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>> good morning. welcome to hudson. think you for coming. nice turnout this morning. our topic this morning is what the united states should do to help defend taiwan. we have three very well-qualified people here. we hope from the introductions you have received when you came in has further accounts of their impressive achievements, because i'm just going to read you a
sort of outline, a sketch. i have a few remarks, then i will turn it over to our guests. a question is, what the united states should do to defend taiwan? i could end this conference right now and say everything that has succeeded in maintaining taiwan's freedom and security, but we need to be more specified than that. we have a distinguished group to give their opinions on that subject. we will give our view of the threat and how the u.s. has addressed it so far.
current policy has sold to make china a stakeholder in international liberal order. china would have a stake in such him him characteristics of the current system as freedom of navigation in international waters, respect for international agreements it had ratified, the rule of law, as well as respect for other state sovereignty, to name just a few. to encourage chinese rulers to identify their nation's own interest with that of the international order, level officials from both china and the united states have met since the nixon administration. with u.s. support, china joined the world trade organization in
2001. in 2016, the people's liberation army navy participated for the second time in the large naval exercise that the u.s. conducted at the pacific rim states. the list of u.s. overtures to china is a very long one. no joyful music has followed these. quite the opposite. in viewing its relations with other states, beijing's foreign minister at the time -- i gave the wrong pronunciation, but i hope you will excuse me -- told senior officials at a meeting in
hanoi on the subject of chinese claims in the south china sea were raised, this was a quote, "china is a big country, and other countries are small countries, and that is a fact." the chinese brand of exceptionalism reinforces this assertion that mike makes right. the qualification of chinese characteristics has become commonplace in international lingo. the press and scholarly publications have reported on a order with chinese characteristics. foreign aid with chinese characteristics.
environmental law with chinese characteristics. nuclear deals with chinese characteristics. the list of accepted international practices with chinese characteristics is long. it shows that china's exceptionalism lies not in its adherents to principal or law or acception of international behavior, but rather its deflection, it's departure from these. the u.s. policy toward china, i believe has failed spectacularly. china's actions show that it sees us as a strategic competitor. we have chosen to see china as a large market that can be could build, -- cajoled, persuaded, encouraged into joining us as a
defender of international security and economic stability. u.s. policymakers hope that the policy of trade between china and the u.s. and the accompanying economic progress from the former would remold chinese rulers to look and think and act more like us. the evidence does not support this hope. historical evidence teaches us the opposite lesson. prior to world war i, britain and germany were major trading partners. this had no discernible effect on the entity that grew between the two states. british leaders regarded germany's rise as a threat, while germany saw britain as an
obstacle to their ambitions. world war i cast a dim light on the argument the british writer and labor mp norman angle made in his book. his argument was the trade between economic powers made war pointless and futile. world war i was pointless, but trade did nothing to stop it. i hope that they next u.s. -- the next u.s. administration will understand that our fate as a great power is inseparable from america's continuing role as a great power in the pacific, and that our future is both morally and strategically linked to taiwan's. i hope that u.s. leaders will see things as president george w. bush did when he said early in his presidency, that he would
do whatever it took to assist the people of taiwan in protecting themselves. for now, the expression coined during the current u.s. administration, strategic patients, governs washington's policy toward china. on the longer-range strategic horizon are more artificial islands, more confrontations with the south china seas, larger and more technologically capable fleets and a not unfounded hope that usc power -- u.s. sea power continue a slow but steady retreat. bound by enormous trade flows, leaders of both states are willing to let the clock keep
taking -- ticking. referring to the american civil war, lincoln wrote that both may be, but one must be wrong, as in the dispute between the states. the same applies to american and chinese leaders view of what is a strategic competition. enough from me. rick fisher is a senior fellow with the international assessment strategic center. he has worked for the center for security policy, jamestown foundation, the u.s. house of representatives, policy committee, and heritage foundation. he is the author of "china's military monetization." i will introduce the other
speakers when rick concludes his remarks. mr. fischer: at a younger, more carefree but distant place in my career, i had the pleasure of working for seth. it is always a pleasure to join him at hudson, as it is to join my esteemed colleagues, ian and paul, on this panel today. i understand, because it is better to point things, and the podium would block the view of people on the right side it is not because i'm a conservative and biased toward the right. what i thought i would do today
is basically run through quickly the threats that taiwan faces, and then list my prescription for what the united states should do to preserve peace on the taiwan strait. it did work this morning. there is a new thing we call cyber warfare. [laughter] i am not known to be particularly friendly towards the major exponents of cybercrime. here we go. before going into the threats
and the prescriptions, i think it is important that we disperse the elephant in the room, and the donkey, too. with that, briefly look at what our presidential campaign so far portends for american policy toward taiwan. my conclusion is that there is a that chance of basic policy stability. if one looks at the republican side, the candidate, donald trump, has yet to make any specific statements about taiwan. but one of his advisers, just introduced earlier this week, peter navarro, has written some very positive things about what american policy towards taiwan should be.
taiwan is a pro-u.s. ally, and rights that we should sell submarine technology, allow taiwan to participate, and pursue better regional integration between taiwan and our isr networks in the region. to this we must act, a very impressive and strong 2016 republican party platform. and a very clear statement that china violates principles, that the united states should defend taiwan. a very useful clarification of american intent. on the democrats side, we have recently had a very positive statement from the foreign policy director of the clinton campaign, secretary clinton supports the current administration's policy on china
and taiwan and will continue to do so. pretty clear. and to that, we must add traditional long-standing support for taiwan in congress. if the status quo with our relationship with taiwan continues, that may suffice for the near-term, but it simply will not suffice for the medium and long-term. here is what we are up against. china has not abandoned its long-standing objectives of defending taiwan -- of -- as taiwan persists in deepening and broadening its democratic culture, china's communist party views the democracy of taiwan increasingly as an existential threat.
this is a burgeoning military threat that has continued to build against taiwan over the last two decades. more recently, the pla has reorganized. this reorganization enables the pla, when it is all consolidated, to undertake far more rapid, surprise and combined arms operations against taiwan. china is also trying to neutralize south korea, isolate
japan, which are part of the goals to surround taiwan militarily, and divide washington from allies. cold war is really showing its ugly face again in the form of the real possibility that china and russia could again come together in militarily significant ways, that would enable both to pose very significant threats to american interests, very quickly. the enduring threat. china wants taiwan because it is that the nose of the first island chain. taiwan blocks china's global projection. china wants taiwan.
it shows that taiwan is astride some of the deepest waters in the pacific. china wants to base their ssp ends near the steep water. these other nuclear systems there. when you have taiwan, you divide the first island chain. taiwan, as i mentioned, is becoming more deeply concerned with pursuing a taiwan identity, taiwan's democratic culture is deepening, chinese communist party is increasingly threatened by this. the new theater commands are depicted here and show how china can very quickly globalize -- mobilize forces from four of
these commands to form very quick joint operations against taiwan. military threats in taiwan have grown, and could increase dramatically in the coming decades. for example, the pentagon says the high estimate of short-range ballistic missiles pointed out taiwan is about 1200. that is counting the current missiles, the ds 15, one missile per missile carrier. the next generation srbm's that the pla has already developed allow for the carriage of two missiles, five missiles, or eight missiles. do the math, and it very clearly -- if the old missiles are
replaced by the new missiles, or the new missile carriers on a one-for-one basis, the potential for the srbm threat to grow from 4000, to 5000 is clear. estimates from the region state that by 2020, the pla could have 1500, fourth-generation fighters. taiwan's fighter force is probably going to remain stable at about 400. it should grow. it can be made more effective. that is probably where it is going to stay for a while. finally, the pla has been working very hard to achieve the ability to actually invade taiwan. if you look at the formal amphibious course, what is in the navy, what is in the air force, the pla could probably put about two divisions on taiwan.
but what we don't look at is the informal list that the pla could call upon. hundreds, maybe thousands of river barges of the kind that were just used to build new basis. and amphibious rejection that i term the largest since inchon. add all of that to the amphibious capability, and estimates in taiwan hold back today, that they could project 12 divisions -- toward taiwan, and that is only going to grow. the south china sea and east china sea are very central to china's long-term strategic ambitions. in order to secure ssp ends, assure the projection of its feature amphibious maritime power projection fleets into assure access to deep space, china needs to -- and to assure access to deep space, china needs to control the south china
sea. here is a depiction from a chinese source of how controlling the spratly islands group assists china's production of power. -- projection of power. in the east china sea, control of the senkaku daiyukai to threaten another island group, japan's ryukyu islands, whereas to control the spratly islands would control taiwan's axis from the south. china and russia is pitted against the united states is gaining steam. i believe it is at the end of may, china and russia held their first missile defense command post exercise. when you cooperate in missile defenses, you must immediately question whether they have also
contemplated cooperation in missile offenses. in 1969, the united states signaled with its nuclear forces against former soviet union to prevent the soviet union from using nuclear weapons against china as part of ongoing order conflicts at the time. i don't think the russians have forgotten this. and the possibility, tilting against the united states with their combined nuclear forces to attack taiwan is not unrealistic. china has and russia's military
exercises are increasing in number. putin has allowed for a new generation of military sales, and high technology corporation in terms of space, airliners, heavy helicopters. this is going forward. what should the united states do? at a public level, we should recognize and state that however appropriate, that taiwan remains a critical political and military asset to the united states. a democratic taiwan is proof to
all ethnic chinese that political and economic freedoms could coexist. yes, this does undermine the legitimacy of the chinese communist party. it is probably the only real lever that the united states has to help chinese themselves decide that they deserve a better political system. we should also recognize that taiwan remains the capstone of the island chain. if you lose that, the chain is divided. america's allies are divided. and china can intimidate and isolate them much more readily. secondly, we should state that china's accelerating military threats to taiwan trigger policy
causes to the policy track. their techniques make clear that the diplomatic relationship with china is based on peaceful resolutions of relations with taiwan. this is not happening. i'm not saying that we need to reverse the deal made with china, that we recognize china and de-recognize taiwan, but i am saying we can do a lot more to recognize taiwan's political accomplishments, and step out far more in the ways in which we helped taiwan to deter attack. my list would be to enhancing taiwan's major deterrent, the sale of submarine technology will help taiwan to achieve a far greater deterrent effect. this would allow taiwan to have
a -- mount a small operation of f-16s that could add a minimum retaliate in the event of an attack against taiwan's islands in the south china sea. i would suggest that helping taiwan to deter such a chinese attack in the south china sea is in america's interest. we do not want china to be rolling over the rest of the islands. we should move quickly to help equip taiwan with new asymmetric military capabilities, new guided artillery shells that can take out aircraft and ships, as well as ground targets. new small and expensive but long-range cruise missiles. the warhead is only measured in tens of kilograms, but they can travel 900 kilometers, and hit a target very accurately and precisely. and it are cheap at $300,000.
for the price of an f-16, taiwan can buy scores of these missiles. make it a priority to assist taiwanese aircraft, perhaps a new fighter aircraft the united --. the united states needs to move quickly to expand its own capabilities in the region. we need missiles. the inf treaty no longer serves american interest here it best. that united states requires an intermediate range missile to help deter china. we should put them on arsenal ships, but the smaller ones on arsenal aircraft. create arsenal submarines. create a wall of missiles along
the first island chain to make it impossible for china to conquer the first island chain. and then we need to modernize and even expand our own nuclear deterrent capabilities, so that we had a sufficient capability in the event of a chinese russian nuclear tilt, or the attempt to blackmail the united states. i would include tactical forces to the american forces in asia. finally, let's consider another major arms package for taiwan. the example of george w. bush's arm sales package certainly inspires, but a follow-through for that package does not.
enter -- invite me back to the hudson institute. it is a pleasure to be back, especially on this panel with rick and paul. i have been asked to talk about the arm sales aspects. when we consider arms sales to taiwan, it is useful to consider it on a timeline, even if it is on it -- artificial. if we look back 15 years into the past, and we think about where we were with taiwan in the summer of 2001, and we compare that with where we are today, we may gain a useful sense of perspective. in 2001, taiwan's economy was
strong, and the military was very confident. the u.s. was announcing new arms sales to taiwan on a regular basis, every 3-6 months, depending on the year. at that time, the taiwan missile crisis was very fresh in everybody's mind, as the crisis happen in 1995 and 1996. there was no question whatsoever that the united states was living up to the letter and the spirit of the law, of the taiwan relations act, and president reagan fixed assurances to taiwan. there was great reason for optimism. that time, the prc economy was about $1 trillion in nominal gdp, making it the sixth largest in the world.
their military budget at that time was only about $20 billion. they had only 350 inaccurate elastic missiles pointed -- ballistic missiles into that taiwan. if we fast-forward and think about where we are 15 years later, taiwan's economy is still strong, but it is nowhere near as strong as it once was. the military is still cautiously optimistic, but they are nowhere near as confident as they once were. there is one u.s. arms sale announced to taiwan that came last december after a four-year, three-month arms sales freeze. you can imagine how that impacted their confidence and morale. on the other side of the taiwan strait today, china has the world's second-largest economy, over $11 trillion economy, second in the world behind the united states.
if you go for parity, the economy is even longer. -- stronger. the military budget is much higher. the trend we are seeing is not a positive one. the question then becomes, what could we do to arrest the trend, or at least to make it look a little more favorable to the interests of the united states and our allies? not only taiwan, but other allies in the region, and help arm sales play a role in doing this. when we think about arms sales, and what we should sell to taiwan, it may be useful to have a timeline and a sense of perspective, but it may also be useful to think about all the details that are involved. all the difficult questions that get asked all the time. it is a very complex issue and has only become more complex over time. just to give you a flavor of how complex this can be, i prepared 10 questions. these are not all of questions
that there are, but 10 of them. i would ask you to think through these in your minds, as i ask them. how you answer them to yourself will tell you a lot about what you think we should sell to taiwan, what might be helpful. question number one. what type of a war does taiwan need arms sales for the most? for an invasion scenario, a blockade scenario, or maybe something less black and white. question number two, when does taiwan need to be the most ready to fight? in other words, wendy you think china is the most likely -- when do you think china is the most likely to attack taiwan? soon, like any day now? maybe, maybe one year to five years into the future? much later on, like 5-15, or 20 years into the future, or perhaps, never at all?
question number three. do you believe certain weapons systems are inherently offensive, and escalate tory in nature? the believe there are others that are not? question number four. do you believe that taiwanese and american strikes on pla bases in china are necessary, or do you believe that a winnable war could actually be fought and limited to the waters of the taiwan strait? another way to ask this question is to say, do you think that if taiwan was attacked, they should then retaliate and take the
fight to the enemy, or should taiwan wait, the invaded and try to defeat them on the beaches and in the densely populated taipei suburb and elsewhere? question number five. do you think the united states is going to come to taiwan's rescue if it is attacked? if so, at what stage in the fight would it be? would it be before, or after zero day? how long would it take to get sizable, sufficient u.s. forces into the theater? bearing in mind that the u.s. southern fleet in tokyo bay is 1300 miles away. they're in mind that the pacific command is 5050 miles away. it's a long way to go. question number six. do you think taiwan's military budget is too big, too small, or just right? the follow-on to that question is, do you imagine that you actually know what taiwan spends on defense? it has never been studied. nobody actually knows what
taiwan spends on defense. question number seven. which service or branch in taiwan is your favorite. who do you think is the toughest or the best and most important -- the army, the navy, air force, marines, or the missile command? who should have priority when we consider our sales? question number eight, and this is related. which chinese weapons systems, in your minds, are the most menacing to taiwan security? holistic missiles, cruise missiles or drones -- ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or just drones, mines, or helicopters, or pla marines and paratroopers? maybe it is amphibious ships. maybe it is something else. number nine. in your view, are taiwan's security services doing a good job catching spies and protecting secrets, and how do
they compare the counterintelligence and counterespionage services of our other allies, south korea and japan? question number 10. if you were the president of the united states, who would you want your arms sale to affect, and how would you want them to be affected? would you want it to strike fear into the hearts of beijing, the show resolve, or would you want to convince the top leadership of the chinese communist party that is no big deal? they should not cancel the next summit meeting with you. do you care about resolve and morel -- morale? do you see what our other allies have? or is your priority making congress happy or the u.s. defense industry or the pentagon. these are some of the many questions related to taiwan arms sale.
there are so many things to consider. i should have prepared a slide, i apologize. but it looks like this, it you have it. if you look at the sheet, you will see in recent years we have sold a lot of arms to taiwan. the obama administration has done a good job of providing taiwan with a lot of defensive capabilities. we are talking about very large arms sales packages. i think folks in the obama administration are proud to have sold taiwan more in terms of dollar amounts than previous administrations. but what they have also done is embrace a policy whereby we
freeze arms sales to taiwan for extended periods of time, let all the platforms that we want to sell taiwan accumulate, and then announce massive packages to congress, at times when it is calculated to be the least offensive to beijing. and the most favorable, therefore, to u.s. prc relations. this approach to arms sales in my opinion has three negative effects. the first problem is that it signals to china that we care more about our relationship with them then we care about meeting our commitments to taiwan in a regular reliable fashion. this can only consolidate the zero-sum approach.
this can only encourage bad behavior. the second problem is by allowing arms to accumulate and then announcing these massive multibillion dollar packages, in taiwan it has the effect of giving taiwan's parliament, media and public sticker shock. the u.s. argument said, we care about you guys, we really do, look at how many billions of dollars we are willing to sell you. the people of taiwan, when you say that, it seems that we are doing it for profit, and not as a matter of principle. it seems as if the white house is a puppet of the military-industrial complex. we are not selling arms because we're set -- caring about taiwan's democracy. we are not doing it because we care about taiwan's continued freedom and security. the third problem with this approach to arms sales is that it disrupts taiwan's ability to manage its own defense budget. they have a one-year, five year,
10 year, long-term defense budget, which affects the strategy. but if they cannot know in advance if the u.s. is going to sell them weapons are not, and at what level, and what weapons and how many and when, then they cannot do their strategy very well. it creates uncertainty. it creates tension in our relationship, between the pentagon and their administrative national defense. it reduces morality taiwan -- morel in taiwan -- morale in taiwan. the last thing we want to do is to pile onto their strategic challenges, but that is what we are doing with this approach. what i would recommend, and it is an easy fix, to go back to
the pre-2008 system. if you have a list, you can see what that used to look like, whereby we announce arms sales to congress in a very regular fashion and generally one platform or maybe two platforms at a time. no one gets sticker shock, and it is more reliable. they have more packages, more frequently. as for the weapons themselves, when we think about what we should sell taiwan, what does taiwan need the most, their treasury is not unlimited. our ability to manufacture things is not unlimited. we have many other allies that we have to worry about as well. i would argue taiwan is facing the greatest peril. when we think about arms sales, they can have three effects. strategic, operational, and tactic. strategic matters most, because it is at the strategic political
and military leadership, policy makers. this is the level where words are decided. this is the level where wars are presented and deterred. if you believe that war can be prevented and should be prevented, and we ought to be thinking about how we can do that, then this matters. president xi jinpeng in beijing, this is an example of a strategic level decision-making. and of course the president in taipei. these are the two people you want arms sales to speak to, albeit in different voices. these are the people who at the end of the day will be making the most important decisions for
years and years to come. their decisions are going to be every bit as political as he ought to be -- they ought to be. at the operational level, you have a much bigger audience come up but it is still very much a vip only show. you have war planners on both sides of the taiwan strait. the top generals and admirals. there are not many of them that ultimately make the decisions or war plans. ideally, we should be thinking about whether or not our arms sales give the pla guys in china a huge headache, and if they give the folks at mnd in taiwan a helping hand. another -- another level is the tactical level. that is huge. everybody on both sides of the pacific and both sides of the taiwan strait looks at and analyzes and takes over the latest system, and where the fire power is, and what its range is, and how fast you can reload it. all those types of things, that are interesting to look at. so, we all do. at this level, the level that i
met, and that i think most are at unless there is a four-star general in the room, this level is the least important. it is the least important, because key decisions, the decisions that affect war and peace, are not made by people at the tactical level. they are not made by unit commanders or research analyst. we need to be thinking about strategic arms sales. we need to be thinking about them strategically. it is quite easy. the president of taiwan is on record publicly asking for four things. new naval surface ships, new submarines, new air defense capabilities, and new cyber security capacity. what does that do to our options, what should we prioritize? if you believe in strategic arms sales and not just tactical and operational, that means we are
talking about aegis destroyers. i think that is what taiwan is asking for, and have been asking for for over 15 years. we are talking about, in terms of submarines, program management support for the defense submarine program. taiwan is starting to build their own, but they need u.s. technical support. they do have fine engineers. what they need is program management support. the pentagon has limited, if not restricted altogether, any u.s. license or corporations to help. that is a huge problem, in my opinion. and air defenses. this opens up a wide range of options. you could have an side ballistic missile defense systems, now trading with south korea. you could have new patriot missiles.
you could do new f-16 sales, and future f 35 fighter sales to taiwan. these are the master keys of air defense. this is the future of air defense. this is what matters the most. for cyber security capacity, this would include things like joint training and exercises between our cyber command, and taiwan's cyber command or cyber army. there's a lot of options that are there. whatever we sell taiwan, or don't sell, i think it is important that we always are cognizant of the signals we are sending to beijing and taipei when we freeze arms sales and on the sales. i think it is also important that we do many other things with taiwan, and we don't just fixate on arms sales, because arms sales alone will never be able to maintain the balance in the taiwan strait. we need to be thinking about, doing more politically, diplomatically, more with trade,
more with economies, more with the systems of education. we need to do things at all levels, from political to security realms. china's militarism, without a doubt, is making asia more and more dangerous. we need to be thinking about strategy, developing strategy, developing new approaches, and looking critically at the approaches that we have adopted so far, and asking ourselves the question, if they are not working, we are not getting what we want, not going the way we like it to go, should we try something new? i would argue we should. i will turn it back over to seth. thank you. [applause] seth: ian, thank you very much. our next and final speaker this morning is paul. he is an old friend, as if everybody else on panel.
he is president of global strategies and transformations, a professional services firm that provides national security strategic analysis, concept development, military expertise, defense industry strategic planning, and applied history as a planning tool. a novel idea. after paul is finished with his remarks, we will have a chance for an exchange here and questions, and then possibly answers. paul: thank you. i'm glad to be here. i think we have a lot in common. like you, i came to listen, so here we are.
the hudson institute has asked me to provide first, an overview analysis of u.s. policy and strategy concerning cross strait relations in taiwan policy, and an evaluation of both including the good and bad aspects, and recommendations for improving such policy. i have 15 minutes to do it. there's always a q and a section. i realize these are grand strategy questions, having as much to do with global economics and american ambitions for a strategic partnership with china, but it is increasingly evident that military shortfalls on our side, and when i say our side i mean the u.s., taiwan, and japan, are driving politics in the wrong direction by encouraging the prc and the belief that not only are we not serious about defending taiwan, but that we are increasingly incapable of doing so.
therefore, i would like to address the broader questions by concentrating on military issues that have developed as a result of increasing the contrary american strategic choices. with regard to what to do answering that question depends on what is going on. in the words of seth, this has been in my view, very critical. it has been a spectacular failure, underscored by an inexplicable military and political languor. in order to answer some of these questions, i wanted to talk about eight issues. these are the eight issues. there is a plan, but not much of a strategy. a strategic u.s. taiwan china triangle, the triangles politics, time is a factor, the reality of geography as a
determinant of strategy, american interests, japan as a committed participant, and five prescriptions. there is a war plan, but not much of a strategy, in my mind. the politics of the u.s. taiwan china triangle have forced us into a false logic, doing as little as possible militarily. in my mind, this reveals the political military disconnect at any attempt of a viable strategy suffers accordingly. the result is the awkward and contorted political stance of defending taiwan by not angering the prc. its corollary is the faulty logic of easily controllable escalation, and a pang conclusion that the defense of
taiwan against mainland china would be easy, sort of an afterthought. this comes in the face of the implications of escalations temptation without deterrence. nuclear cyber and space warfare with civilizational implications. the strategic u.s. taiwan china triangle, over time we consider this to be all about taiwan. so, the u.s. and china planning to defend or retake taiwan. over time, those planning cases have become bilateral, not trilateral. two antagonists earlier in this period after the cold war, they could not reach each other and it was easy for the u.s. the u.s. could keep taiwan and china apart, when they could
reach each other, and it was easy for the u.s. then, the u.s. concluded it could deter and/or defeat china. and then we came to the time now with the expansion and redirection to defend the u.s. and attacked the prc, respectively, is a bilateral enterprise between the united states and china. this is no longer just about taiwan. this is america's problem. the u.s. and china have become one another's primary planning
case. taiwan is a lesser included case, and the primary planning case is increasingly problematic. this is not deterministic, but the result of china's intransigence, and we should not hesitate to say so. the triangles politics. in the u.s., the fix is in. apparently, there is nothing that china can do to get us to change our view that china is in fact a strategic partner. economics hold sway, no matter what. that is job number one. as you know, their collections in jenny's kind of issues.
in the meantime, china is hardening. china is expanding its military. you saw was fishers -- you so with the earlier presentation, he could have put a lot up there with china's determination to make it clear that taiwan cannot be defended. finally, with regard to taiwan, i don't blame taipei, but taiwan is very ambivalent about its relationship with the united states. first, because of the recognition of course, and other things that happened earlier in the cold war, but also because american behavior has made it quite clear that the united states is going to do as little as possible. time as a factor. the hardening of china has come over time, and eventually this adds up to something. taiwan's isolation has become more drastic overtime. in another sense of time, the
military problem has been foreshortened. we are now in an era of the battle of the first. that means attention these kinds of conflicts could be over very quickly, if we are not very very well prepared. it is what some analysts in the pacific theater call short, sharp campaigns. the reality of geography as a determinant of strategy. i will have to step to the screen now for a minute. this is the map i grew up with. created by the dean of the us-japan alliance management. it depicts a geostrategic reality for the soviet union and the cold war in asia. this is literally cut and pasted, we used to put them on video graphs. in any case, jim came up with this. you can see how japan is the
cork in the soviet union's bottle in terms of getting out into the pacific. this is an updated view. if i can do this on google maps, anybody can. it points the same to illustrate the compelling geography of japan in this issue. but the third version, which amounts to the same geostrategic view, since the perspective to include the drc's broad ocean approaches, and taiwan, the philippines, vietnam and so on. the fourth you put -- the fourth view puts taiwan and its most appropriate military operational perspective as a key geostrategic aston. -- bastian. taiwan know this is incredibly important from a military perspective. any amount -- american military strategy in the asia-pacific must take into account the salience of taiwan. by clearly illustrating that --
taiwan's natural allies, and the next puts it into perspective with the prc's maritime salience. in broad military terms, what is happening now, and what is happening for some time, is that china is coming out to sea. this is what is going on. this is why it is such a kerfuffle in the asia-pacific. you can see, taiwan is in the middle of it. whoever holds taiwan will hold the rest of that salient, coming out into the pacific, that operational and strategic wedge. here's another view. the operational centrality of taiwan, right smack there. here is a view of taiwan's political geography, right in
the middle of the entire asia political complex. finally, here is a view of taiwan's geography with regards to the south china sea. taiwan has a key position on the northern flank of any maritime operation in the south china sea. is it any wonder beijing does not want us to look at these maps? you can see taiwan up there, completely thanking anything else that is going on in the south china sea. -- flanking anything going on in the south china sea. it helps to look at maps once in a while. american interests. first thing, i would take the humorous will rogers' advice. when you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. don't continue to make things worse. unfortunately, we do by, as ian described, politicizing the military relationship in a bad way with taiwan.
it would seem to me that we should understand what i just tried to show you on the maps, that taiwan's role in the bilateral sino u.s. competition, in a geographic ledge and political wedge, it is political because of taiwan's role as a viable alternative to the prc. legally, politically, and ideologically. lest we forget, japan is a committed participant. japan is the pig in the bacon and egg breakfast. taiwan's role in the competition is central. tokyo understands this completely and has a fairly robust, but necessarily, a different relationship with taiwan. the geography for japan is compelling. japanese territory and taiwan
are separated at the end of the ryukyus by 67 c miles. that's all. taiwan commands the flank of japanese territorial defense. there is no question in tokyo's perspective, that taiwan is necessary for strategic and operational continuity in any military confrontation, peaceful or operational, with beijing. and finally, five prescriptions. first, i think, and i've said it before here at hudson. extend this belief. think of necessary essential -- and china is waging political, legal psychological war with us as well as kinetic war because missiles across the strait is not a friendly act. so i think we have to do that
first and foremost. the second american interest is frankly, this war must never start. and the reason is because of what i referred to earlier, the implications for the end of civilization of nuclear cyber and space warfare. certainly civilization as we know it. this kind of thought should be familiar to those of you who are old cold warriors and we understood this quite clearly when only nuclear warfare was in this context during the nuclear cold war.
now we've tripled down on this issue and there is no policy in place for escalation deterrent or control. that means that the temptation to preempt, which is phenomenally strong in wars of the first salvo. next, i think we have to defend the salient they showed and you hold the line on the first island chain. that gives a clear operational direction to american, taiwanese and japanese commanders and i think in doing so we have to, first, if not foremost, we have to concentrate on defenses first and in the short term because if you can't defend yourself, even a good offense is pointless. so you have to be able to defend.
next, and defense is part of this -- we have to develop credible deterrents and advertise them. this doesn't do any good if it's in a safe in the u.s. strategic command some place and nobody knows about it, because deterrence is public property. it's a public good and the chinese have to understand that we would do and we, you and i, american citizens at least in this room have to sign up for it in advance. this is the way deterrence works. so, with regard to credible deterrence, war fighting to win, because in order to deter so you can prevent the war you have to be prepared and capable of winning it. escalation control as a primary objective and tool. planning for disruption in all of these things, because china is very good at it and
understands the power of disruptive capabilities. and building integrated strategies, doctrines and operational plans accordingly for when? to control escalation and fight under disruptive circumstances. and finally, back to taiwan, because i've tried to lay out why this is our problem, not taiwan's problem. alliances bring necessary mass and capability to a conflict. but there's no liability like an alliance liability if they're not strongly anchored. so i would recommend, number one, fortified cfisr. command control, computers, surveillance, reconnaissance, as a linchpin of deterrence. why?
because we're either going to hang together or hang separately, as our revolutionary forbearers said. second, i would restore taiwan's military credibility on the japan model. the japan model of military credibility does not include power projection and strike. and i think that's probably appropriate for taiwan. however, it's robust in every other way. -- mr. giarra: the japan model of military credibility does not include power projection and strike. and i think that's probably appropriate for taiwan. third, we're just starting to
see the beginning of this and i would recommend it as a general approach to reverse the cost benefit equation imposed by china on us. it's much more difficult to defend against missiles than it is to use missiles as an offensive capability but new defensive capabilities are coming out of organizations like the strategic capability office with high-velocity projectiles, rail guns and so on that will reverse that cost curve. and finally, like the roman senator who always ended his "carthage mustng be destroyed," i would recommend a u.s. assessment. thanks. i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> thank you, paul. you need to find a latin expression for your last short and pithy remark there. mr. giarra: history. >> right, ok. there are several questions i
would like to ask, but i see that we have 15 minutes left, so let's throw the floor open here or at least allow people on the floor to ask questions and then , if there aren't, then i'll ask questions. here. second row, please. and i'm sorry -- when you get the microphone, would you please tell us your name and if you work for an organization or represent one, tell us that also. thank you. >> my name is grace khan. i'm with the institute for korean american studies, and my question has to do with, to what extent does china's policy towards taiwan affect its policy towards north korea? in other words, how does north korea figure into this larger strategy? it looks, by looking at your