tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN May 31, 2016 10:00am-12:01pm EDT
this is rooted in working hard, being honest and rewarded for the fruits of your efforts. host: governor gary johnson is the libertarian presidential nominee. thank you for being on c-span. guest: a pleasure. a wonderful format. i hope you will invite me back. live to take you now the wilson center in washington, d.c. i hope you will invite me back. we take you live to the woodrow wilson center. feature andll discuss the impact of arms trade in east asia. the woodrow wilson center is hosting this event and we take you there live.
day back from a long weekend. spent somey of you time elsewhere, may be at the beach? hathaway, a public policy fellow here at the woodrow wilson center. having spent many years as the director of the asia program here. be sitting in to on this program today, where we and about some very serious maybe even worry some issues having to do with east asia. for those of you who might be watching live or otherwise
i would simply welcome you to the woodrow wilson center. officiale nations memorial to the 28th president of the united states. our goal is to commemorate both and thelarly depth public policy concerns of president wilson. the title of the program today is "east asia on the brink? " it begs the question to say, on the brink of what? i expect we will have an opportunity to ask and answer that question. theuld like to thank organizers of this program. program,n center asia
the kissinger institute and history and public policy program. i have been asked to make an announcement about which i have not a clue, that i'm sure most of you in the room do, at least those of you who are younger. you are invited to tweet from @asiaprogram. some of you may not know what i'm talking about. east asia. a region in turmoil. rapidlyaracterized by rising defense budgets and the think arms race, tank out of stockholm reports that six of the world's 10th largest arms importers are from asia and oceana.
is the home of territorial disputes involving mosof the principal players of the region. of unresolved historical questions that continued to stoke tensions. and a surge of nationalism throughout the region. experiencing considerable political and diplomatic churn. last week, president obama visited vietnam and japan. this trip,course of he lifted a decades-old embargo on the sale of lethal arms to vietnam. and last friday, he became the first u.s. president to visit hiroshima. taiwan andtions in
the philippines have bought to power -- brought to power new leaders whose policies have not yet been fully articulated. new united nations sanctions, north korea continues its drive for nuclear weapons in the means by which to deliver them. partnershipific trade agreement, long touted as of of the touchstones ivot,dent obama's asia-pacif appears to be on life support. round, the china strategic and economic dialogue will be held next week. and in the united states, one of the two likely presidential
rewriting talks of u.s. alliances in asia and seems unfazed by the prospect of additional nuclear weapons states in the region. so, we have our hands full. keepd, it is enough to asia watchers off the beaches. to help us look at some of these regional security issues today, we are pleased to have two wilson center -- members of the wilson center family. we will hear first from thomas berger, on my right. he has a professor of international affairs at boston university and has been spending the last several months as a fellow here at the wilson
center. he is the author of several war, guilt,uding " world politics after world war ii." his project this spring examines u.s. grand strategy in east asia in japan's disputes over history and territory. after he makes some introductory comments, you will then hear , who justhan caverley left us a couple of weeks ago, having spent several months here as a fellow. we are delighted to have you back. when he is not at the wilson center, he is teaching in the national security studies program at m.i.t. actors ining at how
the united states use the international arms trade, the training of foreign militaries. militarism"mocratic examined the distribution of the costs and security within democracies and these contributions to military oppressiveness. we are delighted to have both you and thomas. thank you for introducing us. inc. you for coming up and showing. of a max,e at the end i would have to do a report. this is what i have done at the end of my fellowship. here you go. let me say that i have been looking at security for a while. i began looking at it 30 years ago.
during that time, the security agenda, it was quite different. we were dealing with the cold war and containing the soviet union. the securityed agenda transform itself when i was writing my first book and doing my early research. i watched as we moved into an agenda that focused upon regaining regional stability. dealing with the flashpoint of north korea and taiwan straits. and maintaining the institutional capacity for responding to those challenges, especially the alliances and those institutional relations with the east asian region. inon't think i'm alone feeling that, once again, we are moving into a time where we will be quite in a number of different ways, reevaluating what the security agenda in east asia is.
has been a great deal of discussion. many people remember two years ago when we had a debate about whether we were going to see a replay of great power politics. abe shinzo got a lot of attention arguing that 2014 would be a replay of 1914. -- propensity of great rising powers to come into conflict with the established order. and that was picked up by -- there was a great deal of debate about that. east asia on the brink of something like the world war, and the up charge of that debate is not likely, not yet. the power abilities between united states and the potential rivals, including
china, were too large to make that sensible for the next few years, at least. the risks in the nuclear arms world war ii great and the political cost in the highly interdependent economy with a high demand an expectation with a standard of living, the political cost would be too high. stillthink that debate holds. but nonetheless, over the last couple of years, since that's round of discussions, we continue to seek worrying trends. think that we are not on the brink of great power warfare, but we are moving into a much antsier and unstable region. one in which we will be seeing a crisis and escalation of these crises and unexpected
possibilities for unexpected consequences, with even greater extra nation -- greater escalation. while we don't have the answer to what the world will look like, both of us have been looking at different aspects of this. at thebeen looking softer side of things. nationalism and the way in which it is shaping the political players in the region of japan, south korea and china in particular. to -- we will switch back and forth. you don't have to listen to either one of us too long. it is good to start with the hard reality, jonathan is closer to that. he will talk about the arms trade. jonathan: thank you. thank you to the wilson center,
it is a delightful intellectual environment to work on some rather depressing stuff. i will talk about the arms trade today. what i want to emphasize, when i talk about the arms trade, in a region like asia, the arms trade is basically talking about arms racing. in the sense that there is some indigenous production capability, but for the most part, it will be maritime conflict -- that is what we are talking about. a likely hot conflict breaking out, it is mostly imported with partial exceptions of japan and china. the weapons have to come from somewhere. mostly imported in this region. to understand the region, you have to understand the arms market. weapons have a lot in common with things like gasoline, coca-cola and heroine.
the demand is high and elastic. demand rises and you can't do much about it. the united states plays a pivotal role in turning out how these markets work, for better or worse. so even though this is about story of the arms trade is largely an american story. it isn't a coincidence that the all the countries that have participated in the program, the only remotely asian flag up there is australia and that is not coincidence. , massiveink of a dog cost overruns and delays, glitches, the performance is questionable -- i am a moderate fan of the fighter but it does have severe problems. one of the critics described it as the -- pentagon because of how expensive it is.
if the crisis is over a priced white elephant, why does it not lose in the fighter competitions? denmark just made a decision and published a very enthusiastic report about why the joint strike fighter is over other competition. people are willing to buy this overpriced goldplated paperweight -- why are they unwilling to buy cheaper american products? f-18 production line is in danger of going stagnant. nge that this does well and other products don't and i argue it is not a coincidence. so why should you care? first of all, arms sales in the currency of international markets is one of the major takeaways of obama's visit -- lifting the arms embargo to vietnam -- that is a big deal.
obama says it has nothing to do with china but i think we can be skeptical of that claim. more broadly, for the obama , securitytion cooperation and building partner capacity -- transferring weapons to other military is the cornerstone of their statutory -- their strategy. there are two other reasons why you should care. first of all, the argument i make will affect how competitive the arms market is around the world and in asia. particularly. thepicture -- that is russian air missile that shot down the malaysian airliner in eastern ukraine. one of the things i will argue is that the better the united states is selling weapons, the less competitive the international arms market is and the less problematic alliteration problems become. i tell people in the defense
it is a rent seeking, threat mongering influence peddling bunch of comparehs unless you them to every other countries defense ministry. the united states is relatively business.in a corrupt 40% of global corruption is associated with the defense trade. i actually think the argument i make here will weigh out some of that. imagine to the region, -- what spratly islands if it is fired as a tanker? again, the arms trade matters greatly for this part of the world. as bob pointed out, asia is buying weapons. and they are importing which equals farming. two things i want to point out here, first of all, the top
level is global demand. asia and the beige area is china. the level of arms imports is the global decision. globally, we are not close to peaking -- to catching up to the cold war. in asia, we have surpassed the level of arms transfers from the mid-1980's. china is a relatively small part of this demand. it is making weapons on its own. the market, in terms of who sells what to whom looks much more different in asia than anywhere else on the planet. the united states has a , andnding lead in non-asia i am excluding china from this for a host of reasons. russia has a massive market share compared to the global position.
more successful at exporting weapons to some of its neighbors, i would not go so far to say that china is an outstanding exporter of weapons. this might interest only me that 80% of china's arms transfers over the past four years have been to three countries. pakistan, myanmar and bangladesh. adon't think it is coincidence that they all are bordering india. area of states that it imports too. marketer is a climbing. we are at 32%. market share is 34%. so even though we have pivoted to asia as a national security interest, we are so much more or dominant in the middle east as opposed to asia. is puzzling, because the united states should be a world leader when it comes to weapons.
the german budget was 100 billion dollars, 50% larger than the entire russian military budget. we spend a lot of money on weapons and that gives us tremendous power. u.s. foreign, a military financing program is the size of venezuela or kuwait's military program. so the amount of money the united states helps other nations by weapons is bigger. we fight a lot of wars and one way to show your stuff works is to use it, operationally. business has been good. how many people here use microsoft word? how many people like microsoft word? two hams are up. there is a reason why you keep using it even though you hate it. he cut everyone else does. that is called the net worth good. gates does well because they sell the software at a premium because everyone has to buy it against you use it and
then it becomes that much more valuable. weapons are like that as well. especially things like the f 35. it becomes more valuable the more people buy it. this leads to monopolies. just ask bill gates or mark zuckerberg. the united states can take all profitst, the super they collect, and use these things to sweeten the pot. when you try to sell weapons to a country, this one happens to be norway, they say we will give you $4 billion and $5 billion worth of transfers. the joint strike transfer is a billion-dollar project. for norway, this is a lot of money. the united states has these tremendous structural advances with selling weapons. the reason why the u.s. likes to do that is because it gives them a tremendous influence.
i could give you some asia examples but i like this one. israel accidentally sold some parts to china -- they were removed from the joint strike fighter program, temporarily. and sure enough, they reviewed the export controls to china. south korea has an f-16 knockoff , it is a trainer but pretty good. try to sell it to pakistan and america said no. so here we are, we go back to my puzzle. if arms sales provide so much american influence and the united states has so many advantages, why are they losing market share? my argument is that there are two different types of weapons in the world. inre has been a divergence the technology that some countries require and other countries require. if you think about ways to think about weapons.
the ambition of a weapon, running the world and projecting , not and how much it costs surprisingly, it goes up and to the right. the more sophisticated it is, the more expensive it will be. aircraft carriers and submarines, the tools of the command of the commons -- the things you need to protect communication. the things that protect free commerce and the transit of trade. these are things that the united states, unique to other countries, specializes in. most other countries want to be left alone. -- weaponry of the close american naval fingers call this anti-access denial. the chinese call it counter intervention. the bottom line is that they don't have to be as sophisticated. you don't need of 35 and
missiles. cheaper to build an anti-access weapon. and more importantly, this area down here, he weapons market is getting more competitive. this area up here is dominated by the united states. amazingant to buy the fighter, there is only one place you can go. not everybody wants a fighter. they just want something to control the airspace. i tried to tell people the difference between the u.s. and other countries, the u.s. doesn't just have an air force, the navy has an air force. and the navy's army has an air force. this is crazy, beyond the scope of any other country on the planet. most countries just want to be left alone. so my colleague and i came up abusedterm that has been , the idea of disruptive
innovation. many of you might be familiar with it. it has been used in the defense department, not always correctly. werence upon a time, there two major motorcycle companies. harley davidson and the fw. ais beautiful creature is harley davidson softail deluxe. it is awesome and it costs a time of money. years, ande of newmont will comes out that is more powerful and that is because harley davidson sold its best product to the highest margins, people who want performance. honda became honda because they found out that it sells inferior products to people who would normally buy motorcycle, they just thought it will be fun and now honda is a world leading country -- leading company. that is the idea, if you serve your best customer, smaller investors can sell a lower
product or a better price and create market shares. example that it goes on all the time in the defense market. the philippines, interested in tying itself to the i've dates, , they wered f-16 very expensive. they ended up buying a south korea model. basically, the united states demands a superlative product and is willing to pay a premium for it. and the industrial conducts supplies the best customer. what does this mean? the united states wants weapons that other states don't want and if that is where the money is then you will see disruption in the market. you inm describing to asia -- there are two different markets. with the united
states, the high-end. japan by some of their stuff, maybe south korea and certainly, australia. but a lot of where the conflict will be is in the lower end, in the anti-access area. the cheaper part. there are lots of people willing to supply that. i will turn to deliveries in asia -- missiles. there is a real anti-shift missile proliferation problem. united states is not participate in this. this is how many units of missiles the united states sells to asia, not including china. 50% market share but in terms of the quality, the trend indicator value, we have over a third of the market share. so we sell better weapons but we sell fewer of them. what's important though, and this supports the argument,
american firms do this because they are making a ton of money. theou can see here, this is revenue of missile exports to asia and it is skyrocketing. this is the ratio of revenue. the ratio of revenue to quality missiles. even though we make skyrocketing profits as a country, the price to quality ratio is escalating. so we are really dominating the top right end of the market. but that is not what people want to buy. let me wrap up. what i'm arguing here is that if we talk about two trends, nationalism could be the oxygen and weapons can be the fuel. and the price of wood has gotten cheaper. the united states is not selling it. and how clearul the united states is about public goods such as free transit of international waters, which a place like vietnam does not care that much about, this
is a trend to watch carefully. with that, i will turn it over to tom. as they said in "monty python" now to talk about something different. i have been focusing a lot on nationalism. the term nationalism is much used and much abused and it has been discussed a great deal, analyses,in various including the wilson center. being used widely in the media. i don't have pretty pictures. i have to hold you enthralled with my narrative. is of the problems we have the hydraulic vision of nationalism. as analism is viewed negative force that comes in, rises like the tide, it ebbs and flows.
i think if you take a look at view,rom this simplistic not much has changed. as you would think. japanesee a look at public opinion polls, they hold feelar polls on -- do you that you are japanese, are you proud to be japanese -- and that number has been static for a couple of decades. we talk a lot about chinese nationalism, when i talk to my and say, isgrew up nationalism new? that is all they talked about in the 1950's and 1960's. so i think we need to have a more differentiated understanding of nationalism. if we stick with liquid metaphors, it has a current, a tide. ,t is going over a surface where there are condors and features. we need to understand that
nationalism is complex and we need to have a more in-depth understanding of nationalism to understand it is going up or down in this simplistic way. my basic argument here is that 2.5-3 decades, the characters have changed in the way which nationalism is discussed in different asian countries. japan, china and south korea. the main focus of my research. i am a japan expert. i do not speak with authority on , but over the last few years and decades, i have been forced to deal with them a lot more. nationalism in one country because otherwise you have a biased understanding of what is going on. the sound of one hand slapping when you look at nationalism in one country.
in any case, nationalism has changed the particular way in which it is linked to other issues in the political agenda. and the interaction between nationalism between japan and the neighbors have changed in ways that i think are rather worrying and destructive. briefly, i should talk about nationalism. it is a form of identity, a collective identity, and it has been the dominant form of identity in east asia since the early 20th century. japan, after the second world war, we had a sharp leverage to where two major currents are trying to find, what is japan all about? i only mention this because i think it is still on the minds of little leaders in which these are issues are very alive.
on the left, a left-wing nationalism, which tried to interpret japanese history and modern japanese history as a warning. they wanted to reject japan's inferior past, they were critical of traditional japan and they were linked to the kind of nation that japan wish to become to the image of japan as a piece nation. obama recently visited the epicenter in most meanings of the term of that national identity, hiroshima. it became a symbol of japanese dedication, trying to learn from its past, to not make war any longer and to serve as a symbol to the rest of the world the principled pacifism. ,his particular vision of japan which is still not dead, by the talk to ordinary
japanese or look at japanese writings, you still find these but therewidespread, is a right-wing nationalism which emphasizes and had a more positive view of japanese inferior past. they had a different understanding of what japanese foreign-policy should be about. japan should work turn -- should return to a great nation. and there was a belief that japan needed to become a strong military power. both to contain communism but also to reaffirm its health. one of the interesting things about both forms of nationalism, both of you japan as a victim. the left viewed japan as suffering from a victimization by the western powers, who waged
a cruel war against japan using a hollow ball -- using a horrible weapon. also, japan being victimized by its own leadership. as aight also views japan victim. a victim of the allied powers and continues to be a victim of the left, who are trying to manipulate and struck japan of the masculinity. most japanese were not that ideologically committed. there was a broad spectrum of people in japan who basically said, japan wants to have fun. andcated to rebuilding enjoying a higher standard of living. ,ne of the important mechanisms which still holds, is that the left and the right cancel each other out.
whenever you have the need to change japanese policy, you had a tendency of people in the center to make an explicit political alliance with those on the right. you needed to have people both -- both on the center and the right to create a winning coalition to push through changes in defense policy. so you have a pattern which the established itself in the 1950's, of whenever you had big changes in japanese defense movey, you would have a also to meet the needs of right-wing political agendas. -- was one of the surest time yous of this, any had major changes in defense policy, you also had symbolic changes to the shrine. in 1985, and in 1996
with half the llam. inzould argue that abe sh fits into this pattern as well. this japanese pattern did not thee problems for much of cold war. and that had a lot to do with the way nationalism was being defined in east asia, the way it played out in the policies of east asian countries. in china, we had a forward-looking view of history of nations based upon maoist ideology. and the particular myth that was is that world war ii had beenese militarism
responsible for -- and therefore, the japanese and china -- and it said into the idea of japanese victimization. the idea that japanese and chinese people were all the victims of militarism, capitalism and colonialism. ways, japan got a pass on these issues until quite late. in south korea, there was strong anti-japan nationalism identities from the beginning. it was one of the central pillars of the administration with anti-communism. but it was not much of a position to push its agenda. the father of the current you had to suppress a
protest and anti-japanese protests for the sake of building closer economic and strategic relations with japan. this gave rise in the korean context of an insurgent vision of korean history. this was referred to by korean which argues that post 1945 -- it is an outgrowth and the continuation of the colonial time. the japanese colonial time. policies of the government and other authoritarian governments part and parcel of korean authoritarianism. so you had anti-japanese nationalism. this change in the 1980's because of a number of secular
trends. by the 1970's and early 1980's, you had a kind of equilibrium which had been reached between the east asian but it began to fall apart in the 1980's. it began with protests which broke out in korea, taiwan and china over reports that japan was planning to revive japanese exports. -- japanese textbooks. for example, instead of the japanese army invading north china in 1930 seven, the japanese army advanced into china. and other sorts of changes. you had a sharp backlash.
and this backlash entered into a new time of japanese-east asian relations which was characterized by the history problems. department, we refer to that as the history problem. why did this happen? this is the point that becomes interesting. he had changes in the way in which national identity was being defined, especially in south korea and china. which made for heightened sensitivity. in china, the post-maoist era. it was looking for a way of holding the country together and legitimizing the chinese communist party, which was no longer wedded to the forward-looking maoist ideology. taking pride in china's past, the glories and accomplishments but also came questions about
the tragedies. a more retrospective view of chinese history. theflection of this was -- there had been no memorial until 1982 commemorating the nanjing massacre. , who was friends studying chinese history at nanjing university, he participated in an oral history project where they gathered chinese history and nanjing in general. chinese opera like, food, customs. one thing they came across was memories of the massacre. and when they wanted to publish their findings, beijing said you
cannot publish anything about the nanjing massacre. that begin to change in the 1980's. that was a byproduct of patriotic education. and got picked up in china you begin to have a pattern social level, the history activists, people interested in chinese history and using it to criticize the chinese government. as well as the state, trying to channel a more retrospective form of nationalism. it began to play a part in politics. you can see that the issue of ,apan and relations to japan informed by a reevaluation and consciousness of japanese imperial atrocities began to
impact policies. -- suffered a great deal of damage because he was too close to japan. i think there are some signs that this continues to play a role today. japan began to respond to the change. japanese business leaders and political leaders and members of the foreign ministry believed that japan needed to respond proactively to this issue. in the 1990's, we saw a series of efforts from the japanese takenment to try and people by the horns and confront the issues. theasian women fund, statement on the end of world war ii in 1995 was the high point of that. this did have some effect. there were some real accomplishments. but unfortunately, they continue to have -- it did not move far
enough and in the 2000's, there was a reemphasize on defense and we began to see a traditional formation on the alliance between the left and the right to try and push through defense reform. and this had the unintended consequence of undermining japan's relationship. and i have been struck again and again how difficult it has been for japanese policymakers to respond to this policy. now, what is disturbing is that in the recent years, and this pushes it up and one might be as aed to view this symbolic tempest in an asian teapot are the atmospheric issues that are increasingly tying themselves to other kinds of issues. once you which are potentially
more disruptive. and the particular concern of this context is the territorial issue. the territorial issue is the dispute japan has with its neighbors, they are not anything new. they date back to the end of the second world war. but during the war, they proved to be manageable. for a variety of reasons. in thessues did move up diplomatic agenda and unfortunately, they have become very closely linked to the nationalist discourse. key moments in this context include when japanese conservatives began to push for a forward leaning position, dr.firming japan's claim to tara shema.
there were a variety of factors that played a role there. it was talked about as being the sense of being a small and insignificant island but in defending korean national honor and national security from japan unwarranted claim in 2005. and while the chinese government has been resisting -- these ideas were picked up by chinese activists going back to the 1960's, in 2012, we had the leaking thernment to the china century of humiliation. saying it had been stolen from china and that china has to defend. it is unacceptable to the chinese people that japan continues to exert control.
so nationalism now has been tight to territorial issues in ways that are taking the history problem to new levels of tension. what does this all mean? what are the implications of what we are talking about in terms of regional security? jonathanrn back to caverley. i will make quick points. some people might think that these are two separate topics. in three very important ways, nationalism and arming intersect , besides the fact that cheap nationalism and cheap weapons is a volatile combination. to do this in the spirit of thomas this presentation, i will move further north. just think, we have not spent a
lot of time thinking about what the implications for overlapping sovereignty disputes are when is becomingct what more competitive and available on the arms market. sayome level, you could anti-access weapons are defensive weapons. they should be stabilizing. everyone is just going to use them to hold onto their particular piece of territory and they should avoid miscalculations. i am less skeptical of that. good at just as threatening communication and maritime trade as they are for defending whatever rock you think is important that week. the other thing i want to point out is that when china looks at the world, when i talked to earlier i talked about in the united states we build
sophisticated weapons and the rest of the world is buying easier weapons that are designed to effectively counter our sophisticated weapons. china is trying to do both things at once and that is hard. anna is trying to counteract amazing american military, a demanding task to begin with. but it has seen the proliferation of missiles and submarines in its backyard. korea,t japan and south but certainly the smaller countries as well. so china is doing what the united states and vietnam are doing at the same time. that is a tough problem. when you have countries trying to do multiple things at the same time, no matter how defense whene weapon might need, you get into the hyper nationalist idea, people start mistaking defense of maneuvers for offensive actions. this is old stuff in my business.
no one has thought about that. offense of lee these weapons? the second point and want to make about nationalism, and this isvery relevant, techno-nationalism. weapons to not just most countries. they are part of the national identity. the ability to defend yourself is a very powerful political materni a source of odernity. and they are spending the amounts of money to produce weapons. so one thing that concerns me is hyper nationalism, when we look at the presidential debate in the united states, it can turn
into a turning inward and protection a listen. production,onomous even though that results in more expensive weapons that could perform worse. so the can to -- so the continued -- will be a problem if they want to build a military that works. american techno-nationalism. one thing the united states should probably learn to live with is the fact that it will never build some brains that will compete against french, russian and maybe japanese submarines of the future. they will not be great at building certain types of missiles. and it should embrace the fact allies actually supply almost all the weapons around the world. it's not just that the united states dominates the trade, other nations like ukraine, the u.k. at israel --
they all produce weapons. is thatrecommendation if they are not buying the f 35, it is much better for a country in this region to buy swedish. it is essentially an american weapon. the united states needs to shift away from its own techno-nationalism and think strategically about what countries around the world are going to buy. will be havinge to swallow our pride and dealing with a strong japanese and south korean techno-nationalism. continue to negotiate how to build weapons while satisfying the primal urge which is not going away. thomas: i will add my thoughts, but quickly, i will try to do this. i'm sure there are a lot of questions in the room. i think the implications of this trend which i am describing for you is obvious but they deserve
to be elaborated upon reflate. for as much of the cold war, japan was removed from the front lines of the conflict. japan was able to view foreign disputes, potential foreign disputes as the fire on the opposite shore. terrible, beautiful and distant. one of the things that has been happening in recent years is that japan is on the front line with regards to east china and the south china seas. at the very big front of the front line is the east china sea dispute. so they have been worried about being entangled with the united states, in a conflict in which they had no direct interest in. for the first time, the united states finds itself inside the
possibility that it might get pulled into a conflict in which it has no interest. that complex would be difficult to manage and is the focal point of chinese and japanese nationalism. the second big problem for us is that we would like our allies, and we are encouraging our allies, to cooperate. they don't think an east asian version of nato will form soon. 1950's, the favorite , and ithim was neato isn't likely. but a greater cooperation is taking place and we would like to encourage it. two of the most important potential form of cooperation, south korea and japan, are deeply divided over the history issue.
so it creates problems for us. what should be done? well, there are all sorts of things that could be done in theory. but in practice, it would be difficult. they just reflect on the politics. obama's visit to hiroshima, you understand the sensitivities. trying to appease domestic interest groups. and the stakes are even higher. in principle, it would be nice to be able to promote reconciliation on these issues. but the requirements for doing so would be there he high. what do i mean by reconciliation? time,ns that, over reshaping national attitudes
towards each other. we have seen this internationally. we have seen this in a european context with the french and germans. angela merkel and president hollande met. with germany and the state of israel. we can see this internally in many countries. so reconciliation can be done. but it has high requirements. it requires a number of things, including mutual interest. we have to be realistic about what are the conditions of which reconciliation can take place. it requires a readiness on both sides, not just one. are reallyapologies
given, and if given, they will not last long unless eventually accepted. it requires a coordinated activity across a range of political domains, not just rhetorical. it requires adjustments in terms of educational policy, commemorative policy. it requires time. ofn you look at these kinds requirements, i think there is the possibility for promoting reconciliation between south korea and japan. they have done some of that. but at this time, they are far apart. encouraged toe get the japanese and koreans together. we had some success last fall. but there are problems. especially the japanese side underues to labor misconceptions about how this works. -- by pushingit it, neither side's own it. thethey can both blame
americans for pushing them. it would have been far better, and in the future necessary, for governments on both sides to take ownership of the project. on the chinese side, i do not see any prospects at all at this point. for any kind of reconciliation, re-shaping our attitude. however, in the long run, -- at least in the short run, we should manage it. one of the things on the practical policy level would be it would be useful to create institutions whereby it will be possible for the u.s. and its allies, not only japan and south korea, to make it more acceptable by having a broader range of countries involved, in which these kinds of issues can be discussed. but i am afraid, to be honest with you, and this is the depressing side of the story, things will probably yet worse
and will need to get worse before the political will to get things better will be found. bob.t me turn it over to our speakerso both for really good presentations. let me ask each of you what is meant to be a question that only brief answers, and then we will turn it to our audience. india is not simply asia's largest arms fire but the world's. arms buyer, but the world's. have on easthis is asia or countries of east asia, including, of course china? but maybe not simply just china. you have done work not only comparedut also
dimensions of asia and europe. looking at this nexus of arms trade and nationalism on regional security, what is distinct today about asia? either in comparison to europe inay or, perhaps, to europe other, more volatile times in european history? anything other than simply that the situation in asia today is more combustible than in europe today? you first. jonathan: great question. one where think about great powers versus not great powers is great powers are in the privileged position where the economic and should tj incentives for producing weapons at home are the same. a huge economy of scale. if you have a big enough budget, you have strong security reasons
for keeping as much of your technology production in-house. u.s. area and the great powers by that definition. japan is not. australia is not. europe is not. none of these countries -- they have to struggle with this idea of "i can build a really good military, or i can support jobs at home and build a not great subs to weapon, rather than buying something off the shelf, and then i am going to bankrupt my foreign minister to create jobs at home." in this case, india is not a great power. it cannot seem to get its act together, though there is a strategic reason. india should have a big enough economy and budget that it should be able to build its own weapons at home. and the financial and strategic weapons are a lot.
but it is not there. it has been a total failure. and india has painful decisions to make about where it buys its weapons from. does it by a from russia? does it buy it from the united states? how on earth can it develop an system?us defense by the logic i was laying out in runningntation, time is out for india. every year, gets harder for the program,mplish even as they try to develop a military to counterbalance china's. thomas: that is a huge question, robert. i appreciate it. it makes me a little more concerned. the thing about europe today is that you have a consensus. an elite trayvon consensus is we do not want to go back to the past.
with me,to have a euro by the way. if you ever look at the euro, it is a nice currency. worth $1.2. the thing about the euro it has no distinguishing teachers except for the european flag and some sort of abstract geographical and architectural features. you do not have any figures. no shakespeare, no goerte. no coliseum or eiffel tower, the no brandenburg gate. a hollowewhat consensus, but we can at least all agree we do not want to go back to what we had before. there are all sorts of potential, including in western could, of disputes you come up with, including some territorial disputes. italy and austria. but the europeans -- west european leaders, east european
is different. the further you go east, the for the -- the further nationalist. east asia looks more like a year up and the old days. ofh the partial exception japan, nationalism has not been discredited in east asia among the elites. again and again, i see this nationalism stand for social solidarity, democracy, standing up with the people. in korea and china and the philippines, in vietnam and so forth. you have a fundamental characteristic. -- there back in time are always differences. itself,does not repeat but as mark twain put it, it rhymes. there are certain semi-charities -- there are certain similarities. in the european context, nationalism ties in with territory in some ways are
disturbing. france and its quest to regain alsace-lorraine. germany and its idea of the reich bringing together the people. serbia finding it totally largeptable that a servings the population is under the control of austria. if you push me in this direction, it looks more like 1914. i become very disturbed. myept like i said in introductory remarks, there are very strong structural centers which make it unlikely. here comes the intersection with jonathan's point of view. one of the problems with the arms trade is we are introducing new military capabilities. those military capabilities, those of us who study
international relations realize, are often difficult to predict. and so you have a war, you do not have a real feedback mechanism. we have not had a great power, especially with war involving naval and air forces involving significant players for a long time. the last time i can think of his 1982, the falkland wars. as these capabilities are acquired, there is the increased inger of miscalculation and which actors may project their desires, driven by domestic political considerations, upon what they think the military outcome will be. that, again, is not a healthy environment. i do not think those things will take place anytime soon. but they do increase the chance for miscalculation and for if they repeat themselves, will become more severe. bob: i am not sure you have cheered me up.
let's go to the audience. we will start right here and then over here. to identify you yourself and keep your comment or question brief, since we have a lot of people here and not a lot of time. >> ken meyer. the, that the united states may be dried into a conflict it does i have much interest in because of alliances , in light of the fact that when we saw in our mutual defense the -- whenpan under japanese administration, and we turned it over to evenese administration though there was strong evidence from china, do you think it was a miscalculation? thomas: it seemed like a good idea at the time. , based onse claim
historical and other features -- look. violence, i would say for the sake of evenhandedness, the japanese legal claim is good. if you try a go to an international court of law. however, the chinese historical argument has some persuasiveness. it is not accidental that japan and forced its claim in nine -- in 1894, 1895. as i sleep a time when china was losing the war. the time whenly china was losing the war. you can understand the argument. in 1960, the run-up to 1968 to 1972, when we look at this -- and i am relying on others' writing for this -- it seems the ,apanese claim was legitimate and the u.s. had strong reasons
to support it. we did not anticipate this -- >> we do not support it? the nuancedake position which, as you know, we do not take any position on who the sovereignty belongs to. however, we would like any disputes over control of the island to be resolved in a peaceful manner in accordance with international law. moreover, we had administered of control over the islands after world war ii, and we then transfer that control to the japanese as part of the route -- reversion of okinawa. all of these things quickly additionally difficult issues because of the potential symbolic importance of the islands, in terms of both japan's claims over its control
thehe other parts -- japanese become concerned that if you turned back, give up on islands, then the chinese demands will not stop there. they will revisit claims to other parts of what is called ishouto,r islands, nanse and potentially back to the ryukyu islands. so becomes not just a question of the senkaku islands, it becomes a question of the okin awa islands. the chinese have implications with taiwan. when he moved into this, the waters become more troubled. not only murky -- i have spoken with chinese academics, including some who have been
appearing in the newspapers, they were saying the japanese gave up on the senkaku islands, would they give up? no. that means that they were wrong on a lot of problems. if that is reflective of the way the chinese thick about these issues, i understand why the japanese would be worried. >> one thing that china, japan, and both koreas have in common are slowing economies, relatively. lead themr economies to spend less on defense because they cannot afford it or more on defense that they can have pride to offset the slowing economy? traditionally, the tie between growth and defense withing is ironclad, and i wouldt is explicit.
say, knowing the south korean defense spending traditions, i see that as a very tight relationship still. i do not -- looking at their white papers and strategic discourse, i do not see them toing a strategic reason necessarily increase more spending as the economy slows. china, because of the fact that its defense industry is essentially state run, even the private firms, might actually ism, to a military keynes depending on the way it deals with its more drastic economic slowdown. studying the chinese defense industry is very difficult. i do not pretend to have any real insight on it. whatvery uncertain about would happen. i suspect, still, to this day, japan and korea's would be
tightly collated to their growth. bob: let's get a couple of questions. we have won over here and one down here. we will take two questions back-to-back. yoyo from hong kong tv. -- after the about president visited vietnam and the trend, what is the prediction of the trend of arms sales and will they buy more arms from the u.s.? let's go ahead and take a second question, here. >> thank you. kai, ands mitsuo japanese native and u.s. citizen. what if south korea goes nuclear? or japan goes nuclear? you talked about arm trade, but
you did not mention anything about nuclear arsenal, so that is number one. number two, some people say the donecentury is going to be by india rather than china. can you comment on that a little? bob: jonathan, you want to start? jonathan: yes. at this stage, what i know about vietnam's explicit defense -- again, not a very transparent regime, when it comes to -- there arening very few products, the name brand products that vietnam has an interest or kimberly of operating, it it is experienced operating soviet and russian weaponry, i do not see that changing. vietnam is a small country with a big strategic problem. the united states is happy to help in the ways it can.
i suspect a lot of this is designed for what i think is a benign thing for the region. control, and communications. sharing of information. water space management. these are crowded waters. having the ability to work together and talk to each other will be important. that is this -- that is something the united states does well and something every country along that spectrum is interested in investing in. in terms of hardware, i do not see much change. speaking of techno-nationalism, the nuclear decision to acquire nuclear can abilities is as much of a nationalist and ideological maneuver as any -- buying a tank or fighter plane. they are fairly separate. korea nationalth project of making a cause i stealth fighter, is that -- quas
i-stealth fighter, if that satisfies national defense, i would rather have that than nuclear weapons. in general, i think they are fairly separate. the taboo and the normative weight and it geopolitical invocations are so massive. on nuclear weapons, just briefly, and in south korea, there are polls which show -- depending on how you question it -- you get the majority saying when should south korea go nuclear? there are some korean elites who think that would be a good idea. most of the ones i talked to in private think it is too problematic. it would create problems with them in terms of relations with not only china but also north korea and the united states as well. i think we can finally find all sorts of ways of reassuring them. in japan, the picture is even
more clear. the japanese public has no appetite for nuclear armament. rationale,strategic by the way, where japan should develop nuclear weapons. the notion that japan should not have nuclear weapons because of his geography and population is a. lots of country, beginning with israel, should not have atomic weapons if you think that way. japanese political calculation is such they will not do it. a range of things the united states can do to reassure its allies. been gavin add m.i.t. has -- add m.i.t. has been researching this. there are lots of ways we can reassure japan about nuclear deterrence and reassure south korea without them actually going full nuclear. india is a great power. i love india. i go to india regularly.
my wife is from india. i still love india. [laughter] >> be careful. [laughter] but -- india has enormous potential and capability, but i have to again forindia has great capacity disappointing. it lumbers forward like an elephant and operates on its own strategic agenda. people from the indian strategic elite, and i have spoken to a few by accident -- they all seem to be related to my in-laws in some way or another -- a country of 2 billion and everybody knows everyone else, it seems. they are not ready to play this kind of role. they are economically focused on pakistan and internal issues. so i do not think they are going to. but at least and maritime issues, partly because of china's pushing into the region,
china's support of pakistan, they are concerned about countering that. in certain areas, we are seeing increased operating -- cooperation. there is room for it. the u.s. and its allies track chinese of rings going through the southeast china sea to the south china sea, and then the indians take over where they have a major base in the indian ocean. it makes sense. it is surprising we do. do more of that. -- we do not do more of that. but i do not see great change in that respect. bob: here and here. than three in a row. michael, retired from the u.s. department of agriculture. i am not sure my question is appropriate, but i will ask anyway. we talk about the u.s. leadership, is there a correlation between our leadership and arms and so on and the fact that in this country itself, education is
failing, infrastructure is failing, health is failing. good produce their weapons, but our people are hurting. --there a connection there that is why i said it may not be appropriate, because we are talking about east asia. but we are talking about the u.s. as a global leader. what is the cost of that? bob: pass it to your right. >> jim here. your map, cuts off. if you go a little further north, there is another country that has an asian component which has lots of funny problems. lots of funny advantages. to what extent is there interaction between japan, korea, china, and russia in asia? bob: in right behind you? formally with the defense department. i wonder if each of you would comment on taiwan's arms defense needs, what it is likely to get from the u.s. and other sources.
bob: why do you not start first, jonathan? jonathan: i will quickly address all three. howcorrelation between sophisticated your manufacturing base, your knowledge economy, and your ability to produce weapons is tight. you can make the argument that american military spending represents opportunity costs, the one of the reasons the united states is so good at building these things is we are really good at building other things that look like it, like software and large industrial projects. it is a tight correlation. is the most successful exporter of weapons in the region. example ofis another i am not sure it is a great power when it comes to arms exports. it does not really have the ability to make its own
products. when ukraine split, it damaged the hearts of the russian defense complex. the sanctions from europe are buildg its ability to weapons. so right now, russia is at the point where it is not as strategic in who is also opens to as it used to be. it is trying to unload as much hardware as possible. china is likely to want to take advantage, because china looks to get the best product from russia and then reverse engineer it. and there is such spectacular corruption in the defense trade ar russia that it is both competitive advantage for russia in this part of the world, but it also really degrades the quality and value of the product being transferred to other countries. basically, most other countries are not willing to sell the product taiwan needs. so it is completely up to the
united states. i cannot even begin to imagine what the united states will decide ultimately about what it exports to the region. joe bosco is the person who can tell us more about taiwan's need. the only thing i will simply say, in terms of nationalism and russia, it is that there has long been a thought in japan -- and one of my dear friends, todo kazuhiko, is that would be natural for japan to reach out to russia in order to weaken the ties between russia and china. china and russia are not necessarily natural allies. in fact, they are natural competitors. friends in the japanese foreign ministry feel we are unnecessarily pushing russia into a corner on crimea
and ukraine and other issues. however, the problem in terms of russian-japanese relations, and we will have more discussions of that in the next couple of months, it is the northern territories. what the japanese call the northern territories and the russians consider the southern kuril islands. for the japanese side, the notion you have to get all four islands back in one sitting seems to be so deeply ingrained and is tied in with a japanese vision of victimization. that is the northern territories are the symbol of russian betrayal of japan at the end of world war ii. that it has hampered their ability to negotiate with the russians. the russians, for their part, have nationals investment in these islands.
so for better or for worse, we have a kind of lock on that particular issue. one thing i simply will say -- i have just been reading in regard to taiwan is that in japan, there is an unfortunate connection between the independence forces in taiwan and japan. it is something which sometimes makes the japanese almost embarrassed about how excited the tire -- how excited the taiwanese are about these connections. i read japanese commentary by the new taiwanese president, and how they mention that she comes from a family that profited from its connections to japan under the colonial regime. suspicious japan a panophilic ja tendencies, like eating the
japanese hillrise bowl. under the current conditions, we are worried these kinds of connections could become even more contentious in terms of sino japanese relations than they have in the past. bob: let's see if we cannot squeeze in one last question. stanley, in the corner. stanley korver. the economy has been touched on briefly. it seems to me, what we are seeing in asia and much of the rest of the world is the sense of people telling their political leaders, "your job is to protect our jobs." we are seeing a growth of economic nationalism. that has not been mentioned yet. i would like to ask the panelists if you feel comfortable in addressing that -- you may not as it is an economic issue. and how that plays into the political system in all these countries.
also internationally. at the g7, the japanese were about the yen value, and we were saying no. because we are afraid of race to the bottom policies. bob: tom, we will turn to you and give jonathan the last word. economicallynk this is part of an earlier question by the general and asking about u.s. leadership and -- it is anon obvious concern. it is a question of priorities. guns versus butter. --luding in non-demographic nondemocratic countries where they went prefer countries focus on things important to them. education, safety, jobs. -- naturalash tendency. in japan, japanese nationalism
has evolved in many forms. in the 1980's, you talk about "my home shugi." the most important thing is "my our a comfortable country. that is something that mitigates toward conflict. it can also create perverse sensitivity, and the question is how well china regard to a silly economy. you have got to bang logical -- solutions, one is spending cooperation with the outside world, and improve the of living. that may have been one of the factors which led to the she's
xiping limp handshake. farng could only go so pushing on the territorial issue because of u.s. support of japan far,e issue and only go so will not become a wedge issue between united take japan, and he was concerned about the slowing economy. that may be a positive thing. on the other hand, we see a tendency to do the opposite, to distract people call a diverse or narrow nationalism, that when the economy goes bad, one way of mitigating pressures is to create an external enemy and project in order to do that. whichry is still out on
direction china will go on these issues. i am not optimistic necessarily. i think we will continue to see china do both, have good relations with japan economically, and also in the south china sea, to push for chinese= sovereignty. the tensions between the two, they seem to be willing to live with. this graphic from , i have good news -- nationalism is what is driving arms productions decisions rather than trying to make economy. muchood news is know how money you are spending on defense, it is a tiny portion of the modern economy, and most of these countries with the exception of russia i do not think they are going to free up oose building more
weapons. the exception is japan, which has a sophisticated defense industry. it would unleash a log economies -- a loss of economies and improve trade if it would sell weapons, and its failure to do so in australia shows there is a lot more to selling weapons of brought. there is politics to it rather than the economic logic, which japan was good on that front. so it is nationalism rather than economic incentives that are driving a lot of what is going on here. mr. hathaway: i want to thank both of you. if you would now join me in a round of applause for our two speakers. [applause] mr. hathaway: we are adjourned.
that area. susan: we are pleased to have joining us from the pentagon admiral john richardson. admiral richardson began his position in september of 2015. he is a naval academy graduate and began his career as a submariner. one of his five children today serves as a naval officer. let me introduce the reporters that won't be asking the questions today. and craigol whitlock. lubold: the defense secretary will be delivering a message. as the chief of naval operations, can you talk about
the proper tone the u.s. wants to take with or continue taking with china as you seek to not provoke, but also send a strong message? admiral richardson: thanks for that. about our we think position in the world and competition, we would like to go right to competitors. as i have settled into the position, there is so much more to play. the rules of the competition have changed, and that shift is as important as any competitors. in particular, the rules with respecter pace of change in the complexity of the situations being trans regional and multi-domain happening in multiple domains at once, we
have got to embrace all that complexity as we address situations around the world, including the south china sea. thehe united states and united states navy is involved in the south china's the, we have got to make sure we keep a long term in mind, that we embrace this complexity and sink broadly as we address these situations. i think to date our position is that we want to establish the conditions on which everybody in that region and certainly globally, because so much traffic passes through that part of the world, can continue to participate and prosper on a level playing field, using a set that allows everybody to participate and prosper to the extent they want to
contribute. the role of the navy is to advocate for that set of rules that for the past 70 years have allowed anybody who wants to participate a chance to prosper. you sit,d: from where what is the risk of provocation? we do anrichardson: awful lot to make sure that that is at a minimum. we do an awful lot with the chinese navy. we have established and agreed upon rule set on which we conduct business at sea, and by and large, the conflict of both the u.s. navy and the chinese adhered to that rule set. we allow our navy and the chinese navy to expand options,
decision leaders as we continue to try to open up this competition without leaving to provocation, without leading to conflict. i would like to follow up on how you described the rules of competitions that have changed and are changing quickly. we also see that with russians and the iranians in the gulf. last month there was an extraordinary close call between russian fighter jet in the baltic sea and the uss donald cook, which was on a routine mission there. the fighter jet came within a few feet of the ship. more of theseing instances, not only with ships, but u.s. military aircraft in asia, but also on our own borders with the russians in parts of europe. the competition seems to be heating up, but the rules are a little unpredictable.
avalis the chief of neighbo operations -- i understand the need to look at the big picture -- that how does the navy protect itself and figure out how to respond to situations like that? we are richardson: putting a lot on the plate of commanding officers, so it is a essential we choose the best people to be in those positions who are making those decisions, sometimes on very short notice. when you -- you brought the situation of the close passing of the russian aircraft, that commanding officer had an awful lot to deal with in a short time, and so that brings up another important dimension. we are going to be operating in a decentralized fashion and so understanding all the way down to that commanding officer on that ship, what are the rules his roles ine terms of making sure that his crew in his people are
protected, and then preventing unnecessary escalation, unnecessary miscalculation. it is an awful lot of responsibility on those commanding officers. so there is that dialogue throughout the chain of command to understand where we can take risk,where we cannot take what the boundaries are in terms of his ability to respond to these crises, what information i have, to do exactly what they are doing right now, handling these situations very professionally, unnecessary escalation. we need to ensure that those other competitors, whether it is the russians or the iranians, chinese, whoever is out there, they also understand and understand the importance of behaving according to those rules as well. when you come as close as that raft came to the donald
cook, your margin of error is so small you could get yourself into an undesired situations very easily. we need to continue to have that dialogue as well. to follow up for viewers, when they see a video of that of an aircraft coming within 30 feet of the ship, that is obviously -- how does the commanding officer respond? what are their options? they do not want to shoot it down and cause an international thedent, but are they at mercy of these risk-taking competitors? are you confident your commanding officers have the tools to respond to protect themselves and their crews in a situation like that? admiral richardson: i'm very craig,nt that they do, they have a lot more information that would be available from a photograph. they have got just about all of the tools, decision assistance
that they need, right there organically, on the donald cook, or instance cannot to make those types of decisions. ofy're very well informed the risks. they understand clearly there need to protect and defend themselves and their crew, so i am confident they have the tools they need and that they have the training and that their mind is right to make those decisions. 4whiskeyspap susan: there was the iranian incident with the captured sailors. i know it is under investigation. that,s the timetable for given that this has actually become a discussion in the presidential campaign this year? and what extra pressure is there on the commanding officers of these ships, knowing these videos make their way to the internet and their decisions are second-guessed?
admiral richardson: ok the behavior of the iranians in that incident was a violation of international law. those ships had a right to be , and boardinge those chips and seizing those ips and -- sh seizing those sailors was against international law. it is in final review right now, and i expect us to be able to tell the whole story of our side, the lessons learned, and the actions we are taking to prevent any recurrence of that. susan: and what about the pressure on the commanding officers? admiral richardson: nothing about that incident specifically increases the pressure on the commanding officers. 's are keeping a log of things in balance party. they had this incident in the
back of their mind, but they also have the donald cook and these other incidents. it is essential we choose the right people, that we train them properly, we support them with great equipment and they are highly trained to give them everything possibly to handle these situations. mr. lubold: the shift was there amid concerns that the russian submarine activity has increased to the extent of more than anybody has seen since the cold war. i understand that you have said we need -- the navy needs to relook at the summer requirement. i wonder if you could explain what your thinking is there. admiral richardson: in terms of read looking at the requirements, the requirement for undersea capabilities, submarines and undersea
capabilities, is a subset of an effort we are in the middle of right now, calling it our for structure assessment, but it is a review of the security environment that demands on u.s. navy in this particular cake, as a member of the joint force, to confront what is a very dynamic security environment. we do this type of assessment. updated it a couple of times. when we did that assessment, situations like research in russia, situations like isis were not in the calculation. when you go to the issue of pace where we have major players in the security environment, major challenges, so we are doing an assessment, is the plan for the navy the one that is best for
getting to the security environment? part of it will be an important element of that study. mr. whitlock: you are seeing that the united states is going back to a great power environment. speaking broadly for the last 25 years since the end of the cold war, the navy has had freedom of navigation around the world. now it is seeing some pushback, seeing some challenges from russian chinese native navy, irani and navy, and in strategic waters. in the yearsdly, ahead how do you see that changing? you said there is a strategic review underway, but for viewers, can they expect in the next years in terms of direct challenges to the u.s. navy from around the world? admiral richardson: you have
challenged me to answer this from a broad perspective, and when we talk about great power competition, one of the things that defines a great power is that they can be competitive, be a player across a wide spectrum of national power. so when we think about great powers, i would say russia and china, they are able to participate and compete not only in militarily, which sometimes we get focused on, i also economically, also from a diplomatic perspective, they can compete in the information domain, and so there is a much broader spectrum of engagement with these great powers. the military element certainly there is a security aspect of what we do. to defend america and protect our vital interests around the world. one of those vital interests is protecting access to markets,
access to sea lines of communication. ,hose maritime super highways over which 90% of our trade rides, we are a maritime nation, and it has been our consistent policy for the navy to protect market so to this we can continue to prosper. as we move forward to the recent the south china sea is so important is about 1/3 of the world's trade travels to that body of water. that includes a lot of american goods, trade. it is critical to our prosperity. as we move forward over the next sees him a i think you will that competition across a broad spectrum of the national power continue. the chiefe my goal as of naval operations, and i said before our navy would provide more options to our national decision-makers, particularly in
the other areas of national power, and we allow the military element to guarantee our security, but also enable our prosperity, which goes back to advocating for that rule set that allows us to continue to prosper. mr. lubold: i think most americans over the last couple -- have access to international markets, that there is nowhere that americans do not have access on the ocean. should they take that for granted? to what degree will there be a pushback that in the coming years? admiral richardson: it is hard to judge anybody content. from the capability standpoint, you can see nations like china and russia are returning back to sea for the first time in 25 years.
there's the competition now for maritime superiority. it is our job if we are going to enable peaceful resolution of conflicts on terms that are acceptable to us and our allies, that we have got to have a sufficient military capability that we would deter any kind of a conflict and enable peaceful resolution of those disputes. susan: nine minutes left. mr. lubold: admiral, i want to ask a specific version, of a question, us get smarter on the navy's readiness issue, your ability to provide personnel and resources and ships to do all the stuff you need to do. on a day in which it sounds there was an unfortunate incident today involving two f -18's, somebody told me as an example, only about 37% of super
hornets our mission capable. more broadly, can you talk about the challenges you face with readiness and what you need to do to fix the issue? admiral richardson: sure. gordon, we are coming out of a time of incredible operational tempo, and the entire joint force. we are not alone there. in terror joint force after a decade or more of war has been first very hard. one is we have had to a deft and make sure we can address the wars we ared the involved in right now, while also maintaining ourselves ready for higher end conflicts should does arise. as i go back to the idea of deterrence, the surest way to did to her conflict -- to deter conflict would be to make it does not begin.
i want to sure everybody listening that those navy forces that are forward deployed are fully ready for the wolfsburg the challenges they could face. i will not deployed forces that are not ready for all the challenges. that would be irresponsible. the -- where are is the readiness debt, and that comes in the navy context from those reinforcing forces that would be provided in the event of a longer-term higher and conflict. we are postures and present around the world to be able to respond quickly to any kind of contingency or crisis that may arise. there will be the initial response, but within a short time, there has got to be a reinforcing forces that comes from here in the united states, and that is where right now we are seeing our readiness challenges, the readiness of those reinforcements to go out
and prevail in some kind of a long-term conflict. absolutely critical to bringing in a suitable, desirable and to those types of -- end to those types of conflicts. we have been working hard to maintain that readiness, even as we sustain a high operational tempo. i'm not making the progress i would like to make, but it is collocated. there is more to this than just funny. in the last couple budget cycles, we have prioritized readiness in our budgets, and it has been well supported. but at some point you have got to address the capacity of the depots to do the maintenance of those aircraft to get them back on the flight line ready to fly, and we are continuing to work our way out of a bit of a backlog there. >> last week the navy had a
meeting of all its admirals and senior executives, civilian executives. you sent out an unusual message before the meeting in which you talked about this is an annual meeting to talk about the navy's strategic priorities, but you were emphasizing the issue of ethnic and personal integrity and the need for the navy senior .fficers to reflect on that there had been several cases over the past year involving investigations into personal is and one in particular has been an ongoing investigation into a contracting scandal, an agent involving the seventh fleet. i wanted to ask you, how is this topic discussed at your meeting with your fellow admirals? was there agreement that there was a deeper problem in the navy, or that these are isolated cases? admiral richardson: i want to thank you for sort of being part of this conversation and making
sure that we do this self-examination. when i talk about the strategic direction forward, that is articulated in a document called the design for maintaining maritime superiority, which was issued last january, we talk about the strategic environment, and we have done some of that already. lines of about four effort that we will take to address that environment. and then we talked about those lines of effort resting on a foundation of what i call core attributes, integrity, the attribute of accountability, initiative, and toughness. so that we ensure to the greatest degree possible that our behaviors as an organization, all the way down to our individual behaviors, are consistent with our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. the message that i sent out, which has been in the