tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN April 1, 2015 11:25pm-1:31am EDT
espionage to more terror and destruction. you can buy a lot of this stuff already on the internet. so i think this is the area -- they say, will keep you up at night, there are a lot of things. cyber, the probability is getting higher, but the consequences are very severe too. so the probability of getting attacked is high, but the damage is that itself, but relatively low casualties, but it is human casualties. the cyber piece is higher probability, but the consequences could be extremely severe and damaging. with time it will get worse. host: great. chairman mccaul: it is great news, isn't it? host: we always feel good. but i'm really grateful that you came and talked to us, took time out of your schedule. you were busy before you were
chairman. i have no idea what it is is like now. think you so much for joining us. --thank you so much for joining us. chairman mccaul: thank you for having me. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> thursday, admiral michael rogers talks about cyber security. he is the keynote speaker at the sixth annual afcea cyber security technology summit. we will bring live coverage of his remarks at 12:15 p.m. eastern.
>> coming up -- the brookings institution hosts a discussion on the state of the iran nuclear talks. then a discussion on u.s. preparedness for a biological or chemical threat. and the former committee chair talks about the role of congress and by a defense preparedness. here are some of our featured programs for this holiday weekend on the c-span networks. saturday at 8 p.m., former texas state senator and gubernatorial candidate wendy davis on the challenges facing women in politics. easter sunday at 6:30 p.m. eastern, golfing legend jack nickless receives the congressional gold medal for his contributions to the game and community service. on c-span2 book tv, saturday night at 10 p.m. eastern, on afterwards activist and author
cornell west on the radical political thinking of martin luther king jr., and sunday at noon on in-depth, our live three-hour conversation with former investigative reporter for the washington post and new york times best selling author ronald kessler. he has written 20 books, including escape from the cia, the sins of the father, and the first family detail. and on american history tv on c-span3 saturday at 8 p.m., on lectures in history, charles calhoun on the obstacles faced and accomplishes made by ulysses s. grant during his presidency. sunday afternoon at 6:00 on american artifacts historian patrick schroeder takes us on a tour of appomattox courthouse in virginia, the site of the confederate surrender in 1865. >> thursday, the peace corps director outlines changes to the organization. since she took the helm last
june. she will discuss new policies aimed at reducing health and violence risks faced by volunteers. we will have a remarks from the center for strategic and international studies, live at 10 a.m. eastern on c-span two. later we will be with president obama in louisville, kentucky, for speech on technology and the economy, live at 2:40 p.m. eastern, also on c-span2. >> during this month, c-span is pleased to present the winning entries in this year's documentary competition. student cam encourages middle and high school students to think critically about issues that affect the nation. students were asked to create the documentaries based on the themes of three branches and you , to demonstrate how a policy, law, or action by one of the three branches
>> nature diversifies itself constantly. if it did not, the whole species would be extinct. it is part of our system, part of our need, not only as human beings, but as physical human beings. >> for more than 200 years, our tradition of welcoming immigrants from around the world has given us a tremendous advantage over other nations. >> the new executive action the president has announced last month, it is an extension of the deferred action for childhood arrivals, so people that enter
this country when they were children, and they never became citizens. it gives them an extra period of time to get their paperwork in order so they are not deported from the u.s. there is something new called dapa, deferred action for parental arrivals, so the parents of children that were born in this country now have a chance to become -- it is not technically a pathway to citizenship, but it gives the more time to get the paperwork in order so they have more time to get employment, visas, social security cards. >> the president's executive action has caused a ruckus. opponents say it is basically amnesty rewarding those who flunked. others oppose and say our president is acting like a king. supporters of the policies say other presidents of done the
same, even ronald reagan of amnesty to illegal immigrants. helping all immigrants, legal or undocumented, helps stabilize communities and encourages diversity. supporters claim diversity is necessary to our country. a perfect example of how diversity was brought into societies the immigration act of 1955. like obama's recent actions that act was designed to be inclusive. that law passed by congress got rid of a quota system that at one time favored western and northern europeans over asians and africans. it had a huge impact on my family and my community in jersey city, new jersey. >> [indiscernible] in germany in the 1960's. i wanted to go back to hometown korea. but the conditions were not
favorable. [indiscernible] >> my first day of kindergarten, i did not speak a word of english. i definitely felt like an outsider. i do not think any of the other kids really knew anyone else that was asian. >> i am from india. i came to settle down my family. that is why i came. i was so interested to come. at the end of 1934, i came here. >> i came in because my parents 1988 and family were here, except me and my twin sister in india. >> in that fall, for the first time ever, there was a brother and sister called mike and susie wells from korea. >> people stepped outside their door and open up to the world.
jersey city, the diversity is probably the biggest asset. the most diverse city in the country. we get together and we go to temple, and we see each other and we celebrate our festivals , and what we enjoy in india and we have our own community. >> i believe jersey city, and any city, benefits greatly from diversity. otherwise, we would live in a little village where we continue doing the same things the same old way and with the same old people. bringing in new ideas, new people, new ways of doing things, it is great. >> diversity in any country is good. however, i do not think we should have policies that should encourage diversity for diversity's sake. after all, a nation is known by its shared culture. if the culture is so diversified that there is no shared culture, then diversity has gone too far.
>> my opinion on president obama's executive action is it is a very great step in the right direction. the society has been working hard and raising families are they have children that are not citizens that are going to school, getting jobs, going to college. they are living the american dream. this executive action helps them fulfill their dreams. >> i just wish he had gone a little bit further. i think it is going to be difficult for some of these people to prove that they have been here and a taxes in order to get a five-year extension. even that five-year extension will not make them sleep well at night. >> long run, i think it will work. i think now it is almost forcing it to be brought up and debated, which i believe in our democracy is always best. >> the illegals will circumvent the system to stay in that state cannot be deported. in my case, i helped my family to come to the united states
legally. they had to wait five to eight years. >> many supporters will cite the act that ronald reagan signed while president. but president obama, with his own sense of authority, ticket -- took it upon himself to create a law, which under our system, does as no authority can do so. >> the realities are what they are. the world is moving on. the world is globalizing. you cannot help but makes -- makes people. not just exchanging products. we are exchanging people. >> give me your tired, your poor, your masses yearning to breathe free. i gaze at lady liberty, a beacon for millions of immigrants who passed through ellis island. the golden door, the wish they hoped to attain, the american
dream. >> to watch all the winning videos and to learn more about our competition, go to c-span.org and click on "studentcam." also tell us what you think about the issue this student addressed on facebook and twitter. >> the negotiations over iran's nuclear program were extended for a another day after the deadline. a former member of the delegation took part of the new key issue -- negotiations said it would have been better to set a june deadline. he took part of a bookings discussion on wednesday. this is 90 minutes.
tamara: good morning and i am delighted to be hosting this discussion over iran negotiations. i think for all of us who follow the middle east, the scope of the events over the last week have been dizzying. whether it is the back and forth u.s., iraq he, and iranian war or the ongoing negotiating drama and was on, what we are seeing is not merely the consequence of the breakdown of the state order in the wake of the arab uprising
of but we are also seeing a 111, grand struggle for power across the region. it is understandable that in that context, regional states feel a tremendous stake in seemingly small struggles. it is also understandable in that context why the significance of these negotiations and laws goes far beyond the substance of the talks themselves or the specifics of what deal may or may not be announced or what terms may not or may be announced. in any event i cannot imagine a , group of better people to help us understand what is going on in these negotiations, and u.s. relations around these negotiations, in american
politics, but the broader significance and symbolism of what is taking place. a few, brief administrative announcements for all of you before we get this conversation underway. first, i want to point all of you to the place where our conversations go on in between these public events. i invite you all to join the conversation on our middle east blog. that is on the brookings website. just over the last week, we have had a dozen posts on all of the issues that i mentioned. we have had a very consistent focus on the iran negotiations. they are with contributions from suzanne, bob bill amma and others. -- bill, and others.
in addition, for those of you who are watching via c-span or following us on twitter at this event, you can tweet questions to the panel when we get to the q&a portion. tweet your questions to the foreign policy twitter handle @brookingsfp. for those of you who would like to be part of a twitter conversation around this conversation, please tweet using our twitter handle for the event #irannegotiations. and with that, i turn the proceedings over to dan. thank you all for being here. dan boy -- dan: good morning. let me add my thanks. i don't think i need to tell anyone who has read the paper in the last couple weeks the importance of the negotiations with iran, but also the importance of the timing right now. we seem to be at a turning point. where in the next few days there may be a foundation from which to move forward. something that will last for quite some time. or, conversely, we might look back at these two days and say this was the moment when negotiations collapsed, when things that had seemed so
promising no longer look that way. making this more complex, in contrast to many negotiations, not everyone believes the deal is the best outcome. in both iran and the united states, there are many serious critical voices that believe that a negotiated agreement is a much worse outcome than no agreement. i am delighted to say that even by brookings standards, we have a truly superb panel for you. we have three people up here who have long been looking at government aspects of the questions they are going to address today. our first speaker on my far left is bob einhorn. a senior government official in multiple administrations. he is someone who is going to give us the state of play in what is going on with negotiations, the unresolved issues, what he sees needs to be tackled in the days and weeks to come. our next speaker is suzanne
maloney, one of our nations are mere iran -- premier iran watchers in the government and outside. she will give us tehran's look on this. our last speaker our last speaker is not giving us a foreign policy perspective, but he is going to explain the political dynamics and ramifications in the united states. together, we will end up with a much more nuanced understanding of the issues that are dominating the front pages. without further ado, let we turn this over to bob. bob: thank you very much, tammy. first, a few words of background to the current round of negotiations in lausanne. last november, the p5 plus one
countries and iran agreed to a second extension of the interim deal they had reached in november 2013. in november, they set a deadline of end of june 2015 for concluding a comprehensive nuclear deal. they also set a target date of end of march, basically yesterday, for reaching agreement on the key elements of a deal, sometimes it has been called political understanding political framework. the idea was that this march political framework would provide guidance to the negotiators in fleshing out the critical, technical details required in a comprehensive agreement by the end of june. since november, the iranians have played down the importance of the march target date.
the supreme leader said that they do not want a two-stage agreement. they want a single agreement that will be worked out by the end of june. they did not place much importance on the end of march concluding date. the u.s. played up the importance of the march target. for the u.s., the march date was a key test of whether a nuclear agreement, a sound agreement was even achievable, of whether iran would be willing and able to make the necessary concessions to ensure that a sound agreement could be reached. also for the u.s., the march target date assumed great political importance.
congress required some time, has been poised to adopt new legislation that could had a -- have a disruptive effect on the negotiations. members of congress agreed to put off any votes on new legislation at least until the conclusion of this lausanne round. it appears at this point that the complete that negotiators political framework hope to reach will not be achievable. there has been some progress over the last 6-8 weeks, including the last six days in lausanne. but some key issues will be almost impossible to resolve in the limited time they have remaining. deputy foreign minister said
this morning that no deal is going to be announced today or tomorrow. what will be issued is, what he called, a press statement, which would simply indicate that progress is being made. after his remarks to the press u.s. officials countered the notion that it would be a simple, vague press statement. the u.s. side wanted a concrete statement with important details of what had been achieved. whatever the contents of a joint statement that may be issued tonight or tomorrow, the u.s. will almost certainly prepare its own version of events in written form. it is not clear. it will hope to brief members of
congress and in form the u.s. and world public of its impression about where the negotiations stand. what has the u.s. been trying to achieve? i will mention some of the key goals. one, it has wanted to achieve rigorous verification measures measures capable of detecting iranian noncompliance at both declared nuclear facilities, as well as covert locations. this would involve not just adhering to the international atomic energy agency's additional protocol, which provides for a much more intrusive verification then standard verification measure, it would also mean going well beyond the additional protocol in a number of key respects. the second key goal is to lengthen, from about the current
2-3 months, to at least one year the amount of time it would take iran to produce enough weapons grade material for a single nuclear bomb. lengthening the so-called breakout time to at least one year would involve putting significant constraints on possible methods for iran to produce the materials for a nuclear bomb. that means constraints on the enrichment program as well as constraints on the nuclear reactor that iran is building. and third, the administration wants a long-duration agreement. this is important because there is already an agreement that after the expiration of the deal , iran will be treated like any other non-nuclear weapons state party to the npt. some, if not all, special
restrictions applicable to iran would go away at that point. it needs to be a long-duration. the u.s. view is that it should at least be 10 years. some restrictions should continue for another five years. and some, such as the adherence to the additional protocol should be permanent. those are some of the key goals and much progress has been made toward these goals in recent weeks and months. in fact in recent days. there are some key issues that appear to remain unresolved. the situation is murky now because they are in the throes and perhaps the final hours of this round of talks. not much official information has been released. there has been a lot of press speculation about the unresolved issues, but i will mention some that have gotten a lot of press play, whether or not they are fully accurate.
one issue that seems to be hard to resolve is the question of the phasing and timing of the relief from sanctions that have been imposed on iran. the iranians say they would like all the sanctions removed almost immediately. the u.s. position is that sanctions should be phased out over time, as iran meets certain benchmarks in restricting its nuclear program and as the iaea a develops confidence is developed in the peaceful nature of a ron paul's nuclear program. recently, the focus has peaceful been on peaceful nature of iran's nuclear program. recently, the focus has largely been on restrictions of iran's ability to procure resources. the second issue is on research
and development on advanced centrifuge machines. this is important because if iran is able, during an agreement to develop high , confidence in the performance of very efficient centrifuges and once the agreement is other, they can move quickly to ramp up enrichment capability and shorten their breakout time . another issue, duration. as i mentioned before, the u.s. would like restrictions to last as long as possible. it has been reported that iran would like virtually all of them to end after the 10 year. period. another issue that has become prominent has to do with the amount of enriched uranium in a gaseous form that iran would be allowed to possess.
this amount is a critical factor in calculating the breakout time. the smaller the amount of gaseous uranium, gaseous enriched uranium that iran could keep, the higher the number of centrifuges that could be allowed iran without shortening the breakout time. for the last few months, it has been widely assumed that iran had agreed, tentatively or not but the understanding was that it had agreed to ship out almost all of its stock of 8000 kilograms of low enriched uranium gas to russia. this would be a very neat and effective solution to this problem. but just a couple of days ago
they said that shipping any of this enriched uranium gas out of iran would be out of the question. it is not clear how this apparent change of position will be compensated for. there are other ways of dealing with this problem, including by diluting the material from an enriched state to a natural state, which is less than 1% enriched, but it is not clear. this is an issue that many assumed had been resolved before , but now it is an open question. a final issue i will mention is called, dmd -- pmd. possible military dimensions. this involves the iaea's investigation into certain past activities conducted before 2003
that the iaea and the united states of believe were related to the development of a nuclear weapon. the iranians have stonewalled the investigation and the u.s. and its partners have said that it is important that this issue be resolved. at this point, given the iranian stonewalling, it is highly unlikely that the iaea can fully resolve its concerns before a june deadline. the question now is whether a schedule will be reached once the agreement goes into force. why have the negotiators apparently fallen short of reaching an agreement on a complete political framework. i think the main reason is that the iranians have dug in their heels on some critical issues.
they have not displayed enough flexibility to reach effective compromises on these matters. some speculate it is tactical. the iranians may have concluded that the u.s. team was under so much pressure from the congress to get a deal that the u.s. and its partners would make all of the remaining concessions. i don't know if that is the case. it may also be not a tactical explanation, but that iran's supreme leader has laid out some very tough redlines and no one is prepared to cross those. whatever the explanation, the deal or the solution, the joint statement that the u.s. team will be taking back to washington, is going to fall short of expectations.
there will be a lot of disappointment in the american administration and a lot of skepticism in the congress whether a deal will ever be concluded. you can expect, in coming weeks, a lot of interaction between the executive and legislative branches of government. the obama administration will try to make a strong case that sufficient progress has been made recently and including in lausanne to justify a continuation of the negotiations and a continuation of the negotiations without congress voting on a new legislation. many will be skeptical of this. there will be very strong pressures in the congress to vote new sanctions laws for a corker-menendez bill that would require the administration to submit a deal to the congress
for an up or down vote. the march round was designed to test whether iran was willing to achieve agreement whether a , sound agreement was negotiable, and i think, unfortunately, after the six intense days of negotiations those are still unanswered questions. thanks. tamara: thanks very much for pulling together today's event. our timing is either perfect or just a little bit premature depending on where you stand. i think it is a great opportunity for a discussion on what we know to be the likely outcome. i think bob -- thank bob for
giving us that comprehensive state of play of where things stand. i was asked to talk about the view from tehran, which is always a bit of a challenge when you are sitting in washington. we have the benefit of quite a bit of discourse on this issue from the iranian side over the past 14 months while the negotiations have been ongoing. it has been a fascinating discussion. i think that it does illuminate a little bit about where things stand from the iranian perspective and how they are likely to play out the remaining three months of the current stages of negotiations. i want to start by saying that there is a broader and deeper political consensus around a deal in iran than we sometimes hear, at least in the conventional analysis outside iran. this is not a controversial notion on the iranian side. the idea of negotiating with the united states and the other partners in the p5 plus one is
one that has been endorsed by the supreme leader time and again. he has provided support to the negotiators repeatedly and in full some terms. when we hear about hardliners on both sides, opponents of the deal on both sides, i would suggest that the iranian debate on a deal is less fractured than the american debate on a deal, that is an important caveat to get. it does not suggest there is a unified position in iran. there is no unified position in avon on any position whatsoever. it is a very politicized society. in fact, i think it is reasonable to suspect that there are those within the current executive engine of the iranian government who might in fact be capable or willing to embrace more lenient terms for a deal, more flexibility on the iranian
side if they have more power to do so. that is a supposition put forward. i have no evidence to support it other than my interaction with them and my prisms and that they have -- and might presumptions that they had eight certainly with the international community. but let me reinforce that both of them are in line with the supreme leader's instruction on this deal. they have no willingness to band from what he put forward in terms radio. they are not subversive in their efforts to negotiate, and they are not likely to sell a deal that he is not endorsed or blessed. by the same token, there are critics from the iranian side, hardliners from the political spectrum who are just interested in anything that looks like capitulation to the international community. hardliners, who at this particular moment in time, who are especially averse to
strike a deal with a country that they see as leaving a sort of encirclement strategy that has contribute to the instability we are seeing in iraq as a result of the islamic state, as well as endorsing or backing the saudi and arab campaign in yemen at thsi tiis time. from their perspective, they would undoubtedly like to see the supreme leader endorsed flexible terms. they are not critics in the sense that they are likely to subvert any deal that the supreme leader does in fact give sacntionnction to. once the iranians can arrive at terms that are consistent with the supreme leader's redline this deal will sell in iran and it will stand in iran. it will be incremented as we have seen the interim agreement,
the joint plan of action incremented -- implement it, in fairly reliable form. that said, the supreme leader's terms radio or not the terms that the international community finds acceptable or amenable. that is the fundamental goal, that you have a set of negotiators on the iranian side who do not have a enormous amount of what's ability. -- amount of flexibility. and you have an international community trying to make the most of what appears to be an important opportunity. we don't remember eight years of ahmadinejad and not having a reliable negotiating position as well as having a real that was amenable and acceptable to be dealing with in a diplomatic fashion. for that reason, with the iranians have included is that the primary leverage these talks is their willingness to walk away, their willingness to hang
tough, mostly because they have to. at the same time, as they hang tough, the p5 plus one, largely due to the creativity and negotiation of the american team, but also because of the close consensus and corporation between all caps six of the partners. -- all six of the partners. that the international community comes back with terms that are closer to the redline. i think that is what we are seeing here again today. i think we will continue to see it play out. with that, i will just make a point that will bear clarification. so many of which watched the election, the endorsement of a more greater engagement with the world and more flexible negotiating position as a signal that he had been elected to do a deal.
i certainly felt that. but in fact, rohani was elected to get a deal, but not at any price. we have seen that over the course of the past working month. -- past 14 months. iran will stay to a deal that is acceptable, which is holding as much nuclear into structure as possible. obtaining as much sacntion relief as possible, and injuring iran's -- ensuring iran's rehabilitation in the international committee. you are seeing these sticking points as a reflection of iran's determination to hang on to this nuclear into structure, but also looking at rehabilitation for sanctions as quickly and securely as possible. i would say that i believe rohani and those around him know that iran needs this deal more
than the international community needs this deal. the supreme leader has articulated a position that iran can manage its economy without a return to pre-sanctions era. and that this resistance economy, relying on it to mystic production can benefit the country by not depending on oil. -- relying on a domestic reduction. -- production. they are prepared to restructure the economy, and it economy even in the event they may not get sanction relief. their plan b is to go forward without sanction relief. they are very determined and prepared to go forward in that direction. finally, let me say a few words about the tactical behavior we are seeing on the iranian side for the past few days.
robert referenced to a. shift of -- referenfed to an apparent shift the position. the iranians putting into jeopardy in the last moments created new obstacles to a political framework that, only a few weeks ago, appeared to be almost inevitable. there seemed to be a lot of optimism coming out of the negotiations. there was, in fact, a pretty robust understanding, still if you remaining issues, but the real kernel that had been lighting the negotiators on both sides over the past year had finally overcome this issue of enrichment. it had finally been with with a fairly comforted -- a fairly copy created formula. -- fairly complicated formula.
i cannot look into the minds of negotiators, but i can suggest possibilities. first, i take there's a real mistrust and part of the iranian system that the u.s. can't uphold its end of the park. that mistrust has been intensified as a result of the ongoing fiction between congress and the executive branch here, and by the determined efforts of many on the hill to suggest that any deal will not be lamented -- will not be implemented, and any attenuation will not go past the current president. there are real doubts on the iranian side about what they are forced to sign, and whether that will be held up on the other side. justin has said he doesn't want a two stage deal. a failure at stake is not terribly high.
there are 11 people on social media staying up all night and tweaking nonstop. many of those are in iran, watching for good news. ultimately, there is no political price to be paid for iran if, in fact this ends with a very vague statement. bob said the clinical price will be much higher on this and. it is an easy round for the iran ians to inflict a wound on their adversaries across the table. i would also just that the issue of sanctions has been underplayed in our focus option of the deal -- in our own conception of the deal. we talk about centrifuges in washington over the past couple of years. everybody, i think has gained a better understanding not as much as bob, but the understanding of what a timeline might entail. but the sanctions regime is far more equally comforted.
-- equally complicated. how to coordinate their unraveling that is beneficial to the iranian economy, i believe has been one that they are playing catch-up on. over the past 14 months, with the imitation of the interim agreement, we have seen that simply signing a deal does not bring factories to iran, it does not open the floodgates of investment. it does not free of the transactions locked because of u.s. measures. they have come to the party late but do not want to -- that is why some of the issues that really want front and center in the agenda of this
negotiation are emerging to become roadblocks at this late stage. thanks. >> well, you just heard the view from tehran. now the view from the united states. i'm willing to talk about two topics. first of all, public opinion as a frame for these negotiations. secondly, more specifically, possible action in the congress over the next few months. let me make four points about public opinion. first of all, stepping back from iran and looking at american's attitudes towards the world in a general. in the past 18 months, there has been a notable shift in public sentiment. a shift towards rising concern
about american national security. support for increased military spending stands at the highest levels late 2001. it is by an astonishing margin of 2-1 americans are not willing to support -- are willing to support the insertion of u.s. ground forces to the middle east to defeat isis if that is seen as militarily necessary. we have moved, i believe, is what is called a post-post-iraq world of national security. in the same way that in late 1979, we moved into the post-post=-vietnam era that the elections of 1980 revolved around to a significant extent. point two. this willingness on the part of the american people to moving
forward, t- -- to lean forward, to use force, is highly selective. that has erring on the topics of iran negotiation. although america continues to seek iran -- see iran as one of the arch-enemies of the united states, that is not changed in decades. americans do not see the red as a imminent -- do not seek iran as an imminent threat. they see isis as an imminent threat, not iran. that is crucial. there is massive public resistance to any course of action that would lead to military conversation with iran in the near future. -- military confrontation in the near future. the discussion has been swirling around me, although i did listen to it. we have been frantically
analyzing a new university poll that came out just this morning focusing on three key swing states -- ohio, pennsylvania, and florida. no one has been elected president for a long time without caring about at least two of the states. in those states, there is overwhelming support for the path of negotiation. in ohio, 73-17.8. in pennsylvania, by a margin of 76-15. so, there is indeed support for the ongoing negotiations with the islamic republic. and about 3 in 5 americans indicate their willingness to accept a deal along the lines that seem to be emerging in
recent weeks until the speed bumps that you just heard abo ut. once again, the swing state analysis 65%3$% florida. 65% in ohio. it's a test of intelligence is to keep two contradictory thoughts in your head at once -- here's the contradictory thought. americans are in favor of these negotiations and the kind of deals that seem to be on the table, despite the fact that they have no trust and confidence whatsoever in the government of iran. almost 2/3 think that iran isn't serious about addressing u.s. concerns. more than 3 in 5 saint iranians
are not negotiating in good faith. -- say iranians are not negotiating in good faith. a national survey came out last week that said many americans doubt that the emerging deal would prevent iran from developing nuclear weapons. yes to negotiations yes to the kind of deal that seems to be on the table, but no confidence in the iranians and no confidence in the deal. [laughter] let me move to my second topic -- congress. my hinge point is this -- there is very strong public support for congressional involvement in these iranian negotiations. but people distinguished sharply between a right way and they wrong way for congress to be involved. a strong authority -- strong m
ajorities disapproved of a letter drafted and then sent to the iranian leadership by the 47 republican senators. almost nobody thought that that was an appropriate action by the congress. on the other hand, and this is going to turn out to be crucial in the coming months, 62% of the american people leave that -- believe that congress ought to have the right to approve or disapprove any final deal that is put on the table. and this, when you look at it in a broader historical context, is not at all surprising. because at similar point in the actual or possible crucial decisions involving syria iraq, and the balkans, similar majorities of americans thought that congress should have the authority to disapprove or
approve the action. in this context what are the prospects when congress comes back from the easter passover recess on april 13, which is the real moment of truth not march 31? let me just review the bidding very quickly. as many of you probably know, on march 20, members of the house of representatives sent a letter to the president of united states defining their understanding of an acceptable deal. it have to be very long lasting it had two to absolutely block any uranian pathways to a bomb. -- iranian pathways to a bomb. it had to have transparency, and
interestingly, it had to take into account "iran's destabilizing role in the region." which was a direct cheek of the administration's effort to decouple the nuclear negotiations from iranian actions on the ground throughout the middle east. i predict that iranian actions in the middle east will become a major talking point when congress reconvenes, and there will be an effort the opponents of the administration's approach against these points that the administration worked so hard to decouple. this was so interesting in no small measure because we hundred 60 members of the house signed it -- 360 members houseof the house
signed it, including 2/3rds of house democrats. in that context, there may be a detailed majority for some significant legislation in the house after april 13. what about the senate, which has been the cockpit of serious legislative activity? i have, in this thick folder, a confusing swirl of pieces of legislation already drafted and introduced which i haven't read it so you do not have to. -- which i have read so you do not have to. in its essentials, this draft negotiation goes along three different tracks. track 1 very simply trying to legislate congressional involvement in the eventual
approval or disapproval of any final agreement that might emerge. second efforts to strengthen pensions in april --strengthen sanctions in april to reach a better deal than what would otherwise be attainable. number three, various strategies on locking were stripping -- blocking or stripping the president of his waiver authority to relax tensions at any time before any final deal has been approved. let's me, do a quick diagnosis of the options. when congress reconvenes on april 13, i believe that senator bob corker, who is the chair of
the senate foreign relations committee, and the lead sponsor of one of the key bills in this area, will proceed with his bill, which will establish congress's right to approve or disapprove within 60 degrees regardless of whether there is a framework agreement or not. corker ahhas make it very clear that he is deferred to democrats, deferred to president, he will wait no longer. i believe that is a very substantial vote. the last count was either 65 or 66 editors, very close toa a veto majority. if there is no framework agreement, there will be radical support for comfort sections along the line that senator bob kirk has introduced. i would conclude with the fact that recent, recent events in
the senate have dramatized the role of some senators. as you know, senator harry reid has made public his determination to stand down after his current term. which means that he be standing down not only as a senate, not only of the senate minority leader. and he has anointed and his rivals have accepted charles schumer of new york as the titular head of the democratic 30. -- senate democratic party. corker got into a heated argument with the white house when he signed still. it was described as he did on both sides.
senator schumer will play a critical role in the last two weeks of april in determining whether the senate in fact will insist, and insist successfully on a role for congress in the approval of any agreement. >> thanks to all of our speakers. that was my hope of how we would begin our conversation today. before i open it up to the audience i want to ask each of you a brief question. for bob, one thing that seems to be happening is that these are deadlines get pushed back a bit. from an american point of view is this a bad thing? if we are negotiating in a similar way to a year from now is kicking the can down the road something we should be happy to live with, because the alternatives are worse? bob: i think the end of march target date, was an artificial.
self-imposed target. i think it put excessive and needless pressure on american negotiators. i think it would have been better if the approach supported by the supreme leader as the end of june as a key target date. the interim deal that has been in effect since november 2013 has been much more advantageous to the u.s. and its negotiating partners than to iran. the interim deal has frozen in all meaningful respects iran's nuclear program. and it has retained most consequential sanctions. if anyone has an incentive to terminating the negotiations and the interim arrangement, it is iran.
that gave us some kind of leverage. i think it would be wise for us not to set any more deadlines but to be patient and use the leverage have to try and achieve a sound deal. >> suzanne, you mentioned this decoupling issue. bill mentioned it. one thing our allies in the region fear is that nuclear deal is part of the alignment between u.s. and iran. the u.s. is switching sides, effectively. i am sure the iranians are not thinking that quite that well, what are they decoupling as well? or are they hoping that with the success of the nuclear field will have an impact on water areas -- in waterbroader areas? suzanne: d decoupling issue is
an interesting one. it was the former administration that endorsed this decoupling white agreeing with the -- by agreeing with the european on p5 plus one on a framework of negotiating wholly on the nuclear issue. there is this very robust conspiracy theory which suggest that the president is all about trying to achieve an alliance with iran and switch teams. dropping our allies like israel in the state and have a new alliance with iran. that does not reflect with the administration is trying to do. -- what the administration is trained to do. there is a presumption that this is an urgent security challenge both to the region and to our primary allies in the region. that is the rationale for the focus as well as the sense that
there is an opportunity to make some progress. on the iranian side, i do not believe in the official political spectrum that there is a readiness. certainly not on the side of the supreme leader. i do not believe it is a security accuracy -- security bureaucracy. obviously, among the iranian people, there is an identification of the steel with a real step toward in this long-standing estrangement. it would be a profound note of optimism for many google or some kind of debtor relationship. -- for many who hope for some kind of relationship. in a way that obviously works to the benefit of the regime, despite the fact that the regime is not interested in, nor is it pursuing this deal.
>> as you know cannot part of the congressional letter was warning the iranians that there is a new election for president coming up. and that a new president might change the deal. let us assume that a republican wins the next election. what is your sense on what might change in terms of an agreement and how this might be -- what would be the same, and what would be different? is this bill: it depends on the legal framework behind it. i think one has to read the congressional letter in the context. so it is always a serious letter when a president of the united states alters or aggregate an agreement with the foreign
country. it is not a step any president will take lightly. there is a version of the legal doctrine that is very decisive that applies to foreign policy because the cost of the abrupt shift are typically significant. with that said, a i talk about two other d's briefly? namely, the deadline and decoupling. the administration, i think, did not establish the deadline because it wanted to, it established it because it had to . the administration has struggled and just has barely succeeded. maintaining control of the negotiation.
the price of that domestically is giving congress a clear sense that we will go this far, this long but no further and no longer. and i believe the administration would have had an unmanageable situation on its hands had it not established some sort of enter in the deadline. and that is why it is there. if the interim deadline passes and we reach april 13 and there is nothing that look like a framework agreement, just a very vague press release and unsettled issues, i think the administration will in part lose control of the situation. this is a game of high-stakes. with regard to decoupling, 2008 is one thing. i believe 2015 is another thing because the iranians are much more active in the region and
much more visibly active than they were even in 2008. i think with the rising visibility the stakes in congress have also risen, and i do not see any way the administration can prevent some relinking of the issues. >> with that i will open it up with a few caveats. first of all, for those of you watching remotely you can tweet questions to us at brookings. please wait for the microphone and identify yourself. yes you. >> i just want to thank you all for a very instructive and timely discussion. the only question i want to asked at the moment, do you
think iranians are correct there is no cost to them, given the political situation in the united states and the dramatic situation in the middle east? i would mention the situation in egypt with the president as what i would predict to be a harbinger of things to come. >> i think you are right, there is a cost to the iranians, but it is not a political cost for them. as a result, it is less significant for example, then appearing to a contravened the red lines of the supreme leader. if in fact this move does reenter giants -- r this move
doeseenergize an effort in the hill and intercede in one fashion or another, it complicates the picture tremendously, but iranians recognize they have little control over that and the president has little control over that. i don't know that from an iranian perspective the movement , that may happen as a result of the vague date meant is any more problematic than the movement likely to happen, even if there was a tremendously robust political framework that has been announced late last night. the differential from the iranian perspective is probably relatively limited. they know the congress will try to sabotage a deal. they know the president has limited ability to stop that and i think they see that playing out almost irrespective of how they manage the deadline. >> standing in the back. >> thank you. fantastic discussion.
susan, do you think if this is not settled by the end of june that this could lead to conflict , or war with iran? susan: i would call on my fellow panelists for their own opinion. i think all parties have overhyped this on the nuclear issue for many years. i think we have seen neither the bush administration, and certainly not the obama administration have been terribly trigger happy when it comes to dealing with this together issue. they have exerted an enormous amount of influence over the choices and options as a result of other forms in the course of diplomacy, whether it is economic sanctions regime or some of the other covert campaigns we read about in the press that have impacted the
decision-making calculus. so i do not believe the choice is between a deal or war. i think that is a political slogan to try to galvanize support for a deal. i believe once we walk away from the negotiating table, we're not likely to get back to a better position in terms of negotiating with iran. what we've seen is the longer this problem festers, the larger iranian nuclear program developed, and the greater the cost, both to regional security infrastructure, as well as the iranian economy and stability of the iranians state. i think that all sides lose and , all options immediately become on the table. the situation becomes more unstable without some sort of an agreement. >> if talks break down, the
immediate tool the u.s. will go to would be to try to ratchet up sanctions substantially. the success is to strengthen the sanctions will depends mckinley -- very differently depending on who is perceived to be at blame for breakdown. if the u.s. is seen as the party to blame. i think it will be hard to get members of the international sanction coalition to go along with us in strengthening the sanctions. also, even if we were able to get stronger sanctions, the question is would it have the desired impact of getting a -- iran able to get concessions they have not been able to make for a year and a half now.
it is right problematic. unless iran is to be seen for a breakdown, i think it will be hard to shift the balance that would get iran to make concessions. at that point, options begin to narrow. at that point, military options become more thinkable. >> foreign policy association and foreign affairs. i would like to bring it back to the current situation in yemen. which would the saudi prefer, and iran that has nuclear weapons but has its economy shoveled even if they benefit or a iran that has sanctions based out and has a better economy but no nuclear weapon?
my second question is, if yemen becomes the newest failed state, do you expect the possibility that the united states will mediate between iran and saudi arabia knowing that a prophet -- possible deal could be reached? >> i will ask you to take that when focusing on how iran sees the situation and what saudi arabia wants. susan: i think the fear is without reform of the foreign policy and regional policy in particular. and -- an iran reintegrated into
the international community that is able to export as much oil as it can produce in repatriate the revenues from the exports is one that is deeply disturbing for the rest of the region. because there is really no evidence a nuclear bargain is likely to alter iran's regional interests or population. we have seen from past experience that iran has a transactional approach to this kind of diplomacy. it has very much decoupled the -- it's nuclear strategy from the rest of its policy. i think from the perspective of the region, there is also added concerned that they do not trust the deal anymore than the american people do. they are widely convinced iran will reach nuclear capability irrespective of the outcome of these negotiations. for that reason they prefer as much pressure on iran or as long
as possible in hopes of altering the trajectory within the region. >> >> yes? >> chris bidwell, my question is in regards to sanctions. i want to dissect between u.n. sanctions and u.s. sanctions, as well as maybe the state banking regulars of new york sanctions read what i heard bob say, and many others said, does iran need relief from the u.n. sanctions or do they need relief from the financial sanctions. if so, are they asking for the wrong relief?
i was hoping you could resolve this conflict. >> i think the most consequential sanctions are the u.s. and european financing and oil sanctions. if those are suspended early on even if they are not listed in terms of statue, that would be the greatest boost to iran's economy. they want that. i think they could get that. the u.n. sanctions, the sick earlier -- security council sanctions have a symbolic importance. this is the international community posing strong punitive measures against them. they would like these gone for political reasons. from the u.s. perspective, the u.n. sanctions are important the reason you alluded to, the
u.n. sanctions include restrictions on iran's import of critical cereals that could be used in nuclear and missile programs. use -- the u.s. and its partners do not want to see these relaxed down the road. >> yes you. >> i am a fellow at georgetown university. my first question is for dr. maloney, you mentioned iran is seeking reintegration into the system and are trying to recoup the revenue they have lost and being able to conduct a transaction. thanks in part to sanctions, there is a big constituency in iran revolves around sanctions. we saw this type of
protectionist economic thinking reflected in the speech. so we also see continuing escalation in terms of the activities at the regional level. to what extent is this about getting sanctions relief versus moving toward global reintegration? >> i am going to try to hold people to one. susan: when i say reintegration, i mean primarily reintegration into the international mutual -- financial community. obviously there is a dimension to this that is subject to iranian pride and dignity and the sense that i think we very deeply felt during the years that management of the country has led to its pariah status in a fashion that was simply unacceptable to most of the political establishment. this may seem comical, because iran has always been something of a pariah.
but the rest of the world did not in fact treat a wrong -- iran in that fashion. that was significant in the way that they dealt with the world. i believe the primary goal is the ability to do business as usual, as much as possible, and particularly with respect to the most consequential aspect, which remains the energy sector. >> thank you very much. my name is jennifer mcabee. you spoke about the possibility of aggregating the deal among two leaders. really there is talk of just one. i was wondering if anyone has a view from beijing or moscow,
, we occasionally hear about france. if anyone could enlighten us about the rest of themm? bob: it is clear the russians and chinese have been less demanding of a ron in these negotiations. they would like to see a deal concluded and most deals the u.s. and a ron would agree to would be acceptable to both china and russia. in terms of continuing the field. after it is been concluded and implemented, i think the russians and chinese with very strongly want to see this deal perpetuated for a long time. that is one of the concerns, if we begin to see evidence of iran cheating or nibbling at the edge of compliance, some of our current p5 plus one negotiating
partners would take the deal, let's pursue this, let's investigate this but let's not be too >> to pull the plug on this agreement. it is a concern that we may be under pressure to tolerate iranian noncompliance. i think the chinese and russians also have a stake in them not getting nuclear weapons. they have a stake in ensuring up they meet obligations as well. >> all of the domestic political pressures would be in the other direction. i suspect those pressures would trump, especially with relations between the united states and russia and the current condition. susan: i wanted to chime in on this issue to reference something bob mentioned earlier, which is the remarkable
coherence within the p5 plus one. the united states has had a very lonely position and struggled to gain support of the precious allies and moments of crisis for applying pressure to iran. in fact, what we have seen is not just a robust and durable u.s. european partnership, but good cooperation from the other members of the premier five un security council which is , particularly remarkable because we are in a time of really difficult relations bilaterally with russia, and yet, the cooperation holes. there are a lot of rumors now about some distinctions within the p5.
but the fact that we have made it this far without a breakdown is important. it really should guide how we move through here. i think that is not fully appreciated within the congress in the way that it should be. if you simply compare the ability to impact outcomes over the course of the past few years as a result of the cooperation with the way we struggle for many years before, we should understand the value of the coalition, and the policy should be framed around sustaining it. >> having said that, in the congress there is a sense that we have been held hostage in some respects to the imperatives of maintaining the coalition and also, the single-minded focus on the nuclear talks talks that we have been debarred or felt ourselves to be debarred from taking stronger action against iranian adventuresome in
the region that we really do not like. this is a sworn it with two edges, -- sword with two edges and i think members of congress , are fingering one edge rather than the other. >> thank you very much. i write the mitchell report. i want to asked bills to come back to one of the points in his opening remarks. that was while there was widespread support for actions against isis and the deal with iran the supposed deal. that americans see a sharp difference between between the national security implications
of isis as opposed to iran? if i understood you correctly, they see it as a direct threat to national security. they do not see iran as a direct threat. i want to asked you are they , right? >> i will give you a metaphysical answer. that is it depends on what you mean by national security. when americans think about national security, average citizens think about direct threats to themselves and people like them. i cannot stress to strongly the impact of the isis videos on american public opinion. i think, depending on how things go in next 10 years, we may look back on those videos and say they were to this decade the soviet invasion to afghanistan
to the late 1970's. you can really see public opinion turn on a dime. if they are capable of doing this sort of thing to people just like us, not special forces , but average people in the wrong place at the wrong time, then none of us is safe. however far-fetched that may sound, it has a very powerful hold on public mind. i think in a broader perspective the outcome of the effort to alter our relationship with iran will turn out to matter even more than isis. there is no way of persuading the american people of that right now, and therefore, no way of persuading the american people at this juncture that
military force is an acceptable option. >> with regard to war with iran? aren't we already at war with them? isn't sabotaging a country an act of war? that and along with the assassination in iranian nuclear scientist makes it acceptable. does the president have authority to commit acts of war against iran? >> anyone want to take the broader question on? bob is the logical person. bob: i think you need to make distinctions between various
hostile acts. i think using cyber warfare, other kinds of course is very different from bombing nuclear facilities. i don't know what more to say. >> suzanne, thank you of your almost comprehensive analysis. one thing that was missing -- >> could you identify yourself? >> i'm sorry, i am from the university. one thing that was missing in your analysis with the upcoming parliamentary elections. i was wondering how the fear they would not be able to convince the iranian people how the deal made their lives any better, particularly if they do not feel the effects of sanctions relief, how will that
affect the parliament elections, and whether that fear is something negotiators have in mind when they are fishing for rapid sanction relief? thank you. susan: i think the elections themselves are important and will be interesting to watch but i do not think it is any one particular election that drives negotiating behavior. you allude to an important concern on behalf of the part is there has not been a trickle-down effect in any significant fashion as a result of the interim agreement. there has been an improvement in the economic situation, largely as a result of better management techniques by the rouhani team he put in place, but there has not been a vast amounts of new investment or growth in jobs and this is going to be a real concern for the entire leadership, and certainly those who want to sell the platform at
the election, at the ballot box, because it will take time. it will be very gradual. there has been a sense among many that rouhani came forward spoke in very forthright and at the time unprecedented fashion in favor of a better relationship with the world. he signed a deal. he spoke to president obama, something no prior iranian leader had done since before the revolution comes so all of these actions and totality as well as the efforts to reach out warrant some reward. warrant some and to besiege -- to the siege the country has experienced over the course of the past five years in particular. there is a frustration that in fact why have we not seen that
. i do not see at turning against rouhani at this stage. i think he is still given a certain amount of running room. i think we all should be a -- b concerned about a situation where they find themselves with a population that does not see any benefit from the diplomatic outreach, because what we've seen in the past is a shift in the elected politics can have an impact on foreign policy and embassy. -- diplomacy. not direct, but certainly one that can be very problematic. that was the hangover very unpleasant for the international community. >> i am karlton stivers with the international nuclear law association. the proposed arrangements for verifying compliance by the
iranians with any agreement depend largely on the application of i aea safeguards. in my view the administration feels to manage this, largely because of resources and parts of its own agreement in the safeguards.. i wonder if any of the speakers have a perspective on whether or not the safeguards can be relied upon to clearly demonstrate they are complying? bob: carl, you are probably followed the monitoring of the interim joint plan of action and the obligations under the joint plan of action go considerably beyond what would be necessary to monitor the additional protocol. going to uranium mines and
mills. going to workshops that produce components of centrifuges and so forth. they are in an area beyond a normal verification mandate, which is good, and they seem to have done a very efficient job and have had to report on a monthly basis on the compliance. they have reported they have been complying. the comprehensive deal would be more ambitious. it would probably require many more sites, more intrusive inspections, access to military installations and some kind of managed access basis, so it would be stressful and expensive, but members of the iaea states have been willing to provide the resources to meet the demands of the verification. i think they would step up under a comprehensive deal.
i think the performance of the agency under the interim deal give every confidence they could perform effectively under comprehensive review. >> i would like to give our last >> i would like to give our last question to the panelists. you have been publicly quoted in recent days to the effect that the parent iranian old back in the willingness to -- it is not just one detail among many. it is imposing some very significant problems for the overall regime we were trying to create. why did think the iranians did it assuming that there was a pull back? that there is something previously agreed to and
assuming that the iranian stand firm on their new position, what would be needed to compensate for her the withdrawal? >> it is a critical element. it goes into the calculation of how much breakout time you have. if you want restrict the amount of enriched uranium, he had to get a much lower centrifuge. the becomes much more problematic. have the iranians agreed, it is unclear. a senior russian told me that there was an understanding which in russia and iran. that iran would ship out. i've spoken to a number of americans who seem to have been operating on the assumption that it was part of the deal.
if it was part of the deal, why did they back away? we do not know. maybe it is time to go. they took a tough position on this and maybe they could bargain for something else. maybe that iranian team found out that it would be tough to get this. just -- i participated in the negotiations in 2009 where that you iranians first agreed to ship out 80% of their mixed uranium to russia. within two weeks after that agreement, i was there in the room when they didn't, they were not prepared to do it. the iranian negotiating team -- a number of iranians are saying we cannot allow any of this
precious enriched uranium produced to leave the country. it is conceivable that they ran into -- they do not want to part with this the serial which has very little value frankly but anyways, it is unclear if they stick to this position, i don't believe the u.s. has given up on getting them to agree to ship the material out. if they stick to this position there are alternatives to one is to convert it into a powdered form. it has to be converted back. if there would be a debate on how quickly you could reverse that process. one would say that is not adequate. it could be converted quickly. another is to die alert -- dilute it.
this would be a better solution. how feasible it is, how much that you iranians would be repaired, and they will continue to enrich. they would have to constantly enrich diluth. why should we go to the expense of doing that? there are alternatives. i'm sure there are alternatives i haven't thought of. i'm sure they will be working that problem today. the best solution in my view would be for the iranians to do what they previously agreed to. >> one word. from what i understand they could just sees of the negotiations -- this position is representative of the way that they iranians have approached
the development of a formula for dealing with enrichment, a have agreed to when peace of the puzzle. as soon as you move to the next one, the first part of their agreement begins to collapse it there is this concern about the negotiating tax fix. it goes beyond even the complexities of dealing with the stockpile itself. it goes through the liability there making a table and this needs to be an incremental process by which many aspects are resolved and then come together to form one overall agreement. >> piercy. -- thank you. i think we all learned smarter -- feel smarter after this hour and a half. thank you for the excellent presentation. [applause]
>> house speaker john boehner and a delegation of lawmakers are in the middle east during the congressional break. speaker boehner met with that israel prime minister benjamin netanyahu. they spoke with reporters. here is a look. >> mr. speaker, it is great to see you. your visit is an opportunity for me to thank you and your colleagues and both houses of congress and for both sides of the aisle for the warm welcome you gave me in the u.s. capitol.
today it is my great pleasure to welcome you and your delegation to jerusalem, the capital of the state of israel in the capital of the jewish people for 3000 years. your visit here is testament to the historic and enduring by an -- bonds that is founded upon our common values, should commitment to liberty, any all rights for all. this alliance of values has common interest. those common values and interests are clearer than ever. the middle east is plagued by anti-western antidemocratic, anti-americans extremism. brutal beheadings.
shackles. building intercontinental missiles to reach america. this violent and unstable region and fanaticism is exploding. one ring remains rocksolid -- our friendship. our alliance. it makes both our countries stronger. it makes both our countries they for. it is thank her for our shared hopes for peace and stability in this region. let me use this opportunity of your visit to reiterate something that i have said before, but needs to be said again and again. the people of israel know that we had no better friend in the world than the u.s. the american people should know that they have no better friend
in the world than the state of israel. you are one of 12 children. he came to the right place. [laughter] we are the descendents of the 12 children of jacob, also known as israel. welcome to israel. welcome to jerusalem. >> thank you. let me say how happy am to be in israel. our delegation has spent the last five days throughout the middle east. regardless of where in the middle east we have been, the message has been the same. we cannot continue to turn your i away from the threats that face is all of us. as you said, the bond between the united states and israel are as strong as ever. our two countries cooperate on
many levels. the bonds between our nations are strong. they will continue to be strong. it has been a historic trip. historic opportunity to be here in israel at this time. let me take a moment to say congratulations on your reelection. >> the hard part begins now. [laughter] >> the elections are always the easy part. but we're happy to be here. >> thank you. it is a pleasure to see each and every one of you. i would like to offer you some lunch. >> good. i'm hungry. [laughter] >> coming up come a discussion on u.s. preparedness or a
biological or chemical disaster. mike rogers talks about the goal of congress in bio defense preparedness. that is followed are the appearance of james foley, a freelance reporter killed by isis last summer. >> national council on u.s. relations hosted a conference on violence in yemen. speakers included the saudi arabian abbasid are to the u.s. and a congressional research service of human specialists. see it live on c-span. thursday, and wrote michael rogers -- admiral mike rogers speaks at the cyber security technology summit. we will bring you coverage of
his remarks at 12 15 p.m. eastern on c-span -- 12:15 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> the c-span cities tour has partnered with cox communications to learn about life in tulsa, oklahoma. >> his very much more than that. he was born in 1912. we are very proud to have his work back in oklahoma. where we think it belongs. he was an advocate for people who were disenfranchised. people who are migrant workers during the dust bowl era. they found themselves in california literally starving. he found this vast difference between those who were the habs and have's -- haves and h avenots. >> a very few songs of his own. we have a listening stage and
that features 46 of songs on his own voice. that is what makes the recordings he did make so significant and important to us. ♪ this land is your land ♪ ♪ this land is my land ♪ ♪ from california to the new york islands ♪ ♪ from their what would force -- redwood forests ♪ >> on c-span 3. >> wednesday, democratic senator bob menendez of new jersey was indicted on 14 federal corruption charges. the charges stand from a two-year investigation into the senator's dealings with a florida ophthalmologists. according to the indictment, the senator allegedly accepted close to to ladle's worth of gifts and campaign contributions in exchange for using his senate -- $2 million worth of gifts and campaign contributions.
senator meant that this professed his innocence, calling the charges politically motivated and he has pledged to remain in office and will fight the charges. [applause] >> please, thank you. >> we support you! >> for nearly three years, i have lived under a justice department cloud. today i'm outraged that this
cloud has not been listed. raised the executors at the justice department's were tricked into starting this investigation three years ago with false allegations by those who had a political motive to silence me. but i will not be silenced. [cheers and applause] senator menendez: i am confident at the end of the day i will be vindicated. they will be exposed. this is a press conference. i appreciate if you would -- [cheers and applause] withhold. thank you. senator menendez: i began my career fighting corruption in city government.
i totally complained about illegal financial dealings in my city until the fbi investigated in the u.s. attorney filed corruption charges against the mayor and others. i was called to testify for the prosecution. i received death threats. i wore a bulletproof vast for a month. that is how i began my career. this is not how my career is going to end. [cheers] senator menendez: i have always conducted myself in accordance with a law. i have always stood up for what i believe is right. i fight for issues i believe then, the people i represent and the safety and security of this country every single day. that is who i am, i am proud of what i have accomplished. i am not going anywhere. [cheers]
senator menendez: i am angry and ready to fight. today contradicts my public service career, and my entire life. i am angry because prosecutors at the justice department don't know the difference between friendship and corruption, and have chosen to twist my duties as a senator and my friendship into something that is improper. they are dead wrong and i am confident they will be proven so. i am gratified to live in a country where prosecutors' mistakes can be corrected by courts and juries, and i ask my friends, colleagues, and the community to hold their judgment and remember all the other times when prosecutors got it wrong. people of this great state
elected me to serve and represent their interests in the united states senate and that is what i have, and will continue to do. a matter how long it takes to clear my good name. new jersey is my home. i intend to continue to fight for it. please excuse me as i say a few words in spanish. [speaking spanish] [cheers and applause] [speaking spanish]
i wish you a good easter and passover. [cheers and applause] >> the blue-ribbon study panel had a meeting on affect his preparedness, response, and recovery of biological and chemical threats. a professor expressed he concerns with the u.s. approach to dealing with such threats. his remarks are in our. -- an hour. >> ladies and gentlemen, mayor's effect, dating our requests to keep everything on its schedule. we still have quite a bit of ground to cover. grateful for your willingness to help us keep to the schedule. our luncheon speaker -- many of
you know him. he is a professor of health policy and management at columbia university. is the director of the national center for national preparedness. we invite him to share his thoughts with us. i have been working with them since my days in the white house. give us the benefit of your thinking. yes, sir. if you would please. we have a key questions from the panel. >> looking forward to it. i appreciate the opportunity to be here. i have known many people in this room for quite some time. there have been issues and struggles together. i want to keep my remarks pointed and specific.
i'm a person with a half empty glass. just forewarning. a half empty glass. full disclosure. i think about disaster. as in the u.s. america was attacked by terrorists on the very day of new york city may oral and american election. clearly, the not entirely expected acts had a great loss of life. it was shocking enough for all of us.
if that was former prevalent in other nations other than our own. we were observers from afar. yes, we had the oklahoma city bombing. but this extremist violence by evildoers from other countries didn't happen here. whether sung and consciously or not -- sound in consciously not -- the logistics and the quarter nations in the unmanageable scenario of three jumbo jets was in the rum of a mediocre bruce willis movie. but it wasn't. was a real wildly imaginative terrorist attack that shook the nation and the world. who could of learned and applied a lot of lessons from that attack. but in my view, we had
experiences that did not turn into real lessons. lessons did not trench -- change policies are the way we prepared for subsequent events. seven enough, that is true for most of the disasters are experiences. we have made progress. we are nowhere near where we should be at this point. everyone of these events that we know are certain will be referred to as wake-up calls and have been far more suggestive of alarm clocks with very successful snooze buttons. there is intense trauma and media coverage followed by promises to prepare or respond better the next time. when the cameras leave, we hit the snooze button and just back off into complacency and not changing as much as we should.
i guess that is maybe human nature on some level. out of all the lessons not really learned about disasters since 9/11 do have to respond to major anthrax attacks were the deep water oil breakdown, the most important thing we feel to do is learn to think about disaster readiness was sufficient imagination and an appropriate scale. it is not that improvements have an innate. yes, in spite of the horrible germanwings tragedy, i think we did the right thing here we did it be well. 10 years later, it is still ongoing. it is still far from completed.
radio and communications technology challenges can she greeted -- contributed to hundreds of risk on dave's -- hundreds of responders. years later responders, including firefighters rushed to the d.c. metro system and couldn't communicate from the tunnel in its on the surface. really? couldn't communicate. some might disagree. it could replicate the global disaster, like the spanish flu 1918. even though we saw volumes on terms of what we need it to do it did not show me a large american city that has prepared
and sustained its health and public health systems for such a calamity. no plans and scratch the surface of how to to ensure that pipelines and supply chains for food and water and medical needs during a massive academic -- epidemic at scale that could be disunity properly in a timely way. locally and nationally and may be locally. what are those impacts? how are we going to cope with those? who is planning to deal with them? these are the things that i worry about. it is one of the reasons i have a limited social life and why my wife doesn't want me talking about work at home. [laughter]
i do want to talk about some of the things i have considered among the important barriers. it is all in my mind an important factor. about finding, and want to make one point -- funding come i want to make one point. we cannot define what we mean by prepared. how could we fund something that we cannot define? what do we mean by a prepared city or a prepared statement even a prepared hospital? we simply do not know the answer to that. in fact, i would dare say i