tv Road to the White House CSPAN May 18, 2015 1:00am-2:01am EDT
funding is criminal activity and controlled areas. it takes a lot of money to keep the lights on in those areas, so a lot of the funding goes there. in regards to the outside areas that is where we are seeing without requiring a lot of money to buy a plane ticket to travel to a nearby country to make your way into isil controlled area. because of that, it makes the investigation that much more complex. we are talking not of thousands of dollars but in many cases hundreds of dollars. the uniqueness by which isil operates in a decentralized way in which they operate, allows people to have that ease of sending the smaller numbers. what we do see, as you mentioned , is the atm withdrawals. and you mentioned wires. those are specifically the types of information that we share with our banking partners, what to be alert for.
again, we realized that there are perfectly legitimate reasons why individuals from u.s. banks would be withdrawing money in iraq, syria, or neighboring countries. there are perfectly legitimate reasons for them to send wire transfers. it is the combination of that information that banks provide with other intelligence that really paints the picture for us. so it is not necessarily just one piece of the puzzle. >> right over here. mr. roberts: -- >> on catch onto one set of words that you used. you mentioned that hundreds may be exposed to material here in the united states, maybe thousands.
that's a lot more than has been publicly discussed in the past. you have been involved in what many of the discussions about what role the united -- the government will take. and i ask you where that conversation is right now. how does the fbi feel about working with community groups, doing interventions, the role of state and locals as opposed to the fbi. mr. roberts: we have worked with each other for a few years now. with regards to those numbers the hundreds or thousands, that was a quote our director last week. is that potential of the campaigns that can reach hundreds or thousands of individuals at a given time. we are not saying that there is thousands of people within the united states that are arming themselves today to conduct attacks, but that the reach and the breath is in the hundreds and the thousands.
that they can reach a potentially have reached. the potential is there, but again it is the distinction between the individuals who have necessarily read the materials and those that have read the material that are marching down that continued radicalization. with regards to your second point, obviously, i'm a big fan the community outreach that we do and you and i have done a lot of work together on that matter, and so i think that the fbi plays an integral role in countering violent extremism. but i think that we only have one seat at the table. i think the community leaders like yourself plan integral role as well. but i think it is everyone's job , and it is not just about violent extremism. we talking about all types of
extremism. i think that state and local as well as other communities plan integral part in that as well. the fact that we need to all work together with that kind of mission. the fbi doesn't get pay any additional money for the number of arrests we get, so if there is an opportunity for us to talk to individuals, as you and i both know, that may be walking down the wrong path. we certainly don't want to see the end game is always being an arrest. host: right here in the middle, please. scott from the new york times. a couple of questions about recruiting in the u.s.. one is that a lot -- is that in
a lot of these cases young people without much money suddenly turn up with $1500 to buy a round-trip ticket to turkey. i wonder if you have seen any evidence that this money is flowing back from isis central so to speak or where that money is coming from. the other question is, the fbi has put a lot of resources into stopping people from flying off to fight for isis. and i have heard people in minneapolis, for example, raise the question of why do you stop them, because you are creating -- that dottie --baghdadi said the other day, either come join us or carry out attacks at home.
are you adding to the pool of people that will carry out attacks at home by stopping them? mr. roberts: with regards to your first question, a lot of this is self-funded. the means by which we've seen individuals obtain this money is sometimes a simple as taking money from their parents about them knowing. there are many means by which they disguise the purpose for that money. that is another way individuals have retained -- have obtained that cash. with regards to your second question, they are threatened threat whether they are here or abroad. so our goal is to disrupt that threat. we certainly don't want is individuals that are looking --
i would argue that they're going over to train him to fight would increase the threat that they are today. so by preventing them from getting additional training whether they are a threat to u.s. interests or our partner interests abroad, would be a far greater threat to the united states. it becomes a decision point with regards to do we disrupt them now or disrupt them later. quite frankly, we are in the game of disrupting the earlier. host: if you are interested in more on that issue, i testimony -- i testified in front of the canadian parliament this week and about one third that testimony is about the problems and challenges that come from that kind of self finance.
>> mike sponder. in my world, this is public relations, if i was faced with something that required 99% of my investment, time, and effort i would maybe look at the 1% occasionally but i would never talk about it, i would never even publicly discuss it. you seem to -- is this political correctness when you mentioned muslim and other terrorists. is 199% in one -- is one 99% and one 1%, and if so, why mention them both in the same breath? mr. roberts: i don't the guy
actually provide a breakdown of it. we are concerned about all threats. the fbi counterterrorism division not only detects international terrorism but homegrown violent extremism and domestic terrorism. i couldn't give you a fraction or a percentage by which we dedicate but we are all threats. we have is a have our cyber division and our counterintelligence in our criminal divisions that have a whole different set of priorities. but within counterterrorism, a lot of our focus is on international terrorism based on the numbers. we have seen 100 disruptions in the last few years. i wouldn't say what our breakdown is, but obviously we
have to prioritize based on what we believe is the greatest threat to the united states. host: right here on the left, please. mr. roberts: richard from the world bank. -- >> richard from the world bank. i want to challenge your contention about the growing importance of countering the current terrorist threat from isil by way of looking at the finance. you yourself have described that comes at two levels. one is low-level operatives that may be self-funded, and the other one is, we have within isil an organization that controls territory and has resources and differs in almost every way from al qaeda. so is the current rules, laws and regulations, are they designed for another era and do we need to revisit them and look at how one can, or if one can
challenge these organizations on the basis of their financing? mr. roberts: i think what we talk about financing there are two aspects. we have a tactical level when we are talking let the foreign fighters and the self funding in that we definitely have the strategic level as we are talking about the more macrolevel approach to disrupting their finances. in those cases, when we are talking about that macro-level approach we work with treasury and state and evelyn l to disrupt that. as you mentioned -- state and everyone to disrupt that. i still is a bust of an organization. it gives us an opportunity to disrupt it in different ways whether it be coalition airstrikes. i think what we need to look at what they are talking about the financial aspect, it is a two-pronged approach. we need to disrupt it at the low level.
but then we have to look at the macrolevel. with regards to your comment not just where talking about counterterrorism but all criminal activity, transnational organized crime as well, we need to continue to look at the aml and try to readjust the. -- readjust those. >> cap board, -- pat bourn europe representative in the united states. one of the goals of isis and isil is to set up the caliphate and i think less to fit -- last december, a german journalist was allowed access and gave some open-source reports of a was happening in their. he referred to a security system , a social welfare system, a school system, which of the
embryonic signs of an economy and the formation of a state. and we have seen with other conflicts in the world that you can strangle an economy by economic sanctions probably as effectively as you can by military intervention. so my question from an eu perspective, and with respect to admiral rodgers the other day we said we are fighting the same enemy here. and probably the eu is more at risk from the amount of foreign fighters that are returning. in the financial sense, is there anything you would suggest -- we do have tftb and are working together with treasury, but i think in the macro sense it is important to have a coordinated policy and don't allow a terror state to form and join together in an economic forum. i would welcome your views on how we could increase our collaboration in that.
mr. roberts: unfortunately we don't have anybody from state or treasury here in regards to sanctions. but obviously, i think that our partnership with euro poll -- europol, with other organizations, is important in partnering with. this presents an interesting challenge. i definitely agree that it becomes a lot of effort targeting isis finances as a whole government approach. we are using every tool in our toolbox, whether it is sanctions or the tactical side. it becomes a whole of government approach. we do need to look at sanctions we need to look at the other avenues in which to construct --
the other avenues which they are fundraising. i think it is no one answer, it is really multipronged approach which we can disrupt their finances but that the tactical and strategic side. mr. roberts: as the former treasury and state person, i will say that i think we are seeing some of that. the financial action task force report on isil financing, one of the best and most deep -- tested most detailed reports done, was done slowly and trying to bring an xml from as many partners around the world as possible. not just the u.s.. this time, it wasn't just u.s., it was information from the arab states. just up the top my head, there are examples from the netherlands, from denmark, from finland, not just the u.k. or france. so we are seeing this kind of international cooperation.
>> of dave pollock, here at the washington institute. i understand that the current focus on isil, at the same time the prime state sponsor of terrorism in the world today continues to be iran. and there is a great likelihood, i think, that there is a result of a nuclear agreement that iran will get a signing bonus of $50 billion to $100 million in frozen assets. from the point of view of counterterrorism finance do you see this as a potential issue? mr. roberts: absolutely.
we are here to speak specifically about isil, but obviously as we're talking about isil we're only talking about one of the many threats we are tracking. obviously we track all state-sponsored terrorism as well and we are concerned about the financial aspects of all of it. already -- our role in regards to that is critical as well. i agree with you that we need to make sure that just because isil appears to be the greatest threat at the moment that we can't take the eyes of the ball of the other threats. >> so it is safe to say that in terms of your remit here as fbi agent, is much more likely to see terrorist groups engaged in fundraising, moving, transferring, then to see states abroad use the united states. that happens but it is probably less likely.
>> amid journalist. -- i'm a journalist. i was wondering what kind of pressure you're putting on countries, such as lebanon. every week there are millions of dollars that are smuggled through the airport to hezbollah and everyone knows about it. as well, for example, last year when cell was arrested that was linked to a qatari national and two people that were supporting isis. whatever of pressure can you put on these countries? mr. roberts: with regards to those, the examples that you gave, the fbi is obviously one player at the table here. it is us partnering with treasury and the state department to tackle the examples.
where you talked about the disrupted cell, obviously, i'm not sure the exact discussed at the moment, but it is something i can research and get back to you on. we played an article part when there is the fbi that is the lead or the dea or any of the other agencies that we are partnered with. again, as the previous kinnaman questioned a connection with regards to money flow there. but with regards to hezbollah as well, we are tracking the money there is well. mr. roberts: is this week's arrests in cedar rapids suggest as well. >> you see that one of the -- a
cash flow device from the selling of oil. what action and voice done to stop the buying of isil oil? [indiscernible] what efforts to stop these suppliers of weapons? mr. roberts: i can't really going to detail of the suppliers of weapons to isil, but with regards to the oil, obviously it is not just the fbi. the department of defense has a big role in this -- in the
disruption of their oil transport, and the united states government as a whole, not just the united states government but our partners as well, is tracking those routes. >> chelsea damon from the loopcast. oil is one of the top players for bringing in funds to the islamic state or isis. also weapons. could you going to some of the other means some of the illegal trafficking of individuals private in the community etc. and how do those plan with the countries neighboring, syria and
iraq, and how can the u.s. intervene as well as be a part of cutting off the funds as they travel. mr. roberts: as i mentioned, and take it for the question. with regards to bribes and extortion, taxation, is probably known as far as the looting of the banks and the hundreds of millions of dollars at isil has obtained through that within their control areas. it's also fairly well-known that they tax the local businesses by which they are able to derive those funds. with regards to new source of financing, the fbi doesn't play a major role within that. we would do so as that relates to individuals of interest targets of the fbi and be able
to assist other government agencies with their investigations. but we don't necessarily play a major role in that aspect of it. with regards to syria, turkey, and other neighboring countries obviously the fbi has partnerships through our legal attache program throughout the world. we do so with the engagement of the state department treasury, and other agencies in order to have a whole government approach to tackling whether it be the movement of people or items. we have one seat at the table, but it is really a multi agency multi-nation approach to identifying those paths first and then disrupting them. host: all the way in the back. thank you. >> sputnik international news,
russian press. you brought up the partnership you have with the financial sector. forgive me for being skeptical of this, but a lot of large players in the financial sector royal bank of scotland, credit suisse hsbc, have been key players in laundering billions of dollars of drug money, other illegal funds. it was a blockbuster reported 2014 out of the senate finance committee. i'm not sure what exactly happened with that. but how do you address the fact that -- i'm just assuming that those types of institutions wall street and european banking institutions are partnering with you. how do you address their come in my view, very poor track record?
mr. roberts: in regards to our role, we don't necessarily have a role with regards to their compliance with their lack of compliance in a couple of the examples that you mentioned. our role really is primarily -- primarily our points of contact within those institutions are the financial intelligence units or sometimes if they don't have an fiu, the compliance. it is a way to better inform them so they can improve. we realize that not everyone has had the same training level of talk about financial institutions. some of very advanced and proactive. some are doing their own targeting and proactive analysis with regards to terrorism financing and foreign fighters in a way ahead of the game.
the partnerships that i referenced is to try and bring everybody up to that level. if, by doing so, they learn best practices from the other partners in an environment similar to this, then that's great for us. it's not just about the terrorism financing. in our last meeting at the federal reserve, it was not just about terrorism financing. we brought it experts from our counterintelligence division from our criminal division, from our cyber division to better inform the banks and hopefully through that, we can play a little piece of making all the banks that much better when it comes to compliance and when it comes to our alertness. with regards to the examples that you gave, a lot of that is not just terrorism. there is a lot of criminal activity that flows through banks and sometimes the banks
need to be better at what they do but often it comes as a result of us pointing things out to them. mr. roberts: if i could just follow-up, because there are a lot of instant best -- a lot of investigations into banks around the world including russian banks. when you talk to the federal reserve and others, what is your advice about improving bank filters. in other words, one of the things that we try and do is to try and help the private sector establish more effective filters for the types of illicit activity we are seeing and that we are understanding they are seeing from their reporting. but there is a difference in terms of how isil financing is happening here in the west. how we improve the bank filters? mr. roberts: that is key to what we are doing. we're trying to improve their
business rules. we don't -- what we don't want and it's not just about the private industry. we don't want to rely only on historical information or on charities. we want to make them smarter. providing that kind of key points to what they are already doing helps their business rules and the goal is that perhaps they don't do 800 suspicious activity reports and a time frame but maybe only 250, but those only to a -- but those 250 are more detailed. >> jeff smith at the center for public integrity.
i did bit confused despite all you've said so far about how you can remain optimistic about making inroads given that there is a lot of self financing the flows of money are quite small and they are not going to be large enough to be reported matter how carefully you fine-tune the bank rules. how are you actually intervening? what are you doing to actually intervening to prevent people from traveling and get the training you want them to do. it seems like a wise thing to do and the training that you do of banks. in this circumstance, which of all small amounts of money people who self identify, who travel in get money from their relatives and families, how can you make an impact? mr. roberts: what we need to
understand is that i'm talking specifically about the financial intelligence aspects of this. this is only one piece of this pie is we're trying to make the impact. we talked about the human intelligence, single intelligence in other avenues earlier. we have people in the public that come forward when they have individuals that they are aware of that may be discussed in a smallthe financial intelligence is just one flavor of this that helps us paint that picture. it is just one of the colors. the other intelligence, the general concern to see something, say something. often, we have the public, not just the financial sector, advising us of ways that are efficient. there are things we can receive from our foreign partners, as
well, that will paint that picture. to clarify for your sake and for the folks here, what i have specifically talking about is the financial aspect. from my perspective, knowledge is power, and the more knowledgeable we make our financial partners, it could be a huge component we are missing. that financial intelligence could be that piece of the puzzle that we are missing. i am a normally optimistic guy. host: there is also an element of developing information. there is a myth out there that following the money is only effective at a certain level large enough to have a footprint, but you can have elements where you are seeing certain types of change. to follow up to the last question we need to lower our reporting thresholds in terms of how much money is considered suspicious.
when i go to australia and meets with austrack, they have 100% insight into every transfer that goes in and out of australia, which is probably less than what goes in and out of new york in a month. but the current debate is that we need to be lowering significantly the $10,000 reporting threshold. mr. roberts: a question from the world bank, as well, regarding our aml standards. i think we need to constantly not just look at the financial rules, but electronic communications in other roles. the world is ever changing and we need to constantly look at the existing rules and assess whether or not they satisfy the growing need. we are talking about the $10,000 rule, or whether we are talking
about store cards or other methodologies by which people are able to easily give money. we need to constantly look at the existing -- host: i have prepaid cards right here. a question here in the front. >> my name is ron taylor. i am the senior feller at the george washington center for cyber and homeland security. i had a couple thoughts. one is that the financial enterprises a global enterprise. for me, using amounts of money as a filter -- there is a disconnect. i want to know what the money is doing, i don't necessarily want to know how much money there is. back goes back to what you said your mission was, and i will put it in slightly different times. -- terms.
the mission to me seems to be identify in disrupt the sources of the money that enables sustaining the ongoing violent behavior. we want to eliminate that behavior so we have to find the money sources and disrupt that, hopefully eliminate them. that seems like the mission. so the question is -- what about russia? what about putin? what about the sources that come out of there, indirectly sustaining the violent behavior? what about the criminal elements that operate out of russia? what about the umbrella countries that support that kind of activity? he was tracking, who was disrupting? mr. roberts: great question. to clarify my earlier statement with regards to the money and financial intelligence is one aspect.
we are not simply looking at a wire transfer or atm withdrawal or transfer between bank accounts. it is that combination with the other intelligence we have, not just focusing on the dollar amount. as he pointed out, focusing on what it is used for. not only what it is used for but time. if we look at financial transactions overlaid with travel, or if we don't have travel information, that financial path can provide us with that travel. it is not necessarily focused on the dollar amounts precise, but iter se, but it is telling a story. with regards to the elements in russia, as i mentioned earlier our focus our sole focus is not necessarily iraqi in syria.
-- and syria. we are concerned with the european foreign fighters. are concern obviously is not just iraq and syria, not just europe we need to take a large luck at every threat, every potential threat. with regards to -- you made a great point -- with regards to relations. it is not to say that criminal organizations are funding terrorism. i think we can probably tell. but there are certainly avenues in which they overlap that allow for that collaboration to happen whether they are ideologically together or not. host: to the back please. there you go. >> kyle bertram, thank you. with regards the technological sophistication you touch on,
with social media campaigns, have you considered are given intentions to use crypto currencies for anonymous financing? mr. roberts: yes. [applause] [laughter] absolutely. much like matt talks about those prepaid cards. the crypto currency -- we as a government are starting to really take a look at crypto currencies. any source of funding, whether it is isil or any other international terrorist organization, if we wanted to see how they are funding any avenue -- whether it is a cash courier, money services, crypto currencies.
crypto currencies allow for a great avenue where you can transfer funds internationally with little or no oversight. we are aware of that and we are tracking that, and any support that anybody can give us is more than welcome. i will touch on matt's point with regards to prepaid cards. that is another avenue as well that we need to take a look at, and it is very difficult to track. it is easy to buy a prepaid card, load money, and you don't have to physically move it. you can e-mail or call or contact someone in another country halfway across the world and provide them with the numbers on that prepaid card and very easily move hundreds, thousands of dollars. host: saudi arabia offered an example of individuals related to isis, soliciting funds on twitter, moving the conversation to skype and instructing people to buy prepaid cards, and
provide isil with those numbers. tremendous amounts of value moves, not a dime through the formal financial system. yes? >> quick question. you just talked -- excuse me, you just touched on the idea of charitable donations. as we saw with al qaeda, do we see funds being transferred through charitable donations with isis? is that a big thing, small? what are we seeing on that? mr. roberts: thank you. i hate to -- what we need to look at is hundreds of thousands
of legitimate charities, but like any other international organization, and allows for the avenue of people to fund not just terrorist activity but also criminal activity. obviously we are cautious with regards to looking at charities because we don't want to paint the brush. any avenue by which individuals are able to move money, whether it be by charity business, front companies etc., would be an avenue for us to look at. provided the intelligence says it is fair. host: as a former government official i can be more blunt. there is no question that there is an increase in abusive charity in the past few years. a boomerang effect post 9/11.
we have done so much work not only cracking down on bad charities and abuse charity but working with the charitable sector. the financial -- if you just track the number of cases in the u.k., in france, here in the u.s. there is no question that we are seeing a rise in the use of charity -- in abuse of charity. people want to do good, and that gives an opportunity for people to use that as cover for not good things. to creates a vulnerability. it brings us back to a few years ago, working with the charitable sector again, and as we were discussing with the bank, trying to improve their filters working with charities to protect them from the easily abused in the context of a humanitarian catastrophe.
which brings me to -- in the back. behind the pillar, or in front of the pillar. >> western union is leaning more towards this qualitative analysis of data and we are doing less with thresholds and taking large amounts of data and trying to see what is happening with that. you mentioned having fewer stars, but if we are seeing issues that appear legitimate -- self-funded and small dollar amounts, look legitimate. if we are looking with large sets of data and we don't have the intelligence, how can we provide more quality sars without that intelligence? mr. roberts: that is a great
point, and i just saw an amazing presentation by western union the other day. my goal is not to have fewer sars but you have better quality sars. we still have 800 but they are of higher quality. i was just using that as an example. rather than having more based on less intelligence and less information, it does not give us a greater picture than having less that arm more directed. it is not to get less, but more. but of a higher quality, that we can push the information to western union. high command western union for how proactive they are in their financial analysis. mr. levitt: yes?
>> good afternoon. one question. the conundrum is with trying to counter the financing. what is touchable? with al qaeda, it was a different structure, you could track them across the world. what do you think is touchable out of the total assets they have? if you have a frame of reference -- 10%? 50%? mr. roberts: great question. i don't have a specific answer for you. with regards to the money they have within their holdings -- i am former imf. i don't necessarily have a specific number as far as what
we can tackle. and as i mentioned earlier, what it comes down to is that whole of government and partnership approach using every tool in the toolbox, whether using dod to tackle their oil and other things or through sanctions. much like other organized crime for the money that they keep, it is very difficult. as matt mentioned, it is when the money starts to seep out that as the avenue in which we can tackle it. mr. levitt: yes? >> thank you very much. do you have an estimation about the proportion of other sources of financing -- for example,
hezbollah? this compound of money flowing to isil. mr. roberts: i don't have the specific number to give you on the use of hezbollah, but i can tell you it is an avenue, and historically has been. as we touched on, prepaid cards and virtual currencies -- the gentleman in the back talks about -- it just becomes one avenue. transferring that money versus a lot of new avenues. we have the introduction of electronic h-- >> we don't know what you -- >> what our prepaid cards -- in
a nutshell, a prepaid card is where you go to cvs and buy a card. of visa card, amazon, and there is a value on that card. you can give the card or give a number on the card and they can use it anywhere. you go to a store, it you give money and you get the card. that card now has value and you can give it to someone on the other side of the world on a phone call or e-mail. they can use it as cash anywhere in the world. you go to cvs and there is probably 30 different types of prepaid cards, including cards that are tied to a particular store. they just have a visa symbol that you can use everywhere. and moving money without -- an informal transfer system, very
old. it is there to be abused. it involves trust between people on two different sides of the world, but it has been used for lots of good purposes and has been abused. there is a lot of new and a lot of old. there is a lot of talk about crowdsourcing or using crowdfunding. the financial action task force says it is a concern and i will read this to you -- "i ssil has encouraged donations and conducted a marketing campaign in a manner that is consistent with industry standards established by major crowdfunding companies. " most people read that and here vulnerability. i am former fbi, former treasury. high here opportunity. in what ways that an opportunity? mr. roberts: crowdfunding,
crowdsourcing, the end line campaign -- the online campaign can be utilized by legitimate charitable organizations are any other organization that could do a marketing campaign. isil uses social media. if you don't want to travel or if you are not in a position to travel not in a position to join the fight, you do what you can to help the organization. by doing so, they have hashed out this marketing campaign by which they are asking folks to fund them through social media sites. i agree with you. they are not similar to their other social media campaigns and communications, spreading their propaganda. it gives us an opportunity to identify and target other individuals. mr. levitt: yes, sir.
>> mike wiley. i have a question about your private sector partnership. i understand that the primary mode of communication that is suspicious activity reports, which often takes a fair amount of time to compile. when you are dealing with matters of financial crime and fraud, emergency may be less so than terrorist activity. can you comment on your relationship with the bank relating to urgent matters? mr. roberts: sure. our banks -- the world is flat, right? a lot of information out there. our banks -- i could talk about western union and our partnerships they are very proactive in what they do. in the cases of an attack, "charlie hebdo" for example
they are proactive in what they examine, quickly pushing out those sars. obviously we need to obtain records and file subpoenas or other information but we have a very good relationship with our partners. they understand the urgency and they are able to prioritize and give us information as quickly as they feasibly can. i have absolutely no complaints when it comes to an urgent matter. the ways and the time in which they give us information. it is really part of this whole campaign of why they are doing this operation. that allows them to understand what the current and emerging terrorism threats are so they understand the sense of urgency. mr. levitt: follow-up in the front. >> thank you.
i think it is very important to point out that we hear a lot of sharing the same threats that the u.s. treasury to our tftp program. we provided 60 leads to the french authorities while the hostages were still held in the supermarket and that is a matter of public record, it is not classified. we stand together on the same threat and complements to the u.s. authorities for that. not every case, but -- mr. levitt: that is a pretty amazing statistic. of thought question -- they were asking earlier about -- i wamam
wondering -- we don't have a one-size-fits-all approach throughout the country. for example, the three pilot project we have across the country -- a lot of this is happening online, the world is flat, but do we see different types of activities different types of groups? mr. roberts: i want a point when
we talk about our partnerships will. at the bureau has numerous outreach programs across all our programs. several other programs in which we are able to share information. but this is not a one-way, fbi stands up and provides information and everybody leaves at the end of the day and we move on. this is a dialogue, and every session that i have been out since i got here i have taken away and learned from those. as the lady from western union mentioned, we have learned from them as wellwell. we have as much to learn as we do to teach. i think that is a good leeway into your question. much like we have talked about
for a few years now, there is no one picture. whether we are talking about counter threat finance -- there is not just one model. i think if we get caught in one track we might miss another. the threat of funding terrorist groups -- we need to have a broad-based view and we need to look at all the options. it is across the board. sometimes people will borrow money from friends and family and not tell them why, sometimes it will take money from their parents. mr. levitt: we are focused on
isil for the right things but if you think about what is going on in yemen, there are reports that -- focus on isil, that it could be under the radar. mr. roberts: great question. having worked terrorism before 9/11 the threats have changed through the years. i can tell you that we are constantly making sure that just because we are looking at the threat in front of us that we are not looking at the threat to the left or right of us.
as our deputy director -- he touched on how we do that, and he touched on our prioritization process, by which we take a look at all the threats all the domestic terrorism threats, and we take a look at the threat the groups pose and their potential to act. we combine those and come up with an expanding prioritization of those threats. the primary focus of isil and their financing does not take our eye off the ball. we need to continuously be alert to that, because a lot of our focus on al qaeda, we did take our attention off other groups. luckily we have individuals that are threat based within the fbi, that look at all the threats and focus on a particular portfolio.
mr. levitt: where in that threat prioritization are -- but don't traditionally target us? if we could take a break from the cutting-edge, what about the old school? what about hamas, hezbollah? what is the status on what we are doing about them? mr. roberts: obviously, we continue to look at all of our groups. i can tell you, having worked those groups in the past, although a primary part of our career -- of my career was on al qaeda, we haven't taken our eye off the ball. we realize, in particular on hezbollah, the attacks that they have conducted.
it still raises a real threat to us and to our citizens overseas. by all means, we need to continue. mr. levitt: i promised you an individual who has not only tremendous expertise and knowledge and i think we have delivered. please join me an thinking jerry. [applause] thank you all for taking the time and have a great weekend. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> next, the internet and tv expo. after that, a discussion on the method of oil extraction hydraulic fracturing. then, house oversight hearing on the conduct of members of the secret service. >> tomorrow, former deputy cia
director michael morel speaks at the national pestress club. announcer: monday night on the communicators, members of congress on nsa collection of phone records, privacy and net neutrality. >> it authorizes the metadata of collection. or austan simply authorizes. last week we found out that the second district federal court agrees with the justice that the patriot act never authorized these programs. these programs argue legal. the nsa said these programs were authorized by section 215.