tv Discussion on U.S. Maritime Cooperation CSPAN April 9, 2016 2:40pm-4:16pm EDT
thank everybody for coming. i am the senior vice president here, and we are pleased today to release a new report, prepared by andrew, whom i will introduce in a minute, who was available out front if you did not get one, in a minute. andrew has been here for about four or five months now working based on hisct experience in multiple stents in the australian government. he is now a distinguished and has fellow at csis come out of senior positions in australian government, most recently, the national security advisor to tony abbott and was also prime minister to john howard and has previously held senior posts in the department of foreign affairs and trade and here in the industry in
washington, where i first met andrew about 15 years ago when i was on the national security council staff. andrew will talk about the paper, and then we will have some commentary from the assistant secretary of defense for strategy plan and capabilities. this is a shop that kind of owns the world and works on strategy plans and capabilities, but bob spent much of his career working specifically on southeast asia and the u.s.-australia, including positions in the asia office of the secretary of andnse, policy planning, booz allen hamilton, among others, and bob is well-known for his expertise on only on planning and strategic guidance, but also in southeast asia and oceana. this report builds on growing momentum for strengthening not only u.s.-japan-australia relations, but to align and make
more interoperable bilateral relations in asia. the u.s.-japan and u.s.-australian alliance were born together, but not really in intimacy. in some ways, quite the opposite. the australian side plate is -- played us quite well in 1951 and helped to design the alliances we know today to maximize australian interests. this was part of a large bargain, but no point in intimacy. but that is changing after the cold war. on an operational level, it began in the clinton administration. when i was in the bush administration, we began in 2001 the trilateral security dialogue, and since then, things
have accelerated from there in terms of trilateral cooperation. when andrew will present is based on his work in this area for about two decades, including the tsd, contralateral response with japan, u.s., india, in the recent tsunami, and recent work with the strong government. it also talks about work on both sides of the aisle in the u.s., japan, and australia. bob scheer is also here to comment, give us the state of play in current u.s. policy, not necessarily to endorse the report. we often have officials appear who politely say we are already doing that, usually polite enough to say that this is the dumbest thing i have ever heard -- somewhere in the middle.
but it gives of context to understand what the government is doing, understand what opportunities there are, going forward. we will hear from and you and then bob, and then open up to questions. andrew: thank you, everyone, for coming along today. i would like to thank mike and csi has for the opportunity to spend time here. i have a lot of old friends here and it has been fantastic to be back as a visiting fellow in the past few months. would also like to thank bob for coming along. likewise, he is a friend, and it is good for you to give us your time. finally, i want to thank folks who reviewed my paper, gave me some really good feedback, probably saved me from some errors. if there are errors left, they are mine, not theirs.
i just want to pick up from where mike set things up. starting point for this project really is the work that csis has been doing on federated defense. this is the idea that the best way to respond to a changing, and in many ways, deteriorating international security situation in an environment when we are all increasingly resource-constrained is to increase our defense capabilities much better in the interests of some very substantial long-term, shared aspirations and interest in our countries. in particular, when it comes to the asia-pacific, to respond to what i think is a rapidly growing series of challenges. some of these are transnational in nature, counter piracy,
responding to humanitarian disasters. mike mentioned the december 2004 tsunami, but there was also the japanese earthquake and tsunami disaster. there will be much more of that. then we are also seeing, undeniably, increasing tensions in the region. in the south china sea, for example, we are seeing a more active russian posture, with russia modernizing it specifically -- it's pacific fleet, bringing some capable agreement into the picture, and then you have a nuclear arms dictator in north korea, of course.
i think, an undeniably deteriorating security environment, particularly in asia, and perhaps driven by these trends, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems throughout the region. china is a big part of that, obviously. and russia, as i mentioned. but we're also seeing a number of countries acquire precision missiles, for example, intelligence reconnaissance surveillance capabilities, cyber capabilities, and yes, submarines, which are starting to change the balance of power in asia and make it much more difficult or the united states and its allies to operate in the region, in the way they traditionally have. this challenge has a quantitative dimension, in terms of the number of weapons, platforms in the region now, and will be in the region in the
future. but also a quality dimension, in that we are seeing the introduction of new capabilities that are changing the strategic landscape. these are the sorts of things i mentioned earlier. at the same time, we are all resource constrained at the moment. budget cuts means the size of the u.s. navy, for example, has been falling. other countries in the region are not spending massive amounts on defense, although australia and japan have committed to increasing spending, particularly on maritime cute ability. generally, we are seeing a reduction in the resources. the task of managing the challenge and monitoring it is becoming greater. as i said, we are seeing gaps in capability, notwithstanding the
u.s. rebalance. there are limits to resources in terms of humanitarian assistance, amphibious capability, undersea assets, the u.s. submarine fleet. actually, around 2020, it will start to get smaller, not larger. gaps in ciber, missile, and cyber security in general. for that reason, i chose to focus my paper on maritime security and how we can take the framework of federated defense and start to actualize it, in terms of real capability in the region. then i narrowed it down to japan and australia for a few key reasons. one is the policy framework that mike mentioned, strengthening trilateral strategic corporations around that has been policy for a long time.
i also chose those countries because they are probably the united states' most capable maritime partners in the region. when we are looking to achieve the sorts of strategic attacks on talking about in the paper, including around deterrence and the capacity to reassure allies, you need high and partners. we have to collaborate, of course, across the region with a whole range of countries, including china on a transnational part of this, but building genuine capability, you have to start with the most capable power. australia and japan have both themselves been shifting their defense policies in the direction of more assist on maritime security, and both have a stated commitment to increase their maritime capabilities. so they are already highly capable partners, and they will become, it's fair to say, even more capable partners over the next 10 to 20 years.
the submarine piece of this equation is the one that generates all the excitement, of course. no doubt, the c 1000, australia's program to replace the current class fleet, is one very important opportunity to strengthen maritime cooperation between these three countries. the question of that. but this agenda is much broader than just the submarine piece. the last chapter of the report really is an attempt to draw out an action plan that will hopefully encourage officials -- i plan to hear from bob about this -- and that is to start making some of these more integrated capabilities real. a critical part to start is around isr and networking our intelligence surveillance capabilities much more effectively. in particular, to build a shared picture of what is happening in
the maritime environment. we know from our time in government, when governments share a common appreciation of the strategic environment, then we are likely to act in concerted ways in pursuit of shared interests. here, i'm talking about networking surveillance aircraft, u.s. and japanese fleet, the unmanned aerial vehicles that our countries will be bringing into service for long-range maritime surveillance missions, and also, potentially, cooperation in radar. our countries have some sophisticated technological skills and systems in place already.
then there is the undersea part of this. undersea warfare will become increasingly important in the asia-pacific. everyone talks about submarines, but i think potentially more important is antisubmarine warfare. certainly in australia, it's fair to say, our asw skills have not had the attention that they used to get during the cold war. we have had other priorities. we need to start rebuilding those capabilities and australia, and here again, the networking potential, and our ability to leverage australia's geography, japan's strategic geography creates a web of capabilities that can take the load off of u.s. resources, which will be increasingly stretched by this picture that i have tried to set out in the paper.
when it comes to submarines, of course, this is on astral indecision. it will be a very consequential decision. -- an australian decision. it will change the force structure available to the government for decades and hints at the level of excitement around the decision-making. it is also a massive commercial opportunity, the largest openly available defense industry contract on the world market at the moment. the successful partner will, obviously, gain huge kudos when it comes to building advanced submarines, so the stakes are high. the point i would make their, and in the paper, and did other things i have written with mike -- i have been careful to say, when it comes to assessing the key capabilities that the different partners bring to the
table, and also things like cost and schedule and risk, and so forth. things that should be under consideration. the point i make in the paper, and more generally, is that partnering with japan and the united states on submarines is a potential game changer at different levels. at the strategic level, it can have the effect, i believe, of embedding japan more in a regional security architecture that can help to allay their anxiety. that is a good, stabilizing thing to do. at the operational level, a fleet of interoperable submarines can certainly had more impact and can deal both with the quantitative undersea challenge that i mentioned, and the qualitative challenge, in terms of increasing capabilities
in the region. then the defense industry part of this is incredibly important. supporting japan's efforts to expand its defense industry, the international dimension of that is incredibly important in terms of locking in japan to a broader regional security architecture. for those reasons, it is undeniable there is a church reject dimension to the summary decision and that those factors should feature in that decision. capability, cooperation, and the summary project is a good example, an important area for the three countries to work in. i say in the paper we should start thinking about combat capability from the get-go, westridge were armies are being formulated, through the capability acquisition process.
that is a way to reduce inefficiencies, reduce duplication, drive interoperability. likewise with logistics, i cannot remember who said it, but someone said amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics. it is undeniable, when you look at the chokepoints, in terms of, for example, precision guided munitions for coalition operations in the region, if we integrate our logistics chain, look at things like, stockpiles of munitions, mutual resupply, pre-positioning, also working together on sustainment of our systems, particularly if we can move in the way of more shared systems and platforms, they would be enormous benefits there. amphibious capability. australia and japan are building their own amphibious capability. it is fair to say it is early days in both cases. this is where, working with the u.s. marine corps, is so important for us, as we build
that capability, and where the marine rotations in australia come into play. that is massively important, but it should be a two-way street. when you read about the shortage of strategic sealift that could constrain amphibious operations in the region, we should be ambitious here and should be looking at building the capability to deploy u.s. marines and their vehicles and weapons and eric wrapped off an australian platform. one of our large 27,000-ton ships, or a japanese fleet, for that matter, and generating a pulled amphibious lift capability that can work in the region on problems as diverse as humanitarian response to stabilization operations, and so forth. just a few other quick things before i wrap up and hand over
to bob. the trilateral machinery has been in place for a long time, as mike mentioned. i sat in the paper, i think it needs to be updated. we have a security and defense cooperation forum, which is an analog to the trilateral strategic dialogue. i recommend that should be elevated to the deputy secretary level, to really give it more drive and cut through the three systems. i think there should be standing working groups and some of the areas i've mentioned this morning, to take forward individual initiatives in that framework. i think we also have to -- need to bring india in. india is an incredibly important potential partner for australia, japan, and for the united states.
and we should do that at a pace that is, i think, comfortable for india. if you look at areas like isr, and a summary of warfare, india has a huge role to play, and there are some real affinities with australia's geographic positioning. also, we need to continue to engage china. we also do trilateral u.s.-australia-china exercises. we need to work more on hadr and counterpart received. and generally, build up habits of working in cooperation. ultimately, that will create greater transparency and hopefully greater confidence. i will leave it there and handed over to bob. bob: i am very happy to be here to discuss this paper.
it is not just because andrew and mike are old friends and colleagues. i would do it for that, regardless of what's in the paper. but also because i really do applaud efforts to continue to examine how we in the united states, with our friends and allies, work together to promote and defend our interests in the ski region of asia. this is a paper that looks to do that. it was well worth the time, even on the weekend, to take a quick look at the paper, and to give you some thoughts and impressions about that, and how that fits into the way that we think about our policy toward asia writ large. as i read the paper, there are two key premises, and i think they are worth pointing out, and all to the good. one, we in the united states, with our allies, have to be given to adapt our long-standing alliance system that used to be predominantly -- if not in some cases solely a hub and spoke system.
andrew pointed out, the federated process, systems that csis is looking at, all of this points out, while hub and spoke was the predominant nature of our relationship in asia, it cannot be the only way we look at it. i think we have not only look at that for many years, standing a number of administrations, but that we have to continue that progress. the second premise is that maritime issues are, and will continue to be, critical to the security and prosperity of asia. it goes without saying, but nonetheless, worth pointing out. looking at a map, you don't have a hard time understanding why maritime issues are so important for asia for security and prosperity. put together, it was an easy sell me to look at ideas about how we could increase trilateral cooperation and increase that
alliance network, and focus on maritime issues. let me deal with each of those in more detail from my perspective. first, the idea of increasing multilateral cooperation with our most capable allies, and doing it together. on the face, it makes sense. these are two allied with whom were closely. we had a very good interoperability with each of them individually. if there is a sure perspective, why wouldn't we look to seize opportunities where they exist, to work together in a trilateral cooperation? that was not always the case, and even when it was, we didn't always jump on it. in today's world, not just because of budget issues, but certainly, that is the way to go. i will jump ahead to a quotation i was going to use later, but before the president announced to asia late last year, one of
the lines in a fact sheet is the following. our priority is to strengthen cooperation among our orders in the region, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based regional order and addressing regional and global challenges. could not have said it better myself. i might have, i don't know. nonetheless, that, as principal, makes perfect sense, and is something we need to continue to look at. we need to look at developing new patterns of cooperation. how can we get our friends and allies to start thinking about things not just in the of and spoke process, but working together? i would argue the united states was not always a large proponent of the hot and spoke process, but were willing to work with our allies in that way when it was most appropriate. as we are merge and as the security develops and we have more allies becoming more capable, we will need to look
for other ways of doing this. trilateral cooperation between our most capable allies is a key piece of that. we are doing a lot in large multilateral. you have seen the eas, all of the other large multi-lateral forums, those are important pieces of our foreign policy. it is one of the things that we have put an emphasis on in the obama administration. that, however, does not mean that it is the only way to do things, or the best way to cooperate in all cases. as you are looking at the more advanced
capabilities, those fora are not ready for those activities so we need to see where we can have those combination of friends and allies, and with what missions, what capabilities will be the most profitable and be able to be flexible. asia has the advantage and disadvantage of not having a set in stone, very clear multilateral forum. we should take advantage of that where we need to, and try to build on it where we think it is not a strength of our relationships. second, maritime security is absolutely one of the key issues and it is the right one to focus on. it is a critical domain to our security, the security of the united states, to our allies, friends, the region at large, and a critical domain for economic prosperity. what we are looking for in a security environment as we can no longer assume as we had for many years that the maritime domain will go uncontested.
and so understanding that as a premise, we need to look to like-minded nations of how we can best ensure the ability to operate in and through the maritime domain as we have done, and as has benefited the united states and our allies in the region for decades. australia and japan are obvious first choices and for reasons that we have all talked about. i do think there are other countries that are capable of doing this, and i think we should look to that in the future. india, korea, singapore are some of the first names that come to mind but i do think that with a clear shared interest and our view of the opportunity and the security challenges in the region, australia and japan make sense to be the right places to start. this is especially true given what japan has recently done and what the government has done to push a view of security, and understanding it is a broader perspective and they can and should be a participant.
anytime those things are put together we should explore these ideas and look at them. i look forward to looking at andrew's paper in greater depth and those inside and outside of government will do that. i'm in no position now, and i do not think anyone would want me to say yeah, this is the right thing or no, it is not. it is well worth looking at. it fits into our overall policy. i would say arguably the thing that i would ask us to look at as we look at these proposals, first of all, i think the areas are about right. isr is a big one, amphibious capabilities, other logistics, these are all good areas to be examining in greater depth. when i think we need to do with the rebalance as we move forward, and what i would recommend to a follow-on administration, is to continue the operations we are doing, continue to look at the way we are doing things now, but also look at what our missions, what our operations? it should not be just about where we are or what
capabilities we bring or enhancing our allies and friends. it should not just be about geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. it should be about all of those things. you have heard them continue to be said. one of the wonderful things about government is you get to repeat yourself and maybe someone will believe that you mean it. we will continue to say those things but we also need to talk about for what? why are we geographically distributed? why are we looking to cooperate on a range of issues? why are we putting our best technology forward into the pacific? so we can work on things together. some of these things will be at the high end of the spectrum, others will be at the lower end, and we cannot forget any of those pieces. making sure we are as better unilaterally with our allies and broader with a set of allies and
friends in doing operations that stand from humanitarian to disaster relief to ensuring the maritime cyberspace domains and commons are able to be operated freely. all of those things we should look for, cooperation, and what we are doing next. it will always be with our asian allies that we are going to be seeing this. this is where our interests are inexorably intertwined. given that, those of the things, i think this fits right in and i think andrew for inviting me to be here. i say that before the questions and answers. and also to be able to take a look at this early on because i think there is some great -- just the premise makes sense so we need to take a look at what bright people are thinking about elsewhere. >> let me thank you both. i will start the questions and
then open it up. i think in andrew's presentations you heard about how much australia can benefit. perhaps getting greater versatility on northern asia security dynamics. there are going to be enormous advantages in this kind of agenda for the u.s.-japan alliance as well as i think our allies will see what it looks like when you were operating globally, when you have more integration of senior-level commands and staff, not a joint and combined command, but much more trust across different commands, intelligent sharing. i think there is going to be an open window for both alliances, and not just the australian and
japanese side. as we see japan take on and see what the gold standard is in many areas, that is a huge advantage. i like the fact that you put this in the context that the u.s. and japan and australia, and particularly japan and australia have been quite operating on regional architecture from aipac and before that. a lot of it came out of japan and australia. even the trilateral security log which i was involved in from the beginning was primarily on the japanese and australian sides telling us to get our act together and telling us the right things to focus on in asia. that set of common interests really drives this. let me first ask each, andrew, the japan-australia security cooperation is 100 years old and write about this time 100 years ago, they were sinking submarines in the mediterranean and the in parallel japanese
navy got troops and so forth. there is a long history with an obvious interruption. my sense is in australia, particularly since 15 and 20 years ago the views toward japan shifted quite considerably in a very positive direction. on the other hand, beijing is very clearly opposed to anything like this even if it involves building capacity for humanitarian relief. i think from china's perspective, this is our intention in the three allied capitals, but i think from the chinese perspective it is window dressing for a containment strategy. i would expect the chinese official criticism of trilateral is, u.s., japan, australia, is going to increase. i guess my question is, are they ready for the heat?
what is the debate like in australia? it sounds like yes, but if you could give this washington audience a bit of the flavor of the larger worldview in australia, how you do this while at the same time retaining commercial relations with china, that would be terrific. >> thank you, bob, for that context. that is absolutely right. as mike says, our partnership with japan goes back a long way indeed and in fact, it is interesting. going back to the formation, it was done through the lens of what had happened in japan and it was when we had the security guarantee provided by ansys that australia felt ready very quickly after the second world
order to extend a hand of friendship to japan & e-commerce agreement as early as mid-1950's. which shows you how quickly australia was, as our foreign minister said the other day, was prepared to move on and see the potential in the relationship with japan. that relationship was incredibly important because australia provided the raw material that cause the japanese boom and credit the asian economic miracle. our strategic relationship with japan came later. we partnered very closely with japan on economics and increasingly in terms of regional diplomacy, and building this sort of architecture in the region that mike outlined. i think it was only when we worked with japan in southern iraq in the mid mid 2000's that the nature of the relationship started to become clear, particularly in tokyo.
the experience of working with the adf and building that level of trust with the adf, and seeing how closely the adf was integrated into the u.s. military was powerful, i think in terms of tokyo's thinking. and information sharing agreement, we are working on a mutual access agreement to facilitate more exercises and operations in each country so the strategic relationship has come on in leaps and bounds. and now finally, i think just a few years ago most of us in this room would've thought it unthinkable that japan would be a potential international partner for australia's submarines. that is a matter of development.
of course there is the china paper. as i said, this paper is about maritime security in asia at large and it talks about russia and it talks about korea, but i think it is inescapable that china's militarization of the program, capabilities it is using, china is a driver of what is happening in our region. i do not think they should be saying in any way it is containment. containment is not actually possible when you look at the greater economic dependence between our countries, even if anyone wanted it. this is about increasing, if you like, the poll of capability in the region to respond to a whole lot of different contingencies, as bob said, and that should be in the interest of the region at large including china.
and the other point i would make is that i do think there is a piece to this, as institutions have done and as is recognized in u.s. government documents, the balance of power in maritime asia is shifting and it is shifting in an unfavorable direction. we need more high-level capability to sustain a favorable balance. ultimately a peaceful and stable region that is underpinned by open economic institutions and respect for core principles, like freedom of navigation. that is the endpoint, the big hole, the prize. those have been the pillars of prosperity in the asia-pacific
for 70 years, and what we are interested in should be the next 70 years. >> most of these questions i think will find andrew, but let me ask you one, bob. you mention a range of areas from diplomacy, har to surveillance and so forth. can you say a little bit more about the initiatives? it seems that by design probably, we are creating a new force posture in the pacific that links our bilateral life. that marines will go to okinawa and also darwin, maybe you can tell the audience were that is all heading. >> we have had this sort of tagline for an awful long period of time, and it is repeated not just because we are comfortable with it but because it actually represents what we are trying to
do in terms upon your within the region. if you think about a number of years ago, you would say that our posture, you would equally our posture with our footprint and say that our footprint is just about northeast asia. you would not have been too far-off. while that may have been overly simplistic it may not have been wrong and certainly a defensible position. we decided, and ideas were started across multiple administrations, to see what we could do to get a better understanding, that we had interests beyond northeast asia. from northeast asia through southeast asia, oceania, and into the indian ocean and to do that you have to have the forces, the footprint, the agreements, the exercises with these countries so we started that, and we continued that effort in the obama administration.
i think you will see some things that point to a fair bit and will continue to point to it. how we have operated with the government of singapore, in and around singapore. you will see the australia piece that we have done in terms of expanding our cooperation and ability to operate with australian forces from northern territories of australia particularly, air force and navy. you will see that we have done a fair bit in the philippines and have gotten to the point where we can have more rotational presence in the philippines on a more regular basis. i think this all links together to say that this will be important to be able to operate with our friends and allies and operate relatively seamlessly with them across and around the region. and again, i really do think a lot of people who work on europe a lot and come into asia think it is a downside, that there is no clear regional architecture
like nato. i understand why they do that. i have to spend a lot of time in europe and i have come to appreciate the nato alliance in a way that i have not before. but i also think there are clear advantages to having a more flexible process whereby you do not have to get the agreement of all 28 nations as you will in europe, to do anything. that is to be able to work with countries with whom you share a similar interest. we look to put our posture in a context of not just being places but doing things. in order to do things with other countries and around the region, we have to have that posture. i think the big piece and the distributed network of our marines coming off of okinawa, leaving critical pieces but
operating guam and being able to have that ability to operate with other countries wherever we think we need to, is really the key advantage of this distributed posture. if i may, as the u.s. government official up here i do feel compelled to say that while there is certainly a changing balance of military power in the asia region, i still feel extraordinarily comfortable with the way it is now. we have to make sure to continue to track it and make sure our allies can operate in the best environment in operational ways that are relevant and able to secure our interests. it is not just about numbers, as the paper points out. it is also about capabilities. i am not willing to accept that trends are inevitably straight lines and i feel very good about our capabilities unilaterally.
but also i feel better about it when i think about our capabilities with our allies and friends. >> same question to you, andrew. >> when you look at the u.s. force posture which bob outlined very well, and not just doing things but being places, i think what comes through very strongly is a shift in emphasis in southeast asia, oceania, and we support the rebalance and what the u.s. administration has been trying to achieve. as i say in the paper, australia is becoming increasingly important in this context. yes, as a capability partner but also because of our strategic geography. so for example, the marine presence is important for the
capability building reasons i mentioned a little earlier, and i think it has a wider regional importance. if you look at it, i actually think the air force part of the u.s. force posture initiatives in australia, the capacity for northern australia to accept increasingly large rotations of long-range aircraft is ultimately more strategically significant. i think the potential for the u.s. navy rotations from the west coast of australia will grow too is the strategic importance of the indian ocean will continue to rise. i think we are going to see australia become more important in a force posture sense. in the report i talk about australia in terms of the century as far as longer-range weapons, but also a springboard
as far as our access to some very critical real state including some of the maritime checkpoints in southeast asia and out into the eastern indian ocean. and here, i think the corporation between australia and india could be very important, and some work together in anti-submarine warfare as well. >> you will find in the report on page 30 a very useful map that shows where some of these critical chokepoints are in maritime asia, and how the geography of japan and australia bear on that. why don't we open it up, identify yourself briefly, and keep it short. >> i am kevin. i was with the state department for many years, mostly in tokyo doing political military issues.
the last 18 years, the policy of japan cooperation has made u.s. great progress. at the policy level, the architecture, it seems to me that we have gotten to the point now particularly in terms of responding to china, and i do not mind using the containment word myself. i think that is what we are all about. there comes a point where the rubber meets the road in terms of capabilities. i agree with your report, you have outlined what needs to be done in terms of the networking and integration to get the force multiplier effect that we need as we all have limited resources. but the context of the rubber meeting the road or not, to me the issue before us is the submarine program. strategically, you have outlined
the issues very well, but how confident are you that australian government will make what i would say is the correct decision on this in terms of this treated just strategic inoperability between our three forces? i cannot see the germans caring that much about the south china sea. how confident are you that decisions will be made for the right reasons? >> thank you, kevin, for the question. the first thing i would say is that i am not privy to the competitive process that is underway within our defense department at the moment. i had a hand in establishing the process. each of the international partners has expressed their support for the process and i think it is a good, robust process and that is important.
us is a $50 billion acquisition and probably another hundred plus billion dollars going forward to sustain, that is absolutely huge for australia. a big project for a start. i am not, because i'm not privy to the inside of the process i'm not going to comment on the relative merits technically of the japanese or german or french submissions. i am not in a position to, and it is not my job to. when i can say, though, is that what i can say, though, is that if the capability can be modified to the minimum extent possible to meet australia's strategic requirements, and that particularly applies to range, and if the japanese proposal is solid on cost and schedule, and
if it is the best way to mitigate the risks that we have experienced with the collins class submarine, and i think the strategic logic of going with the japanese is compelling. i, as an australian taxpayer and someone who worked in the australian government, i have no reason at all to believe that the process will not explore those issues in great detail with great professionalism, and i very much hope and would expect a serious, sensible decision just because of its importance for future generations. i think that would be my answer. >> i am certainly not going to be in a position to judge the outcome. what i think andrew said the
spot on. there are a lot of variables that are beyond my ability to judge, technology and cost, and you did not mention, but industrial participation and labor relations, there is a lot to this. i did my dissertation on the kinds of decisions. when you are talking about technology in this much strategic capability, this is of much consequence. it is not surprising it is under the magnifying glass in tokyo and around the world, you see articles in the financial times and so forth. we have to stay neutral because we have three allies competing. but i think when you control
for, or set aside for the moment all of the important technical, industrial, and other decisions, it is striking to a lot of people here at least, that one of the submarines under discussion operates in the waters of the pacific. and the industrial base and policy of that government is committed to exactly the same strategic objectives in that region. and as i understand it, the bid, made clear there would be some consideration of the strategic factors. it is not surprising the u.s. government has to be quite careful, but the nice thing about being out of government, we can sort of opine based on what we have seen of the dynamics of the region. i assume you do not want to answer this. >> just given the elephant in the room to prejudge or predict any other questions, let's be clear, the united states does not take a position on this other than it is a sovereign decision of the government in australia to make the best decision possible.
i certainly hope all the considerations that everyone has laid out would be a part of that decision, but in terms of whether or not we have a position, the only position is that we will work with whatever submarine the australians choose. we hope they get through this process. >> i think chip is next in the front. >> chip gregson. freedom of navigation was rightly mentioned as a principal which begs the question, whose freedom of navigation? how do we help guarantee vietnam and the philippines the right to freedom of navigation in their own exclusive economics? >> bob might have something to say about this too. it is an excellent question. i think part of it is that as we know, these countries have
limitations on their own capabilities to basically enforce their own interests and their own legal rights. consistent with the clause, so i think that one part of this, and some good work but has already started is building up their capabilities, starting with sort of coast guard-type capabilities to monitor the sorts of problems that you mentioned around fishing and so forth. i know the united states has gifted a couple of retired coast guard cutters to the philippines.
it is interesting, australia has done something similar with malaysia, two of our patrol boats have been gifted to malaysia to help them with precisely these. i think what you mentioned is a particularly good case where trilateral strategic cooperation is to kick in, and i think already has frankly, so that both of them duplicating and having an on coordinated approach, we have a shared idea of what these countries need and how to get them there most efficiently. that is to my mind, a good, practical example. >> it certainly. chip, as you know and many others in the room know, it gets complicated when it comes to defining eez's when you do not have a judgment on who owns which land feature. sometimes it is a difficult situation and it is sometimes where we hope everyone will see the way under customary international law under the clause looks at these issues. we believe that is the right
thing to deal with the disputes, and we support what is going on now in terms of any this unit resolution that could be going on with the case of the fifth -- the philippines and will live by whatever answer comes forward with. all of that i would answer is immaterial to whatever country deserves to be able to address threats within it and deal with and have some sense of maritime humane awareness and be able to do rightful positions regardless of what you believe the territorial waters are, and that is where we focus on the capabilities piece. obviously folks in the u.s. government are dealing with diplomacy and other pieces. we have spent a lot of time working with friends and allies. some of this is arms sales. some of this is gifts and some of this is the maritime security initiative. secretary carter has announced. that is how we are focusing our
efforts, making sure every country has the capability to do what did -- what is in its rights and responsibilities within the international environment. the core answer it is free navigation for everyone. core interest to the united states. it is something critically important to figure out how to best maintain and continued to demonstrate and show and as well as argue it is everyone's best interest for that. >> let me briefly ask some other people on the list, we very well may have a coming decision in the arbitration on the philippines case and many experts expect that it will be unfavorable for beijing. and the chinese side is unlikely to accept it. and may take action to demonstrate.
so this is a hypothetical. you are off the hook, bob. how would this manifest itself in this kind of scenario, which i personally would say is a 50/50 prospect looking at it today? >> i guess i am on the hook. in >> welcome to the nfl. >> i think the arbitration outcome will be very important. not the least because i think the way the rules of the region are shaped now is incredibly important, given that trajectory the region seems to be on. the rules are established now and are at a point when things are more out of hand down the road.
i think the initial point is there needs to be a very strongly concerted diplomatic peace that comes in in support of international rules-based order in this case. the region obviously has at stake. australia is an exporting country in 60% bonuses through the south china sea. the freedom of navigation is incredibly important to us all. it is not just the region. this is where sometimes our european friends need to stand up a little bit more. the eu after all is an institution founded very much on
the rule of law. supposedly -- i think it is very important that the european countries get solidly. even though the south china is a long way from london and brussels and berlin, disorder in the asia-pacific is not going to remain isolated to our region, just as disorder is not chaos in the middle east will stay isolated to europe and europe 's backyard. they can help to come up with a
n effective, diplomatic response and you like to think that would be very well and efficiently joined up if the moment comes. >> over here. >> the center for naval analyses. thank you very much for a terrific presentation. question one, what kind of constraints do you see in implementing the vision that you have seen in the report echo is it political alignment in the capitals? it saves resources but will cost them resources to do the work in proposed to. there will be some expenditure. other considerations, the china consideration. couple of youa
mentioned including india in the effort. i just wonder given the asymmetry between the u.s. and india relationship and the relationship with japan and australia in terms of the kind of agreement that you mentioned and what is the best modality? pulling india along to get to the stage to work with us more as allies, or insisting on the foundational agreements and other mechanisms first in order to dock onto the federated systems you are proposing. >> thanks. i think some of what i am talking about is already starting to happen. it has been quiet and somewhat fitful, but australia and india
goingeen patiently step-by-step, building a foundational document. interestingly, it's modeled on jointlia's historic 2007 security declaration with japan. and india pace is developing quite strongly, a similar sort of institutional framework in place. the architecture is developing. at this stage, it is developing bilateral. i would say this is a bilateral conservatives and we are seeing
but hitting in the right direction. australia, japan, india have established a specific triad. i do not think it is in either or. i do not think we should wait until the perfect edifice is constructed. i think we should patiently build the edifice, but in the meantime, where we can and where it makes sense and where it is everyone's interest, we should bring india in. mike mentioned 2004 synonymy and -- tsunami in the indian ocean, that was a perfect example where from almost a standing start. the four countries generated pretty impressive military response to that tragedy. because they are like-minded, shared values, a lots of license interoperability and capability, which when pointed at the same problem can be very effective.
i think there will be more things where on a case-by-case basis, we can reach out to india and say we are thinking of doing this, what are your thoughts on it, would you like to join? it is that kind of process rather than sort of having some high level goal and waiting until we achieve it. all, we are at a place where we think we can do more try laterally between the u.s., australia, japan. the patterns of behavior have built up. there have been a lot of things. i participate in my fair share, and i think everyone around the table has. they can range from incredibly intellectually stimulating too painful diplomatic and defense sort of sharing the talking
points. we have done more of the former recently. you have to build that up. the pattern of comfort. goal.ndia, it's a great i think we will have to go at it both ways. i don't sense we want to be in a position of looking at it as only through the trilateral lens for the we have a bilateral pieces we want to do. i remember fondly thinking it would be easy within my tenure as the deputy assistant secretary covering asia we have these agreement done, it would be great. it's both disheartening and comforting to see it was not just my problem. that in fact it is just hard. it is hard with any country. it is just new work with india. we will have to look at it both ways. trilateral operation or bilateral cooperation comes out of it for the good, but in the
end it will always be driven by what individual countries use as self interest. if that is not the driving premise behind it, i am concerned about it. i don't know why. i think it is important that we be able to accommodate it. until then, there are lots of things to do with india. both of the countries independently, bilaterally and we should look at any of those opportunities. >> i will just confirm my theory that the greater attraction is watching allies negotiate status agreement. and sitting in the sidelines and saying now you understand. [laughter] i don't know if you want to address constraints, there is a constraint issue of course. when you add this to the pretty intense exercise schedule, you would add and this at that sticks money.
it takes people out of their training cycles. what has been impressive to me is tokyo and washington have been willing to do it. part of the reason i think is those four navies operate at a very high level. i think the indian navy's from what i hear from officers get a lot at of exercising with japan in terms of competence, knowledge, high end, asw and other training opportunities. not necessarily always with the u.s. as big.is not also just for political reasons. it's nice to have high-end exchanges.
even in the u.s. with budget constraints, there is a lot of credit for this. i think despite challenges in the defense budget, the exercise schedule with allied partners has been maintain pretty well. you asked about the agreements. part of the reason we need does is to reduce the cost. if you have these arrangements in place, it will cost less. >> around politics i think you're right. the broad underlying trend, the structural trend is in this
direction but i think there's no question that there are windows of opportunity to advance these objectives. we are in one now. the three countries i have written about and would fit in this category as well. they broadly had the region the same way and have grand strategic objectives. i think there's a good convergence in the capital around this. that's not to say that sort of alignment can't be knocked exampler remember for the government that came to office in australia sort of disavowed quadrilateral operations. i think they did it very soon and probably it hadn't been fully thought through. that is one example of changes in the political realm not stopping this trend or reverse it to but contemporarily hold it
up. there's a very strong convergence there at the moment with all of the countries we have been talking about. the other product makers around the cultural chains this requires. building up real interoperability is partly about widgets and machines talking to each other properly. peoplech more about getting used to how other people do things and building of those real habits of close working. australia and the u.s. have always been close, but the sheer operating tempo that our military's have been working under since 9/11 really means they are almost integrated and joined at the hip.
in other areas, japan works incredibly closely. it is how we take those relationships and brought in them out and encourage a mindset. this is hard. even in militaries, achieving genuine joint miss is a lifelong project really. we are saying we want you to be genuinely joined among yourself and genuinely joint and combined with the australian, japanese, south koreans, indians. that is a really big change, and that will take time for uniform services and bureaucracies to make the changes. >> thank you. from carnegie endowment.
a great report. the important things are all there. in the real world, we have to make choices among capabilities in budgets. i want to push you a bit on that. the case for asw talking to navy people is pretty strong. we need to catch up with our own selves. then you have a case for insidious capabilities. if i had to trade off between them based on what i know i would invoke the general here by saying the amphibious site could be left behind. >> thank you. i certainly don't dispute the importance of isw. if i had to recommend, i would put it ahead of amphibious. i don't think it's a clear trade-off. australia for better or worse
nearlyght these two 30,000 ton ships. japan is making quite a similar investment in an amphibious brigade. those things are happening. the piece -- that was probably a bad metaphor. [laughter] invested. what i am talking about is much more of a human case of the interoperability. mike is right about the exercise schedule. let me give you an example. this is a heavy amphibious flavor to it.
this time last year about 35 members of the black defense force participating. a small start. that does not really cost anyone anything to do that. the three amphibious forces together can start to build what i am talking about. we had an event here the other day with the japanese military saying the u.s. marine corps landed on a japanese platform. being able to do that sort of tough is not going to cost vastly more resources but is a really powerful force multiplier. in australia, we know that
disasters happen. and the resources most stress tend to be the most ready capability. i think we can do both. >> i am just going to comment on one thing, doug. you have hit a raw nerve. we have fallen behind. so not just because i am a u.s. government official, but i would not trade our navy for china's navy. it is just worth clarifying. not you, but i think in general, we are the relative dominance that we have had for decades and clearly not as great as it is going to be. we do have to figure out different ways of operating as result of that. whether or not we are able to do that, we do have the investments to do it. i do think it is not just of about one particular investment but the way a lot of all and a lot of people in the region are assuming certain things of whether -- where we are. i think that if you look at the absolute terms of what we bring and what we bring with our
allies, one of the real important pieces to being here, i take our situation every time over anyone else's. i think that is important that we maintain. something important that we look at and important to understand as a relative strength. >> a question that will not go away. you are right about that. it is reflected in the current debate. this gets at the same choice. i think it is a little bit false in some ways. resources were constrained to do an external review of the rebalance. andrew was in between stents and helped to write part of it. we concluded that you cannot just rely on the world winning high and deterrence, because then you please open those assured of four.
this starts because of the regional dynamic changes. states get weak. balance of power changes. the amphibious capabilities are critical. this is the shaping mission. if it does not work, you really want the others. it will be a trade-off. i think, although i find the navy debate about this a little artificial, i do think it is a reality all three governments from the top will have to shape this. if you leave this to the server -- services, they all have their own answers. so it really does have to be an intelligence plan from the civilian leadership with a military leadership to start balancing this. that is why i think andrews paper is important.
>> did you want to do another panel quickly? last question. >> speaking of resources and budget. >> i have a very different question. you used the phrase raw nerve. i want to hit a big-time raw nerve. donald trump. to what extent, whether he is nominated or not is irrelevant. what we're seeing it is a drift toward isolationism. look at the free trade attitudes of every major candidate. to what extent is this likely to slow down what you guys are
trying to do? we know it has affected perceptions in japan big-time. mr. trump has broken taboo and said go nuclear. that, how might this affect all of what we have been talking about? clearly there is a mood in this country that certainly people in this room do not entirely agree with i suspect. there is a mood here creating perceptions wherever i have traveled with the past couple of months. what is going on in the minds of people who want to do what you want to do? >> bill gates is all over mexico. i will start. i have had experience among pretty experience levels.
this went from chuckling to nervous chuckling to the past week or two, the statements about nuclear real concern. ,not just about the low probability that we have a trump presidency but the core of the international system, the united states could be the place for , this kind of debate at the level of leading candidates. it says something about america's staying power. if you look at opinion polls in december of last year, the most recent polls on this, 70% of americans support tpp. well over half supported free trade broadly. the polls done by chicago council on global affairs show the highest level ever. we do not ask about cholesterol yet because people take it for granted.
the highest ever when asked should the u.s. -- the highest number since the polls had been done in decades. there is no institutional basis. no constituency in the congress. no way to enact policy of retreat. it's hard to imagine democratic senate armed services committee. i think the bedrock of the american international system is if you look at polls and international leadership, it is pretty strong. let's see what the polls look like.
i don't know. i am certain he will than i am not certain it will not. this is a lot more solid than what you have seen in the headlines. that would be my answer. i will filibuster now. robert: the comments being made are obviously a concern. they really do strike at the heart of the pillars of the u.s. engagement. u.s. open economies. military presence and the alliances. they really have been the bedrock of success for the region. so of course countries in the region will be concerned.
i will have to be more optimist and respect to recognize that from time to time you have these convulsions. i think the more sober people in the region recognize the amerco represented in these comments is not really america. i think mike is talking to the structural factors that will reassert themselves after this election campaign is out of the way. i am not downplaying this when a person without a moments thought
saying someone will acquire nuclear weapons is not a trivial thing at all. take your pick. but i do think it you like sanity we will ultimately prevail. >> i am happy to be gone the record on this and ensure we get no more questions on this. i will tell you what i tell people, friends and allies, when they are concerned about this. isolation and of -- isolationism has existed for decades. in the recent history every time that has surfaced, our interest
had been clear to anyone who has been charged with protecting and defending the united states. it is a long-standing trend that over the last century, relates our interest is not just served by that and i suspect we will always do that. >> probably not appropriate to end a us-japan australia conversation given our common cultures as colleagues to quote the brits but you can always count on the americans to make the wrong decisions before they make the right ones. they said yes, it's true but
they are the only americans we have. thingurchill, the worst about going in or without -- if you look at history, it's a rare and important thing. this kind of trilateral effort i think we will see more of. we will look forward to further work of andrew. thank you for your service in moving this all forward and thank you for coming. [applause]
[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> bundesliga's newsmakers, a conversation with virginia senator mark warner. he talks about the federal budget and encryption legislation in light of the fbi-apple case. 6:00 p.m. sunday at eastern. jack lewonday when talks values leadership in the global economic system speaking at the council on foreign relations. watches that live at a: 30 a.m. eastern on c-span2. monday, a discussion on new ways to pay for medicare services. the alliance for health reform host the event. you can watch it at noon eastern on c-span2.
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>> one thing that stands out in this time is this creation of this imagery. is an old concept going back to ancient times godlikewarrior is made by lifting him up and celebrating him. >> on the presidency at 8:00 -- -- ill washington and james madison, who follow jefferson as the fourth president of the united states, owned over 100 slaves, holding a large percentage of while he occupied the white house. he is responsible for exposing to three fisk compromise which guaranteed the south held a disproportionate influence on congress to preserve and uphold
slavery interest. at california state university on the 12 american presidents who were slave owners, eight while in office. to a full schedule, go c-span.org. says thel mike rogers notion that america can combat isis propaganda on the internet by shutting it down is simply not realistic. his comments came after he testified before the senate armed service committee on the cyber security infrastructure. senator john mccain chairs. this is just over two hours. >> good morning. today tottee meets receive testimony from abnormal -- admiral mike rogers.
chief of the central security service. new attacks appear in the headlines on an increasingly nationstates, as criminal organizations, and terrorists seek to leverage activities. when you appear before this committee in september, you noted that we have the competitors in cyberspace and that some of them have already hinted that they hold the power to cripple our infrastructure and set back our standard of living if they choose. since that hearing, russia has demonstrated the ability to cap power to hundreds of thousands
of people in central and western ukraine. it is terribly significant. it demonstrates a sophisticated use of cyber --pons as a bestie bellies i as a destabilizing capability. we must develop not only an effective deterrence policy but also the capabilities necessary to deter any nation seeking to exploit or colors the united states through cyberspace. after significant urging by this committee, i believe the defense department recognize this need and important progress has been made in cyber command. for the most part, the services appear to be on track to meet the goal for the development of a