tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 11, 2015 4:00am-6:01am EDT
implementation. it would be better use of our energies to ensure that this deal succeeds and the iaea has what is necessary to carry out its mandate. one final point. if some of the critics are right and we eventually have to resort to a military option with or without our international neighbors, i think it would be much better for us to have had hundreds of inspectors on the ground inspecting nuclear and non-nuclear facilities -- may i have another 30 seconds -- it would be far better for us and our international allies to have had international inspectors, hundreds on the ground in iran so that if we do have to take military action, we have that information. we have that intelligence so that any military action that eventually is necessary, will be much more effective. but i agree that this agreement
is our best chance. this opportunity for diplomacy. and i ask my colleagues to support it. with that, i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back the balance of his time. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i yield two minutes to the the gentleman from westerman. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for two minutes. mr. westerman: thank you, mr. speaker, i rise tonight in strong disagreement with the president's deal. tonight is the eve of the 14th anniversary of the attacks on america by islamic terrorists. these were direct and premeditated attacks on our soil that targeted and murdered thousands of americans just because they were americans. t was a dirty and cowardly act that reflects least values. those who finance terror and
plan terrorist attacks and those who carry them out. who would have thought we would be here at this time debating whether to approve an agreement with the number one state sponsor of terrorism in the world. a deal with a country that chants "death to america." a bill that removes sanctions dollars billions of to a regime that wants to kill us. deal that a deal that allows them to make nuclear fuel that most likely will be used in nuclear weapons. there is a better way to deal with this regime by not make anything concessions until iran demonstrates they can be civilized and trusted. they must earn our trust. mr. speaker, america's $18
billion to $19 billion dwarfs iran's $4 billion economy and say they would side with us. i never thought i'd see the day when america would negotiate with terrorists or those who sought to protect us would agree secrecy. shrouded in not the congress' deal, not the united states' deal, but the deal of the president and those who support them. i encourage a strong no vote on this deal. i encourage this chamber, the senate, and the administration -- mr. royce: i yield the gentleman 30 seconds. mr. westerman: i urge the administration to do the right thing by rejecting this deal in its entirity and i pray that god
would intervene and help us. i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the gentlelady is recognized. mr. watt -- ms. waters: i yield to the gentleman for five minutes. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. >> as the only ph.d. physicist in congress, the only ph.d. scientist of any kind, i have taken very seriously my responsibility to review the technical assets of the proposed agreement and after over a dozen briefings, many of them individual, classified briefings by the technical experts who supported our negotiators, i have come to support this deal, not based on trust of iran but based on science. so i'd like to take a moment to make four technical points that underpin my support of this deal. first in regards to the claim that iran gets to be in charge of inspecting itself in investigations of its past weaponization activities. this is simply not true.
the investigations will be carried out by a team of iaea inspectors using equipment and sampling kits prepared by the iaea with samples being sent to the international network of analytical laboratories, of which a number of u.s. lab arer tos are members. i urge my colleagues to harbor doubts about this inspection regime to avail themselveses of classified briefings on the details. what i can say publicly is that our technical experts have full confidence in the technical inspection capabilities of the iaea. secondly, in regards to the 24-day inspection delay, which has been a source of concern for many, including myself. under the proposed agreement, iran's declared nuclear facilities will be available for any time, anywhere inspection. however, for undeclared facilities, including military facilities, iran has the opportunity to contest what is normally a 24-hour inspection regime under the
nonproliferation treaty with additional protocol for a period of up to 24 days. this is clearly not ideal, it is a negotiated number. however, when i look closely at the many steps that must be taken to produce and to test a nuclear weapon, the ability to detect activities in a window of 24 days versus 24 hours has limited operational significant. -- significance. this is because while many steps toward weaponization can unfortunately be hidden from even a 24-hour inspection, things like design and testing of nonnuclear components, but the moment that iran touches nuclear materials, it will be subject to detection by the iaea event even months after any attempted scrubbing of the facility. thirdly, i support the administration's estimate of a one-year minimum breakout time. this is the reaction time the world community will have for a diplomatic, economic, and military response if iran
decides to reyume -- resume its knew kyler weapons program. buzz of the importance of this issue, i have spent a great deal of time and effort personally vetting this estimate. the breakout time calculation is complex because there are many possible paths to obtain the fissile material for a first weapon and each of these must be examined. and after many hours of study and detailed questioning of our experts, i have concluded that the one-year estimate for the minimum breakout time is accurate. mr. foster: fourth in regards to the weaponization timeline. this is the time needed by iran from the point that it possesses a sufficient quantity of nuclear material for a first weapon to the time that it will take them to assemble and to test that first nuclear weapon. unfortunately, iran has made significant progress toward weaponization, including such items as the multipoint initiation system for implosion devices that is referenced in the iaea report of 2011. moreover if iran breaks out of this agreement, it will resume
the weaponization activities during the same year that it takes to accumulate fissile materials for a first weapon. therefore, i concur with the assessment that in the context of a one-year breakout effort, the additional time for weaponization may be small. however, at the end of this agreement, when the breakout time to obtain fissile material is shortened, the weaponization activities become the dominant factor in the timeline. this underscores the importance of maintaining maximum visibility into all aspects of the iranian nuclear capability, a position that is surely strengthened by the adoption of this agreement and also of significantly strengthening the nonproliferation treaty for iran and all other nuclear threshold countries. this must be the work of the coming decade, so that by the end of the main terms of this agreement, iran and its neighbors in the middle east and around the world will be found by a much -- will be bound by a
much stronger and more verifiable nonproliferation treaty. as was emphasized by former senators dick luber and sam nun who gentlemen who have reduced the threat of nuclear war instead of just talking about it, that this is not a perfect deal but it is the best path forward and our best chance to achieve our goal of preventing iran from developing nuclear weapons. so i urge my colleagues to support the joint comprehensive plan of action as the best opportunity to prevent a nuclear armed iran. and remember, we did not negotiate this deal alone but if we walk away we walk away alone. thank you, ranking member, and i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. royce: we did not negotiate this deal alone. also negotiating this deal was iran and was russia and was china. true enough.
but when it comes to the question of inspections, i do not have the document that indicates how these inspections will be done. but what i do know is what is reported to be the procedure. and what is asserted also by the iranians to be the procedure. and as reported, it is iran, not international inspectors, who will provide the agencies the photos of the locations. it is iran that will provide the agency videos of the locations. it is iran, not international inspectors, who will provide the agency the environmental samples . and it is iran that will use iran's authenticated equipment, not the equipment of the international inspectors. so the point i make again is
that one of the reasons we wanted to have the agreement, the side agreement the two side agreements, including the one addressing the 12 questions that have never been answered about the thousand pages of bombwork that the iaea had in its possession that iran supposedly conducted at parchin was to get iran to answer these questions and to this day, to my knowledge, scientists in iran are not available to answer these questions. now perhaps if we obtain these documents, these two side agreement, we will have the details that assure us that finally these 12 questions have been answered but i can tell you during the interim agreement, we only got half of the first question answered and after that, iran shut it down. there was to be no more discussion about their past bomb work. i yield two minutes to the
gentleman from mississippi, mr. trent kelly. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from mississippi is recognized for two minutes. mr. kelly: mr. speaker, i rise today to voice my opposition to the iran nuclear agreement. i ask for unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks. i thank the gentleman from california for yielding to me and on the eve of september 11, i remember the american lives lost to terrorism and the unfortunate reality that people want to do america harm. based on my review of the agreement combined with my personal experience of being deployed in the army in iraq in 2005 and again in 2009 and 2010 and seeing firsthand the iranian influence there, i have no reason to believe that iran will act in good faith in this agreement. it's not just my concerns that i have regarding this deal. but it's also my concerns i've
consistently heard throughout the august work month from my constituents regardless of party affiliation that did not support this agreement with iran. lifting economic sanctions that congress has imposed for more than two decades only gives iran a recognized state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, access to billions of dollars to finance terrorism activities in the region and to get closer to their ultimate goal of build agnew clear weapon. i oppose with all my heart and soul the iran nuclear agreement because i do not believe the agreement negotiated by the administration is in the best interests of our national security nor is it in the best interest of our allies in the middle east, nor is it in the best interest of america. mr. speaker, i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the gentleman gentlelady from california is recognized. ms. waters: i yield to the gentleman from new york, four minutes.
the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new york is recognized for four minutes. >> thank you, mr. speaker. i thank the gentlelady from california, my friend, for yielding. mr. tonko: this agreement, mr. speaker is the best option available to prevent iran from acquire agnew clear weapon. the alternatives are simply too risky and too costly, which is why the deal's opponents have failed to articulate a realistic alternative. during any time in congress i have voted for every bill that imposed crippling sanctions on iran which brought the regime to the negotiating table and united the world to stop iran's pursuits of a nuclear weapon. sanctions were meant to be a tool to ensure negotiations. that is exactly what they have done. but as we have learned from the past decade, sanctions alone are not enough to stop iran from expanding its nuclear program. before negotiations began, iran greatly increased its enrichment stockpile and centrifuge capacity despite sanctions. that is why a verifiable agreement that will cut off
iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon is necessary. the international atomic energy agency will have nearly continuous access to iran's declared nuclear facility and can gain unprecedented access to other suspicious, undeclared sites in as little as 24 hours. under this agreement, iran will dismantle 2/3 of its installed centrifuges, remove over 97% of its uranium stockpile and make changes to its iraq plue phone yum reactor before it receives relief. ernest tary of energy moniz said this increases iran's breakout time from two to three months today to at least 12 months going forward this will give us ample opportunity to catch and stop iran should it choose to pursue a nuclear weapon. some have have -- some have suggest wed need to reject this
deal to get a better one but i have found no evidence to show that a better deal is possible. it's clear that some of our negotiating partners and other allies don't want more sangs. if we reject this deal, the robust international sanctions regime would erode if not unravel entirely. in the meantime, iran could move forward with its enrichment program without inspections, limitations on manufacturing, installation, research and development of knew centrifuges and constraints on its enriched uranium stockpile. simply put, no deal would mean no inspections and no constraints on iran's nuclear ambitions. some have suggested that we cannot make an agreement with a country that we do not trust but we must remember that this deal is not based on trust but rather the most intrusive inspections regime on which we have ever agreed. we do not trust the soviet union or did not trust the soviet union especially when we negotiated in harm's -- an arms
reduction treaty with them in devastating proxy wars arn the worldful today we are not debating whether to trust iran, we are debating whether and how to enhance monitoring of its nuclear program. i remain committed to working with the administration and my colleagues here in congress to coen tain iran's conventional capability that threatens stability in the region and throughout the world. but know that this deal is the best option to take the nuclear issue out of the equation and with that, i urge my colleagues to approve this agreement. with that, mr. speaker, i yield back. and again thank the gentlelady, my friend from california, for yielding. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i yield myself such time as i may consume. in terms of viewing this as the most intrusive regime, i remember south africa. we put the kinds of sanctions on
south africa that we tried to get the administration to put on iran. we had legislation here by a vote of 400-20 to do that and the administration blocked that legislation in the senate. that would have given us real leverage. in south africa, when we put those sanctions on, it actually gave the regime a choice between compromise on its nuclear program and dropping apartheid and changing its system or economic collapse and the choice was made in south africa to turn over their nuclear bomb to the international inspectors. i would consider that an intrusive regime. i wouldn't consider this one in the case of libya.
they turned over their weapons programs to international inspectors, allowed them in and allowed them to take them out. i don't know why we say this is the most intrusive regime. it seems to me that clearly in cases where we forced the issue, where we actually in south africa put the totality of sanctions in place that congress in both the house and the senate in a bipartisan way felt were mandatory to force the south african hand. in that case, yes, we got them to give up their nuclear capabilities and their right to enrich and all of that. i don't see that here. i yield two minutes to the gentleman from new jersey, mr. garrett. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for two minutes. mr. garrett: the president has made promises that this deal
would prohibit nuclear weapons. this deal does not do that at all. the iranian regime has done nothing to earn the trust of the international community and this agreement rewards iran with sanction relief. i was a member of the conference committee and i support tough strict -- you see the iranian sanctions were designed to force a peaceful resolution to this ongoing situation and it was clear by many that the sanctions were working. they had an inflation rate of 35% and the value of their currency was falling. iran had no choice but come to come to the negotiation table. the u.s. what in a position of power to negotiate a good deal. instead we have a deal which allows iran to use centrifuges and continue to enrich uranium and a deal where after 15 years it will be unclear what if nyack
cease the inspectors will have and a deal where iran can dispute inspections and delay for 24 days. this isn't any time anywhere inspections that the administration has promised us. the president said this deal is built on verifications. that is simply not true. congress hasn't received all the details related to the detail. there are side deals as well. what makes us believe that iran will abide by the agreement we see let alone by the side deals that we have not seen? this deal asked us to trust a country that holds american hostages and called for the destruction of the united states and its allies. not a surprise that iran and it's allies are celebrating. it is obvious this deal deals little to secure national security. there are still alternatives.
sanctions have worked and let's negotiate a good deal. we can use those sanctions from the very committee i was on to negotiate a good deal and i urge my colleagues to join me in protecting the security of the united states and securing the protection of the allies and i yield. ms. waters: i reserve the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman reserves. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i yield three minutes to the gentleman from arizona, mr. schweikert. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from arizona is ecognized for three minutes. mr. schweikert: mr. speaker, and first, i would like to thank chairman royce.
you have dealt with this and done this very honorably. it's been powerful to watch. there has been amazing testimony given to us. there has been great speakers here. i fear something very important has not gotten enough understanding and enough focus. who in this body is going to take responsibility when the iranian regime is flushed with cash and the death and destruction that is coming with that? who here is going to take responsibility for the displaced people around the region? who is going to take responsibility what some of the experts have told us the potential financing of a sunni-shia war in the region? the amount of death that whether it be the $59 billion the administration talks about or
sits in billion that accounts around the world that is going to be handed back? i hold up this board next to me. so you can see this is more, so much more than just the neighbors around iran. the bad acts have been happening all over the world. ell me why there is an iranian revolution guard money showing up in our hemisphere? earlier there were meetings in panama and had leaders telling us they are seeing iranian money moving through their banks financing bad actors and creating death and destruction trying to finance the overthrows of them. are we prepared as a body particularly those who will vote for this?
to step up and take responsibility for the lives that are about to be lost, for the governments that are going to be overthrown and the destruction and displaced people, the refugees, the cascade that comes from that. we are about to hand billions and billions and billions of dollars to a regime that is committed to destroying our way of life, but also destroying their own neighbors. and that's what's on-line right now. we are about to execute a vote here that is going to kill, maim, destabilize not only the region, the world and those who are about to vote for this, i expect you to step up and be responsible for what you have done. with that, i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the
gentleman yields back the balance of his time. the gentlewoman from california is recognized. ms. waters: i continue to reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman reserves. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i reserve the right to close. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman reserves. ms. waters: thank you, mr. chairman and members. we've heard a lot in these debates that have gone on today. and i would like to take this opportunity to try and reinforce the tremendous support that we have for this deal. i would like to also debunk the idea that somehow this administration is not concerned enough about the security of this country. let me just share with you the tremendous support that this
deal has. i will do that by reading some ex serpts from and insert into the record an open letter signed y 36 retired u.s. generals and admirals, who make the case that addressing the risk of a nuclear diplomat ith iran itically is far spore than doing it militarily. these retired leaders say this about the nuclear agreement with iran, that, and i quote, there is no better option to prevent an iranian nuclear weapon. if the iranians cheat, our advanced technology, intelligence and the inspections will reveal it. and u.s. military options remain on the table. and if the deal is rejected by
america, the iranians would have a nuclear weapon within a year. the choice is tcha stark. uote, end quote. recognizing the importance of strong multi lateral coordination and action, the retired military leaders go on to say if at some point it becomes necessary to consider military action against iran, gather sufficient international support for such an effort would be possible if we are given the path a chance. must exhaust diplomatic options a chance. mr. chairman, and members, while i have great respect for all of the members of this house for e most part, i do not accept
the notion that members who have not served the way that these generals and admirals have served this country would know better about our security. and so i would like to insert that information into the record. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. ms. waters: i would like to share something with someone i have known very well. a "washington post" article that i'm going to quote from. and the quotes will be from republican and former treasury secretary paulsen. and he will not only make very strong statements about his support for this deal, he slams the naysayers of this iranian deal. let me read from and insert into the record a "washington post" article from august 14, in which former treasury secretary hank
paulsen was asked what he viability of he maintaining sanctions against iran if the united states decided to walk away from the nuclear deal that has been decided between iran and the international community. it's important to note that former secretary paulsen, a republican, was in charge of administering the administration's sanctions under president george w. bush during the period when the international community was just beginning to enact a current regime of sanctions over iran's nuclear ambitions. this was his response and i quote, somewhere between naive and unrealistic to assume that we, the united states of america, has negotiated something like this with the five other parties and with the whole world community watching that we could back away from that and that the others would
go with us or even that our allies would go with us, end of quote. paulsen viewed as farfetched the idea that the united states could force other nations into lockstep into a more hard line pproach to iran by threatening them with secondary sanctions. he said, quote, it is unrealistic to believe if we back away that the sanctions would stay in place. i'm just trying to envision a sanction in european banks on forcing them or japanese banks or big chinese banks, end quote. in fact, the former treasury secretary could hardly hide his disdain with those who could strike a path to a better deal than the one that was reached. and he said, i had a seat in
washington when we dealt with a big messy problem, when there weren't any beautiful solutions, paulsen said. and he said you are deciding between doing something that was objectionable or doing nothing at all that would be more objectionable. i don't particularly like it when people criticize something that is big and important that has been done if they don't have a better idea, end of quote. aving said that, i would like to discuss a -- discuss a point i don't think has been discussed enough in this debate. iran could move in any direction over the next 10 years. we're aware of the less benign scenarios, but there's also the scenario in which the agreement helps to amplify the voices of those in iran who want peace and
regional and international accommodation and i have hope with respect to this latter possibility and i'll tell you why. it is because more than half the population of iran today, almost 55% is under 30 years old. and the youth unemployment rate is somewhere between 27% and 40%. i have hope that these young people, given the opportunity to work, to achieve prosperity, and to live peacefully, will in fact help animate the kind of change in iran that will inteed move it to become a response -- will indeed move it to become a responsible member of the world community. this is a possibility i urge members to keep in mind when they vote on the resolution before us today and finally -- the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman's time has expired. ms. waters: i big your pardon. the speaker pro tempore: your time has expired. ms. waters: thank you very much, i have no more time and i would
just urge my colleagues to support this important deal and agreement. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: i yield myself the remainder of my time. mr. speaker, to begin with, i would also like to submit for the record a letter by 200 retired generals and flag officers, admirals, in terms of why they are opposed to this deal and why they feel it would make the national security challenges for the united states more problematic. the second point i would make is that the head of hezbollah says this about this deal -- iran will become richer and wealthier and will also become more influential you should the deal. this week he says. he says this will also reinforce the position of its allies.
a stronger and wealthier iran in the coming phase will be able to stand by its allies and especially the palestinian resistance more than at any other time in history. what does that mean? i can tell you what it means because in 2006, then i chaired the terrorism -- when i chaired the terrorism subcommittee we were in haifa when he was firing off the iranian made rockets with 90,000 ball bearings in the war heads into the town of haifa. that were 600 victims inside the trauma hospitals. d now iran has transferred over 80,000 missiles. but what is it he wants that he doesn't have currently? he wants guidance systems so that those missiles will hit targets such as individual
buildings in tel aviv, the airport, jerusalem. that's what he needs. and that is what iran is telling him it will provide. it needs the hard currency and with this agreement will come the hard currency. it's also committed to restock the inventory that hamas used when it fire off its rockets into israel from gaza. and to rebuild the tunnels. iraniansis is what the seek to fund. to do that, they need the sanctions lifted. and when they lift those sanctions, who is going to be the primary beneficiary? it is going to be people such as the iranian revolutionary guard corps that will be strengthened. look, speaker, if this agreement goes through, iran gets a cash
bonanza. it gets a boost to its international standing. it gets a lighted path toward nuclear weapons. with sweeping sanctions relief, we have lessened our ability to challenge iran's conduct across the board. as iran grows stronger, we will be weaker to respond. and so the question before us today is whether temporary constraints on iran's nuclear program are worth the price of permanent sanctions relief. and when i say the revolutionary guard is going to be the beneficiary, i say that because they're the ones that have taken over so many of the major companies in iran. and they are working to destabilize the entire middle east. that organization fuels the assad regime in syria.
in syria today, those rockets are being launched by the quds forces into israel. they are going to provide them with more weapons, more military personnel, that organization backs the hue tee rebels. -- the hutti rebels. there's 200 quds forces on the vanguard. when they overthrew our ally in yemen and overran that country. and it's responsible for the deaths of hundreds of american troops in iraq. and the irgc exports terrorism throughout that region. it holds sway over iran's nuclear program. it brutally, brutally represses internal dissent. and it's part of -- and as part of the iranian agreement, the irgc is going to be bolstered in a big way and i'll explain how
else. it's going to have the funds to build up its tanks, the fighter jets, the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the european sanctions on the elite quds forces. this is a group that does the political assassinations, assassinations outside of iran and does the terrorist work outside of iran. that's going to be lifted on the -- on the european side. the administration signed off on these concessions. the deal will allow sales of aircraft and parts to iranian airlines which the quds forces use to move its people and weapons throughout the region. the irgc controls key parts, as i said, of the iranian economy. the largest construction companies. the telecom sector. shipping. 90 current and former irgc officials and companies will be taken off the sanctions list as a result of this deal. and even sanctions on the head
of iran's elite quds force, general suleimani, will be coming off. he's been involved in the plot to assassinate the saudi ambassador, here in washington, d.c. while still under a u.n. travel ban, he traveled to moscow on july 24, 10 days after the iran nuclear agreement was announced. and he held meet wgs a russian defense minister and with president vladimir putin. believe me, those meetings are about weapons systems which the russians want to sell to the quds forces, to the iranians. so the irgc is the biggest sponsor of terror throughout the middle east and even tried to carry out a terrorist attack here. and under the nuclear agreement as iran is reconnected to the global economy, the irgc is going to be the biggest winner. e agreement helps he yitmies suleimani and gives additional
resources to the mastermind behind the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism and eyeing future weapons sales. it was russia that teemed -- team up with iran in the 11th hour, after we thought this deal was done, to insist on one more thing, the lift of -- lifting of the arms embargo. and i just ask you if they did that, whose side do you think moscow is going to take when iran test this is agreement? we talked a little bit about the younger generation in iran. yes, yes, the 55% is under 30. but it is not those 55% under 30 that are going to be empowered. the ones holding the strings now, because of the way the iranian economy works are the generals, are the clerics, they're the ones that have taken over the country -- the companies. so when you've got $60 billion
to $100 billion, depending on whose figure you use and you lift the escrow on that and it goes back to iran, it's their accounts it goes into and they'll control the contracts going forward. how is that going to liberalize the economy or work to the benefit of the next generation in iran? no, it makes it more certain that the tyranny that this thee oklahomacy imposes -- that this theocracy imposes will be strengthened. we reverse decades of bipartisan u.s. policy, reremove the security council resolutions against iran's ill list nuclear program and ok iran as a nuclear threshold state. that's what's been done here. and you and i know that once that process is under way, iran is going to produce nuclear weapons on a -- on an industrial scale when they're at the end of that process unless they cheat before they get to the end of
the process. secretary kerry previously said we do not recognize iran's right to enrich and that there is no right to enrich in the m.p.t. however, this agreement legitimizes iran's vast nuclear program, including its right to enrich uranium which can be used to produce a nuclear warhead and i gearn tee you everybody in the region will be looking at that and say, we want the same agreement iran had. we want that same exemption to the m.p.t. and after the agreement's temporary limits expire, iran's nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other nonnuclear weapons state party to the m.p.t. ok so we're going to treat iran like it's holland but it's not holland. it's been caught cheating. that's why we're here. it's been caught cheating in the past over and over on their agreements. iran can have a peaceful knew
leer program without the ability to enrich uranium. this is something we all understand. many countries have this. it is this key bomb making technology that is so objectionable. so we have no problem with the idea of letting them have a peaceful nuclear program. but why give up the right to enrich? preventing the spread of this dangerous technology has been the foundation of our nonproliferation policy for decades. and as a result, over 20 countries have peaceful nuclear energy programs without a domestic enrichment program. in fact, buying fuel for nuclear power plants abroad from countries like russia is much more cost effective than producing it domestically. so you have to ask, why do they want to produce it domestically? if this atpwhreement is allowed to go forward, the united states will recognize the ability of iran, the world's largest state
sponsor of terrorism, to enrich uranium, despite claims to the contrary, this will set a dangerous precedent. it will greatly undermine long-standing u.s. efforts to restrict the spread of this key bomb making technology. how can we tell our allies they can't have it if we do this? if fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the iran sanctions regime. which this congress has built up over decades despite opposition from several administrations. we did that in congress. we pushed this. the billions in sanctions relief that iran will get will support its terrorist activity and those billions are just the down payment. under this agreement, european sanctions on the iranian revolutionary guard and elite leader of its elite quds force
are removed and their job is to export the revolution, that means their job is to export terrorism. general dempsey, i'll close this with, testified that iranian militias such as those trained and equipped by suleimani killed 500 u.s. soldiers in iraq. removing sanctions on him and the irgc is so shocking that when the deal was first announced many thought it was a mistake. more debate on the accord today on a separate measure that would prevent president obama from lifting sanctions on iran.
white house as a geeologist. just months into hoovers term the financial market crashed. first lady used her office to advocate volunteerism and charity. but as the great depression deepnd their one term ended amidst overwhelming public frustration. this sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's original series first ladies, influence and image examining the public and private lives of the women who filled the position of first lady and their influence on the presidency. from martha washington to michelle obama. sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern. n american history tv. >> next, a hearing on what the iran nuclear deal would mean for missile defense and nonproliferation. this is just under an hour.
testify today. we were told in writing that he was available, he would be watching us even now from his office since his schedule was open. however, he is not here today. i understand that senior officials at the state department decided not to send him because the state department isn't ready to discuss implementation. i think everybody should be bothered that we are being asked to vote on this agreement and the department of state won't discuss how it will be implemented. i move to the joint hearing. in february of 2014 undersecretary of state wendy sherman the lead negotiator of the iran agreement whose record reflect she also gave us the agreed framework with north korea which gave them the missile stated that it is true in these first six months we have not shut down all of their productions of any ballistic missile that could have
anything to do with delivery of a nuclear weapon. but that is indeed something that has to be addressed as comprehensive agreement. let me repeat that. but that is indeed something that has to be addressed as a part of a comprehensive agreement. we all know what has happened iran, russia, and china instead. in july the president's senior martin adviser general dempsey testified that "under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking." let me repeat that. under no circumstances -- why it is important, the ban on technology to ballistic milssles is critical to protection.
even if we assume the iranians will honor the nuclear agreement -- which we would be foolish to assume -- we are paying no attention to the chemical and biological programs. just this weekend, 45 soldiers fighting iranian proxies in yemen were killed by a ballistic missile with a conventional war head. we don't have missile defense solely because the bad guys may have nuclear capability. i will read an excerpt from the most recent arms control compliance report on iran. based on available information the united states cannot certify whether iran has met its chemical weapons production facility declaration ligations, destroyed its chemical weapons equipment, tranferd cw -- chemical weapons -- or undeclared chemical weapons stockpile. the jcpoa ig no, sir this violation and provides iran
more funding. iran is also not in compliance with the biological weapons convention, the ballistic milssles it needs to deliver them. i also want to indicate my strong agreement with the letter sent by chairman thornberry and devin nunez last week which i will add to the record that this agreement appears to have already start it had cascade of proliferation in the middle east. unfortunately, i can't say more in this environment but i believe secretary skerry owes we body information before vote. chairman thornberry and nunez asked for a response and that response has not been provided. i believe the administration consealed material information concerning russia's violation of the treaty from the united states congress while the senate was considering the new start treaty in 2010. i have come to the same conclusion about this. the l cast my vote against jcpoa but i do not believe that the president will heed any
call from this congress about the legacy deal -- by this legacy deal for him. we have a constitutional law professionor who seems to be unfamiliar with the constitution's checks and balances so we must all turn to cleaning up the mess being created and what is going to be required to fix it. i only hope that generations to come will not pay too high a price of the mistake of this president and what he is doing now. ranking rning to the member and any opening statements i remind my colleagues who attended this morning's classified session classified ghly briefing and details from this rning should not be statements i remind my colleagues who attended this morning's classified session di in this open session. we will adjourn to a closed briefing at the conclusion of this open hearing and that appropriate venue we can have discussions of those details. i turn to mr. cooper for any opening statements that he may have. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i too welcome the witnesses and
i appreciate this opportunity to hear from them. let me emphasize the word hear. this is called a hearing not a press conference. we call it a hearing so we can hear from the witnesses which i look forward to doing. other colleagues who may come, we make this open portion as brief as possible so we can get to the session. we will adjourn to a closed briefing at the conclusion of this open hearing and that appropriate venue we can have c because i think that will be also much more useful as well as less risky in terms of what people around the world may hear. this is the third briefing on . an today and is the only one to have an open portion. so with that i would particularly urge my chairman and my colleagues to keep this open session as short as possible so that we can get to the classified session.
we value your support and abiding support for our mission and for our people. in that regard i appreciate the opportunity to discuss a critical component of our overall mission specifically our support to the international atomic energy agency or the iaea. the iaea as you know has a special responsibility in monitoring and verifying the nuclear related measures detailed in the jcpoa. i have provide add written statement and i respectfully request that it be submitted for the record. as secretary of energy moniz has said the jcpoa prevents iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon and it provides strong verification measures that would give us ample time to respond if iran chooses to violates its turns. it is a very good deal for america, for our allies and for our global security and i fully share his view and this view. the department of energy and nsa's nuclear experts, national laboratories and sites were involved throughout the negotiations, evaluating and proposals echnical in support of the u.s. delegation. as a result of their work, secretary moniz has said that he is confident that the technical underpinnings of the jcpoa are solid and that the department stands ready to assist the iaea in its implementation. let me take a moment to discuss, as you requested, the department's important work with the iaea on nuclear safe guards. safeguards are defined as the set of technical measures applied by the iaea to independently and objectively
verify that a state's nuclear material is accounted for and not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. safe guards also provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. these technical measures include, for example, on site inspection, nuclear material accountancey, physical measurements, design information verification, containment using tags and seals, surveillance including the use of cameras and environmental sampleling. dough and nsa have closely cooperated with the iaea's department for sareguards for many decades in developping and enhancing these measures, the if you will range of our involvement is actually described in this recently just hot off the press brochure prepared by the nnsa and we have ample copies here for members and for staff in you choose to take one.
iaea also th the training, nding, technology transfers, and expertise. in fact, since 1980, every new iaea inspector has had nuclear materials measurement training at the loss almose national laboratory and every year the department hosts additional specialized training courses for iaea inspectors and analysts both here and abroad. our partnership with the iaea has also generated various technologies for use in safeguard systems. for example, the online one hment monitor is
example of the technology jointly developed by our national laboratories and the iaea. this can continuously monitor the enrichment levels of urenium at a centrifuge enrichment planted and for the first time as a result of this jcpoa the it will be used in iran. sir, i would be very happy to provide any additional information on our involvement in response to any questions you may have. thank you, sir. >> mr. chairman. >> thank you for the opportunity to testify on missile defense and the joint comprehensive plan of action, jcpoa. i am grateful for this committee's consistent attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland, our deployed forces, allies and partners. i too have submitted written testimony for the record so look to keep these opening remarks relatively brief. i would like to start what secretary training, technology transfers, and expertise. carter has noted. this places no limitations on the doff defense, no restrictions on our plans capabilities or what we can do with our frebbeds and allies. for decades we have focused on and prioritized the challenges that iran poses to our
interests. the department has worked to deal with these. i am happy to speak today about our missile defense policies but as you have noted nonproliferation programs and sanction regimes fall outside of my portfolio so i will have to defer those questions. it is a nuclear deal not a ballistic missile diaz such it does not change our programs or plans for copted cooperation on missile defense. iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the middle east and can strike targets throughout the region and into eastern europe. while iran has not developed an intercontinental missile it provides the means to develop longer range missiles. there is no doubt in my mind that their ballistic missile defense activities continue to pose a risk to the united states and our allies and partners in europe, israel and the gulf. however, this is exactly why the united states has
maintained a robust missile defense posture throughout the region and why we have focused on missile defense cooperation with the same partners and allies. i also want to reaffirm thalt u.s. homeland is currently protected against attacks from iran should they deploy such capability in the future. we continue to strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in technologies which better enable us to address emerging threats in the next decades including continued improvements to the defense system and the redesigned kill vehicle for the ground-based interceptor. secondly the administration ntinues to recognize the ballistic missile threat and remains committed to strengthening regional defenses. as president obama stated, iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat not just to the united states but to iran's neighbors and our allies as long as the ballistic missile threat from
iran persists we will go forward with the missile defense system that is cost effective and proven. in 2009 we stated that the approach would have the ability to defend all of nato europe from iranian ballistic milssles and that commitment remains. outside of nato we are working closely both operationally and on ballistic missile defense development with israel and to address the iranian threat. we are currently codeveloping missile defense technology with israel on iron dome, david's sling. we have provided over $3 billion to missile defense to israel. as the secretary also recently noted with prime minister netanyahu, we are full speed ahead on addressing these issues in collaboration with our israeli counterparts. the department also continues to implement the deployment of middle tailored to the
number of gulf cooperation council states. during the secretary's recent discussions with the saudi minister of defense we reiterated our commitment to working with gulf countries on missile defense. the importance of interoperability, and a common intelligence picture. members of the subcommittee, to cooperation council states. during the secretary's recent discussions with the conclude i want to reiterate that regardless of any deal, the department will continue to improve our homeland security capabilities against any threat, maintain a robust posture throughout the threatened regions including europe and st and will focus on increasing cooperation to respond to any potential iranian aggression. i look forward to answering your questions in this session or when necessary in the following closed session. thank you. >> i thank you. >> good afternoon chairman rogers, ranking member cooper, members of the subcommittee. i thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony today regarding the joint
action, sive plan of or national interest often diverge action, or jcpoa, and implications for iran's missile defense and nonproliferation. iran continues to be a threat to regional stability as its regime's with u.s. and allies in this dynamic and turbulent region. understanding tehran's support for terrorists and subnational armed groups as well as its military capabilities and regional ambitions are a priority for analysts and collectors. for years to come we expect iran to be a difficult target. for iran its national security strategy remains to ensure the regime's survival, expands its influence and enhance regional superiority. iran's ballistic missile capability will continue to reaten u.s. interests in the middle east. their overall strategy reliss on a substantial inventory. iran will continue to develop more sophisticated missiles and is improving the range and
accuracy of its current missile ystems irrespective of jcpoa implementation. iran publicly stated it intends to launch a vehicle as early as this year. this would be capable of intercontinental ballistic milssles ranges if configured as an icbm. this could provide more money but challenges will remain. u.n. restrictions on ballistic missile related sales and purchaseless remain in place for 8 years or until the iaea reaches a broader conclusion, whichever is sooner. after the u.n. restrictions end international and domestic tools, the proliferation security initiative and controls will still apply and the u.s. will retain its ability to impose missile related sanctions under nonnuclear sanctions authorities including executive orders 12938 and 13382. in addition secondary sanctions will continue to attach to
foreign financial institutions and other persons that engage in transactions with iranian missile prolive lators sanctioned by the department of treasury. i thank you for this opportunity to discuss these important topic. i look forward to the subcommittee's questions and more detailed discussions in the closed session. >> admiral. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity to be here today and specifically address missile defense related questions. i will save time and save my period. for the q&a again, thank you for the invitation. >> how do you like that, mr. cooper. i thought you would like that. general. no pressure. >> very quick. thank you. >> i likewise appreciate the pportunity to address your
questions regarding the military implications of the joint comprehensive plan of action. the joint staff will remain concerned with over all of iran's destabilizing activities within the region among which it is expanding ballistic missile invebtry and technology that was just underlined. we will preserve the military options at our dispostal. we will likewise preserve our posture and engagements with our longstanding partners in the region to assure our mutual security. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. i will recognize myself first. you heard my reference to the dough and state department -- doe and state department letters. do you have anything that you can tell us on the status of when we are going to get a response? >> mr. chairman, i understand that they are being actively worked within both departments as we speak. >> so no. all right. general, let me stay with you for a minute. to create the so-called one-two-three agreement between and emraties would
prohibit technology by that country? >> i believe that is correct. >> well, is it correct that we have been seeking an agreement from saub for the same so-called gold standard and emr agreement? that syringe is something since it is an ongoing discussion that we ought to discuss in the closed session if i could defer to that. >> i will do that. i may get the same response but are you aware of any information concerning the intentions of the uae or saudi arabia? >> i too would like to defer. >> all right. admiral are you aware of any discussions of changing the deployment phase of phase 3 tha the epaa? >> no, sir. i'm not aware of any changes. >> as a senior d.o.d. witness able to are you
pledge without hesitation that the administration will make no changes whatsoever to the deployment of the aegis as a consequence of jcpoa? >> currently our plan stands as it always has which is to make those deployments as you have discussed. >> mr. cooper. you are recognized. >> able to pledge without hesitation that the administration will make no changes thank you plfment chair to the ooking forward classified session i will do what i can to expedite our movement. >> mr. lanborn. i do think this is an important issue that has public ramifications as well as secure ramifications that we can talk about in closed session. so i want to talk about some in gs here openly and public that i am curious about and the american people might be curious about. you talked about that with the israelis and joint missile defense projects that things in
public that to the are full speed classified ahead. " now, one thing that seems like a disconnect to me is that when it comes to code production of the arrow 3 and david sling, israel has requested that but we have made no response that i am aware of and the administration provided o budget, no money for it in its budget. dress coproduction of the arrow 3 and david sling? >> i will briefly. but then the admiral has that budget under his control so i will ask for details from him. my understanding is we continue together with the israelis to identify what we
on what that cooperation actually looks like. >> i may come back to this. >> let me take that there is ongoing dialogue and negotiations specifically on the david sling coproduction agreement, which is very important for us and very important for israel. it is weeks away in terms of draft, probably months away in terms of final. but we had great success with the iron dome coproduction. i expect similar success with david sling. >> what about arrow 3 coproduction? >> that would follow david's sling today as that would be the next system field. >> all right. thank you for that. i appreciate it. the president requested $155 million for
israeli missile defense in the fiscal year 2016 budget request. but israel's actual needs were approximately $475 million. this seems like a 3 to 1 underfunding to me only funding one third of what appears to be the actual need. can you discuss that? >> i know that we worked very closely with the israelis to try to figure out what the best funding approach is for our support to their programs the ones that we do coproduction for. the president forwarded to the congress that figure that you talked about. we have had i think over $3 billion of cooperation up to this point. we have approximately i think overall about half a billion dollars in the next fiscal year development plan for cooperation with israel. and i would say that that is a negotiation to go on between congress and the white house as what the final number looks like. >> ok. and changing subjects slightly. we have heard from the administration about missile defense integration and interof
rabblet. we have been told that much of this will work through organizations like the gulf cooperation council gcc. however, there seems to be problems. in an article called "little progress made" we see that we haven't been able to achieve establishment on a command and ahead. center " or how it will be operated or even shared training capabilities and foreign disclosure. why is this not coming along better? >> i don't know the details of the negotiations on those. but what i do know is that based on the camp david summit we have reenergized this approach to ensuring that the gulf cooperation council countries are able to work more llaboratively together and
with us. i think we have seen greater cooperation the in terms of other operations. and my hope is that we will continue that greater collaboration. folks from my team and many others have been out to the gulf recently to work on the results with us. i think we have seen greater of summit and we are continuing to follow through. the early warnings and indications piece is the first element of what we are trying to do and work very closely across the regional and also missile defense agency to make sure that we can get over some of the problems that we may have seen in the past on this issue. >> and then in my remaining little bit of time. admiral let me ask you a general question about the budget. if we have to resort to a continuing resolution for next the house nse, which passed, the senate appears unable to pass, what would that do to missile defense in particular under your portfolio? sir, the -- two items in particular. it would put pressure on the procurement accounts because that funding would be limited. more specifically it would not enable me to begin poland mill
con construction if the mill con is tied up in the cr. i view that as critically important that we have those resources to release and the army has the ability to get under contract as soon as possible later in the first part of 2016. >> thank you very much. admiral, if you could. does the iran deal change your assessment of the east coast missile defense site? >> no, sir. >> so -- >> i can expand. >> please. >> i testified in front of this committee and others that there certainly is operational benefit to an east coast deal and capacity benefit to an east coast field. but it's a matter of where does that fit in to the priorities given limited resources on our
homeland security. >> and it would not be a priority. >> today in the budget is a lower priority in making the program more reliable and more complete in terms of the kill chain. so -- >> so you remain on the same path. priority and we ought to be spending our money elsewhere? >> sir, we are focused on the improvements in the homeland program not just in the gbi or the kill vehicle itself but in the radars priority and that we in alaska, and all the other improvements that you and i have talked about. we are in this year's budget, sir, we are proposing and requests a shift in directed energy funding in particular. >> a shift towards? >> towards more directed energy funding. >> directed towards? >> yes, sir. and we asked for everybody's all four committees's support as we feel imperative to get on with that development.
> if the legislation that we passed ndaa or appropriation were to force the money into he east coast defense -- missile defense site that would be money that might jortsde wise be used for directed energy? >> sir it would come across multiple parts of the missile defense budget. it is not cheap. the cost estimate is $3 billion to $4 billion. i don't have that in my budget control today. >> so the other things would be the higher priorities that would be suffering from missile defense if we were to proceed with the east coast site? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. no further questions. >> i thank the gentleman. >> u just a point of clarification that i was kind of surprised. in your testimony you spoke about the lifting of the ban on
ballistic missile technology to iran. and you said that words to the effect that whatever is sooner, referencing the iaea. i hear you right that the iaea can make an assessment whereby that ban can be lifted earlier? or did i hear you wrong? -- i ear you right in fact i ts don't know this is an intelligence question. i hate to say this but i think this is something that state can answer a little bit better about how the iaea could reach a broader conclusion. but essentially i think there is something in the agreement t state can answer a little that allows them to make an agreement -- make -- draw a conclusion about iran's -- whether or not iran is in compliance with the terms of the jpoa and that the clock changes in terms of the arms embargo. >> i was not aware of that.
so what you're saying is -- would at circumstances the iaea make that assessment, that in fact they could be accelerated in terms of lifting the ban on ballistic milssles? >> i don't think i'm qualified to answer that question. i think that is something -- >> is there somebody here who can answer that question? t's a pretty critical point. >> we have the closed session. >> i would like to know, is there somebody that can answer that question that is here? that is a critical point? >> i can pursue it in closed session. >> well, i don't understand, be classified? >> we can take a look at what specifically is written in the the in be terms of when various dates -- various milestones take place.
a provision within the jcpoa for adoption day occurring at 8 years or when the iaea has made the broader conclusion. when that takes place -- known as transition day. when that takes place, the u.n. ecurity council can lift the restrictions on ballistic milssles. and there is a whole series of other things which we can detail that would take place at transition day. >> can you point to where that is in the agreement? is this one of these side agreements or is this -- >> no. this is in the agreement. >> where is that in the agreement? >> it's in annex 5, restrictions on ballistic milssles. which is called the implementation plan. and it describes in some detail specifically what will happen on the copy that i have it's the second page of annex 5 in the actual jcpoa, sir.
>> so is this any time within after this -- is -- can you just tell me is it any time after this agreement is implemented that the iaea can then make that assessment or is there a threshhold after a number of years after the implementation of the agreement that the iaea is free to make that assessment? >> well, the threshhold is a lift of a dozen specific things that iran has to satisfy in terms of the iraq heavy water research reactor, heavy water production plants, enrichment capability, and so on, which it has to, as i said, it has to implement and the iaea has to verify that it has in fact implemented each of those steps, which are laid out in great detail in annex 3 of the jcpoa.
realistically, that is going to take some time. but no in this specific thing it's at eight years or when that broader conclusion is reached by the iaea, that iran nuclear-related measures as specified in the jcpoa. >> ok. i think the american people need to be -- certainly need to it. about nuclear-related i think that is very surprising. can you tell me about iran's biological and chemical weapons capabilities and their ability and aponize biological chemical weapons? >> if we can wait to the closed session. >> amazing. ok. i yield back. i think everything is pretty much in closed session. i really question the security classifications that are being in fact be ht
politically embarrassing and anything politically embarrassing seems to be classified. i yield bag back. >> well, we can get some answers if the surprising. can you tell me about iran's biological and state department hadn't refused to get a witness to this hearing. >> i am deeply troubled by the obama administration's last-minute concessions to iran on lifting the conventional weapons and missile embargos. in testimony to this committee the defense intelligence agency stated that "iran's goal is to develop capability that is will allow it to build missile deliverable nuclear weapons." lifting these bans makes no sense. iran's words and actions clearly show its desire in spite of the deal to build longer range and more sophisticated ballistic milssles and proliferate them throughout the region. in february iran conducted its fourth slite launch.
this one aboard a two-stage booster. it is based on the sha has been 3 iran's most advanced ballistic missile. iran's supposedly peaceful program is simply a cover for long range ballistic missile defense. last week the revolutionary president declared that iran is not committed to the restrictions on its missile program. israel is iran's number one target. while the administration says it is doing everything possible to help protect israel, the budgetary record tells a different story and you talked about this when you did your opening statement. i have two charts. could i get those up on the screen for everybody to see. handouts as well.
can we get those up on the hand screen. i was told that we could get hose up. well, the charts in front of you illustrates the administration's request for funding versus actual congressional appropriation. congress consistently appropriates funding much closer to israeli requirements. the first chart covers funding for all israeli missile defense programs. the president requested approximately $158 million for israeli missile defense in fy 2016 budget request. the house and senate bills boutsdz
would appropriate at over 338. so a comparison of 158 to 338 million. a figure closer to israel's actual need. secretary kerry and the president like to tout their support yet year after year the president's budget request ends up much, much lower than congressional appropriations bo would appropriate at over 338. so a comparison of 158 to 338 million. a which are much closer to israel's needs. congress always propets much closer to what israel asks for based on its national security requirements. can you explain this difference? >> congressman, we appropriate what the combination of understanding of what we worked with the government of israel understanding the other requirements for missile defense money that goes to protection of u.s. homeland and at trick lation of u.s. systems and u.s. programs. and the president's recommendation. and gets understanding the ther forwarded to congress.
then we implement the funding that is eventually agreed to by congress and signed off by the president. >> so when the president sends his budget request, it's now up on the screen. i think everybody can see it. year after year the president's budget request is far below what israel asks for. and of course israel is very concerned because now there is an agreement with iran. and it is also far below what congress would like. is that going to change? >> right now? obviously did not change for this year. i don't know the answer to follow on years. >> let's go to the next chart, please. have particular interest in david's sling as the coauthor of david's sling authorization act. the president requested approximately $225 million from fy 11 to fy 16 for david's david's sling as sling. over the same time, according to the government of israel, with which this committee agreed, the actual requirement million. the administration underfunded he requirement by one third.
can we expect this underfunding for david's sling to continue under the iran deal? is this what the administration means by support of israel? >> we will continue to look at u how we can better cooperate on david's sling. the admiral mentioned can we expect this underfunding i'm happy to encourage, if there are any other more details. but that is a this previously. newer program and hence the figures and the viability of those figures changes as we look through. >> thank you. >> the chair now recognizes the gentleman from ohio. > thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to talk to you as our chairman has about one-two-three agreement and nations who have agreements with the united states that may or may not be at risk. i know that whenever we have an open session and closed session there is always a sensitivity between the issue of what is
open and what is closed. so i want to ask you a question about that line. the uae, the united arab emirates, if they picked up the phone and called secretary rry and said we affirm our requirements and our agreements with the united states and our one-two-three agreement and we will not pursue any uranium enrichment -- we can discuss that openly. right? because it's just affirming an jop going commitment that is there that we all know is public. >> yes. the one-two-three agreement with united arab emirates is public. >> but the affirmation of it, the fact that the uae has no it, tion of reevaluating that there is no discussion about pursuing uranium enrichment, that is no concern about the agreement as a result
of agreement with iran. if all that was affirming you would be able to discuss that in this it, hat meeting right because it is all status quo? >> i don't really know the answer to that because i am having a little difficulty following the question. >> let me help you. >> i suspect it would depend on how that was communicated to the united states. if it was made public by a member state, what its intentions were, that would be something i would assume we could discuss if it was something that was passed on -- >> let me help you. there's also prohibitions liing to congress. do you have any information that a nation such as the united arab emirates has contacted the united states and indicated that they intend to walk away from their one-two-three obligation that is restrict uranium enrichment? i have no san jose of that. >> no one has informed you -- no one has informed you from the administration or any other
agency that they have that?ation on >> not me personally. >> so you have had no discussions with anyone that anyone has related to you of their awareness or information of a concern of one-two-three agreement and the united arab emirates and their issues with respect to uranium enrichment? >> to the best of my knowledge no. i am aware of the what the agreement is in the general sense but i have not been involved in any specific discussions on that subject. >> i am troubled by your words specific. have you had unspecific discussions? >> congressman, i have it is all status quo? not had any >> to the discussions or any sp briefings on uae one-two-three agreement. i am aware of it because it is one of the agreements that the united states has with other nations and i have read a lot in the press and in other documents about that particular agreement but not about the specific issue that you raise. >> well, you would certainly be congress takes up the issue of
the iranian agreement, secretary kerry has made absolute statements to congress there is no one in the middle east who will change their obligations with respect to nonproliferation or their to the united states with respect to uranium enrichment. and certainly, if anyone had information that that was other than how the secretary of state has represented it, it should be known by decision makers because they're not just voting on the issue of iran, they're voting on nuclear programs by iran and their neighbors. to th states with respect to uranium enrichment. and certainly, you could see why that would be a level of concern. >> i understand your point. well, we are going into closed session. and i know you have aveiled yourself of the issue of closed session. i am very concerned about the issue of the -- as we look to
the iaea and the portions of the document that are secret with the iaea's relationships and deals with iran concerning inspections. do you have information that you are going to be able to provide us in the closed session concerning seek -- concerning the secret agreement that we have not seen? >> i am willing to discussion that in the closed session. >> do you have details? >> i have information that we can discuss. >> yet we have people willing to vote in favor that include secret plo vision that is no one has seen and you have not either. >> i change the chairman. we can't get into the skiff for 10 more minutes so i am going to allow one more question. >> thank you for indulging me or asking one more question.
i will start with admiral and general and my purpose isn't to put you on the spot. purpose is to get your best judgment. because this is such an that we are ue voting on. it is historic. were you either of you consulted before the negotiators -- whether it was the president -- agreed to drop the ballistic missile embargo on iran as part of the jcpoa? were either of you consulted about that? >> no, sir. >> no, sir. >> and that is what i guess i assumed. what concerns would you two have shared to whoever asked you? >> sir, i will take that first. my focus in missile defense against iran is unchanged by the agreement. we remained entirely focused on
their rapid escalation of and capacity over the last several years. and we made absolutely the right decision to focus on regional defend for that potential escalation. and i can tell you that my job is to be mess mystic not optimistic. and everything we do at the agency is planning for that capability to increase and that at the to increase rate it has. and as far as i'm concerned, we -- and i've read the agreement. we remain focused on that very mission. >> general. >> sir, i represent the chairman and as he has said on the hill before, this agreement addresses one point of friction with iran. >> excuse me? >> this agreement addresses one the last several years. point of friction with iran, the nuclear arena. and that we must keep pressure on the other maligned activities. so as chairman rogers has cited in the beginning, i agree with
the chairman that we must continue to keep pressure on these areas of develop of ballistic milssles. > i will make a comment. it was a nuclear agreement. arms all of a sudden see embargo lifted and ballistic milssles lifted which is -- are nonnuclear issues. there were enough constegses already. but then to add those on top of it really staggers me. general, don't you have a concern about the ballistic missile embargo being lifted? >> again, i will cite champ dempsey's previous statements. in a perfect world, the embargo would remain. but as it is, we remain concerned about this and we must continue to keep pressure. >> thank you. vice ral, and the
admiral, with respect to budget and allocations for missile defense is it fair to say with sequestration technically kicking back in, in october, that that would also affect the support that we could offer for missile defense for our allies in addition to a continuing resolution that could also u offer reduced support and aid? is that fair to say as well? >> well, sir, i don't deal with missile defense in the national nuclear security administration. but let me say that there are a number of very, very important programs that are under way within the department of energy and national nuclear security administration which apply to maintaining a safe secure and effective nuclear arsenal and posturing ourselves for the future that would be severely affected by sequestration or budget caps and without any relief from that. >> sir, from missile defense and i will just talk to your specific concerns on the cr that certainly procurement account pressure would happen. but my more specific concern
earlier was the potential impact on the mill con for poland and e.p.a. phase 3 which gets to your point on exactly what are we doing with our allies and would it affect that and the answer would be yes. for sequestration identify testified in front of this -- i've testified in front of this committee and others that sequestration at the levels that are being considered would be catastrophic to what we proposed with improvements that must be made for homeland defense and the regional defense systems. in particular, the redesign kill vehicle and the new radar would be at risk. identify testified before that i view that as overmatching. if those improvements aren't made our system could be overmatched by 2020. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. the chair is informed that there is one more question. > thank you.
i would recommend that you do pick up the phone and call the secretary of state and ask him if there is any additional information that he should that is you inconsistent with your statements today. and if any information that he needs to update you on. >> i will see if he will take my call. i doubt if an undersecretary from the department of energy would necessarily get sthru on the first try. >> the efforts, since you put such an admiral effort forward here, would probably be helpful. >> thank you for the suggestion, congressman. >> general, representing obviously the joint staff. on an answer on the east coast missile defense site which i am an advocate for, which i don't want to criticize in any respect, i think the admiral has articulated both a need and a desireableness for an east coast missile defense site but has recognized the fiscal constraints on which he is under and has identified that as a problem for excuting the
east coast missile defense site. but eevep though i'm an advocate, i'm obviously not the initiator. we always here on the armed services committee look to the experts, those in the military, as to what their needs are when we as the admiral has so greatly articulated try to allocate resources. general, perhaps you could give us an articulation on the issue of our response to northcom. northcom continues to include in its integrated priority list the need for additional interceptor sites, a third site in the united states in defense of the homeland. we didn't make this up. we're just agreeing that there is a need, which i think the admiral has recognized the need and the benefits of a third site. and in that it is our intent to try to respond to it in allocating resources.
we are the ones who obviously have to pick where those resources come from. we are not telling the admiral we are going to do this and you have to take it from your existing programs. it is something that we have to find the money for. could you articulate that northcom has continued to identify on the priority list, that still sounds pretty important. is it? >> yes. but if you want to listen to i have to defer to the admiral, sir. >> admiral. >> thank you. it has showed up in their priority list. sir, have to defer i would jus, that it is a priority list in terms of there are many other requirements in that list that we are addressing and we can go through that in sir, that detail in termed of funding allocated. >> but what i was looking for -- i understand your prior answer of allocation of resources and priorities. but i wanted your answer either
-- on the issue of -- or actually need. showing up on the integrated priority list it's a need. could you describe the need? >> the need or the benefit is operational. and capacity. >> and what would that be? >> it would allow more interceptors, which is always better in terms of the war fighter. and it would allow more cision space as both combatant commanders have testified to. >> explain decision space. >> an icbm in particular and what that would provide in terms of interceptor flyout time and future assessment capability. and i will just leave it at that. >> well, i have a minute and a half. i would like you to not leave it at that. >> obviously proximity is one. east coast is closer to alaska where the other missiles might be coming from. >> geographicically. >> and you said additional decision making. that would be an issue of what we have referred to and you have referred to as look, see
-- look, shoot. right? >> you have apply an asset to n incoming asset have an opportunity to assess whether the united states, hundreds of americans at risk require an additional shot. correct? >> sir. >> so that's what you're talking about. the ability to shoot twice, the iblet to try to take something out of the sky, the ability to eliminate a threat to mainland united states. >> sir i would just qualify that by having a first shot opportunity sooner. >> thank you for elaborating. >> i think that's it. before we do go into closed session, i do want to ask you something i think you can answer in your open session. in your prepared statement you site iranian claims it will launch a space launch vehicle as early as this year and it will be capability of intercontinental blistic ranges. didn't they test that earlier
>> this weekend, politics, books, and american history. speeches by two republican presidential candidates. sunday at 6:35 p.m. two profile interviews with grop candidates. first former new york governor talks about his political career. then former pennsylvania rick santorum talks about his time in congress, his 2012 presidential presidential run and why he is is running again. aturday at 8:45 p.m.
scarlett letters. he ever increasing intoll rabs of the cult of liberalism that argues progressives have become intolerant to political views. sunday, minnesota senator talks about her life and political career with u.s.a. today washington bureau chief susan page on american history tmp v saturday at 8:00 p.m. on lectures and history. paul christopher anderson teaches a class on how former south carolina confederates viewed reconstruction in the wake of the civil war. he discusses how some white southerners justified and even romanticized their defeat and motives for fighting. sunday afternoon, the landmark u.s. supreme court decision in loving v. virginia ruled it was to prohibit al interracial marriage at the virginia historical society author and history professor
examines the context and legacy of loving v. virginia, the complexities of the case and how it affected similar legal hallenges. let's talk a little bit about the latest on the iran legislation in the house and senate. >> you end up with a very sort of crazy legislative situation here. you have resolutions of disapproval. what you have is democrats fill bustering to stop the disapproval from going forward. tend result of this democrats
by this have sustained the president's position. they are allowing the president a free hand to go ahead and lift the sanctions as the president wants to do. the vote -- there were 58 senators who wanted to overturn the deal or block the deal. there were 54 of those republicans and four of those democrats. and then you had 42 members of the democratic caucus. so 40 democrats and two democrats leaning independent voting for the filibuster. so one more than the absolute number needed to sustain a filibuster. so a fairly close vote. mitch mcconnell said they will try again next week. so unless there's some major pressure back home on those 42 democrats, it's unlikely that anything changes. but there will be another revote next week. overall though the fact that votes are exactly where we thought they would be going in with those 42 democrats, the democratic supporters, means that the president will have a free hand come september 17th and thereafter to lift the sanctions that the u.s. had
and to unfreeze the money that iran is seeking in this deal. >> and you mentioned senator mcconnell of kentucky. also had an exchange with senator harry reid of nevada. tell us about what happened between those two today. >> well, there's been a big debate over terminology here and whether what actually went on is a filibuster because -- and democrats said they didn't want a filibuster they just want add straight vote on blocking the deal -- or blocking the disapproval resolution but they still wanted that to be at a 60 vote threshhold, which is a traditional threshhold for a filibuster. so you had a lot of terminology turned around. in the end it got heated back and forth when mcconnell said look this is so serious we need to stay on this. you all are going to get another chance to vote on this and we hope you change your mind next week. and reid said we've already shown where we are.
the one thing that may be just as interesting, there are a number of democrats who while they voted to sustain the president's hand in this are looking to put political distance between themselves and the president because this is vsh unpopular. so democrats are already talking about next step. other legislation even though they sustained the deal they want some more get tough measures that they want to try to enact through congress. mcconnell told them you had a chance to say what you thought on iran. so if you are going to come up with new proposals you had better be sure you have a two thirds majority of cosponsors in the senate before we will take it up because we need to be able to prove that we can override a presidential veto. which the republicans could not have done in this situation. they want to be sure if they are going to do any more legislation that they can override a presidential veto. so some tough talk and saying you the ell
senate vote? >> it was essentially a statement saying you took this vote today. you are going to have to live with this as you face voters in 2016. >> then the white house, what has been the reaction from president obama after of victor though he got less than a majority of support for his deal in the senate he claimed victory out of it and claimed a mandate for his position, which of course is to lift the sanctions. his argument is that the only -- that it was a choice between this international deal because of the stance of our international partners on it. it was either this deal or else he would have no choice but to conduct military strike. this was his option. he was hoping for. and he said because the senate did filibuster to sustain his position that was a victory for him. so he claimed it was essentially a victory for national security. >> over in the house, let's turn in that direction. ey began debate on three measures today, voted on those already. where do things stand there and what are their plans for tomorrow? >> as this thing is already confusing enough after the senate. the house had originally as of
a day or so ago had been planning to do the same thing as the senate hold a vote on a resolution disapproving the iran deal. but as of today all those plans are off instead they've already voted on a resolution that declares the 60-day clock, the review period that congress has to look over this deal, hasn't actually started. they argue that because there are certain side agreements between iran and the international atomic energy agency that aren't public and that haven't been submitted to congress, they argue well that means that the actual start of the 60-day review period hasn't officially started. the senate republican leaders have rejected that but house republican leaders moved forward with that and it was a straight party line vote today where republicans said that's true. the clock hasn't started. so they put that position out there. and then tomorrow they will be voting on a resolution of approval. so sort of the opposite of the vote that the senate took. this is a resolution of approval, which republican leaders intend to defeat.
and then they will also be voting on a resolution or a statement that would say the president should not lift sanctions until january basically giving enough time for all these other questions over whether the clock had started ticking to get started out. so we expect i guess the first of those which is already passed, the resolution stating that the clock hasn't startedtology. that's already passed we epect the resolution telling the president not to lift sanctions until january also to pass. and then we expect the resolution that would approve of the president's deal to fail. that would the the house equivalent, the house's statement that they disapprove of the deal. there's a lot of technical reasons they're doing the resolution of approval that they would to fail. >> just briefly what happens if nothing makes its way to the president from congress? >> here's where it gets a little convoluted because of what the house has done.
the house is argue the clock hasn't started ticking. that creates a bit of a legal problem for the president and may open up for a lawsuit if somebody can find standing to sue over this. but as things stand right now the president believes that as of september 17 he has the authority to lift the sanctions. essentially agreed with that by going ahead with the process it's gone ahead with. so as of next week if congress takes no action under the law that the congress wrote and the president signed earlier this year, the nuclear agreement review act, the president will then have the authority to lift those sanctions and carry out the deal the other parts of the deal with no action from congress. >> thanks for joining us. >> my pleasure. >> the house considering three bills dealing with the iran nuclear agreement part one was approved yesterday. that bill says the white house documents on documents on
side deals. the second part debated yesterday the resolution approving of the iran nuclear deal. and the final bill being would prevent president obama from lifting sanctions on iran. here's the debate on the so-called side deals on the iran agreement. the bottom line those of us that were involved in this agreement, we always obama fromth the iran agreement or not, one thing i think all members can agree on is that sound verification must viable drock of any
agreement. iran cannot cheat and get away with it, and the reason this is an issue for us is because iran has cheated on every past agreement. that's why the verification was so important. the problem is key aspects of this verification agreement have not been presented to congress to review. indeed, there are two separate arrangements agreed to between iran and an arm of the u.n. here, the international atomic energy agency. one is regarding the regime's past bomb work of which there are a thousand pages of evidence that the iaea tell us about, and the other involves access to the iranian military base at parchin where that evidence shows that that testing took place. in order to fully assess the agreement, members of congress
should have access to these documents. this is especially important since iran will almost certainly treat these arrangements and setting a -- as setting a standard for future iaea requests to assess any suspicious sites, especially military sites since they have made it clear nobody is going to their military sites. physical access by the iaea to parchin is critical to understanding iran's past bomb work. this is where iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel, to quote the iaea. and why did they do it? to conduct experiments related to the development say the international inspectors, of nuclear weapons. iran has blocked their access, the international inspectors'
access, to parchin for years, and in the meantime we are told by those inspectors that they watch on spy satellite as iran bulldozes and paves over the site. and then paves over the site again. if the international inspectors cannot attain a clear understanding of the experimentation that took place, then the united states will have great difficulty figuring out how long it would take iran to rush towards a nuclear weapon. in recent congressional testimony, administration officials expressed confidence in their access to suspicious sites that the agreement provides the iaea. yet these separate angments -- arrangements have the potential to seriously weaken our ability to verify the agreement as a whole if it is true that iran is going to do self-inspections here which is what iran asserts. mr. speaker, the history of iranian negotiating behavior as
we know is to pocket past concessions and then what do they do? they push for more and more and more. the separate arrangement agreed to between the iaea eniran regarding inspection of the facilities facility's a departure will almt certainly be regarded by that government, in iran as a president. their iaea access to future suspicious sites. in other words, you do not get access to this site, you will not get access to other military sites where there is evidence that the same type of thing has occurred. iran will not let international expect there's do these inspecting today, what makes us think that they will to theserusive terms agreements in the future, after sanctions have been lifted. i have little doubt