tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN April 4, 2016 10:00am-12:01pm EDT
me. -- free. donald trump, we are going to make everybody rich. young people like that. answer everybody should know. the other question is this. i am tired of hearing people, on television saying hillary is a liar. that the woman ever said. one thing where she is not trustable. i am 76 years old. i have followed this woman. i do not recall her ever flying -- lying. please tell me where she lies and where she is not honest. host: how do you respond to that
sentiment? guest: i did not get the entire just -- gist -- referencewas making to her critics saying she is a liar, asking where she was lying. let me turn this into a question for tomorrow. what do you expect the results to mean for her or sen. sanders: wisconsin? look at it.ays to one is the math and the other is the momentum and psychology. it willelegate math, not have a profound impact on the democratic race. if you look at 2008, the way the delegates were divvied up, barack obama beat hillary clinton by 17 points, so it was kind of a wipeout in terms of the popular vote. delegates that year, hillary won 32 and obama got 42. so only a 10-point difference in
the delegate haul. i do not think bernie sanders is likely to win by 17 points if he does winen and the margin is smaller than that, you may only see a gain in the single digits. on top of that, hillary clinton has more support with the superdelegates, unbound delegates. it will not have a big impact on the delicate math, but it could have an impact on the psychology, if bernie sanders wins, especially if she wins by a bigger margin. and that obviously gives him a boost going into new york, helps him make the case that this is still a race. host: here is a look at the delegate totals, including superdelegates for the democrats. hillary clinton with just over 1700. bernie sanders with just over 1000.
2383 needed on the democratic side. on the republican side, 1237 needed. there are 42 delegates up for grabs tomorrow in wisconsin for republicans. karen is the last call from lakeview, oregon. i live in oregon, new resident. i went to the dmv to get a voters card. i was told that you did not have vote.n up to everyone is registered to vote in the state of oregon. registerede, you are , but i want to let people know, if you are in a state -- if you are an independent, or a democrat want to vote republican, you have to fill out a voter card so you can vote in the republican primary.
the final thing i would like to say is, the definition of stupid or kind of dumb, is doing the same thing over and over again expecting a different result. host: thank you for the call. craig gilbert. registrationis no by party in wisconsin, so that effectively means there is an open primary. you can pick which primary you vote in. obviously, you cannot vote in both. somebody who considers them a democrat can vote in either primary, the same for someone who considers themselves a republican. and even if you are not registered, you can register at the polling place. a sizable fraction of the voters in wisconsin and up registering to vote on election day. of the sense, regardless there is ad law, lower barrier in wisconsin that some states to those kinds of
new voters, nontraditional voters, because of election day registration. it will be interesting to see what that means donald trump and on the democratic side. host: a great piece online on js.com. craig gilbert has covered the theonsin primary, with sentinel. we appreciate it. live now, an event getting underway, a discussion on maritime corporation with australia and japan in the pacific. the senate is in session this week, the house returns next week. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] bomb spent much of his career working on southeast and u.s. australia, including position in the asia office of the secretary of defense, policy, planning,
booz allen hamilton, and bob is well-known for his expertise on only on planning and strategic guidance, but also in southeast asia and oceana. builds on growing momentum for strengthening not u.s.-japan-australia , but to align and make more interoperable bilateral relations in asia. u.s.-japan and u.s.-australian alliance were born together, but not really in intimacy. in some ways, quite the opposite. the australian side plate is quite well. the951, they help to design
alliances we know today to maximize australian interests. largeas part of a bargain, but no point in intimacy. but that is changing after the cold war. on an operational level, it began in the clinton administration. when i was in the bush administration, we began in 2001 the trilateral security dialogue, and since then, things have accelerated from there in terms of trilateral cooperation. when andrew will present is based on his work in this area for about two decades, including contralateral response with japan, u.s., india, in the recent tsunami, and recent work with the strong government. work on both about
sides of the aisle in the u.s., japan, and australia. scheer is also here to comment, give us the state of play in current u.s. policy, not necessarily to endorse the report. we often have officials appear who politely say we are already usually polite enough to say that this is the dumbest thing i have ever heard -- somewhere in the middle. but it gives of context to understand what the government is doing, understand what opportunities there are, going forward. we will hear from and you and then bob, and then open up to questions. andrew: thank you, everyone, for coming along today. i would like to thank mike and csi has for the opportunity to spend time here. i have a lot of old friends here and it has been fantastic to be
back as a visiting fellow in the past few months. would also like to thank bob for coming along. friend, and it a is good for you to give us your time. finally, i want to thank folks who reviewed my paper, gave me some really good feedback, probably saved me from some errors. if there are errors left, they are mine, not theirs. i just want to pick up from where mike set things up. starting point for this project really is the work that csis has been doing on federated defense. that the bestea way to respond to a changing, and in many ways, deteriorating international security situation in an environment when we are all increasingly resource-constrained is to
increase our defense capabilities much better in the interests of some very substantial long-term, shared aspirations and interest in our countries. in particular, when it comes to the asia-pacific, to respond to what i think is a rapidly growing series of challenges. some of these are transnational in nature, counter piracy, responding to humanitarian disasters. the december 2004 tsunami, but there was also the japanese earthquake and tsunami disaster. there will be much more of that. then we are also seeing, undeniably, increasing tensions in the region. in the south china sea, for example, we are seeing a more
active russian posture, with russia modernizing it pacifically -- it's fleet, bringing some capable agreement into the picture, and then you have a nuclear arms dictator in north korea, of course. undeniably deteriorating security environment, particularly in asia, and perhaps driven by these trends, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems throughout the region. china is a big part of that, obviously. and russia, as i mentioned. but we're also seeing a number of countries acquire precision missiles, for example, intelligence reconnaissance surveillance capabilities, cyber
capabilities, and yes, submarines, which are starting to change the balance of power in asia and make it much more difficult or the united states and its allies to operate in the region, in the way they traditionally have. ais challenge has quantitative dimension, in terms of the number of weapons, in the region now, and will be in the region in the future. but also a quality dimension, in that we are seeing the introduction of new capabilities that are changing the strategic landscape. these are the sorts of things i mentioned earlier. at the same time, we are all resource constrained at the moment. the size ofmeans the u.s. navy, for example, has been falling. other countries in the region are not spending massive amounts
on defense, although australia and japan have committed to increasing spending, particularly on maritime cute ability. generally, we are seeing a reduction in the resources. the task of managing the challenge and monitoring it is becoming greater. gaps ind, we are seeing capability, notwithstanding the u.s. rebalance. there are limits to resources in terms of humanitarian assistance, amphibious assets, theundersea u.s. submarine fleet. actually, around 2020, it will start to get smaller, not larger. and in ciber, missile, cyber security in general.
for that reason, i chose to focus my paper on maritime security and how we can take the framework of federated defense and start to actualize it, in terms of real capability in the region. then i narrowed it down to japan and australia for a few key reasons. one is the policy framework that mike mentioned, strengthening trilateral strategic corporations around that has been policy for a long time. those countries because they are probably the united states' most capable maritime partners in the region. when we are looking to achieve the sorts of strategic attacks on talking about in the paper, including around deterrence and the capacity to reassure allies, you need high and partners. we have to collaborate, of course, across the region with a whole range of countries,
including china on a transnational part of this, but building genuine capability, you have to start with the most capable power. bothalia and japan have themselves been shifting their defense policies in the direction of more assist on maritime security, and both have a stated commitment to increase their maritime capabilities. so they are already highly capable partners, and they will become, it's fair to say, even more capable partners over the next 10 to 20 years. the submarine piece of this equation is the one that generates all the excitement, of course. 1000,bt, the c australia's program to replace , is oneent class fleet very important opportunity to strengthen maritime cooperation between these three countries. the question of that. but this agenda is much broader than just the submarine piece.
the last chapter of the report really is an attempt to draw out that willplan hopefully encourage officials -- i plan to hear from bob about this -- and that is to start making some of these more integrated capabilities real. a critical part to start is ournd isr and networking intelligence surveillance capabilities much more effectively. in particular, to build a shared picture of what is happening in the maritime environment. we know from our time in when governments share a common appreciation of the strategic environment, then we are likely to act in concerted ways in pursuit of shared interests. ere, i'm talking about networking surveillance
aircraft, u.s. and japanese fleet, the unmanned aerial vehicles that our countries will be bringing into service for long-range maritime surveillance , and also, potentially, cooperation in radar. our countries have some sophisticated technological skills and systems in place already. is the undersea part of this. undersea warfare will become increasingly important in the asia-pacific. everyone talks about submarines, but i think potentially more important is antisubmarine warfare. certainly in australia, it's fair to say, our asw skills have not had the attention that they used to get during the cold war. we have had other priorities.
we need to start rebuilding those capabilities and australia, and here again, the networking potential, and our ability to leverage australia's geography, japan's strategic geography creates a web of capabilities that can take the load off of u.s. resources, which will be increasingly stretched by this picture that i have tried to set out in the paper. when it comes to submarines, of course, this is on astral indecision. it will be a very consequential decision. decision.ralian it will change the force structure available to the government for decades and hints at the level of excitement around the decision-making. it is also a massive commercial opportunity, the largest openly available defense industry contract on the world market at the moment.
will,ccessful partner obviously, gain huge kudos when it comes to building advanced submarines, so the stakes are high. the point i would make their, and in the paper, and did other things i have written with mike -- i have been careful to say, when it comes to assessing the key capabilities that the different partners bring to the , and also things like cost and schedule and risk, and so forth. things that should be under consideration. the point i make in the paper, and more generally, is that partnering with japan and the united states on submarines is a potential game changer at different levels. at the strategic level, it can have the effect, i believe, of
more in ajapan regional security architecture theiran help to allay anxiety. that is a good, stabilizing thing to do. at the operational level, a fleet of interoperable submarines can certainly had more impact and can deal both with the quantitative undersea challenge that i mentioned, and the qualitative challenge, in terms of increasing capabilities in the region. then the defense industry part of this is incredibly important. efforts tojapan's expand its defense industry, the international dimension of that is incredibly important in terms of locking in japan to a broader regional security architecture. for those reasons, it is undeniable there is a church reject dimension to the summary
decision and that those factors should feature in that decision. capability, cooperation, and the summary project is a good example, an important area for in.three countries to work i say in the paper we should start thinking about combat capability from the get-go, westridge were armies are being formulated, through the capability acquisition process. that is a way to reduce inefficiencies, reduce duplication, drive interoperability. likewise with logistics, i cannot remember who said it, but someone said amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics. it is undeniable, when you look of,he chokepoints, in terms for example, precision guided munitions for coalition operations in the region, if we
integrate our logistics chain, look at things like, stockpiles of munitions, mutual resupply, pre-positioning, also working together on sustainment of our systems, particularly if we can move in the way of more shared systems and platforms, they would be enormous benefits there. amphibious capability. australia and japan are building their own amphibious capability. it is fair to say it is early days in both cases. this is where, working with the u.s. marine corps, is so important for us, as we build that capability, and where the marine rotations in australia come into play. that is massively important, but it should be a two-way street. when you read about the shortage of strategic sealift that could constrain amphibious operations in the region, we should be ambitious here and should be
theing at building capability to deploy u.s. marines and their vehicles and weapons and eric wrapped off an australian platform. one of our large 27,000-ton ships, or a japanese fleet, for that matter, and generating a pulled amphibious lift capability that can work in the region on problems as diverse as humanitarian response to stabilization operations, and so forth. just a few other quick things before i wrap up and hand over to bob. machinery has been in place for a long time, as mike mentioned. i sat in the paper, i think it needs to be updated. we have a security and defense cooperation forum, which is an analog to the trilateral strategic dialogue.
i recommend that should be elevated to the deputy secretary level, to really give it more drive and cut through the three systems. i think there should be standing working groups and some of the areas i've mentioned this morning, to take forward individual initiatives in that framework. i think we also have to -- need to bring india in. importantn incredibly potential partner for australia, japan, and for the united states. and we should do that at a pace that is, i think, comfortable for india. isr,u look at areas like and a summary of warfare, india has a huge role to play, and there are some real affinities with australia's geographic positioning. also, we need to continue to engage china. u.s.so do trilateral
-australia-china exercises. we need to work more on hadr and counterpart received. generally, build up habits of working in cooperation. ultimately, that will create greater transparency and hopefully greater confidence. i will leave it there and handed over to bob. bob: i am very happy to be here to discuss this paper. it is not just because andrew and mike are old friends and colleagues. i would do it for that, regardless of what's in the paper. but also because i really do applaud efforts to continue to examine how we in the united states, with our friends and allies, work together to promote and defend our interests in the ski region of asia. this is a paper that looks to do that. it was well worth the time, even on the weekend, to take a quick look at the paper, and to give
you some thoughts and impressions about that, and how that fits into the way that we think about our policy toward asia writ large. as i read the paper, there are two key premises, and i think they are worth pointing out, and all to the good. one, we in the united states, with our allies, have to be given to adapt our long-standing alliance system that used to be predominantly -- if not in some cases solely a hub and spoke system. andrew pointed out, the federated process, systems that csis is looking at, all of this points out, while hub and spoke was the predominant nature of our relationship in asia, it cannot be the only way we look at it. i think we have not only look at that for many years, standing a number of administrations, but that we have to continue that progress. the second premise is that maritime issues are, and will continue to be, critical to the
security and prosperity of asia. it goes without saying, but nonetheless, worth pointing out. map, you don't have a hard time understanding why maritime issues are so important for asia for security and prosperity. put together, it was an easy sell me to look at ideas about how we could increase trilateral cooperation and increase that alliance network, and focus on maritime issues. with each of those in more detail from my perspective. of increasinga multilateral cooperation with our most capable allies, and doing it together. on the face, it makes sense. these are two allied with whom were closely. we had a very good interoperability with each of them individually. if there is a sure perspective, why wouldn't we look to seize opportunities where they exist,
to work together in a trilateral cooperation? that was not always the case, and even when it was, we didn't always jump on it. in today's world, not just because of budget issues, but certainly, that is the way to go. i will jump ahead to a quotation i was going to use later, but before the president announced to asia late last year, one of the lines in a fact sheet is the following. our priority is to strengthen cooperation among our orders in the region, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based regional order and addressing regional and global challenges. could not have said it better myself. i might have, i don't know. nonetheless, that, as principal, makes perfect sense, and is something we need to continue to look at. we need to look at developing
new patterns of cooperation. how can we get our friends and allies to start thinking about things not just in the of and spoke process, but working together? argue the united states was not always a large proponent of the hot and spoke process, but were willing to work with our allies in that way when it was most appropriate. as we are merge and as the security develops and we have more allies becoming more capable, we will need to look for other ways of doing this. trilateral cooperation between our most capable allies is a key piece of that. we are doing a lot in large multilateral. you have seen the eas, all of the other large multi-lateral forums, those are important pieces of our foreign policy. it is one of the things that we have put an emphasis on in the obama administration.
not meanever, does that it is the only way to do things, i think as you are looking at some of the advanced capabilities, those fora are not ready for those activities so we need to see where we can have those combination of friends and allies, and with what missions, what capabilities will be the most profitable and be able to be flexible. asia has the advantage and disadvantage of not having a set in stone, very clear multilateral forum. we should take advantage of that where we need to and try to build on it where we think it is not a strength of our relationships. security istime absolutely one of the key issues and it is the right one to focus on. it is a critical domain to our security, the security of the united states, to our allies, friends, the region at large,
and a critical domain for economic prosperity. what we are looking for in a security environment as we can no longer assume as we had for many years that the maritime domain will go uncontested. and so understanding that as a premise, we need to look to like-minded nations of how we thebest in sure -- ensure ability to operate in and through the maritime domain as we have done, and as has benefited the united states and our allies in the region for decades. australia and japan are obvious first choices and for reasons that we have all talked about. i do think there are other countries that are capable of doing this, and i think we should look to that in the future. korea, singapore are some of the first names that come to mind but i do think that with a cleared share interest and our and thethe opportunity
security challenges in the region, australia and japan make sense to be the right places to start. this is especially true given what japan has recently done and what the government has done to push a view of security, and understanding it is a broader perspective and they can and should be a participant. are putthose things together we should explore these ideas and look at them. i look forward to looking at depth's paper in greater and those inside and outside of government will do that. i don no position now, and not think anyone would want me to say yeah, this is the right thing or no, it is not. it is well worth looking at. it fits into our overall policy. i would say arguably the thing that i would ask us to look at as we look at these proposals, first of all, i think the areas are about right.
one, amphibious capabilities, other logistics, these are all good areas to be examining in greater depth. when i think we need to do with the rebalance as we move forward, and what i would recommend to a follow-on administration, is to continue the operations we are doing, continue to look at the way we are doing things now, but also look at what our missions, what our operations? it should not be just about where we are or what capabilities we bring or enhancing our allies and friends. it should not just be about geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. it should be about all of those things. you have heard them continue to be said. one of the wonderful things about government is you get to repeat yourself and maybe someone will believe that you mean it. we will continue to say those
things but we also need to talk about for what? why are we geographically distributed? why are we looking to cooperate on a range of issues? why are we putting our best technology forward into the pacific? so we can work on things together. some of these things will be at the high end of the spectrum, others will be at the lower end, and we cannot forget any of those pieces. making sure we are as better unilaterally with our allies and broader with a set of allies and friends in doing operations that stand from humanitarian to disaster relief to ensuring the maritime cyberspace domains and comments are able to be operated freely. all of those things we should look for, cooperation, and what we are doing next. it will always be with our asian allies that we are going to be seeing this. this is where our interests are inexorably intertwined. things,at, those of the
i think this fits right in and i think andrew for inviting me to be here. i say that before the questions and answers. and also to be able to take a look at this early on because i think there is some great -- just the premise makes sense so we need to take a look at what bright people are thinking about elsewhere. >> let me thank you both. i will start the questions and then open it up. i think in injured's presentation -- in injured's presentation -- andrew's presentations you heard about how much australia can benefit. perhaps getting greater versatility on northern asia security dynamics. there are going to be enormous advantages in this kind of agenda for the u.s.-japan alliance as well as i think our allies will see what it looks
like when you were operating globally, when you have more integration of senior-level commands and staff, not a joint , but muched command more trust across different commands, intelligent sharing. i think there is going to be an alliances, for both and not just the australian and japanese side. as we see japan take on and see what the gold standard is in many areas, that is a huge advantage. i like the fact that you put this in the context that the u.s. and japan and australia, and particularly japan and australia have been quite operating on regional architecture from aipac and before that. a lot of it came out of japan and australia. even the trilateral security log which i was involved in from the beginning was primarily on the
japanese and australian sides telling us to get our act together and telling us the right things to focus on in asia. that set of common interests really drives this. each, andrew,sk the japan-australia security cooperation is 100 years old and write about this time 100 years ago, they were sinking submarines in the mediterranean and the in parallel japanese navy got troops and so forth. there is a long history with an obvious interruption. my sense is in australia, particularly since 15 and 20 years ago the views toward japan shifted quite considerably in a very positive direction. on the other hand, beijing is very clearly opposed to anything like this even if it involves
building humanitarian capacity -- capacity for humanitarian relief. i think from china's perspective, this is our intention in the three allied capitals, but i think from the chinese perspective it is window dressing for a containment strategy. i would expect the chinese official criticism of trilateral , japan, australia, is going to increase. i guess my question is, are they ready for the heat? what is the debate like in australia? it sounds like yes, but if you could give this washington audience a bit of the flavor of the larger worldview in australia, how you do this while at the same time retaining commercial relations with china, that would be terrific. >> thank you, bob, for that
context. that is absolutely right. as mike says, our partnership with japan goes back a long way indeed and in fact, it is interesting. , itg back to the formation was done through the lens of what had happened in japan and it was when we had the security guarantee provided by ansys that australia felt ready very quickly after the second world order to extend a hand of friendship to japan & e-commerce agreement as early as mid-1950's. which shows you how quickly australia was, as our foreign minister said the other day, was prepared to move on and see the potential in the relationship with japan. that relationship was incredibly important because australia provided the raw material that cause the japanese boom and credit the asian economic miracle.
our strategic relationship with japan came later. we partnered very closely with japan on economics and increasingly in terms of regional diplomacy, and building this sort of architecture in the region that mike outlined. i think it was only when we worked with japan in southern iraq in the mid to thousands -- 2000's that the nature of the relationship started to become clear, particularly in tokyo. the experience of working with the adf and building that level with the adf,ust and seeing how closely the adf was integrated into the u.s. military was powerful, i think in terms of tokyo's thinking. and information sharing on ament, we are working
mutual access agreement to facilitate more exercises and operations in each country so the strategic relationship has come on in leaps and bounds. and now finally, i think just a few years ago most of us in this room would've thought it unthinkable that japan would be a potential international partner for australia's submarines. that is a matter of development. of course there is the china pace. aboutaid, this paper is maritime security in asia at russiand it talks about and it talks about korea, but i think it is inescapable that china's militarization of the isgram, capabilities it china is a driver of what is happening in our region. i do not think they should be
saying in any way it is containment. containment is not actually possible when you look at the greater economic dependence between our countries, even if anyone wanted it. this is about increasing, if you like, the poll of capability in the region to respond to a whole lot of different contingencies, as bob said, and that should be in the interest of the region at large including china. and the other point i would make is that i do think there is a institutions, as have done and as is recognized in u.s. government documents, the balance of power in maritime asia is shifting and it is shifting in an unfavorable direction. we need more high-level capability to sustain a favorable balance.
ultimately a peaceful and stable region that is underpinned by open economic institutions and respect for core principles, like freedom of navigation. that is the endpoint, the big hole, the prize. those have been the pillars of prosperity in the asia-pacific for 70 years, and what we are interested in should be the next 70 years. >> most of these questions i think will find andrew, but let me ask you one, bob. you mention a range of areas tom diplomacy, har surveillance and so forth. can you say a little bit more about the initiatives? it seems that by design probably, we are creating a new force posture in the pacific that links our bilateral life.
that marines will go to broken a ournd also darwin -- open darwin,wa and also maybe you can tell the audience were that is all heading. >> we have had this sort of tagline for an awful long. of time -- period of time for a -- and it is repeated not just because we are comfortable with it but because it actually represents what we are trying to do in terms upon your within the region. if you think about a number of years ago, you would say that our posture, you would equally our posture with our footprint and say that our footprint is just about northeast asia. you would not have been too far-off. while that may have been overly simplistic it may not have been wrong and certainly a defensible position. , and ideas were
started across multiple administrations, to see what we could do to get a better understanding, that we had interests beyond northeast asia. from northeast asia through southeast asia, oceania, and into the indian ocean and to do that you have to have the forces, the footprint, the agreements, the exercises with these countries so we started that, and we continued that effort in the obama administration. i think you will see some things that point to a fair bit and will continue to point to it. how we have operated with the government of singapore, in and around singapore. you will see the australia piece that we have done in terms of expanding our cooperation and ability to operate with australian forces from northern territories of australia particularly, air force and navy. you will see that we have done a fair bit in the philippines and
have gotten to the point where we can have more rotational presence in the philippines on a more regular basis. i think this all links together to say that this will be important to be able to operate with our friends and allies and operate relatively seamlessly with them across and around the region. think an, i really do lot of people who work on europe a lot and come into asia think it is a downside, that there is no clear regional architecture like nato. i understand why they do that. i have to spend a lot of time in europe and i have come to appreciate the nato alliance in a way that i have not before. but i also think there are clear advantages to having a more flexible process whereby you do
not have to get the agreement of all 28 nations as you will in europe, to do anything. that is to be able to work with countries with whom you share a similar interest. we look to put our posture in a context of not just being places but doing things. in order to do things with other countries and around the region, we have to have that posture. the big piece and the distributed network of our inawa,s coming off of ok leaving critical pieces but guam and being able to have that ability to operate with other countries wherever we think we need to, is really the key advantage of this distributed posture. as the u.s. government official up here i do feel compelled to say that while there is certainly a changing balance of military power in the asia region, i still feel extraordinary comfortable --
extraordinarily operable with the way it is now. we have to make sure to continue to track it and make sure our allies can operate in the best environment in operational ways that are relevant and able to secure our interests. it is not just about numbers, as the paper points out. it is also about capabilities. i am not willing to accept that trends are inevitably straight lines and i feel very good about our capabilities unilaterally. but also i feel better about it when i think about our capabilities with our allies and friends. >> same question to you, andrew. >> when you look at the u.s. force pasture -- posture which bob outline very well, and not just doing things but being places, i think what comes through very strongly is a shift in emphasis in southeast asia,
ocn em -- oceania, and we support the rebalance and what the u.s. administration has been trying to achieve. the paper, australia is becoming increasingly important in this context. but as a capability partner also because of our strategic geography. so for example, the marine presence is important for the capability building reasons i mentioned a little earlier, and i think it has a wider regional importance. if you look at it, i actually think the air force part of the u.s. force posture initiatives in australia, the capacity for northern australia to accept increasingly large rotations of long-range aircraft is ultimately more strategically
significant. i think the potential for the u.s. navy rotations from the west coast of australia will is the strategic importance of the indian ocean will continue to rise. we are going to see australia become more important in a force posture sense. in the report i talk about australia in terms of the century as far as longer-range weapons, but also a springboard as far as our access to some very critical real state including some of the maritime checkpoints in southeast asia and out into the eastern indian ocean. thehere, i think corporation between australia and india could be very important, and some work together in anti-submarine warfare as well. >> you will find in the report
on page 30 a very useful map that shows where some of these critical chokepoints are in maritime asia, and how the geography of japan and australia bear on that. open it up, identify yourself briefly, and keep it short. kevin. i was with the state department for many years, mostly in tokyo doing political military issues. the last 18 years, the policy of japan cooperation has made u.s. progress -- great progress. level, thecy architecture, it seems to me that we have gotten to the point now particularly in terms of responding to china, and i do not mind using the containment word myself. i think that is all of -- that is what we are all about.
there comes a point where the rubber meets the road in terms of capabilities. i agree with your report, you have outlined what needs to be done in terms of the networking and integration to get the force multiplier effect that we need as we all have limited resources. but the context of the rubber meeting the road or not, to me the issue before us is the submarine program. you have outlined the issues very well, but how confident are you that australian government will make what i would say is the correct decision on this in terms of this treated just strategic and operability -- strategic and operability between our three forces? i cannot see the germans caring that much about the south china sea. how confident are you that decisions will be made for the right reasons? thank you, kevin, for the
question. the first thing i would say is that i am not privy to the competitive process that is underway within our defense department at the moment. i had a hand in establishing the process. each of the international partners has expressed their support for the process and i think it is a good, robust process and that is important. us is a $50 billion acquisition and probably another hundred plus billion dollars going forward to sustain, that is absolutely huge for australia. a big project for a start. , because i'm not privy to the inside of the process i'm not going to comment on the relative merits technically of the japanese or german or french submissions.
i am not in a position to, and it is not my job to. when i can say, though, is that if the capability can be modified to the minimum extent possible to meet australia's strategic requirements, and that particularly required -- applies to range, and if the japanese proposal is solid on cost and schedule, and if it is the best way to mitigate the risks that we have experienced with the , and i class submarine think the strategic logic of going with the japanese is compelling. i, as an australian taxpayer and someone who worked in the australian government, i have no reason at all to believe that the process will not explore those issues in great detail with great professionalism, and
i very much hope and would serious, sensible decision just because of its importance for future generations. i think that would be my answer. i am certainly not going to be in a position to judge the outcome. what i think andrew said the spot on. there are a lot of variables that are beyond my ability to judge, technology and cost, and you did not mention, but industrial participation and labor relations, there is a lot to this. i did my dissertation on the kinds of decisions. when you are talking about technology in this much strategic capability, this is of much consequence. surprising it is under
the magnifying glass in tokyo and around the world, you see articles in the financial times and so forth. we have to stay neutral because we have three allies competing. think when you control for , or set aside for the moment all of the important technical, industrial, and other decisions, it is striking to a lot of onele here at least, that of the submarines under discussion operates in the waters of the pacific. and the industrial base and policy of that government is committed to exactly the same strategic objectives in that region. bid,s i understand it, the made clear there would be some consideration of the strategic factors. it is not surprising the u.s.
government has to be quite careful, but the nice thing about being out of government, we can sort of opine based on what we have seen of the dynamics of the region. i assume you do not want to answer this. >> just given the elephant in the room to prejudge or predict any other questions, let's be clear, the united states does not take a position on this other than it is a sovereign decision of the government in australia to make the best decision possible. i certainly hope all the considerations that everyone has laid out would be a part of that decision, but in terms of whether or not we have a position, the only position is that we will work with whatever submarine the australians choose. we hope they get through this process. >> i think chip is next in the front. chip gregson.
freedom of navigation was rightly mentioned as a principal which begs the question, whose freedom of navigation? how do we help guarantee vietnam and the philippines the right to freedom of navigation in their s?n exclusive economic >> bob might have something to say about this too. .t is an excellent question i think part of it is that as we know, these countries have limitations on their own capabilities to basically enforce their own interests and their own legal rights. the clause, so i think that one part of this, and some good work but has already started is building up their capabilities, starting with sort of coast guard-type capabilities to monitor the sorts of problems
that you mentioned around fishing and so forth. i know the united states has gifted a couple of retired coast guard cutters to the philippines. it is interesting, australia has done something similar with malaysia, two of our patrol boats have been gifted to malaysia to help them with precisely these. i think what you mentioned is a particularly good case where trilateral strategic cooperation is to kick in, and i think already has frankly, so that both of them duplicating and having an on coordinated approach, we have a shared idea of what these countries need and how to get them there most efficiently. that is to my mind, a good, practical example. >> it certainly. chip, as you know and many others in the room know, it gets complicated when it time --
's when youfining eez do not have a judgment on who owns which land feature. sometimes it is a difficult situation and it is sometimes where we hope everyone will see the way under customary we believe that is the right thing to deal with the disputes, and we support what is going on now in terms of any this unit resolution that could be going on with the case of the fifth -- the philippines and will live by whatever answer comes forward .ith all of that i would answer is immaterial to whatever country deserves to be able to address threats within it and deal with and have some sense of maritime humane awareness and be able to do rightful positions regardless of what you believe the territorial waters are, and that is where we focus on the
capabilities piece. folks in the u.s. government are dealing with diplomacy and other pieces. we have spent a lot of time working with friends and allies. some of this is arms sales. of this is gifts and some of this is the maritime security initiative. secretary carter has announced. that is how we are focusing our efforts, making sure every country has the capability to do what did -- what is in its responsibilities within the international environment. the core answer it is free navigation for everyone. core interest to the united states. it is something critically important to figure out how to best maintain and continued to demonstrate and show and as well
as argue it is everyone's best interest for that. let me briefly ask some other , we very welllist may have a coming decision in the arbitration on the philippines case and many experts expect that it will be unfavorable for beijing. and the chinese side is unlikely it.ccept we very well may haveand may take action to demonstrate. so this is a hypothetical. you are off the hook, bob. how would this manifest itself in this kind of scenario, which i personally would say is a 50/50 prospect looking at it today? >> i guess i am on the hook. nfl.lcome to the
>> i think the arbitration outcome will be very important. not the least because i think the way the rules of the region are shaped now is incredibly important, given that trajectory the region seems to be on. the rules are established now and are at a point when things are more out of hand down the not the least because i initials there needs to be a very concerted diplomatic peace that comesroad. i think the in in support of international rules-based order in this case. the region obviously has at stake. comealia is an exporting
-- country and 60% passive house the side -- south china sea. the freedom of navigation is incredibly important to us all. it is not just the region. this is where sometimes our european friends need to stand up a little bit more. the eu after all is an institution founded very much on the rule of law. supposedly -- i think it is very important the european countries .et solidly even though the south china is a long way from london and disorder in berlin, the asia-pacific is not going to remain isolated to our region,
just as disorder is not chaos in the middle east will stay isolated to europe and europe back are yard. with an help to come up response and you like to think that would be very well and efficiently joined up if the moment comes. >> over here. the center for naval analyses. thank you very much for a terrific presentation. one, what kind of constraints to you see in
implementing the vision that you have seen in the report echo is it political alignment in the capital? it saves resources but will cost them resources to do the work in proposed, to. there will be some expenditure. might askiderations you about china. two, including india in the effort, i just wonder given the asymmetry between the u.s. and india relationship and the relationship with japan and australia in terms of the agreement that you mentioned and what is the best mortality -- ? pulling india along to get to the stage to work with us one as allies, or insisting
the foundational agreements and in orderhanisms first to dock onto the federated systems you are proposing. >> thanks. i think some of what i am talking about is already starting to happen. it has been quiet and somewhat australia and india has since patiently steadfast that building esther she just relationship. this is a 2007 declaration with japan. japan and india pays is
, aeloping quite strongly similar sort of institutional framework in place. this is a bilateral conservatives and we are seeing but hitting in the right direction. i do not think it is in either or. i do not think we should wait until the perfect edifice is constructed. i think we should patiently build the edifice, but in the meantime, where we can and where
it makes sense and where it is everyone's interest, we should bring india in. mike mentioned 2004 synonymy and indian ocean, that was a perfect example where from almost a standing start the four countries generated pretty response toilitary that tragedy. because they are like-minded, licensealues, a lots of interoperability and capability, which when pointed at the same problem can be very effective. it is rather than having a high level goal and waiting until we achieve it.
legrier appointed doing better between japan and china. the patterns of behavior have built up. there have been a lot of things. i participate in my fair share, and i think everyone around the table has. they can range from incredibly intellectually stimulating too and defenseomatic sort of sharing the talking points. you have to build that up. the pattern of comfort. we went to be not looking at it from unilateral lens. we have bilateral pieces that we want to do.
i remember fondly thinking it would be easy within my tenure as the deputy assistant secretary covering asia we have these agreement done, it would be great. both disheartening and comforting to see it was not problem. that in fact it is just hard. it is hard with any country. with india.ew work we will have to look at it both ways. trilateral operation or bilateral cooperation comes out of it for the good, but in the end it will always be driven by countries use as self interest. if that is not the driving premise behind it, i am concerned about it. i don't know why. important that we be able to accommodate it. until then, there are lots of ink to do with india. both of the countries independently, bilaterally and should look at any of those opportunities.
>> i will just confirm my theory that the greater attraction is watching allies negotiate status agreement. sitting in the sidelines and say no you understand. i don't know if you want to , there is atraints constraint issue of course. when you add this to the pretty intense exercise schedule, you and this at that sticks money. what has been impressive to me is tokyo and washington have been willing to do it. part of the reason i think is those four navies operate at a level.gh
i think the indian navy's from what i hear from officers get a lot of exercise and with the pan in terms of competence, knowledge, high end, asw and other training opportunities. it is nice to have high-end it .ences -- expenses. there is a lot of credit for this. challenges ine the defense budget, the exercise schedule with allied partners has been maintain pretty well. if you have these arrangements in place, it will cost less.
remember the red caliber -- sort of disavowed quadrilateral cooperation very quickly. i actually think they did it very stern and probably did this easier. this is just one example of how the political realm cannot stop reverse it but temporarily hold it up. i think there is a very strong convergence at the moment with the four countries we have been talking about. this other part is a colts rolled change required.
and building up those real habit of close working. australia and the u.s. have always been close, but the sheer operating that our military's have been working under since means they are almost integrated and joined at the hip. take this and carry it out. this is means a lifelong project really. we are saintly want you to be yourself joined among and genuinely joint and combined
with the australian, japanese, -- that is a really big change, and that will for uniform services and bureaucracies to make the changes. >> thank you. i am duck call from for uniforms and carnegie endowment. a great report. the important things are all there. in the real world, we have to choices among capabilities and budget. this is pretty strong. we need to catch up with our own selves. then you have a case for insidious capabilities. i had to trade off between them based on what i know i would
invoke general greg spicing the nvidia side -- general cragis on this by saying the amphibious site could be left behind. quick thank you. probably if you really pushed me i would probably put isw and ahead of amphibious. australia for better or worse has bought these nearly 230,010 -- two 30 thousand ton ships. ushink japan is making similar investment. those things are happening. those resources are kind of something few like. that was probably a bad metaphor. [laughter] invested.
what i am talking about is much more of a human case of the interoperability. mike is right about the exercise schedule. let me give you an example. this is a heavy amphibious flavor to it. this time last year about 35 members of the black defense force participating. a small start. that does not really cost anyone anything to do that. the three amphibious forces together can start to build what i am talking about. we had an event here the other day with the japanese military saying the u.s. marine corps .anded on a japanese platform being able to do that sort of
tough is not going to cost vastly more resources but is a really powerful force multiplier. in australia, we know that .isasters happen and the resources most stress readyo be the most capability. i think we can do both. >> i am just going to comment on one thing, doug. you have hit a raw nerve. we have fallen behind. so not just because i am a u.s. government official, but i would not trade our navy or china's navy. clarifying.orth ,ot you, but i think in general we are the relative dominance that we have had for decades and clearly not as great as it is going to be.
we do have to figure out different ways of operating as result of that. whether or not we are able to do , we do have the investments to do it. i do think it is not just of about one particular investment but the way a lot of all and a lot of people in the region are assuming certain things of her we are. i think that if you look at the absolute terms of what we bring and what we bring with our allies, one of the real important pieces to being here, every timesituation over anyone else's. i think that is important that we maintain. something important that we look at and important to understand as a relative strength. >> a question that will not go away. you are right about that. it is reflected in the current debate.
this gets at the same choice. i think it is a little bit false in some ways. resources were constrained to do an external review of the rebalance. andrew was in between stents and helped to write part of it. you cannotd that just rely on the world winning high and deterrence, because thoseou please open assured of four. this starts because of the regional dynamic changes. states get week. balance of power changes. the amphibious capabilities are critical. this is the shaping mission. if it does not work, you really want the others. it will be a trade-off.
i think, although i find the navy debate about this a little artificial, i do think it is a reality all three governments from the top will have to shape this. if you leave this to thestates . balance of power changes. the amphibious capabilities are critical. server -- services, they all have their own answers. so it really does have to be an intelligence plan from the civilian leadership with a military leadership to start balancing this. andrewswhy i think paper is important. >> did you want to do another panel quickly? last question. >> speaking of resources and budget. have a very different question. you used the phrase did you wanr panel quickly?
nerve. donald rovner. i want to hit a big-time raw -- donald trump. to what trump extent, whether hs nominated or not is irrelevant. a driftre seeing it is toward isolationism. extent is this likely to slow down what you guys are mr.osed to do you come trump has broken to bill and secco new we're. aboo androken to said go nuclear. clearly there is a mood in this country that certainly people in room do not entirely agree with i suspect. creatinga mood here
perceptions wherever i have traveled with the past couple of from -- couple of months. what is going on in the minds of people who want to do what you bill gates is all over mexico. so does not have to answer. does not have to answer. i have had experience among pretty experience levels. this went to laughing to pretty serious -- to chuckling to real concern. not just low probability that we have a trump presidency but the core of the international system , the united states could be the place for this kind of debate at being candidates. it says something about america's game power.
if you look at opinion polls in december of last year, the most recent polls on this, 70% of americans support tpp. well over half supported free trade broadly. the polls done by chicago council on global affairs show the highest level ever. we do not ask about cholesterol yet because people take it for granted. the highest ever when asked -- the highest number since the polls had been done in decades. there is no institutional basis. .o constituency in the congress no way to enact policy of retreat. the republican or dumb it --
democratic senate armed services committee. i think the bedrock of the american international system is if you look at polls and international leadership, it is pretty strong. let's see what the polls look like. i don't know. i am certain he will than i am not certain it will not. this is a lot more solid than what you have seen in the headlines. that would be my answer. i will filibuster now. robert: the comments being made obviously a concern.
they really do strike at the heart of the pillars of the u.s. engagement. u.s. obviously a concern. open economies. military presence and the alliances. they really have been the bedrock of success for the region. so of course countries in the region will be concerned. i will have to be more optimist and respect to recognize that from time to time you have these convulsions. i think the more sober people in
recognize the amerco represented in these comments is not really america. this is the election whack -- and i will reassert after the lucky election campaign is out of the way. i am not downplaying this when a person without a moments thought saying someone will acquire nuclear weapons is not a trivial thing at all. pick.our
but i do think it you like sanity we will ultimately prevail. >> i am happy to be gone the record on this and ensure we get no more questions on this. i will tell you what i tell people, friends and allies, when they are concerned about this. but i do think it you like sanity we will ultimately prevail. history, every time that has surfaced, in have beenur interests clear to anyone who is charged with protecting order ending the united states. it is in our interest to have an international approach to these things. regardless of who becomes president, in the end, it's our interest to make sure that we always see the world we we see it now, across administrations -- i will say, andrew said the word, convolution. buts a long-standing trend, over the last century, we have gotten to a point where we realize our interests are not certain by that, and i suspect we will always do that. mike: probably not appropriate
to end a u.s.-japan-australia the brits,to quote count on thealways americans to make the wrong decisions before they make the right one." , inord carrington said once a meeting that we were having one of our convulsions, they said, it's true, but it is the only americans we have. as churchill said during the war, he only thing worse than going in with allies is without allies. the good thing we have going for us in the u.s., our allies actually like each other. you look at history, that is actually a rare and important thing. this kind of trilateral effort that we will see more of. it's been great to have andrew here and look forward to more work from him. is a strategist but also has
>> paul ryan is in israel with the congressional democrats -- delegation. benjamin netanyahu's office tweeted this photo. according to the tweet, the u.s. delegation expressed strong support for israel. coming up, a discussion on u.s. counterterrorism with author john mueller and jon stewart. we will have that live from the cato institute in about 25 minutes. 8:00, a campaign rally for ted cruz in wisconsin. the primary in wisconsin is tomorrow in recent polls show senator cruz leaving donald trump.
campaign 2016 continues on tuesday, april 5 with the wisconsin primary. live coverage starts tuesday night. tune in for complete election results, candidate speeches, and viewer reaction. taking you on the road to the white house on c-span, c-span radio, and www.c-span.org. in about 25 minutes, a discussion on counterterrorism. we will take you to the cato institute in washington, d.c. before that, a look at the congressional agenda from today's "washington journal." want to welcome two veterans of capitol hill. paul kane, who covers for the washington post and kristina peterson who covers the wall street journal. they give for being with us. we begin with merrick garland. he will begin to meet with 11
senators, including two republican senators. guest: it will be interesting to see if senators feel pressure after having spent time at home. there are senators who have come under heat from newspapers over the republican strategy. there are some republicans who have said they will meet with him but it is not clear if that indicates any weakening in their resolve not to confirm him. host: other republicans overnight said that she would not support his confirmation. guest: what you have seen so far is a public a large that supports the idea of hearings by about a to-one margin but the senators themselves, even though they have been wobbly on their position, they have yet to really feel it a lot of
political pressure back home. and therefore, they have been holding back. mitch mcconnell has rallied tim collinssides behind his position. host: do either of you see any scenario in which they could buckle before november? guest: it is hard, because the nature of the u.s. senators and the public at large -- they often thinks of senators as flip-flop errs who change positions. but on issues of importance like a supreme court nomination or declarations of war, it is hard to get a senator to flip his position once he has taken a strong position. is going to take a lot of political pressure from democrats and obama. guest: i think it would infuriate the conservative base
if they were to shift the strategy now. that would be unlikely. the big question will be with the lame duck. even though mitch mcconnell has said they would not nominate, if a democratic candidate was, then it will be a big question. -- says what staffers really think about donald trump, ted cruz and their staffers. when we asked if her public leader should find a loop leader, a third of republican senate aides said yes. aides saidcratic pelosi should go if democrats don't make significant gains in the elections. guest: there is always that pressure. we saw that with terry reed.
-- with harry reid. but pelosi is a tremendous fundraiser. i think that mitch mcconnell has a lot of unity behind him so i would be surprised to see him get the boot. , even mitch mcconnell though he has been around since 2007, he is new to this job. have to take a lot of losses to undermine his position. overall, we are living through a strange historical time where you have so many leaders in their same spot for such a long boehner have left, he had gone nearly a decade. there really is no time in history where you have such a long amount of time with the same people. there are always those that use a sports analogy, like a manager
in baseball. it is opening day, i have to make a baseball reference. managers have been there forever and ever and sometimes they're people who want to turn the page and get a fresh start. host: looking at what the senate will do this week, they have a heavy agenda. they have a bill on trade secrets, they have meetings with merrick garland and the house isn't in until next week. is this going to be how things will play out for the rest of the year before the election? kristina: they are going to have big chunks of time where the chambers are in recess and we are not going to see much action. that is a deliberate strategy so that neither party has to deal with an embarrassment in congress. no bake showdowns we will probably see a stock -- a stopgap spending bill. because there is a bipartisan agreement in place, i think it will get resolved fairly quickly. host: here at the table,
kristina peterson of the wall street journal and paul kane from the washington post. we will get to your calls in just a minute or you can send us a tweet. or go find us on facebook. aimfforts in south dakota to drop party. explain what this is about. kristina: this is an adjusting measure in which is that of having a to public -- a democratic and republican primary, there would be one primary and when people go to vote, they wouldn't say whether they were a democrat or republican. this is to take the partisan labels out of politics in a little bit so people who start the measure say they were inspired by nebraska because it is a nonpartisan legislature. thiscs of this measure say is a ploy by democrats to get back into power. the battle going on
right now. host: i like the way you begin. you say the political parties have become invisible on the ballot. kristina: it would still label presidential candidates with a party label, not that that would be any surprise. but for all other offices, it would eliminate the party. host: paul ryan gave a significant speech if units ago and he never mentioned donald trump or ted cruz's name but referenced him in the tone of the campaign. donald trump traveled to paul ryan's hometown. paul ryan is never mentioning donald trump's name. we have that speech available online. paul: paul ryan has felt for more than two months now that
they have been hounding him about his views on the presidential campaign. there is a constant chatter of -- if they get to a deadlocked convention, would paul ryan become the white knight writing in to rescue? and so he has gotten so frustrated by the campaign that he felt he needed to do something, to say something, just to put a marker out there, to change the tone. it was a well-received speech. the group of interns who were there were very happy, cheering for him. the intellectual conservative movement appreciated the speech. but he left later that afternoon for a three-week recess for the house and since then, you have just had more donald trump and the entire tenure of the campaign has drifted further away from where speaker ryan
wanted it to be. host: speaking about paul ryan in the latest edition, when no means no. he says it is unlikely that anyone outside of those two candidates could get the nomination. kristina: i think there is a feeling that it would be undemocratic. to reject the candidate that voters have not -- to elect a candidate that voters have not cast ballots for. we have seen paul ryan say no, he didn't want to become speaker and then a series of events occurred and now, he is speaker paul ryan. so there is a sense that maybe we will see history repeat itself. host: there is one scenario on the table in which donald trump has the most delegates and the votes but he is 100-125 votes short. what happens then?
paul: i think what happens on the second ballot is that you will start to see efforts of coalition building. that is more likely than going immediately to a paul ryan-mitt romney person, you would see ted all right, you're number one, i am number two, we become a ticket, together, we might get 1237. let, they may be marco rubio, essentially a fourth-place winner in the race, unofficialand play, promises where marco will become attorney general or something like that. you start to see coalitions come together. i think you would have to get several ballots down and really see some near chaos on the floor
before we get to the point where ryan, we knowaker you are the guy in charge of the convention, but come on down. you are the next contestant. i do not think you will get there. we have done gavel-to-gavel coverage. this year could be the hot commodity. the ted cruz campaign has been very organized. their delegates are not officially bound, as well as other states with soft pledges. we expect that to be extremely organized, if it is contested, which it looks like it might be. pennsylvania, independent line with paul from the washington post. caller: good morning and thank you for c-span.
i've called my senator's office and explained that they should you --ave a hearing hearing. you are talking about a lame hearing, butwith a our like to say this and i think it could happen. if bernie or clinton wins the election and the senate goes back to the democrats, i would have eitherobama bernie or clinton nominated president obama for the job and see what they have to say about that. call your senators. it is just a matter of fairness. that is what it amounts to.
that is a fairly unlikely scenario but i think an interesting question is raised, which is if the democrats raise the white house, or in january, does a new democratic president nominate their own choice? that is what republican senators will be weighing. do they risk having a more liberal and younger nominee as president? about senatore marlow cook of kentucky and that senator and two nominees. online.es available in 1969 and 1970, a freshman republican from kentucky hired as his legislative aide for the , young mitchmittee
mcconnell fresh out of law school. mcconnell, the first national -- they both failed under a real assault from democrats and ended up back then writing a 30 page love review .rticle he was very upset at how they would have ethical questions and raise those questions and whether or not he should have withdrawn himself from the situation in various cases. mcconnell thought they were
doing was just try and knock around the nominee from the republican president. politically, we are to knock this death -- this guy down because we have a chance. 46 years later and mcconnell is contradicting himself in that he is being openly political and his reasons for holding back and waiting for the next president, hs their publicans would get the ,residency, truth be told mcconnell would at least say he is of front and honest about what his motivations are. last weekend, our issue spotlight, we dived into the show you-- archives to had to say about a nomination
and joe biden back in 1992. it is all on our website at c-span.org. st. louis, missouri, independent line. good morning. sandersi think bernie said they should have a litmus test. forink that is a good thing them to have. all the money people spent on these elections. host: thank you for the call. donald trump has not spend that money, but he got $2 billion in free television airtime. guest: i think he benefits from the perception that he cannot be bought. people are concerned about how much money is spent on the campaign and he has exuded an being able to be
susceptible with that. that has resonated with voters. sanders projects the same even though he is really doing well in fund-raising. he is going to be hit with a lot of advertisements in missouri as the senate race there between roy and jason is now moving from one of the races we were not paying attention to to a higher profile race and the viewers in st. louis will get plenty of well-financed advertisements from people he is not necessarily a fan of. -- : each: they definitely think there is a path to the white house for them. at the delegate map, difficult for trump, even if he was the majority of delegates. there are all these questions and i think each of the candidates believe they could
prevail if it becomes a chaotic surface, which it well could be. host: usa today has a piece about independent, third-party candidates, and they cannot find in thek perry voted primary and if he did, he opens himself up to the possibility of running as a third-party candidate during how likely do you think that scenario is? i cannot say for certain. there was once a time when rick perry seemed to be a perfectly constructed candidate, governor of a huge state, several terms, economic growth through the roof of texas. key thing in finding a third-party candidate is time. they are running out of time to be able to get on the ballot in places like my home state of pennsylvania. you have to spend a lot of money and time organizing to get signatures.
in pennsylvania, it is more than one million signatures root wired to get on the ballot. you're going to have to do something like that, a lot of money and a lot of organization. that is why people talk about former mayor bloomberg of new york. party power has gotten weaker, a piece by susan page. danny is joining us from south carolina, independent line. would you support a third-party candidate? it i wases, i do disappointed when mr. trump initially stated he would support the republican party. i do not believe any of the republican candidates displaying , most of us anger americans are feeling because of the inactions of congress. i think the representatives and
republicans said if they got control of the house, they would make changes. they did not. they said if they got control of the senate, they would make great changes, and they didn't. now they say if you give us control of the white house, we will make significant changes. i do not believe them anymore. they are liars. i have been republican all my life. i'm now an independent and i'm .oing with trump just like obama when he was running, there was nothing he could have said the democrats would do to turn their loyalty away from him. with mr. clinton, there is nothing he would have done that could have turned his loyal people away from him. now the republicans for the first time ever, we have a candidate who said they will make changes. i believe him. there is about nothing mr. trump could say or do that could turn his loyal people away from him.
i am just fed up with the republican party, who lives continually to me. you are one of the reasons why donald trump remains the republican front-runner. thank you for your call. guest: i think it danny gets at inoint that republicans congress know is out there, which is that they control both chambers but they have not been to achieve a lot of republican gains because they do not have a super majority in the senate and the dem that controls the white house, what they have been able to accomplish is relatively limited. it underlines part of why the strategy on us of angkor is selling in. have modest gains legislatively to shift the balance of the power, it seems unforgivable too many republican voters. i think danny symbolized
a lifelong lesson everybody should learn when in college. never overpromise and under deliver. a lot of conservatives out there on capitol hill, republicans have overpromised and under delivered for five years. leadership probably never gave the right expectation setting for when they took the house of representatives. they tried to set the expectation properly in little over a year ago when they took the senate also, but at that point, momentum was so far ahead catchwere never able to up to where voters wanted them to be. host: we're talking with paul kane of the washington post and thetina peterson of washington journal. the senate returns today, the house next week, and you
mentioned -- i want to share and ad -- an ad. a democratic super pac now in new hampshire. >> still a. >> donald trump wants a delay so he can choose the nominee next year. senator kelly is right there to help. refusing to consider any nominee, ignoring the constitution. the action'sll appalling, wrong, and disappointing. kelly, ignoring the constitution and not doing her job. that is a democratic super pac. you can see that in ohio and pennsylvania and new hampshire peerless cons and, a lot of primaries in which democrats hope to we gain some -- regain some of the senate seats. guest: i am told they really like that add to it we were
talking about earlier, the public at large generally thinks yes, there should be hearings and they should consider these things, but the intensity level among voters in where they and howhe issue important is it, it has not quite reached that point democrats needed to be. linking him to the supreme court, the idea that he could be the guy that fills the supreme court vacancy and tips the balance of the court, that is the f for that turns it into a critical issue for voters. i think you will see similar ad playing out a new hampshire and pennsylvania were pat is of for reelection. rob portman in