tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN April 4, 2016 12:00pm-2:01pm EDT
talking about earlier, the public at large generally thinks yes, there should be hearings and they should consider these things, but the intensity level among voters in where they and howhe issue important is it, it has not quite reached that point democrats needed to be. linking him to the supreme court, the idea that he could be the guy that fills the supreme court vacancy and tips the balance of the court, that is the f for that turns it into a critical issue for voters. i think you will see similar ad playing out a new hampshire and pennsylvania were pat is of for reelection. rob portman in
this is a tough year for republicans, depending 24 seats in the senate compared to 10 for democrats. this message the republicans need to do their job is very simple of the supreme court and republicans have shown it hurts, they do not like to be told by their constituents that they are not doing their jobs. not considered one of the most wonderful republicans. also not liking the message, one coming at him from chewing. coulds something that resonate, even if it does not ship their strategy. simplicity is something that has made republicans uncomfortable. host: the only democratic seat listed as a tossup is the senate democratic leader leaving at the
end of the year. let's get back to the phone calls. democrats line. good morning. caller: thank you for taking the call. i wonder what the guests on your panethought about people bringing guns to the republican national convention this year. host: they are not allowed at the republican national convention, which is probably a good thing. guest: that will not be permitted. host: have you ever called guns at a convention? guest: no. to be clear, you're not allowed to bring in any outside liquid. if i tried to carry the coffee mug into the convention, the secret service would stop me. you can only by the secret service authorized coffee. the idea that they were ever -- they were considering it, it was a polls of that somebody wanted. but it was never going to fly
with the secret service. when you cannot bring in your own coffee -- host go the coffee mug is ok. anyhow, let's go back to phone calls. new york, independent line, good morning. caller: good morning. want to make two points. i am an independent. i do not really like this 140 years of a two-party system. one of the things that guest brought up right off the bat, mitch mcconnell, you're talking about him, 45, 50 years, what is he doing in politics for 40 or 50 years? i say that is a problem right there. number two, my second point, the delegate system. for being herel today. i want to give a special shout out to our conference department or their hard work, making ca
eventsto such a great success. i also want to thank all of you for watching online and on 2001, the united states has created or restructured more than two counterterrorism organizations for every apprehension it has made of islamists, apparently planning to commit terrorism within the country. central to this massive enterprise are the efforts of police and intelligence to follow up on over 10 million of which vast majority lead nowhere. in their new book "chasing ghosts," john mueller and mark stewart try to answer a few simple yet rarely asked questions. ,s the chase worth the effort or is it excessive, given the danger of terrorism actually presents? another quick thing about the book, those of you attending fortunate,ery
, andse we have it for sale it is priced to sell here at the cato institute. $18 for this fine hardcover book. i am quite certain you will not find it for less. on top of that, the authors have assured me they would be happy to sign it for you. those of you here with us today are very fortunate. those of you watching online at home, i bet you wish you were here, but rest assured, you'll be able to find it and other fine retail establishments online, and etc. mark, welcome john and i'll introduce them in the order in which they will speak. john mueller is a senior research scientist at the mershon center and member of the political science department at ohio state university and is also a senior fellow here at cato. he is the author of numerous books. i will mention only a few including over quote overblown,
" war,obsession," president, and public opinion," and with mark stewart, " terror, security, and money." stewart is a professor of civil engineering and director of the center for infrastructure performance and reliability at the university of newcastle in australia, and is also an australian professorial fellow. again, he co-authored with john the book "terror, security, and over 300d has written technical reports and papers. his current work focuses on the quantification of security risks and the cost-effectiveness of aviation security. he also leads a consortium of five universities in australia for the commonwealth scientific, and industrial research organizations flagship cluster
fun project climate adaptation, engineering for extreme events. so with that, let me turn it over to john mueller. john: thanks very much for coming out. it is not totally common for political scientist to co-author books with engineers, and you might be interested to know how that happened. when my first book on terrorism came out in 2006, i managed to andon the jon stewart show, they wanted me on halloween because we were talking about fear, and so forth. mark stewart and his wife were visiting ohio state at the time, both engineers. , i haveailed me saying been working on something along the lines, we ought to get together. we got a cup of coffee. he started talking about what is basically breakeven analysis,
which is basically, if you are dealing with terrorism, the day -- the way to deal with it is not simply to say, try to figure out the probability of a rather,t attack, but how many terrorist attacks would a security measure have to prevent in order to justify its expense. rate, we then embarked on a career of writing on a whole bunch of stuff. we published about 20 peer-reviewed articles in the area, dozens of offense. we even got one into "playboy." we were not the centerfold, you will be happy to learn. mark is very proud of that. it has been a very productive occasion. published our first book together, which is "terror, security, and money" in which we analyzed the protection of
infrastructure, concluding, for example, protecting office buildings in a terrorist attack does not make a whole lot of sense, unless the likelihood of an attack against the building is a thousand times higher than it is at present. is focused onok policing of terrorism. upween the two, they take about 90% of expenditures on homeland security, domestic homeland security, within the united states. let me talk about that and set it in context. as chris pointed out, there has been a prodigious increase of since 9/11.policing the fbi's counterterrorism budget went up from a $1 billion
to $3 billion. and that is continuing. there is an effort overall to find terrorists. was they1, the thought must be everywhere, and they must be extremely sophisticated. as early as 2002, intelligent people were telling reporters, they believed they were between 2000 and 5000 al qaeda operatives operating within the united states. after a longer period of time, we can act and probably can indicate that the total was closer to three or seven. in other words, they were seeing an awful lot of ghost. also impressive was, under the direction of robert mueller, the director of the fbi at the time, the order went out basically to follow every tip, every lead that comes in. they established a threat matrix, which is simply a table of tips that have come in. our calculations are -- in the
book, actually -- is that the fbi has followed up on over 10 million leads since 9/11, of most, 1000 have been productive, and infrequently leads to real terrorism. peter bergen came out with a book recently in which he quotes another counterterrorism official who says basically they are not just chasing 5000 threats a day, but 10,000 a day. that means they have -- if that number is correct -- they have chased down something like 20 million leads, of which only 1000 have led to much of anything at all. probably less than 1000. so it's a prodigious amount of effort, and the question is, is it worth it overall, is the idea of going after every single tip, lead, very effective? bookwe tried to do in the
is assess how bad the terrorism threat is, how significant is it to the united states, how many terrorist are there, and what is the likelihood they could create mayhem? as mark will point out later, a breakeven analysis suggests, for the fbi's expenditures on counterterrorism to be justified, they would have to about oneil, deter quite large attack, like boston or times square, every two months. so the question is, if that is the case, is that reasonable to expect they might have done that? obviously, we have not had anything like that in a number of attacks, but maybe because of the fbi and other governments work. throughike to do is go what terrorism has been in the united states. it has obviously been extraordinary limited in the
sense of destruction taken place. since 9/11, about three people per year have died at the hands of islamist terrorists. that is an externally small number. the same number of people dying from lightning is more than 10 times higher than that. of course, there may have been attacks that would've happened, ,nd the fbi, and other agencies have been able to handle it. let me look at various levels here. first of all, there is the disclosed terrorists, those that have actually been caught in various kinds of plots over this period. i have a casebook that is now well into 800 pages online, case studies done by otter stewards that ohio state -- who are quite good at ohio state. 70h of these cases of 60 or
individual cases that have come -- the terrorists perpetrated them, or they have been disrupted and brought to court during this proved to a time. when you look over all of these cases, they are pretty unimpressive. there are a few that may have led to something, but for the most part, what happens, the fbi gets wind of a plot being put into force, and has been able to disrupt it mostly by inserting an informant into the plot itself. the informant is not just looking but pretends to be a fellow terrorist. for example, one guy in baltimore a few years ago decided he wanted to be a jihadist, so he started to advertise on facebook for fellow jihadists. this is not at all unusual. he got three responses.
the first one told him to stop it. the second response try to argue him out of it. the third was from an fbi operative who said, i have always wanted to do terrorism. i need some help. i have a car bomb in my garage and i need help setting enough. so they got together and eventually the guy was arrested. is, it is not so much that they are working on innocence, but working on people who are predisposed to do something. they are really angry about stuff. be amazingly to incompetent overall. consequently, the idea that they could get together a coherent plot, when you look into these cases, is questionable. in some cases, yes. the guy in baltimore probably would have gotten around to doing much of anything, and more likely he would have been
if they are immigrants, almost impossible to enter the country without lying in some respects, misidentifying something on your papers. if you are an american citizen, these guys frequently have gone things which they can be put in jail for. running drugs, forgery, or something else. a bunch of these plots, but the question is, these are more embryonic than the disclosed plots. if they were less embryonic, they would have been tried on direct terrorism charges. so it is hard to see that whole lot of these had -- without the fbi and other intelligence agencies, have gone to the full poor thing. the next case would be about deterring attacks. surely, the intelligence apparatus and the whole security apparatus has deterred
terrorists from attacking in the united states because it would be very difficult. i am inclined to agree that that , --d be very much the case there are certain targets which are certainly unlikely to be attacked. for example, trying to hijack an airliner is incredibly difficult . mark and i have done lots of studies on that. the chances of being successful are well under 1% with all the security barriers that are there. --ther place that has another popular target that is probably off-limits is military bases. many of the targets -- many of the terrorists want to target military bases because unlike when you hear about radicalization and so forth, as far as these cases are concerned , the chief thing that causes
them to radicalize is hostility toward american policy. not hostility toward democracy or to create a caliphate or sharia law. to give you an example, you may remember the boston marathon bomber who hid in the boat, and while he was there bleeding, wrote a manifesto. this is totally typical, this type of verbiage coming out of would-be terrorist. our actions came with the message, he said. the u.s. government is killing our innocent civilians. see muslim, i cannot go and such evil unpunished. we are beginning to rise up. basically, hostility to american foreign policy in the middle east, military and political. therefore, an attack on a military base would be terrific because that would express that, but tough to do, so they focus as --y bases, such
recruiting stations and so forth. however, if you are a dedicated jihadist, and you cannot bring down an airliner, and you say i'm not going to do anything, there are other targets. a jihadist want to take down an airliner, i cannot take down an airliner, so i will not be a jihadist, as opposed to any number of other targets that they could target, for example, san bernardino. if they are deflated by the fact that they cannot get the gold standard but should continue to keep doing this is questionable. the idea that determines is really effective. finally, the notion that we have -- found, these terrorists we have only caught the stupid terrorists, and the smart ones are still out there. if that is the case, why don't
they do something? the longer they wait, the more likely they are to get attacked. that only the dumb ones have been caught and the smart ones are still out there evening risk suggests, if they are smart, they would be trying to do something. the overall effect on this is basically the amount of threat disclosed and undisclosed is quite limited. i only have a minute or two left. what either to do is say a quick thing which also comes out of the book about public opinion on terrorism. a bit ofone quite looking at the trends in public opinions and 9/11. they are just about all flat, since the end of 2001. do you feel there have been other terrorist attacks, is unlikely or not likely, for in that you will be killed by a lessrist, feel more or
safe since 9/11, do you think the u.s. is winning the war on terrorism? they bounce around on events that are basically flat all the way through, which is impressive. you would think there would be some erosion over this period of time. as i can see, there has not been. and this was before isis added on. so you have a long period of time with no attacks, osama bin laden has been captured, and still, there has not been any erosion. , thereclusion on this is are various things on it, but the final one is essentially, one of the problems with terrorism is this spooky kind of terrorism. namely, islam, the middle east, there is no center to get. it is somewhat similar to fears of the mystic communists, who had an ideology and were associated with a spooky
international movement. even though very little happens domestic communists, concern about them and national security was high. is theer comparison witchhunts in europe. the ultimate spooky adversary is the devil. time, many people became convinced that which is existed among us who were doing all sorts of diabolical thing. over a period of time, tens of thousands of which is, mostly women, were executed in europe. eventually, that did fade away, but it took 200 years, so that is a fairly gloomy conclusion to my talk right now. thanks for your attention. [applause]
mark: i do wish to thank chris and cato for interesting us today -- introducing us today. , so i'm very comfortable with numbers. to me, if you are going to talk about risk, we need to think about how do we quantify what the risk is due to terrorism, and then compare that to others. that is the rational basis for decision-making. as an engineer, i like equations. john does not like any equations at all, so i've had to compromise. the key issue is how do we measure security outcomes? how do we measure the benefits particularly? there is a lot of information out there about what different
security measures cost. when we do not see is how much they reduce the risk, how many lives have they saved, and is it worth spending a lot of money if you believe the risk reduction is low? if i model the system of counterterrorism, is it wise to provide evidence of this? ultimately, it is about how the cost ways against the benefits. 15 years after 9/11, maybe it is time to recalibrate the response to what we're doing now. a key issue that comes up time and again is risk of version. sayu.s. and u.k. equivalent that any new regulations must satisfy cost-benefit considerations. it says that in black and white. that, use expected
values, which means mean values. [inaudible] individuals can be risk-averse. i can decide i'm not going to go downhill skiing. in australia,- you can do that because there is not much snow. governments, though, do not have that luxury. they are spending lots of your and my money, so they have to be risk neutral, which means you look at the average risk. if i'm comparing the risk of death or damage due to cyclones or floods, then i can compare that to the risk of terrorism or different types of medical procedures, and then comparing apples to apples. so therefore, we need to use mean estimates. that is the approach we have used here. when we start to see our analyses putting in numbers that
try to show these measures are cost effective but still not. so we are trying to be generous as best we can. so the question is, what are the risks? john and i speak at a lot of security conferences. often the theme is risk management, how we can do it better. ones who showy this slide. the annual risk of terrorism in the u.s. in the 45 years as 1970 is about one in 4 million per year. in australia, about one in 8 million. recently in attack zimbabwe that killed 92, essentially in our backyard. in great britain, it is about one in six million. so these are actually very low numbers. and that is a good day. in terms of aviation, about one chance and 90 million that an
airline passenger will be killed by a terrorist. what does that actually mean physically? you would have to fly every day for 68,000 years before you were involved in a terrorist attack. that is low likelihood. 9/11, the risk is one in 105 million. these are very low numbers. we are the only ones to even present these numbers. other people are being worried ,bout threats that are evolving but we would argue these numbers are the aces were a discussion. -- the basis for a
discussion. without you, that is probably true. the threat is quite low. that is true as well. and then you can look into these -- in a lot more detail, but it starts to give you some insights. no one seems to wants to know about these things. it is perplexing. suddenly, terrorism is acceptable. flying is more dangerous than a terrorist attack. driving is more dangerous. more risks are a bit adverse. -- ases the risk of being a threat to human life, terrorism at its current levels in the west is a level that is
acceptable. we may not like it, but it is something we can tolerate and society. an accident that does not have the same social economic impact that one gets from terrorism. worth comparing apples to apples. this is where the cost-benefit analysis comes in, to get a better feel for this. the analysis, a simple concept. the benefit is the lives saved thatmages averted, and cost is the cost of the security measure, which comes to one equation. the benefit of the measure is the probability an attack would be successful, multiplied by the losses sustained if they were successful, and the risk could
be how many deaths do we expect per year or what damages could we expect per year. if we are going to spend money, you would expect there would be a reduction in risk, hopefully higher than 5%. that is the basis to compare one against the other. this equation can be expanded in more detail. fundamentally, these are the three main parameters you need to be asking yourself. let's look at the example of the -- and we will run for a simple example, but -- can be very revealing. has as its highest priority. we have seen the budgets have $3 billion, and this is the budget only devoted to domestic terrorism.
maybe doubling the budget or tripling could have been efficient. it is not a management decision $3 billion.st spend being responsible for most of the plots being foiled after 9/11. there are professional well organized organization. it has been to boston the public is welcome which helps. nine out of 10at plots have been disrupted by the fbi. the risk reduction is very high. let's say it is 90%. there are some benefits in terms not just stopping an attack. one will be the proper
identification and apprehension of terrorists, like with the boston marathon bombings. riskive days, there was adverse behavior in this. cbd was shut down. washington who were afraid to be terrorists in washington, were careful where they went. and so that is a strong benefit if the fbi or agencies can get these guys quickly, that minimizes the social and economic losses. ofy might find other types crime, like immigration violence ations. we have opportunity costs. -- in terms of
counterterrorism, a b they are -- sending the resources maybe they are not sending the resources that they did. that could be an opportunity cost. less prosecutions in other criminal activities. we have not tried to quantify these cannot but there may be benefits. great deal of analysis. we are trying to say is how high does the desk to show that the benefit exceeds the cost. we have that equation before. between 100ould be $5 trillion.ars and the uncertainty is how frequent that is. it is a simple question. title, breakeven possibilities. on the left-hand side you can see that this reductions -- the
risk reductions. we felton bombing, that the losses was about $500 $200 billion for 9/11, and then you start getting into trillions of dollars. you can think what will most likely the type of attack would successful the fbi would be. we think a typical threat would be something like a boston bombing. we believe the reflection is 90%. the breakeven analysis shows 6.7 there needs to be boston marathon bombings needed every year to justify the cost of the fbi. every twoout one months. that is a pretty high attack frequency. if you are more concerned about a london bombing, then 30 32 of these attacks to occur -- then
there need to be two of these attacks per year. mentioned, is terrorist attacks in the u.s. and australia cause very little loss of life and little damages. we could argue $3 million notnsion on the c.t. might be cost effective. that does not mean you should spend nothing. says that level of spending might not be double -- might not be optimal. to get the law of diminishing returns. what we say is when we start doing detailed cost-benefit analysis, we double the expenses to $1.2 billion in 2003, that level is about right. if you spend more money after that, you get little reduction in risk, and the marginal return
becomes smaller and some perspective on this. the total expense for the mystics and homeland security at the united states is $115 billion per year. $3 billion.get of the fbi is probably the most effective 3% of spending you are going to get. the other percentage of spending is what we have more dissent about. give you an example, full-bodied scanners at airports cost more than $2 billion per year. to @5sk reduction is 1% 2% at best. we have done a lot of work on
aviation security, and if we're looking at the threat of hijacking, all these existing lines of security reduce the risk by -- so the question becomes how close do we want get and how much do we want to pay for it, and this comes to the concept of acceptable risk. the details are in the book. the federal air marshal service 2000 air marshals in the u.s. they fly on a percentage a of flights. the airlines have given them freeseas, which is another cost. -- free seats, which is another cost. the benefit cost ratio is .1, meaning every dollar the government spends,
which is a very poor return. when you compared to other security measures, such as being armed on the flight deck, for every dollar you spend you get $10 in benefits. the air marshal service we would argue is just not cost-effective. in any moreo detail, it does not seem to pay for itself. pre-check is something that john and i are looking at the moment, an area where there is screening for passengers who are seen as low risk, so people can travel through the screening checkpoint much quicker, so that saves the million per $100 year. the risk reduction is zero, so a
wanting this book for some time now, because these are little calculations i have tried to make myself in my own work, and i am not particularly good at numbers. i always fear and making some embarrassing medical mistakes. i recommend this. it is full of useful details and and the whole thing reminds me of the old joke. there are many variants of the
joke. got is walking down the street in new york and he has a stick and he is banging the stick rhythmically against every post he passes, and finally another guy says, what are you doing , i amon mark the guy says doing this to keep away the tigers. the guy asks the question, there are no tigers in new york city? see, it works. it is apropos to this counterterrorism apparatus we created in which the answer when every everybody raises a question about the efficacy of the national security council, the answer is we are preventing all these terrorist attacks. but there have not been
any terrorist attacks. that is because we are preventing them. it is hard to challenge that. that decision is usually coupled with regrettably i cannot share the evidence with you because it and would reveal sources, so you will have to have collectede several million people who earn their living by being part of this counterterrorism regime, you have to trust that we were not here, there would be a 9/11 attack every day. but we cannot tell you about it. it is amazing we have fallen for this as a nation. i will come back to that in a couple minutes. , you have gotten a little bit of flavor for those kinds of things discussed in the book. comparinge of the this to the which scare in , give us an some way
good analogy for thinking about what this really is. they painstakingly go through their own cost and the analysis and conclude we are spending a fast amount of money with very little to show for it, and this is money that is opportunity cost that could be spent on other things. they do not go to the questions about ways that our characters could be increasing the threat that we think we are trying to respond to, is a whole other can of worms. at the minimum, it is impossible to read the book and not come away thinking, this is crazy, we are doing all these irrational things, not unlike the europeans and the 17th century and the americans in the 17th century who were converts of a variety -- who were convinced a variety of things, so that they could
smoke out the witches who are turning people into cap endologix, making crops fail. we think that is just goofy, and burning these poor people at the state will not, should a thing. it was not going to college anything. they were not doing these things in the first place. it makes sense to think of the u.s. post-9/11 counterterrorism policy as seeing it through an ever biological lens, which is -- seeing it through and anthropological lens, which has nothing to do with reality, much more to do with ritual thinking that we hope without any particular basis for believing this. there are all kinds of things we cannot control. we cannot control. we get scared about the economy, that kids are not going to do well in school.
just as seeking out and destroyed which is becomes a way to take all of these anxieties about a million other things and put them on something and feel like you are doing something. modern america and the effort to root out terrorism has become similar. it is a form of ritual. there's almost no relation to the stated end, and it becomes a substitute for doing anything particularly useful, and becomes a substitute for having to think about the harder and more frightening issues that we actually might be able to do something about it would put our minds to it, but do not because we are too busy chasing ghosts. biggest challenge, and my suggestion is this is better used to it hospira logical frame than the , perhaps leadrame to this question.
i do not mean to say that the cost-benefit analysis approach is correct. if we wish to sustain any believe in ourselves as a political community, the united states of america, that is not just favoring magical thinking over reality-based thinking, over trying to think analytically about problems, that we have to engage in the kind of analysis that this book engages in, and we have to do it courageously. and it takes courage to write this book. we still live in a culture where we write a book like this, you expose yourself to people saying you do not care about the 9/11 dead, you do not care about the boston marathon, you evil person, how will you feel when
your family is killed by terrorism, then you will be sorry. you have that, and i am sure it is wildly unfair, just to the unfair for somebody to say it is good the number of people killed -- carfor actresses crashes has gone down, does not for the will care wh get killed in car crashes. we want our government to be the kind of government, where individuals can be risk adverse, we want the individuals do not pay guy, not engage in magical thinking, not engage in distortions of risks. but we are not rational. we are just not. we think we are, but we are not. logicalan answer for case study in how hundreds of
thousands of very intelligent people, millions of very intelligent people, throwing in all the people who work on this, millions of extremely intelligent people have managed to convince themselves it makes sense to dedicate their working lives to an enterprise is fundamentally flawed. we must say that off at all cost, and we live in a society where humans, americans in particular, are horrible at risk analysis. the panic about peanut allergy. we panic about threat of child
abduction. we overreact. he say no peanut in any school despite evidence that will make peanut countries worse. we do not let them go to the park despite ever these -- despite evidence that that makes them obese. there are all kinds of things we think about in goofy ways that -- whereo live in a world america has become more politically fragmented, into smaller sub audiences. each of us with our own radio ce.w and internet sor even to findougher
ways to speak to americans much less to find ways to get them to listen seriously to things that might change their mind about the health belief systems that have the status of religious belief system much more than they have the status of those beliefs that have been developed through some empirical assessment of the world around us. my fear is looking at this book is i am going to read
victims of terrorism. how do we break through that. that is the biggest challenge of all. your book does not focus on that and there is no reason it should. you have a different task. the broader challenge is this is not dissimilar to let's say we discovered that a commonly taken fight them in supplement is in
fact terribly dangerous to people, but it is beloved. how do you convince people not to do it when they are determined to believe otherwise. the only thing that gives me hope is that political moods change over time. .hey seem to get worse easily thinking back to europe in the 's that was a time in which the annual s from terrorism in western europe were three or four times higher than now, and it was not because of islamist terrorist groups. ira,s because of the little terrorist troops all over europe, which managed to do an enormous amount of damage and yet europe did not fall apart at the seams, and my sense was the degree of public panic was much
lower than it is now, suggested it is not impossible for political cultures to decide to treat terrorism quite differently. to take it much more in stride as it is horrible, a crime, there are plenty of things we can and should do to minimize the likelihood of terrorism, that we do not have to let it turn us inside out, we do not have to do that. the challenge is how do we break through our collective resistance to taking on new information that would challenge a belief system that has turned into a full-fledged bubblelike how do we get-- through that bubble in a way that will actually lead to political change and policy changes and budgetary changes. i will and with that question so we make sure we have time to discuss that.
it is a terrific book, and it is an honored to talk about it. thank you. thank you. i will exercise my prerogative as chair to pick up on something rosa said and at the end. how do you respond to the charge you do not care? one of the strongest parts of the research that i like that you said today, mark, is individuals can be risk adverse, can choose not to undertake certain risky behaviors, but governments should be risk neutral. it is so important because when the government is seen to be dedicating resources that are vastly out of proportion to the dangers they are fixing, then im thingout one
implies not caring about other things. brings the question that you do not care in that way, but it is helpful where you tea that up. encounter this problem. ms. brooks: maybe we should say, don't you see if only we took more money out of the counterterrorism budget and put it into addressing peanut allergies? we have time for questions now. please identify yourself and your affiliation. courtesy to the speakers , limit on the stage yourself to an actual question. that is a statement that ends in a? , so no speeches, please. right there in the back, right there, go ahead.
>> hello. i am from the university of saint andrews, a visiting researcher at georgetown. i have a question talking about money for these issues, and the questions are two fold. how much can we link effectiveness to the budget? i think that is what is being insinuated here. when we did the reform of homeland security or of the intelligence community, that strategy was not just related to budget, but more organizational issues. orterrorism were to increase you would include gun violence, your argument be we should increase the budget, or is there a fallaw? how easy is it to qualify the things your talk about cost and elephant, loss of life, and on it aside, in terms of waiting in
qs, in terms of personal privacy, etc.? mr. stewart: the issue of cost effectiveness is a good one. what do other countries do? the u.k., which has a high terrorism threat, spends about half on the gdp basis than what is happening here. they seem to be just as effective. australia and canada, we spend gdpt 1/4 as a portion of per capita, and they seem to do a fine job as well. the united states seems to be fairly excessive. i can say that and still be un-american. of quantifying
cost-benefit, that will be a challenge. ph.d. topicsed 20 dissolve this. estimation, robust to give you a20%, feel of what side you are on. money, andly western if it is in the middle, you need to spend more resources to pan that out. the value of life in the analysis, and the number varies a lot to different government agencies, up to 10 million. we use 7.5 million from just based on the report done in 2010. most of the losses from terrorism, that is obviously extremely tragic, that in terms
of cost-benefit analysis, what affects society is the indirect losses due to people becoming risk adverse, deciding not to travel, affects tourism, business, and there is a lot of flow effects on that. what we find is the total losses from a terrorist attack we have had in the past is probably the indirect losses dominate. they really dominate the calculations. the number of casualties is not that important in terms of overall calculations. whether it is 20 lives or a hundred lives, it is still tragic and important, but in terms of the economic loss to they are similar because if people decide not to travel, lose confidence in the stock market, that has enormous effects, which is what makes it very different.
we have started three costs to terrorist attacks. the direct costs, in terms of lives of people killed, the others property damage, so those are the direct costs. then indirect costs, that mark mentioned, the collapse of the stock market, people not flying on airplanes. it tends to vary. in the case of 9/11, there are werees of what those costs of 9/11, and they cam with maybe $200 billion,o and in this case, the secondary costs are actually higher even in that case than the direct costs. there are other terrorist events, for example, the fort hood shooter. there is not much in the way of indirect costs.
there is the direct cost of people being killed. there were not people going to -- to fort texas, hood or texas. of cost,a third kind reaction cost, and if you include those -- we do not do with those -- they can sometimes be astronomical because one of the reaction costs to 9/11 was a multi-trillion dollars set up wars in the middle east, if you want to call that a cost of 9/11, and obviously the number it's very high. youny kind of analysis, have to do it. life is not infinitely valuable. you only have a finite amount of funds. infinitelyk life is valuable, you'll be in following --
the speed limit 13 miles. if you do not think it is a good idea, it means you are willing to have 30,000 americans die every year from this particular in the passenger automobile. you cannot avoid the problem. mr. preble: right there. about whaton recently happened in france and in brussels. governmentsan both have been spending a lot less gdp on security and both governments have said they will increase their expenditures. are they making a mistake? asit a matter of the u.s. the house on the block that has the big bars on the window, and therefore they are going to places easier to access, such as france and brussels?
mr. earnest: one of the problem --mr. mueller: one of the problems seems to be lack of coordination. i do not know what the numbers are going to be. clearly the reports coming out of brussels indicate the police did a poor job of keeping these guys under surveillance. mr. preble: right there. >> hi. securityy career in and counter intelligence, and i am reminded of battles we had during the 1990's of risk
avoidance versus risk management. my question is, how many boston and san bernardinos do you think are acceptable to the politicians and the public over any period of time? >> the answer is no. mr. mueller: they have to heavily react to anything. it is not clear, that a lot of heads would roll. for example, how many heads have rolled over 9/11, much less over san bernardino. what politicians should be say is bad things happen. if we keep them low enough, we are in pretty good shape. they should be saying things like your chance of being killed per year.80 million that would be nice to hear, but basically is that were there. it is about trying
to manage expectations. say --ice does not it says we respect bad things can happen. murders will happen and the public seems to accept them. that is a fact of life. if the politicians can manage expectations, to say these things can happen, it does not mean it is someone's fault. my question is whether it is after attack terrorists, then passive defense. nowadays we have so much high-tech, i wonder if there is the divide could be -- to stop hijacking with laser weapons or judgmentshock -- the
and so on. thank you. anything like that to be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. the risk is already low, and if you want to spend more money making it lower is something you would want to consider. clearly, risk reduction areures, very inexpensive, basically desirable and should be carried out. the idea of acceptable risk is not there. several people in the aviation industry and the aviation security administration -- industry, how much risk is acceptable if your chance of getting on an airplane and being killed by terrorist is one in a million --is that enough? how about one in 90 million?
is acceptable? -- is that acceptable? the key issue is not are we safer, but how safe are we. as mark suggested, that issue scarcely ever comes up. what is the current risk rate, think -- you do not that is the kind of question that should be very front and center and it almost never is there. can you think of any politician that has ever said that, any journalist, any pundit or so forth? we have looked very hard to find those people. rosa brooks has. ms. brooks: i would love to see the two of you do a similar effort to evaluate u.s. targeted killings, for instance, because it is an area that is ripe for this kind of analysis, where the
claim that is made -- leaving aside whatever legal and ethical issues there might be -- there is a claim that is made about efficacy that has to do with asentially, precisely, variant of what you suggested, which is go after terrorists outside the united states before they can further their plots enough to pose a serious threat to the united states or its allies and interests? there is a theory that the u.s. government is working on that that is in fact effective. i think we have very little ability at the moment to evaluate that claim, and it is right for this kind of analysis, although it becomes more difficult as more is in the realm of classified information. one back to the issue of indirect costs, what is so challenging is it gets -- it is a vicious circle. the indirect costs are unlike
costs to poverty and human life, which are quantifiable, and they do not depend -- whether people onve -- died does not depend how we feel about the attacks. all the indirect costs that range from people do not travel any more, those are entirely within our control. the more we believe that terrorism creates cost, the more it does create cost, the more increase that the more it creates those costs within our control, user gets for those supporting the enormous budget and agency proliferation, but look, the cost is not the same fromdesk from me -- death a highway accident. mr. preble: here in the front. you have a question?
former state department intelligence analyst. do you think there have been attacksul terrorism that embarrassed government officials have managed to cover up? mr. preble: good question. >> not that i know of? ms. brooks: the coverups have been very effective. mr. preble: right there, and back in the back. attributes a saying to sir peter ustinov -- terrorism is the war of the poor, war is the terrorism of the rich. what is your definition of terrorism? perhaps defining it correctly would help vanquish it. we effectively use
a standard definition, which is a politically motivated act of violence. that is the whole thing. specifying -- but using files to express yourself is terrorism. common, ines very other words, terrorism becomes routine, what we tend to do is switch the war, and we call it war or insurgency. sometimes isis is being seen as a terrorist group, when by any reasonable definition it would be considered a combatant group and an insurgency. one of the problems that is counting terrorism is sometimes civil wars used to have lots of insurgents, which we consider to be terrorists, they were considered insurgents in those days.
if terrorism becomes frequent enough and deadly enough, itically we start carl ill insurgency. that basically happen in iraq. within a couple years, the military was calling it an insurgency, and that was appropriate. wait for the microphone, please. the definition proposed by u.n. high-level panel on terrorism, and that has never been accepted because under that definition, things that we do would also be terrorism. mr. mueller: it has to be done by a nonstate actor. if it is done by the state, we do not call it terrorism, there's a debate. like hiroshima has never influence opinion politically, but it was part of a war done by state, so usually not considered terrorism. you could call that terrorism. i want to ask a question,
which i raised when we did the event going for terror and money, and this goes off of what rosa brooks said. the question is, who really believes the government should be risk neutral? i do not think that is actually true. many people outside economics department and quarters of office of management and budget are in disagreement in this country about political parties and ideologies, disagreements about what risks to confront. government, socially, what risks to leave people in markets to do with. can you speak to the utilitarian purposes that are underlying the analysis here? thanks. i accept that politicians are not going to be risk neutral. the agencies and those advising
politicians should we doing risk-neutral analyses. if the project is decided to be risk adverse, then it is clear what they are going to be. they are going to spend more money on counterterrorism and not much money to protect people from tornadoes. but the advice given to politicians should be risk neutral, and politicians can then decide whether they want to go against that advice. >> it is not just that politicians decide. politicians make it part of their platform. their proposals for the fact that they are not risk neutral, they're making a choice to elevate one type of risk over another. as a political platform. does not meanhat they have to spend a lot of money. one of the australian prime
minister's and tony leier were terrorism andon security, but the spending did not match the rhetoric. they still got a lot of political advantage without spending much. >> let me add one note to that. governments are mainly forms for public safety. the first words in the constitution, preserve the domestic tranquility. limitedarged have a budget and you use it in the most productive and scientific and systematic manner to maximize the number of life say. they are spending billions of dollars to save a life, but in another device, they only spend hundreds of millions of dollars. they say they have to do that because otherwise they will lose their jobs. my position is if you take a job in which making career
may,, youg decisions should make those career threatening decisions. like makenot career threatening decisions, do not take the job. there are a lot of safe jobs out there like plumbers, college professors, who do not have to go through this agony. it is fundamentally irresponsible to miss spend misspend public funds. there's a lot of uncertainty. numbers are not precise. there should be systematic effort to do it. toticularly when it comes terrorism, it has not been done. it has been done in other areas, like nuclear radiation. there, and right then in the front. i noticed the preaching
program gets pretty good treatment in your assessment of security programs, where people pay a little money and share information with government and do not have to go to the strip search machines. is that because ground checks provide a lot of cost-effective it becauser is letting people get away from the time-consuming and expensive machines is avoiding a lot of cost? what is the heavy lifting with pre-check? mr. stewart: we are working on doing risk assessment at the moment, so we are not fully adverse with what the metrics are. background checks is obviously part of it. we seem to like it because it treat people as low risk. it recognizes passengers as low risk and should be treated accordingly when it comes to security screening.
this is a good example of the tsa using risk-based approaches to screening. this is a pretty good step. it saves money. mr. preble: right here, and i see the question over here. think any of the analysis identify any top corporations receiving any of this money? you are talking about large sums of money. a lot of it might go to employees, but any big corporations making billions? >> are the companies benefiting from the sensors disproportionately? mr. mueller: a lot of them. i do not blame the companies. if you find out that the tsa wants to buy a zillion x-ray machines, and you are selling x-ray machines, you are likely to be in washington in a flash.
when you get there, you are not likely to say you do not need these x-ray machines, but we have nice ones if you should otherwise. they should be spending money in an appropriate manner, and they must expect that people have things to sell are going to try to sell them. there is big carnivals of homeland security expenditure -- conventions and so forth of people trying to sell their wares. some of them are very good, probably. they will increase security and his costs, and that is important and should be something that is considered. business people hyping their product is probably a natural force. mr. preble: here in the front, sir. >> thank you very much. that afternoon. proud citizen of the district of columbia and friend of cato. prefaced by is comment for all the speakers because i think this is a very interesting and relevant topic.
thank you for that. tocifically, i would like say to ms. brooks, i appreciate the titillating metaphor about the tigers. hobbught of " calvin and es." have you been in the company of someone in the caliber of jeh johnson who may have a response to what is not going on behind the scenes that he could not reveal in retort the resumpti -- in retort to your assumptions? mr. mueller: we tried getting through, it when rosa talks about getting the message across, there is not a lot receptivity. i will give you an extreme a simple, because as a total no-brainer, which is the federal air marshals, we have looked at that in 748 ways, and other
people have, and it is an incredible waste of money. it does not improve risk reduction at all if at all, and it costs an incredible amount of billion a year. there are proposals where you shift things around without changing security around, you would save with the airlines and the taxpayers several hundred billions of dollars every single year. we have pushed this in places, and so far with one member of an, said weunkic should get rid of the air marshals. we were flabbergasted. somebody is saying it. in washington about a few months ago, we visited the office of du ncan, and his aides said he could not get anybody else to send his bill to get rid of the air marshals. you are starting with something that is bone crunching the
solvable,t is not just on the face of it, and if you analyze the face, it proves to be exactly right. and nothing is happening. ms. brooks: you know, i do not want to put words into jeh johnson's mouth, but in my own time in government, i certainly did not come across anything that made me doubt the basic premise of this book or that cast doubt on the basic premise of this book. and two other things. one problem with giant bureaucracies is you have lots and lots of people -- the mystery of all these smart people doing all these things that is on some level is irrational -- they all have a tiny part of the enterprise. they are thinking, my job is be the person who helps recruit
federal air marshals, or my job is the person who books their flight. i am not responsible for figuring out whether this whole enterprise makes sense. they do not know. they should not necessarily have to know. the question is, who puts the pieces together at the end of the day? i have also met very few people within the federal government or security apparatus who will not say privately that at least a great deal of that whole apparatus is nonsense. it is not wholly unknown to people. it becomes you are not going to challenge it because your job is to be the guy who books the flight. what is the point of you running around saying that? no one will listen to you. part of it is a massive collective action problem. there are lots of people who are speaking aware of this, but they do not have the authority or the
portfolio to say so were they do not want to lose their job or it is not the right moment or they are not going to testify before congress and the president is not saying -- yes, mr. chairman, everything we do is clearly pointless. they would be out of a job tomorrow. i think there are lots of reasons that the system stays in place despite the increasing body of evidence that suggests that it needs some fairly drastic changes. i find in the united states that the apparatus involves hundreds of different government agencies. marshalfederal air service is an agency, they have a director, cap gymnasiums and training centers, it is a civil agency. as john says, maybe you want to cut down those never, and people's careers are coming down to an end.
in australia, we have very few agencies. ofhave one, police, a couple defense agencies, and that is about it. we still cover the same territory. it seems you should be able to do with much fewer agencies. it is easier to deploy resources internally. these are serving federal police officers who go on revision to do this. time,, they can shift around air marshals very easily. they can increase them, lower them, do whatever they want with them because it is internal deployment. andne has created a state --mr. preble: thank you for your remarks. please join me in thanking our panelists today.
i want to invite those of you who are with us today to join us in the second floor of the conference center for lunch and continued discussion. our conference folks will show you the way. if you have not done please buy a copy of "chasing -- i did the math on this, close to $14 off of the cover price. lastly, this is the first full day of the major league baseball season. .o, go, orioles, go, nats thank you for coming. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]
>> and the speaker of the u.s. house, paul ryan, is leading a congressional delegation in israel. this photo showing speaker ryan and other members meeting with his israeli counterpart. here in the states, the new york presidential primary is two weeks away, and hillary clinton is holding a rally in her adopted home state. she will speak at a high school york, just north
of albany. also live tonight, a campaign rally for senator ted cruz in waukesha, wisconsin. the wisconsin presidential primary is tomorrow. recent polls show senator cruz leading donald trump, who is also in wisconsin. he will be campaigning tonight in milwaukee. you can watch that live on c-span 2 at 8:00 p.m. eastern. >> campaign 2016 continues on tuesday, april 5, with wisconsin primary. live coverage begins tuesday night at 9:00 eastern. and for complete collection results, you are reaction, and carry speeches. the road to the white house on c-span, c-span radio, and c-span.org. wife heidi cruised and carly fiorina
campaigned in wisconsin last week. here is a look at that event it is about 45 minutes. do mine, too. you photo.e ladies, and the chair, andce basically we have 17 counties that i help to manage. we are on the phone for you guys. mrs. cruz: thank you. thank you. with that kind of effort, we will be in good shape. thank you for your hard work.
>> mary. mary: hi. mrs. cruz: hi, mary. mary: nice to meet you. mrs. cruz: i-5 -- thank you for the work you are doing. >> have you met our chairperson? mrs. cruz: i just met ron outside. you are his mother question you are far too young. what a wonderful son you have. have -- do you have children? mrs. cruz: we do. we have two little girls, seven and five. >> do they travel with you? mrs. cruz: [indiscernible] i will say hi to them.
>> we have a fire hazard here. how about you get in the middle. is that all right? mr. duncan: why don't we get you through here? mrs. cruz: thank you for being here. >> so nice to meet you. i saw you last week. will i had to come today -- i had to come today. mrs. cruz: terrific. to her for being here. what is your name? jan? do you want to get a picture? thank you for spreading the word. >> nice to meet you. did you look across -- the
posters are in that window, and it says welcome to appleton. mrs. cruz: thank you. i will look at that. beautiful pictures and we have to show that to the trump campaign. [laughter] [indiscernible] mrs. cruz: what a lovely grandmother you have. uri basketball player. >> know, baseball. mrs. cruz: this is fabulous. love it. do you want to keep it? look at me. he would really want to meet you.
[indiscernible] mrs. cruz: very good. and he be back in a day will be here all weekend. >> you have a lot of work to do. my other question --if you win eight square and fair, are you sure the other guy will not cause trouble? mrs. cruz: we will win this through the ballot boxes. 65 percent of the party wants someone other than the front runner. >> one of the front runner gets angry -- what if the front runner gets angry? will run our campaign, taking the high road, having a positive message, treating people with respect, as we have always done. i think this will win the hearts
of the american people. >> you know, he has good things behind him. mrs. cruz: i have the easiest job on the campaign. tell the truth. >> it helps that you are really pretty. mrs. cruz: [laughter] thank you for saying that. nice to be with you guys. thank you. how are you? . -- find. mrs. cruz: so nice to meet you. i have a great husband, and that is all i care about. we are working hard to win the vote. thank you very much. how are you? are you all family? >> just met her today. mrs. cruz: it is amazing how ted cruz brings people together. [laughter] >> to her for coming here. mrs. cruz: do you work here in
appleton? company a riverboat about 20 minutes away. mrs. cruz: we were just there. acute little town. >> we will be operating as of may. we will do all kind of torts. mrs. cruz: i want to come back here. it is a beautiful state. >> you need to. you need to go on the riverboat. mrs. cruz: we do. it is great to see entrepreneurs supporting the economy, and that is what ted was prioritized. definitely has my vote. i have made up my mind. mrs. cruz: thank you for your innovative spirit. nice to see you. nice to see you. got it? >> you are much better looking in person. mrs. cruz: ky. nice to meet you?
you can vote in the reelection. what grade are you in? >> grade seven. . thank you for supporting ted. how are you guys? >> that is my daughter. mrs. cruz: lucky father. yes, i am. -- >> yes, i am. my beautiful guatemalan princess. we got her 14 years ago. part are youat from? >> guatemala city. [indiscernible] [video clip] >> she just turned 13 last week.
>> a marine biologist. nice to meet you. thank you. thank you for coming. >> to i very much. nice to meet you. mrs. cruz: tnk you for coming. >> congratulations on your success. mrs. cruz: we are doing well, but it will only happen if we keep doing well. i think we will. [indiscernible] mrs. cruz: that is so true. thank you. vince: i am fence. nice to see you. mrs. cruz: thank you for coming. are you from appleton? vince: yes. mrs. cruz: i love your state. even in the rainy days, it is see -- beautiful to see what is going on here.
great businesses, optimistic people, and well-informed. we are proud to have the support of your governor. >> he has done a lot to help us. mrs. cruz: it is a great state -- we need to do that at the federal level -- return the power to the people, shrink the size of the government. great to meet you. >> let me get out of your way here. mrs. cruz: hi, how are you? grandson -- oh, your grandson. fabulous. we have to make sure we turn out your state. >> you will be find it we are working on it. my wife and i, my 12-year-old grandson -- we will be knocking on doors and we will be back at it all weekend. mrs. cruz: thank you. it is for the citizens. that is the great thing about this campaign. it is a lot of hard work. when people talk to each other outside of the news media -- that is when we know -- [indiscernible]
womenbrother is a citizen and when he got elected, i did 12,000 dollars. i never missed a day except for the fourth of july. mrs. cruz: how many can you do in a day? >> myself, personally, i can get 200 done in a day, especially in the summertime. mrs. cruz: what time does the sun go down here in the summer? 9:00 p.m., 10:00 p.m. mrs. cruz: in the heart of the summer, it can not a copy of -- >> in the heart of the summer, it can be 9:00 p.m.. mrs. cruz: you are higher than north dakota. son-in-law is an attorney with morgan stanley. i thought i had to get that in. mrs. cruz: nice meeting you. [indiscernible]
>> nice meeting you. mrs. cruz: thank you for your support. >> thank you for your support. >> we are working awful hard for you. mrs. cruz: thank you. this is a great state. thank you. thank you. mrs. cruz: -- >> my mom. this is my grandmother. mrs. cruz: how are you? your beautiful daughter. thank you for being here. nice to meet you. how are you? a pleasure to meet you all. >> i recognize you. mrs. cruz: [laughter]
>> i have 17 grandchildren. mrs. cruz: you do? how old is the youngest? >> [indiscernible] to. cruz: so you have a lot keep up with. i know we are going to get the doll for our little one. our youngest is five and our other one is seven. >> are they all here in wisconsin? mrs. cruz: [indiscernible] >> well, bless your family. thank you. mrs. cruz: oh, you are sweet.
i love meeting people. >> thank you for coming. mrs. cruz: we love it. thank you so much. >> i think we are going to win. [video clip] -- mrs. cruz: i think we are going to win, too. thank you for staying with wisconsin, principled, the constitution. mrs. cruz: it is freedom for all people. it is a great way to run. we are running exactly the same in the general as he is running right now. >> you are correct about that as well. mrs. cruz: thank you for being an early supporter. you have a great state. i think you will do well here in wisconsin. how are you?
did you guys have a good lunch? [laughter] do you all have family here in appleton? [indiscernible] mrs. cruz: good. how many kids do you have? wonderful. are they ground? you got them through? what are they doing out of college? they opened their own businesses? what do they do -- what businesses do they run -- what is the product? >> [indiscernible] mrs. cruz: great. we have met businesses across the country that are small, family-run businesses, private companies, and that is the engine of growth in this country. we need a government that gets out of the way, allows you and your sons to innovate. a flat tax will dramatically reduce taxes. that will let the economy grow, rather than following these
lawyers around. has always done that. that is why he is successful. it has taken a lot of guts. that is the answer. this is about washington versus the people. te stands for the people. d>> can i have a photo with you guys? >> i pray for you every day. mrs. cruz: thank you. >> we want a picture. mrs. cruz: ready? >> it takes a lot of energy. cripes we are having fun. mrs. cruz: thank you. >> a lot of support. mrs. cruz: we feel it in wisconsin. >> we are excited. [indiscernible]
mrs. cruz: how are you? jill: my name is jill. mrs. cruz: how are you? jill: i am great. [indiscernible] mrs. cruz: all these things. vote alone -- [indiscernible] it is very easy to set let's always put women first. do you have kids? >> now, i don't. i am an attorney. i have been doing federal indian law. mrs. cruz: wisconsin.
it is a great part of our heritage. thank you for working on their behalf. >> i am really glad we finally got to meet you. mrs. cruz: the reason he will never waver is because he knows it is not about him, but about the law. [indiscernible] ted will always stand by his principles, the right to life, the second amendment, the ability to worship. believe in theto law of the land. mrs. cruz: exactly. ted stands for that.
the party is coming together. it is changing. that is a great thing. we have a record turnout. people are getting engaged. >> i have been following him since he came out to the public scene. mrs. cruz: have you? it is amazing. it was much bigger about -- that ourt ted were texas, but country. and when he shut down congress -- mrs. cruz: i know. and he did not intend to shut down government, but tended -- intended to fight obamacare. we're going to get rid of it. [indiscernible] doesn't have anything to do with health care, and
everything to do with transforming a major industry. mrs. cruz: thank you for your support. >> i thought you might be ready to go. mrs. cruz: nice to meet you. 1, 2, 3. there you are. please tell her hello. thank you for your prayers. we're going to this together. this is nice. nice to meet you. what is your name? alex. i am in high school. mrs. cruz: can you vote in this election? alex: i can. mrs. cruz: thank you. thank you foretelling your -- four telling your school. ted has the conservative
values that we need. mrs. cruz: thank you for your support. you guys are all caps out? how are you. are you in school? >> senior. mrs. cruz: what are you going to do next year? >> going to college. you --mrs. cruz: you might be the lone conservative. you have a lot cut out for you. stay strong. >> he is doing the right thing. he is the real deal.
better than anyone else. mrs. cruz: thank you. >> wonderful to be here. mrs. cruz: nice to meet you. >> here you go. 1, 2, 3. good job. mrs. cruz: thank you so much. you are so kind to say that. we are grateful for you coming out to see us. you have a lot of great citizens here who are well-informed. thank you. >> we are next-door neighbors. i called her up and said do you want to go? [indiscernible]
really appreciate it. mrs. cruz: sure. i want you in it. let's get both of you. mrs. cruz: he will take it. >> you have to press that. >> all right. ready, guys -- 1, 2, 3. mrs. cruz: thank you for being here. thank you for spreading the word. nice to meet you too. >> we are really happy your husband is running. he is a man of principle. i think our country needs him right now. mrs. cruz: i prayed about it, and i said you know, it is not , it is what our
country needs. he is so principled in who he is, and recognize that the same time that our laws allow for differences. country right now is washington versus the people. we are going to turn this around. it is about who represents us in washington. >> one thing i am thinking about, i do not know a lot about but i'm a student, and i realize god allows evil so that it can come good. senator cruz understands that. he does not want to cause anyone harm. he wants to lift people up.