tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN December 28, 2015 10:00am-12:01pm EST
dangers of reporting from the middle east. here is more. >> i went to do a story about .hristians in iraq earlier this year, my daughter asked me if she could come with me. she is five. i said, no, you cannot come with me, i'm working. she said, i want to come with you, why can't i come with you. geoeye said, it is not safe for little kids. it is not a nice place for children to go. she said, then, why are you going? i said because there are always good guys -- everywhere there are bad guys, there are good guys, and i will be with the good guys. she said, if you don't come h bad that means that that guy guys got youe. not just going to war, you try
looking at your 5-6-year-old -- i mean, liberia had one of the worst civil wars, and they told me over and over that oevbola is worse than war because it is the silent killer. he is at the point that sebastian was at 10 years ago saying, i would have made a different decision at 30. i feel like it is part of my dna. of the discussion about the dangers of reporting in the middle east. this was held recently by the council on foreign relations. you can watch it in its entirety tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span.
>> tonight, on "the communicators" we will take a look at how the music industry works. professor of music business at the berklee college of music discusses the way that music platforms impact the way that musicians are paid and how congress can make the payment structure more transparent. he is joined by jim phillips. >> certainly the narrative of songwriters say they don't understand where their money comes from is not new. everything in the world is chocolate. then as they can know where
>> its nominations, appointments, policies of the senior nominations of those who are opposed to a to state solution, -- the call for the world to stop focusing on negotiations and take international actions. wholeems that from a hol variety of positions, the two state option is in jeopardy, but it still remains the most widely
accepted idea of how we can have peace between jews and arabs in the small piece of land between jordan river and the mediterranean. for the past two decades, the way that the west looked at the conflict was negotiations -- direct negotiations based on the land for peace formula that over time became more detailed. what seems to be increasingly happening is a certain frustration, which is openly expressed by countries and their leaders back negotiations have failed to lead to the desired outcome. therefore, if we cannot trust
negotiations, and as i said, the president even called for abandoning the paradigm of negotiations -- what can be done to achieve an outcome that is the desired outcome? this context, in a variety of actions taking place. most prominently, the direct ofognition of the state palestine, labeling of settlement product. french and new zealand efforts but occasionaly, debate on whether the united states might not veto resolutions, so leave the floor open for them to move forward. we are seeing things taking shape both in parliament. just now, greece is emerging as a country that is looking to
recognize palestine. where is all of this leading? westernld happen if countries basically decided to say, ok, negotiations are not leading to the outcome that we envision, so we will try to create this outcome in the absence of negotiations. . am not describing this i'm not saying this is what should be done. as i said, i personally believe that if we were left alone without the global spotlight and attention, we would have long ago managed some agreement. i'm describing and trying to analyze what might happen given the combination of frustration with negotiations and the sense solution is state in jeopardy. i began to look at what negotiations have yielded.
they have not yielded peace and they have not yielded anything close to peace. they have yielded, over more than 20 years of negotiations, a certain kind of more detailed eacerstanding of what p for look like were it to be achieved. it is a combination of a variety of actions, repeated rounds of negotiations, the roadmap, the geneva track to agreements. all of these have yielded a set of what could be called preferences. these are the more detailed preferences of the west for the outcome, for what a two state solution would look like in practice. they basically include the following four elements. the first is the establishment
of an arab palestinian state side-by-side with the israeli state. recognize borders based on the 1967 or the 1949 cease-fire agreement with some land that ,ncludes major settlement blocs and in exchange, equivalent land being given to the state of palestine so that the territory of the state of palestine is equivalent to the state of the west bank and gaza, if not exactly the territory of the in gaza.k and gaza -- jerusalem as the capital of both states with residential west jerusalem and the jewish neighborhood to be the capital of israel. the residential arab
neighborhoods of eastern jerusalem to be the capital of palestine. religious observance for all. called, a realistic solution to the refugee issue, which generally comes to mean internally displaced people, refugees, and their descendents today registered to be 5 million -- the palestinians include more, 7 million. they would have a right to live in palestine. they would also be, those of them who want a right to settle in the country, where some of jordan,ve today --
lebanon. the state of israel would except some other descendents, the overrs are listed for the years. it represents an end to all claims and the closure of the issue. this is what is referred to as the question of the displaced persons refugees and their descendents. given that these are the preferences and the more detailed understanding of what a two state solution would look like -- and that has emerged over 20 years of negotiations -- where did the policies of western countries stand with respect to the preferences? if this is the preference for outcome, do their policies
reflect that preference? basically, the short answer is no. sometimes it is a big no. for example, almost all western countries want to see a state of palestine emerge. notst all of them do recognize a state of palestine as existing in the present. they say it does not exist, but it should exist. in that sense, their policy is not aligned with their preference for the outcome of a palestinian state. this is the one issue where we begin to see a brin breaking of ranks with the paradigm that there should be an emergence of a palestinian state -- first with sweden, more recently with the vatican recognizing a
palestinian state. this is a line that has been, in the past, preserved. many western countries have offered trappings of a state, recognizing representatives of ambassadors, but never recognizing palestine as a state that exists. it appears to be changing as more and more countries look to be aligning their policy with preference and to say that the preference is for an emergence of a palestinian state, we will existingrecognize as now. on the issue of borders, what is happening there is what i call essentially an overshooting. all western countries basically -- all isis really raeli preference as illegal.
the view is that they are all equal. be a neighbor, itghb could be an outpost on the west bank -- they are all equally illegal, equally condemned. in that respect, there is an overshooting where there is no incorporation of the facts -- whether it is the bush letter or the arab league. there is an understanding that the 1949 lines will not be the borders, but there is no treatment in policy of western have moved to we an equivalent view of territory. to a line policy with preference would require western countries to do the hard work of some kind of border.
to say, ok, there is a notion of settlement laws, but it has never been established. there is nothing that says, we 2%-3% that these are the of the west bank that will be part of israel, we will no longer condemned building in this land, but everything else, we will take harsher measures. this would be a more proper alignment of policy with preference, but in the moment, and we are seeing this with the iseling issue, the tendency to maintain the overshooting policy which does not recognize the developments that have taken place in negotiations. the issue of jerusalem is particularly interesting. here, western countries remain partitiono the 1947 proposal. that shows you how much of their policy differs from the preference.
according to it, jerusalem -- that is a large swath of area including jerusalem of today and belongs to no one. the official policy of western countries with respect to israel is that jerusalem belongs to no one. as a result, there is no recognition of west jerusalem as the capital of israel, no western embassies, none at all in western jerusalem. aviv opposes that, even though there is no tel aviv. that wasete denial jerusalem is the capital of the state of israel. these jerusalem is treated as palestine. said,ll hear being
territory." the case of sweden is constructive. noten declared that it will .pen an embassy in ramallah sweden recognizes palestine, but the investor to palestine first sweden lives in east jerusalem, yet sweden will not take the corresponding steps to move its ambassador to west jerusalem. byically israel is judged the 1947 ideas, and the palestinians are looked at lens.gh the 1967 mo there is no consistency or coherence on that.
if policy were to be aligned with preference, which we would see as a recognition of western jerusalem as the official capital of israel, including moving of embassy, recognition of eastern jerusalem as the capital of palestine, and a continued effort to ensure that the holy basin remains open to religious worship of all religions. the 1947 notion for all of jerusalem to be limited to the holy basin. finally on the issue of refugees and their descendents, here, i find the most glaring inconsistency between policy and preference. the preference is for a piece by means of two states for two people -- the jewish people have the right to self-determination, the arab people have the right
to self-determination. yet, western countries are the sole supporters to a you and agency that essentially perpetuates the notion that the palestinian refugees and their descendents have a right to become citizens of the state of israel, the so-called right of return. those who fund it, including the united states, claim their funding does not mean that they refugeeshe notion that and the defendants have a right to return to israel. actually, they do. this is what is happening in practice. ways,lestinians, in many view international support for it as a guarantee that the international community supports the right for return. the case of sweden is
instructive. sweden recognized palestine as a country already existing. sweden is also one of the largest single donor countries to the organization. this means that while sweden that palestine exists, it also supports or organization that says that 2 million people who live in the west bank and gaza -- most of them live there their entire lives -- are refugees from palestine. they lived in palestine, but they are refugees from palestine. this can only be squared if the palestine which they are refugees from is greater palestine, the palestine that will one day supersede israel. this is not a policy in line with two states for two people. a coherent policy would recognize palestine in the west bank and gaza and immediately
argue that those who live in palestine are no longer refugees from palestine, and those who live outside can be granted citizenship and be acknowledged as citizens of palestine living elsewhere, but not as refugees from palestine. if western countries were to go to the logical end of the idea of trying to focus on outcomes, , iner than on the process full, consistent alignment of their policy with the preference, which means recognizing the state of palestine fully and directly with the capital in residential jerusalem, while focusing on worship rights in the holy basin -- doing that in borders that represent andtlement blocs --
acknowledging that those who live in palestine are no longer refugees from palestine. that would be a full and coherent policy. finally, i ended piece by saying that will this promote peace? the argument for countries that label settlement blocs is that this will harm piece. pe only way it will help eace is if it is not as a package and not just recognizing palestine. if you recognize palestine and east your embassy in jerusalem, you are sending a terribly mixed message. the only way this can even begin to have impacts is to do all of it fully and consistently, and coherently.
finally, i speculate that this might actually be helpful for the cause of peace because it operates in line with prospect theory. if you know prospect theory, it basically says that people value that if benefits less than theyr loss. people operate according to the idea that they're not trying to maximize benefits, they are more likely to minimize their costs, the risk. this policy will actually work with prospect theory. what does it do? it basically gives up all the time,ages ahead of th doing all these things that were kept in the past as bargaining chips for a final status agreement will be given out in advance with no expectation of return because this benefit is less valuable than previously
it would be minimizing the loss that both sides feel. because if everyone recognizes a state of palestine, for israel to recognize it no longer becomes a huge concession. if the world no longer supports the idea of a right of return, the palestinians might continue to dream of it but they will no longer feel that they are losing something that the entire world supports. it would minimize the sense of loss for jerusalem and borders. a slide -- is applied fully, coherently, and consistently it might actually , help promote the outcome of peace by means of two states up aheadhile it gives of time, all of the benefits, and also substantially minimizes the cost. thank you. >> thank you.
boy, that is different. that is different, interesting, and probably controversial. so i am going to turn the floor over to dave. is this a good plan? or is there a better way? dave: two words. this is a very timely piece, i think. as you mentioned, greece today has recognized the state of palestine. we expect the government to follow suit shortly. that as long as the negotiations are absent, this issue is going to stay with us. i think it is a very valuable contribution. you are walking into an extremely controversial issue. look atthat we usually this, the palestinians and
if it disagrees with our position it is unacceptable interference, and borders on anti-palestinian, and so on. you are actually walking into quite a difficult topic. i will look at it from three angles. one is analytical. one ispractical, and what other options there might be. i think this paper does a great job at giving comprehensive, rigorous, analytical study. one think you did not mention, not only do you describe these, -- when i found out useful most useful is that you address some of the challenges that face something like this. in analytical terms. i would not dwell too much on these. i will just mention some of the things you mention, including the risk of an approach like this creating confusion. what would happen of some
countries say arielle is going to be part of the land swap and some countries are not included. what if they and up having a wide variety of international positions? i think you touched this the , difficulty of balancing the two challenges. on the one hand we like to say , we know what the solution looks like. i am not sure this is accurate. we might all know what the contours look like, but the deeper you go, the more disagreements you have in terms of content. for any parameters to be useful they have to be fairly specific intentioneds is with the need to pay a wide coalition. how do you balance the need for having one coalition and the need to be specific enough to be meaningful.
additional layers of complexity that you have not addressed. the first is many of the issues are not simply bilateral issues. but issues that have implications for other players. for example, you talk about the issue of anwar. and you make some suggestions regarding it. these are issues that relate to jordan or to lebanon. logistical but it , is a very deep political concern. recently there was a major push back in jordan against a simple census. jordanians felt this might affect the issue of refugees. basint comes to the holy it is not only a palestinian, , jordanian, arab, muslim issue. this is something to take into
account if we want to analytically approach it. specific to the imbalance of power can create a scenario that might disadvantage the palestinians. for example, when you talk about the world recognizing the jewish neighborhoods of the east jerusalem as far as the current parameters as part of israel. i suspect palestinians will not be comfortable with israel being extended. at a time with the palestinians have no access to ease jordan. unless these ideas reflect a change, they will create a high degree of unease among the palestinians and their supporters. but, otherwise, i would say the peace itself presents what i believe is the most
comprehensive overview of the issue. my issue is not with it analytically it is with the , practical implications of whether or not something like this can be done constructively at this time. i would argue that it cannot. it cannot for domestic reasons. i would argue that the region is too busy elsewhere to focus on this appropriately. in the domestic scene in both, among the palestinians and israelis the domestic political , configurations do not allow the leaders to actually engage in any meaningful way with any major diplomatic initiative, be it something like this or european negotiations. or anything of major diplomatic nature. as you indicate in the paper, for this to work, for this to be meaningful, it has to be undertaken by a wide international coalition. you focus on the western
countries but i would also say it also needs to have the arab countries as part of this coalition. why? to avoid the issue of confusion. but you also need it in order to deprive the parties of an exit. what would happen usually say , the u.s. and the couple european countries go to the palestinians and say, these are the parameters. they would say, fine, this is your opinion. they will quickly go to the arab leaders or arab countries and say, i want a solution completely contrary to this international position. unless we have this international coalition, it becomes hard to create the kind of pressure you need in order to get the parties to respond. i would argue today, because of the competing priorities in the region and frankly because of the trust deficit that the united states as with many of
our arab allies, i do not see the possibility of this kind of coalition emerging. i mentioned the arab countries both because they are important to create both cover and pressure on the palestinians but also because i think presenting international parameters without engaging the arabs creates a problem. the arab league issued the arab peace initiative which has been in my view a paradigm shift to the whole peace process and since the arab peace initiative was issued it continues to be , under a criticism from a number of arab countries. this criticism continues. i fear if we reopen the issue of parameters right now without having a solid arab backing, this will be a reason for the
arab who want to see the api get rid of, it will open a place for them to do that. this is one practical implication. the second risk is political. i will not talk about israel, it is enough to say if something like this came, i suspect the current israeli government would not be supportive. israel, i suspect also, center, center left, and many even in the center-right would find this to be an reason to engage in the peace conversation. on the palestinian side, the palestinian authority is so weak and is going through its own legitimacy crisis, if any of these parameters of this sort would be immediately rejected. the first person who would speak against the parameters of any kind of concessions by the palestinians would be the chief negotiator or members of the cabinet. this would create a very
dangerous precedent. i believe this, rather than creating a debate among the palestinians you will have the , palestinian authority coming out against it and everyone trying to overtake it from the right. if we think the parameters would create to or re-energize the peace i see the current political matter does not encourage this kind of dynamic. instead it might force the palestinians and maybe even the israelis to adopt a position that is even harder than what they would normally take. that there isve any time for diplomacy, be it negotiations or what is being proposed here. the question is what can be done. i believe at this moment we cannot aim too high.
if we aim to high, if we aim for something to hard, too big in the diplomatic realm, we're going to fail. as we have learned from the last failure of negotiations, failure has consequences. i would suggest, let's move away from this type of the gauge men -- engagement and look at more smaller, more complete, more achievable and engagement. there are three fronts we can engage the parties on. neither of these fronts should contain negotiations. i would argue saying no is at a premium for as israelis in palestinian. put them in a room and asked them to negotiate, within five minutes they would talk about 1948. there is a political reason they cannot reach this kind of deal. we need to approach it in terms of how do we as in terms of
international community, it has to be led by the u.s. because nobody else can do this job. how can we engage each side to give certain deliverables to us, not to the other side. i would argue you would need to , engage both sides to see what they can do that is meaningful. that is doable, but also meaningful to the other side. on the palestinian side, we need to engage the palestinian on two fronts. the front of incitement and negative messaging, something that we in the united states say, you either stop this or there is a price. the second part, maintaining security cooperation. i do not think the palestinian has any interest, yet the more they talk about it, the more they create the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy. these are two fronts we should be very strong as an international community with the palestinians and say, do not
give it to israel, give it to us. the failure to give it to us will have costs from honest, not from the israelis. we have to engage them in terms of what can and cannot be done in terms of giving palestinian access. the majority of the west bank to which the palestinians have no official access. they have been saying given the , security cooperation, there is a lot that can be done for the palestinian access. we should engage the israeli political echelon to let the idf take the lead in determining action. this would be significance enough to create a sense of hope for the palestinian. in addition to these steps, we should engage the palestinians and israelis on to bigger fronts that will preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. with the israelis, i would argue growing solid , perception of the current
israeli government as being ambivalent about peace, we need to engage israel to do a certain action that will reaffirm israel's commitment to a two-state solution. there are a number of issues that could be suggested. one of them you touched upon. i wrote about, is israel actually harmonizing its settlement policy with its peace plan? meaning for areas of israel claim, israel can have settlements by the it is to show that israel has a piece map. elsewhere, israel has to stop expanding settlements. this will not be sufficient for the palestinians, but it will message that the israeli government is serious about doing something. for the palestinians, we need to engage them on the issue of reform. revising the issue of palestinian reform and institution-building.
right now, there is a major legitimacy question. many dimensions, but one of the dimensions is the pa corruption. when 80% of palestinians believe their government is corrupt, four out of five palestinians believed they are being ruled by thieves. not have thet does sense to engage in concessions need toatives that we get to a two state solution. it is important to approach the palestinians on a bilateral conversation. to reprioritize the issue of reform. what ideas will get us to a two-state solution? ultimately i believe reaching peace can only be done through high diplomacy and through negotiation. some of these solutions are
absent of the popular -- possibility. hopefully, some could bring us closer to a two-state solution. thank you very much. i am looking forward to the conversation. >> thank you, both of you, for really, really interesting discussion. i am going to take the prerogative of the chair very briefly. i know there are probably a lot of questions and comments. i forgot to introduce myself. i am dave pollock, the councilman fellow here at the washington institute. i also direct a portion of the website, a forum for dialogue. i am going to take this opportunity to say let's continue this dialogue online in the forum. i would love to have contributions from all of you there. it is really an interesting discussion so far and will only get more interesting.
i'm going to pose a quick question to each of you and then open it up to the floor. one often assumes a two-state ace, but i dos pe not think that is a really good assumption. they are not the same thing. you could have a palestinian state and still have conflict. so my question to you is what , about security? that is the one thing that sounds to me like it may be missing from your very interesting new paradigm. before you answer, my question to dave is, what you are saying is something kind of like this is good in theory but not in practice. my question to you is, do you recommend then that outside powers somehow just back off on the big issues of recognizing palestine or dealing with the orugee issue or jerusalem
borders or other things? if that is the recommendation, how is that going to happen and how are you going to get them to stop promoting let's say, pdfs in europe if they do not match that with other action. >> first, i forgot to mention, this paper decided to deal only with policies that are entirely within the decision-making power of western countries. that do not require israelis or palestinians to accept, reject, things that can be done as western countries. so everything i mentioned, from recognizing palestine to moving an embassy to the funding of unwritten policies, that is within the decision-making capacity of western countries and this is why it looked at them. because what i am seeing as western countries increasing
looking to do things they can do without needing to engage with the sides because of all the difficulties you mentioned. the one thing that clearly cannot be done through the means i reviewed here is the issue of security. nothing in all of the kind of diplomatic steps that i reviewed, can remove a single soldier from the west bank or can disarm a single rocket in gaza. everything that has to do with security, the occupation, ending israeli military presence in the west bank, the question of the blockade, all of these things are in the hands of the sides. no outside our, barring military intervention, but no outside power has the tool to change
that situation on the ground. so, everything that has to do with security, coordination, israeli military presence, palestinians arming themselves -- all of this remains the one clear issue that is in the hands of both sides. it will need to be understood that nothing western countries can do diplomatically will change any of that. they can take actions that would recognize that, that would say how important it is for the palestinian state to be demilitarized or for a transitional israeli military presence on the jordan river. or all of these things, or they could say we recognize palestine, but we recognize palestine as continued to be under military occupation. it can say these things, but there is nothing that western countries can do to change it in the absence of the will of palestine. >> thank you. you can ask short questions.
i'm not sure we can give you short answers. >> will try. >> let me just start on the word peace that you mentioned. though i make my living being an expert in the peace process, i am really not a fan of the word "peace." it does bring to mind unrealistic expectations of fuzziness and warm feelings and whatnot. we are talking about arrangements here. i think many of the points that were raised are enough to create a stable arrangement. can we get the world to back off? of course we cannot. one of the reasons we cannot get the world to back off is that this is not only a policy issue. it is also a political issue from us to every country that i can think of in the western world. the united states, the greek parliament votes for the palestinian state, i expect it is not going through an extremely rigorous policy conversation. but there are political reasons, and therefore as long as this
issue remains political, the world will intervene. from typical statements, even things like bilateral recognition which ultimately i think whatever you think of them -- are neither here nor there. they are not game changers. these are just, we are used to this kind of window dressing throughout the palestinian-israeli history. what i very concerned about is the kind of an attempt to impose a solution from the outside on all of the parameters without doing the homework. of actually making sure that this kind of a political initiative could succeed. we can see two kinds of iterations of how this could work. either an attempt to create a security council resolution with parameters, which we saw a glimpse of back in december of 2014, almost an exact year from now. which was problematic because we
saw then the difficulty of actually creating that kind of a coalition. one of the biggest assets that we have in diplomacy these days is an international consensus on a two state solution. push prematurely for a resolution that does not reflect everyone's vision of a two state solution, you might start seeing the breakdown or the fragmentation of international consensus. i'm not sure this is helpful. so it's one of these think that if you overreach you might actually end up doing more damage than good. the second scenario, which is also quite risky, and i think you touched on in the paper -- is the u.s. coming up with american parameters. we hear every now and then, speculation, that there will be obama parameters before the end of the year. -- the end of the administration. it is not the first time we have done it. clinton did as he was leaving office. again, december -- just a month before he left the white house.
it is a little bit different now. it is different in the sense that i think the biggest risk is what if we have an american parameters without doing the homework? similar to what we had when the president spoke at the state department of aipac with partial parameters. without lining up the players. i think it is not good for u.s. leadership and u.s. standing to come up with parameters that are not immediately supported by our european allies, our western allies, and which are not supported -- even which are opposed by our arab allies. it is too much to expect for the palestinians and israelis to endorse these kinds of things. but at least we need to show that the u.s. continues to be the leader of this fight. coming up with parameters that do not have the support, the prior support, of our allies will actually expose the u.s. as
weak and will be viewed by people in the region as another indication that the u.s. power and leadership in the region is waning. i do not think this is good for u.s. national interest. >> great, thank you. i will turn the floor open and try to take questions in the order that i see them. mohammed. >> i would like to ask both of you about what you might call the camel in the room. [laughter] >> [inaudible] we do not have leadership in either palestine or israel who are committed to peace. both are committed to non-peace. they derailed negotiator -- negotiations, blocked good initiatives, and basically it is very obvious for the
palestinians because peace might usher democracy and then this will mean the end of this leadership and so, in this way, this leadership would like to stick to the status quo. on the other side, because peace might and israeli expansion as policies with regard to settlement, so they are totally eace. so, what do we do in order to actually put the good ideas that you might have in the field, when you have leadership committed to know peace education, no peace ventures, no people to people -- and actually are very active against moderates and against the peacemakers? so what do we do with this problem? >> ok. please. >> first, a couple of comments. one of the reasons i decided to do the analysis in this paper is
i think one of the reasons we are facing difficulties, there are many reasons and we have worked on it together on the difficulties for achieving peace, but some of it is really the mixed messaging that comes from the world. that does not send a clear sense of it is either here or there. and that makes it more difficult. but, i must say, this is my view of the conflict in general. i do not put a big premium on leaders in this conflict at all. i think the leaders on both sides can operate at the margins of this conflict. i think this is a conflict that goes so deep to the story of people their sense of what , is just, what is due, who they are, that leaders cannot depart substantially from how each people views the essence of the conflict and what it is all
about. i think leaders can operate at the margins, they have some new room at theng margins. they can try to at least not make things worse, which is certainly something that in israel, i would want to work toward. if we can't make it happen tomorrow, how can we at least in -- inshore -- i think this is our responsibility -- to ensure that we do not make it harder for future generations to achieve it. how can we keep, at least, the option open? but at the end of the day, i think the conflict goes so deep to the history and the injustice of both peoples, that when people ask me, so what is your prescription, what will finally bring peace? my answer is two words: mutual exhaustion. so i think when we will reach -- we do not know how long this will take -- but when we reach a moment of mutual exhaustion, when both sides are finally what
you call the big dream and the little hope, when both sides are willing to finally say, ok the other is going nowhere, they cannot be made to disappear, they cannot be made to give up, surrender, and go away. when there is a real understanding of that, and that can only happen after you ask -- explore all the other terrible options and you have reached a mutual exhaustion. then you can begin to look to words making true peace. >> do want to comment on the palestinian or israeli side? >> maybe you are wiser than me. i still believe that leaders actually have a great role to play. if i look at the advancement of peacemaking in the arab-israeli conflict frankly it has been made by leaders. all of the leaders moved beyond
the comfort of the people. i do not see the sharons or husseins on the horizon anytime soon. i was trying to be diplomatic. when i said that the political environment does not allow for the leaders to engage in major diplomatic initiatives, i would not go as far as you do in your question. i cannot get into people's heads. clearly, the track record has not been one that is one that shows great risk-taking or leadership abilities to be honest. that is why, in some ways, i am more interested right now in putting both leadership systems to the test. and getting them to a point where they must make a decision. that is why i believe we should engage israel away from the pressure of having to kind of show the public they are not fryers or suckers.
when it comes to the palestinians on a bilateral negotiation platform, and have the world, to see how far this leadership can go. but on the palestinian side, as well. that without reform, , and by reform i don't mean technical military, but deeper reforms, constitutionalism, security sector reform, democratic governance reform without that, not only is the , current leadership incapable of reaching a decision, but we do not have a system in the palestinian policy that can help create leaders who will emerge. if we create this state of reform and good governance the , palestinian system can start producing new leadership. we saw this when the u.s. and the world was pushing for reform, it allowed reformists to emerge. i suspect we need a new initiative of this sort from the international community to start energizing and possibly redefining palestinian politics. >> ok.
there are a lot of hands up. i will really try to do this in order. so, i have the professor and you up front. ari, please. >> i was hoping that the rebuttal would be at least partially done in a swedish accent. [laughter] that perspective is kind of missing from the discussion. so, i would like to try to put myself in the shoes for a moment of the swedish foreign minister who would probably say to you, we know very well the details. we know about jerusalem and refugees and orders. we are not ignorant. we view ourselves as having a role here. our role here is to try, it if you would be honest, our role is to try to level the playing field somewhat to try and do , something in order to balance the asymmetry. and therefore, there is no policy dissonance or if there is
a policy dissonance it is intentional because we view ourselves as playing a role. he would say, probably, as long as there is a policy dissonance from the israeli side, as well as having all of the cards, advocating for or saying that it supports the palestinian state, but actually is engaging and policies that counter that -- how do you expect us to not have this kind of dissonance? >> a good question. >> in a swedish accent. indeed, when the swedish foreign minister made her declaration in october of 2014, of recognizing palestine as an existing state, she said that she believed this would promote peace by leveling the playing field. so, she justified sweden breaking rank with the international consensus of privileging process negotiations over outcome by the fact that
she is saying she has a certain analysis of why there is no peace and an analysis is the power of asymmetry and she thinks recognizing palestine can at least contribute to changing that. so, i want to address it on two levels. she said also that she thinks this act will bring peace. as i said, because she analyzes why she thinks there is no peace. so, regardless of the analysis, i'll address the analysis and a moment, it sent a terrible message when she pulled out one element of all and basically said, we will recognize palestine, we will continue to be one of the foremost supporter of an organization that is essentially keeps the dream of greater palestine a life and we will also say that this promotes peace. my argument would be, choose two
or three. you cannot have all three. if you say palestine exists, and you continue to condone the notion that those who live in palestine are refugees from palestine, don't tell me this promotes peace. you're promoting the idea that the jewish people don't have a right to self determination in this land. that is fine if you think that, but then don't tell me that you're promoting peace. if you want to promote peace, recognize palestine and at the same time you can also do that tomorrow, say that as a major donor to -- you will no longer condone the idea of those who live in palestine have been born there and lived there all their lives are registered as refugees from palestine. then, i can believe her, that she genuinely seeks peace by means of two states for two people. that is in the truth of the message that she said. now, she has an analysis. power imbalances are the source
of a lack of peace. i disagree with this analysis. i actually think that the power and balance still is that the jewish people remained -- remain and unwelcome minority in the middle east. although they are powerful as a country, they are actually still a minority that is not acceptable in the region. this is my analysis of why we came close to peace in the 1990's. i actually do not credit rabin or erafat as being great leaders. there were leaders who took advantage of an opportunity that if anything, in my view, was by reagan and gorbachev. those are the people i would credit more. what did they create?
they created a moment in history where the arab world or some of the arab countries lost their soviet backing. america emerged as a hyperpower. one million soviet jews were immigrating to the united states -- to israel. israel emerged all of a sudden in the perception as a very powerful nation. the arab world and the palestinians lost legitimacy when they supported saddam hussein in some of the weakest moments. if you believe that at the core of the conflict lies the continued denial of the arab world that the jewish people have a right to self-determination, have a real claim and an attachment to the land if you believe this is at , the core of the conflict, then peace can only emerge when the arab world despairs of the possibility that the jewish people can somehow be made to go away. so, that is the moment of parity. the moment when the notion that the jewish people are here to stay, then you have an opening for peace. so, my analysis is exactly the opposite of the swedish foreign minister. and the thing is, if you begin to have different analysis of
why there is no peace, you begin to create a diplomatic arms race where every side is trying to convince that they should be strengthened for the cause of peace. that is not helpful, which is why i say if you want to be helpful, be consistent across all parameters. recognize palestine, move your embassy to west jerusalem, announce that your embassy is now the embassy to palestine, and honor those who live in palestine are no longer refugees are palestine. at least then i can see that you really mean peace. >> ok. yes, please. >> a couple of points. a reaction to that point. the first being, if i'm going to credit any outside player it would be george bush, george h w bush, who after the
liberation of kuwait which send a message to the region. and to the palestinians and israelis. you have to fear me. when my interests are being challenged, i take action to do that. and also the region owed him something. at the end of the day, it was american money and american lives that actually created the liberation of kuwait. which enable the united states at that point to create the coalition that we needed to create the madrid process which ultimately produced everything. that is on one point. i disagree with you on the issue of asymmetry of power. you might be describing a regional reality. i think when you zoom into the palestinian-israeli conflict, i would argue that this is not the case and we have a very clear power imbalance. there may be a narrative imbalance which is against israel's favor, but certainly when it comes to power and the ability to make decisions, the israelis are in a much better
place. and i would argue that reconciling narratives is not necessary for reaching state -- stable arrangements. i would challenge anyone here to find more than 10 egyptians who actually like israel or who believe that israel has a right to exist. it does not matter. egyptian-israel peace treaty has survived not because of accepting a narrative but , because of creating arrangements that create a balance of interest. now, my problem with the swedish arguments though, is even if i accept that it is about the imbalance of power, it is not clear to me how recognizing the state of palestine changes any of that. it does not move a single israeli soldier into the west bank nor can it stop a single act of terrorism. it is nice symbolically. it would even be a good opportunity to kind of show that the current palestinian leadership is doing something. but, how it plays into any implementable operational,
diplomatic or real difference, it still eludes me. beside being just a symbol that on. happen and life goes >> i want to take you up on your challenge to find 10 egyptians that think israel has a right to exist. [laughter] builder. >> you had said in the beginning that if we had been left alone we could have solved this. and you hear a lot of that today. leave us alone, we can take care of this ourselves. could you elaborate on that? >> the remarkable thing about our conflict is that it is actually one of the world's smallest, least violent conflicts if you were to be crude and do a body count. i once saw a table of violent conflicts around the world and now the table would be even worse. it placed the conflict as number
49. so, essentially, if people were really just concerned with reducing body count in the world, they would not be focusing on this conflict. and, i think that having all of our energy -- i would be out of a job, but i'm ok with that -- having all of our energy be spent on playing out this conflict on the international stage, magnifying each and every tiny incident, forcing us to use all of our kind of resources, best people, to playing out this thing on the international stage, i think is not helpful. i think if the conflict were placed in the non-theological context of just two tribes battling over until fairly recently a resource for a piece of land, i think we could have come to a lot of understandings and arrangements that would have
allowed us to achieve something, not peace perhaps, but something. in fact, one of my personal criticisms of the secretary of state, and someone gave me a great quote for that, is when he introduces his very passionate effort, when he failed to andstand is that abbas netanyahu had long ago signed a no peace agreement. under that no peace agreement, for quite a few years, able were not dying. now, granted, you do not get a nobel peace prize for people just not dying, but for as, having lived through two decades of this euphoria of near peace and then this dissent into the bloody mayhem of the second intifada, just having a few years where you wake up alive was pretty good. it is not that this was good and this was piece or this end of the occupation, but the two sides were able to understand the two leaders or non-leaders were able to understand that
this is as much as can be done at this moment. i think it's a were brought down to that size, we could have actually reached arrangements that would have let us at least at the minimum live the most dignified lives we could live. >> yes? up front. >> i agree with everything you say, both of you. [laughter] >> afterwords i want you to explain that. >> even though the property rights of jews who were kicked out of arab lands were not mentioned. >> it's in the piece. i did not mention it. >> but when you refer to a two state solution, you assume that the pa has control over gaza. i think until they -- hamas and pa come together, i don't think there will be a two state solution. thank you.
>> two quick reactions. first of all i think there is a , reason we don't mention the countriesork in arab because that is not the palestinian-israeli issue. it is an issue for israel to take up with tunisia and iraq and whatnot. sometimes we confuse arab and palestinian, these are not the same thing in diplomatic terms. my own view is that these two sides hamas and the other will , not unite and should not unite. they should not unite because you have two very different visions that you said they cannot reconcile. therefore, for my perspective, to wait until there is unity, we will get no peace. time is not static. both in reaction to what you said and earlier. yes, we had a time that we were not killing one another, which was also a time where the constituency for peace was actually eroding by the day. so time works in a certain way,
equally, i think with the internal palestinian conflict. as long as hamas can claim that using violence and terrorism produces results, as they did when they abducted the people, and as long as they cannot show their working in diplomacy time , works in favor of hamas. my perspective, some of the small ideas that i came up with, would allow the pa to stand up and say, we are getting something out of our collaborative relationship with the israelis, but ultimately, the palestinians will choose which way to go once confronted with a final peace deal. either hamas narrative lands or the other narrative winds. i do not think one of the narratives can win before we get to that moment. >> ok. thank you. david? >> thank you for your paper and for your presentation. even though this is beyond the scope of the paper itself, the
logic of what you said, the policy with the preference, do it as a package deal all leads you right up to the edge it , seems to me, having the security council before parameters because the odds of 100-200 countries synchronizing their borders all in the same way, i think we would all agree, in the practical sense it is probably not likely. it leads us all to there. you can even argue that in the absence of it, the point become saline, which is that the europeans left to their own devices they're not out to , create a cosmic sense of justice, they want to put their thumb on the scale because they feel the israelis have more power. so they're not going to come up with a grand balance of their own. so, explain then, why, even
though it is beyond the scope of the paper from methodological reasons, why is a bad idea? >> why it's a bad idea to do what? >> to have a security council resolution. parameters which i think you , would have to say is a 50-50 chance that the administration might do after the november elections. >> so, i would say, and this is where we get into the theory and the practice. i don't deny that what i presented has major practical challenges which is why, also, countries are choosing what i call the easy way. they recognize palestine and they will not deal with all of the implications. sweden will announce that it is not opening an embassy and from -- in ramallah and continue to fund andra. i wanted to highlight why that is deeply unhelpful. and why this sends a very, very problematic message about what the world is trying to achieve. in many ways, what i'm saying is
that if you cannot do that coherently and consistently, please don't do anything. because, what you are doing in the middle sends the most problematic message of all. so, i wanted to present what a coherent, smart strategy would look like. given the practical problems, i would at least prefer to deal -- that the alternative that would not be a halfway detrimental job, but to not do anything. if i knew that there was a real chance, somehow the stars align, and there's a real chance to put forward a security council resolution, and in the paper i mention that after years of what was considered constructive ambiguity, which was destructive, now we know that we need constructive specificity. we need to be very clear on the details. if there was a real chance for a
coalition around its detailed proposal that addresses all the issues, and essentially confuses the sides because it gives the israel embassy jerusalem and it ends essentially world recognition and support of the right of return, but then gives the palestinians their capital in jerusalem and a state. if there was a chance to have specific package that the dresses all of these issues, i would support it. >> good. i want to make one quick note. believe it or not, in the u.n. resolution that admitted palestine as first and observer and then a member state of the organization with some qualifications, jerusalem is recognized as israel's capital. believe it or not.
if you look at the u.n. documents, the resolution that the palestinian authority itself recognizes jerusalem as the capital, both of israel and palestine. that is a historical footnote that leads me to a much more fundamental issue that i want to just mention, which is security council resolutions. so what? does anybody listen to every single security council resolution? if governments adopt a policy does that mean that parties will carry it out in practice? probably not. that is something else we need to keep in mind as we consider the diplomacy and limits of outside intervention or nonintervention. >> i want to thank you both, this is fascinating. that i thinksay the ideas are interesting and compelling, however like was
said, it does not work in a vacuum. i want to ask you what you think the role of public opinion, specifically maybe in the u.s., it being a leader and maybe in other countries as well, to promote certain solutions that might be effective in the long term. and one ofnal view the reasons i am publishing this speaking here, will continue to speak about it is because i think public opinion matters. we see it having an impact on the recognition of palestine. i want to highlight why that in itself is not helpful. if the public can be made aware to the need for a more coherent approach, may ultimately that will have some political impact as well. >> thank you.
great presentation, i really enjoyed it. i think i agree that we are really not at the point where the u.s. or any other western power can put a parameters paper on the table as a security council resolution or whatever. i am not sure that the things you are proposing will get us anyplace. side, you saynian we need them to reduce incitement and to maintain security cooperation. basically we have the security cooperation and have had it for some time. on the incitement issue, that is in the eye of the beholder. it spills onto both sides. on the israeli side, you suggest that we open up access to area c, which we have been trying to do since the days of george mitchell. we have made virtually no progress on it and my question would be, how do you see us making question -- project --
progress on it? that israelthe idea completely freeze settlement is something that is so politically impossible now that basically what you are saying, we are going to put this off for another decade or however long. on the palestinian side, you talk about reform and i would say the same thing. we have been trying to reform the palestinian authority since 1994. it is almost impossible. as it stands, palestine if it were a state in the form it is now, does not look that march -- that much worse than the states admitted to the u.n.. not think transparent government is the hallmark of either of those and the difference is we are holding palestine to different standards because of the security aspect which is based on the land
issues and contentions over narratives. howyou say something about you could see those ideas moving us along a little bit faster? >> i would actually disagree with you on a very basic point. i do not believe we have been trying to do either of these things, at least the last few years. during the mitchell times when kelly was doing it, reform and issues of developments on the ground were really, if i want to be charitable i would say a distant second. if i want to be less charitable, i would say a distant footnote. we were so fixated on high diplomacy that we actually did in put that much effort trying to get the sides to change their behavior. these things might not be mentioned in the preamble of the meeting but do not get discussed.
i would also disagree that we have in the past, talked about the issue of reform, we have managed to make some interesting progress of the international community created a coalition that was serious. did with theush issue of the roadmap and the reforms that followed the a very strongad international coalition that gave the palestinians no exit plan. up makinginians ended significant developments, making developments under the prime minister that were i would say, toward the nation are -- nature of palestinian government. they are not precondition to statehood even know international practice is changing in this way, yet i
would argue they are preconditioned. model,hern sudan is the i am not quite sure this is a model i want to follow. i do believe if you do not have betweensocial contract people and government, and part of it is clean government, then the government will not be stable. i admit that none of these things will get us to a piece deal but what they might do is create some degree of a more conducive environment that will allow the facilities to operate. now it is not possible, or is it creating a political environment to push for diplomacy. >> we have time for two last questions. i see them right there. i have a question about -- so
israel will be accepted in the arab world. [indiscernible] >> ultimately the question of legitimacy is manifested in two ways. at least up until now, every time that there was a clear and distinct opportunity for the arab palestinians to have a state, but this would have meant forgoing that year of return, basically coming finally and for all with the idea that the jewish people have an equal claim to the land, they are home there, they are not interlopers, colonialists, that was too high a price to pay. the arab peace initiative emerged from a particular moment
and everything rests on the interpretation of what they talk about a just solution for the refugee problem. if it is a take it or leave it initiative and the arabs basically never made overtures , then thisat did negates the jewish right of self-determination. until i see a clear statement that says, we accept that the jewish people have an equal claim to the land. they are as indigenous as we are , they are as home as we are. their rights and our rights are both not superior and not exclusive. i will note that we are at the peace.of peace, real the issueg as returns, the refugees continue to be covered in the language. veryut people being
specific to say, those who live in the west bank and gaza are no longer refugees, whatever the palestinian people have a right to self-determination and to have a law of return in the state they will have to, but they do not have a right of return. sometimes we are even willing to go to what you would call an extreme left-wing or right-wing solution. i am willing to recognize the asal right of return, equally renounce the implementation of their right. as long as that exists, there is still no -- i do not see a real acceptance. jordan, they do not have to be with israel. a real acceptance of the jewish people is equal, indigenous
>> i am always uncomfortable with bringing matters of negotiations because i do not believe diplomats and lawyers are the best equipped or the most appropriate actors to define a narrative for people. i'm content with that arrangement. the arab peace initiative talks about a just and agreed -- ask to highlight, underline the word agreed. >> both sides have a veto. >> that is the nature of any deal. the way that the jordanians and saudi's understood it is that it in order not loose to impose a solution but to create the framework for either side to agree on. to expect the arabs to put substantive solutions and make concessions is not the objective. say weective was to sav are in agreed parameters and for israel is to say these are initial incentives. -- itare many mistakes was perceived as all or nothing.
athink it shifted from supportive framework to a negotiated framework will not work. >> i will have to apologize. we have run overtime already which is a sign of how interesting and provocative this discussion was, in a good way. i want to thank all of you for coming and for your interesting and important questions. i want to thank our panelists. >> [applause] >> happy holidays and happy new year to all of you. >> with congress on holiday recess, the c-span network's ofture a full lineup programming. lara logan, sebastian younger
and other journalists who have risked their lives covering events in the middle east. celebrity activists from the entertainment world speak out on a variety of issues. wednesday night, events from the c-span archives featuring notable public figures who died in 2015. atrsday night, a look back the year in congress. activists and journalists examine the person system and its impact on minority communities. 2 possible tv, -- books on economics and the economy. authors talk about their books. at 8:00 p.m., discussions on isis and terrorism. friday night at 8:00, several of our in-depth program from this year. on american history tv on c-span3 tonight at 8:00 p.m.
eastern the seven yet anniversary of the liberation of auschwitz. tuesday night at 8:00, the 150th anniversary of the 13th amendment. thursday night, a debate on which president would be a better model for gop candidates today, calvin coolidge or ronald reagan. thursday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, wrote to the white house rewind. lynn manuel valls and a playwright enstar of hamilton accepts the george washington book prize special achievement award. weekend, bookar's tv brings you three days of nonfiction books and authors. on new year's day and encore presentations of in-depth starting at 7:00 p.m. eastern. thom hartmann on his life and career and his response to viewer calls and questions.
his many books include "the ," and threshold. include race and economics and up from the projects. saturday evening at 10:00 p.m. rovern on afterword, karl looks at william mckinley plus 1896 campaign in his new book "the triumph of william mckinley." mckinley bus expansion of the republican base. mr. rove is interviewed by richard burr kaiser. >> the republican party has been beaten in the 1892 election. grover cleveland has come to office. mckinley has seen the country descended into a depression. republicans think the election
of 1896 is going to be there's and he wants to be the nominee but he is not the front runner. >> directly following afterwards at 11:00 p.m. eastern, join book tv as we attend a book party thrown for karl rove. author david marinus will be live with your calls, e-mails, and texts from noon to 3:00 p.m. eastern. book tv this new year's weekend, three days of nonfiction books and authors on c-span2, television for serious readers. congress is out for the year but both chambers return in january for the second session of the 114th congress. the house returns january 5 and plans to begin work on a budget reconciliation bill that the funds planned parenthood while
also repealing the health care law. the senate approved that measure but the president says he will veto the legislation. senators return january 11 and plan to begin consideration for a circuit court judicial nomination in pennsylvania. senator rand paul has said he will move to require an audit of the federal reserve. you can follow the senate live on c-span2 in the house on c-span. next, a look at race relations in light of recent incidents with police. we will hear from a former st. louis police officer who left the force to address what he considered systemic problems in the criminal justice system. this is an hour and a half. >> this semester there have been a number of incidents that suggest a real need to have an open dialogue about race on this campus and others.
event is free and open to the public like all national agenda events. i encourage audience participation from the audience and mitchell hall as well as via social media. tweet at the account @ ud race in america and you can join the discussion. it should be said that along with the candidness and sincerity, civil and respectful dialogue is expected. as i have set all semester if , you would not stand up and say it in public, don't tweet it. look around you. no we are all here -- know that we are all here to get a better understanding of race in america and on this campus. be candid, but courteous. tonight, redditt hudson is the founder of the national coalition of law enforcement officers for justice reform and accountability. this coalition includes current and former police officers around the country who are committed to challenging the institutional racism that is at
the foundation of our criminal justice system and found in police culture throughout america. he is also the board chair for the st. louis missouri based ethics project. mr. hudson was racial justice manager and program associate for the american civil liberties union for eastern missouri. he is also a former st. louis police officer. he left the force in 1999 the focus on addressing systematic problems in the criminal justice system, abuse police authority, and improving the police community relationship. he is the author of the critical investigative report, "suffering in silence," which catalogs human rights abuses in st. louis jails, and which has led to several formal actions to address the conditions in them. please join me in welcoming redditt hudson to the
university of delaware. [applause] mr. hudson: thank you for having me. i have had quite the day. i am getting my second wind now and i'm glad to be here with you to talk about race in america. more importantly, for me, to talk about police community relations and some of the dynamics we have seen relative to race and police in the united states in the last 18, 24 months. i'm very glad to have this opportunity to speak to you. if they decide to run part of , as on c-span, the country
different perspective from law enforcement. my colleagues who also share a law enforcement background, and a lot of times the mainstream presentation of police points of view, you don't hear from officers who understand the history of policing in america and the relationship between police and black communities that they serve in urban core communities across this country. just to tell you a little bit about who i am before i get started, my name is redditt hudson, and i'm a lot of things. i'm a father, a son, former st. louis university basketball player, former racial justice manager at the aclu, currently regional field organizer for the naacp. i'm speaking strictly in the capacity of my position.
board chair of the ethics project. i'm here to talk to you tonight as candidly as i can in a space in our history where your generation -- and i'm talking to the college students here, and the organizers on this campus and around the country, that put us in a position to affect real change. real change. and this has to happen. to lay the foundation for you, i wanted to share some things with you about my experiences when i was on the department. and then i will bring my remarks, to give you a sense, a foundational sense of some of what this movement that you've seen grow from ferguson all the way around the world has been vilified wrongfully in so many corners is really about.
early in my career, i was working with an officer, female officer, and this officer happened to be a white female officer. i will tell you, it is not only did white officers abuse their authority. you have black, asian, and who do it.ficers the issue of authority is where it takes place, which is consistently in black communities and poor white communities across this country. one day we got a call and it was a call for an officer need of aid. officer need of aid call for anybody who's in law enforcement in the room or anybody who knows law enforcement, officer need of aid call is a very serious call. it means all officers in the geographical range of this call, stop whatever you're doing an d expedite to the officer's
location. he or she is in trouble, serious trouble, could be. this officer put out a call. he was in a foot pursuit, chasing a suspect in an armed robbery and he was running. calling out where he was. a call comes out, we expedite to his location and get there first. we see the officer who put the aid call out. we don't see a suspect, we see the officer bent over like this, winded, breathing hard. would go up to the officer in the female officer asked him, are you ok? yeah, i'm ok. i'm all right. he's breathing hard. where did he go? we were on a street called ashland in north st. louis, missouri. that is the black side of st. louis, missouri. .e is bent over like this
she asked him where the guy went and he went like this. i think he went in that house. he picked a house at random. we go up to the house, me and a female officer. we get to the door. she's banging on the door. she had a big black flashlight hitting the door as hard as she , could. open this door. i'm not going to use the language. we don't know if anybody is in the house or not. from the back of the house, with the ruckus we created in the front of it, we see a shape begin to approach the door. wooden door, glass in the center. moving about this be right here. slowly getting to the door.
the door opens, cracked. standing in the door is a kid about 19 years old, african american. i'm standing there with this female officer. mind you, i'm six foot eight, i'm out of shape right now, but at that time i was working out every day. 265, 270,t single-digit body fat, i had on a short sleeve shirt size medium. >> [laughter] >> it was that small on purpose so i can look like i was busting out of it. he opened the door, he looks and he says, lady, i don't know what you're talking about. i live here. i've lived here all my life. everybody on this block knows our family. they know me.
i'm here by myself right now. you've got the wrong house. i guess that was the wrong answer, because as soon as he got those words out of his mouth, she grabbed him by his throat, smashed him out of that doorway and took him to the edge of the porch we were on. in north st. louis, the porches are elevated on some blocks. they set up real high. if you go over the edge of it, you will not just far from here to that floor. you'll fall maybe 10 feet. she had him by his throat over the edge of that porch. bam. she cracked him right in the face. i'm looking at this, and if somebody hits you like that generally speaking you're going , to do one of two things. you are going to put up your hands and try to block something else that may be coming at you, or you may offer up some
discouragement for that kind of behavior. he threw his hands up. i don't know if she thought he was trying to engage or what, but she hit him again to the face, to the groin. she's hurting him, and it's happening. i'm telling it slow, but it is happening fast. at this point, i grabbed the uniformed officer in my uniform and get her off this guy and take her to one side of the porch. i told you, it was an officer need of aid call. which means every officer in the area expedites to this location. he had canceled the aid call, which slowed them down some. if you understand police calls, people want to see what the call was about. they came anyway. here come the rest of the officers. up the steps of the porch we are on, comes a black officer, a
officer.e he looks at me, looks at the veteran officer i had in the corner. he goes, what's going on? she points at the guy who was still laying where she left him and said, that s.o.b., he assaulted me and tried to interfere with what i was trying to do. the black officer said, oh yeah? he goes over to the guy and said, man, get up. the kid looked up at him and said, you see i can't get up. the officer said, man, get the -- up. the kid said, you see i can't get up. the officer grabbed him and his shirt, picked him up, slammed him into the house so his face was against the house and his hands are behind his back. he cuffed him up. the kid is still leaning against the house.
he saying, get in that car because i'm taking you in for assault on an officer. the kid was leaning on the house, looking at him. he said, -- i'll never forget the look in his eyes. it was a mix of anger, hurt, surprise, fear, all of that. he was looking at this brother in front of him thinking, why are you doing this to me? he said it one last time. he said man, you see i can't go. the officer said -- he dropped down and grabbed this kid, pulled up like that. if you have your hands bound behind your back and can't move them and somebody grabs you by your ankles and pulls up as hard as they can, what do you think happens? you hit your head pretty hard, don't you? and he did. and he drug him down that porch
and through the yard and threw him in the car. we got back to the station and we are all in the sergeants room and we all get into it. first the female officer. let me tell you something, if you ever interfere with me again while i'm doing police work -- that's how she characterized what she had done -- i will never write with you again. -- -- ride with you again. i'm already thinking, that's a damn good idea. the other officer and i go back and forth a bit. the sergeant says look, we have , work to do. puts us all back in service. and we all went back in service. that was that. what always bothered me about that encounter, what always has stayed with me to this very day, was the reason the kid kept telling the officer, don't you see that i can't go?
the reason he was saying that is because when he first came to the door and saw me and the other officer standing there and he cracked the door open, he was standing there on crutches. she snatched him off his crutches to do that to him. and nobody was in the house. and it was his home. and he was in violation of no law. no law. i got one more for you to set the foundation and then we will talk. anthony collins. young kid. 21, 22 at the time. 2006. us, is brought to our
attention about an assault committed on him by police officers in st. louis. at a traffic stop, one of those checkpoint situations where they set up a check point and every car that comes through has to stop, and he's at the checkpoint one night. and, he stops. the officer is at a distance and he can't understand at some point what the officer is directing him to do. and so he gets out of his car to find out more about what he needs to do because he has somewhere to be. he has somewhere to be. he gets out of the car. the officer says, get back in the car. because he has somewhere he urgently needs to be, he approaches the officer anyway in an attempt to explain that and find out what it is he needs to do so he can move through the checkpoint. instead of offering him an
explanation for his simple act of noncompliance, which these days can get you killed, the officer proceeds to assault him physically, he maces him, chokes him up with that mace, eyes burning, and get ready to arrest him for assault on an officer or resisting arrest. every time the police beat you up, they charge you with resisting arrest. anthony pleads his case. at some point, one of the supervising officers arrives and a decision is made to finally let anthony get medical attention, which they initially denied to him, and to release him. this was largely due to the fact that at some point, they realized that the assault the officer committed on anthony had caused him to miss his flight
back to iraq for his second tour of duty in the united states army. i interviewed anthony at length, and to hear anthony, this black kid, this soldier, described to me how he felt that he had no rights here in the united states that anyone were bound to recognize how he had always felt this way because the police had always treated him this way and his family this way including his mother, was disappointing, to say the least. these kinds of experiences are part of the daily lived reality of black people everywhere in this country, particularly in the urban poors of this country,
and you need to fully understand that when you see black lives matter, this is what they are talking about. it is not the only thing they are talking about but they are talking about the real, lived experiences of people, and they are tired. we are tired. this is generations old, fathers and sons, mothers and daughters have experienced this going back to who knows when and there has been zero accountability for any of it because, as police officers, we always can fall back on that narrative of heroism, sacrifice, risk, some of the favorite words of many of the most public police apologists that you see all the time in the mainstream media, , the towne harry hoke crier of police apologists. people that justify anything police will do on the street.
this is where we are. what about the more serious cases we have seen? where we have seen absolutely no accountability for officers that violate our human rights and civil liberties. eric garner, murdered in front of us. make a mistake, murdered on the street as he pleaded -- make no mistake, murdered on the street as he pleaded. an officer using an illegal chokehold barred by his own department. he does this with zero expectation that him and his cohorts are going to be held accountable. in the aftermath you get a , police unionoss
president, chin up, chest out, not only justifying this murder but calling on his officers to turn their backs on the mayor of new york for having the nerve to describe the real lived experience of him and his family biracialalks to his kids about how to deal with the police. he would do better to have his officers stopped turning their backs on our human rights. it would do much better in that regard. sandra bland. sandra bland, who encounters an officer and rightfully is indignanthe would do better to s officers stopped turning their at a nonsense stop and who correctly asserts the right -- only to be met with contempt
for having the nerve as a black woman to assert her rights to him. -- directingher her to put out a cigarette after the summons that he was issuing her is issued. their interaction is done. if on the police and on the street with you and you have received a summons for me and we have conducted our business, i am out. i am back to my car. i'm not standing there saying, it you don't put that cigarette out i'm going to hit you with this 50,000 volts because i don't like your attitude. we have got to come to a place where officers see the inherent dignity and value of everyone and every life. the people they serve in their communities. tamir rice.
the reason i'm doing this a specific. we do have some media coverage here and i think it is important that this goes out nationally for people to hear a different perspective from law enforcement . one that knowledge is the realities of our ugly history when it comes to race and racism and institutional racism in our criminal justice system. tamir rice. the child was shot with two seconds of the police officer arriving. he barely exited the vehicle. this was an officer who had a history of failure in his performance area. the department that he left to go to the cleveland police department said he was unfit for duty, particularly when it relates to firearms. in the report this comes out, he thinks he saw tamir reaching for his waistband when you are notified via at least one caller that it could be a toy gun. for youpu