tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN August 13, 2015 11:00am-11:31am EDT
clear from the sanctions relief, from the way the white house is talking and positioning the deal the national debate, that this is intended to be transformational. it is intended to fundamentally reset our relationship with iran, iran's's relationship with i think that is speculative. i think that is hopeful. i would pump -- point out hope is not a foreign policy and think it is much more useful to understand the threat potential of iran as the result of the various provisions including the exclusion of the ballistic missile's element is not diminished. slow, but not diminished. jocpa isy think the having a ripple effect throughout europe and the international community area i think it took the russian 7.5 hours after the announcement of the signing july 14 to argue now threat has been
dealt with, there is no need for missile defense in europe. obviously that has not flown or not flown yet as a persuasive argument. one recent is because they help facilitate the exclusion of the iran missile folio from the scope of negotiations. the iranians insisted it was a unacceptable demand to put on the table. we caved. the russians assisted us, and now they are discovering the one thing they care a lot more about, the ability of europe to hold the strategic arsenal at risk is not going to alter in their favor as a result of the deal. is there are different permutations for how difficult this deal is, certainly for the iranians very favorable. i think some of iran's
international partner, which i put in china and russia, may find over time they are less a verbal. bruce: the gentleman in the back, and then you. [inaudible] i am interested in what we still have in congress over what proportion of the sanctions resume, arguably the most successful regime we have had. executivented 17 orders, major legislation since at least 1990. some have us presidential raver, some of presidential waiver, some don't.
especially the interfaces with the corker legislation. regardless of how the district ripple goes. i have somewhat different views. my sense is there is a couple of things to unpack here. first of all, the way the white house has talked about this deal , it has made it appear as if it is the binary choice. if congress decides to disapprove of the deal and detail that override, this is a past award. this is how secretary kerry has talked about it, the president talked about it last week at a speech at american university. i think it is a strawman argument, because obviously nobody wants war. i think it is worth noting everything i talked about with regard to the salutary benefits with economic and if it is perspective. it has not happened yet. does that happen until implementation day or thereafter. what you are looking at is
iranian. remember, what we're looking at is i has diminished person singr iran has diminished person sing power. this presumes an iranian robustness that is not visible, at least not visible yet. there is a lot you can do in many reasons to expect the day after a veto looks on -- a lot like today that, in which the iranians do not get the benefits. when wend point is that look at sanctions, you have to understand sanctions are qualitative different than they are in europe. here in congress they are far more complex. they deal not only with the new we're in proliferation for oil but terrorism and human rights issues with regard to iran.
a comprehensive iran and investment act of 2010, which i mentioned, best drawn as a kitchen sink in which all of these things go. nuclear issue most important, but not the only one. here i think congress has a lot of incentives to refocus if the deal does go through on the other link on which our regime of pressure on iran, legislative there is a hang up. as part of the terms of the jocp the administration has committed to preventing ancillary forms of pressure that will make the deal harder to implement. all of us, and maybe all of you has read as the administrative working actively against additional sanctions. that may be true, may not be true. we will have to see. my sense is that for congress
this is a gut check moment in constitutional prerogatives and a gut check moment in terms of how robust congress commitment is not only to nuclear sanctions but the other modes of pressure that we have and are still available to change iranian behavior. i cannot disagree certainly. i do take a slightly more skeptical view of the effectiveness of a congressional this verbal and veto overrides on the deal itself, because i believe, and certainly have been told in europe that the rest of the international community will not agree to renegotiate the deal. but i think the broader question whether congress challenges the president or not. addressesministration
the sanctions that remain in the law books in the next 60 months. that, to me, is the real question. i think regardless of what congress does, the administration will do its utmost not to fault the iranians sanctionsolation of until january 20, 2017. the big question, which is redolent especially to the u.n. and the good work you do every day is what happens with the , given thattration this administration is saying tons of norms of regulation, punching and restricting economic sanctions don't remains of the law books. feelext administration may less committed to giving iranians of past, even if congress approves the deal in the end. a rate have a very long
of weapons and tools in the sanction basket you can use and ask the administration to enact. that is one. the second thing is when you go through the measures and entities that will be listed on documentation, there is a lot of inconsistency in which the recommendations have been chosen. i want to give you one example. it may not be the sex just one, but i think it speaks to the problem. between 2011 and 2013, the united states sanction through treasury five iranian airline. iran air, and, a ro iranian tours. sanctioned,se were the one that deals with nonproliferation. two of them were sanctioned by executive order 133 24.
this deals with financial support for terrorists. when you read the motivation for designations of the five -- of the five airlines, all five involved in a variety of activities that included carrying weaponry and military personnel to and from syria and giving aid and support to the irgc. three of these five airlines had activity linked to nonproliferation, all i were supporting the syrian war effort and the irgc. one would assume all five therefore remain under sanctions. actually, three of them, the three sanctions are being removed. so one thing that congress can do is raise the pertinent into teamsnd ask why
and companies that have been supporting and presume to continue to support the irgc in the supply of weapons to terror ,rganizations in syrian regime violations of human rights, human were crimes and so on are going to be getting sanctions relief on implementation. you can go through these things and find a lot of such a able. i think that would be a very useful way to keep the administration's feet to the fire. we know when the next administration will feel as committed or less committed. >> [inaudible] will get this lady right here, then i will ask one from our online listeners.
>> this is serendipitous for the russians and could not keep communication lines open because they did not have money. yesterday there were russian warships. i ron would be the other side of that. over the past year and a half that it has been russian foreign policy that is animated by this risk taking with this. what you are looking at is russia attempting to revive the rules of the road, eastern europe or more so in the poor -- in the persian gulf. i think what you are looking at is both.
one of the main misconceptions we have with regard to russia is in.n has a desired everything suggests that is not true that he is engaging and opportunistic policy. at the gradual escalation of --mmetric restaurant suppression and the ukraine is due to lack thereof. this is very good to apply to what russia is doing of the middle east. russia has big ambition and the united states in the go to arms supplier in the middle east. has a pride of place of the court nuclear supplier from the middle east. this is a lesser-known fact that russia is the world's leading exporter of technology. so the iran deal from a commercial sense looks a lot like a showroom for the russians. but i think what you are looking
at maybe a less long-term definitive strategy as russian regime that is pushing on the door trying to exploit potential opportunities. plenty of them in the middle east now as the united states appears to retract over the --izon has less and less less and less equities. we are seeing today what we saw 6, 8, 12 months ago with regard to egypt were example. russia has because such an enduring stake in egypt or now in iran. it is because there is a russian saying is empty place, sacred place may not remain empty for long. this is what you are seeing in the middle east. a question that came in from the viewer. you are ready started to touch on this in the previous response. is the president's construct of
it is either this deal or, is that a valid construct in this i do want you to answer that on the experience with north korea. see this premised on this deal or war, and the tail end when the question is raised of what happens if iran cheap? -- cheats? one would think he would go to war and snapback is automatic lee terry operations. , the construct has been we spent back on sanctions. on the front end, there is only three options including sanctions. sanctionsinted out are toast, your threat of snapping back is pretty weak. is everyeem the result
position of sanctions and means you have three options in the beginning. could have been continue investigate a stronger agreement. the administration certainly has the weekend and undermined we havecy that it seems basically set up the stage for saying the sanctions don't work anymore because we have trash them in the military option is not credible anymore. -- we drew aine redline with syria and went to play golf and therefore there is nothing left so take it or leave it. i find it very securely your -- very peculiar the administration would make that argument because the administration at the same weretells us the iranians
two months away from breakouts dash the bomb if the deal collapsed but signed up to a deal that claims inexpensively and in lower rate flowery language they never wanted one and never pursued a weapon, why do we need a deal at all? we can shake cans and go home. if the deal is that were to collapse or disapproval with veto over right were taken as annunciation of the deal and says we are not committed to it anymore, you are not going to have more. just like you are not going to have more if the iranians she chegiously --
egregiously. whata i think yout will see is a number of much less severe, much less grave intermediate options. respond tos could approach of disapproval by are ini of nations disapproval of security council resolution and file a come and and will play victim. you will see a lot of other much less fierce responses. one argument the administration to justify this and proclaim the effect of this snapback is that if there is a political will and recognized set of violations by iranians, it will be fairly easy to snapback sanctions. you cannot say i have this tool to snapback and fairly easy to snapback if there is agreement of the mechanism protects the majority from brushing and
chinese interference. the alternative is if there is a behaviors as set of that are violating the deal or the american u.s. congress or administration decide to relist entities on different accounts for syria or human rights violations or other reasons, and the iranian scream and shout, you are not going to war. arsenal ofwhole other policy choices. to suggest otherwise is this syria if the administration continues to defend its deal and foreign ingenioush these argument and soundbites, what does that tell about how good >> two seconds because i answered this already.
i think there are plenty of other options. optimalfar fewer options than we did before because of the administration's conscious and cognizant walking regimeom the sanctions and investing itself of a credible military option and other things. i would point out, what's a manual that is very important. andre here in washington across the street is where the numbers will be crunched. if you look at the math and look at it objectively, there is some doubt there will be a veto. it is not a slamdunk. to use those words anymore, but there is some skepticism that this deal or something similar to which will not become law of the land, at least temporarily. this is an important inflection point for folks who work in congress. one thing the administration
talks a lot about is what the deal contains. they don't talk a lot about what the deal that. for example, what are the on to with thisects of iran kind of e? what does it do to mobile proliferation dynamic? you can begin to list a very significant and compelling order of battle about issues that are likely to be affected once, or if the deal kicks in. one thing there is not been a lot of talk about but there should be is how do we manage consequences? are the institutions in the u.s. government, whether executive or branch, areshould the institutions keyed in to being able to respond effectively to additional iranian infusion of cash? are we properly monitoring proliferation dynamics coming out of asia and the middle east? these are all serious questions and questions that could be the
basis of the legislation and new orders of bottle for different governmental agencies. this is the dog not parking. we are in the process of deliberating the deal, which if it goes through, will put into play a series of very significant trend lines. thinking, even as we think about whether or not to , we should think about what to do with the deal passes, how do we manage the consequences? over here. other questions? i have a wrap question for all of you. you are now each sitting is the new national security survival to the president of the united states today, and the president in 2017nited states .anuary 21
give you a couple of minutes each. tell me, what advice would you get this president? what should he do, and what advice would you get the new president? well, i cannot really conceive of doing that because american u.s. citizen, i would be disloyal to my country if i served in the foreign government. sake, i thinknts it is easier to give advice to the next president. my impression is this president only take the advice he agrees with. the next president may be more open-minded. i would advise the next iranians to hold the
feet to the fire and restore insurance of the united states. otherwise,rily and starting from sanctions. reminding the president policy is never a choice between mutually exclusive options. bridges -- from the irgc, building bridges. it is like asking a blue-collar worker who just won the lottery, will you buy a house or a car? i will do both. that would be my advice. restore deterrence using all the tools and the policy box, and don't be afraid of the deal the iranian make. they still need the agreement more than we ever did. i guess i would revert to previous advice and say don't
you remember, don't do stupid you are soome point far down in a rathole, you don't know how to get out. when you are in a whole, stop digging. emmanuel's point is good, separate from the negotiations is an sure you have sufficient resources devoted to the security requirements to suitably defend yourself and your allies. theave been undermining defense department even before sequestration with massive defense cuts. right now there is a serious -- u.s.about ua capabilities as well as the default. when someone says all of the options are on the table, i don't think people really believe that. the asian side we have been hearing from allies throughout the region that are concerned about u.s. resolve and capability. they can see there is no asia
pivot. there is a good talking point, but no resources for it. thatsume we are hearing from european and middle east allies that there is concern in the direction we are going, lack that will there be a desire or inclination to do a snapback? i don't think so. i think it would be a lot of intel. it is really difficult to get a smoking gun, slamdunk evidence of cheating. it takes time. when you are promising an agreement on something that we will be able to find quick enough to impose sanctions, there is just so many things to me that don't add up. i would parenthetically say if i
was in the position of advising this president and the next one, there is something seriously us do at the office of personnel management. that aside, i would make the case, and i think the point the is on the foreign policy path where there is not a lot of room for deviation or disagreement from his advisers currently is correct. i would only make the point that for a president who prides himself on his foreign policy and flexibility, he has left tool hely unused the has at his disposal, which is to use congress as a backoff. you could have hammered out a much more beneficial deal for long-term strategic interest comes simply by saying we are a democracy and unconstrained by my ledges later branch. my legislative branch has its own prerogatives. -- and unconstrained by my legislative branch. is, it ist
disingenuous to think this is the best possible deal we could of gone. that is not the best advice because i am not sure there is a lot of sunlight to penetrate here. for the next president i think what you are seeing, and you are beginning to see it in the primary debate on both sides of the aisle is this emerging theme of we need to mend it or and it. -- evident inof its simplicity, but i think it is more than that. i think if we have an administration that begins to ourrt globally, to have response to the jcp away -- jcpoa, and have a larger strategy. it cannot just be about iran's nuclear strategy.
at -- danears ago dan patrick moynihan, the senior senator from new york wrote a piece on criminal justice. it was about defining deviancy. that is germane here because we are to finding -- defining it now for a wrong. it is not just deal with the nuclear program. ideology, support of terrorism, and the attempt to remake middle east and its own image. these are all things the administration is fully committed. not just about the nuclear portfolio. get out of we can the policy cold the sack think about the iran challenge more broadly, frankly, the better off we will be. policy thinking about the iran challenge, frankly the better off we will be. this is a very difficult
issue. it is not amenable to simple solutions. anyone who offers simple solutions to this kind of problem, you probably don't want to listen to. it takes more than a bumper sticker to deal with these kinds of problems. of you to takeh what you have heard, ruminate on it, think about it, and come to your own conclusions. don't just take the headlines off this morning's paper or some other paper. we have some heavy lifting in this country to address the problems. please join me in thanking the panel. [applause] and we thank you for your kind attention. we are concluded. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015]
>> we take you live to the iowa state fair to listen to mike huckabee. let's begin -- again with pork cap on the stick. it is what is for breakfast, lunch, dinner and a snack. i want to thank -- they think you to " the des moines register" for giving us this forum and for all of you to coming to listen to a politician talk. i think a lot of times you and i hear a lot of politicians talk. you hear a lot of people come to your city. this time