thought that he could have built something as nice as whitehaven, and was a little perturbed that her father had talked grant into building a log structure. julia would have brought with her minor things because as a privileged child come up she would've had fine furniture that would have been a double. becausend a broad table at this point she would've had five people eating in this dining room. thisis important about area for them is this represents there for first home together. julia will gain a great deal of confidence as a wife and a mother, and her heart is here at
hardscrabble. >> next week, the encore presentation of our series first ladies, influence and image. next week, julia grant to caroline harrison 31st ladies, weeknights all next week and 9:00 eastern on c-span. >> next preventing the next world set. and on security officials met at the aspen security center and july. this is just over one hour. >> excellent, excellent. good afternoon. .y name is dinah temple-rasto tn i hope you had a nice lunch.
our panel today is sort of the crystal ball panel. we have been asked to look into the future and identify threats coming down the road and what we could do as a country to prevent them. among other things, we're going to take a look at whether or not terrorism will continue to be a first order concern or whether it will return to more of where it was before 9/11, and whether it will just become something that we keep an eye on while we focus on other things. let me start by introducing our panel. we have fixtures of the intelligence community across the board. decided not and i to wear a blue blazer just to shake things up a bit. matthew burrows as counselor at the national intelligence council, known as the nic. it put out a very interesting report that i recommend to you called "global trends 2030," which we will be discussing in imminent. -- in a minute. what we don't cover here, you
might be able to see in the report. sitting next to him is john mclaughlin, the former acting and deputy director of the central intelligence agency, and he is now at johns hopkins. sitting to his -- that is my left hand, his left, is charles allen. he was the former undersecretary of homeland security for intelligence and analysis and a fixture, as i said, and the intelligence community. i have talked to him many times over the years, and he is now the chertoff group. last but not least is maury sonnenberg. he is the chairman of the national commitment for -- national commission for the review of the research and develop programs of the united states intelligence community. so we have people who are well qualified to discuss this. nic's global 2030, it was and is a largely positive force
that is helping foster political aroundnomic improvements the world, but the paper also make the point that the growing individual empowerment open a pandora's box of new and heightened security threats. could you lay out that argument for us, please? >> this work is an effort to really look out 15, 20 years in the future. it is used as a planning document. it is not trying to predict exactly what is happening. it is a framework. what you have is very interesting. you have a number of trends, which i would say in most cases are going to be very positive. actually i think improve the security for the u.s. and is the security environment. couldere is also this you say black or underside to its, one thing trends are is this rapid emergence of middle-class, this really rapid
economic growth that maybe a little bit tempered now going forward, but still unprecedented really in world history. and you have as part of that really this individual empowerment, which is part of this is a women's role is really growing in the workplace all around the world. you have the collapse of the really gender gap in terms of education and health. that is all part of this issue. and it is going on not just in the china or india where we hear but actually in all regions of the world. the same time, you also have -- and this is part of that bigger story is the access to technology. , lot of these technologies cyber ones, bios, and so on, which we cs secrets really to improvement in the world and are also on balance ones that individuals can use harmful lethal and very
purposes if they want to. >> for example? in a terrorism, we give an example in 2030 of you could actually think of terrorism as cyber terror. at this point, that is not something that the terrorists have actually begun to do in big ways. we can see a lot of confluence of criminal networks with terrorists, then you have this access to really not only doing the very physical damage, doing a huge amount of disruption. bio is also a huge issue. how you could be creating almost in your backyard a very lethal disease, man-made viruses, that have potential, huge additional four disruption. so you have this case of really a diffusion of power, so casesduals having in most
the ability to do far more good -- really push along this you know, these improvements. or you also have their ability to really do violence on the level. that we have not seen before. this makes it hugely difficult. now you are having to track individuals, small groups, just terrorists,onsored which was more what we were thinking several decades ago. but now you are actually having to think about all these different possible threats. >> a lone wolf problem. >> yes. dni,blish every year the does an annual threat assessment every year. you will notice if you go back 5, 6 years that we don't talk as much about the individual, the lone wolf, that in the last year
, year before that, much more about the lone wolf case. it makes it a much more complex security environment. a lonedifference between wolf case as opposed to people who went to pakistan to train and a comeback? >> correct. they could do this through the internet. they can get the tools they need -- but you can see this, you sarnaev case may be the low level of what you could do with a lot more, very readily accessible technologies. >> lemay branch out a little further and go down the line and see what each of you may believe is the existential threat that you see out there, the two or three top threats that you see out there especially for the united states, and perhaps how the u.s. could respond to those. john, please. >> that is a tough question
because there are so many issues on the table. obviously you do not have to list them for this very sophisticated audience, but if i were thinking about priorities, i would always approach it in terms of concentric circles. i would draw circles and put the most important things that the innermost circle, and in circles out would contain issues of declining importance. but still important. in a that innermost circle, would you put? to me, the calculus has always been what are the things that threaten the lives of americans, the physical security of our armedy, or our forces in combat. i will always be kind of number one. so that takes you to things like terrorism -- we will come back to that, i am sure. weapons of mass destruction of all kinds, including intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons that can reach us.
ciber, which has been talked about a number of times before because it is potential -- because of its potential to have an impact on all of our license of many ways. the next circle out -- our lives in so many ways. the next circle out, still on the issue of threats, here it gets debatable. everyone in the room will have their own way to do these circles. the next blog, i would probably put regional crises as major threats. quite for example -- >> for example, the middle east --ht now, i can't imagine there is no time in my lifetime where we have seen the level of turmoil and danger and unpredictability in the middle east as we see now. just the ark from -- let's just start from iran, that is not quite middle east, but that whole art from iran -- arc across from iran is in various states of turmoil. pick out a couple of examples --
iran -- probably before we meet again in the security forum, i say there is a 75%, 80% chance that it she will have come to a head if you just look at benjamin netanyahu's breadline. he sort of clarified that to say if they get to 250 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium, that is my redline. ambiguous about that, but that is how i read his comments. my calculations -- it is based on what i can see in the open source, is the iranians are only about 68 kilograms short of that redline now. they have got 140 something kilograms. can centrifuges they operate at one time. that issue is going to come to a head in the midst of the greatest turmoil we have seen in the middle east in our lifetimes. i'm sure we will come back to that. but just to pause on another 1 -- syria, it would not surprise -- as aria would it
result. i had my students do papers on serial looking at the question of what would a post assad serial look like, and they inform me that the conclusion was if assad flawless, we will -- if assadtarian falls, we will see more sectarian wars there. big countries that have uncertainty. china, forbes apple, we can talk about in greater detail, but new leadership there, very different than the last leadership, i say china has the potential to surprise us in a lot of ways. for the first time in the period that i've been looking at china, i think there is a plausible chance of some instability there. that is not something i would've said five years ago. i can come back to that if you want. issues there. kenexa clout, i would probably put entries -- the next circle
out, i would probably put countries that do not like is for a much. or korea would be there. they recently demonstrated the capacity to launch a missile into three stages to put a satellite into space am a that is in essence the capability. perhaps without good guidance that come with an icbm as we know it, and intercontinental missile, their last intend to do that when they can only get to stages into space. you have to get the stages to separate. they have to not law, they have to reach orbit, all of that. so there is that. kenexa clout probably big -- the next circle out probably big trends, some of the things that matter has earned about them, paper, burgeoning population growth. if we look out over the next 30 years, the world will increase to 10nly by 2040 to 2050
billion people. only 23% of that growth is projected to take place in the developed world. think about that for a minute. that means that we're going to have a lot of unemployed young people in megacities around the world right for all kinds of backitment by extremists to terrorism at some point i'm sure. if i were sort of listing the threats, that if i think how i would array them at this point. terrorism asput the first order in threat. >> i would put it as a first order. it may not be the number one. an idea of in is not always articulated in our country, but sort of settling in, that that period in our history and our history of conflict is coming to an end. the president did not quite say that in his maiden speech, but that was the takeaway for a lot of people. -- having spent
some time in the cold war -- of leonsoviet personality crabtree is alleged to have said that you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you. changing terrorism -- i think we should be focusing on what is changing in terrorism. not whether there is an endpoint, but what are the changes. i think they are so transformational as to compare plausibly with the transformational effect of the berlin wall coming down into the broader geopolitical sphere. we talk about the narrow sphere of terrorism. the battlefield is changing good we have battled terrorism around the world. been iraq ands
afghanistan. with our departure in iraq, we are not going to have the same granular insight into those countries that we once did. won'terhaps terrorists choose to use them as operational bases, but it will be harder to know that. and iraq itself is now subject to center circle -- center centrificle forces, pair that and you will redraw the lines in the middle east. by the way, hearing myself talk reminds me of bob gates' definition of intelligence, he said that if someone who smells flowers, they look for a coffin. [laughter] i'm not giving you just the dark side here. [laughter] >> negatives.
>> it is the job of an intelligence person to think about the worst case, or have most often when others are not. the second big trend in terrorism right now i would say is the changing pattern of governance in the area of greatest concern. you think about it, these countries which a few years ago were authoritarian countries, we did not like that, but we liked the fact that they had visibility into their street and into their societies, and we had some control over them. that was not our values, but that was in some ways in our interest. now, they have all turned over, and if you again look at that arc that i described before, i think you can make the case that there are only two countries in acrossc from iran and north africa, the two countries out to border, those would be iran and israel. when you get past those two, we're talking about countries
that have urban centers. you have the world's largest ungoverned areas in the world outside of the urban centers. the bottom line there is terrorists now have the largest area of safe haven and operational training that they have had in 10 years. the third trend, and i will stop they are learning. you may destroy some of them but you are not destroying attacks. they adapt. that thelearning harsh treatment they need in areas where they hold sway does not go over with the population. we look at the document and ali after the french left, they are in essence self critiques of the fact that we made a mess of this by
treating the population so harshly, particularly women. we have to remember to treat people with care and provide services for them. that is the hezbollah model in lebanon. we are seeing that same pattern in syria. we are seeing get in yemen. across africa.t if they ever learned this lesson, not to be so harsh where the hold sway we will have ability to route them out. we see where this migrates. >> to push a little bit on social services, they were very bad at this. they ended up taking over these areas and could not provide electricity or anything people
wanted. they put the official back in and said we are not good at this. town.taking them a long >> it is taking them a long time. some of this is very subtle. , one of thea groups involved in the benghazi attacks, what they are telling is do not head to the hills and go to militant training camps. integrate into society. if you are a plumber, be a plumber. come to meetings within the population. i am not saying this is a full- blown finished product yet what it is a trend we are picking up any a lot of these areas. >> what are your big scary threats? am known as the warning officer who always warns nonlinear black swans.
, i lovethe world is what matt said. it is a great piece of work. they have done this before. this is the best. at the same time there is going to be a lot. you look at various options in the paper. i think they did a magnificent job. i certainly am not in the base -- best case of where we will be in 2030. -- an was an insistent assistant, i focus on what would be on the next year. three years was incredibly hard. we have been inevitably surprised. we were in 1973.
1990, saddam's invasion of kuwait, i did forecast that but i cannot buy many people who would go along with the whole idea. -- 9/11 ibefore nine was holding daily meetings on al qaeda. we have people pressing hard. this is such a magnificent thing. it also seems good for bad. i think we're going to have a
lot of regional instability particularly involving around ethnic and religious conflict and terrorism. i think we have evidence that our involving answering. they were from the valley and proxyg as a surrogate force doing a great job. you have fighters coming in intelligence fights from iran. we have the perfect witches brew evolving in syria. our job was to protect u.s. will. he is right. our job is to keep the country safe.
we just had a major attack in algeria. attracted a bent of attention. -- a bit of attention. we forgot the threats that can evolve rather quickly. he allegedly is dead now. i think we'll see more of these discontinuities. first i think the rosen of the nationstate and the spreading of the crisis of terrorism and to are africa and out shabbat conducting this last saturday. attack a human group were they claimed they killed americans. that is totally false. american life is very much at
panel. i think they defended very well and the legality of what we have been doing that has been the subject of such great concern. those are great issue. john talked about east asia and china. china is not an enemy. a major trading partner. we do have to get right the cyber issue would china that has now been talked about publicly by the director of national intelligence and others. take theo also get, whole issue of defense modernization, all of which could lead to some real potential abrupt changes over the pacific and asia. we have been so focused we have
lost our ability to do strategic assessment and warning. i believe we have to get away from the very tactical analysis and intelligence that we have done for the last several years. if we do not do this, there will be other abrupt continuities. i do not think they really acquitted themselves. i think they could have done much better. thee will talk about tactical in just a second. let's set the table and then we owll talk about hel institutionally we can address some of this. there is a huge basket. is there anything there anything we have not mentioned that you would add to that? nobody hassed mentioned pakistan. >> that is why i am the last thick sure here. cured >> ihere
identify with everything that has been said. i am always skeptical about studies that show -- say 30 years from now. with all due respect, i do not think the intelligence community got it quite right when they were not talking about the collapse of the soviet union. we have had a study that iran would not have the bomb from anywhere from 15 to 20 years. that was done by the eni a few years ago. i would rather not look at fro e predictions. what are you actually putting in there to get to the conclusion? that is my point on that. my greatest concern has always and weapons of mass destruction.
periodheading into a have we had all -- people who will have atomic weapons. , russians. the rainy and the pakistanis, depending on how much political turmoil should arrive in pakistan i do not consider them rational players in this. i believe we are heading for a atic catastrophe. it is armageddon changed a little. that may come sooner. predictions are where the economy will be 30 years from now will not matter. all it will take is one of if youramatic attacks will, whether it is nation
handoff or what ever it is. made a speech. a young men and the student said what do you fear most? 20 years ago it was nuclear attack. that is the think we have to worry about. that does not include radioactive bombs. about cyber capabilities in the future. of theow we are ahead game. not for long. the chinese have stolen billions of dollars of our technology ,hether it is from our military private industry. i see no succession of that. people say we should go to the un and have a treaty on cyber. it will never happen. if anyone signed the treaty,
they violated it. we are losing our edge here. looking into the future, quantum. is a way of taking encryption and bring it down from nanosecond two days. the nation that gets that is going to have a tremendous advantage on this. .hese are the two areas i have others. these are my two areas i am worried the most about. >> let's talk about institutionally and how institutions will be able to respond to these kinds of threats. let me they're out one thing that is a perennial think we talk about. on whether they
are still the best institution to handle a terrorism case. ?hat do you think should we go with him to that model? and involves a range of agencies. it is emblematic. foreign domestic boundaries disappeared. we more or less fixed that with in the intelligence committee. going to your question, i would stick with and at -- fbi model. ,ardon my feeling about that there are two parts to it. the fbi over the last 10 or 12 years has made pretty germanic
progress in terms of its capacity -- pretty tremendous progress in terms of its capacity. bob mueller is someone who took over the agency a week before 9/11. i remember meeting with him in the national security team at camp david on september 15 as we try to figure out what are the next steps. , tryingat the front end to understand it. i think you are that down over the last 12 years that he has been the direct or. -- director. the fbi has to medically improved its ability to do what it has to do domestically. -- dramatically improved its ability to do what it has to do domestically. if you improved it, we would have massive institutional chaos.
and societal controversy. listen to the earlier panels and imagine the headlines about a domestic fighting service here at it is exceptionally -- is essentially what the in my five -- mi5 is. for the united states to go into that direction will be too far into complicated. >> i think the fbi has certain centrality and it has all the investigative responsibilities. unintelligent it has real responsibilities. it is one of the players. it has a lots of data is useful for countering homegrown
extremism or inbound. i would like to see the incoming direct her to work harder to make -- director to work harder to make it open infrastructure. obviously, a greater deal of bottoms up a work with the police department agency. it is not just the police. we have not completed that architecture. we can do better. they can work toward improvement. they know tsa collects a lot of information. i would like to just come
back to a point. problemsr to whatever we have remaining i do not think is institutional. achieving further progress, this is where the snowden case comes in. there is a matter of data fusion. if a highway patrolman picks up someone who is suspicious and appears to be heading off to do ill, evil deeds somewhere and cia databaseto a that tells the patrolman what some officer nick up on the back alley -- picked up on the back alleys of cairo, we failed. in the other direction at a time we have achieved pretty germanic strides in data fusion. -- prettyple
dramatic strides in data fusion. one bad apple may have set as back. >> there has been lots of talk about snowden about the possibility of resurrecting the idea of a national security court. is that something you think we should have here in the united states? a court that is focused on these terrorism cases? should there be a tweak to the fisa court? would we have the same problems if we had a national security court? of the countries in the world have special court that giant terrorism. let take friends. you have a magistrate -- let take friends. you have a magistrate and a judge in all him in eight out of paris. -- them all in paris.
they will allow juries been any other case but not terrorism cases. england has a quasi-that of that. aspect of that. there is some value. there was a terrorist case in virginia. that case went on for four years. spank god knows how many millions of dollars. how many- who knows millions of dollars. he said i am innocent. he fired three lawyers and then admitted he did it all. here is a judge. i am sure she's a fine federal judge judge. in my opinion, you have got to have people who are doing these cases that would be a conflict of interests. i would say no.
i am not missgo, masowi would be an example of how they work. >> you are right. was a prettyomber clean case. that was not necessarily a judge >> he did not even have to go. different.ot >> it was very clean. there are a lot of clean terrorism cases. i on one point that was made, have a concern about that eerie to be at the i -- about that. the fbi looks for evidence and then looks for prosecution. in the scope of promotions in putting an fbi,
agent into a foreign country like the cia uses something top intelligence officer in the various embassies. , half of many of them them had never even been out of the country. what happens here is if you in the middle of a case trying to collect evidence, you do not want the evidence changes. when you get into the legal , sometimes the fbi moves too far and then they can go to congress and say look at all the cases. why would i want to see some other program? i rather like it. politically it would be hard to have an mi5.
they have investigative powers but no prosecutorial powers. way ofhere is some building a chinese wall with india the i. .- within the fbi they look solely at these terrorism cases, can never be involved in the prosecution and perhaps in that way. the last way is cooperation. i come from new york city. our top lawn to enforcement meetings police deep old, the last thing in the world they will tell you is how well the fbi cooperates with them. the last part of that is
something called fusion centers which is homeland security and joint terrorism task force. one of the complaints you will isr which the name implies collecting all these people together. it is not very useful. they ought to just close them up and save hundreds of millions of dollars. jttf is good. you get to complain or while the fbi dominates. my concern is to get them to work a little more. they are very good. those are two areas where like to see a little more. >> let's focus on this institution. >> a lot of people have talked about transparency inside the court. there are people now he were trying to figure out ways --
you are trying to figure out more ways to abide to the information. how can we possibly make a secret court less secret? what would be the transparency? i think this is some ring that you have to get -- something that you have to get congress engaged in and have a discussion if you want to build that legitimacy. >> could it be like the fed were they release minutes of the fisa court? >> i do not think you could make it much more transparent. i will tell you why. you have tody, look at this comparatively. the discussions we have had here today are extraordinary. you would not have them in any other country. you really wouldn't.
we are already the most transparent country in the world when it comes to intelligence. everything from our discussions dnihe fisa court, the annual testimony and congress which is seriously done and our oversightg, system. i believe our intelligence community is the most closely overseen institution in the u.s. government, believe it or not. our congress gets more substantive product than any in the world to the extent that when we use materials from another country, a bit off the sayect but a larger issue, as an example, we have to be careful what we show our congress. in all likelihood, their parliament has not seen that
material. i am a big supporter of congressional oversight. connects to- it the american people in some way. we are already very transparent. an article i wrote in the foreign-policy.com exactly a month ago, the way i concluded it was to make a prediction. i will make the prediction here. you can tell me whether i am right. my prediction was that the snowden case and the fisa issue will stimulate a debate where we will bring out every aspect of what we do and how we do it. we have done a lot of that already here this morning. at the end of that debate, the understandblic will and much greater detail and be much more comfortable. that is all for the good. we will continue doing it. we will continue doing it under
a modified legal regimen. we will be more comfortable with it. so will many people in the world who want to know this even more desperately than we do. if you are average citizen, emi look at this and the thought bubble might be "it is all interesting, i am glad to know it. oh if you are an intelligent officer, it is "how hard you want my job to be?" this is not pattycake. with peoplebattle around the world for knowledge. the other folks, one of their weapons is one we do not understand. .his is the age of a symmetry one of their asymmetric weapons to use with us to secrecy. if we cannot find out about our, it helps to cancel out
superior power. we have given up on secrecy here. i do not know what death is required for the intelligence community. set through thousands of briefings on sensitive activities that we did. the written responses, we get oversightto thes committees. we also go to the appropriators. i did that. that we doot much not speak very candidly to.
we talked about sources, methods, accesses, congress could lead to the real detriment and to american lives and also people who work for the united states. i do not know how much further we can go. them very happy to see speak why candidly. >> i need to cut you off. we need to go to questions. maybe you can wrap what you're going to say into one of the questions. if you could raise your hands and we will get a microphone to you. we will start on that side of the room. if you could give the microphone to the gentle man and tell us who you are. keep your question brief. i went a little over time. >> i know most of the gentleman
up there. institute for defense analysis. one topic that did not come up, and i know it is always tricky, one of the big challenges from a national security point of view is economic and financial. i'm interested in your views on how that plays going forward. >> economic and financial issues? ,> and frankly leg and growth how that all plays out over the next couple of decades. >> we did mention that. i cannot remember who. >> it is going to have a great effect. we still have globally 1.1 billion people in extreme harvard she -- and extreme poverty. is of the new world of 2030 a little but of optimism about
middle class. s of the regional instability that i referred to went all the way through the middle east and much of africa. we are going to have continuing instability and the like of economic roof. is grindingonomy slowly. i think he spoke very well of concerns over china. >> i think this was critical. >> we need to do better. the interesting where you can get the stability is with the rising expectations with more growth. egypt have very good growth.
you have rising expectations but you have to have a huge population of youth who really want the job and see the rest of the world is living much better. you think the growth would enhance stability. it does not. how we need to think about this a lot more. how that plays them. time froms a 17 year 1991-2008 that is very important. they pretty much had free reign to do what he wanted to do in the world, whether it is a will or not was another question. financial crisis really put a dent in our power and influence in the world. that is the main thing i take from it.
own housetting our in order, it affects american power. the last time i was in china i asked a vice minister of the communist party, what is your major national security concern? without any hesitation she said "internal development." they are thinking. their manufacturing is growing 14% year over year. figures at the point china will become the largest economy in the world. it is a competitive game. it affects everything. we talked of sequestration earlier. we talk to others, it could be the discontinuity. this begins to weaken and stumble for a variety of reasons.
it is very crucial. gooddo not do enough analysis. is a subject of great discussion. i would like to bring the conversation one step back from terrorism. that simply a tactic radical islam uses to get its way in the world. i wonder if you could comment on the thread that radical islam is wind up in control of the oil resources of the wolf -- the gulf or the nuclear weapons in assess thed both
risks and outline some of the things we might do to mitigate them. >> that is a great question. the current leader of al qaeda has always had in mind the need for that movement to have some territory. some ground that it owns or it can marginally control. looking atbly serious and saying this is my dream come true. of syria willart wind up in the hands of people like that. ties are growing between them and islamic radicals.
if there is continued secretary of war in syria, the country will break up. where is that stuff? you has their hands on it? what will they do with it? that is just one example of what you have to worry about. do not worry about pakistani quite the same way. 100 nuclear weapons and all of that. i do worry about pakistan. it is not at the point of dissolving or breaking up. >> let me just get mad and here. one issue we have not talked about is shale oil and gas. energy different
picture happening overnight. it has been five years. the u.s. can be producer getting up to the scale of the middle east. of wherean issue here the price of oil is going to be in the future. a lot of these features ing saudi arabia rely on a higher price. as a result of these other trendlines, increased stability. there look at pakistan, is population. this country is going to have 30% or 40% more population in a 15 or 20 year timeframe. no country can handle that. that. you stress on governments in both cases. -- huge stress on governments in
both cases. a lot of this comes down to government. that is the most difficult thing for an outside actor. i have a question. you might not like the question. i have been to a few of your presentations were you have here is what will happen in several decades. how reactive how you found the federal government to what you tell them? have you been able to point to saying they are listening because what we found out? >> yes. the interesting thing was that they wanted to engage very early.
wasof the big issues looking at the implications of that. that is still something ongoing in terms of how to think about a policy. certainly getting the information from the preliminary analysis. i point to previous thenistrations that secretary of state clinton had an initiative on water and food. these are open publications that they have done on these issues. some of those were directly a result of the kind of analysis that we were producing. there was impact. this is a moving target.
if you go back, we were talking about shale five years ago. it is not something that the majors did. it is something why you did this, updated. they try to get policymakers. they do this increasingly better. they think about different scenarios and how things could happen. 9/11 was probably a real wake-up call for policymakers beginning to think about these very happening.ents >> i watched this over many years. our governments gradually figured out that these were not point predictions. i'm not going to tell you precisely what will happen in each of three years from now.
they were quite enlightened. one at a things we said is that the world will be revolutionized by universal health and held -- handheld communication. that just happened? the things that we said about population, we talked about population for all these years. we are going to see more and more interested sideshow conflict. it allows the government to take specific actions. if they are thinking strategically, these are a big help. thank you. as a former intelligence officer i know they do look for risk and predict worst-case scenarios scenarios. we also look for opportunity.
my concern about the counterterrorism efforts, focusing on the finish. this to the long- term counterterrorism areas. what are your views on how we can develop it and move away from the reliance on the kinetics and we can do it less over time? >> that is a great question. it is sort of the classic or no effort dealing with terrorism. we have done reasonably well on two thirds of it. the classic formula is to think of destroying terrorism. you have to destroy the leadership. you have to deny a safe haven. yet the change the conditions that give rise to the phenomenon. well on destroying leadership. for a while we had done well on safe haven.
the third think we have not yet done well on at all is changing the conditions. this comes about for reasons that are discernible. the only way you can attack that is not your kinetic means or through intelligence sources, you have to attack it through a combination of assistance policies, strategic communication which we more or less neglected in our country -- ngoy years, in geo- -= work to the extent it is possible and working with local governments on health issues and issues of education. none of this is easy. that is probably why we have not done much. here. have to leave it
i apologizr ng to all of your questions. please give them a hand. thank you very much. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] >> a discussion about the political unrest in egypt and its effect on neighboring country i with john alterman. then vice president stephen ellis talks about the national flood insurance program and how a new law is causing rates to rise. then we look at how social media may be used to predict the outcome of the u.s. house rojas.ns with fabio
live beginning at 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. unfortunately in this environment, the moment something passes the house the pressure on immigration will immediately be back in the forefront. it will be difficult to get away from something that looks like the senate a bill. >> it will be better for them not to act immigration in this environment. >> the american people have a lot of concerns right now. unemployment is out of control. we have everything with obamacare. there were some serious issues that need to be taking care of right now. immigration is one of them. it is nowhere near the top of most people's. 1.5% or so that says immigration was at the top of the list. we have some pretty important issues to deal with. most notably, obamacare.
ceo of heritage action for american, the lobbying arm for the heritage foundation, talks about their plan to promote the heritage agenda. next, some of the challenges of peacekeeping in efforts. panelists include the special instructor for iraq reconstruction or. is from the center. it is about 1.5 hours. >> good morning. i am delighted to welcome you to this conversation between war and peace.
do we need new tools. a time whenring at we can see the end of both the iraq and afghanistan engagements. it is pivoted around the offer by the special inspector general for reconstruction to present the findings. they are now completing its work. it is a moment of reflection and looking back at what are some of the lessons of iraq. manyow that a rock in ways was such an outlier it be ofexception of the kinds engagement they need to prepare for for things on a smaller scale or and places of less strategic consequence for the united states. we have been struggling with stabilityion of
operations, stabilization, how to do peace building, etc. for a generation now. willve three people who bring very distinct and valuable perspectives on how to think about these issues moving forward. we're going to begin with stewart l wind. he is wrapping up more than a deccade of service. in his prior life he is an attorney. he worked in several capacities when george w. bush was governor of texas. we are really delighted that wen has developed such visuals to help understand the complicated story of finding what did not work so well and how we can do better the next time. we have invited him to make his presentation first.
jim has recently finished up his tour at the pentagon. career he was a research research scholar at the national defense university rector of research there. he worked throughout his career on the questions a stabilization and reconstruction including at the un and other success stories in cambodia amid the balkans, and elsewhere. he will speak on his own reflections of what will be the right tools and mechanisms to respond and post-conflict environments. we are very delighted to have leanne smith, the director of the policy and risk best
practices services. she has been in that position for years. she has a long career as an australian diplomat and a person who has worked on humanitarian law. we do really want to bring in how does the broader international community handle these questions. they are the codirectors of our peace operations. we really are glad to be able to broaden the lens and have them offer some observations about how to prepare and plan and organize itself for this very rod a way of post-conflict deployment and responsibility. one last thought i wanted to share.
theant to hear about governmental practices, the procedures. we want to remember that before any of that gets put into veryn there are some important policy questions and political deliberations that are required. what level of engagement as the international community feel it has or should have for some of these engagements? even prior to the decisions we're going to be top about -- we are going to talk about, there are important policy decisions at have to be to put this in motion. center.to the stimson we are delighted to have you here today. >> thank you. anis an honor to be here honor to be on this panel with jim and leann. is -- is theay
united states interagency sufficiently well integrated to plan, execute and oversee stabilization and reconstruction operations? we are not yet sufficiently well integrated to accomplish such an reform is needed. three premises that i think we agree on. one is the iraq reconstruction program did not go well. our inspections, 390 of them, demonstrate that fact. as important as our lessons onened report, the final is learning from the rock which puts forward the interagency should it to heart.
some is the need to form sort of inter-agency capacity that improves our current structure. the second point is the interagency is not well integrated at this juncture. the evidence continues to be revealed in afghanistan and the question arises in afghanistan today and erodes in iraq as well. who is in charge of the reconstruction program? it is an issue that the special inspector general has raised. it is an issue that the commission on wartime contracting raised in its hearings in march of 2010. jim is part of a panel that dealt into that. therenel concluded that was not clarity, integration,
or eight did answer -- or a good answer for who was in charge. is how can weise move forward with an effective path toward reform? spelled out in chapter two. the iraqis i interviewed, the americans i interviewed, concurred that the path for reform must be toward an integrated capacity. the iraqis repeatedly identified for me frustration about the werethat state and defense themselves at war. they spent more time bickering them providing aid. the prime staff to
minister underscore to this. consider getting help from state and defense, he had to observe this constant conflict. our ambassador in iraq in 2010 said that the iraq reconstruction teacher amounted to a bureaucratic clash of cultures. ambassador jeffrey echoed that fact and agreed that we needed reform to improve our approach. theral austin, commander of rock said that the approach we have suggested is a good one. we should do it. on both theip states and defense side underscored the need for reform
.o move toward integration how to do it? that is the question. there are a lot of ideas. let me firstly out what the current structure is and then identify the approach that is now possible. they have interest on the hill that would implement the kind of reform i'm talking about. this succeeded the court in eight or from reconstruction stabilization at the state department wish to not succeed in carrying out the mission identified when it was effectively authorized through this.
through the supports are we suggested and is 2606.ing it in hr we also have the department of transistors of -- transition initiative. largely done through contractors. it is not structured to. out planning. at the treasury department we have the office of technical assistance. they did an excellent regard with regard to stabilizing the aim. it is one of the good news stories. demands of theed early 90's. it is not an integrated capacity
for executing stabilization. we have something that provides eight on rule of law. the most important aspect addressed early on. it came forward later and provide a good assistance but is not an integrated office for planning and executing this. at the defense department, in 2000 five we saw the most revolutionary move in the 21st century. that is the creation of stimulation operations as a doctrine. it is now embodied in the field manual. begun a transformation there. it is still somewhat ambiguous with regard to what the role should be in these operations.
resolve theelp ambiguity. aid,ave the defense treasury, and justice. , aid, treasury, and justice. capacities that operate within their stovepipes, but these tovepipess endured -- s endure. , andination does not work thus oversight is not affected. senator mccain in my interview with him in chapter two said that we need to do the kind of 2606 proposes. charged with planning, executing, and overseeing stabilization and reconstruction operations. ambassador crocker has said of this idea, set the course for the surest path to correct the failures of the u.s. stabilization and reconstruction operations over the past three decades establishing -- three
decades. on bristol -- will create an institution. it will bring together the best of all worlds and provide unity of direction and uninterrupted visions of the u.s. meets the challenges faced in future post- conflict operations. this from a man predominately experienced in the field, having served during the search successfully -- search successfully in iraq. then as ambassador to afghanistan. he has been there, he has done that. he's the -- he sees this as a past -- half forward. -- path forward. attemptedat led the solution to this problem at the state department for three years says with regard to this proposal, neither the state department or usaid trains large numbers of people for stability operations. experience has shown that we need a core dedicated in order
to conduct these operations. this is where it comes in. it would provide the first stabilization professionals ready to respond to emergencies abroad. finally, chief of staff to the multinational corps iraq, says, the fact of the matter is the department of defense has been in lead in our most recent stabilization operations. this has created a situation where the core competencies of other government agencies and departments have not been adequately brought to bear. this is far from the optimum allocation of burdens among agencies. better integration of government agencies into an entity like the u.s. officer contingency operations as proposed by this bill would be a giant step forward. there is a solution on the table. it could fill this empty space, this lack of locus of responsibility for planning, executing, and overseeing these operations. it is a heavy lift, as they say on capitol hill.
as is passing any legislation. but the argument has begun. i am glad we are here this morning to continue the discussion and to move it forward. >> thank you. widen the you like to frame little bit and give us your own thoughts on the dilemma before us? tothank you so much, allan, you and your stimson colleagues for orchestrating this conversation. to use the adjective in your invitation, this is a messy issue. we are discussing it at a messy time. oif isll know, the fading. there is still chronic violence and instability that affects various parts of the world. stabilizatione and reconstruction activities are not well beloved, either by would-be recipients or by would- be suppliers.
it is a huge challenge. i think it is an enduring issue, but it is a very messy time. so, to navigate up towards stuart's proposal, let me give a little bit of context. those of us who have been working on stabilization issues for the last few years really have been focused on three urgent, emerging issues. the first is the retrospective piece, looking back at the lessons. here i give a big shout out to stuart and to your colleagues for all they have done in the iraq context to really explicate really good, solid lessons from the field. that is a function not only of your work and fighting fraud, waste, and abuse through audits and investigations, but more broadly work from the field looking at the programmatics of oif, how it worked, how it
could've worked better. that is a portion that we absorbed. second, the prospective piece, looking ahead. i would say, as we look ahead, we have been and i think colleagues still will continue to focus on the preventative piece more and more. here i would give a big shout out to rick barton and his cso team at the state department for their work in developing this civilian response network, not corps -- it is a broad international network that includes a wide variety of expertise, stakeholders from the private sector, from nonprofits, international partners, civil , and localbers regions, countries as diverse as kenya or burma, and i think that
is an interesting development. i hope our state department leadership and colleagues can put energy into that and further develop it. i think that is key to important preventative activity. so, the third piece is what i would call a preservation strategy. we need a strategy for preserving otherwise perishable skills and expertise. something that happened recently. our secretary of defense chuck hagel a couple of months ago signed a directive giving joint ponency to he -- pro the army. this had not happened before. my former colleagues, some of whom are here today, have been staunch advocates, or as i call it, constructive irritants, for
the mission, but not owners. ponency means you own the mission in the sense of working in a joint context to approach, the structure, the core functionalities, and who does what. to the responsible secretary of defense. that is an important innovation. there is also an ongoing joint capabilities assessment, which we hope will lead to clearer understanding of what the ,therwise perishable capacities capabilities that we need to watch. obviouslylook ahead, it is clear we are in a downsizing mode. ground forces are going to be cut. we know this. we also know that there is a traditionalist argument, which,
as a history buff, i understand, that sro forces are not always prepared to launch back into traditional combat. at the end of the 19th century, the brits had been counting count -- have been fighting counter insurgencies in africa. they did not have a clue on trench warfare. --0, our eighth army copy occupying japan, doing stabilization, thrust into south korea, not will prepare to defend against north korea's armored assault. having said that, let me also say that our current context does provide continued incentive for our forces, especially our land forces, to continue to embrace this mission. that your regular warfare context, the asymmetric threat that we find in various parts of the world or the u.s. military might be called upon to operate,
does give an incentive to population centric approaches to operations, to understand human terrain. think that is critically important in terms of preserving training,expertise, the ability to maneuver in contested environments, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, engineering capability, transitional policing, and other things. there are incentives to keep the pig -- keep the capabilities. let me quickly turn to stuart's proposal. please count me as a sympathetic skeptic. i think we need to give serious consideration to his proposal. i think we also need to look hard at the political and bureaucratic dynamics which it might shape inadvertently. i will identify three things. first of all, what i would call
the mainstreaming versus separation issue. right now, i think our biggest concern is how to mainstream sro expertise within the existing bureaucracies. i worry that setting up a separate entity to do that actually, in a perverse way, or pressure on those bureaucracies. they can outsource. some of you will recall the army's attachment in the 1990s to what they called the operations other than war concept. metastasize, that it became a concern for certain constituencies in the army, to is to gether on war into operations other than what i signed up for. [laughter] we do not want to go through that phase again. it not saying that necessarily would aid and abet that trend, but it is something that would have to be considered. the second issue is what i would
call the field of dreams problem. field of dreams, if we build it, they will come. great for kevin costner in building a baseball diamond in central iowa. it actually worked for our ucomm commander in operation allied force, building refugee camps in northern macedonia, because once they were built, the refugees came. that if you are nervous about using a certain capability, kidding that button is going to be -- hitting that button is going to be hard if you think hitting that button means something will happen that you do not want to happen. i worry that our leaders in the white house and state department, the defense department are going to be nervous about hitting the button when they should be hitting it to doing all the planning and
preparation, if they think it is great to lead to something which, at the end of the day, they want to avoid. i think there would also be great reinforcement from our regional offices throughout the bureaucracy on this. i would be very concerned about what i called the field of dreams problem. convinced thist actually makes the chain of command easier. i think it actually make complexify it a little bit. i heard one officer say, at the end of the day, and ambassador will never report to a general, and a general will never report to and ambassador. there has to be unity of effort. petraeus general david and ambassador ryan crocker worked very well, but i take stuart's point that early in the iraq mission, there were serious issues and there was bureaucratic warfare. that is the reality. i think there are ways to deal
with that. i am not all sure that this resolves the problem. where do i end up on this? at the end of the day, there are several must-dos. we can talk about them in the general conversation. i think we need a scalable stabilization. we need an ability to ramp up quickly. that is preserving critical capabilities, but then the capacity to move up quickly if we get into a large footprint situation, which will be rare, but it is a low probability, high-impact, and oftentimes a sudden onset type of situation. we also need a value-added approach. sro expertise in form high-level policy discussions, generally led from the nss.
i believe this was part of stuart's set of recommendations on a greater nss role. i do think the nss needs to step up to this more than they have. to ensure important value-added for regionally focused discussions on, what do we do now? i would trumpet the work of the atrocity prevention board in this regard. areas whereg on there isn't a lot of oaths -- of visibility right now, because all of our public close of the -- public focus is on the middle east and north africa. i think it is making useful contributions. it is fostering collegial work between the defense, diplomatic, and i will -- developmental communities, and the intel community as well. ii, if you will.
there needs to be of value-added approach. i have a few other things, but i will drone on for too long. probably the wrong verb. [laughter] i'm happy to turn it back to you. >> thank you jim, that was very helpful. now a perspective from the un's department of peacekeeping operations. >> thank you for giving you an peacekeeping a chance to share some of our experience with you all. obviously, i think i'm coming from a different person if, a multilateral perspective, but it struck me how many similarities there are between what you are facing and what we are facing. also the differences. about anu talked ambassador never report into a general and peace the -- a general. in peacekeeping, we have over 100 nationalities approaching to one had as the u.n. in the country, and quite often a force commander from one country haven't reported that civilian head. he see some of these challenges
playing out in terms of our effectiveness and operations. you talked about the field of dreams concept. we have a similar phrase. we call it christmas tree mandates from the security council that give peacekeeping awful range of jobs that we may or may not be suited to and may or may not have the expertise to handle. i got a lot from that, thank you. i wanted to give you a quick update on some of the work we are doing in relation to not only how we integrate and try to do things better as the u.n. on the ground, but how we get out of a place in a sustainable way. this has become a big issue for us in recent years in countries like haiti, where the u.n. has gone in, left, gone back again, left, and gone back again. a bit to understand better what went wrong in those situations, where the gaps were that we missed, and why it involved us having to go back. the main objective being to ensure that what we are doing on the ground is sustainable in terms of the broader peace building objective of the
international community and the u.n.. that is my job largely. i had the policy and best practice service and peacekeeping. we try to learn lessons from where we perhaps messed things up in the past or where we get something right, and how we can apply those lessons to new situations. a lot of my work right now is looking at the new peacekeeping operation that started up in mali, and what we can learn from other missions in that region or other parts of the world that will help us both get in, set up , chief our objectives, and get out as soon as possible. as peacekeepers, sometimes we forget that we should be working ourselves out of a job constantly. it is easy for people to feel like they have an investment and they need to stay to make sure the work gets done. for the past three years, i have been meeting -- leading policy work on transition. , we historically get a mandate from the security council, and when we are finished, we pack up and get out.
we started realizing that that approach to transition is not effective, and there is a lot we need to do with our partners both inside the u.n., inside the host government, and by regional organizations as well to make sure our effects are sustainable. we have been working with our missions on the ground, particularly those in liberia, haiti, and even in places where we have fairly new presences like south sudan. we want to get a sense from them what the problems have been and what they think we can do better. we built this policy up based on those lessons from our missions and also based on the pressure, to be honest, from member states saying, what happened, why weren't your efforts more sustainable? what could you have done better? the uk has been very supportive and helping us develop this body of work. itself is
th kindseeping missi of transition that the u.n. faces, from humanitarian to development. we thought it would be good to start with this particular aspect of how a peacekeeping mission departs, it is that is where there was the biggest part where there was a gap. the whole idea of the policy is to improve both the management and the planning of transitions at the headquarters level in new york, but also on the ground with the u.n. peacekeeping mission and the u.n. country team. what we try to do with the policy was to develop rules and sponsor believes to make clear that everybody who has a stake in all of this knows what they are supposed to do and when and cannot shrug the responsible these to pick up more difficult -- response abilities to pick up more difficult aspects. five principles i thought i might share with you, and maybe some of them are relevant to the lesson learning approaches you are having in afghanistan could i studied into that -- in afghanistan for two years.
i worked pretty closely in the field with your pr chief. i certainly saw a lot of similarities with the struggles that your guys were having that we are having two. for the u.n., with the u.s. is rendition of afghanistan, there is interesting stuff for the u.n. to take on board as a transition partner for the u.s. in terms of work that make neat the ongoing -- that may need to be ongoing. -- confessonvince none of these are brain surgery. for our transition processes, the number one thing we need to do is start early. from the day we hit the ground in the country, we need to be planning for our departure. i'm glad to say that in a , thatn like south sudan is a brand-new mission that started at the outset same, here is our mandate, what are our objectives, what are our benchmarks, and when will we know that we have gotten their? -- gotten there? the second principle in the
policy is about an integrated u.n. response. getting peacekeepers, whether they are uniformed or civilian, to understand they are not in the country on their own, they are there to work with other partners who are doing related or similar work, and they need to be working with them on the transition planning as well from the beginning. rule of lawi am a officer in a peacekeeping mission, i need to be working with colleagues in u.n. development programs from the beginning to see how my part of the pie fits with what they are doing. a big intellectual shift for us in peacekeeping. the third principle of our policy is about national ownership and buy-in. whatever we are doing as the u.n. surely has to be based on what is happening in the host country, in the host government, civil society across the board. how do we tailor our work and our transition around the national priorities of the country we are working in?
how do we make sure the government of the country we are working with appreciates the approach we are taking? if they are not interested in our early departure or our staying too long, it will not be effective at all. the fourth principle is similar, but distinct. that is about national capacity development. how do we convince peacekeepers that even though they are not capacity development experts, from the minute they hit the ground, they need to be working with national partners inside you in peacekeeping and the government and civil society we are working with, not just to do things for them or tell them how to do things, but help them do the things we are doing so that when we leave, there is a sustainable capacity left behind. i'm sure for the u.s. government, you face a similar issue. we talk about capacity development over time like it is easy to do. but a lot of governments we are working with, that capacity is not there. it is not as easy as it might sound. you have to identify the capacity and start with it from the early stage. it takes a long time to do.
the fifth principle is really quite pragmatic. that is, how do you communicate why you are in a place, how long you are going to be in a place, how you are going to get out, and maybe for the u.n. particularly, more importantly, what will you not be able to do? how do you communicate that to your host government you are working with? how do you communicate it with a population more broadly? had you communicated with your staff inside your mission whether they are international or national staff? there is an aspect of being as transparent and honest as possible with all of those kinds of partners that we haven't been very good at before. it raises expectations about what we would be able to achieve , when if we were honest with ourselves, we should have been more realistic. are the proud possession the principles that the policy operates under. are theout -- these principles that the policy operates under.
something we are working on now is the value of benchmarking, how much can you get out of benchmarking? how rigorous is that as a process? what do you do if you give yourself a set of benchmarks that are not achievable in the logical timeframe you have? -- the political timeframe you have? we are also doing a lot of work on public sort -- public perception surveys. benchmarking as a quantitative measure, that surveys as a qualitative measure. afghans your average province feel about their own security, and how should that impact us and how long we need to be in a place? related to that benchmarking is another process, mapping all the work we are doing. in peacekeeping, it is amazing how often we do not know what our staff are doing, how much time it takes for them to do it, who they are working with. when we say, it is time for peacekeeping to leave liberia, we do not have a clear sense of what that means and what tasks there are two handover, what
capacity our partners have to pick up, whether they are in the government or the country team or with other partners. that is something we are focusing on right now. another thing that is difficult to do is to know what is going to happen after we transition out of the place. in esteem or, we spent the last few years assuming that the peacekeeping mission was going to leave, and that u.n. political mission was going to take over. there was a change of government just before the transition was due to happen, and we found, no, there will not be any security council role. there will not be any political mission. there will just be an expanded team present. he could've done a better job of planning contingencies around the scenario that was going to follow. that is something we are working on at the moment. the last thing i would mention for this audience is, how do we get better at maintaining both the political and financial support for a country that we have been working in after we go?
peacekeepers, what we bring to the table is that lens of the security council, and that tends to bring a lot of money with it. country is off the council's agenda, we find that the aid hermetically -- dramatically, a lot less staff to finish jobs. the kinds of issues we have been addressing print i would be happy to answer any questions. >> thank u so much. i thought those were three really fascinating presentations. i'm going to take the liberty of posing a quick question to each of the three speakers, and then i will turn to build search. then the floor will be open for your own comments and questions. said of the things you resonate with how these issues get debated in the united states. talk a lotgy, we about that, is there an exit strategy? the military wants to know, how long is the commitment at the beginning? is worrying of that
about too much public an indication about our own exit plans, because then the bad guys just wait us out. the bad guys know that they only have to be patient for another 12 months, and then the field will be open to them again. this is certainly an argument that is been made in afghanistan. it was made in iraq too. the party out of power loves to scold the party in power for talking too much about the endgame, thinking that it is exposing a vulnerability. because you linked communication strategy and the notion that the u.n. does have to set of finite -- doesits engagement the u.n. also worry about even talking about exit means that it can exacerbate the situation? >> that is a really pertinent question for us. we do not talk about exit, point blank. it is language we have decided
not to do. the work i am doing is about reconfiguring our presence on the ground. it is maybe a bit cheeky to talk about it that way, but we do not talk about the exit of the peacekeeping mission. talk about the reconfiguration of the when presence. in the same way, you may have a significant military drawdown, you will have a continued united states presence in the country doing a range of things. maybe the military peacekeepers will leave, but the when country team -- the u.n. country team will have been on the ground probably before hand and will be on the ground afterwards. it is a different way of communicating that message. you cannot avoid the realities that people will say in terms of communication strategy. that is how we deal with it. >> would you like to comment on that issue? >> i think your five principles are spot on. planning for departure, your first one, and u.s. military parlance, what does success look like? i think one of the reasons that
iraq reconstruction program lasted 10 years almost was we did not have a plan that looked that far down the road. that fellchmarks victim to political realities. fiveother point, principal , providing integration, --ponsibility and one office in one office that would assign the duty of thinking about that very important question so that 10-12 yourave stabilization and reconstruction operations. i think, leeann, you are spot on with all five. number one is properly put first, because you have to think but the end -- think about the end before it even starts, before the first foot lands on the country that is being aided. >> thank you. jim, i have a slightly different
question for you. since you have been in both the learning part of the defense community, the national defense university's institute for strategic studies, and in a more action-policy oriented job -- we gather all the smart people to do these reflections on lessons learned, but then when the reality hits and deployments are six months, turnover, people in the field for short periods of time, what is your sense of how much learning -- are the right people learning, or do the scholars learn and the action folks have to get the cliff notes version of the learning? how much of these insights actually do get absorbed by the people who are being deployed for short tours? >> a fascinating question. i think the importance of lifelong learning, practitioner education, as one goes forward
scholars andeer, the policy world do live differently. they think differently. henry davidg ago thoreau lamenting that we have all become tools of our tools. you've got a -- you've got to understand how tools work, in washington and downrange. you have to understand legal authorities, funding, how to work effectively in an interagency domain. what can we bring together? widely. to cast the net this is a challenge for the stabilization community because you need to be inclusive. everybody needs to be in the room. that can create a little bit of thanks at a very senior -- of angst at future -- that senior levels if the future direction is not clear. the human resources peace is hugely significance -- piece is
hugely significant. i do think at various phases of a career, management capacity and the ability to understand who knows what and who brings what to the table can be very helpful, especially at the country team level. generals do not report to ambassadors, but ambassadors are the leading voice in country x to country y. coordination is absolutely required. having a country team with the right levels of skills of quitelities -- it worked well in a country like columbia at various points in time, for example -- is really vital. i would not accept that there is going to be inevitable differences between scholars and practitioners, but they have to work together. >> stewart, before we open it up, i wanted to ask you to comment a little bit on the cost implications of your proposal.
you have spent a decade now worrying about how the taxpayers money is being spent. did we waste money? did we spend it on the wrong things? can you tell us about whether you considered the cost implications? are you talking about the bricks and mortar new buildings, new agencies, where would it sit in the interagency process, would the defense and state departments no longer do things so that your program would be the magnetic pole where that capability resides? , asorry with the new office logical as it sounds, is it does not necessarily compel the other parts of the system to stop doing what they already do. i want to ask you about cost and efficiency considerations. >> thank you. great question. yes, we thought about this carefully. a the bill, there is provision that ensures that this is budget neutral. its expense is relatively small
to what the office would achieve , 25 million dollars a year, anticipating about 125 employees. it would be scalable. along the lines that leeann was talking about. scalability is critical to carrying out these missions. it would sit as an independent secretary ofing to state and secretary of defense. it is my reporting chain. it works fine. i think it grasps the current reality about stabilization and reconstruction operations, that defense and state are going to play significant roles in them. that is certainly a lesson from afghanistan and iraq. question of the costing. your third point, how does it
resolve the integration question, the coordination question? this space is not filled now. as i laid out, there are five different offices, in five different stovepiped agencies carrying out different aspects of this mission, yet no one bringing it together, before the operation begins. to depend on the serendipitous confluence of favorable withnalities, as occurred general petraeus and ambassador crocker, is not a strategy. serendipity is not a strategy. we need planning. as eisenhower said, planning is everything. the process gets you to resilience. it gets you to clarity. it ultimately gets you to victory in these operations and keeps them short. it would ensure that we would not have this constant turnover in personnel, j think more than anything else contributed to the length of the operation. everyone not staying longer than
a year. the analogy would be like fema. fema has its mission. through the presidential declaration. it has capacity. it has multijurisdictional capacity. prepared with contractors, analyzing what the situations might be, and therefore when it engages, there is not this long ramp up period where you had a free-for-all, as somebody described it to me, in the first year. that is unacceptable. we can do better. i think we will. >> i would like to invite my colleague bill dirch who founded direction, on peace any comments or points you want to make? >> a couple of comments and queries. thank you, alan -- ellen. reservations.t
there are always tensions between the need for a rapid exit and the long-term need to build new, post-conflict political cultures. that are more conducive to nonviolent politics than the ones it replaces. part of the problem is the sheer difficulty of going off -- up a damaged or fragile state. ellenton local priorities against a history of mayhem and war. my first question is to leeann, ,he new u.n. policy balances reflecting national priorities with a very specific caution to adapt to unforeseen security theacks, and i guess question is, what if the security setbacks are a function of national policy? how do you deal with that? a second observation has to do with the civil-military question in the field.
just as the u.n. military in the field answers to civilian authority in conflict operations, and it has for 20 years, u.n. military forces are capacity on loan for the u.n., they are not the heart and guts of the un's foreign-policy or international engagement. u.s. military forces are. they are much more central to u.n. presents -- u.s. residents and u.s. action. presence and u.s. action. my question is for jim and stewart -- how does this difference in the status of the military as a defining element of the institution, the country, make it harder or easier for us to engage and to be flexible in our engagement? >> your question? >> thanks very much for that question, he'llwhen a peacekeepn goes into the country with a
everythingimplement, is contingent on the conditions on the ground and the way circumstances evolve. i mentioned earlier south sudan and the excellent work being done by the mission there to set up benchmarks around phases of the missions life based on what the mission has been asked to do. as soon as negotiations between north and south breakdown and the oil stopped for -- stops running and the economy falls apart, so many of the aspects of the benchmarks we were looking at stopped working pretty is our job to report back to disk or to counsel and say, this is what we were planning to do. this is what happened. we can keep going or we can slow down and recognize the circumstances. it would be our preference to sit tight until the conditions are right, that it will always be a political decision and a financial decision by the member states. add in a related point to what you mentioned, in addition to these policies, it also been working on what we are
calling an early peace building strategy for peacekeeping. the number one reason that peacekeeping gets sent into a place is to help stabilize and bring peace and security and create an environment for broader peace building goals, but we have realized that what we do is also he's building activity. also do is peace building activity. it is basically around three roles of peacekeepers. because of our political role with the council, who articulate with the peace building goals are and help the government that we are in articulate the peace building goals they have, and the second is, by the un security council and we provide to create an enabling environment for other actors to have the space to come in and do some of those peace building works.the third aspect have roles that civilians that are peace building jobs, working with the courts or with
corrections, or as a human rights officer, that is early peace building work. that is part of the stuff we need to transition to. >> ok. very good questions. a difficult one to wrestle with. in, u.s. forces no in -- go i generally take the view that they are seen as partisan peacekeepers. the u.s. is generally not there to be neutral and impartial. it is there to support. it is there to exercise influence and ideally in a positive direction toward capacity building, national capacity development. it is a critical issue in our transitionng word,
-- in afghanistan. will win by waiting. they will be dealing with the national force that may have is inmacy, as our desire the end state. when we go in as partisan peacekeepers, we have certain magnetic qualities. we attract some and we repel some. when we attract some, maybe for the wrong reasons. we have to be careful about that. we recognize that. the issue is, are we dealing with spoilers who may not have any public support within their community, just like the revolutionary united front in sierra leone -- and the british knew that, by the way -- or is there a deep set insurgency ethnosectarian split within the country? we have to be conscious of the terrain.
we go in with a very focused concern. we are generally seen as partisan. >> i concur totally. first of all, with regard to civmil, civilians mostly the stabilization and reconstruction operation. there is a big debate about that in iraq. 75% of the rebuilding contracts were dod contracts with the policy assigned to the state department. ,hat created an insoluble irresolvable dichotomy between policy oversight and contract execution. outsetitary piece at the is aimed at rule of law. that was missed to a certain extent, or to a substantial extent, early on in iraq. it was part of the cause of our policy move from liberate and plan, toe prewar occupy and rebuild.
the very quick postwar plan that not abled that we were to execute. >> the floor is open. the last row. please identify yourself. >> in 1812, napoleon invaded russia. occupied moscow. things do not go to well after that. get the post-he conflict stabilization wrong, or did he simply misunderstand the nature of the war he had initiated? [laughter] you are exceeding my scope of historical understanding here on this. it would not be the first time in history. that probably the international werenity went, and there unexpected perceptions. i recall vividly in 2006 a general officer turning to me in
the iraqi context and saying, when we went ashore, we thought we would be seen as the lewis and clark expedition, and we were instead seen as the vikings. local perceptions count a great deal. yes, pauline baker. how about the political context in which all of these initiatives and lessons learned are being addressed? it seems to me there are two contradictory trends. internationally, there seems to be growing political will of some sort of coordinated effort to solve these problems and get into. r2p, the new u.n. mandate in the congo, which is the first time a mandate has been given for offensive operations instead of incekeeping operations, yet the united states, the political will is going in the opposite direction. people are war weary. we got sequestration. i do not know what kind of reception you've gotten on the hill for this new bill, but i
think there would be a lot of sympathetic skepticism with the emphasis on the skepticism in terms of doing anything new, in anticipation of another operation, and certainly not another operation on the scale of afghanistan and iraq. the question is, how do these two political directions mash? -- mesh? u.n., butjust the also regional organizations, like in africa. back, are. pulled these kinds of new initiatives and needs and lessons learned that we are talking about here, does it have any chance at all in moving us forward on this issue? if the u.s. pulled back, does that in the international efforts to do it? how critical is the u.s. support to these kinds of operations? >> great question. think that this bill would
provide a center of gravity, locus of responsible the for engagement on a multilateral level. there is planning, as you point out, going on. the ex minister from syria is leading the u.n. effort for post-conflict relief and reconstruction activity and is identifying areas that need tens of billions of dollars of aid. wanting for a u.s. connection on that point. there is no existing center of gravity, locus of responsibility to which he could connect. it is scattered across the interagency. afghanistans and is nevertheless not a strategy. the goal of reform is to provide the president options with regard to how the country might respond to a variety of scenarios that would require stabilization and reconstruction help. right now, his options are limited. we do not have a flush out planning process and integrated
capacity for carrying out these missions. what about congress? >> there is a very positive response in both the house and senate to the identification of the problem, interest in this solution, but recognition of the reality of passing a bill has buttious at this juncture, there is work being done on it, and it is work responsive, favorably responsive to the problem itself. >> thank you. did you want to comment on the u.s. role, and if the u.s. pulls out, does that make life easier or harder for the u.n.? >> i think the two things you pointed out are related to each other. the way the international community is looking for new tools to address emerging situations in new places is quite related to the u.s.'s position. it is also related to the global financial crisis and the impact
-- on the countries in the eu as well. it is also about a merchant partners. the african union and subregional organizations are keen and willing and capable of playing a better role, and may be better suited to play a role in some of these scenarios. i think they are all connected to each other. the important thing is to make sure we are context-specific about the right tools to apply for a scenario. some options have more legitimacy and places than others. in certain places than others. -- in certain places than others. >> [indiscernible] addressonder if you can the basic problems for legislation and appropriation, the propaganda of special interest groups. problem, you have to support those who will tell you
the truth, and then we can have real reform, but we did not address this issue, and we diverted the resources in the field. those resources are lost. [indiscernible] they give it to private interest groups. wonder if he should you can address -- i wonder if you can address the accountability andes, the resources, whether the issues will be addressed. -- we are shepherding the people, and then nobody know
what is there or what has gone wrong. i want to know so we can move forward from our basic level of accountability. >> your core point is exactly correct. we need more transparency and accountability and stabilization reconstruction issues. we pointed out in iraq that at least $8 billion was wasted. another $300 million recovered from fraud investigations. there is going to be some fraud and waste inevitably in these operations. i accept that. we need to study that issue before we get in more acutely, but we need to reform our approach to reduce the level of fraud, waste, and abuse in these operations. with regard to the interest group issue, i think this is one that does not really have a particular interest group, as you have been describing behind it. it is bipartisan, as reflected by the sponsorship. interest onartisan the hill, whether that translates into passage remains to be seen.
>> charlie stephenson? i want to pick up on jim's point that maybe senior leaders would be reluctant to make use of this office, i suppose, because of the fear of leaks were unresolved policy disputes over what the situation was. let's assume the office existed today. what would you recommend and think it could accomplish, say, for syria and egypt? what should they be doing today for those two issues, and how likely do you think senior leaders would be to say, go do it? 's as general petraeus interview in chapter two points out, to succeed in the stabilization reconstruction operation, you have to be absolutely, completely conversant in the economies of politics, the history, the society, the needs, the real needs of the object country.
that was not the case in iraq, nor was it in afghanistan. the iraqi interviews, underscoring a point leanne makes, substantiate a failure to consult sufficiently about meeting the needs. the agency would have already fully engaged in those issues a syria-basedfor stabilization reconstruction operation. with regard to suspicions about its role by generals or ambassadors, i think it would be incumbent upon the director to make it clear that the agency was an additive, not subtracted element, that it would help them , relieveh missions them of duties outside their defense or diplomatic roles, so that they could focus on those. the defense, ensuring effective rule of law, the diplomacy ensuring the establishment of democracy and sovereignty and
progress in the political sphere, as the country recovers from failure and moves toward stability. >> i thought jim's point was a little different. it was, if you acknowledge if you are planning, does it create an inevitability to acting? can you plan as a hypothetical , or doesre-decision the planning itself create some momentum? i think that might've been the point. >> let me address that. we maintain a very large military, but by maintaining it, we do not presume that we want to use it in an aggressive fashion. we maintain it so the president has options with regards to national security policy. planning, structure, and establishing capacity does not necessitate its actual use. david aber methods. one question, a comment building on what was said before, i think this proposal doesn't have any
legs. it has to be broadened out to think about different sorts of parameters that the interagency office could actually do. as you were suggesting, there are any number of roles that it could do. if the focus is on its planning and its activities when there is a large civmil operation in the country, i do not see how in the environment we have now it is really going to move forward. as you think about how you pitch this in various audiences, think about how you would talk about those various different responsibilities. , which is for leanne the issue of troop-contributing countries and the limitations that peacekeeping operations often face because of restrictions on the troops that contributing countries put on. as an operation moves through its different phases, how do you the with liaison with troop-contributing country governments to make sure they are comfortable with the change
in operations, particularly in a south -- in a fast-moving environment like south sudan? mess casualty -- mass casualty event. how do get the countries to step up to new responsibilities that come forward in a rapid fashion without the security council thinking through how they will actually execute on the new mission? thank you, sorry for the long comment. >> either of you want to comment? >> leanne? >> the million-dollar question in peacekeeping today. you're absolutely right. we are facing new mandates from the security council. i would point to the new resolution, 2098, as another example of that for us. the evolution of peacekeeping overtime since the early 1990s has gone from having a bunch of western contributors, security council members contributing troops, to a big shift to a
situation where a lot of countries from the developing contributors,r and now post-afghanistan, what is going to happen next? we are hearing a lot of rumblings from european countries about return to blue helmet peacekeeping operations as well. we are working on a strategy right now of trying to expand the base of peacekeepers, try to identify where the problems have haveand why some countries moved away from peacekeeping, and what we need to do to incentivize bringing new countries in. we are working on trying to develop a set of capabilities standards across a full range of is a u.n. agreed standard with member states so countries feel comfortable about what they need to contribute and also what will be expected of them when they do contribute. it is definitely a work in progress. we will see how things pan out with these new operations. >> if i could just at a point which also speaks to pauling baker's question, that is, what we are seeing broadly, locally
-- globally is a tort -- a movement towards regional responsibility. if we look in haiti, the extent to which western hemisphere countries have stepped up, it is impressive. quite frankly, resilience noaa heckuva lot more about how to -- of a lots know a heck more about how to promote peace and stability than we do. i give them a lot of credit. this new intervention force in drc will broadly be from the region. jury is out as to how it will work, but also in the horn of africa, largely a regional effort. the u.s. focus in all of these areas is to enable and promote this effort through what we would call partnered operations, where we are training, assisting on the training, enabling, some advising pursuant to law and direction from the president, and it will be a light footprint.
to enable partners in various regions to work effectively. mali is a current example, a current, evolving example. thank you. >> down in the front here. >> thank you. doug brooks, afghan american chamber of commerce. one quick question to stuart. one of the success stories of a certain program. one part of that was the ambassador who was a strong leader with the authority to act and coordinate things, and it worked quite well. i wonder if you could touch on that, if your bill addresses that issue, and for jim, the question is, if we have all this expertise for stability operations, how does dod plan to maintain it? is it going to be just through ndu? are any units the 10th mountain?
is that going to continue to do the specific training? >> thank you. it is a precursor to what is envisioned for the operations. because of the strong leadership from the ambassador. it has a great legacy. where somewhat replicated there were strong leadership in iraq with the reconstruction or worm. it brought military operations together to meet local needs and forerly oversee and lead the good. that is also true for afghanistan. both of those aspects are part of the ancestry. the success of the excessive would properly lead anticipates you. you want to sure that properly ship exists before the
next operation. existper leadership before the next operation. the capacity to execute the stabilization themselves are resourced. doug, a quick response. there will continue to be expertise and strong comparative knowledge about this mission in the 10th mountain, it is a great example. in the 2000 presidential election, it took a little bit of heat from the george w. bush --paign for not being because of the deployment. typically would --the most likely bill cole the vehicle.
absolutely correct, the peacekeeping stabilization of the u.s. army and national defense unit will continue to be pockets of expertise on which we can drop. i do stress a need for it good comparative knowledge. one we have is one case study which people overgeneralize to say if he can work there, it's to work everywhere else. it can't. >> i have about six people so far and maybe a few others. will try to fit you in. >> hello. i study abroad at georgetown university. my question is related to one of the main ideas of your very interesting discussion today tools.s to broaden on
[indiscernible] one of the first three actions we are 40are you -- years ago when building the institutions for defense policies. it seems to be a change in the discussion because the discussion you are having here about noting institutions for a civil military integration for the last 13 or 14 years intensively and even before the wake of the disintegration of the ussr in 1991 with the european union decided. my question would be to what extent do you also consider the unionution the european has built up? >> quick russian. -- question. it is a good example of
responding to the contemporary challenge. it sought to bring together civilian and military components and tothe uk to prepare be able to execute that capacity in these settings. it is much smaller by definition and by scale. it is aiming meet in the same director. euer member states in the are similarly responded. it is for us to respond in an integrated fashion. >> in the back. >> thank you. thank you for your persistence. weapon working at this a long time. thank you for your skepticism. -- and have been working at this for a long time. i want to drill down. you talked about everything
clearly over the years about what needs to be done. i challenge is who is the leadership on this? not only on the congressional side but in these fields. -- i want to know who is the leadership on this? whichings that resonate you do on oversight aware people want to know where dollars go and the challenge. this is perspective, prevention and some way, planning. campaignsee how the which you have been running for quite some time is reaching the people who need to do it. vice president biden was in the senate and he took up the dismantle of iraq after the invasion. i do not see on the appropriations committee or anybody else was there. the question is many burp words have talked about the dysfunction -- many reports have talked about the dysfunction.
you to drill down on what the be à la tea of doing people support these initiatives but they do not see how it will happen in this climate. >> great question. thank you. appropriations committee member lindsey graham. he was enthusiastic. other members of the armed services committee similarly so. senator mccain, senator ayotte, and senator corker on the foreign relations committee. there are -- although not certainly visible, substantial interest for the idea similarly in the house.
, who is a better leader in writing crocker on this issue -- ryan crocker on this issue? now at uva, continuing to lead a public discussion about this crucial issue. forlarly the senator complex operations and a number of people are interested. there is discussion. hill is engagement on the within the public and private academic communities and most important he by those most familiar with the subject. their general response has been positive. >> thank you very much. i'm a great admirer of your work. what i am back to say should not be detracted from that. -- and theme
civilians fighting the last war, we are building a hammer that would apply to last wars in a time where we did not expect the next was to look like that. the energy and investment that seems to be going into the innovation seems to be the wrong place to put the energy where in the future when not hopefully be doing these invasions and reconstructions with the dominance of the united states. what we really need to figure out how to invest as in some makes other that kinds of institutional changes and the way we go about this and if we convey it to our congressional leadership that the best way to do it is to do a better job of what we just did in iraq and afghanistan, we are giving them the wrong lessons. i would really question the value of pressing that direction for these efforts, not that the lessons cannot teach us.
institutionally, it is critical that we change our course. >> i agree. the status quo is unacceptable. presumption that will have another iraq or afghanistan. we headed them such as they were because we do not have capacityd planning or or effective oversight. that is why they lasted so long. i urge that we will avert a future iraq or afghanistan by more effective integration is operations will be more successful in the and rather than being nine or 12 years long , it will be much shorter. and we can have a vision for departure and expectation of what success looks like by ensuring somebody has us mission as her primary duty, not as an additional duty. the additional duty of those five agencies i mentioned to my not the primary of any of them.
, theyt comes to execution have been focus on their primary duty until called upon to respond. they do not have planning in place in the oversight is not there and you end up staying too long. it is too expensive. >> i am going to bite a few people to very briefly ask questions in a block and will invite our speakers to make their final comments. you and that margaret hayes and then in the back and nexium and if you want to ask -- and next to you and if you want to ask a question? >> thank you. they left, he cited complexities of these operations and my question is how would this affect the inherently complex and difficult political and strategic places upon which most of the missions were found?
the decision to disband the creatingy and allow -- division in bosnia and allowing more failure in the mission in warda and the african world and the situation in congo we still face? these really difficult questions, how does your office affected this? >> great question. >> margaret? >> thank you, margaret hayes. to --stion is -- it goes it has gotten far too little discussion on how difficult it ,s to do capacity building whatever that means and how long
i would use the case of haiti where we have been building capacity for many years and there's still not much there. fear that some the exercises in africa may be the same. how can we do that lesson learning better and what progress has been made? row.ank you in the back >> thank you very much. independent consultant. the doctor raising couple of serious concerns about the organizational nature. i would like to get the speaker to address this. the chain of command because it is basically an institutional orphan and the other one is it would allow ther agencies to outsource
responsibilities for stabilization operations. i think that is a concern that was true of an earlier version. i would like to ask him to address how this relates to the decision-making process and specifically the national security council and does that adequately address concerns that you race -- raise? >> hi, david. is goes to a point that jim raised. fundamental basis of what you are talking about which is planning the exit from the beginning, get in and get out quickly. i would hold that is the wrong approach. once you started thinking that you still plan to leave from the beginning and the focus is on leaving too soon rather than
, youing an exit as an end are missing the opportunity to get things right every -- right. we have made the mistake of leaving too soon and having too short of a vision. i would wonder if that has played into your thinking. >> the last question on the front row. retired from both the u.s. since in egypt is going to settle is on -- own thing as syria is hopeless. the next issue is yemen. on separate occasions, i have asked a judge in general to tell me about their experience, they would not talk to me. should we go back to yemen? egyptian asked several
generals to tell me about their experience am a it would not talk to me. first? why don't you go >> i would not step on that question. there were a lot of great inputs from across the room. a quick comment. i am very simple edit to the debt sympathetic to the point that david makes in terms of leaving too soon -- sympathetic to the point that that david makes in terms of leaving too soon. -- sro part of our as ro effort. we need to do a stress test planning. we need to look at the different, multi-dimensional and where are we going to have a problem at conveying responsibility to a host nation.
part of the capacity building. cultural going to be and capacity differences. the casualty evacuations in afghanistan as well. and other places, so we have to go through each of these transitions from tactical level training and equipping and conflict approach to law enforcement approach to quick impact stabilization in the longer-term development. all of these require your concerted, forward-looking planning. that is really important. and finally, i agree with the needs to step nss up to this. that is very important. , a couple of
questions. >> on the capacity development and planning exit from the beginning of the is one the hardest things we have to struggle with the right now. the main problem i see is we are putting the wrong people into the jobs. of the international lawyer doing capacity development in minister.-- for i had no skill sets. i'm a bit a technical expert, i did not know how to work with older afghan man as opposed to listen to these young women listening to how to get a job when i am earning $5,000 a month. we need to be trained to build capacity and care about building capacity, not just getting a job done. the second is what we build the capacity, how do we keep it there? if you are young afghan a you learn how to do something that there are a few of you a you want to get paid a higher salary
highery be used it -- salary, why do you stay? planning from exit from the beginning, you're absolutely right. we should not be playing to asset based on the -- david exit on the political -- based on the political interests. if that is less about exit and more about benchmarking in the end state, that is slightly different than planning to exit from the beginning. it is planning on doing when we are there. complexity, on march 10, two thousand three, the president he cited that the iraq he army would use a rebuilding force. it should be relatively short.
when i interviewed the administrator later about that subject, he said he did not know about it. continuity've been and equals strength and success in these kind of operation. capacity building is a huge question and was bent over $7 billion on it. in iraq, what did we get bored? possible to answer russian. -- what did we get for it? -- impossible to answer question. very little spent in that area. mike, it would not complex a fight the chain of command. it would fill in an empty space. executingor and relief or reconstruction activities. the inter-agency management system which was set up with an
to run these kind of questions for iraq and afghanistan did not really succeed because it was a hypocrisy. agree -- david, i agree. you do not really identify what it should be a you envision what success looks like. another way of describing benchmarking. as you achieve the conditions , thendeparture decision you have a sense of how the operations and. -- end. provide the is preoperation planning which is everything to success of the execution oversight. if you do not engage in deep understanding of the society, the economy thomas the politics,
the history, the sectarian issues to be suspect -- specific about iraq am a execution is going to be on an ad hoc basis and you will not have what enough.looks like soon >> we have run out of time. if i can link the unit question -- yemen question. would talking about. -- we have been talking about tools and the skill sets needed and what has happened in unpredictable and unstable political environments, that is really happening by a different part of the government system if you will. the decision if it matters for us whether or not something at the u.n. or another group of countries, it is equally compelling part, but not the topic of today's discussion.
i would like to thank you all of you for coming. and a special thanks to leanne for coming. bowen,boeing -- stuart thank you. you for bringing interesting perspective to this discussion. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> in his weekly address, resident obama outlines the
healthcare law to be implemented in 2014. representative shelley moore has a republican address. she criticized certain provisions and talk about the republican plan to help middle- class americans. hi, everybody. over the past few weeks, i've been visiting with americans across the country to talk about what we need to do to secure a better bargain for the middle class. we need to rebuild an economy that rewards hard work and responsibility, an economy built firmly on the cornerstones of middle-class life. good jobs. a good education. a home of your own. a secure retirement. and quality, affordable health care that's there when you need it. right now, we're well on our way to fully implementing the affordable care act. and in the next few months, we'll reach a couple milestones with real meaning for millions of americans. if you're one of the 85% of americans who already have insurance, you've already got
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>> hi, i am representative shelley moore. last month, members of both parties came together in the house to pass legislation delaying the individual mandate in the healthcare law. because you and your family deserve the same by delaying the employer mandate, it is only fair. actually, it is more than fair when you look at how the law is already raising calls, hurting jobs, and reducing access to the doctors you like. recent developments have proven the wisdom and the urgency of the bipartisan vote. more companies have said because of this law, they will have to shift full-time workers to part- moreand lay off others. states have detailed the rate shock that consumers will experience. just the days ago, it came to light that the president gave big business a pass.
they need more time to comply. meanwhile, you and your family are expected to adhere to all of the prescribed mandates as scheduled. where is the fairness in that? the president claims this law is working the way it is supposed to. but clearly, it is not. not when the admin session is missing deadlines, issuing waivers emma and granting -- issuing waivers, and granting mandates. i want to rely on the honor system to see who is eligible. right, it is a train wreck. the need for the bipartisan house to delay the individual mandate cannot be lehner. even though the president has already signed seven bills that would defund part of the law, he has threatened to veto this one. mr. president, and light of this unfair delay him a we ask you to -- unfair delay,
we ask you to reconsider. law, delay this healthcare not just for some but for all americans. it would only be fair. that will be government working the way it is supposed to. for now, republicans will continue to protect all americans from the president's healthcare law so with a focus on reforms that lower costs and help jobs. thank you for listing and enjoy your weekend. well after theo march was over, after dr. king had delivered the speech every resident kennedy invited us back to the white house. he stood in the door greeting each one of us. brimming --a beaming father, he was glad everything had gone well. he said you did a good job.
when he got to dr. king, he said might you had a drink. but the jeff k presidential views them -- >> the jfk presidential museum. life is sunday starting at 1:00 p.m. part of american history tv. >> the president of the national association of broadcasters, gordon smith. an encore presentation of first ladies. a look at anna harrison, mrs. tyler. and later a discussion about intelligence gathering. span, created by the cable companies in 1979 rout to you as a public service by your television provider.