tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 12, 2014 10:00pm-12:01am EDT
metropolitan areas in the scene of the disaster. intelligence is better. being shared better. e've opportunity a lot to protect our transportation ystem and other key systems of our society. but the people o >> the peoplef of the united states i think are safer than before 9/11. they're not safe enough. a lot of progress still needs to be made. we still live in a very dangerous world. >> lee hamilton and tom kaine who served as chair of the 9/11 commission have written an op-ed that appeared yesterday in "the wall street journal" on cyber security and the threat of cyber security. it's available at "the wall street journal" if you want to read that. dave tweets into you, mr. hamilton, i thank lee hamilton and tom kean for trying to get 9/11 commission report portions declassified so the public can be informed. guest: well, that's very important to us. the commission didn't control the question of classification
of the materials it collected. that's done by the executive branch. i want all of the 9/11 materials to be on the public record. they should be. i don't see any reason to classify it. host: chris, buffalo, democrat. go ahead. caller: yes. it seems to me that the last me we actually won a war was the first war in kuwait. we actually paid for that war because george bush sr. raised taxes and basically got voted out of office. do you think the republicans hat run the congress now would actually want to pay for anything that we do now instead of running us back into debt? >> well, i'm a firm believer in paying your bills on a current
basis. we haven't done that. we like to get into the wars, fight the battles, and then not pay the bills and let the debt pile up. that's not a good way to run the country. that's not the way we should run the united states. so if you're going to fight a war, let's come out and pay for it one way or the other and it seems to me to be a very important component of the strategy we were talking about earlier in the program. how do you pay for it? who bears the burden of doing the fighting? it's a very easy thing for anybody to sit back in their arm chair or even for a member of office frankly and to vote to militarily intervene. the way this country is structured today the people that bear the burden of that decision are very, very few people -- volunteers for sure. but a very small percentage of
the american people so the burden of fighting a war in terms of casualties, in terms of fatalities, is carried by very few people. when i used to vote to -- on the question of military intervention, sometimes it was an easy political vote, that is to say the american people were all for the exercise of massive military power to defeat or win hatever we were doing. but i always kat those votes with a heavy heart because i recognized while lee hamilton was sitting in the house of representatives, air conditioned and a nice office and all the rest and a good meal every night going home and going to bed in a nice bed getting a solid dinner, while i was going through all of the comforts of living in america like that, i was voting to send people into war and even they were there volume unmaterial it caused me a deep concern no
matter what the international equities may have been at the time and you could always make a strong case for intervention. but the burden carried by the people on the battle field is highly significant and we have to have a consideration whenever we make the decision we're going to go to war. we're going to militarily intervene, let's think about the people that have to carry it out. >> lee hamilton, were there similarities to the vietnam era when you first began serving and the iraq era when your service ended? guest: well, i think there are similarities and there were differences. for a long time in vietnam the congress was very passive, didn't speak up at all. finally, as the media began to report from vietnam you saw this with the fulbright hearings and congress began to take a more active role in that war. the american people turned
against the war over time and, of course, we eventually came -- pulled out of vietnam. iraq is a very, very different situation for sure. every war has its similarities, i guess, with previous wars and some differences. into iraq case, we went the war under president george bush while we were still fighting in afghanistan and went in in a fairly powerful way. made a lot of progress in a short period of time on the ground militarily but, of course, did not begin to resolve the internal problems on the ground there. in both instances the congress i think played a very secondary role to the executive branch in aking the decision to go in. guest: you have about five minutes left with our guest. go ahead. caller: yes. good morning, representative.
i have two questions. i am not a birther or 9/11 truther. i just want to know, did the question of building seven come up and how it collapsed, during the commission, and, also, if t didn't, why not? >> building seven was a major focus of our investigation. it was not one of the really big towers but a substantial building, i think 30 or 40 stories high. it collapsed and was not hit directly by the airplanes and there was a huge debate, still is a debate as to why that building collapsed. we on the commission were not engineers. certainly not experts on why buildings collapse. what we did was we consulted with the engineers of the country and they came up with their best judgment as to why that building went down.
i don't remember all the details but the basic point was there was intent heat that developed within the building. the sprinkler systems did not work. and such intense heat built up that the building eventually collapsed. now, a lot of people have been looking into that since 9/11 commission reported. they've had a lot of criticism of the commission because they didn't think we explored it properly. we did what we could do. we consulted the experts. and, of course, experts often disagree with one another. so i think that debate continues. i've had all kinds of explanations to why building seven collapsed. i don't pretend to be an expert on that. some of the ideas put forward were, don't make a lot of sense to me, but then i'm no engineer and i don't know anything much about architecture. we took the word of the best advice we could get and they gave the reason, which we spelled out in some detail in
the commission report. >> what is your response to those folks? by the way we did a full segment on this program on building seven and some of the conspiracy theories regarding 9/11. what is your general response to folks who think 9/11 was an nside job or preplanned? guest: i just don't think there is very much evidence for it and there is a good bit of evidence for what we found. we were charged with a responsibility of determining how this happened. building seven and all the rest of it. we wrote the story in a very telling chapter, the first chapter of the report, best seller incidentally, in the book sales in this country. i think that story has basically held up. there are a lot of people who don't agree with all the facts of it. but at the end of the day, you can't just theorize here. you have to bring forth hard
facts. when you're investigating these complicated events, you get thousands of suggestions, literally every morning. hundreds of e-mails would come in with suggestions of what should be done and what should not be done. you go through those things the best you can. with a limited staff. you make judgments as best you can of the circumstances. i think we basically have it right on the evidence we had. now, evidence may develop in years ahead that will change some part of our story. i don't think it has thus far. i think we basically have got it right. you've got to get hard facts to support any idea that you have with regard to what happened on that terrible day. >> and charles of arkansas, go ahead quickly with your question or comment. caller: good morning. he stated about the hate that is brought about by bombing.
what i don't understand is you have people that live with a group that has a belief that you will either join them, ubmit to, or you will die. and if you bomb that group and other people are killed, how can you submit to the fact that , remember dresden? remember hiroshima? nagasaki? those items that were brought stopped he bombing those wars and stopped them fast. and -- host: whoops. thought you were done there. go ahead, congressman. >> well, i think everybody favors limiting the damage done by air strikes. air strikes can be very
powerful tools. they can eliminate enemies but they do sometimes not always have unintended consequences. the united states military goes to very great extremes to try marginal damage, casualties of innocent people. i think they should be praised for the careful way they go about that. you don't want to, i don't think at least, maybe the caller disagrees, you don't want to kill hundreds and hundreds of innocent people as you go after 10 or 15 or 20 bad guys. the use of military force has to be done i think with discrimination and not just with abandon. >> and, finally, congressman hamilton, let's wrap with your current position as director on the center on congress at i.u.
if so many are unhappy with congress why do they continue to re-elect their congressman? guest: well, because the members of congress have all kinds of advantages. the advantages are innumerable. they understand that people don't like the congress so even incumbents of the congress run against the congress and separate themselves from the congress. ho defends the congress today? i don't know any voices that speak up to defend congress at all. everybody criticizes congress. it's the favorite indoor sport of america to criticize congress. members of congress have massive mailing privileges, all kinds of staff to work and help develop a district. they help a lot of their constituents. they have great advantages with regard to the use of the media and so you always have these polls showing people don't like
congress and they re-elect congress almost year after year. they'll do it again this year. it's because of the advantages that the incumbent has i think that needs to be equalized myself. not everybody agrees with that. i want to see more competitive elections in this country. i think the reason you have had this extreme polarization in american politics is because so many congressional districts, even states, have become noncompetitive. and i think the more competitive the election, the more the middle rather than the extremes of the american electorate are represented. and the great question in american politics today is what has happened to the middle? it's the ek treemists that have kind of taken over and that is why you have the polarization, one reason why you have polarization in congress today. let's try to get back to the
system where representatives represent all americans not just a few of them. host: have you ever invited speaker boehner or leader pelosi to come out and speak to your center? guest: well i'd be glad to have either one. host: lee hamilton, former vice chair of the 9/11 commission and now the director on the center of congress at the indiana university. we appreciate you being on "the washington journal." >> thank you. >> on the next "washington journal" the "new york times" correspondent nate cohn looks at senate campaigns and we talk about the president's plan for defeating isis in iraq and syria. as always we'll take your calls and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. "washington journal" live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> this weekend on the c-span
network american history tv is live from baltimore for the 200th anniversary of the star spangled banner sunday morning at 8:30 on c-span 3. later at 6:00 p.m. on american history tv we'll tour fort mchenry and hear how war came to baltimore in 1814, about the british barrage on the fort and why francis scott key was there to witness the fight. saturday night at 8:00 on c-span, the presidential leadership scholars program with former presidents george w. bush and bill clinton and sunday afternoon at 3:30 live coverage of the harkin steak fry. sunday evening at 8:00 q & a with author rick pearlstein on the evolution of the conservative movement in american politics. on book tv's afterward, author ken silverstein on the secret world of oil. then sunday night at 6:45 eastern on book tv, democratic senator from new york, kirsten julie little brand on her life in politics and call for women to rise up and make a difference in the world. find our television schedule at
c-span.org and let us know what you think. call us, e-mail us at email@example.com or send a tweet@c-span #comment. join the conversation. like us on facebook. follow us on twitter. >> next a discussion on the scottish independence referendum. then a forum on u.s. strategy to combat the isis terror group. now a discussion on whether scotland should break away from the u.k. and become an independent country. a referendum vote takes place on thursday, september 18th. panelists at the brookings institution discuss the pros and cons of the referendum and perceptions from scottish voters, the u.s., and the u.k. this is 90 minutes. >> ladies and gentlemen, i welcome all here today to actually one of the very first
events in our new, revamped brookings conference space. i'm actually thrilled now that i put the microphone on that it actually works. it seems very fitting to inaugurate our new facility, revamped facilities with the big question of certainly next week which is the potential revamping of the united kingdom and many people would like that to be happening and what simply is the referendum in scotland as it moves toward a yes vote, the renovation, it will be a complete overhaul of the system we've all known for a good 300 -- we are th absolutely delighted to welcome two colleagues who flown in under their own steam from edinburgh to be with us. arlie jeffrey and juliet kaarbo who have been spearheading a major study of
the implications of the referendum and what will happen on and after september 18th. this has been a huge study and very much symbolic of the whole debate about the scottish referendum. it's been very heavy on process. as we know many people around the world are watching this extremely closely because this is a rather unique event and something being negotiated pains takingly over a period of time, the project of decades of interaction between edinboro and london on issues of autonomy and governments and now we're actually at the big day and the rest of the world is paying close attention. of course a lot of events that could not have been anticipated when british prime minister david cameron and scottish first minister alex salmon sat down to thrash out the details of what was going to happen on eptember 18th.
we've had all kinds of input from unexpected places including crimea and the eadership of crimea weighing in on their interests in the outcome, something that wouldn't have been anticipated several years ago. of course also against the back drop of events in barcelona and in spain. so an awful lot of interest in what happens next in places outside of the united kingdom. but the big, consequential questions we're going to look at today and hopefully give you a sense of are about the implications for the future of the united kingdom, scotland, and europe and also the implications for the united states. we're very grateful to everybody for participating in this panel. 're also joined by jeff dyer who is one of the senior journalists for "the financial times." he is from originally from scotland the one person with
the genuine scottish accent. this shows the diversity of the whole issue. juliet is originally from the united states, oklahoma, but is a resident in scotland, electorate at the university of edinburgh. charlie can tell you himself about his own origins. this has been framed in terms of civic nationalism and in terms of political choices and that's also important. finally, we'll be turning to my colleague here at brookings for the united states perspective. before coming back to brookings where he's been a fellow for sometime, jeremy served as a professional adviser to the assistant secretary for europe in the state department and also on the policy planning staff. he was not assigned to think about scotland and the united kingdom but we are hoping somebody might be thinking about this at this particular juncture and we'll ask jeremy to give his perspective on what this means to the united
states. thank you so much for joining us. i'll turn over first to charlie , who's going to give us a sense of the whole perspective of the referendum, paradigm, framework, how this has all evolved. i'd like to thank charlie and juliet for coming because they've used their own research money to come and explain this nd we are very grateful. >> thank you very much indeed. it is a great pleasure to be here at brookings and see so many people here. we are, indeed, representing a broad program of research on what's happening in scotland and the rest of the u.k. called future of the u.k. and scotland. if you type future, u.k., and scotland into google, you'll find us. what we're looking at is ts the big question. should scotland be an independent country? yes or no. that's what the voters will have before them next week as they enter the polling booths.
that is a momentous decision by any standard. it's a decision which could end what's generally seen as one of the most successful unions of nations in world history. and if we do end it, there will be immense, domestic and international implications. so quite rightly, the eyes of the world are on scotland. we will have in scotland by the end of this weekend some 400 camera crews in edinboro and i think thousands of print journalists covering the events of the next week, which is quite extraordinary. what they will see is a nation exploring its rights to self-determination with great seriousness. 4.3 million scotts have registered to vote in the referendum. that is 97% of the eligible electorate, which is utterly unprecedented. we expect on that basis to see a turnout of at least 80% and
we haven't seen turnouts at that level in u.k. politics since the immediate period after the second world war. what i think is striking is how the debate has been conducted. we have seen and had lots of press coverage of occasional bursts of online abuse and there have been a small handful of confrontations on the streets, but that's just a very, very minor part of the debate. more generally, we have seen an extraordinary flowering of civic engagement, of people in their communities, in church halls, town halls, even more informally, committing themselves to thinking about scotland's future. i think this is by some way the biggest civic engagement process in scottish history. and i think from that we'll have a very well informed electorate as we go to the polls this week.
so, you might ask, what do they think? well, up on the screen here we have the poller of polls. the moving average of the last six opinion polls at various points in time. you can see that at the end of last year on the far left of that slide the pink line at the top, which is no was at 60% plus and the blue line, yes, was below 40%. you can see in a rather uneven process a significant narrowing of the polls in the spring of this year, but what you can see most strikingly is a rapid narrowing in the last couple of weeks. the last six polls carried out over the last eight days show yes, support for independence nd respectively 47%, 51, 50, 47, 48, and 49. that's already out of date, by
the way. it's narrowed by one-third the points. the average is now 51-49. expect a close outcome on thursday this week. a few words on the big themes that each side in the debate have put forward. i'll use the framing of negative and positive campaigning for this because i think the negatives probably outweigh the positives. on the no side, largely led by the u.k. government but also by the cross party campaign better together, we have had an essentially negative message, a message which is all about risk, uncertainty, loss, you will be worse off, and a refusal to accept some of the ideas the scottish government would like to pursue if scotland became independent, including various forms of partnership with the rest of the u.k. to quote several figures on the
no side, it is not going to happen. what we've seen there is quite a dismal vision. dismal in terms of content. it's all going to go terribly wrong. dismal in terms, also, of presentation. i think there's been a certain level of difficulty in getting the message across. i think that message of risk and loss has shown a diminishing return. it's lost its impact. i think that's one of the reasons why on this graph you see a fall in support for the no side. what we're seeing now is a big echo of those concerns from the private sector, from finance and other areas of industry. today's u.s. version of "financial times" is carrying lots of stories like that. that may have an effect on opinion but it may be double edged. i think scotts can be rather averse to people telling them what to do.
n the no side we've seen little positive campaigning, very little about why it is good and, certainly, very little about why it would be better, why scotland would be better if it stayed in the union. we've seen a bit of a change in the last week on this as the no side has firmed up an offer and, more specifically, a timetable for additional powers for the scottish parliament should scotland remain in the u.k. the negatives have outweighed the positives. big things on the yes side. generally, a positive message. generally aspirational. generally, talking about the possibility of a better society, social justice, democratic legitimacy, a different kind of role in the international arena, which juliet will talk about in a few moments. better policy. policy attuned to scotland's needs and not driven by the
interests of the heartland of the u.k. economy in london and the southeast of england. and an aspirational message about continuing friendly partnership in many areas with the rest of the u.k. after independence. all very aspirational, positive, but also i have to say very vague but often quite unconvincing especially in that emphasis on partnerships because it relies on the willingness of the partner and the partner has said, well, we're not really very willing. in the last weeks we've seep a much stronger negative message from the yes side. in fact, i think they've managed to conjure up the presentational perfect storm, which has three elements. if we stay, the national health service, that icon of post war british society, will be privatized. if we stay, social inequality will increase. if we stay, we will continue to be governed by a political party, the conservatives, which
is deeply disliked in scotland. nhs privatization, inequality conservatives have been brought together in a very effective way which has had real traction which i think again is one of the reasons why the polls have closed. i think there we can boil down the big decision to pretty much this. the no side says, if you leave, you will suffer economically. the yes side says, if we stay, we will have a future of social injustice. that's the choice. if we vote yes, what next? well, we'll see a negotiation of extraordinary complexity. it will deal simultaneously with the disentanglement of scotland from the rest of the u.k. no easy task. but made much more difficult by the complications of the domestic political timetable including a u.k. inaction in may next year which will be held while those negotiations
would be under way. the same time as that, the scottish government would be working with the u.k. government to work out the process and the terms of scotland's membership of the international community, no easy those negotiations will have a number of key issues. currency arrangements will be at the heart. that will no doubt be connected to discussion about scotland's share of assets, in particular oil and gas reserves, but also liabilities, in particular, the share of the scottish u.k. public debt. my sense is, on that issue, after a yes vote, the sides would discover a mutual interest in messages of reasserts and stabilization to markets. some of the hard rhetoric we have heard before may go into a common endeavor to calm things down.
it will be challenging, not least because other countries have similar situations. nato membership will be challenging. not least because of the scottish government's commitment to remove the u.k. plus nuclear weapons bases, part of the wider nato deterred from scotland. we can expect package deals, perhaps extending across different areas, currency and nuclear weapons is one package ften evoked in that sense. i would imagine we would see quick agreement on some of the key issues, not least because of that pressure for economic stability, but also long
transition. for implementation of working out final details. final big challenge would be how to insulate all of that very sensitive, lots of different, simultaneous negotiations, from what would be a febrile political atmosphere in the u.k. if we vote no, there will be ess urgency, there will be a limited challenge to economic stability, and the minimal international dimensions to the question. we do have a timetable for the delivery of the additional powers for the scottish parliament in which the no side as recently set up, and that starts on the 19th of september and they rested -- rapid process would continue so that legislation could be in place prior to the u.k. election, involving the decentralization
of tax powers and welfare tax policy. there will be plenty of issues around that, not least because the prounion parties are divided between themselves, but also within themselves on the content of the addition of devolution powers. there is a big question as to whether any compromise they come up with will satisfy demand in scotland. i say that, because whatever happens, close to half of scots, if we vote no, we'll have voted to leave. if we vote no, this is not an endorsement of the u.k. as is. there will be tremendous pressure to placate that drive which has led practically half of scots to vote no. this will not be easy. however, if you placate the scots, you may as well start resentment in other parts of the u.k. we are starting to hear that in wales and in particular, england, where there is a growing sense about the cushy deal that scotland is perceived to have.
if yes, you will be observing, and some of you will be participating in a process of the enormous significance and no little drama with important international ramifications. if it is a no, you will be observing an inward looking debate no that with its own dramas as the u.k. casts around for a second internal arrangement. i doubt that we can find them, but whether we get to that situation, we will have to wait until next thursday. >> thank you. i think you lay that out wonderfully for everyone. juliett, the larger implications? >> thank you to you and your colleagues here at things for coming here to let us talk about these issues. i will briefly talk about foreign policy in the referendum debate, what the yes side says about what an independent scottish foreign policy would look like, and then both internal and external
reactions. and then i will conclude by challenging a couple of assumptions on both sides of the debate. i should say, foreign policy is not a key issue in which voters are likely to decide and cast their vote on next week, but foreign policy is the most distinct area that would change with independence, given scotland already has devolved powers in many areas of public policy, health, education. it is foreign affairs that sovereignty would give scotland considerable new powers. this has also been part of the discourse at least at the elite double. so what would an independent scottish foreign policy look like? the yes side has outlined some directions although not completely specific, that it would take a scottish foreign policy. i like to characterize date foreign policy aspirations in terms of four pillars. profits, protection, principles, and pride. let me say a few things about
what an independent scottish foreign policy would look like along these pillars. on the profits, the yes side embraces a liberal pro-trade economic foreign policy in his discussion of the advantages of continued eu membership. we would see continuity in economic foreign policy similar to current u.k. foreign policy, lthough with a smaller economy. on the pillar of protection, the yes side makes the case for ontinued membership in nato, something the party rejected until referendum party began. this and the scottish defense
force would be the cornerstone of scotland's protection. its military would focus on its territorial integrity but would also take a regional defense role in northern europe and the north sea. its defense budget is modeled after other small european states and proposes a focus on maritime forces. it rejects the trident submarine, the u.k.'s current nuclear deterrent that reside in scottish waters, and says it wants the weapons removed as soon as possible after independence, but has not given a dead time. that is the protection. it is with the principal pillar that the yes side 60 but the most daylight between himself and having characterizes the u.k. foreign policy. they emphasize that it would have different international priorities from westminster. most clearly, in their words, in matters of war and peace. the anti-nuclear argument is also based on value statements such as "trident is an affront to basic decency." the yes side is laying out aspirations for an ethics-based foreign policy, talking about scotland being a champion for international justice and peace, international development, human rights, and climate justice, but there are only a few clues in how these would be implemented. scotland would not be an isolationist country but its
participation in international peacekeeping would be governed by means of international legitimacy and respect for international law. many times along these lines we have asserted the hypothetical argument that an independent scotland would not have participated in iraq. pride lays a place in most dates foreign policy and it is the objective self-image. there is little talk of pride in the yes campaign materials but occasionally they talk about scotland as an outward facing ation exporting goods, people, and ideas around the world, and referred to their proud military tradition as well. so what is the no side reaction? they stress uncertainty, risk, and constraint on scotland as a
small state. the no side argues the international membership: six are not automatic, it eu membership might be vetoed, and if granted, is not likely to come with an opt out that the current -- that the u.k. currently has. the no side point out that membership in nato could come with responsibilities, possibly including the u.k. nuclear deterrent in scotland. the numbers for defense and intelligence in terms of spending and personnel do not add up and could create a security risk. the no side is very familiar to those of us who study international relations, reflecting the perspective that most dates do not matter, cannot have the influence that big states have, dependent on military alliances, and must often coppermine their values in exchange for security.
ccording to this view, scotland's interests are better protected at home and abroad by a u.k. with a permanent seat in the security council and have high profile, well-respected large diplomatic service with considerable the parties. the yes side has some counterreaction to the position on the foreign policy, arguing membership and cooperation with others will come because it is in their interest. a stable intelligence environment in scotland with shared intelligence is critical to the u.k.'s own safety given the shared geographical space and thus cooperation is likely. the yes side also argue small state to not need nuclear protection of mixed states, do not need a global profile, and do not attract the enemies and threats that big states do. consistent with research on small states, it is often pointed out they can punch above their weight and have influence because they are small states. often more trusted because they are seen as less of a threat to others. so what has been the international reaction to this? publicly at least, most states
have conformed to international norms of noninterference and democratic processes and said this is a matter for the u.k. or scottish people. but where external actors have weighed in, this has largely been on the no side. comments from external actors include states, the united states, also international organizations and usinesses. these comments largely see scottish independence as an unwelcome and puzzling to start -- instance. there are others that have voiced general concerns about precedence and a so-called balkanization of europe that the scottish independence would set off, and concerns of a weakening stable ally, the u.k. this is probably the basis of the u.s. and french expressions of concern about independence. i do not anti-international commentary has much of an impact on the internal debate and a vote next week.
perhaps the financial market reaction this week was more important, but when states intervene, the risks can may backfire among the scottish population. so i will end by questioning two assumptions i see in the debate on independence and foreign policy, and to be fair, one assumption on the no side and one on the yes side. first, in the argument that an independent scottish foreign policy would fare poorly, there is an assumption that all else is static and only the question of scottish independence is changing. the u.k., for example, is presented as a major power that better represents the people of scotland in the world, but this is not a test of you and not one invulnerable to change. our balances in the world are changing, emerging powers are ore important and big powers
also do not have as much influence. he u.k. is in the midst of downsizing and will likely face further budget cuts. then there is the assumption hat there are changes. the house of commons vote on serious showed a lack of trust on international intelligence, a lack of enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention, and real disagreements even in the current governing coalition over the works of trident. certainly, the pro-u.s. position in the u.k. is strong but arguably not as strong as it used to be and may not be in the future. my point is these are not just issues that divide westminster versus scotland, they are debated within westminster, too, and even without independence, may affect their role in the world. on the yes side, there has been strong assumption of rational interest-based cooperation. they argue of course britain will share the pound and intelligence in the eu and nato
will let scotland in because it is in their interest to do so. it probably is in their interest to do so and it is not about starting assumptions. but we know states do not always act according to their interests, or they have competing interests which may complicate external relations. consider the rest of the u s, and cost most important negotiating partner in a post-independent world. the u.k. will hold national elections next year and if conservatives win, they have promised a referendum on the membership. negotiations with scotland on trident, on the pound, the division of assets, military, on everything will be happening in the middle of these political and likely contested campaigns. >> thank you. we will not go to geoff dyer. "the financial times" has been running a series on the contours of this debate and many of the issues have been talked about. he and his colleagues will be busy in the next few weeks,
especially as juliett has let on, that no matter what income, this will feed into a much bigger debate in the united kingdom in the run-up to what will be a contested general election next year in may 2015. one of the issues that juliet mentioned that we should put out on the table is the continuation of the u.k.'s claim over a security council seat. a lot of my colleagues who cover other areas of the world, particularly rising powers, that there will be a big demand from some of them about a rethinking of the national security council seat. there is anyway, as we know, and certainly the outcome of the referendum will raise that even higher. nothing will be constant in this debate and there will be more issues on the table as we look
forward. jeff, we have asked you to give a big perspective on these issues. obviously, you have quite a lot to say on the matter. >> thank you to brookings for inviting me here. i appreciate the invitation. charlie and juliett have laid out effectively the issues on the table, some of the underlying thinking on both sides of the campaign. i do not want to go over the ame ground, but maybe what i will do is try to outline the issue of what an independent scotland might look like, if there is a yes vote next week, even though it is a tossup. try to ask the question of what that would mean and look like. the key point to understand is that the yes vote next week is almost the start of the issue, not the end. a yes vote would be the start of a very confiscated divorce proceeding and it may be amicable but it could be nasty, but it will be very complicated
and it would be the start, not the end of the process. as we speak today, the basic outlines of what an independent scotland might look like are still unclear. there are core questions about its place in the world, what the state will look like, institutional questions. they have not been resolved. there are still lots of questions around that debate. we mentioned that an independent scotland would like to be part of the european union, part of the sales pitch. scotland would like to think that it is more to go than the rest of the u.k.. that was not always the case, but that is part of the pitch at the moment. opinion polls show sometimes that is true, sometimes not, but is very much a part of the platform for the snp. it is also important to them
because it is crucial for trade relations for an independent scotland, the general idea that business as usual could carry on even if we take this yes vote, a lot of things could carry on as normal. however, it is not immediately clear that scotland could become a member of the eu. it would reach multiple qualifications but there are three potential obstacles. the first one is like the spanish question. there are other questions in a you that may object, but spain is the one that is most likely to have a problem with scotland becoming a member of the eu. it does not want to look into the changes happening in catalonia. that is an incentive to drag
things out and to show to the cattle and that there is a price to be paid for taking this move. that would be a tough negotiation that scotland would face. there is the question of whether the u.k. would ultimately back t. again, it seems unlikely that the u.k. would say no, but there will be a competent in negotiation ahead. this is one of the bargaining chips that the rest of the government would have as scotland cannot become a part of the eu until both sides have signed up on the separation agreement. that is another factor. the third bit is the euro. in theory, new members are supposed to become members of the euro as well. given the crisis in the euro, one may imagine there is more reluctance to push that rule wholeheartedly, but in theory,
scotland would have to be a part of the euro, and that is not something that nationalists say they want to do. most of these issues would ultimately be resolved, there would be a sensible compromise, but it would be a painful and difficult negotiation. similarly, scotland wants to become part of nato as we have heard. this is part of the general business as usual, we are not going to rock the boat too much. you do not need to worry that an independent scotland will cause radical changes, but that will not be completely simple negotiations either. juliet mentioned the scottish national party are very anti-nuclear. that it is a basic affront. there is also anti-american populism that is part of the snp pitch as well. they talk about america's llegal wars. in a sense, scotland and not want to have nuclear weapons,
plaintiff against nuclear foreign policy in the middle east. there are other countries with a similar profile, but that is a wrinkle, a complication, something that they would have to do to soothe american concerns about that. and then presumably concerns about defense spending under an independent scotland. it is also entirely possible to imagine pressures on a scottish government that would push it into a direction of trying to cut the fence spending. everything that the u.s. wants at the moment from nato is nother country falling below he 2% arc. -- mark. i don't think ultimately these potential obstacles woodblock scotland from becoming a member of nato, but it will be a
drawnout negotiation or things will not be as simple as they are being projected in the campaign. the unit mentioned the eu issue. however, the currency issue has become the most difficult issue hat will face an independent scotland if we vote yes next week. charlie mentioned there would ultimately be sensible, establishment compact between scotland and the rest of u.k. to sorted out here and i am not clear about that. i am more skeptical. this is a key issue because i think there is no easy path for independent scotland on the currency issue. let me lay out the various options that scotland would have it became a member of the eu. there would be the euro option, and for a while that was the preferred option, but is not because of the recent problems
that it has had. other options would be to issue its own currency. ultimately, that would be an economic mechanism that would give it the most autonomy, the best chance in the long run to have an independence kaddish economic policy. but the path to establishing its own currency would be very confiscated and difficult, we have to establish credibility, build institutions, or raise about ms. masters and liabilities, currency risks. there is a risk of quite a lot of economic turbulence in the short and medium term before they got to have a credible currency. there is the sterling is asian option which would involve scotland continuing to use the pound sterling but not being a part of the institutional arrangement of the u.k., similar to how panama uses the u.s. dollar.
that is possible that there are problems with that as well, obviously being that scotland would not have a central bank. so to defend its banking system or to have a backstop for its system, they would need to build up a reserve fund which would ean cutting spending for a number of years in order to build of this fund, and economic cost to scottish spending that has not really been discussed hat would be implicit in the sterlingization process. it is understandable why the snp is putting its money on a plan to stay part of the currency option and then renegotiate the terms, essentially, the current currency union, so that scotland, ideally, would have membership to the bank of ngland, become a shareholder
essentially, partly setting monetary conditions, and would have access to the facilities, the lender of last resort is a ladies. -- facilities. from an independent scotland's point of view, that makes sense. but where i disagree with charlie, it does not really make sense for the rest of the u.k. for economic reasons and for political reasons. economic reason would be, all the risks would be on the one side. if scotland got into trouble, an independent scotland, england would have the resources to bail it out. if england got into trouble, scotland would not have the resources to bail it out. it is the classic moral hazard. all the risk would lie on the english side. there is little reason i could see them wanting to sign up for this. they are exposing themselves to huge risks down the road in scotland had a different economic policy, essentially free riding on the stability that the bank of england could provide them.
even if they did decide to do that, the price they would ask for would be very rigid. iscal rules limits on public spending, financial roles essentially asking for bank of england regulation of the entire system and possibly pulling fiscal resources. even though scotland would get control of these revenues from the oil, they would have to make some of that money available to the broader u.k.. the implication of that is a notionally independent scotland would not have a great deal of real autonomy and independence in the way it runs its economic all at sea. that is something that has not come through in the arguments about what a currency union would mean for an independent scotland.
even if you accept that the establishment would ultimately want to do a deal with england and scotland, because they do not want a crisis, politically, it does not seem possible for them to do so. the striking thing about this referendum is how link -- little england seems to care of what is happening in scotland. one example of that is when québec had its referendum, on the week before, several hundred people marched in the streets of montréal, canadians from outside of québec asking them to tay. there will be no demonstrations like that in scotland. that is not part of the debate. in england, the sentiment is the opposite, of resentment. if you want to go, -- i cannot
use the words. it is not a very polite atmosphere. there will be a general election and the next year. it seems to be impossible for the scottish political party to get elected on a platform saying we should do right by the scots, they will need us. i think the opposite will be the case. the english will demand on political parties very tough conditions. from the english point of view, currency union, scotland seems to be saying we want out but we want all the benefits of staying in. that is the way it plays in english politics. i do not think that is a sustainable argument. for those reasons, i am more pessimistic as to how that will play out. that will be difficult and will not be the kind of answer that scotland or the snp would ike. finally, these very tight pinion polls are fantastic for
journalist. this is a great story for my newspaper, but it seems to be a terrible outcome for scotland and britain. i have no alternative, not suggesting that is the wrong way to do things, but 51-49 is a terrible result showing that it is a divided country and has fragile political consensus in order to take the big step. it also cuts the other way as well. 51-49 is not a rounding endorsement of the union either. so either way we are entering a eriod of some considerable political fragility. i will leave it there. i am sure we can get into these things in q&a. >> thank you. that last point actually makes the united states, where we are having this debate, think about our own divisions internally between the various political constituencies, seem quite mild, which is an achievement.
for that, i can turn to jeremy to see how things look from here in d.c. where we are all sitting. >> thanks to all the previous panelists for coming. i think geoff gave a good view of what an optimistic presence in scotland would be on the international scene. what i would like to cover is what the u.s. government is essentially thinking about in the scottish referendum and also how the u.s. would react if there is a yes vote. as juliette mentioned, the u.s. does not really talk about this very much. they have talked about some concerns over issues, nuclear issues, but have not taken a position officially on the referendum. this is for rather clear reasons. in the first instance, it would be rude to comment on the internal deliberations of a
democratic country. it is not unprecedented, shall we say, for the united states to do so, but it is impolite, and i think in general a principal for the u.s. not to do that kind of thing. particularly for allies which it recognizes as a legitimate system and are engaged in a legitimate process. it's very clear on the u.s. side that is what is going on for better or worse. of course, the united states has an opinion. i think they recognize, however, that stating that opinion is not always help all to promoting it. the u.s. weighed in semi-accidentally, i think, on the question of british membership in the european union a year or two ago, and created quite a firestorm in britain. one of the things it did was align both sides -- it turned
out both sides carried out very much what the u.s. thought and it became a lightning rod. so i think, since that time, they have taken the approach that it can actually predict very well what u.s. weighed into the debate will do come in terms of public opinion. so it is best to stay out of it. that is reinforced by the sentiment that was already mentioned, that scots are somewhat averse to being told what to do, and particularly averse to being told what to do by americans. despite an absence of opinion, we can make a fairly educated guess on what the u.s. government thinks. the united states is a status quo power. i think that is something that we often forget as we talk about crisis and u.s. action. in fact, as the sort of leader of the world, there is a strong bias toward stability in u.s.
foreign policy and a strong bias against secession of any sort. really, secession, for a status quo power, is a complete collapse of policy. here again, the u.s. is not entirely insistent in this regard. kosovo comes to mind, a few other examples, but each of those examples, if you look at u.s. policy, they strongly sought to avoid any idea that there was a precedent set toward secession, or that there was any right of secession by provinces. i think that view israel enforced in this particular case because the u.s. essentially sees it as two of its best friends divorcing. that is never a joyful experience.
i think even beyond the general principle of a status quo power, there are some real issues for the united states, some alluded to already, but i will go over them more directly from a u.s. perspective. probably the critical one is the idea of the weakening of a key u.s. ally, the u.k. the u.k. is clearly, from a u.s. perspective, a very active, effective ally, and there are precious few of those these days. there is a general view that in the tumult after a yes vote, would turn inward after an exit of scotland. it would be more likely to get out of the european union in the referendum in 2017, which would further shrink british influence and activism in the world. there is also a view that scottish exit would put yet at greater pressure on the british
defense budget and the reddish british armed forces. overall, might mean that the u.k. would no longer be able to play the kind of lead role in nato that it has traditionally had. related to this, i think, is a fear of a weakening of nato and the eu. the eu would turn inward yet again, as it had to negotiate the question of secession in general and scottish entry, specifically, and because it would make an exit more likely, -- a british exit from the european union -- sorry, i have been in a conference about that. this gets to what the u.s. said when took a position against british exit from the european union, looking for a stronger and within a strong european union.
it is very clear that scottish exit weakens that strong britain and british exit from the european union would weaken that strong european union. for nato, i think, contrary to what has been said, this is less about the nuclear deterrent than about demonstrating weakness and disunity at a critical point in nato's history in the face of a newly resurgent threat from russia. if you look at the nato summit last week and the president cause trip to estonia, you see a very strong urge to assert nato unity, assert nato strength in the face of the russian threat. the whole idea of one of its members, key members breaking up, and the type of government that was described taking over in scotland and all of the
difficult negotiations over nato, does not really appealed to the united states at this critical moment in dealing with russia. i think the third reason that the u.s. would be against this is the question of precedent. as fiona mentioned, the leader of crimea has already mentioned scottish independence as a precedent for what he would like to do. we have also heard expressions of this this morning on npr, i heard a resident of donetsk asking the question -- if scotland can do it, why can't
we? of course, this present across the eu, so spain and other key u.s. allies could face this question. fiona and i have a piece about this which we distributed out up front which talks about the precedent that this set and the difficulty that that might cause for the european union. so what will the u.s. do in the case of a yes vote? it is always a fair bet in the face of dramatic international developments that the u.s. will urge calm. i think that will be the first reaction. but what that really means is that they will broadly accept the outcome and be urging, in order to make the best of a bad situation, a fast resolution of a negotiated, agreeable divorce. specifically to create a sense of reassurance and minimize the
disruption that i talked about that they fear. so they will, i think, quietly, and to some extent behind the scenes, push for it eu nato membership for scotland on reasonably fair terms. there will be, as geoff implied, very hard negotiations on the nuclear deterrent. but i think they are ultimately looking for a solution. they would certainly prefer a weak member of nato to a nonmember. there are, as was mentioned, plenty of nato members which have romantic anti-american notions, particularly about the nuclear deterrent, and this fits into a wider debate. the united states will not welcome a new one, but will prefer it to a nonmember, to a
sort of irish solution. the key point is it has to be a negotiated solution and a transition. i think, very clearly, the united states will push back against the idea that this referendum represents a precedent for places like crimea, donetsk, or even catalonia. the way that they will do that is by emphasizing the mutual decision nature that this was agreed by both sides, and that that was the critical feature which allows this type of referendum and separation. it must be agreed, both by the region that is holding the referendum, and by the state in which the region along -- belongs. they will say this is totally different from ukraine or from the provinces in georgia where this is under dispute.
also, in more speculative terms, if the scots vote yes, the u.s. will reevaluate its decision to play a fairly hands-off role in the british exit question for the european union. they will still have the problem that i mentioned that it is not clear how weighing in will help. but they will have the president of not weighing in, having not helped. typically, the united states does not make the same mistake twice, it makes a new mistake. >> [laughter] >> so i think we will see them play a more active role. the argument they will use is that because they have a stake in perdition membership in the european union, just as, for example, a country like britain
would have a stake in the united states membership in nato, they have every right to weigh in. i think they will be willing, in the run-up to that referendum, to make their opinion much more known if scotland votes yes. >> thank you, jeremy. obviously, we have a lot of issues here. with a half-hour we have left, i want to bring in the audience. i can see already lots of questions forming. i recognize quite a few people in the audience have a stake in the issue. i will take three questions right away. we have microphones which will come out to you if you will wait a second. then we will come back to the panel to ask them to comment. two questions in the lead here
and on the opposite side of the aisle. and then also, in the back, wave and let me know about your questions. and please identify yourself. >> my name is hugo rosemont, speaking as a british ex-pat, but i do want to take up something that mr. dyer said, that the english do not care on the matter. i would really hate for that impression to be left with his audience and more wind the. if you look at twitter, more generally, you do see today plans for signs of national unity from outside of scotland coming next wednesday. you also see -- and i recommend it strongly -- forgive me for getting slightly emotional on
this matter, the spectator magazine launching a campaign for people outside of scotland, writing in very personal words why it is that they would want the scottish people to vote to stay in the united kingdom. that is probably all i have to say apart from my question, which is, it has been suggested that perhaps a no would be less urgent. a situation in terms of what would happen after. could you ask the panel if the referendum has not shown, and the campaign shows there is a wide feeling of disenfranchisement in scotland and england and wales, and if it is, in fact, urgent, that there is a constitutional settlement in scotland and more widely in the event of a no vote. >> thank you. across the aisle. >> gerald chandler. could you relate to everything you have said in situation -- in relation to ireland? could there be an ireland, northern ireland situation, where is colin voted to thursday
stay in the u.k., it would stay in the u.k.? would ireland and scotland have better relations because they might end of using the euro, or could there be an even closer drawing of ireland to the u.k. because it is now kind of a club, that it is now relatively bigger? >> i am from "the nation." i think the panel for this marvelously instructive survey. i wish to regret the absence from the pan on the eloquent governor of texas, the honorable rick perry, who has some views on secession as well. >> can you speak closer to the mic? >> everybody knows in england scots play a disproportionate role in leadership in
institutions, cultural, academic, economic, and politics. one wonders about the composition, the social composition, of the two parties in scotland. of is there a cross gradient of some kind? it appears through some of the discussions -- it would be good to know something about the composition of the opposing parties. >> thank you so much for all of these questions. this last question -- we have had several sessions on this. it has confused people from the outside. a lot of people are trying to grasp who are the people on our side in terms of how they are
right and defying themselves. jeff and i have talked about this. my family have moved around the border between scotland and northern england. jeff is from scotland and living in the u.s.. he is obviously represented of a larger u.k. entity. that is the history of the united kingdom, one of constant migration. the previous assets were founded on the fact that you were not enough people identifying themselves whole truly as scots to really carry the day. the s&p platform has been based on this idea created they are
residents of the party. this whole issue of identity remains ready important. a question -- they're desperate of the identity of great britain on the map. many of people in england having a backlash, the idea of wanting to leave. there is a larger issue when you think about responding to this, about the identity of britain. the united kingdom -- great britain is not the official name of the united kingdom but everybody talks about it. if there are questions raised by
the united kingdom. this becomes quite complicated because the united kingdom is also a country of immigration and many people come from outside of the british isles, wondering how they are going to identify themselves on september 19. there are all kinds of identities. like many members of british parliament that have come from somewhere else, we have many parliament members from germany and portugal. how do they identify themselves? these are all issues that haven't come out on the panel that they have been a constant debate one way or another. you can also comment on some of this. these are great questions.
>> thank you very much for the questions. i'll try to tackle at least some of them. one of my areas of personal research interests is what the english think. i have done some survey work in england. i can endorse your comment in a sense that the english do care. when asked in april we found 19% of people in england and a very large survey who thought scotland should be an independent country -- a very big majority who do not think that. a little bit more in line with what jeff is saying, if scotland does vote yes what we know is people in england would be in support of a tough line of negotiations toward scotland.
if scotland decides to go then perhaps a little bit of backlash. when i said no urgency, that was not my no urgency. i think there would be a great angel of the u.k. level political system thinking we have sorted that, we have done that. i do think if we vote no a more stable set of constitutional arrangements for all parts of the u.k. would be a strong priority. there are some clear patterns which are quite interesting. men more likely to vote yes than women, younger people accept the very youngest -- younger people generally more likely to vote than older people, people from disadvantaged communities more likely to vote yes than people from more affluent communities. and then the national identity question. one of the best predictors we have of voting intention is around those people who feel primarily british. it doesn't work quite so well on the other side. this doesn't lead so directly to supporting a vote.
a poll was released from the scottish borders which showed two thirds in favor of remaining with the u.k.. there would be territorial differences between different parts of scotland. i don't think that is going to lead to an irish partition situation. i think given that level of voter registration, given that likely level of turnout the formal rules, which say 50% plus one either way wins, i think we'll have sufficient legitimacy. >> i will answer a couple of questions quickly so we can get more questions from the audience. on the issue of identity, partly being an outsider i have been struck at how the identity, the
nationalism and ethnic identity have not been part of the debate. it has been a political debate about policy preferences on foreign policy and health care and spending issues. i think that the way the electorate has been defined in terms of residency has taken away some of that. some of us can't vote. on the question of ireland it is interesting. ireland has looked more toward the u.k. in this debate then towards supporting scotland and independence. scotland hasn't reached out to think about cultivating scottish irish connections. scotland is looking more towards the nordic countries. those countries have largely
stayed on the sidelines in this debate, not just after the referendum but after -- in the case of a yes vote after negotiations we will wait to dig up the offer of scotland to be partners in alliances. >> this question is interesting because it is not formally part of the debates. if it is absolutely the underlying fabric of the debate, which is the sense that scottish identity has shifted in the last couple of decades. there is a strongly held view of most scots that scotland is a different place based on a different education system, church, and legal system. all of these profound and deeply rooted aspects. there is the idea that one
country in the world is england. there is this tension between the two and these last two decades that has really become much stronger. the thing that binds the u.k. together has declined. u.k. was founded on the empire in the sense that it is one of the things of cap scots interested in the u.k. for a long time. the memories of the second-floor cycling together, the trade union movement within the -- trade union movement was another powerful thing. something really broken scotland. margaret thatcher had really broken up some of the checks and balances in the political grammar of the way u.k. worked. even though that is not what is officially on the platform it is
very much one of the driving forces behind the way we got to this stage. we have globalization and individualism. sometimes people to retreat more into tribal entities. all the men of my fathers' generation were wearing a suit. all of the men 50 years under were wearing kilts. that is a way to explain the shift that is happening. identity is not on the manifesto but it is key to understand what is going on. i generally hope you are right. trying to make the case to scotland. >> i don't think you mean to personally.
do you have anything to say on this? >> i will mention on your point about general disenfranchisement, that is an important point. i make it in the piece i referred to. what scotland is expressing is it is often phrased this anti-english but it is more anti-london. it expresses frustration that a lot of the united kingdom, northern england and wales, a lot of the other areas of the european kingdom outside of the metropolitan london area and the south, feel about the english government, the u.k. government. the disenfranchisement they feel from the city, the cultural distance that is being created by the different evolutions of london and the rest of the
united kingdom. what the identity of scotland gives them is a language of vocabulary and an institutional platform to express that disenfranchisement that the rest of the united kingdom doesn't really have. that is why we see this to some franchise men coming forward must clearly and most strongly in scotland. i think it is a general problem in the united kingdom and i think it is something that the united kingdom should really deal with. i would share some of the pessimism that expresses they really will. >> i think many of the british newspapers have pointed out that those divides within the united kingdom are not neat. london itself is divided in politics.
one of the features was the abolition of the london council. it was always leaning to the left of the government. there's a great deal of effort inside of london. for a certain amount of self-determination -- i think this issue would take on interesting dimensions as we move forward. i would like to get some questions from the back because a lot of people have been waving furiously. and please identify yourself. >> i am from "the new york times." what is the impact on pensions and banks it scottish people vote yes? many scottish people are
dependent on the u.k. for social welfare, social security, and a matter of benefits. >> we have public radio in barcelona. do you think people have the right to decide their own fate? as a general matter we have 2 million people in barcelona yesterday. the spanish government does not allow the capital vote to go ahead. you think that any people should have the right to decide their own fate? >> a question from the gentleman standing right behind you. >> i wouldn't want anyone to think my accent reflects any bias. it seems that most of the
organizations have published the portion of don't knows. quite often the press has recalculated the polls to foot them as absolute confrontation between yes and no. i saw brookings succumb to this tendency. as far as i know the don't knows are big proportion of the poll. i think 20% approximately. i was wondering if the panel could comment on this and give some indication as to whether they think these voters will vote yes on it. >> we will start with charlie. >> i will start on that one. it is fairly standard practice when you are predicting elections to get rid of the
don't knows and report figures without them. it does raise a question of which way they are leading. different polls are reporting different levels. it depends a little bit on the polling efforts. if people do face-to-face polling you get more don't knows. people are more reluctant face to face to give their opinion. the picture we have had from some academic surveys research, using the same panel of votes as different time points, which is the most reliable evidence that we have, was that between the two time points earlier this year and in the early summer, don't knows were breaking toward yes but at a ratio of 25 to 18. that is perhaps one of the things we have been seeing.
beyond that it is very difficult to say. nobody has asked about currency but i wants to come back to jeff and to clarify. i am skeptical there would be a formal currency union. i am sorry if that is what you thought i was saying. i do think the debate has become quite polarized and the no side has been so definitive in some parts have gone beyond that by saying the next u.k. manifesto for the labour party as saying we will not have the currency, that it will be very hard to move away from that position. what i was suggesting was there would be an interested in stabilize a should process, most likely around and in formal use of sterling.
perhaps we have seen the first stages of that stabilization process and the announcement of all of the major banks with headquarters in scotland yesterday saying that in the event of a yes vote they would move their registered headquarters, if not necessarily many of their activities, to london so there would be a lender of last resort, which is one way of managing those transitional issues. my broader point was that both sides, including the u.k., which would be bearing uncertainty around currency, uncertainty around business with many firms headquartered in the u.k., would have an interest in stabilizing and saying it is all going to be ok. the idea of sterlingization.
>> let me take the catalonian question in the back. jeremy was talking about precedence and secession. it is a strong and ever-growing normative power in the international system. that is why you see outside actors, even if they are against scottish independence. they are not making many public comments on this. i think this concern about the spillover of scottish independence to other secession movements is sometimes exaggerated.
i was in a really good conference about this at the glasgow university last year. we brought in several experts on the secession all movement. most research shows they do not domino effect. it may be that other secessionist movements use an instant as precedents to push their case. the resulting movements are determined more by local factors rather than what has happened next door or across the world. i think secessionist movements around the world will use the
scottish independence referendum in their movement for secession regardless of the outcome. there is a clear difference. his was a case by westminster government to allow this to happen. this was a fully democratic process without any real conflict. it is quite a unique thing in international history. >> i will take the economic question. the short-term impact is that of uncertainty. it will create a huge number of questions about future arrangements in the country and that can have some economic impact. you can see some pension fund money being moved over the border.
you can imagine people withdrawing money from scottish banks, possibly if they start to get worried about future arrangements. i think there will be a very strong self-preservation institutional movement on both sides of the border to try and overcome that, try and stop the uncertainty from causing a corruption's in the economy created it would really depend on what sort of currency arrangements eventually -- currency arrangement scotland eventually has. maybe they build up reserves, depending on which particular arrangement they have. the wildcard would be oil price theater there would be a large part of its revenue coming from oil. that could counteract it. the oil price could to find whether scotland could spend that amount of money in the
medium-term. uncertainty is a big issue at the moment. >> i will wisely weigh in on this determination question. i think the norm of national self-determination is one in which the rhetoric of states is always exceeded the practice. it is very common for statesman to get up and extol the rights of self-determination. if you look at the history of the thing it has always somewhat clearly limited in the right of self-determination but they do not have the right to determine the size and scope of the political community over which that self-determination runs. it is not legitimate for the brookings institution and to
suddenly decide it wants to be an independent country and secede from the united states, although in some cases we have considered it. this is an issue on which the civil war was fought and quite clearly determined that even if there is a right to self-determination there's not necessarily a right to secession, especially secession that is not agreed by the larger political community. that has been a fairly strong practice. certainly there are many exceptions. even since the rise of the self-determination effort after world war i. >> i want to bring in the last set of questions. there is a gentleman in the back who has had his hand up for a long time. and then the lady in the front. please. please identify yourself.
>> i am an intern here at brookings. if i understood correctly i heard that if scotland gains its independence england will not have enough power and influence to play a prominent role in nato. what does this mean for the united nations? would england be kicked out of the position it is in now? >> the gentleman behind the camera here and then the lady up front. >> i covered the referendum campaign two decades ago in canada when quebec voted by
50.01% to stay in canada. ever since this issue has totally disappeared from the political discussion in canada. if scotland votes no by a similar outcome, will we see another referendum in two years or with this issue fade away? >> thank you. >> i am the congressional reporter for hispanic outlook. i have read a lot about immigration. in the immigration debate, when people talk about nationalism, there is a connotation of xenophobic and anti-immigrant, but i am not hearing that in this conversation. and yet i went to a political conference two weeks ago, international, and european scholars told me that the whole concept of multiculturalism is dead now in europe.
people do not talk about it. i'm wondering if the debate is more about a government versus small government -- big government versus small government. that the huge multicultural governments like london just cannot identify to the many, they do not feel that they can control it. again, multiculturalism, xenophobia, the government versus small government. >> thanks, those are good last questions, unfortunately we do not have a lot of time, there are a crowd of people outside of the door. i hope that they are not demonstrating, i think that there is another event. i will get last words from our panelists for my charlie. -- panelists, charlie. >> quebec did have recently a government led by the pro-independence party which was hoping to secure sufficient support to move towards a further round of constitutional discussion, so i do not think
things are over in quebec. if it's a no vote, i do not think that they would be over in scotland. alex has said that this is a once in a generation issue. i suspect that the definition of generation could be reasonably flexible depending on how other events go. for example, if scotland votes no, and the u.k. as a referendum on eu membership, which has a u.k. wide majority to leave, but a scottish majority within the u.k. to stay, adding that his terrain which is -- i think that that is terrain which is a short political generation away which could revive the debate. i believe the other questions for others. >> let me talk about the immigration, it has not been a part of the scottish national at all, they promise a more liberal immigration policy than the u.k. had. you have seen the tensions
within the united kingdom and more broadly that jeremy spoke of, london versus the rest were divisions within london, scotland can maybe be seen in the independence referendum and the rest of the u.k., the rise of more anti-immigrant populist parties. i think that a smaller u.k. after a yes vote would raise more questions about whether the u.k. has the right to be represented on the un security council. those questions are already raised, and the door is already open with no simple solutions in sight. i do not see that it would -- it would add to the call, but i do not think it would provide more answers. >> the day after a yes vote, india would be out to say it is time to reform the u.n.
the logic for reforming the security council has been powerful for a long time, and it has not happened. you need to organize consensus between the members, and that is never impossible. i think it would be more possible after a referendum vote. even if the national side loses, they have absolutely made a powerful case that there is a strong groundswell of support for independence in scotland. if they lose, they will not get 30%, they will get 45, 49%. the issue will be back on the agenda, sooner than you might imagine. >> thanks, geoff, jeremy, any last words? we will refrain from trying to tip the scales. i hope that nothing we have said here will tip the outcome one way or another.
we all know how inadvertently can weigh into a debate and make a mess of it. we hope that your magic touch that we have educated on the key issues. we are a week ahead of these momentous events. i hope that everybody will be watching this very closely. thank you for participating, you and the audience, and this part in this discussion today. thank you very much. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> next, a forum to come back
isis. another chance to see the scottish referendum. and virginia governor on the balance between personal liberty and security. >> bill and hillary clinton will attend the final steak fry hosted by senator tom harkin, or is retiring. it would be the first visit by the former secretary of state since she lost the 2008 presidential caucuses. here is senator harkin talking about inviting the clintons. , i put in a request to hillary and i spoke to her sometime ago. she is getting ready to do her book tour. she was on her book tour and she said, i do not know what it will be like and what will transpire.
i would really like to do it. can you just give me some time to figure out what my schedule is going to be like? i said, sure. i saw bill in california. i saw bill clinton there. we started commiserating about this and that. i remembered as he was walking -- he was signing some of his books for people. it was just the two of us. i invited hillary to come out and speak at my steak fry. as he turned to walk away, he said -- i said you should come, too. he said he won't both of us? i said couple to couple. it would be great. he said i was think about it. they did. it was such a great honor to have both of them. they have been good friends of ours for all of these years. bill and hillary have provided great leadership for our country
in the past in their respective ways. i served in the senate under ted kennedy with hillary clinton all the time she was in the senate. we had a great working relationships in the senate. i think she did an outstanding job as our secretary of state. in fact as i travel around the world, the last few years, it stature amazing how the that hillary clinton has globally among women and girls all over this globe. she has kind of -- sparked a fire under women and girls around the world. and hold her in very high esteem. formertor harkin and president clinton and hillary clinton are expected to speak at the steak fry. live coverage starts sunday at 3:30 p.m. on c-span.
>> the senate for american progress and washington, d.c. hosted a talk on strategy of against fighting isis. the formerncludes ambassador robert forward and foreign-policy and national security experts. this is one hour, 30 minutes. >> welcome to the center for american progress. i'm brian katulis. we had such a good turnout today. such a turnout. what we are gearing for here is an in-depth discuss on isis in syria and iraq. we really have an excellent panel here today.
first and foremost, i am going to introduce in the order of speaking. we are lucky to have ambassador robert ford. after 30 years of service, he resigned in february as our ambassador to syria. he is well-known to everyone in this room for his committment and dedication to service. we look forward to hearing to his remarks. then we we hear from hardon lang. he is a senior fellow here at the center. and then we will hear some remarks from andrew tabler. our friend at the washington institute for policy. anyonelso well-known to who is paying attention to syria. andrew and i met in 2007, and we engaged him early, back in 2010.
this was when george bush was in office. his expertise is well-known. last, but not least, is doug oliphant. , ande lucky to have him thank you everyone. before we get underway, we have three points. the first point i wanted to make is to acknowledge the fundamental challenge that the iraqi and syrian people face. we sit here in think tanks, and we often forget that beneath these statistics of 3 million syrians and hundreds and
in syria andled iraq, these are human stories. in our research, we have all had contact. we all need to remember about the people who are there. remember being at the border of syria and seeing a family who who had everything they had. i think it is appropriate to start their. we are going to talk about targeted strikes, diplomacy, and a moral framework that we need things in mind are those when we have a discussion like this. there are crimes against humanity by both the assad regime and isis. i wanted to acknowledge our colleagues who are not on stage. syrian opposition, we released
today. it is a strategy report on isis strategyo release a report on isis earlier this week. it is something new we have done here. we have a core team, including jewel, including others who have been out in the fields with us. we have done studies in turkey, and the syrian report is the fourth in the series. we are grateful for our senior colleagues. those acknowledgments are important. reports, wethese try to wrestle with not just what the u.s. does, and also the dynamics of each country.
these are longer reports, but we hope you have a chance to take a look at them. lastly, and i will shut up after offer my ownd to analytical interpretation of what the president said, and what his policy is. and whether it is good or not. and we can talk about that later. athink a useful way, perhaps, little over simple five, is how this administration has used the challenge of isis and iraqi and how to approach it is like a stool with three legs. at we hear about is today with secretary kerry going out to get a regional coalition and an international coalition to fix this. that is one component. thes one that requires u.s. leadership to construct. the second, obviously, is a rock
raq. it is fraught with a lot of booby-traps. hopefully, this moment of crisis with isis and other groups is a wake-up call. the third is syria. in my view, it is the one that even after what president obama said the other night, is still the one that needs the most development, and it needs more coherency from a u.s. policy from how we connect with these actors in the region. it is that last pillar that we want to hold it -- hone in on a bit today. again, with ambassador ford here, i thought we would kick off our discussion just asking are you encouraged, and maybe a
second question of this key question of the syrian opposition, the debate that i think our congress is having right now and will have and will vote on possible additional funds for the syrian opposition this month -- how do you see the president's new strategy, as they call it, and where do you see sort of the next steps on the syrian opposition? >> thank you. thank you. nice to be here. thank you for the invitation. my first time here. i see two distinguished colleagues with whom i used to work, and i just want to highlight that. it's great to see you, rich. i think he is just now leaving government. let me tell you that it's ok. [laughter] i also see colonel rob
friedenberg, and he was our defense attaché and repeatedly put himself at some physical risk in order to help us understand what was going on there. rob, it's great to see you. i am actually a bit encouraged. i don't want to overstate that, but i am encouraged. i think the administration's overall approach of lining up diplomatic, regional, that is to say, above all, support for the effort against islamic state as well as political and financial, trying to cut money flows into the very well-financed islamic state -- these are very well spot on. i was extremely struck by the picture coming out of saudi arabia yesterday of the arab foreign ministers, and there was ibrahim joffrey from iraq, the
former prime minister of iraq, 2005, 2006, a man with whom the saudis would have nothing to do when he was prime minister, despite repeated requests from the american embassy. is could not convince the saud to engage with him, and yet, yesterday, the saudis brought him. i think we are making progress on that. i think it is really important that the governments in the gulf iraq and in a new and better way than they ever have before, so i thought that was a good sign. i have three other points i would like to make, and th i