tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN November 23, 2015 10:30pm-12:01am EST
the position that that is not the goal that we should be shooting for an stop talking -- and start talking about how close we are. >> with that, we have one minute left for your comments. >> it is a decision that was important in constitutional law. it is generally considered the most important constitutional law case of the 20th century. paradox because of all of the things we have talked about, brown was not considered to be a common-law case. there are many questions about the vestiges the court uses but over time, it is expected as the
right principle, the court did the right thing, that is important, it sets a high bar, high aspirations for us. as justice marshall said, so many times, we are still climbing toward its goal. >> jefferson promise that all men are created equal, yet he owned slaves. it took until gettysburg for lincoln to make the promise of declaration closer to a reality. several amendments try to enshrine that in the constitution but it took one century after that for brown to begin to make the promise of the declaration and the reconstruction amendments a reality but we certainly have not come close to achieving that promise for the reasons we have been discussed. >> thank you for being with us for this installment of them are cases, looking at the decision of brown versus the board of education. thank you for being part of our audience.
strengthened the legality of evidence against award to be used in a criminal trial in state court. you can also learn more about c-span's name are cases series online -- c-span's landmark cases series online. written by veteran journalist tony mauro and published by c-span in cooperation with cq press. c-span has the best access to congress with live coverage of
examination of the future of europe following recent terrorist attacks. at midnight, another chance to see landmark cases. later, david cameron on u.k. national security. now, a forum on what is next for france in europe following recent terrorist attacks. topics include why france is a target and how the international community should respond. this is 90 minutes.
>> i don't need to tell anybody in this town, when there is a terrorist outrage like this, the reaction is often fast and furious and rarely well considered. times, we have come to regret that. i think that we understand that the politics of the moment that the body politics demands a response to outrages like this and so, a response it will have. what good would like to do here because we don't have to be is tod to any office think about how that response can be consistent with the public desires but also as smart and considered as we can make it and i think that we have an acellent opportunity to have
somewhat calm her conversation we have a because really excellent panel and an excellent group of people to discuss it and we are going to try to do it from a few different angles. the second speaker is from carnegie. he will talk about the links between french policy in the middle east. be lordd speaker will is the figural correspondent here in washington and he will talk about president don't want -- president francois
hollande on's visit to washington and moscow. and finally, my colleague kim l curry she -- effectstalk about the of the french reaction and the attacks on the broader european migration and refugee debate. started with felipe. >> perhaps just to give you a quick summary of what happened. i'm sure you have been following the news. heard at itsen heart by terrorists for the second time in one year. , it wasn't charlie supermarkets but in every level of society, music lovers, soccer fans, young professionals having dinner.
that perhaps explains some of the reaction that jeremy was describing. on the night of november 13, several attacks took place around paris at the stade de france, on the streets and at the bataclan theater where 89 people were feared -- were killed. 130 people were killed and 400 wounded. that makes it the worst terrorist attack in france since world war ii in the bloodiest in europe since the, 2004. french society is in a state of shock. just french society but i the main reason is because these attacks have been random. it could have been any city.
it is not just friends. been arussels which has ghost city. it has been beirut. it has been shut marshak, where the civilians were shut down. it has even been in mali. a different organization. it is a wave of terrorism i will ask three questions to get the conversation started. the first question, perhaps the most difficult to answer -- a lot of my friends have been asking me -- why has france been targeted? why not others? first of all, other countries have been targeted later or before, but at this level is is
thursday perhaps the fact that france has a fifth-largest defense budget, they have been using it against the islamic state. as well as africa and the middle east. as you know, president along giving special power to the police. that is an immediate response. that has been supported by french political parties, all of them. that is the local response, as well as the arrest and killing of some of the terrorists involved. not all of them, i must say. the second response has been to send the charge the -- charles de gaulle aircraft carrier to the east mediterranean. the last response is the depth -- diplomatic response.
prime minister cameron, meeting on wednesday, with a visit to moscow on thursday. i would say that these meetings are critical, they are helping to define the strategy. i have to say, the end of that process will be monday, when 100 world leaders gather in paris for the prop 21 climate conference. this will be away also to attract attention. in addition to a number of measures, such as france invoking the mutual defense and the u.n. unanimously voting for resolution against the islamic state.
my worries, first they will talk about that. the european corporation and security, the fact that the french president is meeting his counterparts in the u.k. in germany are important gestures, increasing the defense budget of these nations are important, but that's not necessarily the case for germany. you know, europe is in deep trouble. not just because of this terrorist attack, but also the energy crisis. i think that france has to show certain leadership.
that is what president, -- president hollande, who is not seen as internationally minded, but who has become not just a world leader but a warmonger, a bit unexpected, perhaps. i think he has used a sort of adequate response so far. i think that the strategy has to be international cooperation at all levels. >> ok, first the response, then a strategy. sounds a good plan. france needs to take a leadership vision. how do people in the middle east feel about that, joseph? joseph: thank you very much for giving me the occasion to cross the demarcation line between our institutions. >> you have a 90 minute visa. [laughter]
joseph: i will probably prolong what philip just said. what's the strategy, what to do in the middle east? what are the words on the arab component in france? a few words to diffuse some cliches about that. first of all, there is a debate in france now about some thinkers and pundits saying that this is after all a legitimate answer of isis to the anti-muslim policies, etc.. just a reminder to square off these issues. the french active involvement in the anti-isis campaign has really started or upgraded as of september 27, with the strikes. i'm not sure that operationally a terrorist attack like the one that happened doesn't need much more time than that. i think it was probably boot prior to that.
the second argument to that, and philippe alluded to those charlie attacks, those happened before france got into the airstrike operation in syria or iraq. this is something that we also have to keep in mind. isis does not really need a pretext or an excuse to hit tomorrow the u.s.? it could hit in sweden or somewhere else. this is something that we have to keep in mind. the second thing of importance, yes, is an element that distinguishes isis and a muslim arab european phenomenon that is growing. europeans -- belgians and friend , born in belgium, all of them by national, they are european. it's not a question of foreign
cohort crossing the mediterranean. it is inside of us that it is happening. this fends off something important for the future and for our strategy. on that level, the first important remark on that point is that if you look at the statement that isis published after the attack, it's very important to notice the wording. the statement uses a term, strike. in the islamic philosophy of the theory of four, it is something applied in the islamic cosmology. something that is part. meaning that isis considers now that europe or the united states, due to the muslim nation.
it is not for the remote enemy, it is the kind of attempt. these are some points i just want to remind you of. they will weigh on the debate. what will france do? what can we expect out of that? first of all of course, you have seen it. france will upgrade strikes over most of, today, for the first time in a long time french aircraft have taken off from the charles de gaulle this morning to hit iraq. of course, france will be much more active in the airstrike campaign.
this is probably based on the output of the meeting, and if they agree on that they will accompany. this is a departure of the former french reluctance to do that. i will explain this in a second. the second important dynamic at play in france, something i would like to really have in mind to understand what is happening in france, this is strong and probably this will increase. there is a strong pressure that is going to be exerted on the french leadership personally, politically, to change the course over here. even inside the socialist party, from the intel and military
communities, what are we doing with these ambiguous forces? let us talk to a sod, pollutant, the iranians. it is already coming in the large parts in france. it is in order to stop the rise. will that lead to a change? this is a huge political loss for francois hollande. usually politicians don't like to admit that. this is also my personal opinion , on syria in iraq. the software of the flat --
french diplomacy on syria, yes, isis is a monster that grew for a reason. this reason has to do with the rotten situation in syria and europe. unless we tackle this issue, we will not be able to tackle the isis issue. this leads me to my last point. i think that in this diplomatic tour that has been described, this is exactly what francois hollande would be saying. this morning and tomorrow, the message to the u.k. at u.s., partners and allies in france, is that we would have to exchange more, have better intelligence cooperation. however, politically -- and i think that this will be said to obama tomorrow -- we also have to focus much more on syria. this american approach to isis, with the different shading a little bit, having a strong strategy against isis in iraq, a
losing strategy over syria, probably have to change. this is probably what hollande would say. let us do together the things on syria. we have the program to do it. this will be the message to our -- to the french western partners. with russia -- i think that this is probably the most important part of his tour, the first day in russia, the message will be more difficult to convey. you are fighting isis since the first of september. so far we all know that your strikes have had very little to do with isis. you have hit 85% of non-isis targets. if you really want us to build a large coalition that you want us to build, let us focus on isis and not on other things also. focus on isis and call the mutual bluff, in a way.
also, the second point, which will be much more difficult, is to focus on the political component. by saying that we all know that handling isis, vanquishing isis, eliminating isis, it will never work if we still put aside the question of the rebuilding of political hysteria. that has to do with the question of the regime. by the way, this is what hollande will probably add, two weeks ago in vienna we agreed thathis is what needed to be done. this morning vladimir putin saw how many and a statement was issued, a very strong re-insistence on the fact that the question is something that is not to be discussed. that it is none of the business
of the foreign powers. and that the west -- this was very worrying for me, coming from russia and iran together, the rest -- the west is hypocritical, alluding that the west has created isis. i don't know if you can partner in a battle against isis if one of your partners still believes that you are the root cause of creating the enemy you are fighting. these are the things that i think will weigh on the climate of thursday. of course, if i have to answer jeremy's question about -- what do people in the middle east expect? i think that this time the analysis comes from across the board. probably we would say much more, but this is exactly the way that things are seen. things are seen as the following. you cannot build a proper ground force in order to take on isis. moreover, you westerners don't
want to put boots on the ground, which is i think a wise and clever decision. if you don't want to do it, probably it is the best thing not to do, you will have to rely him the people on the ground. kurds, arabs, tribes, etc.. to do that, you cannot in battle. addressing the question of the change in syria at some point. in the community we have the platform for that, altogether let's put a roadmap and calendar up for that. too close, i would say that the pressure to change course and abandon the discourse that so far exist are the two sides of the same coin. the battle together will remain probably in the deep software.
however, what has changed for a time is probably a different priority. he will likely much more focused on militarily isis. and then the question of the regime and the political solution will likely be put on the longer. in the process of vienna he will likely be more instrumental. i don't think that we have to expect a change of strategy, but we can expect a change in focus in the short term. thank you. >> laure, is that how you see the visits the present is making
to washington and moscow? mr. lecorre: -- [no audio] >> why don't we had over two kamal and get the technical working. ms. mandeville: now it seems to work. sorry, i'm taking the word back. so, yes, tomorrow we have the meeting. we have a lot of questions in very few answers about the things that are happening. we have a president coming, francois hollande, who is telling us that this is a game changer. that these brutal attacks on our nation are changing the whole political game. i think that when president obama meets francois hollande, he is going to wait for hollande
to tell him what he wants to do. what strikes me is that in a way the contrast in the situation between these two men, they worked very much on the same line for quite a while. they were absolutely in line concerning syrian policy. the french more in 2013, obama decided not to do anything when he crossed the fame's redline on chemical weapons, the french wanted to go for a much more muscular approach. after that the same line was in france, paris, and washington. neither bishara nor the islamic states, neither strategy. there was an article by the person in charge of the president. she was saying that there was
some kind of quoting of a diplomat, at close member weather was some kind of marginalization of use with the minister in favor of a new approach. the quintessential symbol of this very deliberately, you know, neither neither approach. sort of a very strong criticism of assad. in the context that we have today, does that mean that there is going to be some kind of shift? i must say i'm quite worried about the french context, actually. there is this huge emotional situation in france. the political class, especially on the right, as joseph underlined, is in line on this change of policy. a very strong anti-american feeling is growing in france. look at president obama. look at america. it certainly is feckless.
they are not helping us. they actually created the situation with iraq. now they are not handling it. they are neither engaged nor committed. why not turn to the russians? at the same time you have a huge propaganda operation that has been going on for actually quite a few years in france from the russians. the russians actually using a lot of different weak points to underline that america is this decadent place and that europe should go back to its roots, to its christian roots, the vladimir putin may be the defender and chief of these christian european roots. i see that it makes you laugh but it is pretty effective the altra right parties throughout europe are becoming somehow the new common hand on which some
people say the putin hand in which russia, moscow is relying to spread this idea that you need strong leaders and have to have a change in europe. this is coming in strongly. at the moment you have nicolas sarkozy, who used to be the best friend of america, the most pro-atlantic person in france and political figure when he became president for the first time, he went to moscow a few weeks before the attack and actually spoke in favor of a much more -- much closer partnership with russia. he criticized very harshly the fact that president hollande had not sold the mistrial to russia in the middle of the ukrainian
crisis, calling it despicable and horrible that he had done that. you have the former prime minister and presidential candidate, misaligned with someone staying away from that. this is quite a strong pressure on the president. so, really, the situation is fascinating. a bit like in the 30's, france, europe was between two geopolitical strategic threats. on the one hand you have nazi germany. on the other hand you have the italians, then you have the soviet union and soviet threat. of course, you cannot compare, it's up the same kind of threat we have now, but these are clearly too geostrategic threats weighing upon europe.
one, and aggressive russia that has destroyed the international law and order that existed in europe by annexing crimea, which stabilized in ukraine and has been extremely pushy and aggressive, intimidating the countries like the baltic states , being extremely pushy and their relationships with many countries in eastern europe, trying to have a much better relationship with the germans, having the vice president of germany pleading for a big alliance with the russians, decidedly reluctant to do so because of angela merkel. so, this is the context of francois hollande. next to him tomorrow you will have president obama welcoming him to the white house.
president obama, i must say, when i arrived in washington in 2009 i was really struck that the spirit in washington was that europe was this postmodern, even post historical place, where nothing would ever even happen. there were only these 20 -- how many? 27 countries? trying to settle some kind of bureaucratic issue? it's not important anymore. europe is some kind of slowly rotting -- maybe we should give it to asia. there was very little interest in europe and very little awareness of the dangers that were growing. i have been covering russian issues for 20 years. i just went back from the georgia war when i arrived in washington. i arrived in december to washington. the people did not seem to see that russia was becoming a
serious an obvious threat to european security. there was not this awareness, which was strange. there was also a total underestimation of the islam question in europe. i know that it's kind of politically incorrect to talk about a muslim question in europe, but you know, despite the fact that the president and many people here think that there is -- it's not about this plan, what's going on. it's not about all of islam, but it is about a branch of islam that is at war with western civilization. it wants to destroy it. this lack of awareness created the situation in which the elite in the united states decided to blame the supposedly racist institutional system in france,
supposedly and timelessly not giving any space in france instead of seeing that there was a defined and brutal ideology threatening europe and, also, huge part of the muslim world. i think that this is the context. now you have this situation. i was pretty critical of the lack of the awareness from the administration in the past, but i have seen -- i understand the caution of president obama why. the french are coming with a plan that is not a plan, actually. i think it you said we need a strategy now. what is the strategy? i understand why president obama is asking -- what is the
strategy? is it just to embrace russia and go for some kind of declaration? we have to understand what it means. does it mean for the french to give up on the idea that we are going to push for a sod being away? we have to state that quite clearly, right? second, are the french -- do they want to go for a military option? are they ready for a serious option? not just a few strikes, but i don't know, some kind of safe haven that would actually have some kind of consequence for securing the situation of refugees and preventing them from coming to europe? a secure haven potentially for a military position that could be reinforced? are the french ready to put some ground forces on the ground? french decisions that were made in europe to ally with europeans and tell them -- you don't want refugees, so why don't you also put some troops on the ground and some peacekeeping
operations? we have to really clarify all of that before we indeed ask for some kind of grand coalition. these are very serious questions and they have to be asked in pretty blunt ways. thank you. >> thanks. kamal, france has a problem with islam. maybe europe does too. how do you see this affecting europe? kamal: i knew that the issue of islam would turn around and come to me. >> let me take on the earlier remark that this branch of islam is at war with the west. frankly, i disagree with that. i think it is at war with the whole of the world.
so far it is other muslims, islamists, who have suffered the most from what isis represents. if today there are 4.2 million refugees in neighboring countries, a good proportion of it may still be less than half. we could work on the mathematics of it, have been displaced into neighboring countries because of isis. one could make similar remarks about the internally displaced as well. today in "the washington post" there is a great piece on this turkish town on the border in syria. the destruction speaks for itself.
a lot of construction was brought on because of isis. i think that we need to be clear about that. what i would like to do to tie this up is a piece that a very good friend and colleague of ours islamabad extremism, it's a piece today and the turkish daily newspaper. he says -- don't give isil the islamic phobia it seeks. he will be critical when responding or developing a strategy that france, the united states and others will need to
develop. also, to address this issue of islamic phobia, it has been part and parcel of the presence in europe and elsewhere. very critical not to drift into essentialism, which i think has happened on many occasions in the past. there was a brief remark about the late 30's and recently in the media in bc there has been a number of pieces in a lot of these in the way that jewish refugees were treated in the late early's with some of the reaction to the syrian refugees coming out of the united states.
itself. i would like to make a second remark that in some ways lines up with the question that jeremy raised. one of the greatest successes of the european integration project is the removal of borders. for someone like myself, who might be amongst one of their a few people in this audience who might remember the late europe of the 50's and 60's, who when crossing every frontier, europe, yugoslavia, italy, france, they could take anything from up to two or three hours and you could sense, as a young lad sitting in the back of my dad's car, i could sense that at each border there were huge walls. those walls were not necessarily just physical walls. they were walls of prejudice. walls of attitudes toward the other when you cross from france into italy or from that matter from britain into france.
to me that great success of removing borders is what also needs to be reflected on when addressing this issue of what strategy to develop in the coming days and weeks. last point, jeremy, references were made earlier on to refugees and it has come up on a number of occasions and in that respect in the context of what has happened in paris, as horrible as it is, the bill should not be paid by these people. a good chunk of them are middle-class people. teachers, doctors, shopkeepers with their kids. what is striking for the connoisseur when you look at the pictures is that these are usually families with children. the reason they are moving on is precisely because of what's
happening in syria. an inability to address those challenges. that's one point that must not be forgotten. the second is that today in the huffington post there was a brilliant piece saying more for europe. the euro crisis, when first corrupting, there were doomsday scenarios of how this was it, the end of european integration. somehow europe, as it has done in the past, has succeeded in addressing the challenge of the eurozone crisis as far as we can see. a similar attitude needs to be done, because the stakes are high. the 30's, 50's, 60's, it was a different europe and you cannot right away at the borders with
the achievements in europe, maybe the answer again lies not more in france, croatia or hungary for that matter, but more of europe. i think i had better shut up year to allow someone else to speak. jeremy: thanks for shutting up. [laughter] before we go out to the audience i will ask a question or so to each of the participants. i have to say, in listening to these rich presentations i started to learn a lot, then i unlearned it, that i learned it again, so i'm a bit confused and i would like to try to bring it all home. the thing that most confuses me is -- something that laura got at, what is the plan?
we have been talking a lot about reactions. obviously we don't really know what each, the french, russians, and americans want to do, but for me it's difficult to connect these actions to the strategies that were discussed. maybe we will start with felipe and ask you -- there have been these military attacks. they have a certain satisfying quality to them. isis attacks paris, we attack. that's quite biblical, if we are talking about a return to christian france. how does that fit into a plan to prevent terrorism attacks in paris france? joseph was talking about the fact that i sipped dust isis is the result of socioeconomic governance problems.
among others. in the region. it doesn't seem like bombing a city from the air can really affect that in any great group -- great way. just makes more victims. what are those military attacks actually for? a sense of revenge? or do they actually have a more strategic purpose? mr. lecorre: as you know, the history of france in the arab world is a bold and complex one. obviously there are different elements there. one element, the fact that france is a military, diplomatic power that does have alliances with a number of entries in africa. and in the middle east it has
decided, as was said before, to go for regime change. at least it will medically. as far as the military actions are concerned, there is obviously a similarity with what happened on 9/11. jeremy: does that make you nervous? mr. lecorre: yes, it does, actually. except it's much smaller scale and, i believe, the post-9/11 in iraq invasion, ordered by the bush administration, was about regime change. i don't think we are going for that at this point. on the other hand you have a french president who has another 15 months to go in his term.
the original election is coming up in two weeks. we haven't spoken much about the rise in things like that, but the french people have been shocked. there is a sense that something needs to be done. so to speak, the headquarters of isis are in syria. those who have committed the crimes were in europe. most of them either blew themselves up or were killed by the police. so, the dual approach of using counterterrorism and police actions and military actions is some kind of political response to what the french public is asking. arguably, it's not a strategy because something just happened on november 13.
the strategy would be the plan. what are we going to do in syria? what are we going to do in the middle east? maybe jozef has the answer, so i will let him speak now. i think that on the political level, something had to be done. it's actually quite painful for francois hollande, who is a socialist. i do believe that he has much military knowledge or background to become a war leader. you could say that about a lot of elected politicians. but he has a very strong, very efficient defense minister. but that doesn't make them more powerful than they are.
the french military is overstretched. the fact that they had to conduct operations in france and overseas to make their lives complicated. obviously if you compare the french military to the u.s. military, we are not talking about the same levels. there are troops everywhere. because there is this need for political action, i think that striking isis was right. jeremy: i don't envy the position of francois hollande, but i think that something had to be done, so he bombed the city -- that's not a very encouraging concept for a strategy. joseph, i would love to have you respond to that, if you want to. i wanted to ask you a somewhat separate question. you really got at this critical divide between the u.s. and
russians. there was some disagreement as to which side the french were on on it, but over this question of assad. you made the case very strongly that you cannot really deal with isis until you have dealt with or without dealing with assad. the russian view is that you essentially can deal with isis that he is a critical part of the anti-isis coalition in part because it's the only thing holding the rest of syria together. in part because he has a lot of forces on the ground in there are no other groups in that coalition. to listen to laura, i think that the french, even some of the americans have been a little attracted to this concept. can you tell us quite directly, what is wrong with this?
mr. bahout: first of all, very quickly, your three-point arguments are factually wrong, the three of them. assad is holding 20% of the territory, not syria. the syrian armory -- army has become a shadowy corpse. it is perhaps at 25% of its original capacity. three, so far assad has not shown a lot of willingness to fight isis either. we can multiply that. i think the russian view is -- this is where i also said before so far according to all the reports that we read that are probably serious, russia has 20 percent of the strikes over isis and the rest over something else . i will come back to that by answering or reacting to philip.
first of all, i don't want to enter into a franco french argument, the french socialism has sometimes been good at wars. it's not a very fortunate example, but they made some good military operations. some are well respected as antiterrorist operations. france did not have to do that. the question is not air support. if i take the risk to answer your question, what would be the strategy? maybe it will help me to bridge or connect the dots with what was said before. what would be the strategy? first off, i would be a bad ogre. we will have attacks again. attacks are to be expected. france, belgium, england, i hope not in the u.s., but we have to expect them. it's not something from the coming months.
yes, also, a military answer is required. of course you have to hit. not because you have to take revenge, but because you have really hammered the operational capacities of these people to organize, network, expose the device to europe, train people and etc.. if you only do that, you will not do anything. first of all, fine-tuning them, this will be partially discussed. probably better special operations. however, in coordination. if you don't do that, here i transitioned to my political power, if you don't do that with local partners on the ground, you can do the targeted killings that you want, as much as you want, you can kill the finance minister and oil minister of
isis, he will be replaced in the days after. you will have to have a local partner on the ground. this is where the second part of the strategy is. it is perhaps a much more integrated political strategy that we need today. isis is in syria and iraq. you really have to approach it in one way, more or less, which is not to further the american posture. second, why are you approaching it? in a rack why would you say that we have to find a political transition and we found it by working with local tribesmen -- why don't we apply exactly the same argument in syria, where the case is more compelling? you will have to tackle this issue at some point. but what are the obstacles? indigenous, you say in english?
it fills the gap. i think the cup -- the problems are threefold. the first problems are russia. we are not sure that they are on that part of the agenda. this is where i agree with you, i think that the possibility of holding a grand coalition with russia is fragile because of that. so, we have to call the bluff of russia, which is not a strong challenge to russia. saying to them -- we have not only signed together, but coproduced and cosponsored the geneva to platform and began a prop -- platform two weeks ago, in which we said we had to find a proper way to transition the power in syria. i don't want to get into ideological words that could lead to intellectual blackmail. yes, this is the regime change. transition is regime change, but
it is a device that would take 18 months according to vienna that would lead to the ousting of bashar from the picture. yes, it is regime change. you must agree that this is the only way to dry up the swamp within which isis is swimming. if you don't do that, you will have more. the second obstacle is an american obstacle. you have a president that still has 12 months in office. he also still has to digest and finish digesting the iran deal. anything he will do or not do in syria and iraq is suddenly to do that. i understand that from a political place, however this is the catch-22. we need a more proactive president here with a more proactive american strategy that needs to say bluntly to the americans and iranians -- look, this is what we have to do to slow the issue. however, probably he doesn't want to do it. first, enough is enough and
second, we don't really want to antagonize the iranians, which i also firmly understand. the third obstacle is an arab sunni obstacle. of course, you are not today finding arab sunni partners in syria. you don't have the assad component in your strategy. we talked about this. however, what's lacking, and to however, what's lacking, and to be fair in the blame on everybody, you don't have a proper arab sunni geopolitical component. your partners are not fully on board with that. first of all, of course there is the assad component that is lacking. second we can say, probably they don't really want to fight isis because of some reason. i don't really want to get into that. brookings had a paper on that today by your excellent colleague, saying that the links between saudi arabia and isis could be murky. of course there is that. operationally there is a problem , the gulf states are today sunk
in another theater that is much more vital for them, yemen. of course, when it goes too much, you have no strategy because you have a lot of things to integrate. but if you want to have a strategy, better to take all the pieces of the puzzle and try to put them somewhere. without a proper military answer, it is not only a kind of revenge, but the first weeks, the french population, you have to show that they are taking revenge, but then you have to do something more. second, politics is about syria, with a proper, frank, and resident dialogue. look, isis is partly something
that comes from view, from your habitat. please, help us in doing that. for that journey, this is something you are very much concerned about, we had this dialogue. for that you have to have a western leadership and part of it is an american leadership and part of it, so far at least from the point of view of france and the arabs. jeremy: you are saying that they need to confront the iranians. they need to round up the sunni powers who don't have an interest in this. they need an additional -- an indigenous force on the ground
they can be the ground force. why not drop mana from heaven? this seems to be a harsh requirement that they failed to do in iraq. mr. bahout: just one word, two weeks from now we were sitting where john kerry was active. we produced a paper that said exactly this. either we produce papers that we don't believe in -- so stop producing them, or we produce papers and we are spending our words. when john kerry said last week -- solving syria is a matter of weeks, not months, frankly i am asking myself -- where is he living? not where i am living area jeremy: on that i guess we could agree.
laure, i would love for you to react to that. you mentioned marine le pen. i'm wondering how this sort of french right-wing politics are affecting this response were going to affect the response. what is she and the front nationale going to do to take advantage of this? ms. mandeville: it just said something very interesting, this outline of potential strategy, saying that is what obama should do. what is interesting is i think over the summer, as far as i know from good sources, the americans have been precisely trying to do that. that is exactly what john kerry has been trying to do going to sochi to meet with clinton -- pu tin, getting the saudis to talk to the russians.
>> and the iranians. ms. mandeville: there was this discrete game going on over the summer. the americans telling some sources it was going to work, it was not so bad, we are getting there. now, john kerry is saying we will be there in a matter of weeks. the question is that we are not sure it is going to work. you have to push the russians. but why would the russians give up? this is the question i have. why would they? what would push the russians to give up on a side -- assad when they've been using assad to keep their big influence in syria and at the same time divide europe along lines. it is a much bigger geopolitical
game for the russians and syria is the way to get to the central point of strategy for russia, which is the relationship with europe and antagonism and confrontation of the united states, which i think is at the core of putin's policy. this is the question i have. i have another question, can syria still exist as a country? i remember over the summer, i had an interview with the former c.i.a. and n.s.a. boss. his view, which is probably more informed than mine, is that syria was gone. all these discussions and negotiations taking place in vienna were useless because the west was obsessed with the idea of getting rid of bush are -- bashar but mute on what to put in place. is it possible to reconcile all of this? because of that, i'm going to suggest a scenario that has been
pushed by a few people for syria. some people say there are two real scenarios. there is the russian scenario, which is the scenario putin has applied in chechnya, which is quelling the adversary, just destroying it to the ground. i think that is probably the dream of the russian game. that is not what they rationally hope for but, but with the dream of doing in syria, what they did in chechnya. they managed to quell huge
uprisings which was not radical muslims at first. it was sort of a nationalist quest for independence. they just destroyed it. they imposed a guy who has become the policeman of the caucasus this man has an army that has become sort of the guard, terrible, had an army of its own he would use to quell rebellion. i think putin is using that and they are kicking -- keeping the caucacus in order. it is in check for now, putting the lid on it. that would be the scenario. the russian-sunni uprising islamic state, you are just keeping the lid on by force. that is one scenario. the other is fine-tuning what is
happening now, making it more effective, sort of the attrition model of obama. you keep striking islamic state. at the same time, you have special opt -- special ops and try to do something with the sunni army. the other scenario in between would be what some people have hinted that -- at different ways. kagen has written a piece yesterday saying why don't we create a no-fly zone in syria and put troops on the ground to protect refugees because we
cannot get to an agreement with the russians, we put pressure on them. maybe at some point we get some kind of solutions. then we get this federalization of syria? i don't know. if these people cannot live together, do we get a country where maybe assad is in place for a while and another country that is sunni. i don't know. i am just asking that. would that be a temporary, tactical move which would show everyone the west is willing to act and at the same time push the russians.
you were talking about europe. i think you have a very naïve and idealistic view of the european union at the moment. you say we need more -- >> [indiscernible] ms. mandeville: we need more europe. but at the same time, europe is not showing it exists. you don't give up the prey for the shadow, as we say in french. we have nation-states still. they exist. more or less, they are weak. but they exist. europe does not show it is existing. in september before the general assembly of the u.n., i was amazed the europeans did not together some kind of plan for syria. that was an existential question, the migrant crisis for europe is existential. and they want no initiative on european unified.
there were discussions between putin and obama. there were no initiatives from europe. my question is, does europe exist? because it does not exist, maybe the solution is transforming the borders of nation-states and europe. when your house is attacked, you don't open the windows and doors. you close the windows and doors until you are sure it is safe outside and you are not going to have someone getting in. i think for now, i know it is beautiful, the europe without borders. i remember my youth. it was not so terrible to go to spain for vacation and spend even half an hour at the border of spain or even moving to another country in a couple of hours.
if the future of europe is at stake, i think we should put the button on pause now. >> i would have loved to have more time. on that last point, it is not about only movement of you and i. it is also the movement of goods. that is what is maintaining economic growth or prosperity in europe. the moment you put up the walls, the economy is going to slow down. then you are going to place right into the hands of those nationalists and xenophobic circles in europe. ms. mandeville: i think it is the opposite. if you are not tough enough, he will play the game. they will vote for the
ultra-right next time. >> i think i should stop here. jeremy: why don't you give a quick answer and then we will go to the audience. >> i think the answer would be to elaborate, let me just say i disagree and leave it at that. jeremy: let's go to the audience and see if you can offer better solutions. we will take three at the beginning. when i call on you, please identify who you are. please ask an actual question. and donations are accepted. [laughter] jeremy: why don't we start with gary. >> i write the mitchell report. since you have solved the problem, there's not much left to deal with. i will pose the question this way. i would argue that discussion about strategy is interesting
but not particularly relevant. we have got more strategies floating around, each of which has its various weak points. the issue we are dealing with is execution. it seems to me the problem with execution has to do with the fact that each of the parties in any of the strategies has different objectives in the outcome. having said that, are we focusing on the wrong problem or wrong question? and should we be focusing on the more practical one, which is how do we do this rubik's cube? jeremy: good question. i think it invalidates my entire existence. [laughter] jeremy: let's go to the third row in the center. right there.
>> madame mandeville, i speak on my own behalf as a frenchman. i don't speak on behalf of my clients. the italians and germans had proposed a plan which france refused because we see there was no united front in europe to respond to what was happening in syria. but once again on record, the italians and germans, there was a plan refused by france and other countries. we played a role in pushing back. >> what is the plan? >> it was on how to move and assist refugees who are already on european soil. it was not addressing the entire
affair. it was some discussion of how to have a group arrangement from the start. the first question is -- three prime ministers of france said you have to speak to monsters. perhaps they were right. we did not. bashar al-assad and vladimir putin have to be part of the equation. is it true the americans are the ones claiming economic mobility is the reason? i would like to say maybe not. there was a piece published on brookings on the 17th.
i focus on one paragraph that there could be a reason. two french have touched on one issue, which is we have to look at the socioeconomic mobility to understand where there is some identification from. perhaps we can wrap our arms around the affair. jeremy: we will take one more. let's go here on the second row. >> thank you. i am a phd candidate at the institute in geneva. i am surprised by the responses you have prescribed. i was surprised when of the first resolutions was to limit freedom.
i was wondering whether it might make sense to also look inwards and see how we can, within europe, germany, the u.k., and france, do it without military attack. jeremy: some of the questions were directed to you. why don't you start? ms. mandeville: i don't understand which plans you're talking about germany and italy. you said we have to talk to monsters. i have debated it with him on russia and other issues, saying we have to talk to monsters. yes, of course. talk to them, yes. but believe them, i don't know. bashar, frankly, he explained why keeping bashar is not realistic.
i am not an expert on syria. it is a big weakness of mine. it is difficult for me to talk about it. does he represent something? yes. journalists like me have no access to what is going on in syria. that is one of the big reasons why we are so deprived of answers on the syrian questions. socioeconomic issues, i am not saying there are not issues in the minority in france. not at all. i know there is disenfranchisement. it is not because you are poor you start killing people in the streets. what i want to say is there was this tendency to think because they are disenfranchised and because the french system has institutional racism, i heard that after the attacks on
"charlie hebdo." i have heard some debate and was amazed professors with tenure were telling me the reason was france was institutionally racist that we had these terrible attacks on "charlie hebdo." i don't agree with that. it is not a question of political models. it is not a question of how you integrate muslims. why do i say that? because when you take absolutely different models of integration, the french republican model or the dutch model in the netherlands that have studied carefully, which is very similar to the americans, which is each community is a different color -- pillar. it is a community-based model, like the americans, the dutch. we are coming from absolutely --
the british model very similar to the american model in terms of organization of the minorities. exactly the same results as in france. you had attacks, murders by extremists, muslim extremists. it is not a question of model. it is a question of disenfranchisement and an ideology colored -- coming from the outside and coming from with islam -- from within islam which wants to destroy the west. by the way when you said i don't agree, i think it is not contradictory what you are saying and what i am saying because i said precisely there is a battle in islam. this battle has to be waged. i'm not the only one that says
that. you have prominent muslim thinkers saying we have to wage this battle in islam. we have to have reformation in islam if we want to get rid of this terrorism, islamist terrorism. they say that. it does not mean radical islamists do not want to take on the west. i remember a prominent expert on isis, islamic state, and terrorism who wrote that in 2013, he underlined the journal of the islamic state allowed that one day we will get to rome as crusaders and the flag of the islamic state will be floating. if it is not an attack on the west, i don't know what it is
frankly. jeremy: do you see a relationship between the integration problems in france and these issues? mr. le corre: you were saying you cannot see yourself as president hollande because it is difficult to deal with syria. it will be more difficult to deal with the integration issue. when you talk about xenophobia, obviously -- i think what we have to do is get rid of the "i" of isis. it is a terrorist organization. the reactions from the muslim community in france has been striking in saying this is not islam, and this has nothing to do with us. we have to make sure in the upcoming elections, and there is one in two weeks, touch wood, some of us are worried about the
outcome. but we have to make sure learning how to live together becomes the critical goal and making sure this group is not identified with islam. as laure says, the system is what it is. i spent time in london, five years in the late 1990's, and i saw the birth of a rather radical movement at a mosque in london. the two systems did not prevent either way for radical groups to getting support. we know they are getting support
from others as well. i don't think european countries should change their constitutions or religions. certainly, there are muslim schools in france. there are even imams in the military. i'm not saying it is perfect including the refugees in europe. they will join a certain societal system. let's make sure we lost her size -- ostracize the terrorists. jeremy: for those interested, there is a debate on the relationship between islam and isis on brookings website which is very good, although you probably will not find the answers. joseph, i would love for you to address the execution point and
the integration question. mr. bahout: what is strategy without implementation? all of it is one part. on this issue of isis, syria, iraq, much more than ever before within the same coalition, interest are very divergent. i don't want to plunge into that but very quickly. for turkey, of course. if you have to say either or, it is the kurds are more a danger for isis. isis is worrying. but having iran in the lavonne and yemen is more worrying. within europe, the divergences are enormous. before that, on the arab-israeli process, in 1990 one when saddam invaded kuwait, in 2001 when we
went to afghanistan after 9/11, it did not produce discord between france and the united states. people have differences in priorities and strategy. it took someone to put it together. this is part of strategy and political leadership. today, someone has to put some order in chaos, to quote the bookings -- brookings blog. it is difficult to do. i'm not calling for american preeminence or leadership. someone has to do it. it won't be solved by
itself. i think this is a way of extricating ourselves. without a roadmap, an excellent strategy, it remains a good paper and not something that is incremented. the second point is interesting although it is not our subject, is syria livable again? like everybody, i have an opinion. i think it is beyond debate. the head of the french intelligence two or three weeks ago said syria is broken beyond repair. i believe that. i'm very convinced about that. i think syria is today broken. this is why assad is no more a problem. his ruling something that has disappeared. he is the head of a militia among other militias. before becoming french, i was
lebanese. i lived in a country where for 15 years, it was broken. we felt at times it would never be patched up again. analytically saying something is broken is true, but politically it does not mean you have to accept it. you can let go of the syria process. at one point you will be legitimized. people who sit around the table and say these are the borders, let's accept them. i do not have anything against it. nations are born and die, maybe one day lebanon will disappeared. iraq has more or less disappeared. where all of us today bound to a process which is called geneva. we are -- want a democratic syria. if these words mean