tv Global Missile Defense CSPAN May 31, 2014 1:10pm-4:01pm EDT
today. bea real privilege for me to able to kick off the annual global missile defense conference. it looks like you have a terrific company. a terrific range of speakers and topics, and a wonderfully diverse audience. partners from academia and industry, as well as experts from think tanks and congressional staffers, and a few friends from the diplomatic corps. i know from looking at the list but there are a few friends of mine,. knowledgeable friends mixed in. i appreciate the opportunity to talk about the missile defense and where i think we are headed and what we are up to. before talking or launching -- specifically into missile defense, i would like to begin by setting a bit of a strategic baseline. it will impact what i say about missile defense. everything that we should do
should be derived strategically. we tend to look at strategy as linking and balancing, hence ways and means. then we look at the results and risk. we believe that, at the end of the day, our strategy is reflected in the qdr. it is fundamentally about protecting our national security interests. if we understand what those are and that some are more important than others, not only does this enable us to offer advice on when and how to use force, it means we can link those interests on how to allocate ever-increasing means that are provided by congress. and in between the ends and the means lies the fertile ground of ways, and how we go about getting it all done. and how resourceful we can be in crafting those ways. the tougher we are on ourselves
and how we manage a resources, the better we can conserve our ends. one of the most important ways is deterrence, which really comes in two forms. one is showing an adversary that we can deny objective. in other words, his attacks will fail. alternatively, that we can and will impose unacceptable cost on that adversary if he is foolish enough to attack. every bit of what i just said applies to missile defense. of ouronsider this top list of national security interest, is probably the survival of our nation. at the top of the list of threats to that interest is obviously a massive nuclear attack from russia. because we prefer to use the deny objectives to a missile-defense, in situations where it has the highest probability of being successful and being productive, as you know, we have told russia and the world that we will not rely
on missile defense for strategic deterrence of russia. that would simply be too hard and too expensive and too strategically destabilizing to try. even though russians have a hard time believing us on this. it has the great virtue of actually being true. on our ability to respond massively to an attack. that has worked for a very long time. but we do have other interest around the world. they're what we call was wounded -- limited missile defense and are very relevant, beginning with our determination to prevent catastrophic attack on our nation. this is about ensuring that we can deny the objectives of any insecure authoritarian state that believes acquisition of deliverable weapons of mass distraction is key to the preservation of its regime. the number of states trying to
achieve that capability is growing, not shrinking. our principal current concern is north korea. their closest in terms of capability, followed by iran. because we are not betting on dennis rodman as our current deterrent against future north korean threat, we believe a robust and capable missile defense is our best bet to defend the united states from such an attack. it is, in my view, our number one priority. that is why the system that provides defense, like our ground-based interceptor program, are a much higher priority than others in our shrinking defense budget. we do have other global national security interest, including strong support from our allies and partners around the world, as well as protecting american citizens around the world, including our own troops, wherever they may be present. we also pledge a good bit of
interest on regional defense, closely cooperating with a number of key partners. in a world of declining budget, it likely will come to rely more on those partners to resource the means for their defense, as we work more closely together on the ways. we are doing just that. let me spend a little bit more time talking about about each of these two interest taste missile defense priorities. defense of the homeland and regional ballistic missile defense. regarding the homeland -- the fact of the matter is that koreans havenorth multistage systems that can feed development of ballistic missile technology for longer-range m's.ems, including icb we have to take that threat seriously. has ahough no nation mature capability and both would face an overwhelming u.s. response to any attack.
while we would still obviously prefer to take a threat muscle out while it is still on the ground, we will not always have the luxury of doing so. because it is our policy to stay ahead of the threat, we do not want there to be any doubt about our commitment to having a solid launch capability. so the latter piece boils down to how many missiles we can knock down versus how many the threat can launch. that simple. that is much more than a function of how many interceptors we have or silos in the ground. it is also a function of how many -- capability and reliability. we often say quantity and quality on its own. quality has a quantity all its own. we only have to
shoot half of the number of interceptors for an incoming warhead, then we can handle twice the number of inbound warheads. that is why we're taking so much time and effort to improve the capability unreliability of our systems. in the wake of the last enhancement -- which flew perfectly until i watched it failed in the last two seconds. the missile defense agency has done a terrific job diagnosing what happened. i'm a future at 14 pilot. as one of those, i know that when something is not working, you bring out the entire system. you do not stop at the first thing you find wrong and you do not stop at the first possible fix to anything you find wrong. mda has done exactly that. they have taken their time and they have done it right. last year, they launched an improved ce2 interceptor, not
against an actual target, but simply to put it through its paces and ensure that they had actually solved the problem that they had found. it performed magnificently. our next shot, time against the target, is coming very soon. we're doing everything we can to a chore it success. candidly, itccess, will be a very good shot in the arm for this program. we will resume production on 14 more in progress missiles in keeping with our fly philosophy. we tend to put those in the ground by 2017, in order to increase our capacity and stay ahead of the threat. as we announced last year, with the extra, we will have 44 interceptors in alaska and at vandenberg air force base. we also have an ongoing program in work to improve the actual kill vehicle the right on top of that interceptor.
the quality has a quantity all its own. it is not just about our interceptors. i would put my next nickel and sensor. having enough and good enough sensors, to detect and discriminate a threat, saves a lot of waste in how many interceptors we send up. we have a lot going on in this area. think to our japanese partners, we are deploying an additional radar to the nation by the end of this year to both improve our homeland and regional defense capabilities the same time. we are also continuing to operate a radar float, as needed in the pacific, to provide discrimination capabilities to protect the conus and white -- hawaii. we are planning to deploy a new long-range discriminating radar in the pacific region by 2020.
are continuinge to pursue various uses of space and technologies and increased integration of existing center capabilities across command-and-control battle management to enhance our missile-defense discrimination capabilities in the future. while your session today is primarily about ballistic missiles, i do not want to overlook cruise missiles, particularly as a regards to the homeland. if we choose not to invest in the enormous resources required to defend against massive russian attacks over the normal, why would we care about missile defense? well, the element of surprise is nearly impossible. us, we will have time to react. we cannot always say the same for a cruise missile attack. we are also devoting a good bit of attention to properly configuring against such an
attack on the homeland. we need to continue to do so. turning to regional missile defense, there has been a massive proliferation in recent years of regional plastic 1200le threats, including missiles in the last five years. there are now almost 6000 known ballistic missiles in the world, not counting russia and china. within this proliferation, we have seen a number of technical advances, including liquid and solid propellants technologies and missiles that are becoming more reliable, mobile, accurate, and capable. sunken turkish ships at sea. many have shorter launch preparation times and smaller. technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses are also increasing. for example, several nations exercise near simultaneous salvo firing up short and medium range
missiles from multiple locations, to regional defense. against all this, not only have we brought our own capability to bear, in which we have to point some kind of missile defense system intended for and shipsies, we have early capable of doing the missile-defense mission. a number of them are on station at any given moment. we are also encouraging our allies and partners to apply their own missile defenses and strengthen missile-defense cooperations that will result in better support. for example, in the middle east, the united states is working with a number of our partners on missile defense, including supporting purchases of foreign military sales. the uae is procuring -- this, and edition to their earlier purchase. is updating its
batteries. and kuwait is also purchasing pac-3 batteries. the united states also has a strong missile-defense relationship with israel. are corporation on missile defense has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture. israeli programs, the u.s. has supported include iron dome. in conjunction with operational cooperations, they create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the israeli people from varying types of missile defense -- threats. in the asia-pacific, we have a strong missile-defense posture for homeland and regional missile defense. the cornerstone of our security has been our strong bilateral alliances with south korea, japan, and australia. will continue we to emphasize the importance of
developing regional ballistic missile defense systems. we know this is a very politically sensitive topic for several of our regional allies. progress in this area will only increase our confidence in the face of persistent north korean provocations. during last year's provocation cycle, it appeared that north korea might conduct a test of a regional capable posted missile that could potentially reach u.s. soil in guam. in response, many of you are aware, the u.s. army did a magnificent job of deploying a fad battery to that island. area remains, readily deployable if necessary. in the meantime, defending u.s. soil from the threat. with the unpredictability of the regime, we may find ourselves doing more of this thing elsewhere in the region. a commitment to nato missile defense remains ironclad.
has demonstrated our strong support for missile-defense capabilities, either already deployed or being developed with the european adaptive approach. our contribution to nato missile defense -- here, i would like to lay to rest the misconception that in shifting away from the original program to place ten states in europe, somehow the united states walked away with missile-defense. that is just not true and it is not doing justice to the great efforts of my predecessor, general cartwright. he realized that the threat from iran was pressing more slowly. the medium and intermediate range throughout was growing rapidly. it made great sense of the time and still does to shift to the european phase based on the sm-3 missile and away from the gdi. that is what we are doing.
rather than having 10 missiles, we will eventually have 48 on the ground in europe that can vary capably counter the real regional threat. this approach, with interceptors in the european theater. we have broken ground on the first epaa site in romania. that will be operational in december of 2015. one week ago, we had a very successful shot that demonstrated the functionality of the short based missile. it verified its ability to launch, control, established up bank and downlink medications, and provide communication to standard missiles. the first year, capable ships will be stationed in spain. the uss donald cook is already deployed to europe. ships, uss carney
and porter, will arrive in 2015. we are committed and this program is on track. our allies are also making significant contributions through their purchase and deployment of capable systems and support of nato missions. let me be clear, once again. it is not the policy of the united states to build a ballistic missile defense system to counter russian ballistic missiles. sites are designed to counter long-range listach missiles that may be launched from other nations, outside of the euro area. forsystem is designed launches from the south. a sites are not designed for russian missiles. russia deploys to many missiles, which are too sophisticated for the system to handle.
our sensors are not pointed in the right direction. the interceptions that we intend to employee will simply not have the velocity required to intercept russian icbm's. the most helpful thing that russia and china can do is persuade north korea and iran to drop their ballistics. we do not see that happening anytime soon, unforutunately. while we're on the topic, we need to keep our eyes closely. this cost usct is, $11 million. to find ourselves launched against a scud missile that is proliferating rapidly and only cost three million dollars. this could be working against us. there are three things we can do. first, we can keep the pressure on how much our own interceptors cost. it will be helpful to buy them and economic quantities, which
is proving hard to do. second, we can continue our emphasis on developing the technologies required to hit the listach missiles left of launch. finally, there is no shame in a passive defense, such as denial, deception, and mobility. are adversaries are doing these things and there is no reason why we cannot as well. finally, i would like to address other misconceptions that are out there regarding ballistics. first, is the claim that our missile-defense systems do not work. that we cannot hit the hill. we have an excellent transfer -- track record of properly configured systems. we are working very hard to urge ebi issues and we expect to raise the intercept of those missiles soon. our test record using hit to
kill has put this misconception to rest. today, for our operationally configured interceptors, we are 11 for 11. aegist, 18 for 21. bad, but we are determined to make it better. the second misconception is that it is easy for an adversary to employ ballistic missile counter measures. we will do everything we can to improve our own discriminator -- so is the that is, challenge of employee and deploying countermeasures. if the enemy is confronting a layered defense, it may not work in terminal. to terminal countermeasures may be destroyed in the course. test is critical to any complex weapons system.
are adversaries just do not do much. that means they cannot know how their countermeasures perform. we have had her own countermeasures program, and extensive one. we have learned how difficult it is. spacermeasures take up and have weight considerations. countermeasures are not as easy as they look on paper. last, is the narrative. missile defense needs to be successful, especially when it involves. that is a simplistic argument. no system will achieve perfection. we do notdoes fail, necessarily expect to stop every single muscle. to be sure, we will try. the affected systems we have are further developing and are intended to determine an adversary -- deter an adversary.
knows that there will be a significant price to pay with a missile launched against the united states. the worst of all worlds is that the attack is not only not effective, but you folks a nasty response from us. so, i believe our missile defense is on an upward trajectory. it is very healthy at the regional level, it is on a cost curve, and it is coming back into help for defense of the homeland. i give great credit to our staff and predecessors. shooting a bullet with a bullet is not an easy technical problem to solve. it is probably easier to kill godzilla. or maybe even -- well, nevermind. it is pretty hard. it is even harder to do that
when you're under time pressure. still harder when the assets are difficult to test. and heard any political turbulent environment. but we continue to make progress. we make progress in our work with international partners. we are making progress in working with four fighters and network that is flexible, survival, and affordable. in promisingesting technology programs to ensure that missile defense programs will be fully capable of defeating a complex threat. about what i said earlier the strategy and how they can help preserve our end and the means to climb. the only thing that is harder than getting a new idea is getting an old one out.
we will have to do a lot of work to empower our people to do both things. that is general dempsey's and my greatest concern, that we will not innovate quickly enough to be prepared for the world we will face over the next decade. greatestn is the opportunity for this generation of missile defense practitioners and architects, which is why your section on what is next promises to be so interesting. as we all know, warfare shifts from offense to defense all the time. where will directed energy and big data lead us in the missile defense from? what about the interesting strategic bastions that will arise if and when technology does advance to the point where it is more possible and more economical to defend against ballistic missile attacks? greatestse, one of our
advances is our innovative spirit. this advantage will enable us to protect the american people and stand by our close allies and friends around the world. thank you all for your interest in missile-defense, evidenced by the fact that you're here today. i hope this has been useful to you. i am interested in your questions i am probably more interested in your views and ideas. i look forward to the next part of the session. shall we get ouat it? [applause] right, well that was strategically fascinating, technically been technologically thought-provoking. and rapidly colorful. tougher than getting at godzilla. and how do we counter dennis rodman? or three quick
questions. i will try to hit on one question on north korea and one on the situation in europe. then we will see whether we go to the audience at that point. you called north korea the number one missile defense prior ity. is your assessment of the threat moving quickly? has a gone much higher? how big of a problem -- it has been difficult to get south korea and japan to work well together. youwall street journal, said there is enormous utility in having them work together on missile defense. that would be really useful if they could set aside their long-standing differences. how possible is that? >> you have asked about 30 questions of one question.
>> threat assessment and the trilateral -- >> we keep very close eye on north korean capabilities. it is very opaque nation. that is a bit of a challenge sometimes. but we have to take whatever we see seriously. they are probably the closest, rogue nation. they are the closest one to actually potentially achieving this ability to hit the homeland. we have not seen them test a missile i can do that, but we have send them -- seen them make the pieces. we have to take the conservative approach. we are not sitting by waiting for it to happen. that is why we always have the atability to launch a gbi any missile coming inbound from north korea. we ramp it up and down in terms of readiness, but it is always ready to shoot.
we take that very seriously. the other question you asked was what of a regional focus question. our long experience with this has taught us that a netted approach raises your capability significantly. in your ability to detect and find and diminish a missile threat coming at you. that has to be thrown against the mosaic of politics and international relations among nations. we are hopeful that we can get across some of the barriers that are out there to having trooper operation in the pacific and all regions. it makes a difference to have all countries working together on this problem. >> there's a chance that shangri-la -- that one could push this forward? >> i think that we would love to push it forward, that shangri-la
dialogue. the question is, how far can you push it? we have to be patient with allies who have their own concerns. if we could take a step forward every so often, we might actually get to the gold standard. >> and then on north korea, clearly what you do is not divorced from what we are watching on the ground. is your assessment that the administration and north korea -- in north korea, and potential instability, growing? has the threat escalated? >> we certainly had hoped that when the new north korean leader kim and power, we might find a more cool operative or rational actor that we could work with. to get rid of their nuclear program. and open up their economy.
that has not happened. and with the executions and continued executions and purges, it does not appear that we will see peace breakout or a jeffersonian democracy anytime soon. so we have to play it as it is, an work very closely with our regional partners to contain that threat. and ultimate sure that we are prepared. >> thank you. ukraine is obviously in the headlines. you made a very clear statement approach to missile defense in europe and how it is not aimed at russia. on the other hand, neighbors of russia are rethinking their security situation. what influence does this have on how you look at missile-defense? and in terms of threat assessment, there are a lot of icbm's out there.
how does this change the way you are looking at russia the moment. and the questions you're getting about missile-defense from our allies? >> we have not gotten a lot of questions from our allies about the relationship to russia. we're very clear with her allies and with russia that epa is not about a that we're putting in the ground --is not capable of hitting an icbm coming from russia. it really is oriented to iran and the self. the regional threat from russia, if that were to happen, and we do not see that happening at the moment -- in terms of a threat to nato, it would be a much more larger piece that we are not designed to cope with. we're hoping that russia someday will wake up and see that we are not designing the system to counter their ballistic missile threat. issues ofthe epaa
missile defense, poland is looking at systems themselves. what is your assessment there? >> any nation needs to look after its own interest. in this case, they should look after their own defense against potential cruise missiles were boasted muscles. taking a good look at what their security needs are and how they will fill those. we believe that coming in our direction is probably a pretty smart idea. that is the sovereign idea that poland will make on their own. >> one last question, then i will go to the audience. vladimir putin recently intimated the fee installations of u.s. interceptions would spark a new arms race. is this really new in terms of what he is saying? there have been recent russian testimonies about advanced warheads. some people are worried about,
certainly we do not want -- nobody wants a cold war situation. i am wondering as you plan for the future, are you seeing some sort of -- that you have to respond to? one last part of this question -- could we see u.s. missile-defense systems in setpe reaching the shore, to be operational in romania by the end of 2015, trigger a build up of russian missiles? >> i would say the cold wars are not necessarily started by weapons. there started by people. and people's attitudes and their security feelings. we do not necessarily believe that russian modernization of their nuclear deterrent is having anything to do with the new cold war. a lot of their systems are really old.
their aging out and they have to replace them. that had anation aging system, i would replace them with better systems. that is exactly what they're doing and that is exactly what we are doing. when we look to the future as our systems age out, we will replace them with systems that are more capable. a higher class system will be much more capable. the long-range strike bomber will be more capable than a b-2. we're sort of out of phase with them. at the moment, we do not have any pressing need. we have to look ahead. will russia years, look at us and save your starting a new cold war? the important thing to manages the relationship with russia so we do not end up in something that turns into a violation of a new treaty. we do not see that on the prize and. -- horizon.
they have a lot of rhetoric about the epaa and how this might cause them to take more security steps. i do not know how much of that is a negotiating tactic. you have to believe that somewhere they understand that this really is not about them. >> we have made a huge effort to reach out and work with them on this. has not dried up in the situation? know of any interplay we have had with them since crimea, specifically about missile-defense. we have engaged them extensively. we walked them through the entire process of a bye this is not about them. and how we could help them. we do not want to spend anymore money on this and we have to. either they choose not to get it, or it is not in their dna to get it. this is not about them. >> questions, please? in the back?
you, can you identify yourself? >> rachel, global security newswire. you have said that this is one of the most highest priority project. i was surprised when the pentagon recently announced how it responds to the potential return of full sequester and said they would cut the plan to redesign the kill vehicle. can you talk about the pentagon's thinking on the? >> shore. i do not have all the budget details. i do recall that we cut the new kill vehicle. i believe we are still investing in that program. i would have to defer on that. the current kill vehicle was designed and built very quickly.
accelerated program to produce missile-defense capabilities. i think it is amazing that we did it as well as we did in that time pressure. there have been upgrades. they were designed to keep them missile capable and reliable. it is time for us to look at new technology and new capabilities and more deliberate acquisition programs to get a new kill vehicle on those interceptors. that will be more reliable in the future. so, we should still investing that. >> thank you. gentleman next to her? >> thank you very much. the chinese niche agency of hong kong. you mentioned a lot about russia and north korea and iran, but little about china. what is the missile-defense policy regarding china?
the do you think -- antimissile system in asia would not only be for north korea, but also indochina? particularly when taiwan is concerned. ok, first question on the policy toward china. it is our policy that we will the chinesendermine strategic nuclear deterrent. we value strategic stability with china, even though we do not necessarily believe we need parity. so, that pretty much says it in a nutshell. regarding regional ballistic missile defense systems, that is principally oriented for the fairly unstable regime in north korea. and, if there are any ancillary effects that china has to consider regarding how that
influences their own security, that is for them to judge. the principal purpose of farquhar grecian has to do with korea. >> thank you. please, in the back corner? thank you. ovo. with rein there have been some threats from the russian defense ministry, that if a european ballistic missile defense system continues, that it will be struck potentially. it is viewed as such a threat that it would be potentially struck with missiles. that has been discussed. about much a concern 's, butout russian icbm rather installments in russia.
so, if you could address that? secondly, i have a provocative question, given the audience. your view on the potential for directed energy weapons? >> first of all, i take it as a component that you call me general, not at all. -- adminral. that means a great deal. but, regarding the threat to strike ballistic missile defense facilities in europe, i think and anysia realizes rational actor would realize that that would be very provocative and foolish. to preemptively strike if listach missile-defense site, that would be in article 5. it would be a hugely provocative act. it is hard for me to believe
that any serious russian would consider preemptively striking our ballistic missile defense system that is oriented toward the south. mind toboggles the imagine that. this is probably someone in moscow rattling a sabre. someone who is not necessarily speaking for vladimir couldn't. -- putin. we are committed to the defense of our nato partners and we will continue to apply this system. energy,g directed certainly it has a potential and a lot of applications. it is something we are looking at. we're very careful in the way that we employ those kinds of equipment. there is nothing to rule out the use of that energy. we have experimented with it in the past.
it has not borne fruit. the laserare of capability we put on a 747. we learned a lot from that, but we are not deploying that today. it is not mature technology today, but there's nothing that would prevent us from investing in that, like there is nothing from preventing us from investing in a rail gun. that has a lot of potential. >> one region we have not talked too much about is the middle east. irane event of a deal with over the weapons program, how does that affect progress to a deeper missile defense cooperation? our allies might have one view toward it. but they could have another impact politically. >> sure. if we are able to strike some sort of deal with the iranian does not suddenly
eliminate iran as a potential regional threat. it certainly does not lessen our commitment to our partners in any way, shape, or form. that does not -- we have outstanding relationships with our partners on ballistic missile defenses, getting better all the time. i do not see that changing one bit. at is about a nuclear weapons deal. they have a lot of conventional ballistic missiles that we have to take seriously. i do not see them being removed as a regional threat is that. >> thank you, admiral. on, one second please. >> ask the question, whether you want to or not. >> i am a senior fellow. the atlantic council. president obama is going to poland next week, june 4. poland is undertaking its own missile-defense system, akin to a patriot system.
how do you see missile-defense becoming an element of the u.s.-polish relationship? is it a potential to the f-16? see it asre -- do you a pillar in the relationship? >> may be pillar is too strong of a word. we have a great relationship with poland, bilaterally and through nato. they are a joy to work with, to be quite honest with you. i recall in the deepest darkest days, when europeans did not care too much for americans, i could go to poland and be received warmly by not only polish military officials, but by poles on the street. they are a great and wonderful people. we have a good relationship with them. on the ballistic missile defense side, i think a lot of that has to do with where they go forward
in their own investment strategy. it will be a lot easier for us to work with them if they are buying u.s. systems. there is a natural act there. if they were to buy systems from outside of the nato alliance, then it would be a much more challenging thing to integrate that capability into a nato context. certainly, we will be clock rating with them every step of the way. patriotbeen deploying intermittently to poland as a gesture of support. and also to show them what the system is capable of doing and that sort of thing. i see in up word trajectory. i would not call it a pillar. >> yes? right here. thank you.
vietnamese american -- geopolitically, how do you view the situation in the south china sea and east tennessee? how would that affect our global missile-defense strategy overall? >> the south china sea is a separate issue, in a way. may be slightly linked to ballistic missile defense. >> may i add -- how do you see the alliance? if there has been the connection between china and north korea and pakistan, afghanistan, iran, now russia. from the arctic to the pacific to the indian ocean, if they all alliance, the global defense there. as we hit the ball --
are we ready to protect ourselves against that global nuclear missile balance? >> i think the very simple answer is that we have a regional ally in the pacific to whom we are very committed, completely committed, to their defense. however that represents itself, we will work with our partners to defend them. ado not know that i see conspiracy between pakistan and china and russia and so on. occur, we were to have allies partners out there that we are committed to. >> one more question. i'm sorry, but we have time for one more question. tony? tony with bloomberg news -- what is the implication if the
next test fails? the house armed services committee says it will occur next month. what is the application to expand the network if it fails? what kind of pressure is going, mda, and raytheon under to make it a success? >> we wanted to be a success because we wanted to be a success. we have worked very hard on this. i do not think i can go into exact reasons why it failed, but we understand this very well. our test last year was amazing success in my view. so, i will not sit here and predict that it will be 100% chance that it will be a success. i think it will dramatically raise the odds that it will succeed next month. i do not know how hypothetical i want to get on that. if it does fail, we would look at the reasons why it failed and see if there is something that was outside of the system or
something fundamental to the system that calls into question the viability of the program. but i personally do not think it will fail. i personally think that any failure that does occur, we will get through as we have in the past. i know that there will be additional pressure. there will be people who'll raise their hand and say we told you this would not work. we have had success with this program. it has succeeded in hitting and killing inbound representative missile threats. and we are committed. this program is important. remember what i talked about with national security. preventing catastrophic attacks on this nation, to me, breaks only below survival of the nation. is in our interest to continue to work on a good program and move it forward. so, again, very hypothetical situation.
we are so very committed to this program. >> using your analogy -- this gives us a good shot in the arm if it fails. >> i don't think it is a shot in the head. we have not had a successful test. we have not had a lot of test i would say come of the last one -- i would say, the last one we fired -- we've maneuvered that vehicle all over the place and we were very successful. it would have it its target. we will have to see what happens in june. very generous been with your time. i want to thank you for your opening comments which i think were really rich and gave us the context.
you were very frank about a number of issues. we really appreciate -- you got this conference off to a great us with aleft lot of food for thought. we would be happy to give you all of that feedback. >> fair enough. thank you. [applause] guest: more from the atlantic council form on missile defense. this next panel discusses the threat from north korea. this is one hour. >> it's a real pleasure for me to be here and i want to thank
the allowed to cancel -- the atlantic council. i think the missile-defense age are very a real and pressing -- in asia are very real and pressing. of thelook at the nature threat and how it's evolving -- we have an excellent panel here to help us explore these issues. on my immediate left is david. he currently serves as a distinguished visiting professor from the west naval academy ea. he has served in a number of important government positions. most recently, he was the principal deputy director of national intelligence from 2009-2010 and was the acting
director of the national intelligence. as i mentioned, he holds a bachelor of science degree from -- at theaval academy u.s. naval academy. the senior adviser advisor and senior director for the asian-pacific security program at the center for new american security. he served in a number of research organizations and think .anks at senior levels he has been with the u.s. institute of peace. he served at the u.s. agency for international development. he was the number three ranking official there and he also played a very important role in the establishment and the size of the millennium challenge corporation. hasas been a professor and taught at a number of universities to included georgetown and johns hopkins.
oxford, go to wal you read for things. you don't just study things. he's a graduate from the university of florida. this is a very important panel. of importantumber panels threat today. we do a lot of work on the security challenges in asia. as far as the eye can see, particularly development in north korea and china with the peel way these types of offense , these types of offense of -- it's hard to see that fundamental fact change -- the backbone of this military will be ballistic cruise missiles and it will have an effect on how they land for their own possible contingencies
in the pacific. i'm looking forward to the comments of our panelists and a discussion that will follow with the audience here. david, why don't you kick us off? >> thank you. let me suggest a simple model. to observe we have a big threat in a small threat. we have some combination of deterrence based on the threat of retaliation. and missile-defense to work with. the interesting thing about the big threat, small threat way of looking at things, it's somewhat paradoxical, with regard to the small thread, there are some questions about the certainty of deterrence. , with the large threat, i think deterrence is going to work. i think it's already in place and already working. threat, if we have doubts about the turns and
we worry about that particular onlye, defense becomes not important, it becomes imperative. , weeas with the big threats have more confidence in deterrence and defense is extremely problematic with current technologies -- we are still dealing with enormous technical challenges and economic challenges. to me start with the small, which is in a way the most critical. i think it's a mistake to think that the north koreans might resort to some suicidal use of a nuclear weapon in a demonstrative way in the end days. i don't think they would view it as suicidal. they might view it as their best remaining option. that uses notme
only the possession of nuclear weapons but the detonation of nuclear weapons as a policy instrument. and has done so more than any other regime in the last 10 years or so. conditionedthat is to respond by striking out when under duress. these are reflexes that are built into the way this regime perceives the world and perceives its own survival. doubt, maybenough not in the directory, but at least in psychological terms about the state of the mind of the regime when under severe pressure. think point where i don't we can have adequate confidence in deterrence. nosile-defense -- this is news to the people here -- you have a stronger case with north korea. if important point is that, you are going to have
missile-defense against north korea, you better make it as good as money can buy. i'm not sure that currently we are able to do that. more for reliance reasons -- alliance reasons than u.s. reasons. this is a threat against re-targets. south korea, japan and the united states. the icbmess about threat than about the expansion -medium-range threat. the multiplicity of potential targets and the geography and geometry -- this really cries out for the type of integrated missile-defense that we have all advocated for so long. space-based and ground-based sensors and a land-based and sea-based interceptors and so on. this suggests that the only solution that will be adequate
given that this is a real potential problem of possible nuclear use. in a crisis that may well come. it has to be trilateral and it really is not. i think the united states should be very impatient with this northeast asian ally about the need for adequate and therefore integrated and trilateral missile defense and cooperation for northeast asia against north korea. in theanese are moving right direction. the japanese -- we have our own co-option with the japanese involving sensors and interceptors. likewise, in cooperation with south korea. it's the unity of the two that has been you looting us -- you looting us. luding us. there is little room for error
in the adequacy of our missile defense. with all due respect to our south korean friends, they have a problem with the current state of affairs in relying on japan-based systems. there is a political problem between the two. they also have a problem with china. concerned -- south koreans are concerned about how the chinese would perceive a full-blown, integrated to my trilateral northeast asian missile-defense system. would this be not only against korea but also against china? that is not inadequate concern that should prevent us. let me turn very briefly to china. the big problem. have reason to be concerned, so should china.
i'm not suggesting that either one or two. they basically believe in minimum deterrence. they are prepared to do whatever they need to do in order to make sure that they have minimum deterrence. it gets tougher for them as our missile-defense capabilities expand. i understand chinese nervousness about this. think there hand, i doubts are really unwarranted because the united states has made it pretty clear -- we should make it clearer -- we have made it very clear that we have entered into and are comfortable with a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence with the chinese. we are not going to attempt them retaliatorym with capability.
to conclude -- i don't know if that will satisfy the chinese. whether it's edifies the chinese satisfies whether it the chinese or not, the imperative is the problem we face with nuclear weapons, a significant number of them and a significantly growing number of potential delivery systems and the possession of the last regime in the world we would want to have these weapons. for all the ambiguities we face in our missile-defense programs and politics, the one that is abundantly clear is the requirement for a trilateral cooperation and integrated architecture for northeast asia. >> thank you. you very much. i certainly subscribe to everything he just said. one of the few nuances of difference, he may not
agree with everything i have to say. the issue is a long-standing and enduring and pressing issue as we move forward. it's a question for the united states -- whether the united states under any leader is capable of taking presented of -- preventative action. that is where we are headed right now. we are at risk of getting behind the curve on a breakthrough of north korean capabilities. nuclear missiles that could be a game changer in the region. deterrence could fail with north korea. call it a small issue. it is small relative to china. that is a very big issue in and of itself. the second point is, we look at the allied trilateral
relationship that david talked about, starting with south korea. the president of south korea has become very serious in high-level discussions about the need for defense. she is pressing against some of our own defense establishment forour own public sentiment a number of reasons. the good news is that, last october, the official management mechanism, both agreed on this strategy to destroy north korea's increasingly capable missile inventory. a very important purchase to provide intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. upgrade, finally, long overdue. missiles interceptor the disruption
--ll lacks the capability destruction means a focus on adversary command-and-control assets. very dependent on the u.s. ally for this capability. they are missing something. let me turn to japan. dwelt on minister has a deteriorating security environment from his perspective. essentiallyg to normalize japan's defense posture and create a new post-world war ii identity for japan. shifting to a much stronger posture of proactive contribution to peace.
he appreciates the vulnerability of the north korean missile and ostlear programs as m japanese have had. japan was extraordinarily vulnerable and remains vulnerable today. that is one reason why japan is going from 428 equipped destroyers -- from 4-8 equipped destroyers. that will be part of the missile-defense system. those destroyers were deployed in december of 2012 during the missile launch from three stage rocket launched from north korea that was accessible as well as in the spring. awarenessncreasing and the new midterm defense plan . they are improving air defenses although they may be missing
opportunity. they have a whole series of that f-15's that- of dea they have been upgrading. they have procured missiles at 11 locations. ultimately, they need a network. everybody does. the only way you can make defenses cost-effective it is through some leveraging of national programs by integration. this is the only thing that works. you can always do it against small threats. threat of north korea. because of its china focus rather than north korea and because of its fatigue about the issue, it hass hampered the ability to have an
intelligence group and do cooperation. fourth and final point is the next steps for this regional network building. i would argue that deploying and integrating a ballistic missile defense system among the united states and japan should be an overriding priority grade i use tot phrase deliberately reflect my sentiment. they don't want something they consider to be integrated with united states. this is an issue that has come up in the wartime control issue. also, as david suggested, between japan and south korea. irreparable enough, it's basically integrated. we can privately have our national security teams finessed this difference. need missileallies
batteries to handle a wide range of missile threats. you are dealing with a growing threat of even tactical short-range nuclear weapons that could be launched in south korea -- launched at south korea, we already have that in guam and hawaii. this provides another layer of missile-defense coupled with other programs like the x one radars in japan. , as david suggested, they get upset when there is any improvement in defense around the region on its periphery. sometimes, it's worth a dialogue with china and sometimes it is partly just china venting about an improvement around its periphery. there are reasons for china to be concerned about integrated missile defenses. at the end of the day, if our defenses are truly aimed at the small thread of north korea, you -- this can be sold to the
chinese and they can understand the difference because i agree with david that the difference between china and the united states at the strategic level is more stable than that. steps clearly need to be taken to improve the south korean-japan relationship beyond what has started in the past six months. oft has led to a series meetings. i expect there to be a senate meeting by next year if things don't go off track. -- theth that, president president faces challenges at home because of spending priorities. this is where she is going to have to convince her national security team that this is indeed the priority that she thinks it is. regionally, more broadly, beyond korea and japan, we do need a
much broader common operating picture. this is a different subject. a matter of integrating wider pacific networks that can tie -- we need a better network to make sure we have the information that allows national governments and national security leads to make decisions that advance the crises response. you.: thank you put a lot on the table. certainly enough for us to generate a lot of discussion. we havet off and then microphones with audience questions. maybe i would start with a couple. -- youuld paraphrase described a smaller thread and a bigger threat in size, but bigger threat of lesser concern because deterrence provides
higher confidence. i think you were speaking almost exclusively to the nuclear route when the china missile challenge or missile-defense challenge is conventional. short-range ballistic cruise missiles. they're getting into hybrid type systems. does your view on this change? would you say something differently if you bring in the conventional? how would that impact or view on what we should do regionally? guest: it would reinforce my view. if we think is difficult and going to be even more difficult to pose a threat to chinese strategic offense of forces -- , we have to bes able to defend against the
chinese short and medium range ballistic missile arsenal which could grow to whatever size they wanted to grow -- want it to grow. it becomes even more mind-boggling. shouldn'tying that we protect this ship or that base -- as a whole, the economics are clearly against us. even more so at the continental level. >> would that change with new technology if we moved to use of energy -- i don't think so. they have too many options. that they have not really pursued. they have options with regard to their strategic forces. putting more summary in's and so
on. -- submarines and so on. reallyhnology will disturbs the emerging deterrence relationship with china third those technologies could be very important against north korea. -- the smalla problem is not going to remain so small because, as i said earlier, i worry less about the icbm that i do about the expansion of the short and medium range arsenals. thosee possibility that will have weapons of mass destruction, nuclear or otherwise. for that small but getting larger problem for my the new technologies -- problem, the new technologies could be extremely important, rather than relying on hit to kill even for a growing north korean threat.
>> thank you. you certainly have done a lot of work on the japan-south korea relationship and what we might be able to do to bridge those gaps. david used the phrase that we should be very patient with their allies. you have talked about it being a high priority for the u.s. to try to compel or persuade cooperation. an elegant phrasing of interoperable south korea. you are virtually in a graded. in a practical sense, what are the two or three steps we should be taking to get toward that outcome of integrated -- what should be on the agenda? concrete, practical things to move in that direction? >> one of them is the intelligence sharing agreements.
something that was close to happening in 2012 before the former president visited the island that created a new crisis in japan-south korean relations. ie national security elites have spoken to -- i've spoken to hundreds in the last year alone -- even when they are together, they agree in general on the need for this. it politically, they can sell it because there is no political risk-taking allowed for the present. -- for the president. priorities.her we needed to get over that hurdle and get to that intelligence sharing agreement. we need to pre-position and ahead of a crisis. make it happen.
in terms of covering much wider pact it is great that the trees are finally being procured in south korea. it provides the wider area of protection. i think that would be huge. finally, you need greater contingency planning. we should be impatient, but we should be impatient quietly. more than publicly. these alliesrging to advance. what they know is international interests. we need to help overcome the political hurdles. >> there is no controversy in the previous panel. should be a little bit of controversy in this one. i spent a lot of years in the state apartment. integrated and inter-operable is
not the same thing. maybe they could become the same thing. integrated means that things happen in seconds. they happen at speeds that are required for sensors and shooters to work as part of a single system. that is not what interoperable means. maybe with everybody doing a wink wink and a nudge nudge, interoperable means integrated. i am skeptical that we are talking about the same thing. >> are you talking about an interim step to deal with the political issue? >> i'm talking about the world we are in. not the world we want to be in. this is what the u.s. government could sell today to south korea. we can build on that step tomorrow. >this is what is possible. >> let me ask a question for either of you.
perhaps this reveals some of my own biases. i was surprised that one country was not mentioned at all given where the bulk of the missiles are in asia. neither of you mentioned taiwan. all taiwan figure in at into a regional strategy? this taiwan figure into u.s. priorities in this area? the would probably pick up terms of china being the big problem. we can't solve this problem given the restraints on the west-taiwan relationship and the budget problem. taiwan is not threatened by north korea. it is threatened by china and the mainland. strategyto acquire a that allows taiwan to continue to have enough confidence to deal with the issues and differences. free from the fear of intervention.
that is not a missile-defense system. it is a host of diplomatic, political and anti-access types of technologies. not missile defenses. >> i agree. >> ok. .e can turn to the audience another country that i have not heard you talk about is australia. i'm wondering if you have thoughts about the political will and economic feasibility or the strategic value of having australia participate in missile-defense architectures in the pacific region. i may not be current, but let me give you my take. -- thetrillions resemble
australians represent a nato member is much as they do an east asian power. pretty safeians are . a view that things can be worked out with china. the region andf the australians do a lot of business with china. on the other hand, we have all kinds of exceptionally sensitive and sophisticated cooperation with australia. much -- virtually as much as any other country in the world. , they would have a lot to contribute. be a priorityould for the australians to make a significant contribution, i kind of doubt. whether this is the contribution they would like the australians to make, i also wonder about
that, too. for most of southeast asia, we would like to see them developing systems that can deal with the south china sea problem and overcome access obstacles -- participate in regional missile-defense. one thing to explain to the -- ane that is optimized architecture that is optimized to deal with the north korean threat need not concern them. it certainly would be that much how australialain plays an indispensable role in missilei-north korean defense architecture. hard to convince the chinese of that. >> i would say that, in terms of
the commonrspace, in operating picture, there is overlap between those mentions of security corporations -- they are the building blocks. given our close relationship with australia is one of the is anountries -- this area they are interested in. we should work with them on that. they will not be buying the same things as the northeast asian countries. >> bad situation awareness. >i will reflect my ignorance. become aefense has more animated interest, particularly in central europe.
poland is buying an air missile-defense system. there is growing interest in nordic countries. i don't think they are being driven by the catastrophic scenario of a ballistic missile coming in with a nuclear warhead. they are more focused on conventional warheads being diploid through ballistic missiles. fastse they are and accurate. aircraft andnd such. is concern about the ballistic missile threat in asia driven by conventional scenarios or scenarios involving conventional warheads? think where the south koreans are concerned and where we are concerned is the security of south korea. the north koreans do not need
ballistic missiles to deliver high explosives on south korea. and have lots of artillery lots of rockets and so on. thousands. where ballistic missiles could make a difference for north korea, certainly the reach into south korea, well beyond into south korea. that is a problem. it's the weapons of mass destruction aspect where ballistic missiles could be a game changer of security on the peninsula. it's not only nuclear. that could well be chemical or biological for that matter. that is the way i would see it and that is the way i think the south koreans would see it. >> i agree with that. in a written report earlier this year, based on discussions with korea and u.s. planners, the
fear that north korea -- kim jong-un's new year's message was to create tactical nuclear weapons, it's intended to intimidate south korea. fear.s a real driving that this will be a game changer. the united states starts to more distant places like guam where it still has to make pivotal investments in moving more forces. moving 5000 marines in the coming years. that is where even conventional missiles could make a big difference from the u.s. perspective. as part of the u.s.-japan , even conventional could be a big issue. it varies depending on where you are next to north korea. the wmd issue was really seizing the mind -- it could make a bad
day tomorrow. >> not sure i'm allowed to pitch in or not. both chose to focus on north korea. from the china perspective, it is the conventional ballistic missiles that are driving es.erest in missile-defense every known contingency would involve the use of the system .peaker it is their only effective means for power projection in their periphery at this juncture. striving to u.s. force planning a great deal. driving the u.s. force planning a great deal. , it the china perspective really is the conventional and it is having a major impact in the way people are thinking. followoesn't necessarily
them. the chinese have lots of growing -- growing numbers of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. missile-defense is the most cost-effective -- >> accurate missile-defense? approach, the whole spectrum of missile-defense -- >> that is not the only way of dealing with the problem. >> correct. the tools ofl national power, your diplomacy, everything, at some point you have to deal with the fact that this is the pillar in the backbone of a military that you may end up confronting. you have to deal with those missiles. >> there are ways of dealing with missiles other than shooting them out there.
-- shooting them out of the air. >> i'm talking broad spectrum of defenses against missiles. in the back. that back. sure. >> [indiscernible] two different questions. you had this arrangement in east asia for so long. is it possible to have a store integration where the koreans and japanese have to give us their data and don't have to talk each other? we can launder their information for their systems.
integration between us then a relay between them. ,he second, the china problem the problem of energy, lasers, future,s -- in the near 10-15 years, a possibility of actually changing the big problem to a problem that is on addressable by any technological means. >> i will answer the first question. and turned to patrick for the second one. idea,k is an important what you just suggested. i like that idea. ofter than i like the idea saying interoperability when meaning integration. , we are the brain
center, we are the hub -- we should get data from everywhere we can. we would get data from all sorts of places. , allied,d platforms japanese, australia -- who knows where the data comes from? it comes from us because we occupy that position. my advice to south koreans is, don't get too worked up trying to trace each photon to its source. participate in the system in which the united states gathers data and provides that data instantaneously to folks were able to intercept missiles. they also input data. that is the right way to think about it. whether that overcomes the south korean problems of reliance on radars that are based in japan,
i don't know. it's the right way to think about it. thank you for that. >> we have to understand that it is not just the south korean-japan problem. there is a difference on this issue as well. national sovereignty. it is real. when we get back from a presidential summit and i hear sayingp-level officials that we have agreed on this and it is sealed and we are fully integrated, that means the presidents of the two countries agreed. that does not mean it gets implemented all the way down. i like your concept of the relay of information. that is how we work around the problems today. as you get further from the central headquarters of the intelligence fusion out to the tactical operators, that is when you find there are problems. a potentially. both with systems and operational training and the lack thereof.
it does not necessarily follow -- it is a good way to start. keep working on the problem. ultimately, i do support yediot integration. i am working with what i feel is publicoppositional stance in south korea on these issues and i'm trying to work practically around them. i have forgotten your second question. to not sure i'm qualified answer it on rail guns and so on. the shift from i shoot a bullet with a bullet to i shoot a bullet with a laser or a hypervelocity rail gun slug where i am not firing $10 million and running out of ammo. does that change the way we can
approach the chinese part of the problem? in the category of too big to deal with. >> you don't need the china threat to justify investment in these technologies in the post hit to kill intercept technologies. threat.the north korean me says, let's develop it for that reason and see what the world looks like and 10-15 years. familiar with these particular technologies. delivering operational capabilities within 10 years. maybe 15 years. i defer to pat on this. . it isat is a stretch not just solving the technical problems. the industrial and financial
incentives and capabilities to systems.create such if that is what takes a long time. i believe there are still questions about the efficacy of lasers against ballistic missiles. lasers against a lot of things look pretty cool. that is probably not the right metaphor. it gets a bit sportier. i'm not interested in the game changer with china. when it comes to deterrence. i don't think this is the most cost-effective way to deal with the growing conventional missile problem. i certainly think we cannot count on this. there are other things we can and should do, like move to more sinkvable forces, then to
an enormous hope and resources into building new technology missile defenses aimed at denying china strategic retaliatory capability. >> two points i would make on this. i don't disagree with anything david just said. we do need to look out to the middle of the century. that is what china is looking out to. they are biding their time. be able toey would take on this formidable military that the united states is able to feel. we don't really know their capabilities and impact when we think of 35 years. we need to be investing -- we have this project looking at the longer term. this is where we do need to keep shifting money into our research and element -- and element and figuring out what utilities they have. agnostic as i
moved toward future technology. >> all the way in the back. >> it seems like north korea is going to get nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at all costs because they believe it's going to ensure their regime's survival. how long can we wait until we figure out that this is no longer acceptable and we don't want that kind of technology? should we be looking at preventive measures instead of interception? it depends on your confidence in your missile defense system. confidence or at least enough hope that, with american ingenuity and diplomacy
and the movement the japanese are making toward sentence for his possibility for collective progress on the part of the south koreans, i hope. they are dealing with a dangerous regime with dangerous weapons. that missile defense in asia will be adequate to cover that uncertainty we have about deterrence. a finalarly deterring stage nuclear demonstration of some kind. that to methe case, argues against some sort of preemptive war against north korea. to take out north korea's nuclear installations. some length on this issue in -- it's a very important question. a question of moving toward what i call minotaur.
instant war. -- minute more. the policy we have in place with our south korean ally to respond. things can change so quickly, the difference between preemption and reaction is almost negligible in terms of the minute. we do have to be better prepared counter provocation policies which could include having to take out systems that could launch a wmd at south korea and japan. >> that is a very important clarification. i certainly agree with that. i thought you meant a flat-footed, standing start. it's unacceptable go take a nap. in a crisis where we have thought there was some heightened prospect of those systems being used, all bets are off. >> against the wall.
all the way back. voice of america. doubling as a cameraman. thank you. united states military officials have testified on capitol hill that china is continuing to provide biological assistance to pyongyang in developing military capability. i'm wondering why the united states cannot pressure china enough to stop them from doing that in exchange for perhaps delaying a deployment of a northeast asia missile-defense system. thanks. >> you provided your quid pro quo. i was with you third i don't think we should make a response on a visa be north korean threat contingent on chinese wishes or
attitudes. it's a mystery to me why neither we nor the south koreans who have a very important relationship with china, why neither of us can get the of the right more things and stop doing some of the wrong things for the northern regime. chinese statements, public statements and what we know about chinese attitudes suggest they are fed up with the north korean regime. while they might talk about the possibility of a more moderate approach, that is not what they are seeing. intohat does not translate stronger chinese pressure, given haveeverage they over north korea, why doesn't translate into having more impact on north korean behavior,
whether it's nuclear testing or a variety of other belligerent activities, i don't fully understand. china watchers say, well, it's because they treat the north korean regime with kid gloves your full that if they push it too hard, they might create even greater instability in the regime and on the peninsula in . i'm not convinced by that argument. i think the chinese still have a surplus of unused leverage with north korea. shouldthe south koreans continue to lean on the chinese to use every bit of that leverage. >> those are good points. when you think about a different question -- under what circumstances might china intervene in north korea? one of the scenarios mentioned
that is plausible is to clamp down on the taboo on the partly he wmd. it has been discussed in bilateral channels. two more maybe get in questions. >> to add a footnote to this discussion, i believe we have put significant pressure on the chinese and it has had some payoff. it's not as though the chinese have not responded to u.s. pressure to restrict that activity. it does not go on far enough. >> that is true. >> we can try a couple more. our host has some prerogative here. you talked about the
usefulness in the region -- i wonder if you can elaborate on why we don't have plans to that in south korea. i know we have radars in japan. , is it costorate on prohibitive or other reasons? guest the>> we only deployed toe last year. last year. to guam we are in discussions with japan and korea. if you listen to the president's speech today at west point, the u.s. cannot do everything but it is still willing to lead and provide collective defense with their allies who cannot afford to take bigger roles for their own defense. these are issues that affect korean and japanese security first and foremost and u.s. interests. it's important for these large
economies like korea and japan to procure their own. in many ways, japan is moving faster than south koreans would like to buy more hardware. the south koreans are moving to procure more, but they have some tough trade-offs to make. the president is interested in that, but she is getting pushback. these are just part of the defense debate and budget debate within our allied countries. as north korea improves its capabilities, that is an essential part of the multilayer defense that will reassure all of us that we can continue to deter and dissuade north korea or be able to defend if they do something that would be so reckless. >> we will try to move quickly.
the woman in the back. she left. >> the missile-defense cooperation. the missile-defense cooperation in china. .e have tried with russia perhaps that is lessons learned here and why haven't we tried with china? should we echo >> it's easier to make the case that iran poses a threat to russia than it is to make the case that north korea poses a threat to china. pushhad the opportunity to military cooperation -- to push
the frontier of military , it would be maritime cooperation. i would not place a high priority on it. i'm not sure i would understand what the underlying rationale -- unless the world changes to the point that the chinese would view the north koreans as dangerous, even to them. >> there's a reason why maritime issues have made the strategic cut already. these are concern -- are of concern to both countries. chinafferences between and the nest is, this could be part of the discussion of reassurance. it is an issue if you have japan, korea and u.s. integrated in missile-defense.
we will have to bring it up and we already do. it is not central to the agenda that you underscored. >> there are some legal restraints as well. technology being heavily controlled. i think that would quickly get into an area that may be prohibited. we have a relationship with pla, but even that is constrained by -- to explore this area, you would quickly find your self arriving at a point that may be restricted. >> philosophically, i have an issue with the missile-defense cooperation with china. they are the major driver of the problem. andretically philosophically, sure, we could engage in those. i think we have come to the
end of this session. thank you. [applause] >> news about the release of a u.s. soldier that has been held captive in afghanistan since 2000 and. acted as aent mediator between the u.s. and the telemanagement negotiation's two free the sergeant. they have agreed to host the five detainees were being released from quick monday in exchange for the sergeant. a memorandum was signed by the
u.s., establishing the terms under which the detainees would be released. including that they would remain for up to one year. john mccain released a statement about his release saying that these particular individuals are i am eager to learn what they do to make sure they never returning to fight against our partners or in gained in any activity that can threaten prospects for peace and security. we will keep you updated. councilto the atlantic forum on missile defense. this next is about future of capability and technology. this is one hour and 15 minutes. they release years
a port that shows global trends out 20 or 30 years. it does so to try to frame policy makers and policies. heard, we are trying to stitch some of these trends apply it to then various work areas and transatlantic security to asia and the middle east, to the defense industry or he happened here a couple of weeks ago. flying inions drugs the corner. we are applying this framework in many areas. 2030 is just a little bit away. when we go back to 1998, the landscape looked very different than it does today.
china's per capita gdp was about 1/10 of what it is today. there are many examples. considering the shift and shots that have occurred since then, many caught most of us or all of us by surprise. this serves as the perfect capstone to today's excellent discussion. over, i want to hashtagou to use your on twitter. there are additional seats in the front row. i would like to turn to jim miller and here his bot aware he sees the he elements of the space moving forward.
>> thanks very much for this conference and all the great work that has been done over the years and very recently the european security significantly. as a think about missile to thinkit is useful of yogi berra. prediction is very difficult. just as you thought about years ago in 1998, a couple of other items i will let you here. a couple of guys from stanford, larry page and a guy named sir j brennan -- sergey brin had a start up called google. it is indicative of the change you have of the internet. , norths ago this year part ofew over japan as
the test program. people will remember that very vividly. since then north korea has tested nuclear weapons three times and of even greater concern, it is now capable of displaying it. capable of reaching the united states. we have seen major threats in those 16 years. we have seen others as well. i will start by agreeing with your premise. while we need to look at trends, we need to be resilient for the possibility of surprise. i wanted to address three questions. the first fundamental question technology for missile defense over the next 16 years can keep up with the technology and operating concepts for ballistic mussels and cruise missiles. same consult that
document, we would find it interesting although inconclusive. it remains to be seen. keep pace.y can be seen i want to go little further than that. cade, we next that de should expect a threat to continue to advance any number of ways. ballistice number of missile skyrocketed, we can expect the numbers to continue to go up across the globe. and crew missiles missiles are a cheap delivery system. you see the trends there. we are seeing increased precision for them. as we seee time, biotech advances, we see
manufacturing advances and 4/d p rinting advance, we will see small groups have more capability for everything from unmanned aerial vehicles to potentially chemical and biological weapons. the widespread proliferation of thoses likely to make very interesting for small states. at the other end of the spectrum see the systems we will united states, russia, and china the capacity to deliver hypersonic cruise missiles as well as devices off of ballistic missiles. a look very promising. site, are on the defender that is a pretty daunting set of issues.
we ought toasons think of that. let me see what those are very briefly. first we have tremendous technology advantage and human capital advantage relative to our competitors. to out scalebility like north korea and iran. we prefer not to get into a spin millions of dollars to defeat a threat that costs thousands of dollars but we have the ability to spend more than they do. incredibly importantly, the u.s. and allies and partners have the combination of a multiplier effect. they worked to advance in every region.
my bottom line assessment of the timeframe is although it is quite inserts him -- uncertain, is that we have a lot of his bandages and we should be able to sustain that capability. the past successor has a lot of work to do. hand, i would expect over the next 16 years the same situation to apply for national missile defense. with some greater uncertainty. that is both russia and china are likely to have a combination of quantity and quality countermeasures to be able to offset any missile defense system of the united states. they have the technology and incentive to do so. i would expect them to do so. very youthfulve a missile defense system, we are a have this bikeo cruise missile defense. if we continue on a reasonable
, we have a good prospect to , capableproclamation of dealing with regional threats of but not capable of dealing for homeland defense of dealing with large-scale attacks. we are going to need to work hard over the coming decades to maintain that position. i want to mention two wildcards in the digital. if russia or china were to share countermeasures when north korea and iran, is not something we , it would throw that calculation into question. it is not in russia or china's interest to do so. that is an important caveat. the united states will have choices about additional technologies including directed including gun,
technologies as well. i expect by 2030 we may have a mixed approach with some of the systems in play. that will complicate the calculations to some degree. can the u.s. and our allies and partners share technology intelligence more effectively? can we get more bang for the buck? natoalked earlier about missile defense and particular. howst want to reiterate strong the commitment is to the adaptive approach. we are on track for phase two in 2018 in poland. that by 2018 that we will have that deployment in poland. be sustained in the future. the same story is true with variations in the asia pacific and middle east.
the u.s. needs to take some steps to improve our posture in the sister car. i want to highlight three areas. thisirst is that administration took important steps to reform control. that has helped significantly. there is a long way to go as we look to reform our foreign disclosure processes to work more effectively. protecting crown jewels of our systems is important. equally important is to be able to share with our allies and .artners we have a lot of work to do there. second, to stay ahead of these threats we need to do better at protect and our cyber. we will start with protection of intellectual property. it makes no sense to have a
control regime that makes it challenges to share this with allies and then have others be able to come in. we have to do much better protecting our intellectual property. we look forward to enhancing the systems. related to missile defense. that leads to my third and final issue. what implications will advances strategicogy have for stability and missile defense? energy and to boost counterspaceh capabilities the to be considerations. with thing about missile defense.
this regard i want to use a couple of quotations. jimt least referred to clapper. he testified earlier this year that threat to u.s. bae systems will increase in the future including both destructive and disruptive if abilities. also say the risk of exportation disruption for critical networks is growing. changes,f all these this is likely to change by 2030. there may be more uncertainty about the capabilities of these emerging systems. and our being able to have frank discussions with the russians and chinese about the capabilities, dr. and, if --
doctrines. they need to accelerate and go into more depth in the coming decades. the challenges will evolve over the next 16 years. the last thing that we want to have his misperception or miscommunication and miscalculation. let me stop there. thanks to the atlantic council. in q2 the good work that has been done here. you to the good work that has been done here. >> a fantastic opening discussion will set the stage for the rest of this panel. i will turn to dean and what his thoughts are. >> i would like to think both you and the electric -- atlantic council were hosting a very
interesting discussion. i thought back 15 years and use that as the framework rethinking how far we might be in the future 2030. the first thing i noticed his 15 years is not a lot of time. it is one development cycle of a major weapon system. in 2030 we are going to see mostly evolutionary defense. we can quibble about where the boundary between evolutionary and revolutionary exists. let me talk about political developments, and development, developments. over the last 15 years we have a major political development. fors interesting to note those that are fans of arms control, the treaty was a very good treaty. tightaces very quie
constraints. we cannot do 90% of the things we are doing today. see in the next 15 years any enthusiasm for reimposing any political constraints. whereas there was a changed 12 years ago i do not see any political developments. with respect to the threat, many speakers have arguments in there has been tremendous evolution of the expansion of the threat. certainly regional threats. and the intercontinental range, the united states has had a tendency to exaggerate how quickly states will develop this. going back to the rumsfeld they can have that capability. either you have to conclude that north korea did not decide to do develop is harder to
this than the rumsfeld commission thought. i think it is the latter. developed icbms? i would put in the 2020 timeframe. i suspect they will have operationalized once. the regional missile once we have seen a lot of developments. we have seen the development of space launch vehicles by north korea and iran. continuedg to see expansion of the sophistication of the number of missiles that jim alluded to a moment ago. there are some interesting potential development out. ofiran goes nuclear the uses or graphs. saudi arabia, egypt and the rest. that is a potential disaster in the making.
i think probably the first full-scale use of missile defense we may see in the next 18 years and it will be israeli missile defense against regional reps. we are resolve the iron dome in operation not more than a year or so ago. one can only hope that in the future they operate as was the iron dome did a few years back. me talk a little bit about system evolution. if we go back 10 or 20 years ago, we have mostly viewed her missile defense systems. the standard missile treaty. were an early stages of development. now they have reached maturity. we are fielding them and modest numbers as much as we can afford to. we are looking at foreign military sales summoned the system. forward, i will see probably the next generation of a lot of these systems. ons to thellow
standard missiles. and the ground-based interceptor arena that is a system that has than people had hoped. i think the earlier panel at noon talked about that a little bit. it is a proto-talk design. -- prototype design. it is great for testing and to learn from the failures. you're going to rely on that as an operational system, you should not be too surprised that it tends to fail more than youw like.uld we will see a redesigned ground-based interceptor. i believe it will work quite well. by 2030 we will have a well functioning, it groundbreaking missile defense.
in fact, and interceptors in my view are the smaller piece of to missileh respect defense. it is the command-and-control that are the most important element. , in theo back 15 years 1990's radars were just coming into being. it was module technology. within the last 15-20 we have seen the maturation of a lot of high-frequency radars. we are now close to the end of modernizing the early warning radars. activity been a lot of in the center arena, not so much .n the space of a spirit it was canceled last year.
looking back 15 years we have not seen a successful development of the space ace tracking sensor. i think next 15 years we likely will. 2030 we mayict a see a very interesting and important -- important space ace centered architecture. summarize, iry to think the technology and missile defense is sounds. it is very good technology. ofis the technology precision guided and missions. the thing they have had a change in conventional warfare that is what we're seeing with the missile-defense problem. lot of newe a technologies. i will talk about lasers in a minute.
by 2030 weink that will see space-based weapons. not the interceptors. most of the interceptors will be hit to kill. multiple kill vehicle's. it will be the same class of technology. an evolution from the kind of technology that are working quite well today. think this is one of the most important arenas we will see illusionary improvements, sensors. we'll see long-range discriminatory radar deployed until uniteddson states. we will probably see a space-based tracking system. a lot of interesting opportunities in the optical tracking and sensor arena. it was alluded to briefly earlier but often ignored is
software signal processing, command and control. all that data from the various sensors and use it to efficiently discriminate decoys and the like. there is a lot of interesting developments that will take place in the software arena. technology,ew lasers and rail guns are interesting technologies. definitely worth while conducting research and development on it. the 2030 timeframe we may see some niche applications of the technology. mostly four point defense. andrs four point defense maybe some limited range boosts.
i do not think they will have a genetic effect on our missile defense capability. this will remain the domain of midcourse and into some extent terminal. was one class of technologies that would be extremely interesting to see him at though i have no clever ideas about what technology this might that canhnologies reduce the cost of missile-defense systems per shot, per kill. if there is one technology that will he a change in it will play in u.s. national strategy. it will make the cost per shot
competitive. it's probably five to 10 times more defensive. something in that arena. it does not mean you do not deploy this against regional .vid series -- adversaries it is the cost relative to our gdp. we can win that competition. the look at the commission on threat you start having to worry about the cost of the opposite shot. if we can reduce the cost of our defensive interceptors, it opens up the possibility of moving away from a thin defense.
if one can come up with the technologies, that will be truly a change. again, i will reiterate a point i made earlier. ist we will see by 2030 systems integrated with one offensivet also with operations and other forms of operations. will greatly enhance the effectiveness of missile defense as one of the tools in our toolkit. be a capability we can stand on a loan. it will become an increasingly effective instrument in our national arsenal. i will just leave it at that. like thank you very much. i now have different questions for jim as a result. i will still hold those until we
hear from bob. >> i will try to give you another bunch of questions. as i think was said in comments earlier today, i am going to focus on the more conventional role of missile-defense in dealing with rogue threats and not even for pretend there is a missile-defense denial role in a massive nuclear attack against the country. it is clearly a deterrent to the extent that raising doubts helps that but it is largely on the offense. about 2.5 to talk subjects. subject number one, evolution and missile-defense. i have been involved in missile since the early 60's. i have seen a bunch of
evolution. i have seen three revolutions and i see a fourth possibly on the horizon which i want to talk about. and i'm going to talk about my have subject. something we are not stepping up to the plate on in the country. let me go to the evolution part. there is no doubt in my mind that over the next 15, 16 years we will continue progress on all of the elements of missile-defense. there's no question in my mind ekv.ll see a new we will see sensors. that we havee them today compared to what he had 15, maybe 20 years ago, is virtually no comparison in terms
of the accuracies and sensitivities, ranges that they can work out. missile technology has come a long way. far as inot quite as think some of us tend to think. i was part of the range measurement work on missiles develop inired in the 60's. boeing actually built one the douglas aircraft built the other. this is when we thought we were going to defend nuclear silos 1000 feet away. a thousand feet away? the atmosphere will have done its job by the time this gets and to a thousand feet
strip out all the decoys we did not know how to deal with. that gave rise to the need for some exquisite missile capability. if you can imagine both of the companies built developed and had success on the test range with missiles that reached mock 10 in 8/10 of a second. that is an average of 400 g 's. it was incredible. lateralo did 400g turns. it is eye watering technology but in different ways, particularly in guidance more than propulsion. we have developed for the sophisticated capabilities and that will continue. the big area we will see evolution is something he touched on. orchestrate our
command and control, how we tie together sensors that are hundreds if not thousands of part. register things so they are doing this so it does not end up reporting it as to targets. it sounds trivial. it is not to be able to do that. we will see a lot of progress in that arena. tois really important networked bissell -- missile defense which is what we really depend upon to get large areas of protection. we will also worrying more than we are worrying now about how we make our missile cyber proof and electronic warfare proved. both of them are areas that we need to invest more attention
and. i'm sure we will over the next. of time. none of those will yield new revolutionary capabilities. we will continue to get better. even if the next generation or the generation after the next generation of a new kill vehicle allows us to do some multiples. that is not going to fundamentally solve the cost to exchange ratio. something else has to come along to reduce that significantly if we are going to reduce it significantly. will nowalways mean -- lead me to my possible revolutionary change. back in the 60's it is hard to imagine these days, but back in
the 60's, the warheads were nuclear. a guidance designers dream. you do not have to get exquisitely close to a missile. it is hard to imagine that the country stood still and accepted nuclear tipped missiles sitting in residential neighborhoods and probably 40 or 50 locations across the united states. we did. those we then learned how to do some active and later active guidance which allowed us to get rid of the nuclear warheads and put on these warheads, pretty heavy ones. that opened up all kinds of avenues to open up missile defenses we had not used before. revolution occurred.
the guidance got better and better and better. them.namics to go with better and better. we moved out into space where it was easier to get exquisitely good systems. warheads.pox on all what we will do now is drive my missile to wreck your -- directly into the other guys missile. spray ofepend upon the the warhead or reviews. that has been very successful. we see it virtually in all of our atmosphere missiles and in the pack. three missiles. that has been a revolution. suspect that you are all expecting the words to come out of my mouth that dena mentioned-- that dean
peer directed energy. that will not come out of my mouth. i agree with hundred percent with what he said. we should not give up on technologies. rail guns have yet to be proven. they'll have a limited role in any case. promise has been around the corner. seven years away. that is the algorithm. they do have a good role in missile-defense. for killingssarily a target. there are other things that could be very useful. >> there is a natural synergy that i believe the country has not been exploiting. as i build at her and better -- better and better defenses, i force my adversaries into positions of having to deploy decoys, maneuvers both invasive
maneuvers, putting stickers on missiles so they will get good distance of they can reduce the payload so they can maintain this will putting other things on the missiles to compound the defenses. thatone of those things they do to a missile, dispensing to know wherezing they are, all of these things open up an avenue that gives me an opportunity to mess with the missiles. mess is a technical term. all of those things we talk about doing. there is virtually no coordination that i am aware of, whether looking at missile-defense or use a va package,hniques as a
and integrated package, could be can dogether so that we a little bit of steering of what she does by what the conventional defenses do. it is a fertile field. significantere are technological opportunities to be able to do that. there are issues associated with it. some are technical issues. political issues. there are a variety of issues associated with that. it is something i believe we ought to point and it represents a true layering of capabilities. the reason layers work as they are independent. if you are using the same sensors from one to another, you do not have it.
there is potential in this. end to my half subject. i almost nothing to say about it. the united states has provided lessons to the entire rest of the world about how effect land attack cruise missiles can be. that lesson cannot have gone unnoticed throughout the rest of the world. they are fundamentally different. we tend to talk about missile to an. quitessiles are really different. ballistic missiles are easy to see. they are up there. any can find them and see them.
boy are they hard to knock down. ballisticn a nice trajectory and in less you blow them to smithereens they keep coming. it is easy to see but difficult to not down. cruise missiles are the opposite. you get anywhere near them in the fall down read a are, far away from you. they are hard to find. they hug the earth. he can be exquisitely small. -- they can be exquisitely small. they are very different. all the -- although they do with this to a degree when you want to get this you got to do something different. it is something that has been on the back burner for as far back as i can possibly remember. we do not pay serious attention to it. by serious i mean really start doing something about it.
there is the protection of ships. it is important. of countriesa lot have ballistic missiles, sometime go look at who have cruise missiles. far more have cruise missiles. we really need to get serious about cruise missiles. with bade one conflict results to make us serious. it would be nice to get ahead of that power curve. >> thank you very much. say that the percentage of the topic that i know, you raise a very presidentg topic. obama gave a major speech at west point that had a lot of noteworthy items in it. one that caught my eye was the emphasis on the trend that many of you have spoken about today,
it is the individual empowerment trend. which gives individuals and groups the ability to do things increasingly the only nationstates could do. i wonder to what extent do you think in this period that we groups see individuals or have access to the range of tools you have been discussing. we know they have access to ballistic missiles tending toward the shorter. we have seen those in conflict in the middle east. i also wonder about land attack s. i wonder about space access which i know from reading some of the literature is increasingly available to anybody who has a few tens of thousands of dollars to watch
various locations. i worry about counterspace. is in suchknow cyber hands. how should this change our discussion here? would not wear a particularly about ballistic missiles in the hands of rydividuals that worry -- wor particularly about ballistic missiles in the hand of of individuals. i do not think smokers who worry about being attacked -- thing small groups are going to worry about being attacked. if i were going to worry about things i would really worry cruiseand attack missiles serving a political, not military, purpose. they do not require much accuracy.
you can create havoc in the city with them. they don't have to go very long distances. if you can fly a model airplane you can essentially fly a cruise missile. warheads thatous can be made in literally people's garages that could create havoc in the city. we are not prepared to deal. evernot know if you will be able to deal with that. difficult to deal with that. it is a potential open source. >> i particularly worry about that scenario you paint it combined with the explosion of biotechnology. that was one of the two you
would worry about. the share the concern about concerns for unmanned air technology being used by small groups and so forth. the possibility that terrorists could do that. the first is their counterterrorism and so forth. i think it is also possible that with good but not perfect intelligence one could imagine effectively a point defense or small area defense if the relative location were isolated. bit on do for a little the question of ballistic missiles. this may depend on where you draw the line. if you look at what they have today, i certainly consider them
a terroristt group. he referred to the iron dome success. you did earlier. i think you deal with large numbers of relatively short range systems including at a low cost. it'll be an important part for many of our partners. >> to do have anything on that? i echo those concerns. if there is one marriage the delivery system i would worry drones and drowns -- biological weapons. anthrax is a great weapon. it is easy to make relatively. just need to know some microbiology. that would be very worrisome. mask is news is that a very protective. you can get morning from
military personnel to put on a largeou will save a percentage of that. what you do with the city i do not know. israel understands that problem. the second question is almost an analytic framework question. lot about relatively inexpensive and relocatable missile defenses themselves. themve pictures of one of behind me. we talked about may be directed energy but not as likely. physicistsother telling me something else. for now i will suspend my and some certainty -- my uncertainty. we have talked about much
cheaper and distributed access to space-based capabilities. to increase capabilities for networks, battle management and command and control, counterspace. cyber offense and defense. as thealking about this break -- at the break. i was thrilled to hear jim and other panelists discuss the link between this particular. i think it is underappreciated to an extent. i wonder if we have thought about countries like china who were getting increasingly as a possible goal come to a more innovative set of defense systems that can surprise us in one way. there are questions which we have addressed system by system.
with all of this broader conversation than the one people of a certain one have grown up with in terms of the strategic balance, we kind of leave it at that. we are adding on all these other areas. it is time to have a completely new discussion about what a strategic battle looks like. seems like the areas we are adding on are potentially more numerous and more significant than some of the core areas we are very comfortable thinking about. a strange way to ask the question. all of these lines of capability and potential technology strikes me and says saying pb framework and let the work these problems, maybe it is time to change the framework.
i do not know of any of you have thought about that. the question of what is the nuclear balance and is it stable, it will continue to be a separate question to ask. these other issues will cut through that. we will romp global striking. will it be sufficient to cause once i to have less confident -- one-sided to have less confidence? --will it be sufficient to cause one side to have less confidence? it will get more murky and complicated. we need to be able to have the conversations with chinese russians and our allies and partners.
of thate future basis core elements. at the same time, your question rightly implies there will be other kinds of strategic attacks, whether it is a cyber attack on critical infrastructure or some other means. we need to think about the combination of rules of the road, code of conduct and push that down and try to have those conversations with a number of other countries about the basic for strategic more broadly. element are the same for other countries. the advantage we have of having friendly neighbors on the north and south is important. if the thing about strategic stability, you have to get into
questions that are much about employment for short range systems. about that broadening of a definition, we want to work closely with allies and partners to make sure we do away something that is important to them. little to add to what jim said other than to echo the parts on cyber. i think we really had to think about cyber as at least a semi-substantial rep. been 100% unsuccessful into turning china and the use of cyber in terms of stealing trillions of dollars of i.p. it will clearly be less successful should we ever get into a situation where they are shutting down all kinds of things in the country.
to me that says we need a discussion amongst ourselves. ien you were in the building, ain't a healthy conversation with ourselves as to what is -- 80 healthy conversation with ourselves as to achieving a balance in what that policy is to engage. >> i have a lady in the back. >> this question is actually for further than 15 years. i was interested in one of the possibilities of develop a new a missile transfer control regime for technology or technology for
a hypersonic glide vehicle. acknowledging the limits. it prevented creature transfers of ballistic missile tech. it was developing some policy here that could perhaps regulate the advance of technology. i guess it is from the policy side. the basic side is dealt with not just through the code of conduct but through the missile technology control regime and the various elements. could you add to that? it would then attempt to force countries and large states as
well as smaller states to stick with ballistic technology. i can imagine that in theory. seeing thent i'm not strategic rationale for doing that. i think the verification association with it would be very challenging. i do not think it is beyond the scope of missile technology at well understanding to a goodve to come multilateral understanding about what it means. what types of warheads can be put on them. different conversation.
from my perspective i'm not seeing the case for separate consideration. >> this has been a useful vehicles. applying that to boost glide. i do not see the incentives on the russian or chinese site to enter into any constraints. one could propose regimes to do it. the u.s. is probably less interested in the technology. the u.s. is clearly pursuing get the. it is a prompt global strike. as do not see a lot of enthusiasm for trying to constrain those technologies. how much will the advent of 3-d printing may be proliferation of systems we are
concerned about a much greater challenge? will this make missile defenses even more urgent? the thing it has thentional to bring down components. think of the printer that is going to print that behind you. in other areas it will be revolutionary. if you can be made. this tends to make very small gadgets that otherwise you manufacturingth
techniques. if you look at the missile-defense interceptor, the palms, there is not a lot of application to this class. >> thank you from the atlantic council. lunch we had three former missile-defense direct nurse who gave a very positive assessment able toay this has been develop the technologies that culminated in defense. abilities we had today. have this in particular.
are there other things that can be done to make it more this in developing not just evolutionary technology revolutionary change in missile-defense? >> that is a bit of a joke. i'm glad we have not changed it. that is a waste of energy. i have involvement over my five years. i think i saw not just every him and hisry cycle team having to make critically important judgments about what is the most cost effective work.
i know that for any given thefolio there will always multiple people with different views. the relative balance should be between near-term and long-term a national missile defense. this.r to lean into i push hard. i want to give a very possible one. >> i will echo those comments. i think the mda over the last 10 or 15 years is radically different than the missile defense work going on before that. there's a certain ma tration that took place both in the organization that led to maturation of the products.
we got serious about producing real things getting them in the field, having people trained to actually use them kind of getting out of the wonder worled of the grand experiment. enough of that going on to further the advanced things. but serious things getting into the field. so i too would take my hat off to that evolution over the last 10 to 15 years of the missile defense agency. >> very quickly i indicated that i haven't told about before but i and other senior officials got exactly the same timeline of notification about tests that exceeded this test that failed -- tests that failed and tests that succeeded. and that openness and the understanding that that is the way to operate and it's the way to improve to have that openness within the department and with congress and the american people i think